Transcriber’s Notes
Variations in hyphenation and accents have been
standardised but all other spelling and punctuation remains
unchanged, except as noted below.
Page 203 - Corrected “Parliamen” to “Parliament”
Page 216 - Corrected “PARLIAMLNT” to “PARLIAMENT”
Page 481 - Corrected “wa sno” to “was no”
Page 538 - Corrected “devoloping” to “developing”
Italics are represented thus _italic_, superscripts thus
y^n.
HISTORY OF ENGLAND
_L. VON RANKE_
London
MACMILLAN AND CO.
[Illustration: CLARENDON
OXFORD PRESS.]
_PUBLISHERS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF_
Oxford.
A
HISTORY OF ENGLAND
PRINCIPALLY
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
BY
LEOPOLD VON RANKE
VOLUME II
Oxford
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1875
[_All rights reserved_]
CONTENTS.
BOOK VI.
GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND WITHOUT THE PARLIAMENT.
TROUBLES IN SCOTLAND.
PAGE
CHAP. I. Peace with France and Spain 3
” II. Share of England in the events of the Thirty Years’
War 1630-1636 15
” III. Monarchical tendencies of the Home Government 31
Taxes levied without a grant of Parliament 33
Charles I’s relations with Catholicism 38
State of opinion in the Church of England at this time 45
Further designs of the Government 51
Public Affairs 54
” IV. Conflicting tendencies of the Age, and within the Kingdom
of Great Britain 59
” V. Origin and outbreak of Ecclesiastical Disturbances in
Scotland 71
” VI. The Scottish Covenant 88
” VII. Attempts at an accommodation. Independent Assembly
of the Church 105
BOOK VII.
CONNEXION BETWEEN THE TROUBLES IN SCOTLAND AND THOSE IN
ENGLAND AND ELSEWHERE.
PAGE
CHAP. I. Campaign of Charles I against Scotland 121
” II. Relations of the English Court with the Court and
Policy of France 138
” III. Relations of England with the army of Bernard of
Weimar and with the Spanish fleet under Oquendo 157
” IV. Renewed disturbances in Scotland 169
” V. Strafford and the Short Parliament 182
” VI. The Scots in England 199
BOOK VIII.
THE LONG PARLIAMENT AND THE KING, DOWN TO THE OUTBREAK OF
THE CIVIL WAR.
INTRODUCTION 215
CHAP. I. Summoning of the Parliament 216
” II. The first sittings of the Long Parliament 225
” III. Progress of aggressive tendencies in the Lower House.
Debates on Episcopacy 240
The Proceedings against Strafford 246
” IV. Attempt at a Reaction 253
” V. Parliamentary and popular agitation. Execution of
Strafford 264
” VI. Concessions and new demands 272
” VII. Charles I in Scotland 280
The Irish Rebellion 283
” VIII. Days of the Grand Remonstrance 290
” IX. Formation of a new Ministry. Tumultuous agitation
in the Capital 304
” X. Breach between the King and the Parliament 315
BOOK IX.
THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR, 1642-1646.
INTRODUCTION 335
CHAP. I. Origin of the Civil War 338
” II. The Campaigns of 1642 and 1643 362
” III. Fresh interference of the Scots. Campaign of 1644 383
” IV. Preponderance of the Scots. Reconstruction of the
English army 405
The Westminster Assembly 408
The Negotiations at Uxbridge 412
Dissensions in Parliament. The Self-denying Ordinance 415
” V. The Campaign of 1645 423
BOOK X.
INDEPENDENTS AND PRESBYTERIANS. FATE OF THE KING.
INTRODUCTION 447
CHAP. I. Flight of the King to the Scots 448
” II. Charles I at Newcastle 465
” III. The Parliament and Army at variance 480
” IV. Influence of the Agitators 495
” V. The so-called Second Civil War 511
” VI. Fall of the King 530
BOOK VI.
GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND WITHOUT THE PARLIAMENT. TROUBLES IN
SCOTLAND.
CHAPTER I.
PEACE WITH FRANCE AND SPAIN.
If we consider the embarrassment in which Charles I had
been involved by his conduct of the war, we are tempted to
assume that, in order to extricate himself from it, he must
have opened negotiations with the two great powers with
which he was at war whilst they were still at variance with
one another. This however was not the case.
Negotiations with France were opened at the instigation
of the powers combined to resist Spain, between which
an agreement had first been set on foot by James I, and
had been renewed by Buckingham. Those powers regarded
the breach between England and France as a misfortune,
which they must endeavour to obviate if they would carry
on the war against Austria and Spain with full vigour.
The Republic of Venice, which felt itself most seriously
threatened by these powers, made a great point of promoting
a reconciliation between France and England by the agency
of its ambassadors.
A few days before his unhappy end, Buckingham withdrew with
the Venetian ambassador, Aluise Contarini, into a retired
chamber in one of his country-houses, and there concerted
with him a letter of pacific import to his brother envoy
in France, for him to communicate to the French court[1].
While Buckingham was preparing to strike a blow, he still
hoped to procure from France tolerable conditions for the [A.D. 1629.]
besieged town of Rochelle. All other difficulties he
thought might then be removed in a couple of hours.
But Buckingham was assassinated. When the Venetians after
this event brought their negotiations before the King, who
as yet knew nothing about them, he even refused to hear
them. He quite recognised the necessity of finding some
arrangement: ‘I acknowledge all that,’ he said one day to
the ambassador; ‘but,’ he added, ‘I have arms in my hands,
not to negotiate, but to save the town. My honour is at
stake[2].’
Though Rochelle, as we have seen, failed to hold out,
the result cannot be ascribed to King Charles. After
Lindsay’s attempt to break through the mole had proved
unsuccessful--we do not quite know whether on account of
the superiority of the French, or from the above-mentioned
deficiencies on the side of the English--Charles I gave
orders to renew the attempt again, without any regard
to the danger to his ships, and not to retire from the
town whatever might be the cost[3]. On this the council
of war had in fact resolved to lead the ships against
the palisades by a way hitherto untried, when the town,
despairing of help and overpowered by unendurable
hardships, capitulated.
After the fall of Rochelle the Venetians resumed their
attempts at mediation with redoubled ardour. King Charles
was brought into a more favourable frame of mind by the
tolerable conditions granted to the town in regard to the
profession of religion, and by the evident impossibility of
doing anything effectual in France: and Contarini now found
him inclined to listen. But the ambassador was considerate
enough not to urge the King, after he had been beaten in
the strife, now to make overtures for its adjustment[4]:
the negotiations were left more than ever in the hands of
the Venetian ambassador in France, Zorzo Zorzi.
They were principally concerned with two points. The [A.D. 1629.]
French demanded above all the execution of the provisions
laid down in the marriage contract for the constitution
of the Queen’s household. Charles I not only refused to
revert to these, he even rejected the conditions which
he had consented to when Bassompierre was in England,
and which the French at that time did not accept. He
insisted that her court should continue as it was. He had
made other arrangements for filling the offices in the
household;--how could he take away their places again
from the English lords and ladies who were in possession
of them? He would not have any misunderstandings at his
court, in his house, and as he said plainly, in his
marriage bed. The Venetian ambassador in England remarked
that it would be disadvantageous to the Queen if these
demands were persisted in. And she herself also had already
begged that they should be dropped, on the ground that
she was satisfied with the present arrangements of her
court: she did not even think fit to write about them
to her mother[5]. However disagreeable it might be for
the Queen-mother herself, and for the zealous advocates
of the Church about her, her son and Cardinal Richelieu
sympathised with the point of view of Charles I, or else
they saw that he would not give it up: at all events
they contented themselves with stipulating that, if an
alteration in the court were necessary, they should
come to an amicable arrangement on the subject, to suit
the requirements of the Queen’s service[6]. Even these
words were merely accepted by the English in the avowed
expectation that they would never be used to disturb the
repose of the kingdom, or the mode of life of the King[7].
In brief, the execution of the former stipulations was
given up by the French. In this matter, which most nearly
concerned King Charles, he carried the day.
The second point affected the old connexion between the [A.D. 1629.]
English and the Huguenots. The former had hitherto claimed
to regulate through their intervention, and to fix by
compact, the relations between the French government and
the Reformed Churches. Buckingham had already been disposed
to drop this claim: and after the last turn which affairs
had taken, there could be no more thought of maintaining
it. The English plenipotentiaries were satisfied with a
general pardon bestowed on the Huguenots by the King of
France, reserving to them their Protestant worship. But the
English had wished that it should be indicated, if even by
the slightest expressions, that this concession was the
effect of the peace[8]. Not that it should be a condition
of the agreement, nor even that any interest in the result
should be ascribed to England, but something was to be said
about regard for peace as the foremost public good, and
about the joint action between the two nations which was
in immediate prospect. They thought that this was demanded
by their honour, and they would not at once renounce all
common feeling with the Calvinists. But the French returned
a decided refusal. True as it was that the concessions
that were vouchsafed to the Huguenots were based on the
necessity of a closer connexion with England and Holland,
which but for these could not have been agreed on, yet the
French would not allow any hint of this to be dropped. They
would have feared that occasion might thus be given for
interference at some future time: in any case the authority
of the government would have been damaged. The Venetian
ambassador in London makes a merit of inducing Charles I
finally to desist from this request. The principal reason
alleged by him in support of his advice was that not only
a question of religion, but an actual rebellion was here
concerned, inasmuch as the Huguenots had leagued with
Spain[9].
Thus was this peace concluded at Susa, April 1, 1629. In [A.D. 1629.]
estimating the historical relations of the two kingdoms
in general, great importance must be assigned to it. What
had been brought about in the times of the Normans and
Plantagenets, and once more during the great wars of the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries--I mean a most intimate
connexion of French and English interest--had, as it were,
repeated itself, although on a far smaller scale, during
the religious wars. In the times of Queen Elizabeth and
James I the French Reformed ranged themselves under the
influence of England: even in the time of Charles I this
had not ceased. On the other hand the French had sought
to establish a counteracting influence on their side,
especially by the late marriage contract. Neither of the
two governments profited by this. In the peace of Susa they
agreed to desist from this mutual action on one another.
The French resigned the literal fulfilment of the marriage
contract: the English renounced the connexion with the
Huguenots which had hitherto been acknowledged. Relations
into which religion entered could not be avoided, but the
political sting, so to speak, was taken out of them. In
France from that date the ascendancy of Catholicism could
more decidedly be erected into a principle of the state:
in England the court once more asserted its Protestant
character.
For the moment the result of the peace was to untie the
hands of France for the conflict with Spain. Every one
knows what vast dimensions this assumed: it set fresh
enmity between the parts of the world of that day which
it rent asunder, and laid the foundation of the state of
affairs which prevailed in the following epoch.
While France carried her arms into Italy, in order to force
back the Spanish influence there, the King of England was
to direct his forces to North Germany, in order to check
the spreading power of the Emperor and the League. Maritime
affairs at that time principally attracted the general
attention. Wallenstein advanced a claim to sovereignty
over the Baltic, but at the same time he intended to
hold the ports of the German Ocean and the mouth of the
Elbe in behalf of the Empire: and a combination between
the Hanseatic shipping and the Spanish naval power was [A.D. 1629.]
contemplated. Roused by this unexpected danger, the Kings
of Sweden and Denmark held a conference in February 1629
on the confines of the province of Halland, and united to
defend the ‘Regalia of the northern crowns on the Baltic
sea[10].’ The Danish ambassador exerted himself most
zealously to kindle the sympathies of the Dutch and English
also. And in fact the King of England, in transmitting the
official notification of the peace with France, announced
to the States-General that he had sent a squadron under
Pennington and Colonel Mackay to the Elbe in order to
encourage the King of Denmark[11], and he invited the Dutch
likewise to support him. A short time before, Colonel
Morgan with another considerable body of troops, among whom
were newly enlisted French and Scots, had started from the
islands of Sylt and Föhr and made an attack upon the troops
of the Empire and of Gottorp at Nordstrand. But at this
moment, when a new coalition embracing the South, West,
and North of Europe, was again just about to be formed to
check the advance of the house of Austria, Denmark, which
was to have been supported in the first instance, came to
an agreement with that power. In the beginning of June, at
Lübeck, King Christian IV renounced his operations against
the German empire; but in return he received back without
loss of a foot of land his possessions in Holstein and
Jutland, the greater part of which was in the hands of the
enemy. If we ask what induced the Imperialists to make so
extensive a concession, it was no doubt anxiety about that
maritime coalition, for which great exertions were being
made at Copenhagen. Even without this aid the Danish fleet
was able to defend itself with much more success than
the army: the Imperial and German navies, with all their
combined force, were still far from being a match for it.
The generals were afraid of reverses, and of a mischievous [A.D. 1629.]
action of the Danish fleet upon the coast towns of which
they had taken possession, and upon the German empire in
general[12]. Charles I had just sent one of his ablest and
most zealous diplomatists, Thomas Roe, a particular friend
of his sister the Electress Palatine, to Hamburg, in order
to bring about a northern alliance between the two kings,
the Republic, and the Hanse towns[13]. He hoped still to
delay the ratification of the treaty between Denmark and
Austria, and to make it abortive. But all was in vain; the
peace was far too advantageous to Denmark for the Danish
councillors to give it up again.
Upon this most of the adversaries of Austria and Spain,
even those in Italy, directed their gaze to the King of
Sweden. The forces of the Emperor, which were no longer
engaged with Denmark, were now twice as dangerous to him,
and he appeared quite ready to take up arms if he should
be supported by France and England. Cardinal Richelieu
showed an inclination, if England would send a fleet to
sea against Spain, to furnish a third of the vessels, and
to make common cause in general with that power: he only
wished that the undertaking should be carried out in the
name of England. But the withdrawal of Denmark had quite
a different effect upon the King of England, to whom the
preservation of his uncle had supplied a motive for taking
arms: he inclined on the contrary to follow the example
set him by that prince. The Lord Treasurer Weston, who had
to provide the money, looked upon the Danish peace as a
relief: he breathed more freely when it had been concluded;
for after the unhappy results of the last Parliament the
want of money was so sorely felt by the government, that
no one reckoned upon their fulfilling their engagements,
and they themselves would undertake none. And such great
injury had been inflicted on trade by the war, that the [A.D. 1629.]
whole people cried out not only for peace with France, but
also, just as loudly, for peace with Spain[14].
Under these circumstances Peter Paul Rubens, the painter,
arrived in London bearing proposals from the court of
Spain. The painter was also a clever diplomatist; his art
served to cloak his missions. Two years before he had had
an interview with Balthasar Gerbier, a skilful miniature
painter, also a native of Antwerp, who had been employed
by Buckingham on secret business: they had conferred at
Delft in July 1627 on the establishment of peace between
England and Spain. Rubens belonged to the court of the
Infanta Isabella, and had made communications to her on the
subject, but was reluctant to send his papers to Spain[15];
and besides, no one, he said, would have been able to
extract information from them. He was therefore summoned
to Spain in person, and was sent to England charged with
overtures of peace on the basis of the plans sketched out.
Extremely remarkable were the overtures which Rubens made.
Although the estrangement between England and Spain had
grown out of the affair of the Palatinate, Rubens made
no attempt to settle this: he declared, on the contrary,
that it was not in the power of Philip IV to restore the
Palatinate to its former owner; that he would gladly set
about it, but that it was dependent mainly on the Emperor
and the Elector of Bavaria. Rubens however saw in this
disagreement no absolute hindrance to the renewal of
friendly relations, especially in regard to commerce, nor
to the return of the ambassador of either power to the
court of the other: he thought that the two governments
must only abstain from framing new articles, and revert
to the peace which King James had concluded with Spain at
the very beginning of his reign, and which left several
important controversies unsettled; that in the same way
at this time the affair of the Elector Palatine, and [A.D. 1629.]
even of the Dutch, might remain untouched; that Charles
I need not give up either the one or the other, and yet
might maintain peace with the Spaniards[16]. From our
knowledge of this prince, these proposals, especially after
the conclusion of the Danish peace, must have been most
welcome to him. He also had now a freer prospect. Almost at
the first moment when the arrival of the French ambassador
was talked of in the Queen’s presence, he had said to her
that in the course of the year she might see the arrival
of another from Spain. She answered, for she was not yet
of his opinion, that he must only take care that no one
deceived him afresh.
The world was already prepared for negotiations with Spain.
The Venetians had so zealously promoted the arrangement
with France, principally in order to anticipate them.
People saw those persons again appear at court who were
thought to favour Spain, and had been obliged to retire
when Buckingham’s ascendancy was established. To men’s
astonishment, Lord Bristol, once the great antagonist of
Buckingham, now on the contrary himself acquired influence
over the King. The Earl of Arundel, of the house of Howard,
resumed his former place in the Privy Council. Closely
allied with these men was the Lord Treasurer Weston, who
principally exerted himself to save money with the object
of relieving the King from the necessity of reassembling
Parliament: it was owing to him that dissensions at home
furnished a real motive for peace abroad. Weston himself,
and Cottington, who was regarded as a staunch adherent
of Spain, and who professed Catholicism with hardly any
disguise, were selected to confer with Rubens; and that to
the exclusion of the other members of the Privy Council,
even of the Secretaries of State. Before the end of July
they had made such progress that the matter could be laid
before the Privy Council[17]. The King loved to sit in
council: but on important questions he expressed his [A.D. 1630.]
opinion so decidedly, that no one ventured to contradict
him. Thus on the present occasion also he gave Weston’s
scheme his unqualified approval. Cottington, much to the
annoyance of the French, set out for Spain: while on the
part of Spain, Don Carlos Coloma, one of the Infanta
Isabella’s most trusty ministers--for a subordinate would
not have been thought of--was appointed ambassador in
England. Coloma was an old friend of Weston; and it is
supposed that the basis of an agreement had been concerted
between them beforehand[18].
In the negotiations however the question of the
Palatinate presented a great obstacle; for King Charles
and his ministers sometimes seemed unwilling to come to
a conclusion unless the Spaniards undertook a formal
obligation with regard to it. But the latter rejected
conditions by which they would very likely have even
been compelled to go to war with Austria and the Elector
of Bavaria, and that at a time when peace had not been
concluded between Spain and France[19]. Looking to the
existing state of affairs in Europe, they refused to
give up the fortresses that were so extremely important
strategically, and which in that case might easily have
fallen into the hands of others who were hostile to them.
They adhered to a view of the situation fundamentally the
same as that which had moved the King to break with them
in the first years of his reign. But the lofty courage of
that period had now abandoned him: he now dispensed with
a stipulation like that which he had then demanded, and
contented himself with a simple promise that satisfaction
would be given him in the affair of the Palatinate. At the
signature of the peace, an assurance of Philip IV on this [A.D. 1630.]
subject, written with his own hand, was solemnly delivered
to him by Don Carlos Coloma[20].
And already there were indications that the Spanish
influence might possibly this time produce more effect
on the Emperor than before. The Emperor allowed a
plenipotentiary from the Elector, whom he had laid under
the ban, to appear at Ratisbon; and he showed a disposition
to withdraw the ban and to allow the expelled sovereign an
income out of the revenues of the country. Notwithstanding
these offers the restoration of his territory was still
very far off. Charles said to his sister, the Queen of
Bohemia, that the agreement was a remedy which could do
no harm, even if it did no good; that he acquired thereby
a right to the co-operation of the King of Spain; that
moreover he was taking steps to conclude a defensive and
offensive league with France and the States-General for the
restoration of the Palatinate, but that unhappily he did
not find these powers so willing as he had expected[21]. We
know from Queen Elizabeth’s letters that she was calmed by
these assurances[22].
The States-General had again rejected the proposals of the
Spaniards for a peaceful arrangement, which in themselves
were not acceptable; for they feared to endanger their
existing government. The treaty of 1630 therefore caused
them certainly not less uneasiness than that of 1604 had
done. Charles I repeated to them assurances similar to
those which were then made, that his alliance with them, as
far as their state and religion were concerned, should not
be prejudiced on that account.
It was the wish of Charles I to revert to the policy of
his father. Experience had taught him that he could no
longer advance in the path on which he had entered while [A.D. 1630.]
still Prince of Wales, and which he had continued to
follow after he became King. He had plunged himself into
the gravest political embarrassments; and, although the
hostility between Crown and Parliament had long been
threatening, he had caused the first open outbreak. He now
wished to establish tolerably good relations with both the
two neighbouring powers alike. With France he felt himself
more intimately connected in the great affairs of Europe,
and he took good care not to loosen this tie: he did not
drop the cause of the Elector Palatine; but he wished at
the same time to open commercial intercourse between his
country and the extensive and wealthy provinces of the
Spanish monarchy. When Cottington returned home from his
embassy, he had the silver brought by the ship in which he
came laid upon wagons, and carried in a sort of procession
through the town. For he intended the inhabitants to be
impressed by the opulence of the country, the commerce of
which was reopened to them by the treaty just concluded.
Charles I shrank from bringing his whole strength to bear
upon the great questions of religion and politics which
engrossed the continent, that he might above all be the
King of Great Britain. We may certainly ask whether he was
morally entitled to renounce his connexion with European
affairs after he had contributed so largely to increase
the existing confusion, and to bring the Protestant cause
to destruction. And moreover such a severance was hardly
possible any longer. Religious and political sympathies
and conflicting tendencies had become so strong on the
continent of Europe, that in one form or another they could
not fail to react upon Great Britain as well.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Aluise Contarini, 20 Agosto 1628: ‘Essendo trattenuto
ben quatro hore a disputar, risolver et adomesticar il
negotio: sempre coll’ assistenza di Carleton che in questo
fatto si è portato egregiamente.’
[2] ‘Tutto è vero, ma il mio honor importa più.’
[3] ‘That they should hazard for the relief of the town all
his ships, that he purposed not to have it left re infecta,
whatever it might cost.’ Mead to Stuteville, in Ellis iii.
269.
[4] Contarini, Nov. 18. ‘Non può con doppio dishonore et
parlare et perdere.’
[5] Contarini to Zorzi: ‘Mi manda a dire in molta
confidenza che non vorrebbe disgustar il re interessandosi
troppo in questo affare.’
[6] ‘S’il y a quelque chose à ajouter ou à diminuer, se
fera de part et d’autre de gré à gré.’ Traité de paix fait
à Suze, 24 Avril 1629, Art. iv. Dumont v. ii. 580.
[7] Zorzi to Contarini, Jan. 20, 1629: ‘Che la Francia non
vorrebbe servirsene, che da sola apparenza senza sturbar il
riposo del re et il gusto degli Inglesi.’
[8] Contarini to Zorzi, Nov. 21: ‘Questo parte (l’Inglese)
piu non insiste d’esserne direttrice--punto grande
guadagnatosi--ma vederebbe volentieri che Ugonotti non si
dolessero da lei che li havesse abbandonati et il re vi ha
riflesso.’
[9] A. Contarini designates this view as ‘la massima con
la quale credo d’ haver portato questo negocio.’ (8 Giugno
1629).
[10] Cp. Slange ii. 1. 378. Schlegel’s doubts are done
away by the news which Anstruther gave to England about
the ‘abboccamento seguito tra il re di Danimarca e Suecia,
et i buoni concerti stabiliti tra loro per difesa del mar
Baltico.’ Dispaccio Veneto 1 Mayo, 1629.
[11] Aitzema: Saken van staet en orloogh i. 243. Contarini
avers that the squadron, consisting of five ships, had gone
in the direction of the Elbe.
[12] ‘Istis locis nullam esse classem, deesse navigia,
quibus bellum mari possit sustineri,--Danis in promtu esse
classem quam indies Sueci, Angli, Batavi novis augeant
subsidiis.’ Extract from the report of the Generals in
Adlzreiter, Ann. Boici iii. 1821.
[13] Contarini, 29 Giugno: ‘Per unir seco con qualche buon
concerto tutto questo settentrione.’
[14] Contarini, 2 Giugno 1628: ‘La pace gridata a piena
bocca dei popoli o con Francia o con Spagna o con tutti,
rispetto al commercio.’
[15] ‘Je ne doute pas, que Rubens n’ait declaré nettement
ce que Gerbier lui a proposé.’ Lettre de l’Infante 1628,
31 Mai (Gachet, Lettres de Rubens); so that it seems as if
people in Spain had doubts about it.
[16] ‘Che si confermi semplicemente l’ultima pace fatta col
re Giacomo, lasciando il negotio del palatinato vergine
senza parlarne, admettendosi nel resto in quel trattato
l’assistenza a stati et altri amici di questa corona.’
Contarini (here our principal authority), 20 Luglio 1629.
[17] According to Contarini (Aug. 3) we must date the
decisive meeting of the Privy Council on July 19/29, 1629.
[18] There is an order to the vice-admirals extant, dated
March 8, 1630, in which they are admonished to allow no
rudeness or insolence to be shown to the ambassador of the
King of Spain, who was expected to arrive shortly. Bruce,
Calendar of State Papers 1630, No. 50.
[19] Contarini gives us part of the contents of a note of
Coloma to the King of England: ‘Pienissima attestatione che
nel cattolico sia vivo e cordiale desiderio de sodisfare al
re della Gran Brettagne in tutto quello pin si possj--che
per ridurre in stato di riuscita il negotio della
restitutione del palatinato sia necessario che prima di
tutte le cose segua la pace tra le due corone nella quale
debbe esser incluse il principe Palatino.’ (26 Aprile 1630).
[20] ‘A writing under the King of Spain’s own hand and
seal, promising never to take off his hand from that
negotiation, until the King our master should have entire
satisfaction touching the restitution.’ Windebank to Aston,
in the Clarendon State Papers i. 780.
[21] Letter from the King to the Queen. Rushworth ii. 61.
[22] ‘Though I am not much rejoiced at it, yet I am so
confident on my dear brother’s love and the promise he
hath made me not to forsake our cause, that it troubles me
the less.’ (Elizabeth to Carlisle, June 1630, in Green’s
Princesses of England v. 482).
CHAPTER II.
SHARE OF ENGLAND IN THE EVENTS OF THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR,
1630-1636.
Charles I had told his sister that the conclusion of peace
with Spain did not hinder him from forming an alliance with
Sweden. And in fact, in the summer of 1630, as soon as
Gustavus Adolphus appeared in Germany, we find one of the
principal nobles of Scotland, James Marquess of Hamilton,
collecting English and Scottish levies with the support of
the King, who handed over to him the proceeds of a Scottish
tax for that purpose. One part of this force embarked at
Leith, the other at Yarmouth; and towards the end of July
1631 they landed at Usedom, as Gustavus Adolphus had done
a year before. The English have always affirmed that the
arrival of Hamilton with a considerable body of troops
contributed materially to the decided successes of this
year of the war. And with good reason; for they gave the
Protestant princes greater confidence in their cause and
made the Emperor anxious for his territory of Bohemia.
Hamilton was one of those personages of high rank who
gave themselves up to the cause of the Queen of Bohemia
with chivalrous devotion. While the King of Sweden was
pressing forward into Saxony to try his strength against
the arms of the League, Hamilton guarded the passage of
the Oder to provide for the possible contingency of a
retreat: but after the decisive battle at Breitenfeld,
not far from Leipsic, he turned his steps to Lusatia and
Silesia. How advantageous would King Charles have found it
for his purpose, which he thought to promote by combining
Spanish influence and warlike demonstrations in support of [A.D. 1631.]
it, if he had been able to offer places in Silesia in
exchange for those in the Palatinate! Hamilton had taken
Guben, and was on the way to Glogau, when Gustavus
Adolphus, chiefly out of regard to Saxony, gave him orders
to turn aside towards the Elbe to besiege Magdeburg.
Hamilton looked upon this as an intentional injury done
to Queen Elizabeth and her consort. As the King of Sweden
was advancing into West Germany without a check, Hamilton
hurried after him, hoping to be put at the head of a
separate division, and charged with the reconquest of
the Palatinate. But the number of the Scots and English
had already melted away to a great extent, owing to the
unhealthiness of the climate and to their marches through
a devastated country: they were besides at variance among
themselves, so that he now threw no weight into the scale.
It was intimated to him that every one knew quite well that
he was not prosecuting his own cause, but that of the King
of England: but that no one would help him to attain his
party-end by these means.
Gustavus Adolphus was convinced that the enemy would not
be able to drive him out of Germany. He was more afraid of
the coldness and jealousy of his allies, who could easily
undermine his authority[23]: and he looked upon Charles I
as one of them.
At Frankfort on the Main Henry Vane presented himself
before Gustavus Adolphus as ambassador of the King of
England, in order to invite him to restore the Elector
Palatine to his country. The King of Sweden made various
objections, founded on his relations with France, which was
again showing much regard for the Catholic princes; but
he principally urged the request that King Charles should
break with Spain[24]. People feared that whenever the King
of England saw his brother-in-law restored, he would throw
himself entirely on the side of the Spaniards. If, as
Charles I said, his relations were such that an agreement
with Spain did not prevent him from forming a connexion
with Sweden, they yet involved the consequence that this [A.D. 1632.]
was never very close; for Sweden was allied with France,
whose interests ran exactly counter to those of Spain.
Gustavus Adolphus saw with pleasure that the Elector
Frederick, with the support of the States-General, of the
Prince of Orange and the King of England, joined his camp
and followed it for a time. Frederick was present when
Gustavus Adolphus conquered Kreuznach, formerly one of his
towns; and it appears possible that the reviving affection
of his subjects contributed to the result. A couple of
English regiments were also engaged here[25], and Frederick
welcomed them with satisfaction. He attended the King on
his victorious march to the Lech and into Bavaria; every
word the King uttered strengthened his hopes of returning
in a short time to his country as sovereign. But when he
now desired to come forward on his own account and to arm,
Gustavus Adolphus would not accede to his wish. He gave him
to understand that this would interfere with the success of
his own enlistments. The King even hesitated to replace in
his hands the government of those circles of the Palatinate
which had been reconquered; at all events he annexed to
his consent the condition that the Lutherans should be
allowed free profession of their faith. Everything led
men to expect that if he wrested from the Spaniards the
two strongholds which they still retained, he would keep
them for a time in his own hands. Even in this moment of
apparent success Frederick endured hours of sadness and
heavy sorrow of heart. He once with tears in his eyes told
Hamilton and Vere that he had rather be out of the world
than obliged to submit to the conditions imposed by Sweden.
In October 1632 Frederick returned to his country. But in
what a plight did he find it on his return! Oppenheim,
where he wished to take up his residence, was half burnt
down; the houses that were left standing had no bolts or
bars, no doors or windows. To avoid being carried off by
the first active bands of marauders, he set out for Mainz;
but a pestilent sickness was raging there; he was attacked
by it and perished, far from his wife and children. He had [A.D. 1633.]
paid for the short possession of a throne, which his
own unassisted strength was too weak to maintain, by
a fugitive’s life, in which many yielded him their
sympathies, but none the help of which he stood in need.
At that time his death was hardly remarked, in presence of
the great loss which the whole Protestant cause and the
world in general experienced when the King of Sweden fell
on the battle-field of Lützen.
The two events exercised a concurrent influence upon
England. King Charles, after his brother-in-law’s death,
regarded it as his duty to identify his nephew’s cause
still more closely with his own. The death of the King of
Sweden made his task easier, inasmuch as the strong will,
which had hitherto controlled every design, had now ceased
to act. Charles I now immediately invited the Protestant
sovereigns of Germany to carry on the war, by which the
Palatinate was to be restored; and in return he offered to
continue to them the subsidies which he had contributed
to the King of Sweden. And Chancellor Oxenstiern, who
guided the Swedish policy, had weighty reasons himself for
respecting the interests of the Palatinate, as they were
linked not only with so many others in the Empire, but with
those of the Netherlands besides, and just now with those
of Great Britain[26]. In May 1633, at the convention of
Heilbronn, where the English ambassador Anstruther appeared
among others, the cause of the Palatinate received more
consideration than it ever had before. Electoral rank was
conceded for the first time to the plenipotentiary of the
Palsgrave Louis Philip, who came forward as administrator
of the Palatinate in the name of the Elector Charles Louis,
who was still a minor. The Chancellor of Sweden promised
them the restoration of the whole country, so far as it
was in Swedish hands: and in the Consilium formatum,
which it was determined at Heilbronn to set up, to act in
conjunction with him, the Palatinate occupied the first
place. In return the administrator granted the restoration
of the Lutheran faith: he left Mannheim, as well as other [A.D. 1633.]
important places, in the hands of Sweden for the time, and
made himself answerable for the payment of 60,000 reichs
thalers. These however the English ambassador undertook to
furnish; and in fact we find that immediately after this
time £15,000, which at that time was about equal to the sum
stipulated, was despatched to Germany. The King and Weston
were well pleased that England was not named in the treaty,
nor pledged to further advances[27]. They now thought it
preferable to leave the matter alone.
But the help of England could not but be often claimed
hereafter in aid of this cause.
In the summer of 1633 there was much talk of invoking the
sympathies of the English nation in behalf of the widowed
Queen Elizabeth and her children. Her friends flattered
themselves that half a million thalers might be raised by
voluntary contributions; and Nethersole, one of the Queen’s
most trusty friends, was in the country to conduct the
transaction, which was to be carried out in the name of the
Princess and of the King. But it was soon perceived that
the nation was not so forward as had been expected; for it
saw in this scheme an attempt to evade the necessity of a
Parliamentary grant. In order to meet this suspicion the
sketch of a proclamation was laid before the King, in which
the remark was made that he would measure the loyalty of
his people by the amount of their voluntary contributions,
and would be the more ready to seek their help in another
way when the time for this should have arrived[28]. But
this clause displeased the King, because it contained a
promise which he was reluctant to give, that Parliament
should be summoned; and he struck it out with his own
hand[29]. On this the whole project fell to the ground, for
without an assurance of this sort the Queen’s friends had
no hope of effecting anything.
Towards the end of the year 1633 there was a moment [A.D. 1634.]
when the Emperor again obtained advantages on the Upper
Rhine; and the attention of King Charles was called to
the inability of the territory of the Palatinate to
resist even a feeble attack from the side of Alsace. The
administrator asked for only a small force of 6000 infantry
and 1000 cavalry, which after it was once raised might be
kept in pay for £6000 a month. The Queen of Bohemia, the
States-General, and the French ambassador united their
requests with his; the Chancellor of Sweden sent his son
over to recommend the King most strongly to accede to
them: but the King and his treasurer shrank from a new and
regular outlay, which in the present instance was sure to
entail much other expenditure. At last they raised 100,000
thalers for Germany, and sent the administrator a gold
chain in order to keep him in a good humour: but they could
not be moved to undertake an obligation which could lead to
the assembling of Parliament.
We should remark however that they were withheld from
decisive action, not only by want of money and by fees of
Parliament, but also by general political considerations as
well.
In the last few years, since the leading of the King of
Sweden in Germany, the importance and power of the French
had immeasurably increased. They had the Protestant
interest in Germany on their side, and they already
exercised a decisive influence on the Catholics also. In
all their proceedings it was seen that, notwithstanding
the advantages which they won, their allies derived no
benefit, but that on the contrary they only endeavoured to
make their own position so strong in order to be raised
above all need of considering the interests of other
powers. Only one other state, Holland, raised itself side
by side with them to daily-increasing importance. Just at
that time the Dutch had thrown their English rivals into
the shade: they had founded their East Indian empire, they
had established a footing in Brazil, they had captured in
the West Indian waters the Spanish register-ships which
went from Mexico to Havanna with all their rich cargo--an
achievement which the English had so often attempted in [A.D. 1635.]
vain; and in their domestic waters, in the narrow channel
of the Slaak, they had annihilated the fleet of the Infanta
Isabella which was sailing to attack them. In consequence
of this they also became masters of the neighbouring seas.
They did not hesitate to seek out ships under the Spanish
flag, especially those of Dunkirk, in English ports, or
in English waters, and to take them across to Holland as
their lawful prize. And even on land at that time they
achieved important results. By the successful surprise of
Wesel they not only again secured their own frontier, but
once more infused some portion of vital power into that
principality on the Rhine, which had been formerly founded
there by Brandenburg in conjunction with England, but which
certainly required a longer time for its development. The
sieges of Bois-le-duc and Maastricht, notwithstanding
so many other great events, riveted at that time the
attention of Europe. The success of the Dutch in these two
enterprises appeared a proof of their general superiority;
the provinces of the Spanish Netherlands were much
straitened by it. And as it revived in those provinces the
hereditary feeling of dislike to a foreign rule, Holland
and France on their part might well think of availing
themselves of this dissatisfaction, and of putting an end
for ever by a sudden attack to the rule of Spain.
It is quite plain how great a blow the English would have
sustained if the whole coasts of this part of the continent
had fallen into the hands of these two neighbours, whose
close alliance was in itself very offensive to them[30].
Against the danger of being entangled in continental
affairs, and of feeling their reflex action in Great
Britain, Charles I had to set off the other danger, if
he held aloof from them, of seeing new powers develop
during their progress, which might make his position most
critical. In order to acquire the means of resisting the
ascendancy of France and Holland, he was obliged to make
fresh advances to Spain.
We can hardly form an idea for ourselves how much the
relations between England and Spain changed and shifted [A.D. 1634.]
in the great conflict which was going on. In the year 1631
a scheme was drawn up for a great attack of the English and
Spaniards upon the United Netherlands, as a result of which
Zealand should fall to the lot of the former. As yet indeed
there was no treaty, but only a plan sketched out for
further consideration, which Charles I avoided accepting,
although Cottington seems to have approved of it[31]. But
we see at all events to what the aim of the Spaniards was
directed. After a short time, when they found themselves
deceived, they entertained designs of an entirely opposite
character. A detailed plan of Count Olivarez is extant,
according to which Spain and France were to undertake
a general attack upon England[32]. England, Scotland,
and Ireland, were each to be attacked separately, and
internal animosities of every kind were to be invoked in
aid of the invaders. An idea was entertained of placing
the young Elector Palatine on the throne of England,
under the condition that he guaranteed full religious
liberty and restored the expelled Irish to their lost
inheritance. On the other hand, in the summer of 1634 an
alliance between Spain and England was again in progress.
Weston, Cottington, and Windebank, took counsel with the
Spanish resident, Don Juan Nicolalde, for this object,
in such entire secrecy that even Coke, the Secretary of
State, had no information about it. The King besought the
court of Brussels, which on this occasion as on others he
was obliged to take into his confidence, to apply to no
one about this matter except himself and Windebank. The
overtures which he made to Spain at that time are accounted
for by the ascendancy of the Dutch marine and the rise
of that of the French. The claim of England to exercise
a sort of supremacy over the neighbouring seas, was once
more called in question. The English contended for this
right in learned treatises[33]; the King of France on the [A.D. 1635.]
other hand showed a determination no longer to acknowledge
it. For, as his ambassador said, everything must have its
foundation in reason; the usage of the sea only required
that the less powerful should show honour to the more
powerful; even England could have no other claim: and what
would happen if the relative power of different states
varied? The English would not entertain this supposition,
for they clung to the principle that their navy must have
the superiority over that of all their neighbours[34], for
this reason, if for no other, that, if it had not, their
neighbours could throw a far superior army on the shores
of England. And another principle was asserted at that
time, which did not find full acceptance until a quarter
of a century later, viz. that there must be an equilibrium
between the European powers; for fears were already felt
lest France should become supreme by sea as well as on
land[35]. Moreover King Charles was implored by English
merchants to protect them against the insults to which
they were exposed, while he was not even in a condition to
give effect to his ordinances, e.g. those which concerned
the fisheries: he therefore cherished the ardent wish to
be able again to show himself strong by sea; it was to a
Spanish loan that he looked for the requisite means. For
even in reference to this object he was cramped by his
misunderstanding with Parliament. We shall see hereafter
how fatal to the development of domestic affairs were the
measures which Charles I was induced to adopt in order to
attain this end. Certainly Spain, fully occupied by the war
in Germany, and threatened just now by a French war in the
Netherlands, could not give him the assistance he desired.
But even though no subsidy was forthcoming, yet at all
events a common tie of interest between England and Spain
again grew out of the situation of affairs.
And this necessarily produced its effect on the treatment [A.D. 1636.]
of the controversy about the Palatinate. For, if in the
general conduct of affairs the King was inclined to favour
Spain, how was it to be expected that in the affairs of
Germany he would with all his heart support the allies of
the French, whose ascendancy he was already beginning to
fear? The relation in which England thus stood had already
at times been advantageous to the Palatine dominions. After
the battle of Nordlingen, which restored to the Imperial
arms their superiority in Upper Germany, those districts
had had some mercy shown them, at least for a while,
owing to this consideration; though on other occasions
it was completely lost sight of. In England an intention
was cherished of supporting the young Elector with the
whole weight of the British name, when in January 1636, on
entering his eighteenth year, the time should come for him
to claim his hereditary rank and position; for whatever
guilt the father had incurred, they thought that it could
not be imputed to his children. In this matter the King
had reckoned on the good offices of Spain, and on the
favour of the Emperor. Then came the news of the treaty
of Prague, the fulfilment of which was based upon a new
dynastic connexion between the whole house of Austria and
Bavaria, and upon the concurrence of the Elector of Saxony.
The former stipulations made in favour of Bavaria with
regard to the Elector’s dignity, and the dominions of the
Palatinate were therein expressly confirmed: the sister of
Charles was promised her personal property, and his nephews
a maintenance proportioned to their rank so long as they
submitted; but these concessions were granted as a favour
and not as a right[36]. These tidings produced on Charles I
an impression of the most painful surprise; he would hardly
believe them: but he thought that, if they were true, every
effort must be made to cancel the agreement. Now too, very
much as in the year 1623, the Stuart policy depended on
the conclusion of an agreement with Austria and Spain.
Instructions of this import were given to Lord Aston, who [A.D. 1636.]
went as envoy to Madrid: and John Taylor, an agent who was
not without experience in these transactions, was sent by
Charles to Vienna to protest against the provisions of the
treaty, and to bring the Emperor to another determination.
Taylor was one of those diplomatists who find their whole
happiness in the success of the mission committed to them:
who accept as perfectly genuine all the overtures made
to them in regard to this object by foreign courts; and
therefore try to induce their own government to accept
them. In Vienna he fell in with John Leslie, one of the
agents in the murder of Wallenstein, who at that time was
in high favour with the court, and who introduced Taylor
at the different princely houses and procured him a good
reception there. They both thought the alliance of Charles
I with the house of Austria the only hope for the world.
How glorious, they thought, would be the position of this
monarch: he would then be the most powerful of European
sovereigns. The Jesuits had already on one occasion, in
a play performed at their seminary at Prague, celebrated
King Charles as the restorer of universal peace. And how
could the Imperial court itself fail to be sensible of
the advantageous prospect held out to them by a connexion
with England? On the 24th of February, 1636, the Emperor
declared that he would free the Count Palatine, Charles
Louis, if he made proper submission, from the ban under
which he had been laid owing to his father’s guilt; that he
would again receive him among the Princes of the Empire,
and enfcoff him with no mean portion of his father’s
possessions: that if negotiations about the electoral
dignity were then opened, he would give proof of his
favourable disposition to the King, as well as to the young
Prince, conceding everything which could be granted to
them under fair conditions[37]. These were well-considered
words, which made no promise but held out all the greater [A.D. 1636.]
hopes. Taylor interpreted them to mean that the Lower
Palatinate on both sides of the Rhine would be restored at
once; that negotiations about the Upper Palatinate would
be set on foot, and that the dignity of Elector would be
transferred to the young Palsgrave after the death of
the Elector of Bavaria. He reported that Charles I would
receive an assurance on the subject in writing from the
Emperor, and his son the King of Hungary, and also from
the King of Spain; and that the young Prince would be
married to an archduchess, and become greater that any
Elector Palatine had ever been. He said that the Queen of
Hungary, to whom Charles had once paid court in Spain,
had not yet forgotten him, and that the old Elector of
Bavaria was derided by her court; that it was intended to
restore the old Burgundian alliance between the two houses;
that even the Spanish ambassador Oñate, who was at first
less favourable to the plan, had said that Spain wished
for the friendship of the King of England, not in part
but altogether, and only hoped that he would renew his
ancestors’ claims on France[38].
In England, Taylor’s ardour had never been approved; but
the affair seemed to have reached a point at which further
negotiations might be committed to one of the magnates of
the kingdom, Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel and Surrey,
Earl Marshal of England, whom the King had once rightly
styled the most distinguished of his subjects[39]. From the
statements of the Secretary employed in these affairs, it
is clear that Charles would have been quite contented with
such terms as might be hoped from the tenor of Taylor’s
despatches. In June 1636 we find Arundel at Linz, where at
that time the Emperor had arrived on his way to the meeting
of the Electors, which was to be held at Ratisbon, for the
choice of his successor.
But a very unexpected difficulty showed itself at once.
The full powers entrusted to the Imperial commissioners [A.D. 1636.]
appointed to negotiate with Arundel, rested on the
assumption that an offensive and defensive alliance would
be concluded between England and the house of Austria.
Arundel was one of those statesmen who were generally
considered to favour Spain; but he was haughty and
measured, and had neither inclination nor authority to
form so close an alliance. England wished to conclude a
treaty with both lines of the house of Austria as secretly
as possible, in order to be able on the one hand to offer
resistance to the French by sea, and on the other to
promote the interest of the Elector Palatine: but she did
not desire to plunge into open war with Holland and France.
The Imperial ministers referred to Taylor’s overtures; but
the latter proved that he had spoken, officially at least,
only of an intimate understanding, and not of an offensive
and defensive alliance[40]. Arundel remarked, that the
understanding could only be of such a character that all
other sovereigns also might be admitted into it. He was out
of humour that the other side should have intended to lead
him unperceived further than his King thought of going.
Although this beginning certainly argued no good, the
negotiations were still by no means rendered hopeless, so
long as the prospect of a close connexion was maintained.
On the contrary, though Arundel had at first pressed
for the restoration of the Elector Palatine to his full
rights, he now only asked whether such a restoration
might be expected, at least at some future time. The
Imperial ministers repeated the declaration given on the
24th of February, with the additional statement that the
King of England might promise himself the more affection
from the Emperor as the ambassador gave assurance of the
sincere good intentions of the King towards him: but they
proceeded to indicate the conclusion of an alliance as a
necessary condition. Further progress was deferred until
the time of the negotiations, which were to be conducted at
Ratisbon[41].
For these negotiations nothing was more needful than that [A.D. 1636.]
the Imperial ministers should first of all be agreed among
themselves how far they were willing to go. But how could
they have taken any steps at all without conferring with
Bavaria? In the face of the impending Diet of the Electors,
they could least of all have ventured to affront the
powerful sovereign, with whom so many others took part.
They sent a special mission to invite him to express his
views to them categorically: at the same time they called
his attention to the importance of the English fleet at
that juncture.
The Elector Maximilian attached little weight to this.
