CHAPTER XIV.

CHATTANOOGA AND KNOXVILLE.

JULY TO DECEMBER, 1863.

After the fall of Vicksburg, and its corollary, Port Hudson, the

Mississippi River was wholly in the possession of the Union forces,

and formed a perfect line of separation in the territories of our

opponents. Thenceforth, they could not cross it save by stealth,

and the military affairs on its west bank became unimportant.

Grant's army had seemingly completed its share of the work of war,

and lay, as it were, idle for a time. In person General Grant went

to New Orleans to confer with General Banks, and his victorious

army was somewhat dispersed. Parke's corps (Ninth) returned to

Kentucky, and afterward formed part of the Army of the Ohio, under

General Burnside; Ord's corps (Thirteenth) was sent down to

Natchez, and gradually drifted to New Orleans and Texas; McPhersons

(Seventeenth) remained in and near Vicksburg; Hurlbut's (Sixteenth)

was at Memphis; and mine (Fifteenth) was encamped along the Big

Black, about twenty miles east of Vicksburg. This corps was

composed of four divisions: Steele's (the First) was posted at and

near the railroad-bridge; Blair's (the Second), next in order, near

Parson Fox's; the Third Division (Tuttle's) was on the ridge about

the head of Bear Creek; and the Fourth (Ewing's) was at Messinger's

Ford. My own headquarters were in tents in a fine grove of old

oaks near Parson Fox's house, and the battalion of the Thirteenth

Regulars was the headquarters guard.

All the camps were arranged for health, comfort, rest, and drill.

It being midsummer, we did not expect any change till the autumn

months, and accordingly made ourselves as comfortable as possible.

There was a short railroad in operation from Vicksburg to the

bridge across the Big Black, whence supplies in abundance were

hauled to our respective camps. With a knowledge of this fact Mrs.

Sherman came down from Ohio with Minnie, Lizzie, Willie, and Tom,

to pay us a visit in our camp at Parson Fog's. Willie was then

nine years old, was well advanced for his years, and took the most

intense interest in the affairs of the army. He was a great

favorite with the soldiers, and used to ride with me on horseback

in the numerous drills and reviews of the time. He then had the

promise of as long a life as any of my children, and displayed more

interest in the war than any of them. He was called a "sergeant"

in the regular battalion, learned the manual of arms, and regularly

attended the parade and guard-mounting of the Thirteenth, back of

my camp. We made frequent visits to Vicksburg, and always stopped

with General McPherson, who had a large house, and boarded with a

family (Mrs. Edwards's) in which were several interesting young

ladies. General Grant occupied another house (Mrs. Lum's) in

Vicksburg during that summer, and also had his family with him.

The time passed very agreeably, diversified only by little events

of not much significance, among which I will recount only one.

While, we occupied the west bank of the Big Black, the east bank

was watched by a rebel cavalry-division, commanded by General

Armstrong. He had four brigades, commanded by Generals Whitfield,

Stark, Cosby, and Wirt Adams. Quite frequently they communicated

with us by flags of truce on trivial matters, and we reciprocated;

merely to observe them. One day a flag of truce, borne by a

Captain B...., of Louisville, Kentucky, escorted by about

twenty-five men, was reported at Messinger's Ferry, and I sent

orders to let them come right into my tent. This brought them

through the camps of the Fourth Division, and part of the Second;

and as they drew up in front of my tent, I invited Captain B....

and another officer with him (a major from Mobile) to dismount, to

enter my tent, and to make themselves at home. Their escort was

sent to join mine, with orders to furnish them forage and every

thing they wanted. B.... had brought a sealed letter for General

Grant at Vicksburg, which was dispatched to him. In the evening we

had a good supper, with wine and cigars, and, as we sat talking,

B.... spoke of his father and mother, in Louisville, got leave to

write them a long letter without its being read by any one, and

then we talked about the war. He said: "What is the use of your

persevering? It is simply impossible to subdue eight millions of

people;" asserting that "the feeling in the South had become so

embittered that a reconciliation was impossible." I answered that,

"sitting as we then were, we appeared very comfortable, and surely

there was no trouble in our becoming friends." "Yes," said he,

"that is very true of us, but we are gentlemen of education, and

can easily adapt ourselves to any condition of things; but this

would not apply equally well to the common people, or to the common

soldiers." I took him out to the camp-fires behind the tent, and

there were the men of his escort and mine mingled together,

drinking their coffee, and happy as soldiers always seem. I asked

B.... what he thought of that, and he admitted that I had the best

of the argument. Before I dismissed this flag of truce, his

companion consulted me confidentially as to what disposition he

ought to make of his family, then in Mobile, and I frankly gave him

the best advice I could.