He answered, that Germany certainly had nothing to fear
from this fleet, and that France, which was just as well
equipped by sea, would not be deterred even by the enmity
of England from extending its power in Germany: that
Charles I moreover could not long keep his fleet at sea,
for that he was on bad terms with his Estates of the realm,
without whose assent he certainly could not reckon upon
any permanent contribution. It is remarkable that this
consideration which exercised so much influence on the
decisions of the King himself, also affected the attitude
of other powers towards him, and influenced a negotiation
carried on between Austria and Bavaria.
But even apart from this, what would come of it, Maximilian
asked, if concessions were made to the presumptuous
demands of England? He said that for his part he was not
disinclined to surrender under certain conditions the
district of the Lower Palatinate, which he had in his
hands, but not the Upper Palatinate, which he held in
pledge: that the Emperor by virtue of his authority had
made over the electoral dignity to him and his house for
ever: that this settlement had been made in concert with
the other Electors, and that his father and cousin, the
Emperor, would not wish to reverse it: that he could not,
if he would.
On the resumption of negotiations with England, Count
Olivarez remarked that they had been broken off for other
reasons, no doubt those very reasons which arose out of
the stipulations of Saxony and Bavaria with regard to the
Palatinate. He thought however that even now Charles I [A.D. 1636.]
would take no decided action in behalf of Spain, and would
always look to his own interests alone. The great successes
of the Spanish army in the year 1636 perhaps enhanced his
self-confidence: and when negotiations were renewed, the
Spaniards were rather on the side of Bavaria than on that
of England.
The Imperial court was then confronted by the same question
which had formerly been discussed in Spain in the year
1623. Was it to show compliance towards England, and for
the sake of this break off its connexion with Bavaria,
and quarrel with Spain? The question was submitted to the
Emperor’s successor, who decided that in this case England
must be disregarded[42].
A formal answer to this effect was communicated to Arundel
at Ratisbon on September 12. The restoration of the Count
Palatine to the Electorship was deferred until events
should have happened, which seemed to Arundel about as near
as the end of the world. He remarked that, if his sovereign
had been told this before, he would never have sent him to
Germany. He returned to England deeply incensed, for he
thought that, personally as well as officially, he had not
met with the consideration which he had a right to claim.
This was the second time that the Austro-Spanish house
refused to draw closer to England from regard to its
relations with Germany. There is no doubt that, for
the German branch in the present state of affairs, the
maintenance of Catholicism and of an alliance with Bavaria
outweighed all other considerations. But was this the case
also with the Spanish branch? For it, both for the sake of
the monarchy and its general position in European politics,
a closer agreement with England even under the Stuarts
would have been of inestimable advantage. Olivarez differed
from Lerma, in that the latter studied most carefully the
general and maritime interests of Spain, the former her
interests in Germany and on the continent. The mistake of [A.D. 1636.]
the first Stuarts lay in this, that they thought to find
in Spain the centre of gravity of the joint relations of
the two houses, even after it had been transferred to
Austria. In that long and bloody conflict between all the
continental powers, which we term the Thirty Years’ War,
England also had her interest. James I and Charles I never
wholly lost sight of the principal aim of their continental
policy, the restoration of the Elector Palatine. But they
never staked their whole power on the issue. They once
stirred up Denmark to conduct the cause; they then allied
themselves with Sweden in order directly to attain their
object. But for all that they would never adopt as their
own the common political point of view of the Protestant
powers. They would far rather, from first to last, have
procured from the Emperor the recovery of the Palatinate by
means of Spanish influence. But even for securing this the
means which they set in motion were not sufficient. Their
misunderstandings with Parliament rendered strong measures
on their part impossible, just where it was most necessary.
In the great continental struggle which must be decisive
as to the future condition of Europe, the Stuarts could
not interfere to influence the result. Meanwhile they were
pursuing their own special end.
Whilst the agitation of the world was at high tide, Charles
I in his insular domain, which was affected by it without
feeling its full force, was scheming to establish for ever
the kingly power.
FOOTNOTES:
[23] Roe to Henry Earl of Holland, in Bruce Calendar
1631-1633, Pref. x.
[24] Report in Rushworth ii. 132.
[25] Letter to Lechhausen, April 1632. Rushworth ii. 175.
[26] Chemnitz: Schwedischer Krieg ii. 87.
[27] Gussoni, 27 Maggio 1633; ‘Ha fatto vedere il
secretario, che nell’ estesa della scrittura, con avveduto
riguardo dell’ Armstruder a niente rimaneva impegnata
l’Inghilterra,--il trattato si stipulò tra l’Oxistern et
l’administratore solamente per mezzo di deputati di quel
duca, il che qui piacque sommamente.’
[28] Ib. 29 Luglio. ‘Il motivo pare habbia risvegliato nei
sudditi nuovi susurri che no convenga esborso di danaro per
altra via che per l’ordinaria del parlamento.’
[29] Documents in the Clarendon Papers i. 57.
[30] The French ambassador Seneteire writes on the 28th of
April 1635. ‘La grande liaison de M^{ss} les états avec le
roy (de France) leur donne grande jalousie.’
[31] Arandel to Windebank, in the Clarendon Papers i. 611:
‘Oñate confessed that the paper given My Lord Cottington
was never any ground of treaty, but only as considerations
of conveniency between the two crowns, which must fall to a
fit consideration after.’
[32] Parrafos de un papel del conde duque. 1633, Archives
of Brussels.
[33] Selden: Mare clausum. The title-page of the English
translation contains the words; ‘In the Second book is
maintained, that the King of Gr. Br. is lord of the
circumfluent seas.’ The book was looked over by Charles I,
and expressly sanctioned by the Privy Council, March 26,
1636.
[34] Gussoni, Relatione 1635: ‘É massima fondamentale di
stato in Inghilterra d’invigilare sempre ad essere più
polente di tutti i suoi vicini sul mare.’
[35] Coke says to the Venetian ambassador, who is speaking
to him about the old alliance of the Union: ‘Tutto sta
bene, ma bisogna avvertire che le cose restino in fine nel
proprio equilibrio e che la bilancia non preponderi nè
dall’ uno nè dall altro canto.’ (Gussoni, 16 Maggio 1634.)
[36] The articles in Khevenhiller xii. 1696.
[37] ‘Ubi ad tractatus ventum fuerit quoad dignitatem
electoralem et reliqua petita, cum (S. C. M.) servatura sit
modum, ut in iis quae aequis conditionibus concedi poterunt
habeat cum serenissimus Britanniae rex, unde studium in
se at benevolentiam, tum supradictus quoque Palatinus
propensam in se gratiam possit cognoscere.’ Clarendon
Papers i. 461
[38] Taylor to Windebank, March 3; Clarendon Tapers i. 454.
[39] ‘Upon a confident assurancy of Taylor that H. Maj.
shall have both the Emperors and King of Spains assurancy
under their hands for a present restitution of the lower
palatinate and of the electoral dignity after the death of
Bavaria, H. Maj. hath made choice of the Earl Marshall.’
Windebank to Aston, ibid. i. 508.
[40] ‘Foedus arctissimum,’ out of which, in the letter of
authorisation to the Emperor’s plenipotentiaries, had grown
a ‘foedus tam offensivum quam defensivum.’
[41] The declarations exchanged are in Khevenhiller xii.
2103.
[42] The King of Bohemia delivers his opinion that ‘whereas
owing to their unreasonable wishes either the crown of
Spain and Electoral Bavaria, or England must be rebuffed,
it were desirable to retain the old confidence and tried
friendship of Spain and Electoral Bavaria, rather than
to commit themselves to an untrustworthy alliance with
England.’ Khevenhiller xii. 2122.
CHAPTER III.
MONARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF THE HOME GOVERNMENT.
Among the English ministers Lord Treasurer Weston, who at
that time exercised the greatest influence upon foreign
affairs, and had almost the sole direction of domestic
matters, afforded, a signal instance of successful
activity. He had formerly taken office, when matters were
almost desperate. The English were still at war with both
the neighbouring powers; enormous demands were made for
the support of the forces by land and sea. The former
moreover were burdensome to the districts on which they
were quartered: none of the civil officials had been paid
for several years: the considerable burden of debt which
James I had bequeathed to his successor (£1,200,000),
was increased a third by the years spent in war; and as
interest was paid at the rate of 8 per cent. for the
earlier, and 12 per cent. for the later loan, it absorbed
the greater portion of the revenue. But this latter, which
was principally derived from customs, had been rendered
precarious by the dispute about tonnage and poundage. Bales
of woollen goods had been sent back from the ports to the
manufacturing towns because the owners refused to pay the
duty; and foreign merchants had abstained from having their
wares landed because they expected unpleasant treatment
from the population if they paid the customs. The trade of
the country was at a standstill. How entirely matters were
altered after five years of Weston’s strict and watchful
administration! Peace was concluded and maintained; the
counties freed from the soldiers quartered on them;
the customs regularly levied; at least half of the old [A.D. 1634.]
debts paid off; English commerce developed into the most
flourishing and productive in the world, if for no other
reason, because the continent, and all the neighbouring
seas, were distracted with war.
Richard Weston had attained a certain reputation among
legal circles in the Middle Temple, and in embassies of
the second grade: he had then been engaged by Buckingham
in higher political affairs, and after the death of the
latter had to a certain extent stepped into his place. His
policy however was altogether different. The active desire
for war was replaced by a readiness for peace at any price.
Weston informed the French that even in the service of his
King he loved their interests. If, in spite of this, he
had dealings with the Spaniards, the French had no fears
on that score: they found that he would never break either
with them or with their opponents, because his thoughts,
as well as those of the King, were directed solely to the
maintenance of neutrality in foreign affairs[43], and
in domestic affairs to economy and the avoidance of a
Parliament. Weston himself did not long remain the pliant
and complaisant person which he had formerly been. He
now appeared inaccessible, close, rude, imperious[44].
He was always careful to have a sum of money in hand, of
which he could dispose: in order to avoid expenditure he
stopped the despatch of a foreign mission: the most rigid
barriers were erected round the royal generosity. After
the fashion of the statesmen of that period, he did not
forget his own interests: he was made Earl of Portland,
and by the marriage of his son with a lady of the house
of Lennox, he became related to the royal family. All who
enjoyed a certain importance in the kingdom were on his
side, Arundel, Cottington, Wentworth, as well as James Hay,
Earl of Carlisle, among the Scots who had come over with [A.D. 1637.]
James the only one who knew how to make himself at home
in England: he was regarded as the man who understood
the position of foreign affairs better than any one in
England. Weston could not but have rivals and adversaries.
At their head was Henry Rich, Earl of Holland, who had
taken a considerable share in the negotiations for bringing
the Queen home, and who since then had always adhered to
her. He appeared the most brilliant and, owing to the
favour shown him by both of the royal pair alike, the
most prosperous member of the court. For a time he had a
good prospect of becoming Buckingham’s successor in the
admiralty as well as in the royal favour. But neither
he himself, nor his friends, were of such importance as
to become dangerous to the Treasurer. When Cottington
returned from Spain, efforts were made to separate him from
Weston. He was advised to attach himself immediately to the
Queen, who was no friend of that minister; but Cottington
preferred his old political connexion, which secured him
greater prospects. Weston knew how to obliterate all
unfavourable impressions in the King’s mind, and to regain
his confidence, which once or twice seemed to waver.
Besides this, it was a principle of the King to bestow
his chief confidence upon one man alone, and to cling to
him, and let people say against him what they would; for
he thought that the nature of political life was such that
every one attacked the possessor of authority[45].
_Taxes levied without a grant of Parliament._
Economy did not suffice to secure for the government
complete independence in administration: means had
therefore to be adopted to increase the receipts. Tonnage
and poundage, the amount of which had in a few years
increased by £80,000, offered the principal resource for [A.D. 1633.]
effecting this object. But when old records were searched,
other crown rights of earlier date were discovered which
had fallen into oblivion, and might be revived with
advantage.
How many persons, it was said, had been bound by old usage
to appear at the King’s coronation, in order to be knighted!
The government called to account all who had incurred the
guilt of neglecting this duty, in order that a pecuniary
fine might be levied on them[46]. Another feudal right
of royalty had a still wider application. In April 1633
the Earl of Holland, who sometimes took part with the
government although he did not love it, was seen driving
through London in a royal carriage to Stratford in Essex,
in order to hold his court there as Lord Forester in the
fashion of the twelfth century. He cited all those who
had built within the borders of the ancient royal forests
to appear, that he might investigate their titles. The
occupants in vain affirmed that the claims of the crown
against them had long ago been redeemed by purchase: as
they had no documentary proof of this, they were compelled
to pay a sum in acquittance, which in Essex alone amounted
to £300,000[47]. Lord Holland opened his court in August
at Winchester, to try cases connected with the New Forest:
in September, attended by five judges, he went into
Northamptonshire to the site of those same woods, which
had once served as a refuge for the Britons, and then as a
hunting-ground for the Norman kings, that he might exact
penalties for encroachments on the forest of Rockingham.
Some of the leading nobles, the Earl of Westmorland, Lord
Peterborough, Lord Newport, and the Earl of Salisbury,
were condemned, the last-named on account of an estate
which had been presented to his father, Robert Cecil, by
Queen Elizabeth[48]. And these claims were constantly being
stretched further: it appeared as if the greater part of
England would soon be considered as having been forest-land [A.D. 1634.]
in former days. Even the government now felt itself in
a critical position from the agitation kindled by this
conduct, and suspended proceedings for a moment[49].
In spite of so many declarations made to Parliament,
monopolies of different kinds were again granted by the
crown, especially to associations which were formed for the
exclusive prosecution of some branch of trade, and which
were regularly invested with the rights and constitution of
companies with governor, assistants, and society. They were
obliged to purchase their title by yearly payments, but in
return were then supported in those vexatious regulations
which they made to enforce it. Other sovereign rights
furnished an opportunity of levying considerable taxes on
separate articles[50]. It is calculated that up to the
year 1635 Charles I had raised his income from £500,000 to
£800,000.
The King, says Correro the Venetian, moves among the rocks
by which he is surrounded, slowly but surely. The judges
explain the laws in his favour, as there are no Parliaments
to contradict them: and his subjects do not then venture to
withstand him. ‘With the key of the laws he seeks to open
the entrance to absolute power[51].’
By far the most important and remarkable of all his claims
was the demand for ship-money.
Those were times in which he thought it necessary to
oppose the resistance of a powerful navy to the maritime
encroachments of the Dutch and French. We have seen that
for this purpose he asked for subsidies from Spain, but
was unable to obtain them. In the embarrassment into which
he was thrown in consequence, a very welcome prospect of
assistance was held out, when some of his supporters who
were learned in the law maintained that he had the right
to demand the aid of the country for this object even
without the assent of Parliament. As by English usage the
duty of defending the country and of guarding the sea [A.D. 1634.]
was laid on him, this duty, it was said, carried with
it also the right of making the necessary dispositions
for that purpose. They adduced a series of precedents,
according to which monarchs on their own authority, without
the support of Parliament even when it was sitting, and
only with the consent of the Privy Council, had issued
the requisite proclamation for equipping naval armaments,
and had met with obedience down to the end of the reign
of Edward III. To the objection that this was more than
two centuries and half ago, the King’s supporters replied,
that the continuance of an opposite usage for any length of
time could not cancel the right of the sovereign, and that
even in the most recent times an instance had occurred, for
that the whole warlike preparations by which the attack of
the Spanish Armada had been repulsed in the year 1588, had
been set on foot at the sole order of Queen Elizabeth[52].
At the present moment, when the old sovereignty of England
over the seas was contested by the neighbouring powers, a
similar proceeding appeared peculiarly justifiable. Not
only were the seaport towns summoned to furnish the King
with a specified number of ships of a certain tonnage for
a period of six months, but the obligation was extended to
the inland counties and towns, and in their case the ships
were commuted for an assessment of money, which was to
be raised in the same way as a subsidy. There was even a
design entertained of having a number of men embodied for
the defence of the coast.
Much agitation had been caused by the previous renewal
of old claims; and it was naturally doubled by this last
claim, because it was the most comprehensive, and might be
renewed at pleasure. The loudest remonstrances were heard.
The official interpreters of the laws however came forward
on the side of the crown, and acknowledged its right. In
November 1634 the Judges gave sentence that the inland as
well as the seaboard towns might be called upon for the [A.D. 1636.]
defence of the coasts. This judgment did not contain a
declaration that Parliament need not be consulted in the
matter; but in February 1636 a decision on this point
also followed[53]. It was declared by a sentence of the
Judges, that if the kingdom were in danger, and the king
thought it necessary, he had the right of ordering his
subjects under the Great Seal of England to equip as large
a number of ships as seemed to him necessary; and that in
case they should refuse to do so, the law gave him perfect
right to compel them. The judges could not have delivered
a more important decision: it is one of the great events
of English history. The King commanded that it should be
entered in the records of the Star Chamber, and of the
Courts of Justice at Westminster, and that all possible
publicity should be given to it, in order that every one
who had doubted the King’s right might be taught to know
better. But even the sentence of the Courts of Justice had
no longer absolute authority in England, where they were
now deemed subservient or even corrupt. A gentleman of
Buckinghamshire, John Hampden, who had there a very old
family estate, refused to pay the sum for which he had been
assessed, twenty shillings, not because of the amount,
which was only trifling, but in order to bring the matter
once more publicly under discussion. When he was cited
before the Star Chamber to answer for it, he requested to
hear the writ. After it had been read, he denied that it
had any legal authority over him. The King, who thought
himself perfectly certain of his right, had no objection
that the question should once more be publicly discussed.
Nor did he order others also who refused payment to be
visited with penalties of real severity: the sheriffs in
each case merely seized possession of property to the
amount which they had to raise from each according to the
assessment. They met with no resistance in this; but men
refused to acknowledge the claim by voluntary payment.
‘They stick to their laws,’ writes one of our Venetian [A.D. 1637.]
informants, ‘and allow legal proceedings to be taken,
solely to make it known that the laws are violated, and
that they are compelled to pay by force[54].’
But what a state of affairs hereupon set in! The whole
administration of the state depended on the receipt of
tonnage and poundage, the payment of which Parliament
declared illegal, while the government insisted on it, on
the ground that it had been made to the earlier kings; and
all refusals of payment were overridden by the coercive
power of the state. All other fiscal measures as well were
considered wanton attacks on the fully acknowledged rights
of private property, or as illegal. People gave way, but
only in the expectation of better times.
The opposition between what the government and what the
nation or the Parliament thought legitimate, was presented
in the sharpest outlines, when it led to acts of personal
oppression. The members of Parliament, against whom the
King had claims, refused to be brought to trial before the
Courts of Justice before which they were summoned; for they
affirmed that Parliament alone had the right to pronounce
judgment on their conduct. They were condemned however, and
the most resolute of them, Sir John Eliot, was treated with
a severity bordering on cruelty: he died in the Tower[55].
At times however the King’s indulgence and mercy in turn
appeared illegal, especially when they were extended to
Catholics. This had so important an influence in the life
of the King, that we must devote to it a closer examination.
_Charles the First’s relations with Catholicism._
The old severe laws of Parliament against priests and
Jesuits still existed, but, as the King had promised [A.D. 1636.]
in his marriage-contract, they were no longer enforced. It
was not only that the bloody executions of former times
could not now be thought of, but even the pecuniary fines
incurred by non-attendance at Protestant worship were
reduced to half their amount, or redeemed in perpetuity by
compositions allowed under the Great Seal. The spies who
had formerly forced their way into houses, in order to look
for priests who were thought to be hidden there, no longer
showed themselves; and steps were taken under the influence
of the Queen altogether to annul their authority to do so.
The English Catholics affirmed that they had never enjoyed
so much repose and security as under King Charles[56]. Yet
they felt anxious, because the existing laws could legally
be revoked only by Parliament. The King certainly thought
the power of dispensing from them an essential part of the
prerogative; but public opinion took a different view, and
the adherents of Parliamentary authority, especially the
Puritans, on the contrary insisted that the laws must be as
strictly enforced on this point as on any other.
And had they not in fact some ground for feeling anxious
lest Catholicism in this way should again obtain the
ascendancy in the country? In the Netherlands, in France,
in Spain, and at Rome, those seminaries were still
flourishing, from which in former times young and zealous
priests had been sent to England. At that time there might
be counted in England five hundred secular priests, about
three hundred ecclesiastics belonging to the great orders,
and about a hundred and sixty Jesuits. Most of them were
entertained in the principal families in the country, who
secretly or even openly professed Catholicism, and in the
houses of the rich proprietors, nobles, and gentry. In
countless places the Catholic service was celebrated, but
with most splendour in the residences of the ambassadors,
where men vied with one another, especially in keeping Holy
Week with devout pomp, with sensuous representations and [A.D. 1636.]
musical services. On high festivals the Queen and her
court appeared in her public chapel, which was served by
Capuchin monks in the dress of their order: besides this
she had a private chapel. Just as an agent of the Queen had
gone to Rome, so now an agent of the Papal See, although
under another pretext, appeared at the English court.
Even there Catholicism found rich and powerful patrons.
At the head of these was Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel,
who now, as has been mentioned, stood high at court: the
King’s ministers, Weston and Cottington, and Windebank, the
Secretary of State, belonged to this party. The opinion had
spread, and is still constantly echoed, that King Charles
also shared in these tendencies, and sought to bring back
his kingdom to Catholicism.
We are in possession of the copious letters of the Pope’s
agent Cuneo--a Scot whose real name was Con, but whom we
shall speak of under the Italianised form of his name--from
which we may gather with certainty how far the opinion was
true, and how far it was not.
The negotiations on which Cuneo was engaged principally
concerned the form of oath by which King James had long
ago wished to ensure the loyalty of the Catholics. By the
wording of the oath as adopted by Parliament, the doctrine
that the Pope could absolve subjects from their obedience
to their prince, was not only rejected, but expressly
termed heretical[57]. The first archpriest who had the
supervision of the Catholic clergy in England was induced,
as we have seen, to take this oath; and many missionaries,
among whom were even some of the regular clergy, the
Benedictines especially, followed his example. Others
thought that the scruple would be removed by a declaration
that the King required obedience only in civil matters. The
Jesuits, following the example of Bellarmin, rejected every
expedient of this sort, and zealous believers sided with
them. This point however, according to Charles’s views,
was one of great importance. He seldom caused the oath to
be tendered; but when he had once done so, he required it
to be taken; if it were not, the objector was put under [A.D. 1636.]
a sort of civil excommunication. The matter had been
already mentioned by Giorgio Panzani in a former mission,
and the Papal court had empowered Cuneo to prevail on the
King to alter the oath[58]. The inadmissibility of the
present form was put especially on the ground that no one
could call a doctrine heretical, until it had been declared
so by the Church: it was demanded that the King should lay
down such a formula as would only affect the obedience of
his subjects in temporal matters, without touching the
spiritual question. And a very earnest endeavour was made
to find such a formula. It was proposed to say nothing
about a ‘damnable doctrine,’ but only to speak of the
conviction of each individual: and Cuneo assured the King
that no Catholic would refuse to take such an oath, if
only at the same time he were relieved from the other.
Against this the King had two objections. He called Cuneo’s
attention to the fact that the oath had been prescribed
by Parliament; that for its removal it would be necessary
to call Parliament together and to lay the alteration
before it--a proceeding which might have very unpleasant
consequences, most of all for the Catholics. ‘Sire,’
broke in Cuneo, ‘we Catholics hold that your Majesty is
superior to Parliament[59].’ The King thought that even
here he might invoke his dispensing power: but to put a
new formula in the place of the old, and merely to drop
the enforcement of a law, were quite different things.
The former course was neither congenial to the King, nor
could have been ventured on by his ministers, who in their
departure from parliamentary government still kept always
within a line which they did not overstep. But besides this
the King would not deviate from his own doctrine, viz. that
the right of kings was a divine right, and could not be
superseded by any man, not even by the Pope[60]. The [A.D. 1637.]
opposition between the Papal and the Royal power might
perhaps be smoothed over in practice, but could never be
adjusted in theory. People at Rome were not content with
the proposals of Cuneo, which were rejected by Charles.
In the course of these negotiations, or perhaps in the
course of friendly conversation, a further step was made.
Something was said of the necessity of a closer political,
and of the possibility of a closer religious approximation.
Cuneo set before the King the prospect that in the event
of an union with Rome, which still formed a great centre
of European politics, he would have as much power as
any continental potentate: and the King might well feel
tempted to enter the lists at Rome as elsewhere against
Spain and France. But Cuneo did not go so far as to make
a real attempt to convert him. The amiable ecclesiastical
diplomatist and courtier felt far too strong a conviction
that he could not venture on this. At times the prevailing
controversies between the two churches were touched upon
in conversation. The King did not conceal that, from all
that he had seen in Spain, or even heard from theologians
there, an impression of estrangement had been left on
his mind[61]. His Anglican heart rejected the adoration
of saints and the invocation of the Virgin, and was
completely repelled by other forms of popular worship.
Cuneo once asked him what he held to be true besides Holy
Scripture[62]. Charles answered that he held the three
creeds and the decrees of the first four councils; and
he expressed his astonishment that any one could put the
decrees of the Council of Trent on a level with those of
the old councils. Once, after a decision had been given in
favour of the Catholics, Cuneo fell on his knee and kissed
his hand. ‘You will, nevertheless,’ said the King, ‘not
make a Papist of me.’ On one matter Charles would have
been glad to hear the expression of the Pope’s sentiments, [A.D. 1637.]
namely, on the divine right of bishops, on the assumption
of which the constitution of the English Church, and the
ecclesiastical policy of the English kings mainly rested.
But that was a very serious question for the Pope, who
wished neither to outrage the convictions of the King, nor
to lead the Catholic bishops to renew their former claims.
Pope Urban VIII avoided expressing even a personal opinion
on the subject.
A very lively impulse was given to the spiritual movement
of the seventeenth century by the attempts to reunite
the two communions. It had become clear as a result of
a worldwide conflict again and again repeated, that
Protestantism could not be overpowered. The inroad of the
Swedes into Germany, the revival of the Protestant credit
which was connected with it, the alliance of France with
the Protestant powers, all gave a shape to European affairs
in presence of which the hope of effecting a restoration of
Catholicism must have appeared a cobweb of the brain. This
led naturally to a revival of the old plans for bringing
to pass some kind of reconciliation between the opposing
churches. We meet with them in France, in Germany, in
Poland, over the whole Continent. They were cherished by
well-intentioned kings, powerful ministers, and learned
writers of the first rank.
In England there was in each of the two great parties a
fraction which closely resembled the corresponding fraction
on the other side. In the one party there were found many
who took the oath of allegiance without hesitation, who
acknowledged the supremacy of the crown, and attended
Anglican churches, who made a figure in high places, and
then perhaps after all declared themselves Catholics on
their deathbeds. We might almost suspect that, from a
superstitious opinion of the saving power of ceremonies,
or because it was the safest course, they kept priests in
their houses only for this last hour. But even among the
Protestants we discover not a few who sought to strengthen
the resemblances to Catholicism which were retained in the
English Church. This was done principally out of dislike
to the Puritans, who declared that the Pope was the
Antichrist foretold by Scripture; while the others were
inclined to recognise in him the true Patriarch of the [A.D. 1637.]
West, if he would only admit some moderation in the
exercise of his power. From this point of view they had
publicly condemned the schism in sermons, at which the
King and the court were present. They praised auricular
confession and the bowing of the knee at the sacred name or
before the crucifix[63]. Even in the local arrangements of
churches the innovations of the Reformers were done away.
Everywhere the communion table had again to give way to
the altar. Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, acknowledged
that the Church of Rome had an uncorrupted tradition on the
main points of the Christian faith. He avoided the harsh
expressions of controversial theologians about that Church,
and loved to speak of a reunion between the divided members
of the whole body of the Church. But he was by no means a
Papist. Like the King he condemned the popular worship,
especially the invocation of saints: in the adoration of
the sacrament, the refusal of the cup, and the doctrine of
purgatory, he also saw error, or superstition, or both.
When, after his appointment, the question was put to him
whether he would not be willing to become a cardinal of
the Roman Church, that was only an attempt to kindle his
ambition, and to open negotiations, which might have
had further consequences: but he did not fall into the
snare. After a time people on the contrary spoke of the
probability that Cuneo might be raised to this dignity,
which he hoped to achieve by the aid of the Queen, and that
he might then remain in England wearing the purple. The
Roman court was apprehensive lest a violent ecclesiastical
quarrel for precedence might thus be raised. Between Cuneo
and Laud, who outside the English court were considered
allies, harmony by no means prevailed: they did not get
beyond the external forms of ordinary politeness to one
another. From the beginning Laud could not endure that
another ecclesiastical influence should exist at court
beside his own. Cuneo’s letters to Rome show an ill-feeling
towards the Archbishop[64] which is mingled with [A.D. 1637.]
bitterness, and even with a kind of contempt. Cuneo
declares him incapable of contributing in the least to the
removal of the English schism.
With absolute certainty we can pronounce that the
statement which was then made, that Charles in connexion
with Cuneo and Laud designed to bring back the English
nation to Catholicism, is erroneous. The supposed allies
were personally bitter antagonists. The King, with his
Archbishop, adhered to the point of view of the Anglican
Church, which they only endeavoured to raise to complete
supremacy.
_State of Opinion in the Church of England at this time._
The controversy which then most busily engaged men of
active minds, did not concern the differences between
Catholicism and Protestantism. Only as to the frontiers
of the spiritual and temporal power were opinions still
wavering: on all other points every man had already taken
his side. Even the old dispute between Lutherans and
Calvinists about the Lord’s Supper, although it still
went on, attracted no special attention. The questions,
which are properly traced to the spirit of the age, were
fought out within the domain of the Reformed Church.
They concerned the doctrine of election by grace, which
determined the system of dogmas, and the influence in
spiritual affairs appertaining to the temporal power, which
was of decisive importance for the constitution of the
Church. The Synod of Dort derived widespread importance
from its adherence to the strict Calvinistic doctrines of
unconditional election by grace, and of the independence of
the Church. It condemned the Arminians, who were inclined
to less rigid views on both questions: they were expelled
from their offices in the Netherlands.
At an earlier period James I also had condemned Arminianism [A.D. 1619.]
as promoting tendencies towards Catholicism. But the
theories of this sovereign were always thrust into the
background by his interests; and when the decrees of this
synod, in which some English theologians had also taken
part, though to a very slight extent, roused controversies
in England which threatened to disturb the repose and
even the system of the Church of England, it no longer
commanded his sympathies. He forbade the theological
question to be discussed publicly in the pulpits; just as
in the articles of the English Church it had already been
handled with great caution. Still more repugnant to him
was the article in the conclusions of the Synod of Dort,
in which equal authority was ascribed to all ministers of
God’s Word, whatever position they might hold[65]. The
English members of the Synod, who looked upon this as an
indirect condemnation of the constitution of the Church of
England, protested against it, of course without obtaining
a hearing. But how obnoxious must this article have been
to the sovereign, who designed to found his state upon
the alliance of the Protestant mitre with the sceptre!
His Presbyterian opponents now acquired the support of an
assembly which, by its very strictness on other points,
gained for itself great authority in the Reformed Church.
What was termed Puritanism was, strictly speaking, the
combination of the dogmatic decrees of the Synod of Dort
with resistance to episcopacy. So far as we know, the
Archbishop of Spalatro, Marcus Antonius de Dominis, who at
that time had taken refuge in England, was the first who
used the word in this sense[66].
There could be no more hearty admirer of the Anglican
Church than this foreign Archbishop. His works on this
controversy, which although voluminous are written with
learning and candour, have contributed to maintain the [A.D. 1633.]
reputation of the constitution of the English Church in the
eyes of the literary and theological world[67].
In August 1633 a great alteration took place in the
state of the English Church. George Abbot, Archbishop
of Canterbury was removed by death; a man who himself
inclined to Puritanism, for he was a zealous Calvinist,
and in the exercise of ecclesiastical authority displayed
an amount of indulgence and clemency that brought on
him the reproaches of many. He had long ago ceased to
influence the court, or the relations which the church
and the crown bore towards each other. Charles I reposed
his whole confidence in William Laud, at that time Bishop
of London, whose opinions agreed with his own, or at any
rate were in harmony with his tendencies. But in regard
to doctrine Laud’s Arminianism went even beyond that
of Arminius; and the combination witnessed at Dort, of
strict Calvinistic opinions, which he rejected, with
resistance to episcopal government turned him completely
into a declared opponent of the Synod. For his own part he
considered episcopacy a divine institution, and contested
the Christian character of all those churches which
were not episcopally organised. And just because this
institution was so deeply rooted in Christian antiquity,
he endeavoured in every respect to return to the oldest
usages. Before his eyes and those of the King floated
the vision of an episcopal church independent of the
Papacy, which, purified from all human additions, should
embrace the whole world. Laud was very highly educated,
and showed an appreciation of universal learning: he did
much for the printing of Greek, for the acquisition of
Arabic and Persian manuscripts, and for the promotion of
Oriental studies in general. He was blameless in private
life, and extremely beneficent: out of his ecclesiastical
revenue he always set aside a considerable portion for
the poor. But he was one of those men in whom the temper
of persecuting orthodoxy seems to be innate. Even in his
youth he noticed chiefly those passages in the lectures
of professors which ran counter to the Anglican system, [A.D. 1633.]
of which he early formed a high conception. In this
temper he read the writings which were called forth by the
controversies of the day, and then invoked the vengeance
of the temporal and spiritual power on the deviations
from accepted formulas which he noticed in them. In the
disputes between the Government and the Parliament be lent
his pen to the service of the former with vigour and not
without success; and Buckingham, with whom he was most
closely connected, promoted him to the see of London. After
Buckingham’s death the King transferred to the Bishop a
portion of the confidence and favour which he had bestowed
upon the Duke. Laud might be considered his ecclesiastical
favourite. On the first intelligence of Abbot’s death,
Charles I saluted the Bishop of London as Archbishop of
Canterbury. For what could be nearer to his heart than to
transfer the authority of Primate of England to the man
who fully shared his point of view? On this the Anglican
zealot stepped into an official position which opened the
widest sphere of action for his ecclesiastical tendencies.
He was a man of comprehensive energy, which operated
in all directions, and at the same time retained its
ardour. With large general designs he united indefatigable
attention to details[68]. But all defects which Laud
observed in the Church he attributed to the indulgence
of his predecessors, especially of the late Archbishop,
George Abbot: he had resolved to take an opposite course,
and to suffer no departure from the law of the Church and
from rigid obedience. Such deviations were punished in the
bishops when they made any resistance to the institution
of ceremonies, as in the case of Williams, Bishop of
Lincoln[69]; how much more in the Puritans, whom he
regarded as the most dangerous adversaries of the orthodox
system. Woe to the man who ventured to bring forward a
controverted point in the pulpit, when once it had been
forbidden there: the smallest hint of it was fatal. Laud [A.D. 1637.]
set himself against even the religious strictness of the
Puritans. In the Sabbatarian controversy, which was then
being set on foot, he advocated the Sunday amusements of
the people as warmly as the King. An ordinance issued
by him on the subject roused disapprobation even among
clergymen who conformed in other respects. The Archbishop
appears to have thought that by this indulgence he would
attract the people to his side. But even in this matter he
went to work with an intolerance that could not fail to
alienate men’s sympathies from him. We know how zealously
the Puritans condemned theatrical representations, which
just at that time, when French actresses were introduced,
appeared doubly obnoxious. William Prynne, of Lincoln’s
Inn, who wrote a copious book called Histriomastix,
suffered in consequence the most degrading penalties; he
was branded and lost his ears. The same punishment was
inflicted on Bastwick, a physician, who on his return from
travelling related much that was discreditable to foreign
bishops, and which might be unfavourably applied to the
English bishops also. The theologian Burton, who blamed
as novelties some alterations that were introduced into
the Church, fared no better. These were educated men, and
belonged to the upper classes; and their exposure in the
pillory, which was intended to disgrace them, was turned
into a kind of triumph. Laud indeed intended to establish
for ever the unassailable authority of the ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, just as he had emancipated afresh the
ecclesiastical courts from the influence of the temporal:
but without doubt he undermined it; for no one has ever
insulted natural human feelings with impunity. His idea was
conformity at any price, subordination of the people to the
clergy, subordination of these latter to their own chiefs,
and of all to the King.
It is not quite clear whether he consciously cherished
the design which is attributed to him of expanding the
archbishopric of Canterbury into a patriarchate of the
British Islands, and of holding this dignity himself:
but his efforts aimed without any disguise at giving the
episcopal system and the usages of the Anglican Church the
supremacy in the other two kingdoms as well as in England.
We know how zealously James I had struggled to obtain this [A.D. 1634.]
end in Scotland; and we shall soon see what further
advances were made on his footsteps. In England itself
conformity of all individuals, in Scotland conformity
with English institutions, was the most prominent motive
of everything which was done in regard to the Church. In
Ireland also the same attempt was made.
When colonies were established in Ireland, in which many
Scots took part, articles for the Irish Church, which might
satisfy the Scots as well as the English, were accepted
in that country. They were introduced by James Usher, who
at that time was Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, and
afterwards Archbishop of Armagh, Primate of Ireland. But
little was said in them of the necessity of the episcopal
constitution, although it was retained. The difference
between presbyters and bishops was passed over in silence.
The Pope, after the example of the Synod of Gap, was
termed Antichrist: the observance of Sunday as though it
were the Jewish sabbath was ordained; and many distinctive
Calvinistic tenets were accepted. King James, it is true,
once called Doctor Usher to account for this; but at all
events he confirmed the articles just at the time when
he himself was maintaining strict Calvinistic opinions,
owing to his connexion with the Prince of Orange. Now
however under Charles I these opinions were no longer to be
tolerated; for the King felt that the variety of Protestant
opinions was a scandal in the eyes of the Irish Catholics,
and that their conversion was hindered by the violence of
the contrast presented by Calvinism. And it is evident that
the consolidation of perhaps the most zealous adherents
whom the Pope had in the world into one single state, such
as Charles I contemplated, with those who declared him
to be Antichrist, was impossible. Consistently with the
prevailing policy, the Lord Deputy, Thomas Wentworth, in
the Parliament of 1634 undertook to procure the abrogation
of the Irish articles in substance if not in form. The
Lower House of the Convocation of the Irish Protestant
Church made the canon law of the English Church the subject
of free discussion, and a committee of Convocation had
already framed a canon which insisted on the maintenance [A.D. 1634.]
of the Irish articles, even under pain of excommunication.
Wentworth regarded this as a sort of revolt. In severe
language he pointed out to the Convocation its presumption
and want of subordination in wishing to pronounce judgment
on laws of the English Church. He himself drew up a canon,
in which assent to the Thirty-nine Articles in general
was promised. The Archbishop of Armagh, who could not
act inconsistently with his former behaviour, but at the
same time could not resist the plans of the government,
proposed a less stringent form: but Wentworth insisted
upon his canon, and had the pleasure of seeing it carried
in Convocation almost without opposition, in the very form
in which he had drawn it up; for the members were one and
all enchained by his sovereign will. This is perhaps the
last canon drawn up for the Irish Church as such, which was
thus inseparably united with the English[70]. Wentworth
gave Archbishop Laud triumphant tidings of his unexpected
success.
_Further designs of the Government._
The Irish Parliament, which stood side by side with
this Convocation, was the same which made the general
administration of Wentworth famous. It was composed partly
of Catholics and partly of Protestants; for his main
object was to unite both creeds in one community: but in
disputed questions the Protestants had the preponderance,
and among the Protestants the Anglicans. In the Upper
House the bishops as a rule had the decision in their own
hands. Parliament was induced to grant supplies by which a
well-ordered government of the country was for the first
time rendered possible.
What a vital union is here displayed between the elements
of spiritual and temporal obedience! Wentworth adds to the
information above mentioned the remark, that in Ireland the [A.D. 1636.]
King was as absolute as any other sovereign in his own
country, provided only that he had as his representative
a man of insight and loyalty, whose hands were not tied.
The Lord Deputy can be as little accused as the King or
the Archbishop of wishing to pave the way for Catholicism:
Wentworth was known as a very staunch Protestant.
Their thoughts were only directed to the development
of Anglicanism expressed in its most rigid form, and
administered without indulgence. What James I had already
intended and attempted to carry out, but with vacillation
and with fresh concessions to the other side, Charles I and
his statesmen undertook in earnest. They wished to make
episcopacy one of the chief foundations of the monarchy.
Did they entertain the thought of sweeping away the English
Parliament altogether, or at least of not calling it
together again? This is not likely. King Charles affirmed
on more than one occasion that it lay with him to summon
or not to summon Parliament, and a resolution had been
formed to issue no fresh summons as long as the royal
authority was not firmly established on its own foundation.
The Archbishop once said at a later time, that Parliament
was intended to maintain the power and greatness of the
crown, but that nothing in the world was more lamentable
than the corruption of what was good: that Parliament had
once ventured to depose a king, but that it never ought to
be allowed to proceed to this length again: that for his
part he had never thought of setting aside Parliamentary
government; though he had perhaps thought it right, in
cases of urgent necessity, to collect taxes which had not
been granted by Parliament.
We become still more accurately acquainted with the
direction in which affairs were moving, through a letter
from Wentworth to the King. After the miscarriage of
Arundel’s mission, much was said of the expediency of
again forming a connexion between England and France
and the States-General, of imposing certain conditions
on the Spaniards, and then exacting their performance
even by force of arms. Wentworth declared himself most
decidedly opposed to the scheme, and that not only because
he preferred the alliance of Spain to that of France on [A.D. 1636.]
general grounds, but most of all, as he states at full
length, because the power of the King was not sufficiently
confirmed in Ireland, much less in England, to allow him to
interfere decisively in European affairs. Whatever weight
might attach to the declaration of the courts of justice
that the King was entitled to levy ship-money, yet he
considered this decision far from sufficient. If a war were
to break out, he thought that the tax would be refused,
and that the government would have less power to exact it:
what would happen then if any disaster occurred? It would
certainly be necessary in that case to summon Parliament,
and to claim its assistance--a course which under the
present circumstances no one could wish to adopt. So long
as it had not been decided that the King had the same right
to raise an army which he now enjoyed with regard to the
navy, Wentworth thought that his authority had only one
foot, and that he must be put in a position to raise forces
for service on land, which he could lead into foreign
countries according to his own judgment, like the old kings
of England; that this state of things must be brought about
first in England, and then step by step in Scotland; and
that till then the goal could not be reached, and no great
undertaking could be hazarded[71].
On principle Wentworth was as little opposed to a
Parliament in England as in Ireland; but he wished to have
only such a Parliament as would be subservient. He thought
of making the government and the royal power independent
of grants of Parliament in great affairs, such as peace
and war and foreign enterprises generally. The King was no
longer, as in the late sessions, to be compelled to make
concessions in order to maintain his proper position in
European affairs. His immediate intention was to uphold
the decision of the Judges with regard to the payment of
ship-money, and to obtain a similar authorisation in regard
to the support of the army.
It is apparent however what would have been the
significance of such a decision. The political importance
of Parliament had arisen from the power of granting the [A.D. 1635.]
money required for the purposes of war: if the latter were
taken away, how could the former endure? The King had not
only an acknowledged right of judging whether the kingdom
was in danger, but it was laid down as his duty to forestal
such a contingency. If he were now authorised to call out
the military and naval forces of the kingdom in case he
thought fit, how could he be refused the needful resources
for keeping them up when called out? Parliament would have
played a very inferior part; and, in England as on the
Continent, the monarchy would have taken the form of a
military administration.
_Public Affairs._
Among the King’s advisers there was no lack of men of
ability to connect the ascendancy of the monarchy with the
great interests of the country and with their furtherance.
Wentworth bequeathed to the Irish no contemptible monument
of his autocratic sway. He founded their linen manufacture,
in the first instance at his own expense, with the definite
expectation that it would form an inexhaustible source
of wealth for the country[72], just as wool and woollen
manufactures were for England.
The English had their factories at Alexandria, Aleppo, and
Constantinople, as well as in Persia and India: for their
cloth was in request all over the East. Among the motives
in Charles I’s mind for entering on friendly relations with
the Pope, one was the intention of opening the harbour of
Civita Vecchia to his subjects.
The arrangement concluded with Spain was of immense value
for commerce, which was carried on in a very peculiar
manner during the continuance of the general war. The
Spaniards sent their gold and silver to England, from
which country their payments could be made in Flanders
and Germany through the bills of English houses which
enjoyed good credit on the continent. The precious metals [A.D. 1635.]
were sent from Spain in bars: the English crown thus gained
the advantage of coining them. The transport of goods,
and even of the necessaries of war, between Spain and
the Netherlands, was carried on in English merchantmen,
or under English escort. The Portuguese kept up their
intercourse with their American colonies under the English
flag, which assured them against the attacks of the Dutch;
and they were glad to hire English ships, which were better
armed than their own[73].
The construction of the English vessels aroused the
admiration of experts: the ships of the East India Company
by their solidity and their provision for every possible
requirement, appeared to carry off the palm from all others.
As the King’s policy contributed to the extension of
commerce, so the religious disputes contributed to the
extension of the colonies. To those who would not submit to
Laud’s ordinances New England offered a refuge: we shall
return to the circumstances under which the colonies were
planted there. But even for the toleration of Catholics in
England there was no legal security. The first attempt at
an ecclesiastical order of things, in which Episcopalianism
came to terms with Catholicism on fixed principles, was
made on the other side of the Atlantic, in Maryland. This
may be the reason why this colony received a constitution
that was to a great extent independent of the mother
country. Maryland was peculiarly the creation of Charles
I: the name it bears is derived from the Queen of that
sovereign. A scheme was entertained at that time of
colonising Madagascar in the interest of a Palatine prince.
As yet the colonies had no towns: London was the market to
which they resorted for their supplies, and for the sale of
their products: under these circumstances she began to be
the emporium of the general trade of the world.
The cultivation of English commerce was almost a matter of
personal care with the King. Not only the administration of
his state, but even the maintenance of his court, rested [A.D. 1637.]
upon the proceeds of the customs; and the court was still
suitably and brilliantly kept up[74]. And however little
Charles may have thought of endangering the repose of his
kingdom for the sake of the Palatinate, yet he had never
been loath to provide for the necessities of his sister and
nephews.
But besides this he loved to support literature and art. He
directly offended the scruples of the Puritans by attending
the theatre. A splendid and costly masquerade, which the
four Inns of Court combined to exhibit in the Carnival of
the year 1633, was counted as a proof of their loyalty.
They drove from Ely House through Chancery Lane and
Whitehall in their carriages surrounded by torches; and the
King sent to request them to take a route that would enable
him to see the spectacle twice. The ladies and gentlemen
of the court mustered in their richest dress, and later in
the evening the Queen mingled with the dancers. Shirley,
who was in the Queen’s service, Massinger, and old Ben
Jonson still prevented the English stage from degenerating:
Cymbeline, Richard III, and other plays of Shakespeare
were favourite pieces with the public. Ben Jonson lived
till 1637: from time to time he had the opportunity of
celebrating the generosity of Charles I, of which he
was greatly in need. In his later writings, such as his
‘Discoveries made upon Men and Matter,’ a ripe and lively
feeling for literary culture and for culture generally is
displayed which does honour to the age.
Charles I developed not only a preference, but a real
appreciation, for art. Inigo Jones, whom many consider as
the man of the greatest artistic talent whom England on
the whole has produced, and in whose works we perceive a
steady progress from an overcharged romantic style to purer
forms, was one of his personal friends. It is easy to see
why a man of architectural genius should attach himself to
the court, for which he built chapels and banqueting halls,
and to Archbishop Laud, who undertook to restore churches
in the style of Christian antiquity, rather than to the [A.D. 1637.]
Puritans who looked for salvation in the bare gospel.
Among the King’s servants we find Vandyke, who in his
incomparable portraits has preserved for us the forms of
those who moved in high society; and Rubens, who reconciled
his political commissions with constant practice of his
art. On him as on others the obstinacy of the popular
resistance with which Charles came into collision in his
last Parliament produced an unfavourable impression. He
blames the learned Selden for getting him involved in
this confusion, to the prejudice of his art[75]. But as
for the rest he was astonished by the zeal for study
displayed by the English, and by the richness of their
collections of works of art. The Arundel marbles were
already rousing the attention of students of antiquity:
Kenelm Digby procured for the King himself some of the
finest monuments of ancient Greek art from the Levant. From
Italy and Spain there was brought to him, as one of his
contemporaries says, a whole troop of emperors and senators
of ancient Rome, which he himself took pains to arrange in
their chronological order: and he was capable of showing
impatience if any one disturbed him in his task. He may be
regarded as one of the best connoisseurs of art that has
ever sat on a throne: he was able after short consideration
to distinguish with delicate and certain judgment between
those Italian masters who are closely allied in style
and touch. There was no surer road to his favour than
bringing him a picture of some celebrated master as a
present, or pointing one out for purchase, which could
still be effected with remarkable ease. The catalogues
of his property show nine Correggios, thirteen Raphaels,
forty-five Titians--among which are some of the greatest
works of these masters, such as ‘The Education of Love,’ by
the first; ‘The Holy Family,’ known under the name of ‘The
Pearl,’ by the second; and among others by the third, ‘The
Venus of the Prado.’ These catalogues present a many-sided
interest in the history of art: they enumerate 400 works
in sculpture, and 1400 in painting. Inigo Jones built a
gallery for them: the King wished to have the principal
works about him in his chambers at Oatlands, Hampton Court,
St. James’s and Whitehall[76]. In the gardens of York House
he put up the figures of Cain and Abel, by John of Bologna,
the imitator of Michael Angelo, one of the finest groups
by that master, a present from Philip IV of Spain. It was
the intention of Charles I to adorn the squares and public
gardens of London in general with works of artistic merit.
It is worth while to remark the connexion between
these efforts in favour of art and poetry, and the
social cultivation, the general tendencies in favour of
toleration, of ecclesiastical ceremony, and of antiquity,
and the cosmopolitan sympathies, which mark the ascendancy
of royal authority. Could Charles I ever have succeeded
in leading the English mind in this direction, and in
instigating it to produce works of its own? We may feel
ourselves tempted to agree with those who have at all times
made it the bitterest reproach of the Puritans, that they
opposed these intentions, and even frustrated them. But in
the struggles between different tendencies, which give the
tone to an age, the question in dispute cannot be settled
by the encouragement which they afford to this or that
branch of culture. They are like the forces of nature,
which create but at the same time destroy. The other party
also had its rights, its ideas, and, if we regard the
general state of the world and of the time, a still greater
destiny in the field of universal history.
FOOTNOTES:
[43] Relation de Mr. Fontenay, 4 Juin 1634: ‘Le tresorier
veut la paix et pour sa subsistance et par sa foiblesse:
c’est pourquoy il demeure neutre entre France et Espagne.’
Cp. the instructions to the ambassador Poigny in the 4th
vol of Avenel’s Lettres du Cl. Richelieu.
[44] Gussoni. ‘Gode la fortuna d’esser il piu autorevole
e superiormente favorito di S. M.--sogetto di cupo e di
sagace ingegno, benche nell’ esteriore si dimostri non
amabile, anzi ruvido di natura.’
[45] A Contarini, Aug. 24, 1637: ‘Ha saputo dar ad
intendere al re’ che tutti gli altri cerchino d’ ingannarlo
e che lui solo vole conservarlo nella sua autorità
independente della volontà di parlamenti.’
[46] Summary in Rushworth ii. 71. Cp. Hallam,
Constitutional History ii. 76.
[47] A. Correro gives the sum (Relatione di 1637). Cp.
Garrard to the Lord Deputy, in Stratford Letters i. 413.
[48] Garrard to the Lord Deputy, in Stratford Letters ii.
117.
[49] A. Correro: ‘Per dubio che mettendosi in scompiglio
tutte le provincie, non si sollevassaro.’
[50] A. Correro mentions ‘Imposte annuali perpetue in
virtù della regalità nominatamente sopra abloni, che sono
ingredienti per far la birra, vini, taverne, tabacco,
carboni di terra, saponi e simili.’
[51] Or, as he says again, ‘havendo fatta strada all’
autorità assoluta per la legale.’
[52] Mr. Attorney General, his second day’s argument (in
Rushworth ii. 573): ‘I find by the books that are kept in
the council chamber, that the preparations were in October
ao. 87; I find no parliament called that year; yet by the
letters and orders from the council board these ships and
defence that were made, was adsumpt of the subject.
[53] The charges that were afterwards brought against
individuals with regard to this transaction, and are still
repeated at the present day, may be passed over, especially
as the intentions of each person cannot be ascertained.
There can be no doubt that Lord Coventry had a great share
in it.
[54] A. Correro, Relatione 1637: ‘Stanno attaccati alle
leggi come ad un asilo e litigano le cause sotto la loro
protestatione con solo fine che le leggi si veggano violate
ed essi costretti.’
[55] Forster, Statesmen ii. 122.
[56] Panzani, Relatione dello stato della religione:
‘Ognuno confessava che non mai si erano veduti tempi
migliori: non e però che l’ uso della religione sia libero,
essendo ancora vive tutte le leggi severissime, ni possono
essere rivocate, se non da un parlamento.’
[57] Ex registro literarum Georgii Cunei. Brit. Mus. 15390.
[58] Cuneo to Cardinal Franc. Barberini, Jan. 7, 1637.
[59] Dispaccio 16 Settembre, 1636: Io dissi, Sire, noi
(cattolici) teniamo Vra Maestà sopra il parlamento. Egli
rispose che era vero, ma che bisognava pensare alla
difficoltà grandissime.’
[60] ‘Il re dimando se non mi pareva che fosse opinione
cattiva di supporre l’ autorità regia ai capricci d’un
uomo.’
[61] 12 Marzo 1637. ‘S. Maestà mi contò discorsi passati
tra lui ed il confessor del re di Spagna in materia di
religione e del tutto S. M. mostrò d’ essere restata poco
sodisfatta.’
[62] Cuneo: ‘Demandai al re, che dottrina teneva egli per
buona, fuori quelle che era nella scrittura sacra. Il re
me rispose, che credeva li primi quattro concilii ed i tre
simboli.’
[63] Conference with Fisher the Jesuit. History of the
Troubles, 460.
[64] Cuneo’s Letters, June 5, 1637. ‘Il Cantuarense seguita
en li soliti artificii a mostrarsi buon capo della chiesa
Anglicana. Ho procurato di far tastare il Cantuarense,
in ordine di levare lo scisma, ma egli è molto vario nel
suo discorso ora mostrando di voler aderire alia dottrina
delli primi 400 anni ed ora lamentandosi del concilio di
Trento--timido ambicioso ed inconstante e poco abile all’
imprese grandi.’
[65] Ubi sint locorum verbi dei ministri eandem illi atque
aequalem omnes habent tum potestatem, tum autoritatem,
ut qui sint aeque omnes Christi unici illius episcopi
universalis et capitis ecclesiae ministri. Art. 31.
[66] Fuller, Church History x. 307.
[67] De republica ecclesiastica. T. ii (1620), lib. vi.
[68] Brace’s Calendar, 1633-4 furnishes in the preface and
in the extracts which it contains, much new information
about Laud.
[69] According to Correro, Relatione 1637, his offence was
‘d’aver parlato alla tavola contre il presente governo. La
sua pena--ha eccitato le lingue quasi dell’ universale alle
maggiori exclamationi.’
[70] Dated at Dublin Castle, December 16, 1634. Strafford
Letters i. 344. The Canon in Collier ii. 763.
[71] Considerations, in Strafford Letters ii. 60.
[72] Forster’s Statesmen ii. 380.
[73] Gussoni, Relatione 1635: ‘Gli Inglesi navigano molto
meglio armate di quelle caravelle Portoghesi, quali erano
per la maggior parte preda degli Olandesi.’
[74] Gussoni: ‘Abonda con molta superfluità cosi per il
numero d’ offiziali et ministri d’ ogni qualità, come per
le assignationi del piatto quotidiano che si da lauto e
splendido anche eccedentemente.’
[75] Gachet, Lettres de Rubens. Guhl, Kunstlerbriefe ii.
189.
[76] Old Parliamentary History xix. 83; Waagen, Kunstwerke
und Kunstler in England, i. 450.
CHAPTER IV.
CONFLICTING TENDENCIES OF THE AGE AND WITHIN THE KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN.
If we adhere to the view that the Latin and Teutonic
nations, in the development which they have reached under
the influence of the Western Church, make up a great
indivisible community which furthermore appears as an unit
in the world; and if we further look for the characteristic
features by which this system of nations is distinguished
from all other growths of worldwide historical importance,
we find that they are principally two; the close connexion
between Church and State involving a constant struggle
between these two principles; and next the mixture of
monarchical with representative institutions in each single
country and the internal conflicts thence arising. At times
republican formations made their appearance; yet they were
hardly able to emancipate themselves from aristocratic
and even from monarchical forms. At times absolute
monarchy obtained the upper hand; but, if we consider the
governments which are most conspicuous in this respect,
we find that the supreme will of the sovereign was hardly
ever able to prevail over the great obstacles presented by
provinces and individuals. So there have been centuries
in which the great monarchies appear to have been broken
up or oppressed by the hierarchy: but even the Papacy met
with opposition; the authority of those self-same popular
bodies, which were perhaps originally allied with it, in
later times was opposed to it. The characteristic life
of the West, the continuity of its development, and its
ascendancy in the world, are due to this conflict between
ecclesiastical and political influences, between the [A.D. 1637.]
tendencies towards monarchical and those towards
representative government, and to the mutual action of
independent nationalities, within an unity which embraced
all, but yet was never complete, and was rather ideal than
actually realised.
The great secession from Rome which came to pass in the
sixteenth century did not break up this system of nations.
The more remote were brought at times into closer relations
with one another by the universal opposition and struggle,
which in turn very materially affected the shapes into
which the domestic relations of the individual states were
thrown.
If Protestantism contributed to strengthen the power of the
sovereigns under whose lead it was carried out, yet the
temporal estates also shared the gain which accrued from
the defeat and curtailment of ecclesiastical interests;
for by this means their own power became more firmly
established. The restoration of Catholicism at a later
period had a very different effect. The concessions which
the Papacy voluntarily made to secure it, redounded mainly
to the advantage of the sovereigns. The Popes themselves,
in order to revive their ecclesiastical authority in every
country, employed all the pecuniary resources which could
in any way be raised in their newly conquered state, which
now for the first time was entirely reduced to obedience.
In Italy they created for themselves a new Grand Duchy,
by the erection of which the rights of the municipalities
comprised within it were entirely destroyed. The Spanish
monarchy, which in this epoch played the most important
part, had not, it is true, annihilated, but had kept down
the independence of the provinces in the Italian as well
as in the Spanish peninsula, which in earlier times had
been so powerful; and as by the aid of American gold it
had obtained a power independent of the good will of the
Estates, the authority of the sovereign was asserted far
and wide. These two agencies reacted most powerfully upon
Germany. Even before the Thirty Years’ War the territories
of the ecclesiastical and Catholic princes followed the
example of Rome. During the war, and by means of it, the
house of Austria brought into subjection the representative
constitution of the kingdoms and countries belonging to it [A.D. 1637.]
which had attached themselves to the principles of
Protestantism. Frederick Elector Palatine stood at the head
of these independent bodies, but they did not understand
how to support him effectively. They fell with him. The
same thing then happened in the central districts of
Germany, where the combinations between sovereigns and
estates were so weak from their rivalry with one another
that they went to ruin.
In France Catholicism had once helped the Estates in their
struggle against the monarch, but this alliance could not
be maintained. After the hereditary sovereign had reached
throne by the going over to Catholicism, he still based his
authority upon the maintenance of an equilibrium between
the two religious parties. But for his successors this
policy was no longer necessary. The Catholic portion of
their subjects attached themselves to them without any
regard to a title conferred by the Estates; and though
the magnates then sought for safety principally in an
alliance with Protestant interests, the result was that
ecclesiastical and political independence sustained a
common defeat at the hands of the sovereign and of the
Catholic party. The power of the state assumed a deeper
Catholic colour the more it aimed at absolutism.
The principle of monarchy combined with Catholicism now
appeared in different forms in three great kingdoms. In
that of Spain it was intolerant of Protestantism, but was
surrounded by provincial assemblies of estates, whose
action, although subdued, was not altogether annihilated:
in the French monarchy it appeared more tolerant of the
Protestants even on its own ground, but was master of the
Estates, which just at this period were completely subdued:
in the Austrian monarchy it was intolerant both towards the
Protestants who were persecuted and ejected, and towards
the Estates which had just been conquered. The struggle
which had broken out between France on the one side, and
Spain combined with Austria on the other, caused the two
latter kingdoms to adopt, or at least to try to adopt, the
principle of unity under an absolute monarch which had
been carried out in the former. There is a very peculiar
difference in the relations of the three powers with the
German Protestants, who were saved from utter ruin by the [A.D. 1637.]
intervention of the King of Sweden. The French sought to
make the Protestant Estates of the Empire as independent
as possible of Austria: Spain at that time was willing to
tolerate their faith, but wished to bring them back under
the control of the Emperor: at the Imperial court itself
there was a tendency prevailing, at least for a time, to
suppress both their belief and their independence.
Thus the Western world at this epoch was pervaded by a
threefold hostility: by the religious dispute between the
two great parties, in which the Catholic party had obtained
an immeasurable superiority: by the great opposition
in regard to foreign policy between France and the
Austro-Spanish power; and by a third antagonism in regard
to domestic affairs. The monarchical had become more than
ever supreme over the constitutional principle.
Let us now sum up the position which England under the
Stuarts occupied in these great questions.
From the posterity of Mary Stuart, who at the same time
were the successors of Queen Elizabeth, and to whom the
alliances of both queens descended, nothing else could be
expected than that they should interfere but little in the
religious struggles of the continent. They sought to keep
on good terms, and even in alliance with both parties. They
had certainly been implicated in the great struggle by the
affair of the Palatinate: Charles I had on one occasion
even taken up a position at the head of the Protestant
party; but he had suffered a defeat in that character. This
connexion had even turned out ruinous to the Protestants:
henceforward he left them to shift for themselves as far
as the principal question was concerned, and followed only
his private end, the restoration of his nephew, the Elector
Palatine.
In his disputes with the two great continental powers,
James I had carried out still further the policy for which
Elizabeth had paved the way. He had contributed to the
emancipation of the Republic of the Netherlands from Spain,
for the ascendancy of this monarchy by land and sea was
obnoxious to James himself. But he would go no further. It
was altogether contrary to his wish and intention that he [A.D. 1637.]
was involved at the end of his days in a quarrel with
Spain. As in the religious, so also in the political
conflict, the Stuarts did not wish, properly speaking, to
take the side either of France or Spain. From this radical
tendency of their policy they sometimes deviated, but
always returned to it again.
In both those great questions in fine which decided the
future of the world, Charles I, after his interference had
once resulted in failure, no longer took a pronounced and
independent part. We saw what was the issue of his wish
to be the ally at the same time of Sweden and of Spain.
In domestic affairs on the contrary he had fixed his eyes
upon a definite aim. Here, although the questions which
were agitated might be altogether native to the English
soil and atmosphere, his policy had some analogy with
that which prevailed on the continent. He also, like the
great Catholic sovereigns, sought to crush the pretensions
of the Estates in political affairs; and he, like them,
endeavoured to strengthen the royal power by means of the
attributes of the spiritual.
It was not that Charles I had thought of subjecting himself
to the Papacy. We know how far his soul was averse to this:
he could not come to an understanding with the Pope even
about the formula in which the Catholics were to promise
their obedience, in order to make their toleration possible
for him. The English crown could not be strengthened, as
was the case with other powers, by encouraging the ideas
of Catholicism: on the contrary, it was rather supported
by the authority which it had wrested from the Papacy. The
royal supremacy over the Church was intended, by means
of the closest alliance with the Protestant bishops, to
become, in the hands of the supreme power, a weapon which
should be employed in all three kingdoms. The bishops were
confirmed in their possessions and dignity; moreover the
common opposition to their opponents, who had been hated by
the Stuarts before they left Scotland, united the bishops
as closely as possible with the sovereign, whose cause
they defended as their own. When the crown found that its
interest lay in sparing the Catholics and suppressing the [A.D. 1637.]
Puritans, an extraordinary effect followed; the
ecclesiastical power which had grown out of the Reformation
proved more favourable to the adherents of the old creed
than to the zealous champions of the new.
This was completely in harmony with the position of the
Stuarts when they received their crown. They wished to be
Protestants, but to avoid the hostility of the Catholics
and, if possible, to annihilate Puritanism. Their relation
with the Episcopal Church was on the whole the same with
that which Elizabeth had established; but it differed from
it, inasmuch as the Queen persecuted the Catholics with
decided hostility and tolerated the Presbyterians as her
indispensable allies in this conflict, while the Stuarts
hated the Presbyterians, and wished to grant toleration to
the Catholics.
The hereditary right of the Stuarts, which was acknowledged
by both religious parties, had been the ground of the union
between Scotland and England, and of the greater obedience
of Ireland: it was therefore natural that the Parliaments
should appear to these monarchs to be subordinate
provincial bodies, which had only a limited influence
on the government of the whole monarchy. They thought
themselves fully warranted in enforcing the rights which
the monarchy derived either from the abstract idea they had
formed of it, or from the customs of their predecessors,
without regard to the Parliaments. They regarded them as
assemblies of counsellors which they might consult or not
at their discretion, and whose duty it was to support the
crown, without the right of dictating to it in any way, or
of obstructing it in its movements.
The whole system arose out of the views, experiences, and
intentions which James I brought with him to the English
throne. But this sovereign was as skilful in practice as
he was aspiring in theory. Incessant oscillation between
opposite parties had in him become a second nature. He
avoided driving the adversaries with whom he contended to
desperation: he never pushed matters to an extremity. He
never lost sight of his end for a moment, but he sought
to effect his designs if necessary by circuitous paths,
and by means of clever and pliant tools; he had no scruple [A.D. 1637.]
about sacrificing any one who did not serve his purpose.
Charles I deemed it important to avoid this vacillation.
He loved to be served by men of decided tone and colour,
and thought it a point of honour to maintain them against
all assaults. He adhered without wavering to those maxims
and theories which he had received from his father, and
which he considered as an heirloom. He always threw himself
directly upon the object immediately before him. In the
world which surrounded him, Charles I always passed for
a man without a fault, who committed no excesses, had no
vices, possessed cultivation and knowledge to the fullest
extent, without wishing to make a show in consequence:
not indeed by nature devoid of severity, which however he
tempered with feelings of humanity;--for instance, he could
hardly be brought to sign a sentence of death. Since the
death of Buckingham he appeared to choose his ministers
by merit and capacity, and no longer by favouritism:
even his queen seemed to exercise no political influence
over him. But this calm, artistic, religious sovereign,
certainly did not add to his qualities the cleverness
which marked the administration of his father. James could
never be really affronted: he put up with everything
which he could not alter. Charles I had a very lively
and irritable sense of personal honour: he was easily
wounded and sought to revenge himself; and then perhaps
he committed himself to enterprises, the scope of which
he did not perceive. He wanted that general sense of the
state of affairs which distinguishes what is attainable
from what is not. He prosecuted the quarrels in which he
was involved as zealously and as long as possible, and
then suddenly renounced them. People compared him to a
miser, who turns over every penny, as we say, before he
parts with it, but then suddenly throws away a large sum.
Yet still when Charles I made concessions, he never made
them unconditionally. This trustworthy man could bring
himself to balance the promises he made in public by a
secret reservation which absolved him from them again.
With Charles I nothing was more seductive than secrecy.
The contradictions in his conduct entangled him in
embarrassments, in which his declarations, if always
true in the sense he privately gave them, were only a [A.D. 1637.]
hair’s-breadth removed from actual and even from
intentional untruth. His method of governing the State
was in itself of an equivocal character, inasmuch as he
declared that he wished to uphold the laws of England,
and then notwithstanding made dispositions which rested
on obsolete rights and ran counter to what all the world
deemed lawful: he affirmed that he did not wish to encroach
upon Parliamentary government, and then nevertheless did
everything to relieve himself for a long period from the
necessity of summoning Parliament. Notwithstanding all the
forbearance from shedding human blood which he had imposed
on himself, yet he had the severest punishment inflicted
upon the opponents of his system, by which even their lives
were endangered. For his political aim outweighed all other
considerations, and he did not hesitate to employ any means
to attain it.
The system of Charles I consisted in making the royal
prerogative the basis of government. He had no military
forces however which he could employ to secure that object,
such as at this time were used in France to maintain
the supreme authority: on the contrary, foreigners were
surprised to see how completely the King was in the hands
of his people; that there were hardly any fortresses
to which he could fly for safety in time of need; that
everything depended on the laws and their interpretation.
This was just what gave importance to the fact that some
of the heads of the judicial body, and those too the
very men who had formerly belonged to the Parliamentary
party, such as Noy and Littleton, now became champions
of the prerogative. Their change may have been due to
altered convictions and lawyer-like attachment to one
side, as there was much found in the laws which could be
urged in favour of their present view; or it may have
arisen from slavish ambition, animated by the desire to
obtain the highest offices. Many persons in England as
well as in France, and with the same zeal which was shown
in that country, espoused the idea of the sovereignty
of the crown; they thought that it was older than all
Parliaments, and was acknowledged in the laws. From the
duty of defending and ruling the kingdom they inferred the
right of the King to demand from his subjects the means
of fulfilling that duty. All the provisions of Magna [A.D. 1637.]
Charta, or of the laws of Edward I to the contrary, or the
doctrines of law-books, which in fact contained much that
was indefinite and dependent upon the circumstances of
the time, were of no account in their eyes in comparison
with this right. And while the advocates of these views
thus had a position which could be regarded as legal,
the administration had already found in the Lord Deputy
of Ireland a man who had the will and the capacity to
develop government by prerogative to its full proportions.
And the Archbishop of Canterbury, who had never wavered
for a moment, so conducted the government of the Church
as to uphold the King’s prerogative of supremacy in
ecclesiastical affairs. He appeared to aim at establishing,
or rather, properly speaking, already to possess in
substance a British patriarchate, such as that which long
ago in Constantinople had stood beside the throne of the
Greek emperors, and had promoted their views. Although
different in procedure, and in the foundation on which
they rested, these efforts had a general coincidence with
the policy which was being carried out in other great
monarchies in the name of the sovereign by ambitious
ministers, obsequious tribunals, and devoted bishops. Where
in England was the power which could have resisted it? In
order to realise the dull dissatisfaction and the despair
of the mother-country which was spreading in consequence,
we must recollect that the colonisation of New England was
due to emigration from English shores. Even at an earlier
time a troop of exiled believers, who termed themselves
pilgrims, and who in fact were seeking a refuge in
Virginia, had been driven further north, where they founded
New Plymouth. After existing for ten years, the colony
reckoned no more than three hundred members, and it still
lacked legal recognition. But the increasing ecclesiastical
oppression which prevailed in England now impelled a number
of families of some property and position in Suffolk,
Rutland, Lincolnshire, and Northamptonshire, to turn their
steps in the same direction. Their principal object was
to erect a bulwark in these distant regions against the
kingdom of Antichrist, which was being extended by the [A.D. 1637.]
Jesuits[77]. For they thought that they had to fear lest
the English Church also should fall a victim to the ruin
which had overtaken so many others. How much better, they
imagined, would the faithful in the Palatinate and in
Rochelle have done, if they had seized the right moment
to secure an asylum for the exercise of their religion on
the other side of the ocean! That country in which they
could best serve God seemed to them their fatherland. As it
conduced to their safety that they should not cross the sea
as fugitives without rights, they obtained for themselves
a transfer of Massachusetts Bay and the neighbouring
territory, drawn up according to the forms of English law.
But even this was not enough to satisfy them, for they did
not wish to be governed from England, after the fashion
of other colonies. They did not decide on transplanting
themselves until they had received by charter the right
of transferring the government of the colony to the other
continent. John Winthrop, if not in wealth, in which some
others surpassed him, yet in descent and position the most
distinguished among those who conducted the enterprise was
the first governor of the society and of the colony. In the
year 1630 the emigrants, numbering about 1500, crossed to
America in seventeen ships, sailing from different ports.
But year by year other expeditions followed them[78]. For
on this side of the water the pre-eminence accorded to the
English Church was constantly becoming more decided, while
on that side Presbyterianism, in the strict form in which
it was now embodied, had free scope. In the year 1638 the
colonists were reckoned at 50,000, and they had already
established a number of settlements in the country.
And this colony even then appeared a place of refuge for
political exiles. We must certainly reject as unfounded
what has been so often related and repeated, that Hampden
and Pym were hindered by the government itself from going
to America: but it is true that they had entertained the
thought of going. Their names are found on the list of [A.D. 1637.]
those to whom the Earl of Warwick assigned as a settlement
a large tract of coast which he had acquired[79].
The catalogue of these names is also remarkable in other
ways. We find on it the names of Lord Brook, and of Lord
Say and Seale, who, like the Earl of Warwick himself,
were among those members of the aristocracy who offered
the most decided opposition to the designs of Charles I
and of his ministers. They passed for opponents of Weston
and of the Spaniards, and for friends of Holland and
even of France. Another special bond of union was the
Presbyterian interest which was, as it were, the element
in which the colony lived and moved. Lord Warwick, one of
the largest proprietors in England and America, was one
of the principal patrons of the colony. His mother’s name
is conspicuous among those of the benefactors of the new
plantation.
But the nobility in general were by no means upon the
side of the King. Their influence indeed had been already
felt in the attacks directed by the Lower House against
the rising power of Buckingham. If the King abstained
from convening another Parliament, they would thus lose
the principal influence upon public affairs which they
possessed. The English aristocracy did not share the
fiery impulses of the French; as it did not at once rise
in insurrection, it did not incur those chastisements
for disobedience with which the other was visited by an
inaccessible power in the State. It waited for a convenient
season to come forward.
Like the great nobles, and even in a higher degree than
they, the landed gentry felt themselves threatened and
endangered by the revival of laws which had fallen into
abeyance, and claims to rights which had been forgotten.
The extension of the forest-laws was effected without
their participation by juries of foresters, wood-rangers,
and other persons interested in the advantages which were
to be expected from such an extension: their verdict was
afterwards confirmed by judges discredited by the suspicion
of partiality.
The displeasure of other circles was roused by the
degrading penalties which the ecclesiastical courts
inflicted on men of no mean position. Very few might find [A.D. 1637.]
pleasure in Prynne’s attack upon the drama; but to crop his
ears for some words which referred to the Queen appeared
an affront to his University degree and to the barrister’s
robe which he wore.
And how deeply was public feeling humiliated when the
sentence of the judges followed affirming the royal claim
to ship-money: men were seen passing one another in silence
with gloomy looks. Even those who did not grudge the
King a new source of revenue, and esteemed it necessary,
were yet alarmed that it could be assured to him without
grant of Parliament. The doubtful legality, to say the
least of it, of this proceeding inspired anxiety lest
the untrustworthy, morally contemptible and covetous men
who contended for the claims of the crown, should become
masters of the government, without any possible expectation
of a Parliament to instil into them some fear and respect.
Such however was now the condition of affairs: no one
had a position which enabled him to raise his voice to
remonstrate; and any free expression of opinion involved
the extremest danger. The authority of the Church and of
the judges, supporting itself on its own interpretation of
the laws, now governed England. This system was extending
itself over Scotland by the agency of the friends and
adherents of Laud: in Ireland a resolute will drew the
reins as tight as possible. It seemed likely in fact that
the union of monarchical and ecclesiastical power, which
prevailed in the rest of the Teutonic and Latin world,
would also take possession of England, and would thus gain
a complete ascendancy.
The foreign policy of England was fairly in keeping with
these tendencies in domestic affairs. The great Anglicans
and champions of the prerogative showed little ardour for
the cause of European Protestantism. On the other hand the
adherents of Parliament, and the Nonconformists, regarded
the cause of this creed as almost identical with their
own:--opposite views which were found even at court, but
threw the nation most of all into confusion, and were
the main cause why the efforts of the King encountered a
resistance which by degrees proved insuperable.
The great struggle began in Scotland.
FOOTNOTES:
[77] From a letter of the younger Winthrop in Bancroft i.
[78] In the year 1634 D’Ewes (Autobiography ii. 112)
expresses his astonishment at the number of God-fearing
people of both sexes who were resorting to that far-distant
region, ‘there to plant in respect of the doctrinal part
one of the most absolutely holy orthodox and well-governed
churches.’
[79] In Hutchinson i. 64.
CHAPTER V.
ORIGIN AND OUTBREAK OF ECCLESIASTICAL DISTURBANCES IN
SCOTLAND.
Not one of the governments of Protestant countries had had
so little share in carrying out the reform of the Church as
that of Scotland. The change had taken place in opposition
to Mary Stuart, or the representatives of her rights. James
I had accepted it, so far as doctrine was concerned; but he
had from the first shown a dislike for the ecclesiastical
constitution in which it was embodied.
His ancestors had always found support in their connexion
with the hierarchy; and in the same way we have noticed
that this prince, induced in the first instance by the
relations of the different elements in the state, had
sought to restore episcopacy. Political reasons were
supported by considerations of a strictly religious
character, but above all by the example of England. The
establishment of episcopacy appeared to him the principal
step towards effecting the union of both countries: he
regarded it as one of the great tasks of his life.
Properly speaking the revival of episcopacy passed through
two different stages of development during his reign.
So long as George Gladstane was Archbishop of St. Andrews
(1607-1615), the Scottish episcopate remained pretty nearly
what it was originally intended to be--a superintending
body such as had previously existed. Gladstane showed great
indulgence in the exercise of his archiepiscopal rights
themselves. He tolerated everywhere the ecclesiastical
usages which had been imported from Geneva, and which
allowed much freedom to the minister. Among learned
theologians a school was developed, principally by [A.D. 1618.]
Cameron’s action in opposition to Melville, which
reconciled itself to the episcopal system in this shape,
and many ministers adhered to it. A sensible addition was
made to the strength of Anglican and episcopal tendencies
when, in the year 1615, John Spottiswood became Archbishop
of St. Andrews, and thereby primate and metropolitan of
the Scottish Church: he was one of the three bishops who
had received their episcopal ordination from English
bishops, and had in consequence espoused the theory of
apostolical succession. Even Spottiswood did not go so far
as to wish to take the legislative power of the Scottish
Church out of the hands of the General Assembly of the
clergy: on the contrary he himself, in conferring with the
King, opposed a scheme of legislation which aimed at this
object; but, while he reserved the rights of the Assembly,
he thought himself justified in using it to promote the
reception of episcopal authority, and to bring about a
nearer approach to the Anglican system. In this he sided
with the King, even if he was personally not convinced of
the necessity of a change. He cherished the opinion that
obedience must be shown to the King in everything which was
not in contradiction to the faith; and he asserted this
principle in the Assembly of Perth in the year 1618, with
such success that the King’s proposals were accepted by a
considerable majority. These proposals were embodied in the
decrees known under the name of the Five Articles of Perth.
They decided various points, among which the practice of
kneeling at the reception of the Lord’s Supper, and the
observance of high festivals were the most important.
But whilst the Archbishop satisfied the King, he provoked
the hostility of those zealous Presbyterians who looked
upon the conclusions of the Assembly, which they affirmed
to have been this time influenced by the bishops, as a
falling away from former laws, and were ready to urge many
objections to them on the ground of doctrine. The practice
of kneeling at the reception of the Lord’s Supper was
objected to by them, because no mention was made of it in
the words of institution. They met the demand that they
should observe high feast-days with the assertion that
they contained points of agreement with heathenism; as for [A.D. 1627.]
instance Christmas Day was only another form of the
Norse Yule Feast[80]: and they laid the greatest stress
on keeping Sunday strictly as the Sabbath. The rest of
the Articles of Perth were almost entirely disregarded,
and these two, the most important of them, were very
imperfectly carried out[81].
The distinction between active and passive resistance
in regard to the will of the sovereign, which appears
at this moment, is significant of the state of affairs.
The ministers did not wish to resist the King, for they
were still doubtful whether such conduct was reconcilable
with the Divine commands; but they refused on their part
to follow ordinances which they deemed unlawful and
inconsistent with the established religion. This obedience
which they refused would be active obedience: merely to
abstain from resisting they also considered obedience, and
this they denominated passive obedience, and believed that
they might satisfy their duty by paying it[82].
James I had no desire to go further, and resisted the
demands of those who urged him to do so; for, as he said,
he knew his people, and did not wish to fall out with them
as his mother had done.
In the first years of his reign Charles I also allowed
toleration to prevail. When the preachers who had been
appointed before the introduction of the Articles of Perth
neglected to obey them, he overlooked their omission. The
affairs of the Scottish Church were left in the hands of
Spottiswood, who, in spite of all counter-influences,
conducted them peacefully, with foresight, and with a
certain moderation. But when, after the conclusion of
peace with France and Spain, the system of combining
ecclesiastical with political authority began to prevail
in England, affairs assumed another aspect in Scotland
as well. The vacant bishoprics, which had hitherto been
filled up according to the recommendation of the Scottish [A.D. 1633.]
bishops, were now disposed of according to the wishes of
William Laud, whom the King made his counsellor in the
affairs of the Scottish Church as well as of the English.
He, however, selected young men who concurred with him in
his hierarchical and theological opinions. A new system,
the Laudian, later indeed also called the Canterbury
system, found acceptance in regard to the constitution and
dogmas of the Church. General assemblies of the Church
were as carefully avoided in Scotland, as Parliaments in
England; and that with the definite object of concentrating
ecclesiastical power entirely in the hands of the bishops,
on which subject the testimony of the early Church was
collected and put forward. At the same time favour was
shown to those Arminian opinions which ran counter to the
common feeling of the country in favour of Calvinism, that
had been strengthened and advanced by the Synod of Dort.
When Charles I came to Edinburgh in the year 1633, he
was attended by Laud; and his design of introducing into
Scotland the external forms of divine service in use in
the Anglican Church was displayed without any disguise.
In the royal chapel their introduction was attended with
no difficulty; but elsewhere no one would hear of it. In
Parliament the King met with opposition in his attempt to
determine the most purely external matter of all,--the
dress of the clergy. In proportion as the government
favoured the introduction into Scotland of usages similar
to those of the Anglican Church, zeal for Presbyterianism,
which in contrast with these usages was identified with
Puritanism, gained the upper hand. In May 1633 an address
was presented to the King, in which the absence of binding
force in the Articles of Perth was again pointed out, and
a restoration of independent ecclesiastical jurisdiction,
and of the old constitution in general, was demanded. It
was urged that a General Assembly of the clergy ought to
be held every year; that the prelates called to a seat in
Parliament were bound by the instructions of the Assembly,
and were responsible to it. What the petitioners desired to
restore was the old independence of the Scottish Church as
established on its first erection, free from all encroachments
of the crown, and with a merely nominal episcopate such as [A.D. 1633.]
that established by the statutes of 1592 and 1597, which
the King was requested to restore.
Under the pressure of encroachments, which increased
notwithstanding these manifestations of opinion, a peculiar
form of opposition grew up in the Scottish Church, which
at any rate went perceptibly beyond the bounds of passive
obedience[83]. The ministers hit upon the institution of
private meetings, which were held with the faithful who
were in agreement with them. At the beginning of every
quarter notice of these meetings was secretly given, and
every member prepared himself for them beforehand by
fasting. The assembled congregation then set itself to
take into consideration the danger which threatened the
true Church from the action of the bishops. Prayer was
made to God that He would put an end to this danger by
wholesome means[84]. At times there were even conflicts in
those congregations whose ministers had submitted to the
ordinances of the government. When meetings, instituted
after the model of Geneva, were held before the Communion
for putting an end to all mutual complaints, the ministers
were called to account by some members of the congregation.
People would no longer receive the Lord’s Supper at their
hands, nor according to the prescribed ceremonies; but they
sought for men who observed the old ritual, or else they
abstained altogether from communicating. To the official
church of the King and the bishops, almost as in former
times, when the revolt from the Papacy took place, a secret
worship was opposed which united men’s hearts in inward
resistance to the attempts of the government.
And on this as well as on the former occasion the
opposition spread to the highest circles in the country.
The Stuart kings of Scotland had striven from the beginning
to break down the importance of the great vassals, which
was due to the old clan relationship, but especially to [A.D. 1633.]
wrest from them the administration of justice. King James
on his last visit had instituted public discussions
about questions of this sort, and with an air of triumph
had announced to the chieftains the joy he felt when he
vindicated his claims on these occasions. But Charles I
now assailed the position which the nobles at that time
occupied with regard to property. The collection of tithes
had given the nobles great authority over the proprietors
themselves and over the clergy who were interested in
them, although only to a small extent: these he now made
redeemable. He attempted to take back, either in the
interests of the crown or for the endowment of bishoprics,
a part of the property of the Church which had passed into
the possession of the nobles during the tumultuous times
of the Reformation. Even this occasioned great agitation,
especially as it was intended to carry out the measure
without giving compensation. Lord Nithisdale, who attempted
to enforce it in the name of the King, ran a risk of losing
his life in consequence. The violence of feeling was still
further increased by the favours granted in political
matters to the Protestant hierarchy[85]. Controversies
about precedence arose between the temporal dignitaries
of the state and the bishops, who were reinstated and,
arrayed in silk and velvet, rode to Parliament in the midst
of the nobility with all the old ecclesiastical pomp. At
the coronation of 1633 the King wished that the Archbishop
and Primate should take precedence of the Chancellor for
that one day only. The Chancellor Hay, Earl of Kinnoul,
answered that, so long as the King left his office in his
hands, he would retain it with all its privileges, and that
no man in a stole should walk before him. But not rank and
honour alone, but very substantial elements of power, were
at stake in this dispute. Among the thirty-two Lords of
Articles, upon whom in Scotland the previous discussion
of all resolutions to be laid before Parliament devolved,
the eight bishops were the chief: they nominated the eight
noblemen, and these latter the sixteen other members. It is
plain that by this means they exercised a very active [A.D. 1635.]
influence upon the deliberations of Parliament. But the
ecclesiastical jurisdiction which was set up was still
more burdensome to the Lords. In Scotland, as well as
in England, a High Commission based upon this supreme
jurisdiction of the King was instituted, in order to bring
before the tribunal all transgressions of ecclesiastical
ordinances, and even those persons who were only suspected
of transgressing them. The Privy Council, which exercised
the power of the King in Scotland, was commissioned to
enforce its sentence. The clergy and the men of learning
first felt the pressure of this authority, but neither
birth nor rank were a defence against its proceedings.
The Scots affirmed[86] that the tribunal outdid even the
Spanish Inquisition in harshness and cruelty. While in this
way bitter feelings were raised by the collision between
the high nobility and the bishops, the most disagreeable
impression of all was made on the former when King Charles
introduced a number of bishops into the Treasury-board,
into the temporal courts of justice, and into the Privy
Council. In old times the seals of the kingdom had been for
the most part in the hands of learned clergymen, because
from their experience in canon as well as in civil law
they could best advise the King: following this practice,
Charles I in the year 1635, after the death of Kinnoul,
nominated an ecclesiastic, no other than Archbishop
Spottiswood himself, to the Chancellorship of the
kingdom[87]. This dignity had been latterly an object of
emulation and ambition among the temporal lords; and they
felt themselves aggrieved when a clergyman, who thereby
combined the supreme spiritual with the supreme temporal
authority, was preferred to them. The person most mortified
was Archibald Lord Lorne, afterwards Marquess of Argyle, [A.D. 1636.]
a man who thought that he had a definite claim to the
office, and who indisputably possessed all the capacity
required for it. The aspiring Bishop Maxwell roused the
jealousy of the treasurer, Lord Traquair, who suspected an
intention of dispossessing him of his place, and investing
the bishop with it.
In this way the advancement of the ecclesiastical element
had already roused various antipathies of a political
and religious nature. The nobles feared for their
possessions and for their jurisdiction, especially as some
well-grounded objections might be made to the latter;
principally however for their share in the authority of
the state, which seemed doomed to pass into the hands
of the clergy. The country clergy cherished anxiety for
their independence, and the people for the accepted
ecclesiastical usages with which religion itself appeared
to them to be bound up. Yet all this would hardly have led
to an open outbreak of discontent. Meanwhile, however,
the King and Archbishop Laud again took up an old plan
which had been formed by James I, had been long ready for
execution, and had only been postponed on account of the
difficulties into which the King had feared to fall in
consequence,--the plan of fortifying the episcopal power
in the Scottish Church by issuing a new book of canon law,
and at the same time of binding Scotland more closely to
England by bringing the Church service of that country
into conformity with the English. A similar attempt on the
part of the Lord Deputy had just succeeded in Ireland: why
should not such a measure be forced through in Scotland?
The majority of the Scottish bishops held out hopes of
success.
The Book of Canon Law was first brought out. It was drawn
up by three English bishops, the Archbishop of Canterbury,
and the Bishops of London and Norwich, who belonged to the
prevailing school of opinion. It was sent to Edinburgh,
there amended, ratified in this shape by the King, in May
1635, and promulgated in the year 1636.
It stands in sharply-defined contradiction to the
ecclesiastical customs and to the opinions of the Scots.
The Scottish Church had always opposed the royal supremacy:
but in the new law-book this was laid down and enforced on [A.D. 1636.]
pain of excommunication against all who should resist it,
on the ground that it had been exercised by the Christian
emperors of the first age. The Scots had originally claimed
an independent legislative authority for their Church
assemblies: the new law not only ordained that they must be
summoned by the King, but also that even the bishops should
not be authorised to introduce any alteration without the
previous consent of the King. Single ordinances, as for
instance those which prescribed the form of prayer in
the Church, or the consequences of divorce, ran directly
counter to Scottish usage. But the authority of the
bishops, which all the measures aimed at securing, gave
the greatest offence. The bishops alone were to have the
right of expounding the Scriptures; private meetings of
ministers for this purpose were to be forbidden; no one
was to be allowed to controvert the opinion of another
minister of the same diocese from the pulpit without
permission of the bishop; without this permission no one
was to give instruction either in public or in private;
the bishops were to inflict punishment at their discretion
when any publication appeared in print without the approval
of the censor[88]. It is plain that these provisions
put the whole internal life of the Church in regard to
opinion and doctrine into the hands of the bishops. And
was not the constitution of the Scottish Church virtually
abolished when canons which made so thorough a change were
to be introduced without the participation of the General
Assembly? This was an affront to the national feeling of
the Scots. ‘Supposing it were true,’ they said, ‘that the
Scottish Kirk belonged to the province of York (as was
formerly pretended), yet more than the bare warrant of
the King would be required to introduce ordinances which
affected the life of the Church collectively.’ The laws
enforced beforehand, and that under threat of the severest
penalties, the acceptance of a liturgy which had not yet
appeared.
In October 1636 this liturgy was proclaimed by the King,
and the order to conform to it was promulgated amid the
sound of trumpets. No one had yet seen it. But a rumour [A.D. 1637.]
circulated to the effect that to the English ritual, which
already retained too much of Roman Catholicism, it added
still further ceremonies of a decidedly Popish tendency. It
was to be introduced at Easter 1637: at last it made its
appearance, at any rate in single copies.
The introduction into the Scottish Church of the
English Prayer-book in its entirety had been originally
contemplated, and in no other way can the arguments be
explained which are given in the preface. The union of
Christian churches in one system of doctrine and under
one ritual was therein stated to be the most desirable
end possible, which, as the authors lamented, could not
be universally attained, but must be striven for in those
countries which obeyed the same sovereign. The Scottish
bishops, however, had thought that the book would meet
with a better reception in their country, if it were not
simply the English Prayer-book. Draughts of alterations
were more than once forwarded from England to Scotland,
and sent back again from the latter country: the King
himself had a personal share in them. For the most part
they were attempts to return to ancient rituals that had
existed before those ages which could properly be called
hierarchical. If the choice lay between Protestant forms
of expression, the older were accordingly preferred to the
more recent. The greatest stir was made by the formula
which was prescribed for the administration of the Lord’s
Supper. The selection of this was connected with the
differences between the first Book of Common Prayer of
the year 1549, and the second of 1552, which was drawn up
at a time when Swiss doctrinal conceptions exercised a
stronger influence. The first form clings to the doctrine
of the Real Presence: the second corresponds more nearly to
the idea of a commemorative meal. Under Queen Elizabeth,
who believed in the Real Presence, both formulae had been
combined; in the Scottish Liturgy Laud returned to the
first. Nothing is there said about Transubstantiation: the
formula could not be called Catholic but Lutheran. But it
was at any rate a departure from Calvinistic conceptions,
which regarded Lutheran views as far too nearly allied
to Roman Catholic: popular comprehension interchanged [A.D. 1637.]
the one with the other. But nothing more was wanting to
give prevalence to the opinion, for which the way had
already been sufficiently prepared, that the Liturgy was to
pave the way for the re-introduction of Catholicism.
Neither Charles I nor Archbishop Laud had any such design.
But could any one be surprised that they were charged with
entertaining it? The toleration which the King allowed the
Catholics to enjoy, and from which the Catholic element
received fresh life in the neighbouring kingdom of Ireland;
his connexion with the Catholic powers; his dilatoriness
in the affair of the Palatinate; his inclination to
Spain, which was constantly re-appearing; the presence of
a Papal envoy at the English court; the authority which
men professing Catholicism acquired in the administration
of the State,--all these considerations might well
supply reasons why this anxiety might be felt without
any discredit to those who entertained it; though rumour
exaggerated their importance. Further indications were
supplied by the book of Canon Law, which gave to the power
of the bishops an extension corresponding with Catholic
rather than with Protestant ideas; and even if fears were
not exactly entertained about the further existence of
Protestantism, yet the introduction of Anglican forms into
Scotland could not fail to create general excitement.
Tidings had just come of the shocking punishments
which were inflicted in England upon the opponents of
hierarchical tendencies: were men to be exposed to a
similar procedure in Scotland? An instance had already been
furnished of the lengths to which ecclesiastical tendencies
could lead when supported by the laws against high treason,
so extraordinarily severe in Scotland. Lord Balmerino had
been condemned to death for the share which he had taken in
drawing up, or even in merely spreading about, the Puritan
address before referred to: he owed his life solely to the
mercy of the King.
The introduction of the Canons and of the Liturgy was not
due to fondness for ceremonies nor to a passing fancy, but
it was the keystone of the system which James I had all
his life kept in view without carrying it out. Charles I
took steps to bring it into execution. The Liturgy would [A.D. 1637.]
not have had much importance without the Canons: with
the latter it completed the edifice of political and
ecclesiastical subordination, which for the first time
reduced Scotland to complete subjection. Properly speaking
the whole country was against it: it was opposed by the
Presbyterian element, nowhere stronger than there, by the
native government itself, and by the great nobles, who
felt themselves specially threatened and alarmed by the
precedent established.
Not precisely on Easter Day, but soon afterwards, the
introduction of the Liturgy was begun. It did not appear
in print till April, when the arrangement by which every
parish was to be supplied with two copies, could be carried
out. Here and there divine worship after the new form was
introduced, for instance in Galloway. Opposition indeed
showed itself even during service, but it was treated as a
disturbance of outward order, and had no further effect.
As people delayed to purchase copies the Privy Council
renewed its ordinances, threatening the refractory with the
pains of rebellion. On this the bishops thought that they
could no longer delay in the capital, although the murmurs
were loudest there. They appointed the last Sunday before
the end of the regular session of the courts of justice
for introducing the new Liturgy, in the hope that people
on their return home would spread over the whole land the
tidings of its introduction in the capital, and that this
example would be followed. They perceived a sullen movement
under their feet which they hoped to put an end to by
prompt and consistent action.
But the adversaries of the Liturgy would not allow matters
to go so far. The execution of the measure in the capital
must have been followed by so great an effect, that they
deemed it necessary to resist it.
Immediately before the day appointed, a number of proud
nobles and ministers zealous for the faith were seen
assembling in Edinburgh. Tradition affirms, although as
often happens the statement is not fully attested, that the
opposition which was then offered was excited and prepared
by them.
On the 23rd of July, 1637, the dignitaries of Church [A.D. 1637.]
and State had assembled in the great church of St. Giles
in Edinburgh. The Chancellor-Archbishop, many bishops,
among whom the Bishop of Edinburgh did not fail to appear,
the members of the Privy Council, although these were not
all there, the members of the High Court of Justice, and
the magistrates of the town, were there; they wished by
their presence to give authority to this solemn proceeding.
But the Dean had hardly opened the book when fierce cries
arose from the midst of the assembled audience, which were
redoubled when, at a signal from the Bishop, he began to
read. Abusive epithets were directed against both, giving
utterance to the opinion that they were lending themselves
to an anti-Christian proceeding, for the sake of their
own personal advantage; that the book was papistical, nay
Satanic, and that Satan was already introduced into God’s
house. The women of the lower class who were present showed
that rough impetuosity which characterises them in their
personal behaviour: they rose up and threw their stools at
the heads of the Bishop and the Dean. It was necessary to
remove the tumultuous crowd before the Liturgy could be
read or the sermon preached: even then this was done only
amid noises at the doors and showers of stones discharged
against the windows. The Bishop was attacked on his way
home, and was saved only by the escort and protection of
a temporal lord[89]. And so lively and powerful was the
excitement, that the lawless and seditious proceedings
which had taken place could not be punished.
On the 28th of July the Provost and Baillies of the town
promised to provide for the peaceful introduction of the
Liturgy on the next Sunday, and for the security of the
persons concerned in it. The Privy Council wished for
an assurance on the part of the citizens, over whom the
magistrates had not complete power. The arrangements made
for this purpose were thereupon to be proclaimed with beat
of drum, but the repugnance to the measure exhibited itself [A.D. 1637.]
so strongly that no one ventured to stir it up to fresh
outbreaks. On Saturday, July 29, the Archbishop and Bishops
saw reason to propose that the use of the new Book of
Common Prayer in Edinburgh should be postponed until the
King should make known his pleasure in respect of the
punishment of the tumult which had occurred, and should
have taken measures for its peaceful execution. Meanwhile
neither the old nor the new Liturgy was to be enforced,
but only the sermon was to be delivered by obedient and
compliant ministers[90]. The Privy Council assented to this.
The civic authorities took a fatal step when they gave
way to an outbreak of the seditious feeling of the
capital, and claimed the immediate interference of the
distant sovereign in its behalf. In order to explain the
commotion, people compared the noisy crowd with Balaam’s
ass, which was obliged to speak because men held silence:
an expression in the Biblical phraseology of the time,
which however may intimate the silent agreement of the
upper ranks with the masses. They had been told that the
Liturgy would destroy the old faith and bring back Popery.
But what is more popular among great Protestant peoples
than hatred of Popery? The ministers had from the first
aimed at teaching the people that in matters of religion no
blind obedience was due to the ruling powers, but that God
must be obeyed rather than men. And with this doctrine on
the present occasion an uprising of the multitude in the
town against the magistrates was immediately connected,
like those which had accompanied religious excitement on
countless occasions, especially in the sixteenth century.
The magistrates would have been glad to conform; but the
populace held out and carried the day.
The public peace in the kingdom of Great Britain rested
upon the undisturbed observance of the ordinances
introduced, and on the customary obedience paid to
constituted authority: the monarchy as we have seen was
without weapons. But if order was to prevail anywhere, it
must be disturbed nowhere. If a breach occurred in any one
place, as at this time in Edinburgh, it affected the whole [A.D. 1637.]
country. The capital of the second of the two kingdoms had,
by throwing aside its spiritual, at the same time thrown
aside its temporal obedience.
After this first step in resistance, a second and more
definite one was immediately taken. Some zealous ministers
in Fife met the repeated summons to introduce the book by
a demand that they might be allowed to prove it first,
especially as it had not been laid before the General
Assembly, which was the representative body of the
Church. The Bishop of Ross replied to them that they were
mistaken; that the representation of the Church was in
the hands of the bishops. But this question was the great
question of the day. The ministers, who insisted upon
their old established claims, presented a petition to the
Privy Council which, amid all this commotion, thought it
expedient to hold a session on August 23, in the middle of
the vacation. In this petition they based their request
for a suspension of the order issued to them simply on
the ground that the Liturgy had not been confirmed either
by the General Assembly, which since the Reformation had
always, they said, had the management of Church affairs,
or by Parliament[91]. ‘This Church,’ they exclaimed, ‘is a
free and independent Church, just as the kingdom is a free
and independent kingdom.’ They thought that as the patriots
should decide what was best for the kingdom, in the same
way the pastors should decide what was best for the Church.
They held that the Romish Church, to which this book
brought them nearer, was just as idolatrous, superstitious,
and anti-Christian now as at the moment when they had
separated from it. The expressions which the speakers used
were echoed back from all parts of the country. The Privy
Council remarked with astonishment, that even those who
had hitherto obeyed the will and the laws of the King,
made common cause with his opponents. The Council thought
that it was justified in suspending all further steps for
introducing the Liturgy until the King had again taken
the matter into consideration, and had expressed his will
decisively.
And in truth there could never perhaps have been a more [A.D. 1637.]
opportune moment for seriously weighing the position of
affairs, for investigating the causes of the discontent,
and for meditating how to remove them. If any one had
called to mind by what means James I had once succeeded in
quelling the rebellion of the town of Edinburgh, he would
have found that his success had been principally due to the
King’s agreement with the nobles of the country. If it had
been asked how he had achieved so much in ecclesiastical
matters, it would have been seen that the scale was turned
in his favour, because among churchmen too he always had a
party on his side, and knew how to avoid steps which would
excite prejudices universally felt. But on the present
occasion there were found, even among the bishops, some
who resisted the introduction of the Liturgy, so that the
Archbishop of Canterbury himself expressed a wish to learn
the objections which were made against certain articles,
and showed an inclination to pay heed to them. But it is
quite clear that the matter could now no longer be settled
in this way. Men’s minds had been seized by anxiety lest
their old native Church with which the independence and
freedom of the country were bound up, should be brought
to an end. This fear could no longer be dispelled by the
surrender of one or two controverted points of theology.
The King, dissatisfied with the Privy Council, which
had not, as he thought, done all that lay in its power
to enforce the two books, and extremely incensed by the
tumult in the Scottish capital, demanded the punishment
of the disorder, and the performance of divine worship
according to the prescribed form[92]. He did nothing to
calm either the nobles or the clergy; his declaration was
not calculated to meet the existing state of affairs,
of which the disturbances were symptoms, but rather the
symptoms themselves, which he regarded as manifestations
of a disobedience which the weight of his authority would
soon suppress. But while he entertained this hope, he was
forced to learn by experience that the cause of resistance [A.D. 1637.]
and disobedience received almost universal support in
Scotland.
Expectations were rife that an answer from the King would
shortly be communicated to the people; but at the same
time fears were entertained lest an attempt should be made
to introduce the Liturgy in Edinburgh by force on the
arrival of the Earl of Lennox, who was on his way from his
ancestral castle to the English court. At this juncture
some of the more eminent among the great nobles, such as
the Earls of Sutherland, Rothes, and Dalhousie, a great
portion of the gentry, especially from the neighbouring
counties, such as Fife, where hardly any remained at home,
some deputies from the boroughs, and about a hundred
ministers, assembled in Edinburgh in order to prevent the
enforcement of any obnoxious measures, and to defend the
ministers informed against by giving them free support
in the Scottish fashion. When the reasons urged by these
ministers had been stated, the assembled body declared that
the introduction of the Liturgy would disturb the peace
of men’s consciences and the harmony of the country. They
called upon the Privy Council to represent to the King the
importance of the matter, which they said he ought not
to regard as an ordinary tumult, and to prevail upon him
not to tamper with the religion they professed. The Privy
Council accepted the petition, which had the assent of its
lay members; Lord Traquair had himself looked through the
petition, and had softened some harsh expressions in it.
The Earl of Lennox promised to do everything at court to
put the King into a frame of mind favourable to it.
Thus the King’s designs were met by a demonstration on
the part of the most distinguished Scots, and indeed of
almost the whole country itself; and it is clear into what
embarrassment he must have been thrown by it, between the
desire to give effect to his will, and the wish to continue
at peace with the land of his birth. But from the first
moment the opposition between them was too strong to be
controlled by such considerations as these.
FOOTNOTES:
[80] We know that the boar’s head, which was eaten,
conveyed an allusion to Gullinbursti, the bristly boar
who signified the sun. Bede derives Easter from a German
goddess Eostra.
[81] According to a notice by Spottiswood 1627. Aiton, Life
of Henderson 118.
[82] Calderwood, the author of the history, put this
distinction before the King himself, according to his
account, vii. 263: ‘We will rather suffer than practice. To
suffer is also obedience.’
[83] Grivances and petitions--presented by me, Mr. Thomas
Hogge, minister of the evangell, in my aven name, and
in name of others of the ministry. Balfour Annales, ii.
207. Among their complaints was one relating to the name
Puritans. ‘Pastors and people adhearing to the former
professione and practisse are nick-named puritans.’
[84] The Memoirs of Bishop Guthry 9.
[85] From the report of the King-at-arms. Aiton, Life of
Henderson, 129, 137.
[86] ‘La quelle (it is said in an instruction of 1640) en
rigueur et cruauté surpasse l’inquisition d’Espagne, car
en cette nouvelle cour les evesques seuls commandoient
à la baguette, avec un pouvoir absolu--à l’encontre de
toutes sortes de personnes, de quelque condition et qualité
qu’elles fussent’ Russel, Life of Spottiswood xliii.
[87] Baillie, Jan. 1637. ‘The last year (1636) our bishops
guided all our estate, and became very terrible to our
whole country.’ A later petition (1638) of the Scottish
Privy Council complains of ‘the illimited power which
the lords of the clergie in this kingdom have of late
assumed--its unwarranted power.’
[88] Canons and Constitutions Ecclesiasticall--ratified
by H. Maj. royal warrant--and ordained to be observed:
Aberdene, 1636. Cp. Collier, Eccl. Hist. ii. 762.
[89] Account of the riots on Sunday, July 23, 1637. From
Wodrow’s Life of Lindsay, in Aiton, App. I.
[90] The Clergie’s report about the Service-book. Apud Edr.
29 Julii, 1637.
[91] Supplication of certain ministers of Fyffe, and
Information given to several counsellers, in Baillie, App.
i. 400.
[92] A relation of proceedings concerning the affairs of
the King of Scotland from Aug. 1637 to July 1638, by John
Earl of Rothes.
CHAPTER VI.
THE SCOTTISH COVENANT.
The cause of Presbyterianism in Scotland was also the cause
of the Presbyterians in Ireland and England. We hear of
violent pamphlets which arrived from England and poured
oil upon the flame. The greatest activity was displayed
by the ministers who had been banished from the Scottish
colonies in Ireland. Unable to offer further resistance
in that country to the ordinances of Wentworth and of the
Irish bishops, they sought refuge in Scotland: and as
they found there a spirit like their own ready to meet
them, they threw themselves with ardent and unbounded
zeal into opposition to the progress of that episcopal
authority which had compelled them to retire from Ireland.
That discipline and subordination which had hitherto been
maintained in Scotland had been broken up by the course
of affairs above mentioned. All obstacles had thus been
removed from their path in that country: the injustice
which they had suffered doubled their hatred of the system
of Charles I and his ministers; and they exercised an
incalculable influence upon the excitement of Puritan and
Calvinist feelings prevailing in Scotland[93].
But the cause of the Scots appeared to be at the same
time the cause of Protestantism in general, which had
been everywhere placed at a disadvantage in consequence
of the defeat of Nordlingen. In the year 1637 the arms [A.D. 1637.]
of the Catholics asserted their supremacy on the Rhine and
in the Netherlands. The Swedes were driven back to the
coast of the Baltic, and were not disinclined to accept
a pecuniary indemnity. The Peace of Prague, which united
the interests of the Emperor and of Spain with those of
certain powerful princes of the empire, but did not satisfy
the just demands of the Protestants, appeared destined to
become an inviolable law of the empire. By this superiority
of the Austro-Spanish power, France, which the year before
was obliged to withstand a most dangerous invasion from
the side of the Netherlands, felt herself threatened. We
shall return hereafter to the political complication in
the midst of which France and the other powers defended
themselves against this ascendancy. They believed
that by so doing they were at the same time defending
Protestantism. It would have seemed very damaging to that
cause if King Charles, to whom all the world ascribed an
inclination in favour of Spain, had succeeded in carrying
out his designs in Scotland. But, even apart from this,
the advance which Catholicism was once more beginning to
make roused the Protestant spirit to the utmost vigilance.
From the Protestant point of view, the re-establishment
in a Protestant country of institutions resembling the
old form of worship and the old constitution appeared
exceedingly dangerous. This is the true reason why people
detected a tendency towards Catholicism in the introduction
of the Liturgy. It was not found in the words, but the
general tone which was felt to pervade it led men to this
interpretation. The Scottish troops which served under the
Swedish flag, their connexion with their native country,
and their movements backward and forward, were the means
through which the common feeling for Protestantism at large
was kept alive in their country. If the fear lest the great
religious struggle should have an unsuccessful issue was
in the minds of so many Englishmen one of the principal
motives for emigrating to America, how could the same cause
fail to act upon the Scots as well? They thought that,
supported by their ancient rights and laws, they could
offer resistance without incurring on this account the
guilt of rebellion.
The 17th of October was the critical day for the course [A.D. 1637.]
which they afterwards adopted.
The harvest had now been gathered in, and a still larger
number of persons than before had assembled in Edinburgh,
with the intention of moving the capital, where the
magistrates still adhered to the side of the King, to
join in the petition which had been presented; and at
the same time they wished to await there the answer of
the King. A courier had already brought one, which was
made known on the evening of that same day. It had not
exactly the character of a refusal, but rather that of
a postponement[94]. The King declared that he could not
yet give instructions on account of the disturbances
which had not yet been suppressed. For this reason he
suspended the competence of the Privy Council in church
matters as the first step, and caused orders to be given
that all who had come to the town should leave it within
twenty-four hours. In order to remove the Privy Council
from contact with the excited multitude, he ordered its
sittings to be transferred from the capital to Linlithgow.
In this manner he thought to check the influence of
popular excitement upon legislation and government. But
it would be impossible to describe what a storm broke out
at this announcement among the assembled people. They saw
in it the intention and will of the King to carry out
the introduction of the Liturgy, at any rate as soon as
he should find an opportunity, in spite of the wishes of
his people to the contrary. One of the ministers present,
himself a Presbyterian and an opponent of the Liturgy,
expresses his astonishment nevertheless at the violent
agitation by which his countrymen were seized: he says
that it could not have been greater if any one had wished
to force upon them the Mass-book itself[95]. In this
frame of mind they were not satisfied with repeating and
enlarging the petition, but a project began to gain ground
which gave its whole tone to the movement in Scotland. [A.D. 1637.]
Not content with standing on the defensive against the
Liturgy and the Book of Canon Law, the assembled people
resolved to go further and to attack those to whom, in
their opinion, the attempt to introduce them must be
ascribed, on the ground that the measure was contrary
to law. They resolved to make a formal charge against
the bishops. For they thought that the bishops were the
original promoters of both these books by which the
doctrine and constitution of the Church established by law
was to be upset; that it was intended to bring back the
country to superstition and idolatry; that the King issued
these commands at their instigation; and that the people
were thrown into the unfortunate dilemma of being obliged
either to suffer prosecutions and excommunication, or else
to break their covenant with God; that every one, in fact,
must endure either the vengeance of God or the wrath of
the King. The nobility, the gentry, and the clergy, held
separate meetings: each order had its own subjects for
deliberation. However much the clergy might be divided into
different schools, comprising adherents of Melville, of
Gladstane, and even of Spottiswood, who sought to adjust
their differences, they all agreed in opposing the present
innovations. The complaint was first proposed and resolved
upon among the clergy, then among the gentry, then among
the nobility. Before the close of the evening a commission
from the three orders was appointed to draw it up, and
executed a draught of it without delay[96]. In this the
reasons assigned were first set out. It was therein said
that the petitioners, as in duty bound, addressed their
complaints against the prelates and bishops, to God, the
King, and the country, and prayed to be heard against them
before a legal tribunal. Next morning this document was
signed by twenty-four lords and three hundred gentlemen,
and in the afternoon by all the ministers present. To many
the expressions seemed too harsh; others thought the whole
proceeding too violent: but it was the only step from which
they promised themselves any result. A skilful lawyer, [A.D. 1637.]
Archibald Johnstone, the advocate, who combined zeal for
the cause with a capacity for finding amid the flames of
legal controversy forms which could be justified, had
principally influenced the assembly at this moment, and had
led them to think of a petition. They were wise in taking
his advice, for what they required was not a manifestation
of feeling, but the certainty of firm ground in the further
conflicts that were to be expected. People felt that they
would be brought to account for what had happened, and that
the petition submitted to the King would be an object of
judicial proceedings. The complaint against the bishops
was first of all intended to put them in the position
of parties concerned, and to prevent them from being
able any longer to sit or to give judgment in the court
of justice from which a sentence of condemnation might
emanate. But this complaint had also a more comprehensive
scope. Its authors did not intend to oppose the King
as such, but to oppose the combination of temporal and
spiritual authority, which constituted the essence of the
form of state government he intended to set up. While the
leaders of the movement recurred to the old laws, and
considered the anti-hierarchical usage of the country as
the foundation of all legality, and as that which above all
must be represented in independent courts, an opportunity
was gained for attacking the existence of episcopal power,
whether in its present extension or under any form at all.
From the existing order they went back to the circumstances
of the time when Presbyterianism was in its vigour as the
only legal state of things.
But if everything now depended on maintaining the legal
ground, no inconsiderable obstacle appeared to arise
from the inability of the Privy Council to adopt the
new petition and complaint;--for this reason if for no
other, that according to the last mandate of the King its
commission in ecclesiastical affairs had been withdrawn.
Manifestly therefore it could not take any legal action.
Nothing else could be expected than that the spiritual
courts, especially the High Commission, should begin
proceedings against the petitioners.
The danger was increased by the fact that Edinburgh was [A.D. 1637.]
not only still liable to punishment for the old offence,
but that it exposed itself to still heavier penalties by
fresh tumults. While the three orders were pursuing their
deliberations there, a rush was made in the town upon the
council-house. The magistrates were actually compelled to
pass their word that another petition in accordance with
the prevailing temper should be sent up on the part of
the town, deprecating alterations in the Church[97]. The
nobles exerted their influence in this tumult in order
to check acts of extreme violence, to which the people
themselves appeared greatly disposed. But at all events,
public order had been disturbed afresh by this means; and
people felt that they must make up their minds that the
government would do everything to chastise this fresh act
of insubordination.
In order to meet this twofold danger, the assembled
nobles and others, to whom on their request permission
had been given to remain four-and-twenty hours longer in
the capital, adopted a second resolution, which like the
first entailed very wide consequences. This took place at a
supper of the nobility, at which deputies from the clergy
and the gentry also appeared. They agreed in refusing
to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the High Commission,
in case it should summon such as then signed or should
afterwards sign the petitions against the two books, and
to support one another in common in this refusal. By
this means they not only secured themselves, but also
the citizens of Edinburgh, who joined in supporting the
petition, and who were expressly allowed to do so.
These were the events of October 17 and 18, 1637. If we
consider merely the tumults in Scotland, they appear, as in
so many other cases, to be the chance result of momentary
ebullitions; but if we look at the legal steps which were
coupled with them, we perceive connexion and consistency in
the leading ideas. The Scots had now won a position, which
they secured by mutually engaging to resist all steps [A.D. 1637.]
which the government was expected to take immediately, and
which might be detrimental to those who had shared in the
resistance. At the same time, by means of the petition,
the way was paved for a return to the old condition
of the country, which had preceded the establishment
of episcopacy; and the widest prospect was opened in
consequence. The petitioners already came forward as a
great association embracing the whole country.
In a new assembly which was held in the middle of November,
but which was appointed at the earlier date just mentioned,
an additional step was taken which imparted a certain
organisation to this association.
This assembly had a different character from the preceding.
All tumult was carefully avoided: those who were present
were hardly noticed in the street. Conferences about the
petition and the acceptance of the complaint were held with
Traquair, who had come with two of his colleagues from
Linlithgow to the town for this object; but the importance
of the day was derived from another feature.
Those who were assembled set up a claim to be allowed to
leave behind in Edinburgh representatives invested with
full powers, assigning the very plausible reason that
this would conduce to the general tranquillity, as they
would then not be obliged to return frequently and in
great numbers. It did not escape the Privy Council how
obnoxious these representatives in their turn might also
become: but another learned lawyer, none other than Thomas
Hope, the King’s Advocate, declared himself in favour of
the scheme. It is affirmed that he had been in the secret
of the whole movement, and had directed the steps taken
from the beginning, and especially those of the nobility.
He gave it as his judgment that it was lawful to choose
representatives not only for Parliament, and extraordinary
assemblies of the Estates, but also for every other
public matter. On this the Privy Council could offer no
opposition. It was determined that two members of the
gentry from each county, a minister from every presbytery,
and a deputy from every borough, with as many nobles as
might choose to come, should constitute the representative
body, but that besides these a smaller committee also, [A.D. 1637.]
presided over by some nobleman, should sit in Edinburgh,
and have the immediate management of affairs[98].
And into this great league the town of Edinburgh also was
now admitted. For it was said that what the common people
there had been guilty of in the days of the excitement
amounted to nothing more than such outcry and resistance
as suppliants might oppose to the intended alteration in
religion. The committee was charged to be on the watch lest
anything should be done to injure them, and to take care
that no attempt was made to introduce the Liturgy into the
town by a surprise.
Thus the party which took the name of petitioners, came
forward united in an organisation embracing the whole
country. From the general body went forth the elected
representatives, and from these the committee, in which the
most enterprising magnates and the most zealous ministers
were united. They formed a league to repel every movement
on the part of the authority of the State, which might
be made towards carrying out the King’s policy. The most
experienced lawyers, among whom was the King’s Advocate
himself, were on their side.
Matters had gone thus far, when in the beginning of
December the Earl of Roxburgh entered Scotland with a
reply from the King. Properly speaking it did not contain
a formal answer to the earlier petition. The delay was
excused on the score of the disturbances in the capital,
by which the honour of the King was declared to have been
insulted: but, while Charles I reserved to himself the
right of punishing these offences, he sought to quiet men’s
feelings in the matter of religion. He declared in express
terms that he loathed the superstition of the Papacy from
his very soul, and that he would never do anything which
ran counter to the religious confession or the laws of his [A.D. 1637.]
kingdom of Scotland. The Privy Council did not delay for a
moment to have this declaration everywhere proclaimed to
the sound of trumpets, and as it produced a very soothing
impression, it led them to hope that they might effect an
adjustment of affairs on this basis. They said that the
King manifestly gave up the introduction of the Liturgy:
what more, they asked, could be expected from so kind
and gentle a sovereign? Traquair said that a symptom of
submission on the part of the capital, a single prostration
on the part of its representatives, the deliverance of
their charter into the King’s hands, would content the
King, for that he was most interested in preventing
foreigners from believing that his authority was despised
by his own people.
But the united petitioners were not to be satisfied so
easily. They wished to be assured of the withdrawal of
the Liturgy not by equivocal expressions, but in distinct
and final terms. Above all, moreover, they wished to
uphold the view that theirs was the truly legal mode of
proceeding. They had taken counsel afresh with the most
eminent advocates--the names of five of them are given--how
the movements that had been begun, on the part of the town
as well as on their own, might be justified by their aim,
which was the restoration of the laws; and how on the other
hand, the illegality of the spiritual tribunals might be
proved. They showed signs of an intention to institute
legal proceedings against those who calumniously asserted
that their behaviour had been seditious. They upheld
the complaint against the bishops with unabated zeal.
Traquair had already at the meeting in November held out
to them a prospect of reaching their end, if they would
take their stand on the rejection of the two books alone.
They answered that so much damage had been done to the
constitution of Church and State, and to the freedom of the
subject in regard to person and property by the bishops
and the High Commission, that they could not be tolerated:
that if the Privy Council would not receive the complaints
against them, it might at least allow an information to
be laid before it in regard to these questions. The Privy
Council at any rate did entirely reject this proposal: it [A.D. 1637.]
declared itself disposed to receive both petition and
information, in case the King’s answer, when it came,
should fail to satisfy the petitioners. But this had now
actually happened. The confederate Scots demanded with
impetuosity the acceptance of the petition and complaint.
The Privy Council long refused to accede to the demand;
it required that at least some violent and offensive
expressions should be moderated; but as these affected the
gist of the matter, the petitioners remained immovable.
On their threat that if their demands were refused they
would betake themselves immediately to the King with
their petition, the magistrates, who did not wish to be
passed over, resolved to receive the petition as it stood
(December 21, 1637[99]). Lord Loudon, after the fashion
which prevailed in the courts in Scotland, appended to
it (in the name of all) a ‘declinatory,’ that is, a
repudiation of every judicial sentence, which the bishops
might take part in drawing up, on the ground that they were
the accused, and that they would, if they sat, be judges of
their own cause.
Thus what was clearly in itself a struggle against the will
and intention of the King acquired the appearance of a
legal controversy with the holders of episcopal power: the
resistance in both cases was based on the same principle.
For both attacks aimed at setting up again the old Kirk, so
bound up with the independence of the country, as the only
legitimate Church.
But all was not yet complete till the King had accepted
the complaint against the bishops. Traquair set out for
the court with the petition in which the complaint was
embodied, with the declinatory of the petitioners and all
other documents. He hoped, by giving thorough information
about the state of affairs in Scotland, to induce the
King to grant yet further indulgence beyond that of which
Roxburgh had held out hopes.
King Charles did not really require new information about
the particulars of what had occurred in Scotland; he was
only too well informed of each and every circumstance [A.D. 1638.]
by his adherents, especially by the bishops. The petitions
and complaints had been given him to read before they
had yet been addressed to him: he knew who had drawn
them up, what exceptions had been taken to them, how
they had at last been adopted: he knew the behaviour of
each individual, and liked or disliked him accordingly.
Traquair set before him, most of all, the power of the
opposition, which he thought it was no longer possible to
break down; he said that the King would require an army to
procure acceptance for the book of the Liturgy: that in
Scotland, now at all events, people would not allow the
national Church to be governed by any one in England: that
they would not submit to the influence of the Archbishop
of Canterbury: that they demanded a parliament in order
to bring controversial questions to a decision in the
country itself; and that people would give way to such
a body alone[100]. At least he himself affirmed that he
had expressed these views. But Traquair was not a man
whose statements could be accepted without reserve. He
was himself one of the opponents of the bishops: he, as
little as the other Scottish statesmen, wished to see them
politically powerful: but at the same time, while he was
aiming at acquiring importance in the estimation of the
people, in order to increase his importance in the eyes of
the sovereign, he fell into an equivocal position: no one
trusted his assurances entirely. Other representations had
also been made, according to which nothing but resolution
and quiet perseverance were needed to revive the wonted
obedience of the people. What a demand, it was said, was
made when the King was asked to receive a complaint against
the bishops who had been leagued with him in the same
enterprise! He would by compliance have declared his own
conduct illegal, and have broken up the constitution, which
had been founded in Scotland at the cost of so much trouble
by himself and his father.
The decision which he gave was the opposite of that which [A.D. 1638.]
had been expected from him. In order once for all to avert
the blow which threatened the bishops, Charles I took upon
himself the responsibility of everything which had been
laid to their charge. He met the suspicions which had
been thrown upon the Liturgy by the assertion that it was
only intended to serve as a means of strengthening true
religion and of dispelling superstition: he took praise
to himself for the trouble which he had personally taken
in its composition: he said that there was no word in it
which he had not approved: he continued firm in his resolve
that it must and should be accepted. He still adhered to
his point of view on church matters with a full sense of
his dignity. He said that if meetings had been held and
petitions forwarded to him in opposition to the book, he
would ascribe this conduct rather to mistaken zeal than to
intentional disobedience, and that he would pardon it; but
that for the future he forbade every assembly of this kind
under threat of the penalties inflicted on treason.
James I had always succeeded in keeping alive the idea of
the obedience that was due to him. Following his example,
Charles I came forward personally, as it were, in defence
of his cause: was it not likely, he thought, that the
disturbance would be kept within bounds on this occasion
also by the interposition of the supreme authority? Would
men refuse to seize the means of escape afforded by the
amnesty which the King offered, and prefer to break with
him instead?
But already during the last tumult astonishment had been
excited by the slight effect which the name of the King had
produced. We read in a contemporary letter that any one
wishing to take King Charles’s part would have endangered
his life, that a demoniacal frenzy possessed the people,
that men had now a notion that Popery was at their doors,
and would not let it go. Baillie expresses his fear lest
they should be forced to drink the dregs of God’s cup
which had been so bitter for the French and Dutch, and his
apprehension not merely of a schism in the Church, but of a
civil war.
The King had been supposed, from his previous declaration, [A.D. 1638.]
to disapprove of the innovations attempted; for he had
then said that he would maintain the laws, to which
these innovations were plainly seen to be opposed: if
nevertheless he now approved them, this change was also
regarded as the work of the bishops only, by whom the
name of the King was thought to be abused. But people
could never bow to this, and allow the bishops in any
way to resume those powers of which they were thought to
have been virtually deprived. As the royal proclamation
declared all previous assemblies and their resolutions,
supplications, and petitions to be null and void, it was
thought necessary, before it was received throughout
Scotland, to forestal it by a protestation, and in this way
to keep the declinatory in force. Measures were taken with
this object at the Castle of Stirling, in Linlithgow, and
above all in Edinburgh, where the main body of petitioners
now again appeared. In order to keep them together, and to
enable those who resisted the royal proclamation to take up
an imposing position, a still more universal demonstration
seemed requisite. More than half a century before, when the
Western world was most violently shaken by the conflict
between Catholicism and Protestantism, and the Scots feared
that they had secret adherents of Catholicism present among
them, they had set up a confession of faith in which all
leanings in that direction were abjured in harsh terms
(March, 1581). This confession, which King James had
approved, had been considered as a covenant of the nation
with its own members and with God, for it was sworn to in
the high name of God. A design was now embraced not only
of renewing it, which had been done more than once, but of
giving it a fresh and immediate importance by adapting it
to the prevailing tone of affairs. Alexander Henderson and
Archibald Johnston the lawyer, who were the leaders and
pioneers of every step of the movement, were commissioned
to draw out the alterations, which they then laid in the
first instance before Lords Rothes, Loudon and Balmerino.
It was not altogether an easy matter to find a formula with
which not only those who had previously conformed would be
contented, but those also who from the beginning had placed [A.D. 1638.]
themselves in opposition: at last however one was arrived
at. The gist of the declaration drawn up lies in the
identification of the King’s efforts to reduce them to
Anglicanism with the hostile movements of the Catholics
in former times. It was laid down that the religious
abuses noticed in the last petitions and declarations
might be looked upon in the same light as if they had been
condemned in the old confession: every one pledged himself
to withstand them with all his might as long as he lived,
and in so doing to defend each man his neighbour against
every one: whatever was done to the meanest among them on
this account was to be considered as affecting each and
all of them in their own persons. On February 28, 1638,
this agreement--of all which bear the name of Covenant the
most famous--was read in the church of the Black Friars at
Edinburgh from the original parchment on which the clerk
had written it, and after the scruples which some few
ventured to express had been easily set aside, was at once
signed. The first who then and there appended his name
was the Earl of Sutherland: a whole series of the most
distinguished names in the country followed his: then the
members for the counties and the gentry signed, and the day
after, the citizens and the clergy. The document was spread
out on a tombstone in the churchyard. Many are said to have
opened a vein in order to sign it with their blood; others
added to their names words which gave additional force to
their signature. With the religious enthusiasm of those who
signed--for in fact people thought that they were opposing
an insuperable barrier to Popery, and were establishing
for ever the prevailing faith--the feeling found vent that
only in this way could they secure themselves against
the hostility of the bishops and the strong arm of the
King. But this was more important for the inhabitants of
Edinburgh than for any one else. The original document was
carried through the streets of the town attended by women
and children who cheered and wept at the same time.
Every one still avoided mentioning the King’s name with any
feeling of hostility in these proceedings: they asserted
on the contrary, that they were contending for God and [A.D. 1638.]
for the King. But who could have failed to perceive that
the current of the agitation would be turned against the
King himself, in proportion as he declared that the cause
of the bishops was identical with his own? He had once
more solemnly proclaimed the old policy of an alliance
between hierarchical principles and the monarchy. But the
Scottish petitioners, in a meeting which he declared to be
treasonable, set before him demands which aimed at dividing
the sceptre and the mitre for ever. They explicitly stated
that the recal of both books would not content them:
they demanded the withdrawal of the High Commission, the
origin of which they said was illegal, on the ground that
powers such as it possessed could only be conferred by the
General Assembly and by Parliament. They demanded, not
exactly the abrogation of the Articles of Perth, for they
had been adopted in Parliament, but the abolition of the
penalties annexed to their infringement, for which no such
authority was found. They did not in so many terms desire
the removal of bishops, but asked for the restoration
of the restrictions under which they had formerly been
appointed: they adhered to their demand that the bishops
should be called to account for their transgression of the
laws of the land, and that before the Presbyterian General
Assembly, by virtue of the statute of 1610: they wished
that this should be summoned yearly for the future: that
the Church should be secured by statute of Parliament, so
that no alteration affecting it should ever be introduced
unless the General Assembly had been previously informed of
it[101].
It was Henderson and Johnston who put these demands into
shape, as well as the preceding: they were laid before the
King almost as conditions of peace from which no abatement
could be made.
Charles I was surprised, affected, and deeply mortified.
What he had undertaken was nothing new, nor strictly
speaking arbitrary. He felt himself free from any real [A.D. 1638.]
inclination towards Catholicism. All that he had set his
heart on was the close union of Scotland with England,
the removal of oppressive aristocratic privileges, and
the strengthening and confirmation of the monarchy. His
ordinances were but a fresh step along the path on which
his father had entered. But downright crying acts of
violence are not needed to call forth violent and general
storms. What stirred men’s feelings and provoked opposition
on this occasion was the stronger pressure which the King
thought himself entitled to use, but which the people and
the great nobles feared would effect the completion of a
detested system. Taking their stand on the ancient laws
of the country, which they expounded in a popular and
Presbyterian sense, the Scots set themselves with logical
consistency to curtail the importance of the monarch. From
defensive they passed to offensive measures. King Charles
thought it almost mockery in them to set the new Covenant
on a level with the old[102]: for although in both the
duty of mutual defence had been set forth, yet in the old
steps were to be taken under the lead of the King; in the
new, on the contrary, they were directed against every
one, without excepting even the King, and therefore under
certain circumstances even against him: and he thought that
the man who entered into such a League could be no good
subject. The demands moreover which were laid before him
at the same time, ran directly counter to the principles
with which he started: they annihilated the power of
inflicting punishment, which had hitherto been based
upon the co-operation of royal with episcopal authority,
and transferred it to the General Assembly, which at the
same time retained an extremely strong lay element. This
power of inflicting punishment however, combined with the
interpretation of the laws, constitutes in a non-military
state perhaps the most important attribute of the sovereign.
The idea of divine right and power from above to which [A.D. 1638.]
Charles I adhered, was speedily and boldly met by another
theory, which, although it did not reject monarchy, yet in
substance undertook to build up the edifice of Church and
State from beneath.
FOOTNOTES:
[93] Spottiswood considers that it is most necessary to
repress them by ‘taking order with the deprived and exiled
ministers of Ireland, that have taken their refuge hither,
and are the common incendiaries of rebellioun, preaching
what and where they please.’ Letter to Hamilton: Baillie,
App. i. 466.
[94] The letter is given in Balfour ii. 236; the
proclamation in Rushworth ii. 402.
[95] Baillie to Spang: Letters and Journals i. 23. ‘I think
God, to revenge the crying sins, is going to give us over
unto madness, that we may every one shoot our swords in our
neighbours hearts.’
[96] Supplication against the Service-book, with a
complaint upon bishops: in Rothes 49.
[97] Rothes: ‘They might concur in the common way of
supplicating against the Service-book.’
[98] I do not find any confirmation of the definite
statements of Aiton, Life of Henderson 207, according to
which four noblemen, three lairds from the counties, &c.,
were said to have constituted this small commission. Rothes
names only Sutherland and Balmerino, with six barons and
some citizens (p. 34). Immediately afterwards (p. 34) six
or seven noblemen appear as commissioners. The nobility had
certainly a great amount of independence in the commission.
[99] Rothes, p. 25; but it was intended that the King’s
consent should be obtained.
[100] A. Correro, 5 Marzo, 1638: ‘Il regno di Scotia,
rettosi per tanti secoli colle proprie leggi nel viver
civile cosi bene come nel ecclesiastico soffirebbeio
gia mai dichiararlo subordinato a questo, il che
s’intenderebbe, quando quelle chiese ricevessero da questo
arcivescovo di Canterbury le regole di laudar Dio.’
[101] ‘The least that can be asked to settle this Church
and Kingdom in a solid and durable peace.’ Rothes 97.
According to Balfour ii. 252 these demands are referred to
the date of March 1638.
[102] The King in one of his declarations characterised
the difference between the old and new Covenant: the old
required ‘that they should mutually assist one another,
as they should be commanded by the King or any entrusted
persons’; but the new bond, which he repudiated, ‘was made
without our consent, and by it they swear mutually to
assist one another, not excepting the King.’ St. P. O.
CHAPTER VII.
ATTEMPTS AT AN ACCOMMODATION. INDEPENDENT ASSEMBLY OF THE
CHURCH.
King Charles thought that the Scots wished to give him
somewhat of the position of a Venetian Doge, but that he
would not yet be reduced to the necessity of complying.
He was confident that he still had a party of his own in
Scotland.
The signature of the Scottish Covenant had run the natural
course of a great political party movement. The universal
bias of men’s minds, the esteem in which a few great names
were held, the insistence of active leaders, made up for
any lack of conviction. A number of copies on parchment, to
which were appended the most influential names, were set
in circulation in the provinces: noblemen and important
landed proprietors canvassed for the signature of their
friends: certain objections were silenced by assurances
of loyal intentions: here and there recourse was had to
threats, and even to active measures against recalcitrants.
Yet there were still many who refused to sign. They felt
themselves repelled by the violent character and method of
the proceeding, by the absence of higher authority, and by
the comparison of Anglican with Popish institutions; or
else they had some regard for the King: many indeed thought
that Episcopalianism would still gain the upper hand. The
learned school of Aberdeen called attention to a statute of
1585, which forbade all associations of which the King had
not been previously informed. One at least among the great
nobles, George Gordon, Marquess of Huntly, who had adopted
the doctrines of the episcopal system at the court of James [A.D. 1638.]
I, adhered to the side of the crown in spite of all
incentives to the contrary. He said that his house had
always been connected with the royal family, and that
it should stand or fall with it[103]. And though the
Privy Council had at first promoted the movement by its
connivance, it immediately withdrew it, as soon as it was
perceived that the centre of gravity of ecclesiastical and
political life was to be placed in the General Assemblies
independently of the government: from that time most
official persons severed themselves from the leaders of the
nobility. They thought that they would be able to resist
the anti-monarchical alliance which had been formed between
the aristocracy and the popular and religious elements, and
to defeat it, if only the King would show discretion at the
right moment. They acted consistently with their original
position in asking him to do away with the two books in
which his system had reached its culminating point, and
to modify the Court of High Commission: as for the rest
they only wished that he should promise himself to take
the grievances of the country into consideration, and so
remove them in accordance with the laws. Traquair and his
friends by no means wished for a General Assembly with such
extensive powers as the Covenanters demanded: they had
reached a point beyond which they did not mean to go.
Charles I at that time, to use an expression current even
in England, had formed a Junta to deliberate on the affairs
of Scotland. It consisted of Arundel, Cottington, the
Secretaries Coke and Vane, and a few Scots of high rank,
the Duke of Lennox, the Earl of Morton and the Marquess of
Hamilton. Archbishop Laud was only now and then admitted
to take part in it, for the embarrassment of affairs in
Scotland had already entered on a stage in which principles
at once episcopal and monarchical were no longer a safe
guide. Even in this Junta the views of the Scottish
statesmen asserted themselves: one of their number, the [A.D. 1638.]
Marquess of Hamilton, was selected, and undertook to go to
Scotland as Lord High Commissioner representing the King,
and to make an attempt to compose the disturbances on the
basis of concessions to be made by the King in accordance
with the views of the Scottish Privy Council.
Hamilton had lived at the English court from his youth.
Early in life he had married a niece of Buckingham, and,
supported by this connexion, in consequence of which his
wife filled an important office at court, had been brought
into the closest relations with the royal family. The King
bestowed on him his unreserved confidence. He had once been
warned against Hamilton, who had an hereditary claim to the
crown of Scotland: the effect of this warning was that, the
very next time he saw him, he invited him to share the same
sleeping apartment with himself on the following night.
Hamilton had given no special attention to study, but he
possessed natural gifts; a keen and solid understanding,
sound judgment, and imperturbable calmness in discussion:
his counsels had the greatest influence upon the King. In
his political and even in his personal attitude, he as well
as the King was dependent upon the change of circumstances.
His mind had a natural tendency to conciliation and
compromise, in consequence of which he had supported John
Dury, who travelled about promoting with unwearied zeal
the union of the Protestant confessions. Devoted to the
King, popular with the Scots, averse from all extremes,
he appeared to be the man best fitted to stem the further
progress of the quarrel that was every day becoming more
dangerous[104].
In May 1638 James Marquess of Hamilton set out for
Scotland. The royal declaration seemed very well calculated
to further his design. He communicated it privately in the
first instance, in order to found his negotiations on it;
and in the beginning of July he made it known publicly.
In it the King reasserted in the strongest terms that he
would adhere to Protestantism, and would not attempt to
introduce any innovation in Church and State in Scotland; [A.D. 1638.]
that he would no longer insist upon the reception of the
Liturgy and of the Book of Canons; that he would bring the
High Commission into harmony with the laws of Scotland,
and would summon a General Assembly and a Parliament at
his earliest convenience[105]. The Scottish government
expressed its thanks to the King for his assurances,
and the hope that his subjects would as was proper show
themselves well satisfied with these concessions.
In fact these concessions corresponded to the original
intentions which still prevailed in many quarters. Had
the King’s instructions appeared on the memorable 17th of
October, things might have taken another turn. But they
could not satisfy those who on that day had revived their
complaint against the bishops with fresh vehemence, and had
thereupon signed the Covenant. They observed that the two
books and the High Commission were not actually abolished
by the King’s concessions, still less the Articles of
Perth; that moreover no mention of their petition was made
by the King; that no notice was taken of the guilt of the
bishops, and that the time of summoning a General Assembly
was left unsettled.
Hamilton offered the malcontents to call an Assembly and a
Parliament at once, if they would renounce their Covenant
and would deliver up the original document. But how was it
likely that that condition should be secured? The zealous
Scots declared that they would rather forswear their
baptismal obligations than the Covenant, the best document
that had been drawn up in Scotland since the fabulous days
of Fergus. They affirmed that it was a mistake on the
King’s part to think that it threatened his authority.
They said that they acknowledged that their weal depended
on the weal of the King, who was set over them as God’s
vicegerent, to uphold religion and to administer justice.
In order to satisfy the religious zeal which was still
coupled with loyalty to the King, the Scottish Council
hit upon the plan of setting up in opposition to the [A.D. 1638.]
Covenant of February another which should emanate from the
King himself. In this the clauses referring to the latest
measures of the government and to the hostile feeling
they had aroused, or implying the possibility of offering
resistance to the King himself, were to be left out, but
the anti-Catholic tone of the first was to be retained, and
to be as prominent as ever. The Scottish statesmen affirmed
that if the two books and the Articles of Perth were then
recalled, the High Commission dissolved, and the General
Assembly acknowledged, there was ground for entertaining
not merely a hope but a confident expectation that general
contentment would revive in the nation, and that all
opposition would be put down at home: for that the movement
in the nation had been caused by anxiety about innovations
opposed to Protestantism, not by any feeling of disloyalty.
On the advice of the highest officials in Scotland and of
his friend Hamilton, the King conceded all these points.
He consented to the proposal for renewing the old Covenant
of his father’s time: he wished this to be signed at his
own injunction, and a proclamation making new concessions
was published in Edinburgh on the 20th of September[106].
The Privy Council expressed its agreement with this
proclamation, which it characterised as the only thoroughly
sufficient means of securing Church and State. They thought
that the King’s subjects should prove their gratitude
to him by hearty obedience, and that whoever henceforth
should venture to disturb the peace of the realm ought
to be chastised with all severity. The old Covenant was
signed by the members of the Privy Council, and was then
transmitted to the King in proof of re-established harmony.
Proclamation was made with his sanction that a free General
Assembly should be held on the 21st of November following
at Glasgow, and a Parliament at Edinburgh in the May of the
next year.
And in the nation these measures were received with hearty
approval in many quarters.
The provost, baillies and town council of Glasgow voted [A.D. 1638.]
the Lord High Commissioner an address of thanks for
his exertions, with which the clergy expressed their
concurrence in glowing terms. The University of Aberdeen
had always condemned the Covenant of the Lords, because it
had been entered into without the consent of the King. Its
members signed the old Covenant without scruple; certain
restrictions were attached it is true, but such as betrayed
a leaning to episcopal government, and an aversion from
the claims of the national assemblies of the Church. Of
the fifteen Judges of Session who had been brought back
again to Edinburgh by Hamilton’s means, nine affixed their
signature to the old Covenant. Even the Lord Advocate, who
had at first assisted the opposition by his advice, now
affirmed that the King’s declaration was the greatest piece
of good fortune which had befallen the Church of God since
the Reformation.
And certainly from the point of view of religious
controversy this appeared to be the case. The King’s
concessions only needed to be maintained and to be
confirmed in the popular assemblies appointed to be held,
in order to constitute a firm foundation for the freedom
of the Church and for that of the State, which was closely
connected with it. Charles I in these negotiations cannot
be accused of obstinate adherence to a foregone system. He
granted everything which the Scots had originally demanded.
This compliance however did not content them; and we
cannot be very much surprised that it did not. It is
ever the rule that when political parties are repelling
an injury done them, peculiar tendencies of more general
application grow up in them. The development of strength,
which was necessary for obtaining some end, feels capable
of asserting itself in a yet wider sphere. Individual
positions, which the holders will not surrender,
obligations to which those who undertook them will not
prove false, contribute to the same result. In Scotland at
that time, Lord Rothes, a man of easily excited popular
and enterprising nature, found himself, to his infinite
satisfaction, at the head of a powerful and constantly
increasing party whose reverence he enjoyed. Lord Loudon,
who had not long left the schools, felt a natural
satisfaction at the scholastic element in the controversy, [A.D. 1638.]
at the opposition of ideas, and the subtle distinctions and
syllogisms which it presented. The conflict which had been
opened offered the widest scope to his ambition, which had
been repressed by his feelings of loyalty[107]. Hamilton
represented to these noblemen that, after the King had done
so much for them, they also were bound to do something
for him. He thought that he might arrange with them what
should be brought forward and decided in the assemblies
appointed to be held. He demanded from them, if they would
not go so far as to sign the old Covenant, at least such a
modification of the new Covenant as the King could accept.
But they declared that they would thus be themselves
condemning the oaths which they had taken, and induced
others to take: they did not deny that it would have been
desirable for them to have had the King’s authorisations
for those signatures and oaths; but they added that the
less authority they had had, so much the less hypocrisy,
and so much the more truthfulness and freedom there
had been. Extensive alterations had followed from the
acceptance of the Covenant: in the presbyteries the
moderators appointed under the influence of the bishops had
been again ejected: in an assembly of burghs the resolution
had been taken to retain no magistrate who had not signed
the new Covenant. They asked whether they were again to
destroy what they themselves had founded, and to break up
the alliance which made them powerful, and which gave them
a better security than all the proclamations of the King?
For his concessions appeared only to have been extorted
by circumstances; they expected that when circumstances
altered, they would again be withdrawn.
And, moreover, the Scottish Covenanters had not yet reached
their ultimate aim. The design of abolishing episcopacy,
of which they had always been accused, but which they had
hitherto, perhaps with truth, disclaimed, was now become
their conscious intention. The main reason of their protest
against the King’s proclamation was, that they might not
appear pledged to maintain the institution of episcopacy. [A.D. 1638.]
They now applied their whole influence to prevent the
signature of the royal Covenant.
It is worth noticing how completely aristocratic and
religious interests were blended on this occasion. In
counties in which the great lords were most powerful the
Covenant of the King did not receive a single signature. A
prophetess arose who declared this Covenant to be made by
Satan, the people’s Covenant to be given from Heaven: and
her utterances found credit. The latter Covenant was indeed
a logical result of the great commotion, and conducted to
further extremes the enthusiasm out of which this commotion
had arisen: the former was a resource taken up under the
pressure of circumstances, and gained no confidence.
These influences had their effect on the elections to the
General Assembly which now came on. The committee of the
Covenanters which sat in Edinburgh exercised the greatest
influence over them. Their instructions to the presbyteries
are extant, in which they caution them to elect no one
who had shared in the institution of bishops or in the
proceedings of the High Commission, or had acquiesced in
the imposition of the Liturgy: but on the other hand, to
make provision in the proper place for the election of
members of the nobility and gentry belonging to their
party[108]; and generally to prepare carefully for the
elections, in order that the votes might not be split up.
Even before this time a dominant influence had often been
exerted in the election of representatives, for instance,
in France, in the constitution of the Assemblies of the
League; but this was perhaps the first occasion on which
popular elections had been conducted by a committee with
such precise instructions. In the elections the adherents
of the Covenant of the nobles were completely victorious.
The Assembly of the Church which was opened on November 21, [A.D. 1638.]
1638, in St. Mungo’s Cathedral, at Glasgow, presented a
very extraordinary spectacle. On the floor of the church
the lords and gentlemen were seen sitting at a long table
as the elected elders of the Church; but their spiritual
capacity did not prevent them from wearing swords at their
sides and daggers in their belts. Behind them on benches,
which rose as in an amphitheatre, sat the preachers:
separate galleries were erected for the public, for the
nobility, and the commons.
Hamilton had hoped to sever the interests of the ministers
from those of the lay elders, and to enlist the former body
on the side of the King. This sight was enough to teach
him how greatly he had deceived himself. He still thought
that the elections most obnoxious to him, which had not
unfrequently been conducted in a disorderly manner, might
be set aside on a scrutiny. In fact, some elections were
declared invalid: but these were only cases in which men
not partisans of the Covenant had been chosen. The Assembly
constituted itself entirely in accordance with the views
of the Covenanters. Henderson was nominated moderator:
Johnston who, as secretary of the Edinburgh Committee, had
had the greatest share in conducting the elections, was
nominated secretary of the Assembly.
Charles I had hoped that the General Assembly would be
constituted according to the forms in use when it had last
met under his father, when hardly anything had been heard
of the lay elders. In that case it might have been expected
that episcopacy would be maintained, even if it were made
subject to the general representative body of the clergy.
But without applying to him for permission, an elder had
been elected to represent every presbytery, and that
without regarding whether the elder so elected was resident
in the presbytery or not. The leaders of the movement, who
were the original promoters and subscribers of the Covenant
rejected by the King, and declared by him irreconcilable
with the duty of a subject, now confronted him as the most
prominent members of an Assembly invested with undefined
right.
Everything had been already prepared beforehand in
the Assembly for taking the decisive step against the
bishops. Just at the time of the elections it had been [A.D. 1638.]
recommended that proofs of their guilt should be collected,
and preparations made for an abstract discussion on the
nature of their office. The bishops now handed in a
declinatory on their part also, in which they especially
insisted on the point that an assembly composed for the
most part of laymen, had no longer an ecclesiastical
character, and by the ancient usages of the Church was
incapable of sitting in judgment on bishops. But in the
prevailing state of opinion, how could any regard be paid
to this objection? The Moderator put the question to
the Assembly, whether they did not consider themselves
nevertheless as the legally-constituted tribunal for
judging the bishops. The Lord Commissioner would have
allowed judicial proceedings to be taken against the
bishops, but only in a General Assembly summoned according
to the forms usually adopted of late, not in this Assembly,
against which he had protested from the beginning, and
which every one knew to be contemplating the entire
abolition of episcopacy. He thought that he could not
await the issue of the voting. He once more explained why
he was obliged to declare the composition as well as the
claim of the Assembly to be illegal; and he then pronounced
its dissolution in the name of the King. But the Assembly
was now in a humour which mocked at the exercise of any
authority on the part of the crown. Henderson said that
the Lord Commissioner might uphold the prerogative of
his master as much as he pleased; but that there was yet
another prerogative, that of the Church of God, and the
General Assembly must take care of this. He first put
the question to the Assembly whether, in spite of the
declaration which they had heard from the Commissioner,
they thought of proceeding with their deliberations.
Only some ten votes were given in the negative. Then he
returned to his former question, whether the Assembly
regarded itself as the tribunal which had jurisdiction
over the bishops; and this was answered unanimously in the
affirmative[109].
This took place in the seventh session of the Assembly,
on November 28, 1638. On the 29th a proclamation from
the King was read in the Market-place of Glasgow, by [A.D. 1638.]
which all further meetings of the members of the illegal
Assembly were forbidden, and all resolutions which it
might draw up were declared null and void. The Assembly
made answer on the same spot by means of a protestation,
in which they refused to allow this dissolution to take
effect. One of their reasons was the necessity in which
they found themselves of rejecting the Royal Covenant and
of maintaining their own. The members of the Privy Council
had all of them signed the King’s proclamation: only one
name was missing, that of Lord Lorne, now Earl of Argyle,
one of those ambitious and capable men, who with sure
instinct attach themselves to the power which is strongest.
He had chosen this moment for passing over from the side of
the royal Covenant to that of the Covenant of the nobles
and the people.
Thus these elements, whose previous struggles had still
left a hope of reconciliation, now opposed one another face
to face in open and irreconcilable hostility.
The intention originally professed was only that of
abolishing the arbitrary innovations of King Charles, and
of returning to the ordinances which James I had carried
out in the General Assemblies and Parliaments after his
accession to the throne of England. But it had always been
the opinion of the staunch presbyterians, who dated the
decay of the Church from the rise of the royal influence,
that even this course should be opposed: and the ruling
thought of the Assembly at Glasgow was directed to the
same end. Everything was there declared invalid, which had
been enacted in the Assembly of Linlithgow in the year
1606 and in subsequent Assemblies. The two Books, the High
Commission, and with them also the Articles of Perth were
not merely rejected: it was declared a crime to have taken
part in their composition or introduction. Episcopacy was
not only abolished on the ground that it had no warrant in
God’s Word, but it was abjured. Upon the Bishops who had
taken part in the ecclesiastical enactments of the last
ten years, sentence of excommunication and deposition was
pronounced; upon the others sentence of deposition alone.
And how could bishops and lay elders even exist side by
side? The former exhibit the authority of the Church as [A.D. 1638.]
hierarchical; the latter exhibit it as democratic in
principle. The chief obstacle that prevented the Kings from
establishing the authority of the bishops was in truth the
independent origin of the Scottish national Church, and the
correspondence which existed in consequence between its
fundamental arrangements and this origin. The institution
which they had wished to make the basis of their influence
over the Church was now shattered and annihilated. The
most important agencies affecting the state of affairs
were involved in the opposition between the bishops who
supported the crown, and the lay elders whose rights were
bound up with the congregation and with the subordinate
temporal authorities.
We shall not, I think, go too far if we consider the
Scottish General Assembly at Glasgow, notwithstanding its
original ecclesiastical purpose, as nevertheless affording
at the same time a type of subsequent national assemblies
which had a purely political aim. In the conflict of
opposite tendencies a party has here grown up which enjoys
general sympathy to a wide extent, and aims at effecting a
thorough transformation of the whole condition of Church
and State: the supreme authority is compelled by it to
assent to the meeting of an assembly able to bring about
this result: this party controls the elections, and by a
definite organisation brings to pass a result wholly in
accordance with its wish: its leaders themselves are thus
invested with a public character: they obtain a position in
which they proclaim their intentions as the desire and will
of the nation, above all of the national Church, and are
able to force them upon the sovereign, whose ecclesiastical
authority they repudiate. The moment at which Henderson
refused to dissolve the Assembly at the demand of the
King’s Commissary, however widely the circumstances may
differ in other respects, may well be compared with the
first steps by which, a century and a half later, the
newly-created French National Assembly for the first time
withstood the commands of its King. The Assembly of Glasgow
held its sittings, carried on its deliberations, and drew
up resolutions after it had been dissolved by the King,
and its continued existence had been declared an act of
treason. People realised quite well what this state of [A.D. 1638.]
things meant[110]. Into the world, already filled with
various fermenting elements, another was introduced which,
not only from its inherent nature, but from the method in
which it asserted itself, had, both here in Scotland and
everywhere else, a boundless prospect open before it.
FOOTNOTES:
[103] Report of James Gordon, in Napier, Montrose and the
Covenanters i. 153. ‘Some were threatened and beaten who
durst refuse, especially in great citys, as likewise in
other smaller towns: namely at Edinburgh, St. Andrews,
Glasgow, Lanark.’
[104] Burnet: Memoirs of the Dukes of Hamilton 409.
[105] ‘Statuentes ex pio eiga antiquum nostrum regnum
affectu, ut omnia gratiose stabiliantur et instaurenter
similiter adeo ac si nos in sacrosancta persona nostra
ibidem adessemus.’ Letters of Authorisation of May 20.
[106] Articles of Advise offered to His Majesty, August
1638. They were signed by Hamilton himself, Traquair,
Roxburgh and Southesk. Rushworth ii. 758.
[107] Narrative of proceedings, in Rothes 220.
[108] Note on the private articles: Baillie i. 469.
Guthrie’s assertion goes somewhat further: ‘For the ruling
elders, as there was but one from each presbytery, so they
enjoined that he should be a well-affected nobleman, and
failing there a well-affected gentleman; whereby it came to
pass that all the noblemen who were furious in the cause
were elected either in one presbytery or in the other.’ (p.
46.)
[109] Documents in Rushworth ii. 342. Aiton, Life of
Henderson 358.
[110] Cp. Laud to Strafford. Strafford Letters ii. 265.
BOOK VII.
CONNEXION BETWEEN THE TROUBLES IN SCOTLAND AND THOSE IN
ENGLAND AND ELSEWHERE.
CHAPTER I.
CAMPAIGN OF CHARLES I AGAINST SCOTLAND.
Some few score of years before these events, the Aragonese
had rebelled against Philip II for reasons similar to
those for which the Scots rebelled against Charles I.
The pressure of the ecclesiastical and temporal rule as
exercised by that sovereign had made the Aragonese anxious
for their ancient liberties: the Inquisition was as much
hated by them as the High Commission by the Scots; and a
trivial circumstance had sufficed to cause the nobles, the
hidalgos, and the towns to revolt in quick succession. But
Philip II had arrayed against the Aragonese the power of
his principal state of Castile, to the position of which
they feared to be reduced, had recovered their obedience
by force, had still more narrowly restricted their ancient
liberties, and had established the royal authority more
firmly than any of his predecessors had ever succeeded in
doing.
The cause of the Scots involved yet more serious issues
than that of the Aragonese. If the Aragonese had been
victorious, they would only have revived within narrow
territorial limits a representative Catholic constitution,
according to the ideas of the middle ages. The Scots on the
other hand repudiated everything which reminded them of the
old hierarchy and its alliance with the crown: they laid
claim on religious grounds to a political freedom such as
had never yet existed in the world.
So much the more did Charles I believe himself entitled to
put an end to this movement by force of arms. Even at the
time when Hamilton first went to Scotland, and expressed
his anxiety lest he should be met by protestations and [A.D. 1639.]
rebellious assemblies, the King had plainly said that in
such a case he might collect troops and scatter the rebels.
‘But,’ rejoined Hamilton, ‘what if there be not troops
enough found in the country for this purpose.’ ‘Then,’
answered the King, ‘power shall come from England, and I
myself will come in person with them, being resolved to
hazard rather my life than to suffer the supreme authority
to be contemned.’ Hamilton had offered far more than
the King originally intended, but, in spite of all his
advances he had only awakened a more violent opposition.
The letters in which he announces this result strike a
chord of self-reproach, we might almost say of contrition,
for he felt deeply that he had brought the King into an
almost untenable position. On his return he expressed his
conviction that the only course now open to the government
was to crush the rebels by force of arms. It was intended
that Scotland should be coerced by England, in the same way
that Aragon had been coerced by Castile.
In the Privy Council and among the friends of King Charles
this design was debated from various sides.
It was pointed out to him that a war between his subjects
in the two countries, whatever the issue might be, could
only bring loss to him who was King over both. And who,
it was asked, could guarantee to him that England would
bestow the assistance of which he stood in need? He would
be conjuring up a storm which after such long years of
peace would burst forth with all the greater violence. How
much better under all circumstances was an agreement, more
especially as mercy became a king.
In answer to this by the other side, it was said that the
agreement must above all be such that the King should
appear in it as master, and should assert his importance.
Of all misfortunes which a sovereign could undergo, loss
of authority was the worst; and the loss moreover was most
severe, when he had intended to make an alteration, and
had been compelled to withdraw it: the subject then became
insolent, and the sovereign fell into the plight of being
no longer master, but servant. What an unendurable position
it would be to sit still and to go on making concessions to
men actually engaged in rebellion. Even a serious war would [A.D. 1639.]
be better than such a peace: and if the King would surround
himself with trusty counsellors, would place the nobles
under an obligation to his cause, be gracious to the
people, and then courageously take horse, everybody would
follow his example[111].
Still further considerations, of a less general but of
all the more urgent character, are stated in the letters
exchanged between the two men to whom Charles I was
accustomed to give most heed, Wentworth and Laud. They
found the reason of the embarrassment which had arisen in
Scotland, not in the King’s design itself, but in the want
of proper means for its execution. Wentworth said moreover,
that if these rough spirits were able to carry out their
disorderly designs against the honour of the King, the
danger would be as great in England as in Scotland: that
the peace of the three kingdoms depended on the course
taken by this movement. Laud answers in similar terms. He
adds, that if the King did not defeat the Scots, a second
confusion would arise greater than the first, and that
no one could see what this would bring with it in its
train[112].
These two men were the principal supporters of the
unparliamentary and hierarchical system which the King
had undertaken to enforce. From the first moment they had
felt the recoil of the Scottish movement upon both the
other kingdoms: they saw that the whole system as well as
themselves personally would be endangered by its progress:
and they were of opinion that their whole strength must be
exerted to put an end to it, cost what it may.
The assertion was advanced at this very time that an
alliance between the Scottish and English nobles had
preceded the disobedience of the former: that they had
made an agreement in regular form to abolish the episcopal
constitution, and to curtail the prerogative of the
King[113].
But this is without doubt too strong a statement. The [A.D. 1637.]
Scottish nobles were aware of the discontent of a powerful
party in England which was excluded from the government.
They may have reckoned upon it, but at this time no proof
is found of a formal agreement.
What is recorded of the alliance between the religious
parties in the two kingdoms with a view to common action
has greater credibility. A Scottish clergyman, who had long
resided in London and returned to Edinburgh in the year
1637, brought with him from the English Nonconformists the
assurance that as soon as anything was done in Scotland
something would be attempted in behalf of Presbyterianism
in England also. And, in fact, after the outbreak of the
disturbances in Edinburgh, Puritanism bestirred itself in
London as well. In Cheapside, Lambeth, and on the doors of
St. Paul’s, placards were put up, in which complaint was
made against the Archbishop of Canterbury for shedding the
blood of the saints, and allowing Popish and Romanising
tendencies to have free play. It is remarkable what a
reaction at first arose in consequence. Archbishop Laud
showed some courage in seizing that moment for establishing
the supremacy of Anglican orthodoxy over Catholicism
as well as over Puritanism. He had already long felt
displeased at being sometimes hindered by the influence
of the court, or of certain nobles, from enforcing the
laws of the Church against Catholics as well as against
Protestants. He made a bold effort to show the world
that he was no Papist, and secured a decision in the
Council that the old edicts against recusants should be
revived and put in force. Catholic writings were again
forbidden. Popish writers were treated with a severity
similar to that which had hitherto been shown towards the
Puritans. Laud himself had his old controversial writings [A.D. 1637.]
against the Jesuits reprinted. Proclamations appeared
which, although more moderate in language than before, yet
indicated afresh that spirit of hostility to the Papacy
which had originally characterised the Anglican Church as
well as other Protestant bodies. Charles himself fully
concurred in these proceedings. Cuneo had once complained
to him of the Archbishop, on the supposition that every
order proceeded from his individual determination. The
King answered that the other members of the Privy Council
as well held the same opinion. Cuneo took the liberty of
reminding him of the conditions of his marriage contract,
by which he had assured the Catholics of protection and
care. ‘I shall never break these conditions,’ replied the
King, ‘but with your permission I will show that I really
belong to the religion which I profess. I know that the
Pope wishes me to be other than I am[114].’
There is as little truth in the assumption, which has been
often made, that the influence of Cuneo, and a tendency to
Catholicism on his own part, had kept back the King from
doing justice to the demands of the Scots. The King thought
only of the supremacy of the Anglican Church: the regard
paid to Scotland operated at first even to the prejudice
of the Catholics, for the Archbishop wished above all to
convince every one that he had no leanings towards them.
But if the King and the Archbishop had hoped to calm
men’s feelings by this means, they were mistaken. The
English Puritans, no less than the Scottish, considered
the demonstrations of the rulers of the Church against
Catholicism a mask which they would soon let fall again.
They thought that if the King wished to keep the Puritans
in England in subjection, he must first put down their
fellow-believers in Scotland.
With the religious agitation in England moreover there
was now connected another of a civil character, which had
reference principally to the interpretation of the laws.
Just during those months in which the revolt in Scotland
was gaining consistency, the question about the legality [A.D. 1638.]
of ship-money which, as has been mentioned, the King
allowed to be raised, came on for discussion before the
Judges of the Realm during the term of their regular
session, from the autumn of 1637 to the summer of 1638.
Who does not know the passionate interest which is wont
to attend proceedings of the higher courts of justice
when they bear on unsettled political questions? This was
strengthened by the compulsory exaction of the tax which
went on simultaneously with the discussion of the point at
issue. The Judges, who declared themselves in favour of the
legality of the tax, incurred hatred and obloquy. But there
were two of them. Crooke and Hutton, who pronounced against
it. Their arguments agreed with the assumptions made by
public opinion. They affirmed that the right to which the
crown laid claim belonged to it only in very exceptional
cases, and then only with the reserve of the subsequent
consent of Parliament; but that in the present case such
an extraordinary necessity had not arisen, and Parliament
had now for some years not been summoned. The two judges
contested the precedents adduced by the other party in
favour of its own view: they looked upon the question as a
simple controversy between legal justice and authority; and
they threw themselves without reserve on the side of the
former.
This however was no reason why the sentence of the majority
of the judges may not have been consistent with former
ordinances. The refusals of payment were condemned as
illegal; but nevertheless the proofs alleged by the two
dissentients had made an indescribable impression[115].
The government did not allow itself to be driven from its
course in either of the affairs in which it was engaged.
It both kept down the English Puritans, and continued
to collect the tax to which exception was taken. But
opposition and agitation increased daily in the country.
The Scots stirred up this feeling with various pamphlets.
They sought to make the English conscious that the cause of [A.D. 1638.]
both countries was the same. And their example itself
produced a still greater effect. From time to time anxiety
was felt lest the Scottish uprising should spread over
England[116].
While already, apart from other considerations, there was
much to be said for the necessity of contending against the
rising in Scotland in open war, it was also seen that the
same course was necessary for the preservation of order in
England. Hamilton, the mediator of peace, who had returned
from Scotland after failing in his attempt, the Lord Deputy
of Ireland, and the Primate of the English Church united
their voices in favour of war. Without doubt their counsels
were what determined the King.
But it is also clear that no one could think of claiming
the help of the English Parliament in the conduct of this
war, however important it might have been under other
circumstances. The King indignantly rejected the advice to
summon a Parliament; for what could he have found in that
body but a combination of Puritans and men who had refused
to pay ship-money, with those who supported on principle
the rights and claims of Parliament? His intention was to
carry on the war upon the strength of the prerogative of
the crown with those forces which his income, that had just
now been increased, as well as the voluntary offerings of
the friends of his system should supply.
And his position in general depended upon his success
in this undertaking. If the enterprise against Scotland
prospered, the validity of the prerogative in England also
was for ever established. The King’s hierarchical and
monarchical system of government would have acquired double
force through a victory won by his own strength. Thus in
former times Philip II had first become completely master
of his own kingdom by his victory over the Aragonese.
Charles I was not without a prospect of a like success.
Large sums were brought in by those contributions which the
most eminent members of the English clergy, especially [A.D. 1638.]
the bishops, agreed to make: for not only was the cause of
the King in substance their own, but they wished besides
to distinguish themselves by giving proof of loyalty. At
the special request of the Queen the Catholics, who were
again relieved from the burden of those oppressive measures
lately mentioned, gave something, though not indeed very
much, nor very willingly; for though they wished to acquire
the favour of the King, on whom their very existence
depended, they yet feared the vengeance of the enemy in
case of a reaction. Among the high nobility also the King
and his cause had some ardent adherents of both sexes who
made large contributions.
Those feelings of personal dependence on the hereditary
sovereign, which were the cement that bound together states
of Germanic and Latin origin, were on the whole not yet
extinguished in England. On the King’s declaration that he
would display his standard in the spring at York, many gave
in their names as volunteers. The gentry in the northern
counties especially showed zeal and devotion. The militia
was everywhere put under arms. In April we find an army of
about 20,000 men, horse and foot, assembled around the King.
The army was not intended strictly speaking to invade
Scotland. The plan, in the formation of which as in other
matters the Marquess of Hamilton had great influence,
contemplated only measures of coercion against the
Covenanters. And as their principal strength was thought
to lie in the town-populations, and the towns lived
principally by trade, especially by trade with Holland, he
had taken up the opinion that they would be compelled to
submit, if they were cut off from this commerce. He went
himself with an English squadron to the Frith of Forth in
order to carry out this measure. The land-army was intended
only to make a demonstration in his support, and above all
to secure the Border against an incursion which the Scots
might otherwise feel tempted to make.
Another design was entertained, which is worth mentioning,
although it was not carried into effect. A couple of
thousand experienced troops, made up of cavalry and
infantry, especially arquebusiers, were to be transferred [A.D. 1638.]
from the Spanish to the English service; and the Spaniards
were to be allowed in return to enlist a corresponding
number in the British dominions. These were to be conveyed
to Scotland in Flemish ships, but at the cost of the
English, and to be stationed in Edinburgh Castle either
by amicable means or by force. From this point they were
to be put into communication with the royalists in the
northern counties, especially with Huntly, and with the
town of Aberdeen. The power of the King would have become
so strong in Scotland itself, that, under the influence
of coercive measures adopted simultaneously by sea and
land, the Covenanters in the capital and in the southern
counties might well have been expected to consent to such
an agreement as the King desired[117].
The prospect of a very widely extended alliance between
various elements of strength had thus been opened: but to
secure their co-operation, which was naturally difficult
to bring about, diplomatic negotiations of the most prolix
character with the courts of Brussels and Madrid were also
necessary. While the King was still engaged upon them the
Scots on their side were already making preparations for
resistance.
But if success depended upon bringing over experienced
troops from the Continent to Great Britain, this was far
easier for the Scots than for the English. We have already
mentioned in what numbers the Scots served under the
Swedish flag in Germany[118]. If the Protestant cause which
they defended in Germany were now to be fought for and
carried through in their own native country, how could they
hesitate to return thither? The heads of their families,
for whom they still cherished an inborn attachment, now
themselves summoned them home.
Among the Scots in the Swedish service Alexander Lesley
had acquired a very distinguished position. He commanded
the first troops which Gustavus Adolphus threw into
Germany: he it was who, by crossing to occupy Rügen from [A.D. 1638.]
Stralsund, had opened the Swedish war in Germany[119]. In
the school of Gustavus Adolphus he learned to exercise the
command-in-chief of an army in troublous circumstances.
Chancellor Oxenstierna, who made him a field-marshal,
afterwards employed him in the most difficult political
and military enterprises. His exertions in the years 1635
and 1636 had almost the greatest share in establishing
the Swedish supremacy in Western Pomerania. Even in
Germany however he had been deeply affected by the
disagreements between Scotland and England. The views
of King Charles, which were at that time represented by
Hamilton, when he appeared with the King of Sweden in
order to bring about the restoration of the Palatinate,
were distasteful to the Scottish troops: they wished to
see their King a decided enemy of Spain and Austria. The
Field-Marshal might consider that he was merely executing
a flank movement in the great war if he went to Scotland
and assumed the chief command of his countrymen, who now
opposed the doubtful policy of their King, and undertook
to maintain their religious and political independence
against him. He had moreover a special inducement for
going, because Lord Rothes, the head of the Lesleys, was
the foremost leader of the movement. People had at first
thought that the plain-looking man of mean origin and
small stature, with a lame foot and already advanced in
years, would secure little consideration among the proud
and magnificent nobles. But what is more irresistible in
the world than military experience, and more captivating
than fame for generalship? Everything was swayed by his
counsels. Following his example others also gave up far
more lucrative and important positions in the German War in
order to serve their country, so that a staff of captains
and under-officers was soon formed who rendered the greatest
service in training troops[120]. From their fellow-believers [A.D. 1638.]
in Holland the Scots obtained munitions, and even some
pieces of ordnance.
It was important for the Scots in the first place to guard
against, or to render impossible, any hostile attempt on
the part of England. Under Lesley’s guidance they turned
their arms against the Castle of Edinburgh: the gate was
blown open with a petard. Dalkeith and Dumbarton were taken
possession of in like manner: the intended enlistment of
Spanish troops was still far from being effected, when
the royalists in the north of Scotland were compelled to
submit, Huntly was taken prisoner in violation of a promise
made to him, and was brought to Edinburgh.
Meanwhile, at the beginning of May, Hamilton appeared with
his squadron in the Frith. Beacons upon the neighbouring
heights proclaimed his approach to the country, and the
whole people hastened in arms to both shores in order to
prevent his landing. It is not clear whether he seriously
intended to land. He contented himself at present with
occupying the small islands of Inch-Keith and Inch-Colm,
and of there stopping the Scottish vessels that were
passing by. He did not let them go until the crews swore to
him that they would stand by the King.
But the royal army also, under the command of the Earl of
Arundel, had already arrived at the border. With a force
the strength of which is rated at 20,000 men, and which was
superior, at least in infantry, to that of the King Lesley
advanced to meet him: he set up his camp at Dunse Hill
immediately under the eyes of the King.
After the example of Gustavus Adolphus and Bernard of
Weimar, Alexander Lesley also took pains that the aspect
of the camp should correspond to the religious motives
of the expedition, and nowhere could men’s feelings have
been better prepared beforehand for such a proceeding than
in Scotland. The soldiers were heard singing psalms or
reading the Scriptures in their tents: the ministers were
girded with swords or carried carbines: the more fiery
their discourse, the more devoutly they were listened to.
But whilst the Scots were opposing their King under arms,
they did not wish to wear the appearance of being at war [A.D. 1638.]
with him. They sometimes gave him a cheer: on the flags
were to be read the words ‘For God, the King, and the
Covenant.’ They did not wish to fight against the King, but
against the bishops, by whom he was thought to be misled:
they would not let their influence, so ruinous to Church
and State, rise again, at least in Scotland.
How entirely different was the appearance which the English
camp presented!
It was not merely that but few of the leaders had ever seen
war: the soldiers were unaccustomed to strict discipline,
and did not render to their officers that punctual
obedience which military service requires. The Scottish
soldier had few wants[121]; sufficient supplies had been
provided from the capital: the English soldier had many
wants; but the delivery of supplies was irregular. When
the King showed himself they even cried out for bread. No
trace was to be found among them of the military spirit of
the time; and how should the episcopal system have been
capable of calling out a religious zeal corresponding to
the Puritan enthusiasm?
Charles I moreover had not been able to assemble, even for
a military expedition, so many men of importance without
bringing to light the political opposition with which
he had to struggle. The Lords of the Opposition had not
appeared with the arms and followers which they had been
expected to bring. The King sought to assure himself of
their obedience by means of an oath, in which they were to
vow to serve obediently against all seditious combinations,
even if they were formed under pretence of religion.
Lords Brooke and Say and Sele refused to take this oath.
The King, who when in the field demanded the absolute
submission of his vassals, had them arrested; but on this
a general disturbance arose in the camp. Their friends
took the ground that the King had no right at all to
demand a new oath, which had not been approved beforehand
by Parliament. The rest of the lords went to the Earl of [A.D. 1638.]
Arundel with a request that he would put himself at their
head in order to represent this to the King[122]. Arundel
called their attention to the danger which would thus arise
to the King’s service, and promised them redress for their
grievances. Legal authorities in London gave it as their
opinion that the prosecution against the two lords could
not be proceeded with. They were accordingly, after some
days, set at liberty again.
Thus much at least was by this means made plain to every
one,--that there could be no thought of an unanimous and
decisive prosecution of the war in favour of the King’s
prerogative, as connected with the authority of the
bishops. The state of religious opinion shook the loyalty
of obedience. The views of the Scots had penetrated even
among those who were to have fought against them.
The Scots also on their part had reasons for not driving
matters to extremities. An open conflict with the King
would have fanned into bright flame the opposition in the
North, which had hardly been quelled, and which was already
stirring again, so that it would have been necessary to
detach a military force to that quarter; and, as has been
mentioned, such a conflict was no part of their original
intention.
Hamilton had not long been stationed in the Frith when
some of the leading Covenanters presented themselves
for a conference with him, in which they offered to
pay every kind of civil obedience to their sovereign,
provided that they could obtain satisfaction as to their
ecclesiastical institutions[123]. Hamilton applied to the
King in reference to these proposals, and as from the
beginning Charles had not intended to subdue the Scots
by force, but only by taking arms to compel them to show
greater compliance in negotiation, he now acceded to their
proposals. On a further application, and on the appearance [A.D. 1638.]
of symptoms of returning obedience in the army encamped
over against him, he issued a safe conduct to his own camp
for the four deputies whom the Scots appointed, that they
might lay their demands before a commission nominated by
himself.
The two armies had advanced into the field to meet one
another, and lay encamped against one another in open
hostility; but in temper they were not altogether opposed.
In the one, obedience to the King had not yet been entirely
thrown off: in the other it still reigned, but no longer
in full strength. How then could men on both sides not
hesitate before they caused fresh bloodshed between two
nations of common descent, who had been closely connected
together for the last century? Instead of fighting they
began to negotiate. We must now turn our attention, not
to deeds of war, but to arguments and counter-arguments
advanced before an assembled council.
The royal commission was composed of men of very different
views. With Arundel, in whose tent the meetings were held,
sat Essex and Holland: among the Scots were seen some of
the former champions of the movement, Rothes and Loudon.
The negotiations began on June 11. Hardly had Arundel
formally opened the conference when the King appeared in
order to conduct his cause in person, for he could not let
it be said of him that he was unwilling to listen to his
subjects.
The Scots affirmed that their proceedings were in
accordance with the acknowledged and written laws of the
country. The King denied this: for how indeed could it be
said that the last Assembly at Glasgow had been elected or
held according to legal forms? In consequence of this he
was also unable to regard their decisions as legal or to
ratify them. He assured them that he had no intention of
altering anything in the matter of religion or law which
had been laid down by sovereign authority: but if he said
one thing and they another, who, he asked, was to judge
between them: who was to fix the sense of the laws?
This in fact was the question at issue. He had intended
to decide it in his own favour by superiority of arms,
and to break down the political and military opposition [A.D. 1638.]
in which the Scots had engaged. As he had not succeeded in
doing this, while at the same time matters had not gone so
far as to compel him to an absolute surrender--for at all
events he had achieved one object, and had in the first
place secured England against an invasion of the Scots,
which had been feared--no final accommodation could be
expected.
The Scots declared in writing that their wishes were only
directed to the maintenance of religion and liberty in
accordance with the ecclesiastical and political laws of
the country: that they would never desire anything which
was not laid down in these; and that they were ready as
loyal subjects to obey the King. Charles I replied, that if
such were their wishes, they were also his own.
A movement towards an approximation now took place, in
which however each side reserved to itself its own views as
to what the laws really contained.
The agreement which was arrived at after some days (June
17), the so-called Pacification of Berwick, arranged that
the Scottish army should be disbanded, the English fleet
withdrawn from the Frith, the King’s castles with their
ammunition restored to him, and that any vessels that had
been detained should be returned to the Scots[124]. The
King consented that in the following August first a free
General Assembly, and immediately afterwards a Parliament
also, should be held; that they should henceforward be
regularly summoned, and that the one should have the
decision of ecclesiastical, the other that of temporal
affairs. He did not however consent to acknowledge the last
Assembly at Glasgow as legal, from considerations, as was
said in the proclamation, which were imposed upon him by
the sovereign power which had descended to him from his
ancestors. What were these considerations? Even if Charles
I allowed everything which he or his father had lately
introduced to be swept away, yet he would not permit that
any part of it should be declared illegal or papistical. He
would not allow the reproach of having ordained anything
illegal to fall either on himself or on his father. He [A.D. 1638.]
assented to the most important enactments of the Assembly
at Glasgow; he assented provisionally even to the abolition
of episcopacy; but he held to the view that the Assembly
had been illegally summoned, and was illegal: that which
might be reaffirmed in a new assembly approved by him, and
that only, would he then ratify. In other matters also he
clung with similar inflexibility to his conception of the
supreme power which must remain in his hands. He was ready
to allow periodical ecclesiastical and temporal assemblies
to meet. His commissary was to be instructed to proclaim
the meeting of such an assembly again within a year; but
it appeared to him insufferable that he should be pledged
to do this for all future time. If he allowed that his
veto should not be exercised with regard to their next
proceedings, he was yet resolved not to allow himself to
be robbed of this veto for ever. But these are just the
most important questions which arise as to parliamentary
or representative forms of government. How could it be
expected that the strong opposition between royal authority
and the independence of parliamentary and ecclesiastical
assemblies which was implied in these questions, and which
had deep root in Scotland especially, should so easily
be brought to a settlement without a real and strenuous
conflict.
The news of the Pacification of Berwick was received with
great satisfaction, especially in the Protestant world.
That the Scots had not been overpowered appeared of itself
to be an advantage; but it was thought moreover that King
Charles would desire to give employment to the Scots in
order to keep them obedient; and where else could that
employment be found but in the German war? It is affirmed
that Lesley offered him to lead his troops immediately to
the Continent for the reconquest of the Palatinate; that he
did not require the King to bear any other cost but that of
their transport; for Lesley intended to maintain his Scots
in Germany as Mansfeld and Wallenstein had maintained their
troops[125]. King Charles is said to have entered for a
moment into this plan. The rejection of his last overtures [A.D. 1638.]
by Austria appeared to justify it, and no doubt all his
affairs might, had he accepted the proposal, have assumed
a different aspect. But so bold and reckless an enterprise
was repugnant to his character. After some reflection he
put it aside. Apart from his fears of strengthening his
opponents at home, his relations with France and Spain were
not in such a condition that he could throw his weight
decisively into the scale.
FOOTNOTES:
[111] I have taken the description of these contending
motives from an essay entitled, Révolte des Écossais
(Biblioth. imp. at Paris, Melanges Harlay 218), with
the inscription: ‘fait deux mois après la révolte
d’Écosse’--apparently from the pen of a French Catholic who
was closely connected with the English Court.
[112] Strafford Letters ii. 250.
[113] John Spalding: Memorials of the trubles of England
and Scotland, i. 77, gives a very detailed account. He
knew of ‘ane clandestine band drawn up and subscrivit
secretly between the malcontents, or rather malignantis
of Scotland and England, that eche one should concur and
assist utheris, while they gat their willis both in church
and policie, and to bring both kingdomes under a reformed
religion, and to that effect to root out the bischopis of
both kingdomes crop and root, quairby His Majesty should
loiss ane of his trie estatis: and likevayes that they
sould draw the King to dispenss with diverss pointis of his
royall prerogative.’
[114] Cuneo, Dec. 18, 1637: ‘Io non contraverro mai
ad alcuna di queste conditioni che voi pretendete, ma
con vostra buona licenza, io voglio mostrare essere di
quella religione che professo. So che il papa mi vorebbe
altrimente che sono.’
[115] G. Giustiniano, Oct. 1: ‘Avanzate le loro istanze
nel pretendere che anche in questo regno si chiami il
parlamento per unitamente dare la miglior forma al governo.’
[116] As early as September 1637 the Venetian ambassador
speaks of the ‘pericolo evidente che s’estenda la
sollevatione anche per questo regno, dove i popoli non
meno che gli Scocesi avidi si mostrano dell’ occasione di
sottrarsi al giogo a cui poco a poco si sono universalmente
piegati.’
[117] Compare ‘A design to extricate His Majesty out of
these present troubles with the Scots,’ in Clarendon Papers
ii.
[118] Chemnitz, Schwedischer Krieg i. 43.
[119] The pass given to Lesley by Charles I extends over a
year (May 1637-38). In a Venetian report of April 1638 it
is stated that Lesley had taken leave of the King in order
to go to Scotland and from thence to Pomerania into the
Swedish service. In that case Rothes must have induced him
to remain behind.
[120] ‘To help their bested mother church and country, they
have deserted their charges abroad to their great loss,
which they knew she was never able to make up.’ Baillie,
Sept. 1639, i. 223.
[121] ‘They are a people that can live of nothing, and
we that can want nothing.’ Countess of Westmoreland to
Windebank: Hardwicke Papers ii. 129.
[122] Depêche de Bellièvre, 12 Mai: ‘Les seigneurs qui
étoient à York s’étoient déjà assemblés pour voir ce qu’il
il y auroit à faire en ce rencontre, et avoient été à
trouver le comte d’Arundel, qui est le premier, pour porter
la parole.’
[123] Sir Henry Devick’s account of this conference in
Burnet, Dukes of Hamilton 133. Although it there appears to
have taken place later than the application to the King,
yet it must have preceded it. The application was made in
consequence of the conference.
[124] Pacification of Berwick. Hardwicke Papers ii. 241.
[125] Giustiniano July 1-8, 1639.
CHAPTER II.
RELATIONS OF THE ENGLISH COURT WITH THE COURT AND POLICY OF
FRANCE.
Let us now once more direct our close attention to the
relations between England and France, which at that time,
as they had almost always done, determined the general
course of European policy.
In July 1637 the two powers, between which, notwithstanding
the above-mentioned objections on the part of Wentworth,
negotiations had always been going on, came to an agreement
about the articles of an alliance for mutual assistance,
which opened a wide prospect for the general relations of
Europe, especially with regard to Germany[126].
By this agreement they combined in proposing to restore the
Estates of the German Empire, which had been overpowered by
the house of Austria, and especially the Palatine house,
to those possessions and rights which they had enjoyed
before the war. The King of England pledged himself that
he would not permit either money or the necessaries of war
to be supplied in future to the Austro-Spanish house, but
on the contrary, that he would equip a fleet which should
entirely prevent any transport of the kind: that he would
never again allow the Spaniards to enlist soldiers in
his dominions, but that he would give this permission to
the French. In return the King of France promised not to
conclude peace either with the German or with the Spanish
line of the house of Austria without the consent of the [A.D. 1637.]
King of England, and above all not to do so unless the
complete restoration of the Palatinate had been obtained.
In order to achieve this end, their allies, Holland and
Sweden, were to be invited, in common with the two Kings,
to lay before the house of Austria and the Duke of Bavaria
conditions for a general agreement, and were to enforce
these by arms if they were not accepted within a month.
The two Kings were then to sanction any kind of enterprise
on the part of their subjects against the possessions of
the crown of Spain in America, in the East Indies, or in
Europe: they were to cut off the communications of Spain
with the distant parts of the world, as well as with
Flanders and Germany; and they were to settle beforehand
how to deal with the conquests which they hoped to make in
the Spanish Netherlands.
On the last point negotiations had not yet led to any
agreement. Charles I had demanded that if Dunkirk, or
other places in the Netherlands, were conquered, they
should then be handed over as a pledge to his nephews, the
Princes Palatine. The French, on the contrary, adhered to
their intention of erecting in the conquered Netherlands
either a Catholic republic, or a government under the
common sovereignty of the allies, like the bailiwicks in
Switzerland. In the further progress of the negotiations
Charles I expressed himself at last not disinclined to
assent to a government in the form of a common sovereignty.
All points in the agreement were to be again deliberated
on in a congress of the powers at Hamburg, and to be there
brought to a settlement.
Thus matters were settled after long negotiation. When we
read the articles it is hard not to believe that a powerful
joint effort for restoring the former condition of affairs
was to be made without delay.
A closer consideration of the circumstances however shows
beforehand that on neither side was there a decided
intention of making such an effort.
The French were convinced that Charles I wished for the
continuance of the war between France and Spain in order
that meanwhile he might revive his naval power, recover his
lost reputation, and enrich his country; but that he was
so fettered by the profitable relation which he secretly [A.D. 1638.]
maintained with the Spaniards that he would never proceed
boldly to fight for the interests of the Palatinate: that,
if he now seemed inclined for an agreement with France,
he was only trying to induce the house of Austria by
arousing anxiety as to his alliance, to make some trivial
concessions to his nephews with which he would be content.
The obligation of keeping up a fleet on the coasts, which
Charles undertook by the treaty, was considered by the
French far too contemptible considering the greatness of
the cause which the two powers upheld.
Why then, we may ask, did the circumspect Cardinal
Richelieu consent to this alliance? His anxieties were the
reason for his conduct: he wished to keep King Charles from
allying himself more closely with the house of Austria. He
put off the definitive conclusion of the treaty until the
conference at Hamburg, because he foresaw that it would
encounter obstacles there and be delayed. In the summer
of 1637 the articles had been laid down: in the autumn of
1637 Richelieu gave to Bellièvre, the President of the
Parliament, who went as ambassador to England, instructions
not indeed to conclude anything, for this was far from
his intention, but only to keep Charles I in the belief
that France wished for the conclusion of the treaty, and
that she would promote it at Hamburg. Meanwhile he was to
induce that sovereign to throw more obstacles in the way
of intercourse between Spain and the Netherlands[127]. In
February 1638 the Council of State, which worked under
Richelieu’s directions, once more considered the treaty.
Father Joseph, who sat in this council, proposed to insert
the condition that the King of England should employ his
ships not only for the protection of his own coasts, but
for the attack of the coasts of the Spanish Netherlands, or
of the Spanish peninsula[128]. The other members agreed,
but went a step further still: they demanded that a joint
attack should be made upon some place or other in the [A.D. 1638.]
Netherlands, to be more precisely determined by and by:
they thought that it was in the highest degree unjust that
England should not support the French, and yet should wish
to prevent them from conquering Dunkirk for instance.
They thought, moreover, that any share in governing
the conquered territory after the fashion of the Swiss
bailiwicks could be allowed to England only if that power
itself took an active share in the conquest. But however
much stress the French laid upon this co-operation,
they nevertheless also thought right not to break off
negotiations, if Charles I should still be inclined again
to defer his answer.
But if we ask what views Charles I really cherished, it
is plain that he would never have consented to engage
in direct hostilities against the strong places in the
Netherlands. He might possibly have allowed an attack to
be made by the Dutch and French, supposing that he were to
have a share in the government of the conquered places, but
he would never have taken part in such an attack. In the
summer of 1637, whilst he was acceding to the preliminary
stipulations with France, the Spaniards made advances to
him on the other side, and, to say the least, he did not
reject their overtures. He treated the Spanish court at
all times with the greatest respect. In 1638 the Elector
Palatine had been placed in a position to appear in some
force in Westphalia: the King of England had assurances
given to the Spaniards that this was not his doing,
although on the other hand he was not opposed to it; but
that he looked upon it as an exclusively German affair,
which had no reference to the Spanish crown. He assured
them that his wishes were only directed to the restoration
of general peace in Christendom, in which every one should
again enjoy his own.
Cardinal Richelieu may have been quite right in his
opinion that the main object of the King of England in his
stipulations with France was to compel the Spaniards to
show greater compliance in the affair of the Palatinate
than had been displayed at the time of Arundel’s [A.D. 1638.]
mission[129]. But that however was not the only reason why
the projected agreement could not be executed. During the
negotiations of the allies as to the agreement on proposals
to be made to the house of Austria, England, as it had
intimated to the Spaniards, expressed the opinion that each
one ought to have his own, and therefore that not only the
Palatinate, but everything else which had been taken from
its rightful owner, must be given up. Cardinal Richelieu
was agitated by this proposal, for he thought that the
house of Austria might well accede to it, but that it was
impossible for France and for Sweden to do so; and that
the consequence of the negotiations would be that they
would lose England as their ally, whom they had hoped to
gain[130].
The negotiations underwent fluctuations which were often of
a petty character. Neither side was altogether in earnest
in them: but notwithstanding these uncertainties and the
momentary complications which crossed them, the great
interests at stake and the opposition between them came
under discussion. The opposition arose from the dislike of
Charles I to allow either the acquisition of Lorraine by
France or the exclusive occupation of the strongholds in
the Netherlands by the arms of France and Holland, without
any advantage or participation on his part, and his equal
dislike to the establishment of the Swedes in Pomerania.
His wishes and, in regard to the Palatinate, his interests
also were engaged in bringing about the restoration of
the old distribution of territory in the German empire,
not merely however with reference to the Princes and the
estates which had been injured by Austria and Bavaria, but
with reference to those also which had suffered from Sweden
and France. This was a scheme which even at the present
day might awaken a certain feeling of sympathy for King
Charles, especially in Germany: had it been carried out, [A.D. 1638.]
the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe would
still have been possible. But for that object far other
efforts would have been needed than those which he could
make, and far other resources than those which he could
wield, but above all an energetic and always decided
policy. The first result was that even the suggestion
of those ideas in France, where the very designs were
entertained which he wished to defeat, made the conclusion
of the projected treaty impossible.
The political difference was aggravated by personal
misunderstandings springing from those divisions which at
that time were agitating the court and kingdom of France.
It is indispensable in this place to bestow a word upon
them.
The marriage of Charles I with a French princess had been
desired on the part of the English in the year 1624,
because they thought by this means to find support against
other enemies: for the Queen-mother Mary de’ Medici, in
concert with Cardinal Richelieu, still ruled at the French
court, and there was every appearance that her dominion
was likely long to endure. She herself had promoted the
alliance because she wished to see her daughters the
consorts of the neighbouring sovereigns of Spain, Piedmont,
and England: she thought by this means to acquire a
personal influence in all the important affairs of Europe.
But then followed an epoch in which the interests of the
dynasty began to be thrown into the background by the
interests of the state. While Mary de’ Medici sought to
maintain the former in her dealings with Spain, and to
be just to that country, in spite of all other disputed
questions, she fell out with Richelieu, who supported the
principle of the power of the sovereign, to which he wished
to give effect in France, by the principle of the exclusive
ascendancy of that country abroad, in favour of which he
enlisted the sympathies of Louis XIII. The mother of the
King was obliged to give way to his minister. The ‘Day of
Dupes,’ though it appeared like an act of a comedy, was
nevertheless a great event both for France herself, and for
all her relations with other countries.
The quarrels between the Queen-mother and the Cardinal,
her subsequent flight, and her attempt to return in [A.D. 1629.]
conjunction with her second son and a strong native party,
but at the same time with foreign aid as well, reacted upon
those countries in the west and south, with whose reigning
families she was allied, and on which she sought to support
herself. Her daughters--who could wonder at it?--took part
with their mother.
The English court had scarcely attained a certain measure
of domestic repose, when it was acted upon by these
divisions of the French court, and even drawn into them.
In the year 1629 the Marquess of Chateauneuf was
ambassador-extraordinary at the English court. In public
he attached himself to the policy of Richelieu, to whom
he owed his advancement; and he sought to bring about
an union between France and England against the house
of Austria. He gave satisfaction to the Cardinal in the
conduct of affairs, so that after the fall of Marillac the
great seal was entrusted to him. But, as is mentioned in
the instructions to the next French ambassador, Poigny,
Chateauneuf at that time was already secretly labouring
to poison the mind of the English Queen against the
Cardinal[131]. He had succeeded in acquiring the confidence
of Henrietta Maria: it was also affirmed that he had formed
a connexion with the Chevalier Jars who stood, through the
medium of a lady of the bedchamber, high in her favour, and
that Henrietta had been estranged from the French policy of
the time and from the Cardinal. But how much easier must
it have become to produce an effect of this kind after the
scenes at the Luxemburg and the flight from Compiègne?
Chateauneuf carried on a correspondence which, being
sometimes intercepted, revealed his unbounded ambition.
Chateauneuf at that time stood in intimate relation
with the notorious, perhaps still beautiful, certainly
seductive and ever excitable Madame de Chevreuse. We cannot
say whether she, like many other French ladies of that
time, formed connexions from inclination uncontrolled by
any regard to prudence, or from policy directed to very [A.D. 1633.]
different ends. As Marie de Rohan she had already a very
important position in the world, through her descent from
a family related to the house of Bourbon, and itself among
the most distinguished in France. Owing to the influence
of her first husband, the Constable Luynes, the favourite
of Louis XIII, she was appointed Mistress of the Household
to the young queen Anne, whose favour she completely won
as she cheered her otherwise melancholy days. After the
early death of the Constable she married, while still
quite young, the Duke of Chevreuse, son of the greatest
of the antagonists of Henry IV, that Henry of Guise who
was murdered at Blois. She thus became a member of the
house of Lorraine, which at that time was endangered by
Richelieu’s policy, and formed the centre of the European
political combinations which countermined him. It was the
chief ambition of the Duchess of Chevreuse to oppose the
Cardinal, just because he was so powerful and was daily
becoming more so, and because he imposed upon each and
every one his own will as law. Her rank, her position, her
connexions, her personal charms, resistless to the young
and even to older men, gave her a variety of constantly
fresh means of fomenting this opposition. She had already
had the principal share in the conspiracy of Ornano: the
unfortunate Chalais fell a victim to her; for no one could
approach her without suffering for the connexion. At that
time the Keeper of the Great Seal had the highest place in
her regard, a man of adroitness and of great attainment,
of industry and ability, who seemed well fitted to become
the successor of the Cardinal, if he should once be
overthrown. Richelieu accuses him of having betrayed to the
lady the decisions of the Council, which had been directed
against Lorraine. And as the Duchess of Chevreuse also had
relations with the Queen of England, whom she had known
from her youth, these machinations extended even across
the Channel[132]. The attention of Richelieu was called by
people in England to the efforts made to overthrow him, and [A.D. 1633.]
to put Chateauneuf in his place. Queen Henrietta was
said to have given out ‘that Chateauneuf, who was her
friend, and had no share in the pernicious designs of
the Cardinal, would manage the affairs of France better
than he.’ Even in matters of religion Chateauneuf
preferred to oppose the views of the Cardinal. But these
projects were not restricted in their application to the
administration of France. We have mentioned the various
enmities which the Lord Treasurer Weston had to encounter
at the English court. They originated to a great extent
with the Queen, who would have wished to bring her friend
the Earl of Holland, the friend of Chateauneuf, to the
head of affairs[133]. Richelieu and Weston, although in
other respects much unlike, yet resembled one another in
this:--they both had no other interest in view than the
extension of the royal power, which put out of sight all
personal considerations. It was intended to overthrow
them both, and to replace them by more accessible men,
who belonged to a different system. With this object was
connected the design of restoring the Queen-mother in
France, and with her the line of policy common to the
Austro-Spanish party and to that of Lorraine.
In the midst of this net of political entanglements and
intrigues King Charles remained calm and unconcerned. He
took pains to hinder the threatened outbreak of factious
violence, despite of which he knew how to support his
minister.
In France such proceedings were taken as were usual at that
time. Chateauneuf and Jars were arrested in February 1633:
the former, whom his enemies wished still to spare, was
sent to prison at Angoulême; against the latter criminal
proceedings were instituted. He was condemned to death, [A.D. 1637.]
reprieved only upon the scaffold, and then thrown into the
Bastille. All their friends experienced a similar fate,
except such as were able to save themselves by flight.
Madame de Chevreuse was banished first to Dampierre; and
as she sometimes came thence to Paris in order to see the
Queen, she was sent before the end of a twelvemonth to
Tours, where she spent four long years.
From that place, so far as the secrecy enjoined by her
dangerous position allowed, she kept up a very extensive
correspondence with friendly members of the various courts,
and received messages from the Duke of Lorraine. In the
year 1637 Richelieu came upon traces of the share which
the consort of his sovereign took in these and similar
combinations. But he had no mind to suffer any deviation
from the policy to which he adhered, in any member of the
court. Queen Anne had established a correspondence with
the Cardinal-Infant, which she used to conduct by means of
English agents in Paris and at the Hague. She was forced
to confess her guilt, and was then pardoned, but only upon
promising to renounce for ever all intercourse of this
sort. Madame de Chevreuse, who knew that she was involved
in this discovery, in order to avoid arrest, fled to Spain
in the disguise of a young cavalier, as suited her bold and
adventurous character.
The Queen of England, who had no share in these matters,
sided at that time in her political leanings with France.
The ambassadors report how sensible she was of every token
of friendly feeling exhibited by her brother and the
Cardinal, and how she at times even resisted proposals
made by Spain[134]. After the death of Weston she acquired
more importance, as the King exhibited a passionate and
growing attachment to her, and it was thought that she
would turn it to the advantage of France, if she were
properly advised. In Bellièvre’s despatches it was said
that the Queen was well disposed, but still had slight
influence; and that nothing more must be desired of her
than she herself thought expedient for maintaining the [A.D. 1637.]
good understanding between the two crowns: that perhaps an
opportunity would soon arise when she could do more[135].
The Cardinal thought it worth while to secure her good-will
by fulfilling one of her most urgent requests. Nothing was
nearer to her heart than the liberation of Jars, who had
been thrown into the Bastille on her account. She made
requests in his behalf through the diplomatic agent who
attended to her especial business at the French court: she
spoke to the French ambassador in London on the subject,
and wrote to the Cardinal about it. Richelieu granted her
request. One day in May 1638 Chavigny, one of the ministers
employed under Richelieu, went to the Bastille and brought
out Jars, in the first instance to the dwelling of the
Queen’s agent, to whom he said that, at the command of the
Cardinal, he delivered Jars into his hands; henceforth he
was the prisoner no longer of the King of France, but of
the Queen of England, and she might deal with him according
to her pleasure[136]. It would have been impossible to
fulfil the wish of the Queen so as to confer a greater
obligation on her. The way seemed opened for establishing
the best personal understanding between the two courts and
the two kingdoms, as it had already for some time been
opened for establishing a cordial understanding politically
by the plan of an alliance already referred to.
But meanwhile even in the personal relations between them a
strong counteracting influence came into play.
As early as the autumn of 1637 intelligence had reached
the French court that Mary de’ Medici, the mother of the
King, weary of her residence at Brussels, which led to no
result in her favour, wished now to visit England. The
French ministers thought the matter important enough for
them to call the attention of the King of England to the
untoward consequences that might arise from it. They said [A.D. 1637.]
to him that the whole world knew that the Queen-mother
cherished views favourable to Spain: that if she found a
reception at the court of the King of England, people would
conclude that the latter was not seriously in earnest about
the alliance with France. They added that Charles I would
not be able any more than others to succeed in reconciling
mother and son; if for no other reason, because Louis
XIII had declined the mediation of his brother and of his
brother-in-law the Duke of Savoy, and regarded the matter
as exclusively his own affair; and moreover because he was
convinced that the Queen-mother, if she returned, would,
with her friends and adherents, only give trouble[137].
In England this expression of opinion awakened some
displeasure. Charles I expressed himself surprised that any
one should think that the Queen-mother could acquire so
much influence over him as to shake him in his inclination
in favour of France. He said that she doubtless did not
even desire this: that he himself would not entertain
the thought of mediating, were he not certain that the
Queen-mother was resolved to think no more of what had
occurred, and to throw herself unreservedly into the arms
of her son through the mediation of the Cardinal[138].
It appears to have been the fact that the Queen-mother
had decided to go to England mainly in order to take
advantage of the friendly relations established between the
two courts, and so to effect her return by means of the
influence exerted by the one upon the other. But in France
people regarded her project only as a design suggested by
the Spaniards. As it had become clear to the latter that
the Queen-mother could render them no kind of assistance
so long as she lived away from France, the French thought
that the Spaniards were desirous of procuring her return to
France in order to avail themselves of her services; but
that the French government could not allow itself to be so [A.D. 1638.]
grossly deceived; that if it was as important to the
Queen-mother as she affirmed to detach herself from the
influence of the Spaniards, she had better return to her
native place, where she might expect ample maintenance to
be given her by the King her son.
At first the matter rested here. But Madame de Chevreuse
coming from Spain made her appearance at the English
court, long before the Queen moreover, early in 1638. As a
great lady and a friend of the Queen she met with a very
honourable reception, in which no expense was spared: the
charges borne by the King every month of her stay were
reckoned at a considerable sum[139]. To her old admirers,
among whom Earl Holland was the greatest, new ones were
added: every one sought her company; and she produced a
fresh and cheerful excitement in the naturally grave court.
This however did not prevent her from showing herself a
strict Catholic in other respects, as we perceive from an
attempt she made to convert Lord Holland. She inspired
the Queen with the fatal thought of favouring Catholic
tendencies in the education of her children: all her
wishes and manœuvres were directed to the removal of the
hindrances, which seemed to obstruct a close alliance
between the English and Spanish courts: she made proposals
for an union between the Princess Royal of England, who
was still extremely young, and an Infant of Spain, without
regarding the objections advanced against it on the ground
of the experience of former times, which she jestingly
set aside. She had paid especial attention to the Spanish
ambassador Cardenas: the Papal envoy, Cuneo, relates
that on one occasion she even borrowed his carriage from
him in order to visit that ambassador without exciting
remark[140]. Charles I had been angry with Cardenas on
account of one of the ambassador’s reports which had come
to his knowledge; Madame de Chevreuse succeeded in removing [A.D. 1638.]
the misunderstanding, and in restoring friendly personal
relations between them, which opened the door to further
negotiations.
If Richelieu was inclined at that time to allow Madame de
Chevreuse to return to France, and to promise her an entire
indemnity for the past, his inclination may have been
due to the material hindrances thrown in his way by her
activity at a foreign court. That she was ever in earnest
about the negotiations for her return may be doubted.
In October 1638 Mary de’ Medici found means to set out for
England from Holland, where, out of regard for Richelieu,
her residence was not altogether viewed with favour. It
was only when she put to sea that she sent to announce her
approach, adding however that she would turn back again if
she were likely to cause embarrassment to her children.
Queen Henrietta Maria in reality feared that the maternal
authority would place restrictions on her freedom: but
it also gave her great pleasure to see her mother again
after so long a separation, and to show her hospitality
in her exile; her husband also would not now offer any
opposition, although the restless activity of the people
who came with the Queen was distasteful to him[141]. The
Queen-mother, who had a rough passage of seven days, was
received with all the honour due to her rank and to the
ties of relationship. Even in England she exhibited the
self-respect which she maintained during her misfortunes.
When the Privy Council paid her a visit, she did not even
rise from her seat: the King was seen to speak to her only
with head uncovered, although she was maintained by his
kindness, which cost him no small sacrifice; the Queen took
pleasure in the performance of filial duties. Mary de’
Medici also had a Spanish match in view: she is said even
to have opened a negotiation for that object of her own
accord, without being authorised by her son-in-law. Above
all she clung to her purpose of using her residence in
England to effect her return to France.
One day in December the French ambassador Bellièvre had
had business at the royal palace. He was desirous of [A.D. 1638.]
leaving, when he was detained by Lord Holland in one of
the galleries, and after a short time the King and Queen
of England with the Queen-mother came in through the very
door by which he would have been obliged to withdraw. He
had intentionally avoided paying her his respects, as all
the other ambassadors had done: when she came nearer she
now said to him that she had a word for his ear, and the
King and Queen left her alone with him. She then assured
him that, after so many painful experiences, she was of
quite another mind from that in which she had formerly been
when she left France: that she conjured the Cardinal to
deliver her out of her misery, and not to leave her under
the necessity of begging her bread: that she wished for
nothing except to be near her son, and that she promised
if near him to interfere in nothing: but that if this
indulgence could not be obtained for the present, she
wished to be allowed to remain anywhere else in France, and
have a maintenance given her; that she would remove from
the neighbourhood of her person all who were displeasing to
the Cardinal, and would in all things do what he advised
her[142]. Bellièvre in vain declared that his commission
did not go so far as to allow him to listen to her; that he
was merely ambassador at the court of the King of England.
She replied that she knew that the French ambassadors were
bound to report what was said to them, and that this was
enough for her.
Cardinal Richelieu however had made up his mind never
to allow her to return to France, and to give her a
maintenance only if she would repair to Florence. There was
no question of compassion with him.
The Queen of England remembered full well that her brother
had forbidden her to interfere in any way in the affairs
of the Queen-mother: but the unhappy plight of her mother,
the general interest which she awakened at court, and
her own confidence in herself, founded upon the respect
which the power of her husband must procure for her, [A.D. 1638.]
moved her notwithstanding to make an attempt to do
something for her mother. After some time, as her first
expression of opinion had no kind of effect, she sent one
of her people, Henry Jermyn, who of them all perhaps stood
highest in her confidence, to the French court in order
to set on foot in France itself a negotiation for the
Queen-mother’s return.
Bellièvre not only did not recommend the Queen’s proposals,
but was even adverse to them.
There are everywhere petty motives of animosity which not
seldom exercise an influence upon affairs: and here also
this appears to have been the case. Bellièvre, a small
but well-shaped man, still young, and of lively aspiring
spirit, had special reasons for dissatisfaction. He was a
member of a French family that belonged to the nobility of
the long robe, and it was his ambition never to stand in
the position of an inferior. He was annoyed that the honour
of the tabouret, i.e. the privilege of being allowed to sit
in the presence of the Queen, had not been conferred on
his wife, although it had been conceded without hesitation
to the Duchess of Chevreuse. The efforts and intrigues of
this lady were therefore all the more obnoxious to him.
He believed that she brought the King offers from the
Spaniards which ran counter to those of the French: he
pretended to know that she expressed her undisguised joy
at losses which had overtaken the French in the field. On
the whole it appeared to him that, under her influence and
that of the Queen-mother, Queen Henrietta Maria herself had
contracted an inclination for the policy of Spain, from
which she had hitherto been free, and which gained ground
also among her suite; not perhaps with Lord Holland, who
continued true to French interests, but with the rest, from
whom for that very reason Lord Holland was beginning to
detach himself.
Bellièvre expressed his conviction that it would do no good
to receive back the Queen-mother into France: he thought
that, if she were replaced in exactly the same position
which she had enjoyed before, she yet would never part with
her advisers. He was of opinion, even with regard to the
Queen of England, that it would not be of much use to give
ear to her proposals. Certainly if they were declined the [A.D. 1639.]
ministers of the Queen-mother would do everything to
sever England from France: but even if her proposals were
acceded to, the same men would for that very reason be so
much the more completely masters of the English court, and
would enforce their wishes on the Queen, and even on the
King[143].
In consequence of this Jermyn not only found no opening
for his proposals, but met with a bad reception generally.
Queen Henrietta Maria made a jest of it, but nevertheless
she was irritated. Among her friends she let it be known
that she was treated in France as a daughter of the house,
that is, without any respect, and with the contempt which
had always been shown there towards England; but that
some day she would be able to take her revenge. Among
her friends Montague, who for love of her had become a
Catholic, was regarded as the one who principally confirmed
her in her views.
How long had people in France already waited for the day
when the Queen of England would acquire influence over
her husband! This came to pass for the first time in
the course of the disputes with the Scots, after which
a certain community of interest sprung up between the
Episcopal Church and the English Catholics, both of whom
had to expect their ruin from the rise of the Puritans.
The Queen was useful to the King from her influence with
the Catholics: cases had arisen in which her counsels had
proved suited to the occasion: he began to listen to her.
But when this period arrived, the Queen was no longer on
the side of the French government. She felt affronted
and rebuffed by the Cardinal: she thought him capable of
allying himself with the Scots against England; and she
espoused the cause of her mother with increasing warmth.
In March 1639 the French ambassador expresses to his court
his fears that the Queen of England, under the influence of [A.D. 1639.]
the friends of the Queen-mother, would do everything which
the latter might suggest to her against the interests of
France. Many other opponents of Cardinal Richelieu also
happened to be in England at that time;--Vieuville whom
he had once overthrown, and De la Valette who had retired
from France because he had allowed himself to be entangled
in a plot against the Cardinal. Bellièvre reports that the
latter was almost every day in the company of Madame de
Chevreuse; that he had long conferences with the ministers
of the Queen-mother, and on those occasions also saw
the English Queen; that they all were in uninterrupted
communication with the Spanish ambassador[144].
Already long before this time new projects of wide range
had been spoken of, which were said to have been set afloat
in England by means of the friends of the Queen-mother. At
that time a Frenchman named Petit, who possessed property
in Lorraine, and was engaged in chemical researches in
London, paid a visit to the French ambassador, and told him
that they had embraced the design of hazarding an attack
upon Brittany: he said that they had selected a place (of
which he did not mention the name), which might be captured
with little trouble, and maintained without difficulty.
Moreover people in France spoke of an impending alteration
in the government on the death of the Cardinal, who was
very weak and sickly. Vieuville said to the Duchess of
Chevreuse that she would be wrong if she did not take
care to be on the spot in France at the moment when such
a change occurred. People expected everything from the
preference Queen Anne felt for her.
These hostile tendencies, which certainly were primarily
of a personal character, but which nevertheless penetrated
deeply into politics, now fell in with those differences in
the conduct of political affairs which allowed no hope of
union.
However seriously Charles I on his part might affirm that
he would not estrange himself from France, yet Bellièvre
nevertheless adhered to the opinion that this was quite [A.D. 1639.]
possible, nay probable. He knew that the Queen, so far
as could be seen, was an enemy of France; that many
members of the Privy Council were in the pay of Spain
and drew pensions from that power; that many others, who
had hitherto been prevented by regard for the Queen from
speaking against France, were now on the contrary invited
to do so by her change of feeling: and that nothing less
could be expected than that even the King would allow
himself to be hurried into hostility to France.
Under these circumstances people in France were very
far from expecting King Charles to come into the French
and Swedish alliance in consequence of the Pacification
of Berwick. On the contrary this agreement seemed to
constitute a danger, as it untied the hands of the King
of England. It cannot be doubted that alliances between
the Scots and Cardinal Richelieu had already been formed:
they were carried on through his almoner Chambres. They
may have inspired the Scots with a general feeling of
courage, owing to the support which was held out to them
in consequence; but they could hardly have had much effect
upon the steps which they actually took, if only because
the medium of communication was a zealous Catholic. But now
Bellièvre advised his employers to espouse the cause of the
Scots with a very definite political aim. He considered
that the old alliance between France and Scotland ought
to be renewed, and the King of England hindered from ever
embarking on hostilities against France without the fear
arising in his mind that he would have the Scots against
him. Bellièvre thought that the negotiations which were
being carried on between Charles I and the Scottish
Parliament ought to be made use of and directed towards the
attainment of this object[145].
FOOTNOTES:
[126] Traité auxiliaire (hitherto, so far as I am aware,
unknown). A copy is found in the despatches of Seneterre,
Bibl. Nat. at Paris, Harl. 223/21: the revised original
draught in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Angleterre 47.
[127] ‘De tenir ce prince dans la créance que le roi desire
l’avancement et la conclusion de la traité et que la
conférence de Hambourg se fasse le plustôt.’
[128] Memoires du Père Joseph. Ruel, 7 Fevr. ‘Il faut que
toute cette flotte ou une partie d’icelle serve à attaquer
les places dans la coste d’Espagne ou de Flandres: selon
que le roi de la Grande-Bretagne sera requis par le commun
advis des alliés.’ Archives des affaires étrangères.
[129] Windebank to the King, Sept. 1638: ‘The Conde Duke,
while that whip was over him, beginning to be better
natured.’ See Clarendon Papers ii. 13, for the effect
produced by the siege of Funeterrara.
[130] This is the tenor of the words dictated by the
Cardinal to his secreta Cherré St. Quentin, Oct. 23,
1638. ‘Les Anglois qui ne songent qu’à avoir leur compte
estimeront juste la restitution de Lorraine et même celle
de la Pomeranie, pourvu qu’on leur rende le palatinat:
nous nous mocquerons d’une telle proposition et ainsi au
lieu d’avoir gagné les Anglois par le traité, que nous
commencions à cette fin, nous les perdrons en effet.’
[131] Instruction au Marquis de Poigny 1634: ‘Le Chevalier
de Jars lequel s’étant joint avec le Sr. de Chateauneuf
lorsqu’il fut ambassadeur extraordinaire en Angleterre, fit
entendre beaucoup de choses à la dite reine.’
[132] Mémoire de M. le Cardinal contre M. de Chateauneuf:
one of the most acceptable pieces of information in
Cousin’s Madame de Chevreuse, of the date of February 1633;
Appendice No. 8. p. 235.
[133] This explains the reason why the younger Weston, the
son of the Lord Treasurer, who at that time was entrusted
with an extraordinary mission in France, was impelled to
intercept the correspondence between Lord Holland and
people in authority in France, which on his return he
laid unopened before the King. It turned out to be quite
innocent: but the King approved Weston’s conduct. The
Queen’s whole court however was thrown into a state of
excitement. Holland sent Weston a challenge to fight a
duel; but the King succeeded in preventing it. (Calendar
1633-34, ii. 14.)
[134] Cousin, Appendice No. 1, No. 3, p. 280.
[135] Mémoire et instruction au Sr. de Bellièvre,
Angleterre 46. In order to anticipate an objection which
might be founded on the correspondence of Estrades, I must
state beforehand that I consider the first part of it
spurious, or at all events falsified.
[136] From Digby’s letters to Montague, which are to be
found in the French Archives, from March to May, 1638:
‘qu’il n’étoit plus le prisonnier de ce roi, mais de la
reine d’Angleterre.’
[137] Light is thrown on Bullion’s proposal by a letter of
Leicester, Oct. 6/16, 1637.
[138] ‘Le roi nes’ entremettroit pas, sans qu’il est
confident que la reine mère désire réellement une amnistie
de tout le passé et de se jetter entièrement entre les bras
de son fils par le moyen du Cardinal.’ From a letter of
Windebank to Leicester, Oct. 26, which was intercepted and
translated.
[139] Dispaccio Veneto 14 Maggio: ‘Per la sua tavola
restano assegnate 40 lire sterline il giorno; 200 ai mese
per le spese minute: e per i vestiti li fornisce la regina
di quanto le occorre.’
[140] Cuneo, 4 Giugno 1637: ‘La Duchessa di Cevrosa meco si
è andato mostrando piena di buon mi concetti ora comincio
a farli animo et a procurare che lei faccia il simile con
la regina principalmente in ordine alla educazione dei
principi e principessa’
[141] Cuneo ‘La regina ha persuaso al re di trovar buona la
sua venuta con sdegno di tutti’
[142] ‘Qu’elle me prioit de faire savoir a Monsgr. le
Cardinal, qu’elle le conjuroit de la tirer de la misère,
où elle se voyoit reduite--qu’elle est prête de faire en
tout ce que le roy luy voudra ordonner et ce que Mgr. le
Cardinal luy ordonnera.’ Despatch of Bellièvre, Dec. 23,
1638.
[143] ‘Que si les ministres de la reine n’obtiennent ce
qu’ils desirent, ils brouilleront l’Angleterre avec nous,
et la feront joindre à l’Espagne, comme on croit que
Monsigot a proposé au Card. Infant; que si Germain rapporte
contentement, ils regenteront dans la cour d’Angleterre
et feront faire au roi et à la reine ce qu’ils voudront.’
Extract from a letter of Bellièvre of March 7, which was
submitted to the Cardinal.
[144] ‘Madame de Chevreuse voit encore plus souvent
l’agent d’Espagne, avec lequel les ministres de la reine
mère traitent par l’entremise d’un fripon nommé Gedeon.’
Bellièvre, Aug. 4.
[145] ‘Faire proposer par l’assemblée et le parlement des
choses qui étant accordées brident l’Angleterre à un point,
qu’elle ne puisse jamais être notre ennemi, sans avoir au
même tems l’Ecosse sur les bras, ce qui se pourroit faire
en renouvellant les anciennes alliances entre la France et
l’Ecosse.’ (Bellièvre, July 7, 1639.)
CHAPTER III.
RELATIONS OF ENGLAND WITH THE ARMY OF BERNARD OF WEIMAR AND
WITH THE SPANISH FLEET UNDER OQUENDO.
It is quite true that Charles I was at this time engaged,
as he had been at an earlier period, in carrying on
negotiations with the Spanish court which might easily have
led to an open quarrel with France.
In the autumn of 1638 a contract was drawn up at Brussels,
according to which Spain and England were to unite in
order to wrest from the French their conquests in Germany
and Italy; indeed it was the great interest which the two
crowns had in this object which brought them together.
On the other hand the Emperor Ferdinand III was to be
induced by the Spanish court to recall the ban which had
been issued against Frederick Count Palatine, and to
restore the Electorship to the heirs of that prince. King
Charles was quite ready to accede to the contract, if only
trustworthy security were given to him with regard to the
Palatinate[146].
In the spring of 1639 accordingly the intention of Charles
I to take troops from the Spanish Netherlands into his
service, as formerly mentioned, was much discussed. The
Cardinal-Infant asked a question on the subject in Spain.
A third point on which negotiations took place was still
more urgent. The Spanish monarchy was once more collecting
all its resources to send a great fleet with troops and [A.D. 1639.]
the necessaries of war to the Netherlands. The Spaniards
indeed boasted that they desired to chastise the insolence
of the Dutch and French: but in fact they were conscious
of the superiority of their adversaries. They sought to
assure themselves beforehand, if not of the alliance of the
English, yet at least of their protection within English
waters, if disaster or too strong a resistance should drive
their fleet thither. Charles I did not refuse this request,
always provided that satisfaction should be done to him
in return in the affair of the Palatinate, with regard to
which the Spaniards made fresh proposals[147].
What injustice is done to Charles I by any one who accuses
him of having negligently lost sight of the cause of his
nephews! It is true that he would not draw the sword in
their behalf: but they supplied the principal motive which
guided him in his diplomatic transactions. His relations
with the great parties and powers who were fighting for
ascendancy on the Continent, were principally determined
by regard for them: the ceaseless vacillation of his
policy was due to nothing but the multiplicity of the
circumstances which affected them.
It certainly seemed that he might expect the Spaniards to
do most for them; for Spain, by its influence on Austria,
could act most effectually in support of the restoration
of the Elector Palatine. But we know how often he had been
deceived in this hope: the relation between German Austria
and Bavaria especially made the designs suggested by the
Spanish ambassador impracticable. Had the King been willing
to give his unreserved support to the interests of Spain,
which were so closely connected with those of Catholicism,
he would never have effected anything. He therefore sought
an alliance with the French court: the affair of the
Palatinate formed the principal subject of the stipulations
he made with it. But Charles I could not and dared not side
unconditionally even with France: for by taking this step
he would have been compelled to come to an open breach with
Spain, which would have disturbed the profitable traffic of [A.D. 1639.]
the English nation with the distant possessions of that
monarchy: and he would thereby have promoted the general
ascendancy of France, which was in the highest degree
disadvantageous to the position of England. Moreover he
would not even have reached his end by this path, for the
final decision still rested with the Emperor.
In these embarrassments it was the policy of King Charles
to make advances to those powers which were striving to
resist the Austro-Spanish house, while he did not exactly
make common cause with them: he hoped, as it seems, to make
such use of the fluctuations of fortune and of war as to
induce the Emperor himself at last, for the sake of his own
interest, to grant the wished-for indulgence.
The affair of the Palatinate forms as it were the woof
in the web of Charles I’s history, running through it in
all directions. And never at any time had it been of more
importance. In one of the most remarkable entanglements of
European relations, the considerations arising out of it
decided his line of policy.
The conquest of Breisach by Duke Bernard of Weimar in
December 1638 was hailed with as much joy in England as
in every other Protestant country. The establishment
of this brave general on the great continental line of
communication between the different parts of the Spanish
monarchy, could not but determine that power to devise
some way out of the difficulty. The occupation of this
place too threatened Bavaria with an immediate danger,
which could not fail to make an impression on the Elector
Maximilian, on whom everything depended. A project was even
entertained of marrying the victorious Duke of Saxe-Weimar
to a princess of the Palatinate, so as to attach him as
closely as possible to the interest of that family. Duke
Bernard for his own part sought to make himself a little
more independent of France: not that he had in view the
foundation of a third party, which would have brought
everything into confusion; he was only unwilling to be a
vassal of France: he thought of taking his place beside
that power as an independent ally. In this enterprise he
had Protestant Switzerland on his side, which was very [A.D. 1639.]
unwilling to see the French establish themselves in
Lorraine. This design moreover exactly suited the policy
of Charles I, to whom the aggrandisement of France was
displeasing.
The unexpected death of Duke Bernard in July 1639, whilst
he was preparing to assume so great a position, must be
regarded as a general calamity. At first however it seemed
as if this casualty would even have consequences favourable
to the plans of England and the Palatine house. Many
Englishmen had already made preparations for taking service
in Bernard’s army: the project was now mooted of putting
the Elector Palatine at its head, by which means he would
at once have regained the position of a military power.
Charles Louis seized this idea with ardour. While he opened
negotiations on the subject at the court of Sweden through
his ambassador, he came himself to England in order to gain
for his enterprise the support of the King. The ambassador
accredited by Switzerland, who had just arrived in England,
displayed especial zeal: he tried every expedient to move
the Cantons to action in the Elector’s behalf. Letters
were instantly written to the directors of the army, who
at once returned an answer. They showed themselves quite
ready to accept the Elector as commander-in-chief, when he
should appear amongst them, but on condition that the King
of England paid them a definite subsidy monthly, in order
to maintain the efficiency of the troops and keep them in
good spirits. In spite of the want of money, which had been
rendered doubly pressing by the Scottish campaign, we learn
that the sum required for taking over the command of the
army was nevertheless got together, and hopes were held out
of further advances. A private individual, Lord Craven, who
had most abundant means at his command, and had formed the
resolution of applying them to the service of the Palatine
family, was ready to attend the Elector to Germany[148].
This enterprise corresponded exactly with the views of
the King. He hoped to achieve his great end by cleverly [A.D. 1639.]
availing himself of a favourable moment, while at the
same time he made no great efforts, and did not actually
participate in the war itself, or come to a breach with
Spain, with which on the contrary he carried on constant
negotiations. If he had succeeded in his design, he would
have attained to a different position in foreign, and
perhaps even in domestic, affairs.
A difficulty however stood in his way, which might be
regarded as insuperable: namely, the opposition to be
expected on the side of France.
The court of France had hitherto regarded the army of
Bernard of Weimar as half its own, inasmuch as the Duke
owed the means of keeping it together in a great measure
to French subsidies: how then could it be even imagined
that France was to stand by quietly when this army not
merely claimed to act for itself, but even made itself
dependent on another power? Cardinal Richelieu on the
contrary intended to acquire both the army itself, and its
conquests, permanently for France. This was what he had
most at heart: he was nearer to the scene of action; he
had long formed relations with its leaders; he was better
provided with money: how could he fail to anticipate and
nullify the negotiations of England?
This obstacle to his plans did not escape the notice of
King Charles: but owing to the peculiar complication of
circumstances he expected to get into his hands a means of
removing it by a counter-concession.
Just at that time, in the middle of September, 1639, the
Spanish fleet appeared at sea. Long as it had been prepared
beforehand, it was not at starting sure of success, and
reckoned on the protection of England. King Charles had
been entreated, as we have seen, to grant it hospitable
reception in English harbours, if matters so turned out as
to make this necessary. And straightway this contingency
occurred. The fleet on this occasion, as before, consisted
principally of huge galleons, whose tackling was too
weak long to resist wind and tide in those narrow seas:
nor was the fleet adequately provided with artillery and
seamen. On the first collision with a much smaller Dutch [A.D. 1639.]
squadron, which was cruising in the Channel under Van
Tromp, the Spanish admiral Oquendo found himself compelled
to seek a refuge on the English coast in the Downs near
Dover. And as his preservation from a superior enemy now
depended on the protection which Charles I would accord him
there, the admiral entreated it most urgently, saying that
the honour of the Spanish monarchy and the maintenance of
its dominion in the Netherlands were dependent on the King.
Charles I appeared strongly inclined to grant his prayer.
He opened a negotiation with the ambassador Cardenas, in
which the affair of the Palatinate was brought forward
afresh: and Cardenas promised him all possible compliance
and assistance in the matter.
The Dutch and French ambassadors, however, urged an
opposite course on the King. They called his attention
to the fact that he stood in close relations with their
governments as well as with Sweden, and had all but
concluded a treaty with them: they suggested to him that
he ought not to incur their hostility by preventing them
from annihilating the Spaniards here on his coasts; that he
ought to remember that he had never hitherto experienced
any benefit at the hands of the Spaniards, and that even
on the present occasion he could not hope that they would
fulfil their promises.
This was one of the most important moments in the life of
Charles I. The two great conflicting forces which divided
the world, and with each of which he had some connexion,
now called upon him to choose between them without delay.
This was even a source of moral embarrassment, inasmuch as
the King by his previous attitude had given both parties
a certain right to expect his support: but the political
embarrassment was the most conspicuous, and seems to have
been the only one felt by the King. He had now to put an
end to all wavering, and in one decisive instant to throw
himself on the side of one of the two parties.
Bellièvre once more brought into play the whole of the
influence which he claimed to exercise on Queen Henrietta
Maria as the ambassador of her family. He reports that she
had favoured an adverse policy, but that he had spoken with
her in a manner which might certainly have provoked her
displeasure, but which however had in fact changed her [A.D. 1639.]
opinion. Negotiations were opened between the ambassador
and the King himself through the mediation of the Queen.
But if the promises which the Spaniards gave with regard
to the affair of the Palatinate supplied a motive for
extending shelter to them, how much stronger a motive,
under the circumstances which we have mentioned, must
the King have had for attempting to win over the French
government!
Bellièvre, when informed of the negotiations that were
being carried on with Spain, acted on the hint that France
must oppose promises on her own part to those made by
Spain, and at last asked to be informed what was expected
of him. We learn nothing of the deliberations that may
then have been carried on between the King and Queen. But
the preference was given to the plan of purchasing support
for the Elector Palatine, in the projects that were being
agitated, by making concessions to France. In answer to the
French ambassador, the Queen expressed a hope of obtaining
a promise from him that the Elector Palatine should be
placed at the head of the army of Bernard of Weimar. She
added that in this event the King on his part would offer
no resistance to the wishes of the French: that he would
not break with the Spaniards it is true, but that he would
not interfere with any steps which the Dutch might take
against the Spanish fleet[149]. Bellièvre said that he was
not commissioned to make proposals; still he by no means
set aside those which had been submitted to him: he merely
asked how many troops the King was willing to give the
Elector to take with him to Germany. Charles I replied that
he rather left the King of France to support the Elector
with troops; that he could do no more in this way than
have some 6000 men enlisted in England and transported to
the coast of France, where he intended that they should be
taken into the pay of the French: that in return for this [A.D. 1639.]
however, and especially for that other far greater service
of allowing the Spanish fleet to be destroyed on his
coasts, he required the King of France to promise that
he would conclude neither truce nor peace which did not
comprise the restitution of the Palatinate. This was the
same object which he had already attempted to gain in
the former negotiations: open hostilities against Spain
had been demanded of him in return. His intention was
to extract the desired engagement from France, without
committing himself to this extent, by means of the
concessions which he now expressed his readiness to make.
He allowed the ambassador fourteen days for procuring the
consent of his court: if this period expired without any
result, he intended to be at liberty to make terms with
Spain.
It is indeed possible that King Charles was incensed afresh
against Spain by the tidings, which he then received, of
a renewal of the connexion between the Spaniards and the
malcontents in Ireland; and that he called to mind their
former breaches of faith. He had also certainly not given
them any definite promise of protection. Still it remains
a most odious imputation on the sovereign who laid claim
to maritime supremacy that he resolved to deliver over
the weaker party, who had come to his coast entreating
shelter, into the hands of the stronger in return for
an advantage which he bargained to obtain from them.
What seduced him was the consideration that he need not
interfere decisively: he thought that, without breaking
with the Spaniards, he could bind their adversaries to him,
and carry off the fruits of the victory without drawing
the sword himself. And moreover this was after all but a
project, not a settled conclusion. Meanwhile he continued
his negotiations with the Spaniards, from whom he claimed a
large sum of money in return for the armament which he had
been forced to equip for their protection.
But how could these counsels have had any good result,
inspired as they were by weakness and the love of peace on
the one side, and on the other by the intention of turning
an accidental combination of circumstances to the greatest
possible advantage?
The French felt the advantage of the position of general [A.D. 1639.]
superiority in which they found themselves placed. Even
under existing circumstances they did not feel in any mood
to accede to these proposals of Charles I. They adhered
to their wish that he should at last sign the offensive
and defensive alliance, which had been so long talked of,
and which was still kept in prospect. If he would then
support his nephew the Elector Palatine with an army,
which he would be expected always to keep in an effective
condition, and if he would further himself contribute to
the actual destruction of the Spanish fleet, they thought
that he might feel assured that France would conclude no
arrangement without stipulating for the restitution of the
Palatinate, and procuring satisfaction for the Elector.
The French court passed over in silence the proposal for
helping the Elector to become commander-in-chief of the
army of Bernard of Weimar: it thought it best not to
express any opinion at all upon that subject. It certainly
expected no result from the renewal of former demands;
but it was already satisfied with the maintenance of the
negotiations: above all it wished Bellièvre to take care
that King Charles did not come to an agreement with the
Spaniards, as the Dutch fleet would meanwhile gain time to
annihilate the Spanish[150].
The interval which Charles I had allowed for the answer of
the French court had not yet expired: he was still able
to think that he had the matter in his own hands, when
the Dutch admiral Van Tromp, empowered by a resolution of
the States-General to that effect, proceeded to attack
the Spanish fleet in the English roads. The English
vice-admiral Pennington was neither strong enough to
prevent the conflict, nor had he any orders to do so.
The Dutch sank a number of Spanish ships, and burned
others: the number of those which they captured was about
eleven[151]: the greater part, however, with Oquendo
himself on board, favoured by a thick fog, escaped to the
opposite coast and ran into Dunkirk harbour.
The Spanish fleet was not, strictly speaking, annihilated; [A.D. 1639.]
the booty which the Dutch carried off hardly equalled the
outlay which their armament had cost them. The event must
however be regarded as decisive. A similar fleet never
again set sail from Spain for the Netherlands.
Charles I, in allowing this transaction, had rendered a
great service to the Protestant cause; but at the same
time he had played an uncertain part unworthy of his great
position, from which none but consequences disadvantageous
to him could arise.
The suspicion entertained against him by his subjects went
so far that they even inferred from his dubious attitude a
secret understanding, to the prejudice of their religion,
between him and the Spaniards. They hailed the occurrence
as a victory over the King himself. True Englishmen felt
annoyed that a great battle had been fought out on their
coasts without their participation.
The Spanish ambassador complained loudly and bitterly.
Charles I answered him with contemptuous remarks on the
slight power of resistance displayed by the Spanish Armada.
The Dutch ambassador, on the other hand, who attempted to
excuse the enterprise of his countrymen, was rebuffed by
the King with harsh expressions. Disagreeable incidents
encountered him on every side.
But the most annoying of the quarrels in which he was
involved arose out of his design upon the army of Bernard
of Weimar, which he attempted to carry out even before
the defeat of the Spanish fleet. He did not even wait
for the French court to state its views in reply to his
application. As soon as a favourable answer arrived from
the Directors of that army he allowed the Elector, Charles
Louis, to set out without delay to take possession of the
command.
And indeed the intention was that the Elector, attended
by only a few trusty companions, should take the route
through France to Breisach, which was both the nearest
way, and was least exposed to the disturbances of war.
The King said to the French ambassador, that the Elector
should make his appearance with the army merely as a
volunteer; and that any further steps should be dependent
on the answer of the French court, which was still looked [A.D. 1639.]
for. The ambassador called his attention to the impropriety
of a prince of such high rank travelling through France
without previously giving notice to the King, in fact
without even so much as a safe conduct from him. But
Charles I would hear of no delay: he professed to think
that his ambassador, the Earl of Leicester, would still
have time enough to make a communication to the French
court on the subject. Bellièvre, however, did not himself
believe that the King was serious in his professions. In
his report he says, that such a communication, if made,
would be made only after the event; that the intention was
that the Prince should travel through France incognito,
without seeing the King, or any of his ministers. In
reality, people in England thought that if he went to
Court, he would be detained there until matters had been
settled in the army to his disadvantage: that if on the
contrary he made his appearance at the right moment, and,
what was more, with sufficient supplies of money, the
greater part of the officers would declare in his favour.
And it appeared quite possible to go through France
unrecognised, as the King himself had succeeded in doing in
his youth.
Thus it fell out that Charles I allowed his nephew to set
off for France, with few attendants, but provided with
money and good letters of credit. On October 15 Charles
Louis left England on board one of those ships which were
still lying beside the Spanish fleet in the Downs. On his
arrival at Boulogne he was saluted by all the other ships.
On October 17 he was at St. Denys, and on the following
day he proceeded through the capital to Villejuif on the
road to Lyons. He endeavoured to maintain so strict an
incognito, that he did not even see the English ambassador,
for he wished to allow no one at all to recognise him[152].
But meanwhile the French government was kept informed
of every step which he took. It knew that the object of
his journey was in complete contradiction to its own
intentions; and it was not accustomed in political affairs [A.D. 1639.]
to show the smallest regard to others. When the Elector
arrived at Moulins he was detained for want of a safe
conduct; and was brought without further ceremony to
the fortress of Vincennes, where his captors professed
their intention of examining him. The French government
maintained that it was thereby exercising its right: for if
the intentions of this Prince were good and laudable, why
should he so carefully conceal his journey through France?
But so far as his intentions were not of this character,
but were hostile to the interests of the King of France,
they alleged that they had every reason for not allowing
him to travel any further[153].
Just at that time the convention was concluded by which
the army of Bernard passed into the service of France.
On October 22 Erlach, who had the principal direction of
the army, took the oath in the presence of Guébriant. All
counter action to which the feeling of other officers might
have given rise, if the Elector had been present in person,
was avoided beforehand by his imprisonment at Vincennes.
His presumed secrecy was what furnished a specious pretext
for making him harmless.
The King of England regarded this transaction not merely
as a misfortune, but as an affront. The services which he
had rendered to the French were returned with ingratitude,
or, rather, with the contrary of that recompense which
he had expected from them. But, while he made known his
displeasure on the subject, twice as great a feeling of
irritation set in on the side of the French. They had the
less hesitation in taking part against Charles I wherever
an opportunity of doing so presented itself.
FOOTNOTES:
[146] Clarendon State Papers ii. 13. The erection not only
of an eighth Electorship for Bavaria, but even of a ninth
was talked of: ‘attendue la nécessité du nombre impair des
électeurs, sa Majèsté Impériale se trouvant obligée d’en
créer un autre à son choix.’
[147] Giustiniano, 15 Aprile, 20 Maggio 1639. ‘Spagnoli
hanno procurato d’introdurre Brusselles nuove pratiche per
li interessi della casa Palatina.’
[148] Giustiniano, Aug. 19, Sep. 23, 1639: on whom we have
principally to depend for information about this matter.
[149] ‘La reine me dit, que le roi feroit tout ce que
nous et les Hollandais pourrions souhaiter en leur faveur
contre la flotte d’Espagne, sans néanmoins se déclarer
ennemi, en sorte toutefois que les Hollandais auraient lieu
d’entreprendre et faire tout ce que bon leur sembleroit:
qu’il (le roi) voudroit aussi que je lui proposasse en
recompense, de mettre Mr. le prince Palatin [he was not yet
acknowledged Elector] à la teste de l’armée, que commandoit
feu le duc de Weimar.’ Despatch of Bellièvre of October 9.
[150] Bullion to Bellièvre: unfortunately not dated.
Bellièvre’s despatch is of October 9: the battle in the
Downs took place on the 21st.
[151] The Venetian ambassador reckons them at this number.
Cp. Thysius 239.
[152] We learn from an intercepted letter of Leicester
that he entirely approved of this: ‘s’il est reconnu je ne
pourrois être soupçonné d’en être la cause.’
[153] Chavigny replied to Leicester’s complaint: ‘Le roi ne
pouvoit pas faire moins à un prince, qui vouloit passer par
la France incognito.’ Cp. Puffendorf, Rer. Suec lib xi. 59.
CHAPTER IV.
RENEWED DISTURBANCES IN SCOTLAND.
The French nowhere found wider scope for this policy than
in Scotland, where the Pacification of Berwick had not
only not led to peace, but had stirred up yet more violent
dissensions.
From the first moment different opinions were formed among
the Scots with regard to this measure. Even among the
Covenanters there were many who hailed it with delight.
For what, they asked, must have happened if the King had
continued obstinate, and they had been obliged to fight
against him? Among the English, at all events, they did
not find so much support as had been expected; even among
the Scots the old divisions were reviving; many of the
Covenanters felt their consciences smite them when they
thought that they would be plunged into a bloody conflict
with their King. But on the other hand it was remarked by
others that the literal meaning of the conditions did not
offer them any adequate security. They saw the camp broken
up with feelings of dissatisfaction: for they thought
that without such an army they would be obliged to submit
to every dictate of the King. They complained that the
agreement had been concerted in far too great haste by some
few, without the concurrence of a sufficient number of
nobility, gentry, and clergy.
Even at the moment when the Pacification was being
concluded, these differences had made their appearance. The
King had expressed himself in conciliatory and soothing [A.D. 1639.]
terms about some clauses which gave offence by their
severity[154]. These expressions were taken down, and
passed from hand to hand: at the same time it was thought
expedient to append to the King’s proclamation, which
was made known in the camp, a remark upon the sense in
which it was to be understood. People would have been
glad to have procured a further written declaration to
this effect from the King himself; but he would not allow
himself to be persuaded to give this, just as he persevered
in maintaining a somewhat proud and rigid attitude in
general. Men like Argyle, when they appeared in the royal
camp, could not congratulate themselves on meeting with a
particularly gracious reception. Between the nobles who
attached themselves to the King, and those who belonged
to the other party, unpleasant discussions broke out in
the King’s presence. The Covenanters were discontented
and full of suspicion when they saw the sovereign to whom
they wished to restore a certain, even if not the old
traditional, measure of power, surrounded by men of high
temporal and spiritual rank, whom they regarded as their
enemies.
But meanwhile the people also were thrown into a state of
excitement, mainly because the strongholds wrested from
the King’s garrisons were again to be restored to them.
In Edinburgh especially it was thought insupportable that
the Castle of that town should again receive a garrison
such as had formerly held it, and, what was more, with
Ruthven for its commander, a man who, as well as others,
had fought in the German wars, but was known to be a
decided Royalist. Popular disturbances broke out, in which
the King’s servants were insulted,--Hamilton especially,
who had hastened thither in order to enforce in person the
conditions of peace, which, for the most part, had been
suggested by him. A number of the Scottish nobility, whom
the King had ordered to come to his camp with a view to [A.D. 1639.]
further negotiations were prevented by force from going
thither. It is probable that they were not sorry for this,
even if it cannot be proved that they had themselves
provoked it.
When the King promised to attend both the Assemblies in
Scotland in person, he cherished the hope of reviving his
power, to some extent, during the proceedings, and by means
of them and of preserving the old forms of the constitution
intact in their most important particulars. Hamilton now
came back from Edinburgh with the impression that this was
impossible, and that the King could expect nothing there
but fresh losses. A full month had not yet elapsed from the
conclusion of the Pacification; yet he already declared a
fresh war to be inevitable. In making representations on
this point, he raised a number of questions that had a wide
application: for instance--whether the King could procure
money for such a war without an English parliament? and if
not, whether he was willing to summon a parliament, and
to leave himself to its discretion[155]? No one decided
these questions; but all had made up their minds to witness
further complications, when the King unexpectedly announced
his resolution to return to London. The two Assemblies
were not on that account given up; they could not but
take place; but they appear only as attempts at a further
pacification, the results of which were to decide whether
after all recourse must be had once more to arms. Hamilton
declined to appear at them as the King’s Commissioner. The
Earl of Traquair, whose views at that time more nearly
approached those of the Scots, undertook this office. On
August 12th the General Assembly was opened at Edinburgh.
According to the terms of the Pacification the Scots
refrained from demanding a formal ratification of the
resolutions of the Assembly of Glasgow. But as to the
substance of them, they declared to the Commissioner
that they would cling to it as long as the breath of
life remained in their bodies. They would not recede a [A.D. 1639.]
hair’s-breadth from the assertion that the ground on which
they stood was the only legal ground. In open opposition to
the King’s opinion, they again enacted that the proceedings
of the last Assemblies of the Church which had been held
under his father were null and void: if the King would
at any rate, under present circumstances, allow a new
Assembly to be convened within a year’s time, they on their
part were ready to make a permanent statute, prescribing
that the Assembly should be held once every year, and if
necessary still oftener. The Commissioner on his part could
not refuse to permit the abolition of Episcopacy: this
was the principal concession made by the King: a dispute
however arose about the wording of the resolution, which
concerned indeed only one expression, but at the same time
affected the main point of the controversy. The King had
consented to the measure, on the ground that Episcopacy was
contrary to the constitution of the Church of Scotland;
the Assembly laid down that it was absolutely unlawful.
At last Traquair assented to this expression, but the
King showed great indignation, for he thought that what
was contrary to the constitution of some one church was
not therefore absolutely unlawful[156]: and he was afraid
that the expression, if not moderated by a limitation to
Scotland, might be applied to the English Church, which,
like the Scottish, was a reformed Church. He censured the
Commissioner in harsh terms for his compliance.
Still greater and more immediately urgent differences were
to be anticipated, when on August 31 the Parliament met,
like the Assembly, in Edinburgh. The summons had been
issued under the presumption of the continuance of the
legal forms; but now the King himself had given up the
bishops; and the first question was, how the vacancies
in the Parliament were to be filled. The King thought of
replacing the bishops by clergymen selected by himself;
but the Scots were of opinion that in this way Episcopacy [A.D. 1639.]
would be abolished only in name, while in substance it was
retained; and the nobles did not wish the influence which
the bishops had exercised upon the nomination of the Lords
of Articles, and upon the deliberations of Parliament,
to be revived. Even the Scottish clergy felt no desire
for this dignity, to which in fact they traced all the
abuses that had crept in; they at that time declared that
the participation of the clergy in civil business was as
unlawful as Episcopacy itself[157]. It was vainly objected
on the other hand, that in this way one of the three
estates was abolished, which was a criminal proceeding
forbidden under the penalties attaching to high treason.
The Scots affirmed that the concessions of the King carried
with them at the same time the removal of the episcopal
element and the necessity of constituting a parliament of
a new kind. They now themselves took in hand the work of
reconstitution without delay; for, as they alleged, the
King had promised them a free parliament. In fact their
design was to give the representatives of the shires an
independent position, almost as in the English Parliament;
they did not wish to abolish the Lords of Articles, but
to draw them from the deputies of the nobility, gentry,
and commonalty, as was then forthwith done[158]: it is
quite clear that this was not merely a question of form,
but also a question of the distribution of power. For by
the nomination of other clergy in place of the bishops,
the crown would certainly have been able to win back its
former influence over the Parliament, and the gentry would
have lost the authority which they had derived from their
participation in the movements of the Covenanters. But how
should the members of the Tables and of the Committees,
who had acquired a feeling of independence, have again
returned to their former position? They endeavoured, on
the contrary, to maintain, even under parliamentary forms,
the power which they had acquired, and they succeeded in
their endeavour. Not only was the Parliament transformed
according to their views, but the most important rights were
claimed for it. The Parliament proposed that the King’s [A.D. 1639.]
Privy Council should be responsible to it, and that
the King should be bound to follow its advice in making
appointments to high military commands, especially in the
fortified places; and to comply with its recommendation in
alterations of the coinage: even the right of conferring
honours and dignities was in future to be exercised only
under definite conditions; the Treasury was no longer to
possess any jurisdiction. When we consider the scope of
these proposals, we understand why the royal commissioner
brought his whole power to bear, by whatever means he
could, to prevent the Parliament from advancing to
definitive resolutions in the direction on which they had
entered. He adjourned Parliament, at first for a short
time. This was repeated some eight times in succession: at
last he pronounced it to be prorogued from November 1639
until June 1640. This step however raised a question which
was as important as any of those which he was attempting to
get rid of. The Kings of England and Scotland had hitherto
exercised the right of dissolving as well as of convoking
Parliament: to other sovereigns who did not possess this
right in dealing with their representative assemblies,
this had appeared to be a most enviable prerogative. The
Scottish Parliament now denied this right; it sought
to show that the right belonged to the King and his
commissioner only in concert with Parliament. The Assembly
broke up, it is true, but it left a committee behind
it, which claimed to be considered as representing the
Parliament, and transacted public business in this capacity.
How completely contrary to the expectations which had been
entertained at Berwick was the course which affairs had
now taken! We do not join the complaints of treachery and
breach of faith which were raised by men of the different
parties against one another. Two powers and forces, between
which a reconciliation was hardly possible any longer, now
stood in opposition to one another. The monarchy on the
one side, which, in spite of the great concessions which
it made, nevertheless maintained its pretension to possess
lawfully within itself plenary public authority; and,
on the other, a parliamentary and spiritual power which [A.D. 1639.]
had grown up during the rising under the patronage of
proud nobles and preachers mighty in the word, and which
would not at any price resign the independence which it
had once asserted. The attempt which the two parties had
made at Berwick to approach one another brought to light
the internal opposition between them. The Scots, proceeding
onwards with the logical consistency which from the first
moment had marked their course, achieved such a measure
of independence in determining the internal arrangements
of the State in spiritual and temporal matters, that the
monarchy was reduced to a mere name. They thought that they
were thus defending an universal interest at the same time.
Whoever reads the journals and memoirs of the Scots sees
clearly for the first time how entirely they identified
their cause at home with that of Protestantism, and with
the Continental struggle against the Austro-Spanish power.
They note the advance of the Swedes, of the German powers
allied with them, and of the Dutch and French as an
advantage to themselves. The advance of Baner into Bohemia
in the summer of 1639, when he even made Vienna tremble;
the further advance of the army of Bernard of Weimar, even
after the death of its leader, and the danger with which
it threatened Mainz, while in Westphalia and in Franconia
the friends of the Emperor were kept down, and his enemies
raised their heads:--all these events appeared to them
to indicate the general victory of Protestantism, which
indeed was their own victory also[159]. They were above all
pleased that the Spanish fleet should be blockaded, and at
last defeated on the English coast; for the embarrassment
into which King Charles was thrown contributed to their
security.
But, it may be asked, had they not, besides the support
which they found in the relations between the great Powers
of the world, also received some special assurances from
one side or the other?
The French ambassador, Bellièvre, felt no hesitation
in putting himself in alliance with the adversaries of
King Charles in Scotland, in systematic opposition to
the tendencies prevailing at the English court, which he
regarded as dangerous to the interests of France. He was [A.D. 1639.]
not, strictly speaking, authorised by his court to take
this step. Yet he acted in the name of his court when he
assisted a few Scots of the Covenanting party, with whom
he had become acquainted in London, to go to Edinburgh,
in order to further his designs among the members of
the Assemblies in that city. He wished them to keep
three objects before their eyes--the maintenance of the
privileges of the Scots if the Pacification was brought to
a final conclusion[160]; the renewal of the old alliance
between France and Scotland; and lastly, a representation
of the Scots in the English Privy Council. It is not to be
supposed that the emissaries of Bellièvre exercised much
direct influence upon the course of the transactions of the
General Assembly or of the Parliament, for these bodies
observed in their movements an internal consistency of
their own; but no one will venture to deny that the leaders
were encouraged to persevere in their course, even at the
risk of breaking with their King, by the thought that in
case of extremities they might reckon upon the support of
France. Under these circumstances the maintenance of this
alliance promoted their own security. As early as August
1639, Argyle, Lesley, and Rothes, addressed a letter to
Bellièvre, in which they alleged circumstances as an excuse
for the delay of the French enlistments in Scotland, about
which Bellièvre had intentionally complained in terms
intimating suspicion, though deeper than he himself felt,
while at the same time, he referred to the old alliances
between France and Scotland, which he said ought ‘not to be
disturbed by any shadow of mistrust[161]. Towards the end
of the year, King Charles refused to grant an audience to
the Commissioners of the Parliament who came to London, not
so much on account of the object stated in their commission
as an account of the nature of the authority on which it [A.D. 1639.]
was based. Thereupon the principal member of the
Commission, Lord Loudon, did not hesitate to turn to the
French ambassador with a declaration that Scotland reckoned
upon the support of the crown of France in the event of a
breach with Charles I. A Scot of the name of Dishingtoun
was the agent of the negotiations between Lord Loudon
and the ambassador. The Scots announced their intention
of requesting the King of France, if their dispute with
Charles I were not shortly adjusted, to take cognisance of
it according to the terms of their old alliance, and to
mediate between them and their sovereign; and, in case this
was impossible, to afford them protection against him. They
remarked, that they would easily have been able to come to
an understanding with the German sovereigns or with the
Dutch instead, but that they were convinced their petition
would not be rejected by France; and, if they were right in
this, that they were determined to conclude no agreement
with their King which did not allow full restoration of the
alliance between France and Scotland. We cannot help asking
how this alliance could have been contemplated after the
crowns of England and Scotland had been united on one head.
The ambassador had himself intimated that the participation
of the Scots in Charles’ Council for the management of
foreign affairs would be necessary to effect that object.
The Scots not only caught up this notion, but turned it
into a demand for a high degree of political independence.
They wished that the King should henceforward not be
allowed to proclaim war without applying to the Scottish
Parliament on the subject; the Scots must be conceded
a regular place, not only in the management of foreign
affairs in the Council, but also about the King’s person in
the offices of his household; they must have liberty even
to keep plenipotentiaries in France as well as at the
Hague[162]. Not until these designs were accomplished [A.D. 1639.]
could those political results be achieved, which the
General Assembly and the Parliament had desired to bring
about, in order to promote the independence of the Church,
and the change of the constitution, by which the previous
influence of the crown was to be excluded. The independence
which the Parliament demanded in the conduct of internal
affairs was now to be extended to its relation with foreign
powers as well.
Bellièvre had entirely approved of the articles which
were communicated to him, for they could only redound to
the advantage of France: thus also hopes were held out to
him of concluding a treaty of commerce in the interests
of France, and to the prejudice of England. The proposals
coincided with the most cherished aims of the ambassador;
he regarded the severance of the policy of Scotland from
that of England as the great object of his efforts. But if
we are asked whether Richelieu also was of this opinion,
and especially whether he thought it permissible, while
France and England were at peace, to support a movement
so decidedly hostile, we can only reply that such was not
his view. Soon after the beginning of the proceedings he
had directly forbidden the ambassador to mix himself up
with the affairs of Scotland. When a proposed mission
from Scotland to France was mentioned, he instructed the
ambassador to prevent it, because at present it could have
no result; for Louis XIII was very conscientious, and
would not injure any one without reason. It was possible,
he said, that England, which was constantly negotiating
with Spain, would conclude an alliance with that power; in
that case, the King, on his part, would be ready to enter
into an alliance with the Scots, whom he loved; but until
that time it would be as well to keep back the intended
invitation.
He wished to let the Scots cherish the hope which they
entertained of the eventual support of France, but affairs [A.D. 1639.]
were not in such a state as to encourage him in the wish to
make common cause with them openly at this moment.
The Scots however proceeded on their way. A letter is
extant, much disputed it is true, but of indubitable
authenticity; it is signed by six of the principal leaders,
among whom we find Montrose, but not Argyle. In this letter
the writers claim the protection of France, and formally
accredit an ambassador named Colvil at the court of Louis
XIII; even the instructions are extant which they gave
to him. According to these, Colvil was commissioned to
represent their grievances in Paris, especially touching
three points--the illegality of the High Commission, the
declaration of Charles I that the Scots were rebels, and
the dissolution of the last Parliament, not only without
its consent, but even in complete opposition to its wishes.
He was to remind the King of the repeated alliances between
the two nations, and of the services rendered by the Scots
to the royal house of France: and he was to invite the King
to procure for them, by mediating with their sovereign, a
renewal of the enjoyment of their privileges[163].
The attention of Charles I had long before been called to
the connexion formed between the French and the Scots; his
confidential agents were now indefatigable in seeking to
come upon the trace of it.
Bellièvre had become odious to the English court,
apparently because he was conjectured to be the agent of
that connexion, but still more because he had taken an
active part in the negotiations with regard to the Spanish
fleet, and the journey of the Elector Palatine, and seemed
to be responsible for their unsuccessful issue. One day
he was walking up and down in confidential conversation
with the King of England, such as he had for a long time
been accustomed to hold: the conversation turned on the
imprisonment of the Elector Palatine; the ambassador made
a proposal; the King suddenly checked himself, and said [A.D. 1640.]
that he felt at a disadvantage in these negotiations; that
the ambassador was prepared beforehand with his proposals;
that he, the King, was not, and that he must ask him not
to make much account of what he said to him; that if
the ambassador wished to have a precise answer, he must
hand him in a written question; that he should receive
a written answer in return, and that this answer alone
would be valid. The ambassador felt the full force of this
intimation; the standing-ground upon which he had hitherto
rested began to sink under him. He had certainly at one
time expressed himself to the King in unfavourable terms
with regard to the Queen; he now experienced a counter
action from that side. The personal friends of the Queen
he regarded as his enemies. These were Percy, Montague,
and Jermyn, from whom he was already estranged, because
they were friends of the Queen-mother. He had introduced
the alliance with the Scots chiefly in order to counteract
the influence which they exercised in favour of Spain.
He said indeed that more was ascribed to him than he had
done: that he was thought more dexterous, more active,
and more dangerous than he was: but nevertheless it is
apparent, if we consider his proceedings, that he had a
great share in producing the growing ill-feeling between
the two courts, and even in fomenting internal disputes.
For not only the Scots, but all those who even in England
were in opposition to the court attached themselves to
him. How deep an influence can in general be exercised
by the machinations of foreign ambassadors at a time of
internal dissension, especially when those machinations
are supported by governments of strong and well-understood
political tendencies! An instance of this is afforded by
the influence exercised by the Spanish ambassador at an
earlier date in England, and in France itself at the time
of the League. Bellièvre had acquired a position similar
in kind though by no means similar in degree. But he felt
that it was no longer tenable, and in January 1640 he left
England.
Not until after his departure did the Scots resolve, as has
been mentioned before, to send an ambassador. Notice of
their intention was first sent to Bellièvre in France: but
on this occasion the inquiries of the English government [A.D. 1640.]
were more successful than they had been before. The
original of the letter addressed to Louis XIII fell
into its hands: it had Colvil arrested, and some time
afterwards, Loudon also, who had again come to London.
Richelieu was very fortunate in having declined to
recognise the mission of Colvil. He had Bellièvre told that
the French government had been wiser than he.
King Charles knew of the hostile intention of the French
court: the strongest impression must have been produced
on him when he now also became aware how cordially it was
met on the part of the Scots. He determined to make the
discovery a motive for the resistance which he wished to
offer to his rebellious subjects.
FOOTNOTES:
[154] Baillie i. 218: ‘The Kings own exposition, declared
to us by all the Communers, and taken first at their mouth
by many extemporary penns, and there set down by themselves
to be communicat to all, gave tolerable satisfaction.’ No
doubt this was the original of the promise, which at a
later period was so often brought home to the King, but
which he never acknowledged.
[155] The Marquis his advise to the King. Berwick, July 6.
Burnet, Dukes of Hamilton 144. This shows more sagacity
than anything else that fell from Hamilton, so far as I
know.
[156] ‘For many things may be contrary to the constitution
of a church, which of themselfs are not simply unlawfull.
For whatsoever is absolutely unlawfull in one church,
cannot be lawfull in the other of the same profession.’
Charles I to Traquair, Oct. 1, in Burnet, Dukes of Hamilton
158.
[157] ‘All civil places and power of kirkmen to be
unlawfull in the kingdom.’
[158] ‘Commissioners of shyres chosen (to be) one (of the
lords of) artickells.’ Balfour ii. 360.
[159] Baillie, Oct. 12, 1639, notices all this.
[160] ‘Persuadés que pour l’honneur de leur pays et le bien
de leur religion ils ne doivent point laisser executer
l’accord fait en termes généraux entre le roi de la Grande
Bretagne et ceux du covenant, qu’ils ne fassent bien
expliquer en quoy consistent leurs privilèges.’
[161] ‘Nous ne consentirons jamais, que tant et tant
d’alliances faites entre les deux royaumes soient jamais
teintes par la moindre soupçon de notre côté.’ 20/30 Août.
[162] ‘Ils ne feront point de traité avec le roi sans que
les conditions suivantes ne leur soient accordées: à savoir
1. que l’ancienne alliance entre les roys et les royaumes
de France et d’Ecosse sera entièrement retablie; 2. le roi
d’Ingleterre ne pourra entreprendre aucune guerre sans
l’avis et le consentement du parlement d’Ecosse, et s’il le
fait autrement, les Ecossois ne seront tenus d’en prendre
part; 3. dans le conseil des affaires étrangères et près de
la personne du roi d’Ingleterre il y aura dorénavant des
Écossois qui prendront garde, que rien ne se resolve qui
préjudice à leurs alliances, 4. que les rois d’Ingleterre
et leurs fils auront des Ecossois en chaque office de
leur maison, 5. que le roi d’Ingleterre trouvera bon que
les Ecossois tiennent un agent à la cour de France, ainsi
qu’ils font a la Haye.’
[163] Traduction de l’instruction du Sr. Colvil envoyé par
les Seigneurs d’Ecosse in Mazure, Histoire de la Revolution
de 1688, iii. 406. The letter also is printed there
according to the copy found in the French archives.
CHAPTER V.
STRAFFORD AND THE SHORT PARLIAMENT.
About this time the Lord Deputy of Ireland, Thomas Viscount
Wentworth, was summoned to England to take a seat in the
Council of the King: the affairs of Scotland were the
immediate cause of his return.
The statesmen of England have always been distinguished
from those of other countries by the combination of their
activity in the Council and in the Cabinet with an activity
in Parliament, without which they cannot win their way into
the other sphere. Wentworth, like others, had first made
himself a name in Parliament as a resolute and dangerous
opponent of Buckingham. But there was as yet no clear
consciousness of the rule, infinitely important for the
moral and political development of remarkable men, that the
activity of a minister must be harmonious and consistent
with his activity as a member of Parliament. In the case
of Wentworth especially it is clear that he opposed the
government of that day, by which he was kept down, only
in order to make himself necessary to it. His natural
inclination was, as he once avowed, to live, not under the
frown, but under the smile of his sovereign. The words of
opposition to the government had hardly died away from
his lips, when, at the invitation of that government, he
joined it, although no change had been introduced into
its policy. He accepted the position of Lord President
in the North, although the powers of this office, which
transgressed the ordinary limits of jurisdiction, were
repugnant to those conceptions of English law of which he [A.D. 1639.]
had just before been the champion. He had been trained
beforehand for an office of this kind in the school of
the Law Courts, principally by the proceedings of the
Star Chamber, which he had attended for five years; he
was afterwards for a time a Justice of the Peace, and
had the reputation of knowing, perhaps better than any
one in England, what was required for the exercise of
that office. Nature, inclination, and ability, united in
fitting him to wield authority. The Council of the North,
which embraced the counties of Yorkshire, Northumberland,
and Westmoreland, the bishopric of Durham, the towns of
Newcastle, York, and Hull, was restored by him, in spite
of all opposition, to the high position which it had
possessed under the Tudors. Charles I assisted him in
this enterprise by conferring fresh powers upon him. But
Wentworth afterwards found a far larger arena for his
activity as Lord Deputy of Ireland, where we have already
met with him, and where, for the first time for centuries,
obedience to the King was once more enforced. He despised
the custom, adopted by former viceroys, of coming to an
agreement beforehand with the native nobility about the
measures that were to be taken; his only counsellors were
the exigencies of the country, his only support was the
royal authority itself. He derived great advantage from the
exclusive possession of the initiative in Parliament, which
was enjoyed by the government in Ireland: he there brought
his idea of the royal prerogative into practical operation;
he declared to the members without any circumlocution, that
reward, or even punishment, awaited each of them according
to his behaviour during the deliberations. The resolutions
of Parliament served him as his instruments in ruling the
country; he put an army into the field, and found means to
pay it: for the first time the revenues of Ireland covered
the outgoings; the island was protected from piracies by
its own naval power. While he remitted many oppressive
burdens in favour of the Catholics, he yet gave fresh
encouragement to the Protestant Churches by the agency
of learned bishops and theologians; he maintained the
conformity between the Irish and English Churches, which by
his decisive word he had restored. Under him justice was
regularly administered, principally for the protection of the
humble and weak; he considered that in his position he was [A.D. 1639.]
justified in directing arbitrary measures against the
great, if at the same time he did not come into collision
with the actual letter of the law, which he was careful
not to do. The impulses of natural imperiousness he
nevertheless moderated by deliberating with prudent
confidants[164]. If Ireland, which needed the adjustment
of internal rivalries and enmities, not by counsel but by
a strong arm, had alone been concerned, Wentworth would
certainly have been the right man for the government of
that country; for he was, as it were, born to conduct
administration according to his own judgment of what was
best: he was indisputably one of the greatest of the
administrators who rose up among the English before they
gained possession of India. But nevertheless Ireland could
only be governed on those principles which prevailed in the
rest of the kingdom. What if these were in contradiction to
the principles which he himself followed? The Lord Deputy
was of opinion, and he thought the King’s system required,
that the whole realm should be governed as he governed
Ireland.
Thomas Wentworth was a man of lofty stature, who although
still in the full strength of manhood, already stooped as
he walked. When he was seated and immersed in reflection,
a cloud seemed to rest upon his face; when he raised
himself and gave expression to his thoughts his countenance
appeared cheerful and almost radiant: he spoke fluently and
with effect; and he had the gift of quick apprehension and
apt rejoinder.
In the narrow circle of persons among whom the affairs of
Scotland were first debated, Laud, Wentworth, and Hamilton,
the opinion was quickly arrived at, that nothing could be
done without resorting to arms. But the importance of the
matter made it indispensable to bring the question also
before a full sitting of the Privy Council, to which all
the members were summoned. Traquair was present on this [A.D. 1639.]
occasion, and delivered a speech about the late proceedings
in Scotland. Charles put the question, whether he should
concede the demands of the Scots, which in his opinion
were inconsistent with the honour of the King and the
obedience due to him in temporal matters, or whether he
should not rather bring back the people to their duty by
force of arms. Every individual was invited to give his
opinion on the subject. The Council answered unanimously
that it was now advisable to have recourse to arms. But
it still remained to consider how Charles should obtain
the means requisite for the war; whether, on this occasion
at all events, he should not seek to obtain them in the
ordinary way by the help of Parliament. It seems strange
at first sight that the smaller body which surrounded the
King expressed itself favourably to this plan. But the
necessity of such a step had been already foreseen when
the King resolved not to go on from Berwick into Scotland;
for the most important turns are given to affairs at a
few decisive moments. Hamilton had at that time already
remarked that the King would be obliged to employ force,
and to claim a grant of Parliament for that purpose[165].
Yet the royal councillors did not intend thereby to make
themselves entirely dependent on the opinion of Parliament.
On the contrary, they definitely set before themselves the
possibility that Parliament might refuse its assistance.
And perhaps they looked forward with no great anxiety to
an unfavourable result. They were of opinion that in such
a case the King would be justified in the eyes of God and
man, if he had recourse to the extraordinary means which he
was still trying to avoid.
The summoning of a Parliament was also approved at a
meeting of the Privy Council: the anticipation was
expressed that Parliament would take the honour of the
King into consideration, and would provide him with the
necessary subsidies. The King, who knew the temper of the
people, was not satisfied with this conclusion: he put
forward the possibility that Parliament might perhaps even [A.D. 1639.]
oppose his wishes, and he submitted to the assembled
Councillors the question whether in such a case they would
support him in resorting to extraordinary means. They
unanimously and cheerfully declared ‘that in such case they
would assist him with their lives and fortunes, in such
extraordinary way, as should be advised and found best for
the preservation of his state and government[166].’ On
this the King gave out that he would summon the English
Parliament for the ensuing 13th of April.
The prospect of a successful issue of the negotiations with
Parliament was not perhaps in the first instance altogether
hopeless. Some old members gave an assurance that the House
of Commons would on this occasion remain within its proper
limits, and would agree to the necessary grants. Some
effect was expected from the impression which the connexion
between the Scots and the French, that was by degrees
coming to light, could not fail to produce upon Englishmen
of the genuine old stamp. The Puritans themselves had
been put into an ill humour with the French and their
selfish policy by the imprisonment of the Elector Palatine,
from whose appearance in Germany they had expected great
things. People had said that in the next war the English
arms might be turned against France as easily as against
Scotland[167]; and the Queen, at all events, had now no
objection to such a measure. She had been formerly an
opponent of Wentworth, whose ambition had been represented
to her as dangerous; she was now one of his admirers, as
were also her friends the Countess of Carlisle and the
Duchess of Chevreuse. The most influential members of her
household, her intimate friends Jermyn and Montague, passed
for the most decided adversaries of the French. Yet there
were some who adhered to their side: the Earl of Holland
would not be deterred from visiting Bellièvre, even when
he lay under the displeasure of the court; but he and his
friends feared for the results of the next Parliament. [A.D. 1639.]
They thought that the dominant party had laid their plans
so well that they would maintain their ascendancy[168]:
that the King would allow only the affairs of Scotland
and the imprisonment of the Elector to be brought under
discussion: that his design was to hold a Parliament
according to his own views, and after his own fashion, and
to become more powerful by its assistance than any of his
ancestors had ever been. It was thought that the opposite
party had already resolved, if all went well, not to spare
the heads of their opponents.
The opposition of religious opinions, the great European
interests at stake, and the most important questions of
internal policy, were mixed up with the quarrels of persons
in high positions, who, in the event of a political defeat,
would, according to old English custom, have to fear even
for their lives.
The King had resolved that an Irish Parliament should
precede the sitting of Parliament in England. Wentworth,
who was not until now raised to a rank fully equal to his
position, was nominated Lord Lieutenant in Ireland, and
at the same time was made Earl of Strafford, which was
the name of the wapentake in which Wentworth-Wodehouse
was situated, where his ancestors had resided since the
Conquest. He had now to go over to Ireland once more, in
order to bring matters there to a successful issue.
He fully realised to himself the importance, the
difficulty, and even the danger of his position.
In his gratitude for his promotion in rank he once more
expressed the opinion that the kingship was an image of
the Divine Majesty. After his journey to Ireland, where he
had to endure an attack of gout, he writes that whether
in health or suffering, whether lame or blind, he would
at all times be found faithful to the service of his
lord. He promises to be back in England at the opening
of Parliament, even if he should be tormented with pain,
even though he might have to expect to find his most [A.D. 1640.]
violent enemies in that body; but he strongly urges
that everything should meanwhile be carefully prepared
beforehand in England as well as in Ireland, and especially
that the raising of troops, which had been resolved on,
should not be delayed. ‘For that this work before us,’
he says, ‘should it miscarry, we are all like to be very
miserable: but carried through advisedly and gallantly, it
shall by God’s blessing set us in safety and peace for our
lives after, nay, in probability, the generations that are
to succeed us. Fi a faute de courage: je n’en ay que trop.
What might I be with my legs that am so brave without the
use of them[169].
In Ireland the Lord Lieutenant easily attained his object.
On March 23, the very same day on which he invoked the
loyalty of the King’s Irish subjects against the Scottish
Covenanters, whose designs he declared to be detestable,
the Irish granted four subsidies, adding that they were
ready, in case the war continued, to devote all their
possessions, and even their persons, to the service of the
King. Further measures were taken to equip an army of 8000
men, with cavalry and artillery. Thus, after a stay of
fourteen days, in which he had successfully executed his
plans, Strafford recrossed St. George’s Channel.
At the English Court meanwhile negotiations with the Scots
had been resumed, but the commission appointed by the King
to manage the affair decided that, if Scotland did not
first of all acknowledge both those rights, without which
no supreme authority could exist, namely, the right of
convening and dissolving deliberative assemblies in Church
and State, as well as of vetoing any measure proposed in
these assemblies, no further negotiation could be carried
on with that country. Strafford, successful and full of
conscious pride in consequence of his success in Ireland,
thought that matters had been so skilfully arranged that
the Scottish war would be ended as soon as begun, and that
the Earl of Argyle would sell his cause at a cheap price.
The eyes of every one in the three kingdoms were now turned
upon the English Parliament, to which the question was
submitted, whether it would support its sovereign in his [A.D. 1640.]
position in Europe, and, above all, maintain him in his
sovereignty over Scotland, or whether it would, on the
contrary, attempt to give effect to its own ancient but
hitherto repressed claims.
On April 13/23, 1640, the Parliament, as had been
announced, was opened. The Lord Keeper above all things set
before them the necessity of giving the King assistance
against the Scots. He read the despatch of the six Scottish
nobles already referred to, by which Colvil had been
accredited at the court of the King of France, whom in the
despatch, after French fashion, they simply called ‘The
King.’ Charles I himself added a few words on the matter.
The Lord Keeper’s proposal aimed at securing an immediate
grant of adequate subsidies; without this, it was said,
the war could not be conducted, and yet it must be waged
in the following summer. A formal approval of tonnage and
poundage which the King, under the pressure of necessity,
had hitherto collected without approval, was also now
proposed. If these grants should be made, which the King
regarded as a pledge of the affection and loyalty of his
subjects, he would prove himself on his part, it was said,
a just, gentle, and gracious sovereign; then, and not till
then, might petitions directed to promote the welfare of
England be brought under discussion, and the King would
then co-operate with Parliament to the advantage of the
country.
It was intended that, before any further discussion of the
questions of domestic policy at issue, the King should
be placed by means of copious subsidies in a position
to revive the royal authority which had been shaken in
Scotland, and, in consequence, everywhere else as well.
It is evident however that the English Parliament could
not be moved to adopt such a course. In the elections
the government had been again as unsuccessful on this
occasion as it had been ten or twelve years before. The
boroughs had the preponderance at the elections, and in
the boroughs the party devoted to the Presbyterian and
Parliamentary cause were in the ascendant. The oppression
of the system previously pursued, and the apprehension of
worse consequences, had necessarily led to this result. We
learn that even in Westminster the King failed to procure [A.D. 1640.]
a seat in the House of Commons for a confidential servant
of his court: supporters of the Opposition were elected
under his very eyes[170].
A disadvantageous influence had been exercised from the
very first by the reappearance of the man who had given
occasion to the last violent scenes in the year 1629, and
who was in ill repute with every one--John Finch, who now
came forward as Lord Keeper. His appearance awakened the
old controversies and the old hatred.
And moreover the disloyalty of the Scots failed to produce
so great an impression as was expected, because it was
partly a result of the religious conflict. France was
regarded as the protector of Protestantism, which, on the
contrary, was in danger from a King who belonged to it. The
French government had not been slow to release the Elector
Palatine from prison, on the receipt of the warning which
was addressed to it; it had removed this cause of offence
as well as others, and in both Houses of Parliament it
reckoned decided partisans.
Thus it came to pass that Charles I was encountered in the
Parliament of 1640 by an opposition no less resolute than
that which had led to the dissolution of the Parliament of
1629.
The very first speaker who made himself heard, Grimstone,
set off domestic grievances against the complaints
which the King made of the Scots; he dwelt above all on
the infringement of the obligations undertaken by the
acceptance of the Petition of Right. He said that freedom
and property had been shaken, the Church thrown into
confusion, and the true religion even persecuted. While
appealing for support to a passage of the Bible he gave
utterance to the significant opinion that men ought to
enquire how this result had come to pass, and who had given
the advice which had brought it about.
Then rose up John Pym, the man of all others in that
assembly in whom the union of Puritan and Parliamentary
principles was most clearly displayed. He had drawn up
for himself a list of the grievances, which he now set [A.D. 1640.]
forth, with methodical and almost scholastic accuracy, but
with clear vision, and not without statesmanlike insight.
He gave especial prominence to the religious grievances, to
the failure in executing the ancient laws in consequence of
which men of the Catholic faith were placed in positions of
trust and power, and to the presence of a Papal Resident
in England, who, he said, was only carrying into execution
what a congregation sitting at Rome was devising for the
conversion of England. It was necessary, he affirmed, to
consider the Papacy in its connexion with the other states
which it governed, as the sun governs the course of the
planets; he thought it was intended that England also
should be torn from her proper path and subjected to the
same influence[171].
To this origin--for everything, he said, had its
source--most of the abuses were then referred by him and
by others; especially the suspension of the sittings of
Parliament, and the attacks made on private property by the
collection of taxes which had not been granted, measures
intended to relieve the government from any need of
convening that body[172].
The various complaints of a similar nature which came in
from every county and every class made all the stronger
impression, as they were also based on the ground of
a general danger to the religion ‘which was professed
according to the law of God and the law of the land.’
These all showed the same conception of the King’s
intentions as that entertained by the Scots, although
much more moderately expressed; yet, for all that, it
cannot be accepted as resting on an historical basis. The
efforts of the government certainly proceeded from one
fundamental design, but this was the design of uniting the
three kingdoms in a like obedience, not by the acceptance [A.D. 1640.]
of Catholicism, but only by more lenient treatment of it;
according to the King’s idea, Great Britain far from again
becoming a satellite of the Papacy, was, on the contrary,
to describe its own course as an independent portion of the
universe, while external influence was to be neutralised.
But nevertheless Pym’s assertions made a great impression
even in England. In the religious conflict which filled the
world neutrality might well seem to be partiality to one
side; the danger lay, not merely in the intention of the
ruler, but in the nature of things, which often exercises
an influence even beyond that of individuals.
The controversy was connected with a question which has
always been one of the most important in those countries
which have a highly developed representative constitution.
When, on April 23, at the wish of the government the
proposal was made to allow the granting of subsidies to
precede the discussion of grievances, this proposal, after
long debate, was rejected in the House of Commons; it
was thought that it ought not to set so bad an example
to posterity. The House came to a resolution to grant no
money, unless it received at all events simultaneously the
definite assurance of redress on those three points under
which all others were comprised--security for religion, for
property, and for Parliamentary liberties.
By this resolution the House of Commons at once placed
itself in opposition to the intentions of the government,
which required grants of money without delay. For what
a wide prospect must have been opened by the discussion
of these points even in a friendly and indulgent spirit!
On the evening of the same day a meeting of the Privy
Council was held, and, at Strafford’s proposal, although
not without opposition, a resolution was taken to bring
the matter before the House of Lords. Not that the power
of granting subsidies was ascribed to that House; the
formal question was laid before it, whether the King
ought first to give satisfaction to his subjects, or to [A.D. 1640.]
expect satisfaction from them[173]. In the House of Lords
a tendency in favour of the opposition was not wanting:
the Earls of Southampton and Rutland, and Lords Say and
Brooke were against the King’s proposal. But the majority
were still decidedly in favour of the government; and a
resolution was passed that the satisfaction to be given to
the King must precede the discussion of grievances[174].
The members of Convocation without waiting any longer
granted the King six subsidies. The House of Commons in
great excitement remarked that its rights were thereby
trenched upon, as the granting of subsidies belonged to
that House alone[175]. Hereon the House of Lords once more
took the matter into consideration on the 29th of April;
but on a second division they arrived at just the same
result as before. The Lords again took the side of the
government by a majority of twenty votes.
The King considered this an important advantage, and
Strafford as the only man whose advice he could follow. He
said to him that he had more confidence in him than in all
the Privy Council together, and the Queen spoke of him as
her husband’s most capable and trustworthy minister.
With renewed hopes of a favourable issue, especially as
the Lords had explained their views at full length to the
Commons, the King had his proposal again brought before
the latter House a few days afterwards by the Treasurer
of the royal household, Sir Henry Vane. In the sketch of
the message to be submitted to it, very strong expressions
were originally inserted with regard to the delay of the
grant, which was represented as unprecedented in such a
case; the King, however, for fear of making bad blood,
had struck them out with his own hand. The Treasurer
merely represented in the most urgent terms the necessity
of the grant, without which, he said, the honour of the
King and of the State would be in danger; delay in this [A.D. 1640.]
matter was no less pernicious than a refusal[176]. The
subject was again taken into consideration at once; it
continued to be the unaltered feeling of the House that the
removal of grievances in Church and State must first be
taken in hand; its answer however was still kept back.
At the court it was thought that a grant might still be
obtained, at all events by the offer of concessions; and
the King had a declaration made that he would give up
ship-money if twelve subsidies were promised him. It was
not the sum which people would have had to pay that kept
them from accepting this offer. The Speaker, Sergeant
Glanville, who rose to address the House, (the debate was
being carried on in Committee,) calculated, judging from
his own case, that the tax would not fall very heavily on
each individual, but he did not for that reason advise
Parliament to accede to the offer; for, as he affirmed,
this would be to acknowledge the payment of ship-money as
binding, and would indirectly be authorising it. Glanville
was regarded as one of the greatest authorities upon
legal questions; and a deep impression was made by his
declaration that ship-money was against the laws, if he
understood anything about them. Others suggested other
motives besides, but the legal point was decisive. Sir
Henry Vane, when he came out of the House, told the King
that he ought not to reckon upon obtaining any grant.
That this was in fact the case is not quite certain; but
such was the impression which was made by the proceedings.
The government thought they had tangible proof that
Parliament would grant the King no subsidies, or, at
all events, would grant them only under such conditions
as ran counter to his system of government. It would
not content itself with any mere removal of grievances
by the act of the sovereign, for it thought that the
interference of Parliament was necessary for the cure of [A.D. 1640.]
national evils: the King was to be pledged for ever
to abide by parliamentary procedure. The King found
himself not merely forsaken but threatened with
further demonstrations; he did not hesitate, before
such demonstrations were actually made, to declare
the dissolution of this Parliament, as he had that of
others[177] (May 5, 1640).
This was a decision of all the more importance inasmuch
as no resolutions of Parliament, properly speaking, had
yet been arrived at; and another decision of no less
consequence, with reference to the resumption of the
Scottish war, immediately followed. In the Commission
appointed to consider the subject attention had indeed been
called to the insufficiency of the means available for
the support of an offensive war; the question was asked,
whether it would not be better in the first instance to
leave the Scots alone. But, as we know, the leading men
had already prepared themselves for an unfavourable issue
of the deliberations of Parliament, and had determined
not to allow themselves to be thwarted on that account.
The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland encouraged the King to
proceed boldly. He said that a merely defensive attitude
would diminish his reputation; that he would exhaust and
weaken himself, and would stand, as it were, between Saul
and David; that no long time could elapse before England
rose to support him. He said that an offensive war had
been already decided on; that the King should undertake
it; that, as Parliament refused its assistance, he was
justified in the sight of God and man if, under the
pressure of these circumstances, he should seize every
other means which lay within the grasp of his power; that
he had an army in Ireland of which he could avail himself;
that Scotland could be subdued in a single summer. Were it
his own affair, he added, he would make the venture; he
would either carry it through or lose everything in the
attempt. Archbishop Laud supported the views of the Lord
Lieutenant; he said that every means had been tried, and [A.D. 1640.]
all had failed; that if people would not grant the King
what according to God’s law was his due, he had the right
to take it. Cottington not only warmly agreed with Laud,
but also added as a general reason for action that the
House of Commons looked forward to getting rid of the
monarchy as well as of the Episcopal Church[178]. If he
meant a definitely entertained design, there was as little
truth in his statement as there was in attributing to the
King the intention of becoming a Catholic. Men on either
side, judging from what has occurred, attribute to the
opposite party the intentions which are most offensive to
themselves.
On this the principle of parliamentary and military, or,
which is much the same, of limited and absolute monarchy,
once more came into conflict with one another in the King’s
Privy Council. The latter obtained a complete ascendancy.
The alliance between Scotland and a foreign power was
thought to remove all doubts regarding its treatment; it
was therefore to be attacked by sea and land at once, from
the side both of England and Ireland, with all the strength
which the Crown, unaided by Parliament, had remaining to
it. The militia of the country had already been called out
for that object. It was intended that part of the expense
should be defrayed by the contributions of the Lords, which
proved very considerable, and by those of the clergy[179].
Two days after the dissolution of Parliament the assembled
Privy Council embraced the resolution of calling the High
Sheriffs of eight counties, among which were Middlesex,
Yorkshire and Essex, to account for having improperly
neglected to collect the ship-money; they were to be dealt
with straightway, without regard for their rank, and to be
treated according to their deserts. A command was issued to
the Lord Lieutenant of Norfolk to punish with imprisonment [A.D. 1640.]
all men of any position who had shown themselves
contumacious during the levy and on the march of the
troops. Fresh negotiations were begun with a view to
obtaining a loan from Spain. It was also suggested that the
silver lying in the Tower might be coined to more advantage
than before. Strafford laid before the Council a memorial
about the French practice of raising forced loans from the
wealthy, and advised imitation of that practice.
Can we be surprised if the opinion gained ground that the
war against Scotland, which was not in itself necessary,
was intended to serve as a means of introducing absolute
monarchy on the French and Spanish model into England also.
Without doubt men like Strafford, Laud, Cottington, and
the King himself, thought of realising, despite of all
opposition in England and Scotland, the ideal of a monarchy
resting on a spiritual basis.
A document is extant which indisputably sets forth this
intention. This is the Book of Canons, drawn up in the
Convocation of the clergy, which held its deliberations at
the same time as the Parliament. In this book a theory as
to the royal authority, not very unlike the views which
Richelieu and his adherents were then contending for in
France, was strongly asserted as the doctrine of the
Church. It is therein said that the monarchy is the highest
and most sacred Estate, is of divine right, is expressly
instituted in the Old and New Testament for ruling over
every one, of whatever rank and position he might be,
and is entrusted even with the supreme government of the
Church. Whoever wished to set up a power independent of
the King’s, whether of Papal or popular character, thereby
placed himself, it was said, in opposition to the Divine
ordinance[180]: it was consonant with the law of nature,
the law of nations, and the law of God, that people should
repay the protection which they enjoyed from the King
with tribute, tolls, and subsidies: for them to bear arms
against the King, not merely in order to attack him, but [A.D. 1640.]
even in order to defend themselves against him, was to
resist the ordinance of God. These views, which condemned
the resistance of the Scots, as well as the agitation of
the popular spirit in England, were proclaimed as the
doctrines of the Church; and an oath in keeping with them
was imposed on the clergy and on the graduates of the
universities.
The ecclesiastical ideas of Laud, and the political ideas
of Strafford, were in complete harmony with one another.
Though it was perhaps still possible to unite a form of
parliamentary government with the monarchy, such as they
would have made it, yet the former could only have been
such as would have been unconditionally subservient to the
views of the crown, and would have regarded their promotion
as its own province.
Strafford and Laud were still determined to carry these
plans into execution, and that, in the first instance, by
means of the war in Scotland; and without being really
conscious of the powerful forces which were opposed to
them, they cherished the confident hope of succeeding in
their attempt.
FOOTNOTES:
[164] George Radcliffe (An Essay towards the life of my
Lord Strafford, Letters app. 433) names himself, Charles
Greenwood, and Christopher Wandsford as the principal
counsellors. ‘They met almost daily and debated all
businesses and designs pro et contra.’
[165] Hamilton’s Advise, July 5. ‘If the kingly way be
taken,--how money may be levied--and if that be feasible
without a parliament.’ Burnet 145.
[166] Windebank to Hoxton, Dec. 14: Clarendon Papers ii. 82.
[167] Hugo Grotius, Dec. 1639: ‘In Anglia arma parantur, in
Scotos an in Gallos ambiguis conjecturis’ (589).
[168] Bellièvre: ‘Quelques uns de ceux, qui out
connaissance des desseins du roi, qui peut-être seroient
bien aisés qu’ils ne réussissent pas, m’ont dit, qu’ils
sont si bien projetés qu’il y a grande apparence, qu’il
vienne à bout de son entreprise.’
[169] March 16, 1639/40. Letters ii. 394.
[170] Depêche de Montereuil, 15 Mars. ‘Après un long débat
deux propriétaires de fort basse condition out été élus par
le peuple.’
[171] A more accurate draught of Pym’s speech than that
given by Rushworth is found in the State Paper Office: the
speech is there assigned to April 17. The draught which is
the basis of Forster’s account (Statesmen iii. 89) seems to
be a later amplification.
[172] Speech of Rouse, which I do not find noticed in
Rushworth or in the Parliamentary History: ‘The root of all
our grievances I think to be the endeavour of union betwixt
us and Rome.’
[173] Parliament Journal, 16 Caroli, 23 Ap.: ‘The house
sat till 3 o’cl. in the afternoon debating the question,
whether to give subsidies before a redress of grievances
or after. Concluded that the example was dangerous to
posterity. The King and Lords had conference about at 8
o’cl.’ (St. P. O.)
[174] Dépêche de Montereuil, 1/10 Mai. ‘Le Lieutenant
d’Yrland I’emporta contre l’avis de plusieurs’: the only
information about this affair which I can find.
[175] Parliament Journal. ‘That it was a tranching on the
priviledges of the house of commons from the upper house,
to chaulke them a way to give supplies first and then to
redress grievances; that the honour and thank belongs to
them for the subsidies and not to the upper house.’
[176] Speech in Rushworth iii. 1153. Parl. Hist. viii. 467.
The original words were ‘His Majesty cannot but resent it,
as that which per adventure is without any precedent of
such behaviour from subjects to the King, and not suitable
to that antient reverence and duty formerly paid by the
house of commons to the crown in the cases of this nature.’
[177] ‘For preventing quhairoff [that is to say, one of
these declarations] the parliament was broken up.’ So it
runs in the Scottish Declaration in Spalding i. 328.
[178] The protocol of this sitting, which was destined to
exercise so great an influence, is printed in Nalson ii.
208. In the State Paper Office the original document exists
among Vane’s papers: there is some doubt however about the
right reading.
[179] Giustiniano, 25 Maggio: ‘Il re continua nella
stabilita resolutione di volere con il mezzo della forza
cavare de popoli le contributioni necessarie per sostenere
la guerra contra la Scotia.’ Cp. Rushworth iii. 1173, 1179.
[180] ‘To set up, maintain, or avow, in any of their realms
any independent coactive power, either papal or popular,
whether directly or indirectly, is to undermine their great
royal office.’
CHAPTER VI.
THE SCOTS IN ENGLAND.
As early as March 1640, on the receipt of the first
intelligence of the warlike designs of Charles I, the Scots
had resolved to renew their preparations for war. Lesley
and the other commanders were confirmed in their posts: in
every county people began to arm. Hostilities again broke
out between the castle and the town of Edinburgh: but
Ruthven did not allow himself to be overpowered as easily
as his predecessor had been. When an attack was made upon
him he replied to it by an artillery fire from the walls.
While shots were being exchanged, and men on both sides
were falling, the Scottish Parliament reassembled on June
2. Its proceedings could not fail to breathe a similar
tone of hostility. It met without the presence of the King
or of his commissioner; as men observed with astonishment
‘without sword, sceptre, and crown.’ In place of the
commissioner the Parliament established a president of its
own, elected from among its members. The session lasted
only eight days; but it was said that for six centuries
there had been no Parliament more remarkable and more
thoroughgoing. Those resolutions were repeated, and even
enlarged, which had been adopted in the last session before
it was interrupted by adjournment, and to which the King
had refused his consent. Though hitherto the clergy had
taken a high place in the constitutions of all European
kingdoms, even in Northern and German countries in spite of
the Reformation, yet in Scotland it was resolved that this
order should no longer be represented in Parliament. In
its room the gentry appeared as the third order, standing [A.D. 1640.]
between the nobles and the citizens: they took definitive
possession, as before mentioned, of the political influence
which they had won for themselves in the late commotions.
In this new form, so it was enacted, Parliament was to
be held every three years[181]: proclamations which ran
counter to the laws and liberties of the Parliament were to
be forbidden under the penalties attached to high treason:
only natives, and moreover only those natives who were
disposed to protect the reformed religion in the shape in
which it had been established, and to maintain the union
between King and people, were to be appointed to the
command of the three strong castles of Edinburgh, Stirling,
and Dumbarton. Such further changes were introduced
into the resolutions as made it necessary that the most
important military commands should be filled according to
the wish of the Estates. The clergy were also excluded from
the Courts of Justice; for people did not wish that an
order, which had shown itself so amenable to the influence
exercised on it by the crown, should be seen exercising any
political functions. The inferior clergy were quite content
with this, as the continuance of their Assemblies and the
independence of their jurisdiction was expressly secured
to them. The monarchy was certainly allowed to remain, but
care was taken to surround it with independent powers,
which took away from it the substance of its authority.
The Parliament authorised the Committee of the Estates,
which was already appointed, to carry on the government.
This committee was so composed that the resolutions always
conformed to the wishes and proposals of the leading men,
especially of Argyle, who was considered even then as the
most important person of all, though he was not himself one
of the members.
We should mistake the feelings of the Scots, if we assumed
that these arrangements had been approved by every one.
Even Thomas Hope, the King’s Advocate, who had at first
so entirely concurred in the movement, warned the Earl of
Rothes not to go so far as to give the King good ground [A.D. 1640.]
for saying to other sovereigns that people in Scotland
had an eye, not so much to religion, as to the abolition
of the monarchy. Hope told the Earl that they ought to
strengthen their religion, that they should then see
what he would do or suffer in its behalf, but that in
matters of civil government they must not reckon on his
going with them. The same views were entertained by many
other of the more reflecting spirits among the clergy
and scholars. The government had thought it necessary to
appoint as Professors in the Universities men who shared
its tendencies, and knew how to gain acceptance for them
in the minds of the young. These regulations did not
enjoy entire popularity. While in the English Parliament
the boroughs returned a majority, in Scotland the gentry
had an ascendancy by which the commons, at first at all
events, felt themselves oppressed[182]. And meanwhile the
Covenant was not yet by any means everywhere accepted.
Those counties that repudiated it even made attacks upon
others which had submitted: the old Scottish lawlessness
and desire for plunder now availed itself of religious
pretexts. A small army was required to be permanently in
the field in order to extinguish the flames of revolt which
kept flickering here and there. In the minds of many of the
great men who concurred in the religious demands of their
countrymen, their political demands awakened all the more
opposition because their rivals were just the people who
derived advantage from the new constitution; or else in
fact feelings of loyal devotion to the King awoke in them;
they did not wish to allow the crown to be robbed of all
its splendour and all its power.
One might almost wonder that the dominant party was still
in such good spirits.
For even the arming which had been determined on proceeded
but slowly; it appeared hardly possible to collect a
serviceable body of cavalry. A tithe-penny had been laid
upon property; but in order to collect it a valuation of
property would have been necessary, and hence a great
difficulty arose. From the first extreme measures were [A.D. 1640.]
necessary; for example, the exaction from private
individuals of the silver they had in use, under a
guarantee of making good its value. But, as Baillie says,
what was all that compared with the requirements of the
army, for which 20,000 marks were daily needed? And what
would ultimately happen, when Scotland was entirely cut
off on the side of Ireland and England from its maritime
commerce, as was intended? The resolutions of the English
Privy Council and of the Irish Parliament created a great
impression among the Scots.
A much greater impression however was now created by the
proceedings of the English Parliament.
It has been always assumed that the Scots were strengthened
in their attitude and induced to determine on advancing
into England by overtures from English peers in the ranks
of the opposition. And there is no doubt that invitations
of this kind reached them.
Lord Loudon, the man who had first formed a connexion
with the French, and who was one of those who had signed
the letter to the King of France already referred to, had
been thrown into the Tower immediately before the opening
of Parliament; but he there received visits from English
peers, and among others from Lord Savile. The Saviles were
old opponents of the Wentworths: their families imported
their county quarrels into public affairs. It was indeed
by the favour shown to a Savile at one time that Wentworth
had been driven into the ranks of the opposition. The high
position to which, on the other hand, a Wentworth now
rose, may have contributed to turn Lord Savile into an
opponent of the whole system[183]. So far as we know, he
is the man through whom it was intimated to Loudon as the
wish of some English lords, that the Scots should advance
on England with their army. Shortly after the dissolution
of Parliament, Loudon received permission to return to [A.D. 1640.]
Scotland[184]: he immediately sought out Argyle, who was
still stationed with his small army in the North, in order
to apprise him of the position of affairs. But it was not
possible that the expressions of a peer, who was not even
one of the most important members of his order, should
afford sufficient security. Then Savile, who had always
affirmed that he was the spokesman of many other nobles and
gentlemen, sent in a declaration on the part of some others
of great name, the Earls of Warwick and Essex, Lords Say,
Brooke, and Mandeville, in which the Scots were invited to
cross over into England. The genuineness of the signatures
was denied afterwards in terms, the truth of which can
hardly be called in question. The Scots however at that
time could entertain no suspicion of deception. And this
invitation undoubtedly produced a great impression upon
them, as they could now venture to count upon the support
of a considerable portion of the House of Lords.
But the attitude of the House of Commons no doubt supplied
them with the principal motive for their decisions. As
the Scots affirm in their manifesto, after they had been
proclaimed as rebels in every parish church, the English
Parliament--convoked with the sole purpose of supporting a
war against them--could not be moved by any threatenings,
fears, promises, or hopes, to grant any subsidies for
the war, but had rather undertaken to justify the Scots
by parallel complaints and statements of grievances. The
Scots now laid the greatest emphasis upon the coincidence
of the interests of both realms. The only design of both
kingdoms, they said, was the maintenance of true religion,
and of the just liberties of the subject; but the King
was surrounded by a faction which was endeavouring to
set up superstition and bondage in place of religion:
it was intended by the war against the Scots to stir up
the English against them that they might with their own
swords extirpate their own religion; set up a new Rome in
their midst, and establish the slavery of both countries
for ever. With such adversaries no agreement could be
concluded: no just desires were listened to by them: to sit
still and wait their hostility would be contrary to sense
and religion: they themselves, the Scots, were determined
to seek in England their own peace, the maintenance of [A.D. 1640.]
their laws, and the punishment of the enemies of both
kingdoms. It might perhaps be doubtful whether it was
warrantable for them to advance into England, but there was
a necessity which justified proceedings of this sort, and
constituted a law above all laws. ‘The question is not,’
they say, ‘whether we shall content ourselves with our own
poverty, or enrich ourselves in England: that question is
impious and absurd. But this is the question, whether it
be wisdome and piety to keep ourselves within the Borders
till our throats be cut, and our Religion, Lawes, and
Countrey be destroyed; or shall wee bestirre ourselves and
seeke our Safeguard, Peace, and Liberty in England. Or
shall we fold our hands, and waite for the perfect slavery
of our selves, and our posterity in our Souls, Bodies,
and Estates, and (which is all one) foolishly to stand to
our defence where we know it is impossible; or shall we
seek our reliefe in following the calling of God (for our
necessity can be interpreted to be no lesse), and entering
by the doore which his providence hath opened unto us, when
all wayes are stopped beside?’ They do not enter into a
full statement of the innovations which had been undertaken
in their Parliament; they hardly touch upon them; they
bring into prominence only the great questions from which
everything had sprung, and they express the hope that
England will sympathise with them in the stress of affairs
which compelled them to overstep their borders, and will
aid them in the measures which they are taking to obtain
their just desires. They promise that in their advance they
will exact nothing by force: but should their resources be
exhausted they reckon upon the support of the English[185].
This lofty mode of expression, to which a certain amount
of truth cannot be denied, accounts for the silence of
all opposition, at all events in those circles which had
attached themselves to the religious cause for which the
Scots contended. In the army moreover there were men
serving who did not wish to see the monarchy put down. [A.D. 1640.]
In all the churches prayers were offered for the General,
who purposed to go to England with his army, and to confer
with the King.
In the latter half of July, the army mustered at Cheslaw
Wood, near Dunse; one half of the Committee of Estates was
to accompany it, the other half was to remain behind. It
was not intended to take Highlanders across the border.
Argyle led his own men into the field against the Ogilvies
and the district of Athol, where the opposition was kept
up. It was not until August 18 that the army broke up from
the place of rendezvous. There may have been somewhat over
20,000 men: with the native leaders of high rank there were
associated a number of captains who had gained experience
in the German war, and who maintained military discipline.
Lesley, who was connected with the former by political
sympathies, and with the latter by common service in past
time, was again invested with the supreme command.
Two days afterwards the Scots crossed the river Tweed, the
boundary between the two countries. The cavalry halted in
the water, in order to break the force of the stream, while
the infantry waded across. Montrose dismounted from his
horse, and marched over at the head of his regiment; he was
the first of them all to tread on English soil.
The Scots did not find any dispositions made to meet them
at the border; they advanced into Northumberland without
opposition. It was only on arriving at the fords of the
Tyne that they came upon a couple of breastworks upon which
cannon were planted. They set up a camp, around which
hundreds of coal-fires illuminated the horizon; they still
however refrained from making any attack.
The engagement which then ensued is characteristic of the
state of feeling. On the morning of the 28th a Scottish
officer, wearing a hat with a black feather, rode his horse
to the Tyne, in order to water it. An English musketeer,
seeing the Scot fix his eye upon the breastworks, could
not resist the temptation; he aimed well, and the officer
fell wounded from his horse. Upon this the Scottish
musketeers opened fire in return; both sides discharged
their artillery upon their opponents. But the camp of the
Scots was in a higher and stronger position than that [A.D. 1640.]
of the English; they had also, without doubt, more
practised artillerymen, and the English found themselves
outmatched. But this was quite enough to bring the matter
to a crisis. The English troops in the entrenchments
complained that they had not been relieved from Newcastle
as they should have been; they murmured that they were
expected to do double duty. But they did not give vent to
their discontent in words alone. They gave ear for a few
minutes longer to the exhortations of their commander; but
when they found that they had the worst of it, and were
in danger from the Scottish artillery, they immediately
abandoned their works and threw away their weapons, not so
much from cowardice as from ill-humour excited by the war
and the bad arrangements which had been made. On this the
Scots, both horse and foot, under cover of their cannon,
crossed the Tyne. The English were then completely driven
from all their positions. On the next morning Lord Conway
abandoned Newcastle[186].
Not less significant was the manner in which this town was
taken possession of by the Scots, into whose hands, on the
retreat of the troops, it inevitably fell.
The leader of a troop of Scots, James Douglas, on
approaching the town found the magistrates at the bridge.
He told them that the Scots were come to speak with their
gracious King; that they carried in one hand a petition
in favour of their rights and religion, in the other the
sword, in order to defend themselves against the enemies
who placed themselves between them and their King; that
their hope was that their brethren of Newcastle would unite
themselves with them for the advantage of both churches
and kingdoms, and would, in the first place, allow them
supplies of provisions and ammunition. The mayor and
aldermen observed that such conduct was against their
duty; and that as the Scots were subjects of the same
sovereign as themselves, they hoped that no violence would
be employed against them. The Scots replied that that would
certainly be unavoidable if their requirements were not [A.D. 1640.]
voluntarily satisfied. On the next day they occupied
the gates of the town, and encamped their cavalry in
them, while the infantry entrenched themselves upon the
neighbouring heights. They first took provisions and
munitions of war from the royal magazines; they then made
out a requisition; the inhabitants were compelled to accept
the Covenant, notwithstanding the fact that they were
Englishmen; whoever opposed them was treated as a public
enemy.
It was remarked as a flagrant inconsistency in the conduct
of the Scots, that they continued to pray for the King in
their public worship, while at the same time they prayed
for the army which was advancing into the field against
him. But the whole nature of their rising was involved in
the same contradiction. While they were pressing forward
into England with arms in their hands, and were taking up a
strong position there, they still kept affirming that they
were loyal subjects, as their demands were founded on the
laws, and that even now they prayed for nothing but that
the King should take these demands into consideration and
grant them.
The royal army had meanwhile assembled in York. The Earl of
Strafford, who had undertaken the command, together with
the King, who himself was present with it, even appeared
not displeased to see the Scots invade England, as he
thought that such a proceeding would serve to rouse the
old English feeling of hatred against them. He reminded
the gentry of York of the old wars, of which the present
was, he said, merely a repetition: he said that religion
was only a pretext with the Scots; that their object was
rebellion and invasion. He declared that the law of nature,
reason, and the law of England demanded that they should
support the King with their persons and property against
them; to deny this would be ignorance, to hesitate would
be little less than treachery. He added, that they ought
not to allow the Scots to taste the superior advantages of
the English soil; that they must attach themselves to the
King’s cause, or run the risk of losing everything[187].
Strafford obstinately persisted in the line of policy which [A.D. 1640.]
he had once taken up. He persisted in attributing to the
Scots those very intentions of which they declared their
horror. Even in the proclamation of the King the enterprise
of the Scots was described as a raid of freebooters, after
the fashion of former centuries[188]. The spiritual and
temporal lords were summoned in the style of former ages,
to join the King’s standard with the followers whom they
were bound to bring.
Strafford still hoped to put down the opponents of the
sovereign authority in both countries. He thought to bring
the strength of England into the field by the means which
formerly had been at the service of the crown; he intended
that the very revolt of the Scots should help him to subdue
them. A new battle of Flodden Field would have restored the
monarchy as it once existed, on both sides of the border.
No one will make any very heavy political charge against
Strafford on the score of his government of Ireland, or
of the partisan attitude which he had taken up in the
intestine struggle in England in general; for the ideas for
which he contended were as much to be found in the past
history of England as were those which he attacked. His
royalist principles are not without basis and elevation;
he at all events had no conscious intention of proceeding
to employ illegal violence. The greatest blame which falls
upon him is incurred by his behaviour during these days;
his mistake lay in wishing to treat England in the same
way as Ireland: but a past success is an evil counsellor
under circumstances which are entirely different; both
he and his sovereign were deficient in the sense of what
was practicable in England. While they in their zeal were
proceeding to the most extreme assertion of the prerogative
for which old precedent could be found, they were placed
in a position where such an assertion could no longer be
made with effect. For whatever may be the nature of laws,
they never can be executed unless, to a certain extent,
they are voluntarily accepted. Strafford’s most imprudent [A.D. 1640.]
act was the prosecution of the war against Scotland, after
Parliament had refused to grant the subsidies necessary for
that object. However large the sums which the Lords might
contribute in accordance with the pledge which they had
given, it was clear that these would not suffice to carry
on a great war. But what resources were left when these
were exhausted?
In that case the King would have to depend principally on
the city of London. But this was the very place in which
the dominant system had provoked the greatest discontent:
nowhere were there more staunch supporters of parliamentary
government. A proof of this assertion may be found in
the tumult which broke out in the capital after the last
dissolution of Parliament, and was directed against the
Archbishop of Canterbury, who was threatened with death
by an excited multitude. These disturbances had been
quieted and their promoters punished; but placards were
constantly put up indicative of the same feelings. For
a long time the Archbishop did not venture to return to
Lambeth; he considered himself secure only in the King’s
palaces. The middle classes were excited rather than
disposed to compliance by a threat, which Strafford held
out, of attaching the silver in the Tower, or of raising
the value of the currency. The Lord Mayor and Aldermen
refused the King a loan which he requested, not because
they lacked money, but because it seemed dangerous to allow
the necessity of the consent of Parliament to be called
in question in this manner. The government turned to the
Common Council, before which Cottington laid the most
urgent representations: but his proposals were rejected
even by this body. Strafford indeed spoke of treason;
for the money, he said, was in hand, only people refused
to lend it to the King under the circumstances: but the
threats which he founded on these statements he was unable
to carry out; even in the Privy Council he met with firm
and well-grounded opposition to his proposals. Tonnage
and poundage, as usual, brought in a certain amount:
but ship-money was paid into the exchequer in smaller
quantities even than before. The sheriffs in vain gave the
necessary directions to the bailiffs of the hundreds: they
no longer took the matter up with any zeal, but returned [A.D. 1640.]
empty-handed. In this embarrassment Charles I betook
himself to the East India Company, to which he proposed
that the spices which it had imported should be handed
over to the King, and sold on his account: but the Company
would not trust the King either with their wares or their
capital[189]. Foreign capitalists or governments were
then solicited in the King’s name. But the former, the
Genoese for instance, demanded securities which he could
not obtain for them, as they depended on the consent of
the city of London: and the latter were engrossed in their
own affairs. Application was secretly made to the French,
and the prospect of an advantageous treaty was held out
to them as a return for an adequate loan[190]: they were
told that, if only a French ambassador were present in
England, much might be effected in their interest. It is
true that at this moment the Scots were neither supported
nor even instigated by the French. But the latter were
still less inclined to help King Charles to gain an
advantage over Scotland. And what could possibly have been
expected from the Spanish monarchy, which just at that
time was plunged into the greatest difficulties? Whilst
Charles was quarrelling with his subjects, the French
had gained the mastery over the Spaniards: this was one
of the years which decided the ascendancy of the former
power on the Continent. But if there were no pecuniary
resources available, in what manner could such an army
as was required have been created? This deficiency was
the reason why the Earl of Northumberland declined the
command-in-chief which the King offered to him. The militia
called out in the different counties was guilty of acts of
violence which made its presence intolerable; and moreover
it displayed an insubordination that was unparalleled. In
some places the soldiers assaulted their officers; in
others they refused to embark in the ships destined for [A.D. 1640.]
a descent on the Scottish coast: the government no longer
ventured to arm them. It was even found that the Archbishop
of Canterbury, whose hierarchical system the soldiers ought
to have maintained by their weapons, was insolently scorned
and mimicked by them. In the army assembled at York there
were no doubt trustworthy officers in considerable numbers,
but the common soldiers were not of this character. Neither
the Earl of Strafford nor the King ventured to lead their
troops against the Scots, and besides, their army was too
weak for a serious attack. They could not but expect such
events as those which had occurred in the entrenchments by
the river Tyne.
In the Privy Council misunderstandings and dissensions
broke out. Pembroke and Holland absented themselves on
different pretexts, in reality merely to avoid taking part
any longer in its deliberations.
Things had now come to a crisis: the springs which the
government had been accustomed to set in motion lost all
their elasticity. No one would any longer concern himself
about its designs and undertakings, about what it did
or left undone[191]: its commands and instructions had
no longer any hold: that free co-operation was withheld
without which a government can do nothing.
Not even among the Anglican clergy, whose cause the King
had intended to conduct, did any real agreement with his
system exist. The majority rejected the canons of the last
Convocation. There were formal reasons enough for such
rejection, as the Convocation had continued to sit after
the dissolution of Parliament; but the substance of the
canons were still more fatal to their acceptance. It was
thought dangerous for the crown itself that the doctrine of
the divine right of bishops was laid down in them, for how
easily, it was remarked, might that lead to the assertion
of a claim to independence! The oath demanded of the clergy
was refused on the ground that it was illegal and contrary
to the royal supremacy[192].
But if the clergy of the State Church were dissatisfied, [A.D. 1640.]
what was to be expected from the dissenting clergy and
their supporters? The Puritans hailed the inroad of the
Scots and even their occupation of Newcastle as a victory.
For they thought that the King would now be forced to
convene a Parliament, and that that body would overthrow
the government, which had now drawn universal hatred upon
itself, and would restore the ancient rights and liberties
of England.
FOOTNOTES:
[181] ‘Sexte acte rescissory--it rescindes all former actes
of parliament, which grantes to the kirk or kirkmen the
priviledge of ryding and wotting in parliament;--nynthe
acte called statutarie, ordaining parliaments to be holdin
every three yeires.’ Balfour, Annals ii. 376.
[182] ‘The commons are slaves to the gentry.’ Hardwicke
Papers ii. 143.
[183] The statement given by Sanford in his ‘Studies and
Illustrations of the Great Rebellion’ 170, as a ‘new
account,’ and attributed to Lord Falkland, has already
been printed in Nalson ii. 477. It is a fragment from the
Memoirs of Lord Manchester, the complete publication of
which is much to be desired.
[184] Montereuil, July 12. ‘Il s’est engagé de faire
beaucoup de choses; le Marquis d’Hamilton, dont il est
parent, a été le premier auteur de sa liberté.’
[185] The intentions of the army of the Kingdome of
Scotland declaired to their Brethren of England; by the
Commissioners of the late Parliament, and by the Generall,
Noblemen, Barons and others, Officers of the Army. In
Spalding i. 321.
[186] Original information in Rushworth (who was himself in
the English camp) iii. 1238.
[187] The Earls of Strafford Speech: ‘You are no better
than beasts if you refuse in this case to attend the King.’
In Rushworth iii. 1235.
[188] ‘Cum quidam rebelles regni nostri Scotiae regnum
nostrum Angliae cum posse non modico hostiliter ingressi
sunt.’ From the King’s proclamation, in Rushworth.
[189] Giustiniano, Sept. 7: ‘Di procurare a credito dalla
compagnia dell’ India tutti li peveri, portate ultimamente
giunte che ascendono alle somme di 70 m. lire, a disegno di
farne poscia la vendita con discapito a mercanti.’
[190] Montereuil was informed in Cottington’s name, ‘Qu’on
avoit besoin de 3 ou 4 millions; si le roi prestoit cette
somme, pour en tirer quelque avantage de l’Ingleterre
et l’engager à quelque traité, c’estoit à la France de
proposer les conditions,’
[191] Montereuil, Aug. 23, 1640: ‘Pour n’avoir point de
part aux conseils auxquels il y a pen de plaisir de se
trouver présentement.’
[192] Sanderson to Laud, Sept. 13: ‘Multitudes of churchmen
not only of the precise sort whose dislike is less to be
regarded, because they will like nothing that is not of
their own devising, but even of such as are otherwise every
way regular and conformable.’ He laments ‘the disaffection
which is already too great in most of our people to all
public proceedings.’
BOOK VIII.
THE LONG PARLIAMENT AND THE KING, DOWN TO THE OUTBREAK OF
THE CIVIL WAR.
In a sense quite different from that in which James
I thought to achieve the union of the two crowns and
kingdoms, was that union destined to be accomplished;
and already everything was smoothing the way thereto.
The special object of the first two Stuart kings was to
complete, on Tudor principles, the institutions of Church
and State in England, and to extend the same to Scotland.
But they had thereby awakened in the land of their birth a
spirit of resistance at once aristocratic and religious.
In direct opposition to the King, the Scots took up an
attitude of ecclesiastical and political independence,
which never was paralleled in any other monarchy. The King
hoped to crush the Scottish movement by the strength of
royal influence in England; but the consequences were the
very opposite, for the movement spread into England also.
When the Scots entered England their first and chief
demand was that the King should settle the home affairs
of Scotland; but they added two other demands which
concerned England as much as Scotland. They pressed for the
punishment of those who had caused the troubles, that is to
say, of the chosen counsellors of the King in matters both
spiritual and temporal, and also for the summoning of an
English Parliament, in which peace might be arranged.
They thus fully expressed the wishes of all the domestic
opponents of Charles I: no further extension of them was
necessary to imply the overthrow in England also of the
political system that had hitherto prevailed. On the
question how far the King would yield depended the future
of his government, of his own life, and of the two nations.
CHAPTER I.
SUMMONING OF THE PARLIAMENT.
It seemed to be going back to an ancient long-forgotten
state of things, when in the English Privy Council,
which continued its sittings in the King’s absence, and
was anxiously discussing means of escape from existing
difficulties, the Earl of Manchester, Lord Privy Seal, a
man of great age and strong sense, though somewhat too fond
of precedent, proposed to renew at this juncture the old
institution of the Magnum Concilium, which had preceded the
formation of Parliament[193]. He recalled the times when
the advice of the peers, as the born counsellors of the
King, had roused the nation to great efforts. The objection
was urged that no assembly of the kind had taken place for
fully three hundred years: moreover that it would merely
be leading indirectly to what the Scots had demanded, the
summoning of a Parliament. Archbishop Laud did not like the
prospect, but, considering the probable results of calling
a Parliament, declared for the assembly of peers. The King
without hesitation accepted the proposal, and on September
7 issued writs, whereby he summoned the Peers of the realm
to York, ‘to take counsel with them about weighty and
serious matters touching the condition of the kingdom.’
The nation however was not satisfied; and the first cry for
the immediate convocation of a Parliament arose from among
the nobility themselves.
The government was somewhat alarmed to find that without
their previous knowledge a considerable number of peers
about this time assembled in London, most of whom were [A.D. 1640.]
known to be bitterly hostile to the existing régime. There
were the Earls of Bedford and Hertford, whose forefathers
had won their fame by the share they had taken in
forwarding the thorough reformation of the Church (what had
become of the bishops, if the ideas of Protector Somerset,
the ancestor of Hertford, had maintained their ground?):
there were Essex, Warwick, the brother of Holland, who
fully agreed with them in general political sentiments,
Lord Mandeville, the son of Manchester, but belonging
to a totally different party from his father, Say and
Brooke, who had been the first to show that their views
were opposed to the King. After a short consultation they
agreed on a petition, in which they repeated the general
grievances of the last session of Parliament, and with
special emphasis insisted on those which had first come
to light since then, such as the newly imposed oath[194].
They laid great stress on the dangers arising from the
military preparations. The recusants, said they, are
forbidden by law even to have weapons in their houses,
and now high commands in the army are entrusted to them:
what misfortunes would happen if any Irish troops were
brought over to England--a fear which had seized on men’s
minds in consequence of the known views of Strafford, long
before his expressions had been thus interpreted. The Lords
declared that there was only one remedy for all these
evils, namely the immediate assembly of Parliament, which
was necessary in order to remove the grievances of the
people, to punish the originators of them for their several
offences, to end the war without bloodshed, and to unite
the two kingdoms against the common enemy of religion. It [A.D. 1640.]
will be seen that these Lords, who had been named to the
Scots as guarantees that they would meet a favourable
reception in England, now, as might be expected, urged as
their own the chief demands of the Scots.
On the very day on which Charles I issued his summons for
the Magnum Concilium to meet at York, the two Earls of
Bedford and Hertford appeared in London before the Privy
Council, laid their petition before it, and moved for its
concurrence in their prayer. The Earls said that they
themselves were ready to pay true obedience to the King
under all circumstances, but that they could not answer
for the friends by whom they were commissioned, and that
if their request was rejected, they would not be held
answerable for the mischiefs that might ensue[195]. The
obvious question was asked, who were their associates:
and they replied, many other lords and a great part of
the gentry in all parts of the country. The news of the
summoning of the Great Council was communicated to them:
they received it without attaching much importance to
the fact, remarking that this council durst not take any
steps towards the granting of money, nor allow any injury
to the commons and their rights. Lord Arundel referred
to the religious portion of their petition, saying that
they seemed to wish to join the Scots for the purpose of
effecting a reform in the Church[196], but that the result
might be, under the pretext of liberty and religion to make
England a prey to the Scots. The two Earls were asked if
there was not already in England an association similar to
the Covenant: but this they denied.
Without doubt such was the situation;--it is true that no
popular religious union, either in England itself, or with
the Scots, was actually formed: still that did not prevent
the Scottish cause from being sure of general sympathy. [A.D. 1640.]
Some saw in it the cause of God and of the only true
religion, which the Scottish army had come to defend:
others cared chiefly for the support which the presence
of the Scots afforded to their own political attitude: in
many both these motives for sympathy were united. From the
beginning down to the present day, the exact understanding
which had been entered into between the parties has
continued in the profoundest obscurity. Tradition connects
the memory of it, among other places, with Broughton
Castle in Oxfordshire, the seat of Lord Say, and Fawley
in Northamptonshire, the house of a son-in-law of John
Hampden: there a table was pointed out, at which all the
plans were concocted from which the civil troubles arose.
In London it was at the house of John Pym, near Gray’s Inn,
that the meetings were held and conferences took place,
by which, as it was assumed, a close connexion with the
Scots was maintained[197]. Moreover the well-considered
and well-written manifesto of the Scots made a marked
impression in their favour: it suggested points of view
which every one could accept. They did not omit, after
the capture of Newcastle, a place which was of the
utmost importance to the English capital on account of
the coal supply, to open communications with the city:
they expressed in a special letter, as well as in their
manifesto, their good-will and even their reverence for
London, assuring them that the traffic should not be for an
instant interrupted, their purpose being to make friends
and not enemies. We learn that this declaration produced
the desired effect[198].
After the step taken by the Lords, preparations were
immediately made in the city to present a petition similar
to theirs. The Privy Council sent a letter to the Lord
Mayor and Aldermen, warning them against this proceeding;
saying that the city had from the earliest times been
treated as the King’s chamber, even as his own house, [A.D. 1640.]
to which he would entrust his wife and children[199]:
that they ought not to press him about grievances which
he was ever labouring to remove, and that this course was
inconsistent with the customs and charters of the city. But
the Aldermen refused to interfere: still less could they be
induced to do what was suggested to them--address to the
King a petition of contrary tenour[200]. These ideas of a
special connexion vanished before the general religious
and political motives of action in the Commons as well as
in the Lords. The King was requested, in the name of his
capital also, to summon a Parliament as soon as possible,
for the removal of grievances to which, as experience
proved, the usual course of justice did not extend.
This was the demand which had been repeated for more than
ten years in stronger or weaker language, which the King
had evaded as often as possible, but which nevertheless had
often been pressed upon him. Once he had taken steps in
that direction, in the hope that complications abroad might
in the interval occur to check opposition at home: but he
was most bitterly disappointed. Should he now after all
decide on this course? The need of Parliamentary aid was
more pressing than ever, the cry for a Parliament louder:
and the impression which this demand had made was deepened
by another motive, the fear of worse consequences in case
of refusal. The idea gained ground that if the King delayed
to call a Parliament, the associated Lords would take steps
towards that end[201]. A Parliament had already been held
in Scotland without the King’s participation. What else
did the threats mean that Bedford and Hertford had uttered
before the assembled Privy Council? It was asserted that
the Queen, who was close at hand at Hampton Court, and was
taking counsel on the state of affairs with her confidants
in the Privy Council, had been induced by the impending [A.D. 1640.]
dangers to advise the King to summon Parliament
immediately; and if he would not do this--so she was
reported to have written with the concurrence of some of
the ministers--that at least he should not lose an instant
in returning to London, otherwise irreparable disasters
would be imminent[202]. Hereupon the King adopted the
resolution which of all others was most repugnant to him,
and that immediately; no extraneous influence could have
led him to it. The time-honoured course of constitutional
deliberation appeared under the circumstances to promise
the best results: people flattered themselves that the
Earl of Strafford would exhibit his parliamentary talents
in England also. That nothing might interfere with his
presence in the English Parliament, the Irish, in which he
was equally necessary, was prorogued to Easter. The English
Parliament was to be held as early as possible: the opening
was fixed for Nov. 3.
With this declaration the King met the peers when they
gathered round him at York in the latter half of September:
the great question had already been decided without them.
Charles I claimed their assistance in two other matters
which, though secondary to this, were in themselves of
great consequence--to bring about an accommodation with the
Scots, and (inasmuch as until this could be effected the
royal army must be held together, without any Parliamentary
grant being made for its maintenance) to procure him the
means of keeping the army for a time in an efficient state.
The latter of these two points was the most pressing. There
was a talk of compulsory loans after the fashion of the old
benevolences: some of those present declared themselves
ready to make considerable efforts of that kind: but at
last they came back to the idea of trying to get a loan in
the capital. Lord Bristol observed that, as the previous [A.D. 1640.]
proposal for one had been rejected through political
misgivings, since removed through the issue of writs for a
Parliament, they might now reckon on acceptance. Six of the
peers, among whom we find Pembroke and Manchester, in the
name of the remainder repaired to the city on this errand.
After they had conferred with the Lord Mayor and aldermen,
a meeting was held on October 2, not of the entire civic
body, a thing which was purposely avoided, but of the full
common council. It had been rumoured in the city that their
last petition had been badly received by the King: the
Lords contradicted this report, and declared themselves
fully satisfied with the behaviour and with the latest
resolves of the King. The objection was urged that they
could not grant to the Lords what had been refused to the
King, but they produced a letter from the King in which he
expressed his full assent to this course. The necessity for
keeping on foot the royal army was shown by the violence of
which the Scots had been guilty in the northern counties.
The Bishop of Durham, who had suffered most at their hands,
was present to give information on the subject. After the
Lords had retired their request was assented to[203]. So
much trouble did it cost to obtain a loan of £200,000,
the repayment of which was to depend on the grants of
Parliament, but was further secured to the city by the
guarantee of the Lords.
It remained to make some arrangement with the Scots. For
this purpose the most favourably disposed of the lords,
especially the signers of the address, were despatched
to Ripon. Men like Strafford could desire nothing more
than that the affair should reach this stage: they were
always hoping that a complete knowledge of the intentions
and demands of the Scots would induce all old-fashioned
Englishmen to combine against them. All actual negotiation
was however stopped by the question of money: the Scots
required that their army should be maintained at the cost [A.D. 1640.]
of England. On this account they asked so large a sum,
£40,000 a month, that the lords who had been deputed to
meet them thought it necessary to refer the matter back to
the great council of peers at York. By this council the
subject was debated at length on October 6. Among others,
Lord Herbert of Cherbury, the historian of Henry VIII,
declared himself emphatically against the demand, saying
that he had read now and then of buying treaties of peace,
but never of buying negotiations, the result of which was
still as it were in the air. Others declared it to be an
inevitable necessity: they must either drive the Scots
back, or grant their demands in full. The first course
Strafford himself deemed impossible; he pledged himself to
defend Yorkshire against them, but not Westmoreland and
Cumberland[204]. Could they abandon these two counties to
be occupied by the Scots, and probably plundered as well,
together with those already in their hands? It had been
said that the Scottish army might be reduced, and then
supplied out of Scotland: but in order to attain this they
must first defeat it, and for this must before all things
be unanimous. It was determined at last to guarantee to
the Scots for the future the sum (£850) which they exacted
daily from the occupied districts, this money to be raised
at once from the neighbouring counties of Westmoreland and
Cumberland, with the promise that Parliament would make
good to them whatever they might do for the safety of the
kingdom. On these terms a truce was signed with the Scots.
They stayed in England, and thus the very extraordinary
result followed, that two armies which had been intended
to fight each other, remained facing each other with their
swords sheathed, both at the cost of the same authority.
That both armies thus depended on the grants of Parliament
rendered that body absolutely indispensable, and gave it a
necessary strength sufficient to overrule the King’s will.
In general terms it may be said that the summoning of
Parliament implied the defeat of the King. His system of
alliance between the crown and the hierarchy was thereby [A.D. 1640.]
virtually overthrown. Between the ideas of the Scottish
spiritual and temporal assemblies which he combated, and
the tendencies which had caused him to dissolve the last
English Parliament, as well as previous ones, a league
was formed which thenceforth held the upper hand, and
threatened to dictate the law to him. The question was
merely how far the restrictions would extend, to which he
must undoubtedly submit, and what changes in the State
would be attempted in consequence.
In the elections which now began preference was given
in general to those who had most zealously opposed the
existing authorities, or were known as the most ardent
Protestants. There were no such boards in London as
in Edinburgh, formed on purpose to manage elections
systematically. But those who were of one mind were seen
to hasten from county to county, in order to exert their
influence in each to the utmost. On the side of the
government also a list was prepared: the King claimed the
aid of the chief lords in his service, such as Pembroke,
in support of his candidates in the boroughs: and some
names show that this attempt was not altogether fruitless.
But the efforts of the popular party were by far the most
successful[205]. Of the members of the last Parliament
three-fifths--294 out of 493--were re-elected. Moreover the
new members belonged almost entirely to the popular party.
Of those who had already won a reputation on this side, not
one failed.
FOOTNOTES:
[193] Memorial, in the Hardwicke State Papers ii. 168.
[194] Unfortunately the petition, like so many other
documents, is very badly printed. In the Record Office
copy it is not ‘grievances, which your poor petitioners
lie under,’ but more correctly, ‘which your people lies
under.’ The concluding words run, ‘The uniting [not ‘the
continuance,’ which makes little sense] of both your
kingdoms against the common enemy of their [not ‘the’]
reformed religion.’ The thing most wanted for this history
is a trustworthy critical edition of the chief authorities.
Even the signatures are not certain. The Record copy gives
at the head the name of Rutland, which is wanting in the
rest. In the same copy the name of Bristol is wanting,
which undoubtedly appears wrongly in most editions. It was
wanting also in the copy on which the Clarendon Papers were
based. Windebank says that he was present, Clarendon Papers
ii. 115.
[195] Protocol: Bedford was very shy of doing anything
without those by whom he was authorised.
[196] So says the Protocol, which is extant in the State
Paper Office, and well deserves to be printed. We find
especially ‘the end and conclusion very strange, to desire
the Scots to joyne in the reformation of religion.’
Windebank on the same day furnished a report to the King:
some points he added, and omitted others.
[197] Forster, Statesmen iii. 126.
[198] Giustiniano 12/22 Sett: ‘Il tenore di queste
artificiose lettere che si va da per tutto spargendo,
accresce motivo d’alteratione contro ministri et a ribelli
sostenta il favore delli primi applausi.’
[199] ‘Honoured from all antiquitie with the title of his
majesty’s own chambre.’ Letter of the Privy Council, 11
Sept. in Rushworth iii. 1262.
[200] Windebank to the King, 18 Sept. Clarendon Papers ii.
116.
[201] We see from Giustiniano, 15 Sept., that the rumour
was, that in a memorial to the King the formal threat had
been expressed, ‘di chiamarlo (il parlamento) da se stessi.’
[202] ‘Di tale ardita resolutione--penetrate dalla regina
e da ministri le piu particolari notitie ha mandati in
diligenza gli avvisi al re consigliandolo a ridursi
celeremente in questa citta per divertire quei pregiuditti
che ben grandi gli sono irreparabilmente minacciati, quando
non si disponga di convocare senza intervallo di momenti il
parlamento.’ (Giustiniano, ib). Montereuil (4 Oct.) also
heard of the Queen’s influence (‘que la reine y ait fort
porté’) on the summoning of Parliament.
[203] ‘These things made such impression on them, that we
discerned as they satt, how well they were disposed--so
that we came about.’ So it is stated in the report of the
Lord Privy Seal and Chamberlain, dated October 3, in the
State Paper Office, a document which is the more welcome
since Windebank’s letter about these proceedings, to which
he himself refers, is not in the Clarendon collection.
[204] The obscure words of the protocol in Hardwicke, State
Papers ii. 247, are explained by the note of Sir Henry
Vane, p. 196.
[205] Pamphlet of 1643 on the elections of 1640: ‘We
elected such as were not known to us by any virtue, but
only by crossness to superiors.’ Montereuil reports about
the same time that the elections had begun ‘par le choix
des personnes, que l’on croit moins portées à favoriser le
roi d’Angleterre.’