While we were thus lying idle in camp on the big Black, the Army of

the Cumberland, under General Rosecrans, was moving against Bragg

at Chattanooga; and the Army of the Ohio, General Burnside, was

marching toward East Tennessee. General Rosecrans was so confident

of success that he somewhat scattered his command, seemingly to

surround and capture Bragg in Chattanooga; but the latter,

reenforced from Virginia, drew out of Chattanooga, concentrated his

army at Lafayette, and at Chickamauga fell on Rosecrans, defeated

him, and drove him into Chattanooga. The whole country seemed

paralyzed by this unhappy event; and the authorities in Washington

were thoroughly stampeded. From the East the Eleventh Corps

(Slocum), and the Twelfth Corps (Howard), were sent by rail to

Nashville, and forward under command of General Hooker; orders were

also sent to General Grant, by Halleck, to send what reenforcements

he could spare immediately toward Chattanooga.

Bragg had completely driven Rosecrans's army into Chattanooga; the

latter was in actual danger of starvation, and the railroad to his

rear seemed inadequate to his supply. The first intimation which I

got of this disaster was on the 22d of September, by an order from

General Grant to dispatch one of my divisions immediately into

Vicksburg, to go toward Chattanooga, and I designated the First,

General Osterhaus--Steele meantime having been appointed to the

command of the Department of Arkansas, and had gone to Little Rock.

General Osterhaus marched the same day, and on the 23d I was

summoned to Vicksburg in person, where General Grant showed me the

alarming dispatches from General Halleck, which had been sent from

Memphis by General Hurlbut, and said, on further thought, that he

would send me and my whole corps. But, inasmuch as one division of

McPherson's corps (John E. Smith's) had already started, he

instructed me to leave one of my divisions on the Big Black, and to

get the other two ready to follow at once. I designated the

Second, then commanded by Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, and the

Fourth, commanded by Brigadier-General Corse.

On the 25th I returned to my camp on Big Black, gave all the

necessary orders for these divisions to move, and for the Third

(Tittle's) to remain, and went into Vicksburg with my family. The

last of my corps designed for this expedition started from camp on

the 27th, reached Vicksburg the 28th, and were embarked on boats

provided for them. General Halleck's dispatches dwelt upon the

fact that General Rosecrans's routes of supply were overtaxed, and

that we should move from Memphis eastward, repairing railroads as

we progressed, as far as Athens, Alabama, whence I was to report to

General Rosecrans, at Chattanooga, by letter.

I took passage for myself and family in the steamer Atlantic,

Captain Henry McDougall. When the boat was ready to start, Willie

was missing. Mrs. Sherman supposed him to have been with me,

whereas I supposed he was with her. An officer of the Thirteenth

went up to General McPherson's house for him, and soon returned,

with Captain Clift leading him, carrying in his hands a small

double-barreled shot gun; and I joked him about carrying away

captured property. In a short time we got off. As we all stood on

the guards to look at our old camps at Young's Point, I remarked

that Willie was not well, and he admitted that he was sick. His

mother put him to bed, and consulted Dr. Roler, of the Fifty-fifth

Illinois, who found symptoms of typhoid fever. The river was low;

we made slow progress till above Helena; and, as we approached

Memphis, Dr. Roler told me that Willie's life was in danger, and he

was extremely anxious to reach Memphis for certain medicines and

for consultation. We arrived at Memphis on the 2d of October,

carried Willie up to the Gayoso Hotel, and got the most experienced

physician there, who acted with Dr. Roler, but he sank rapidly, and

died the evening of the 3d of October. The blow was a terrible one

to us all, so sudden and so unexpected, that I could not help

reproaching myself for having consented to his visit in that sickly

region in the summer-time. Of all my children, he seemed the most

precious. Born in San Francisco, I had watched with intense

interest his development, and he seemed more than any of the

children to take an interest in my special profession. Mrs.

Sherman, Minnie, Lizzie, and Tom, were with him at the time, and we

all, helpless and overwhelmed, saw him die. Being in the very

midst of an important military enterprise, I had hardly time to

pause and think of my personal loss. We procured a metallic

casket, and had a military funeral, the battalion of the Thirteenth

United States Regulars acting as escort from the Gayoso Hotel to

the steamboat Grey Eagle, which conveyed him and my family up to

Cairo, whence they proceeded to our home at Lancaster, Ohio, where

he was buried. I here give my letter to Captain C. C. Smith, who

commanded the battalion at the time, as exhibiting our intense

feelings:

GAYOSO HOUSE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

October 4, 1863, Midnight

Captain C. C. SMITH, commanding Battalion Thirteenth United States

Regulars.

MY DEAR FRIEND: I cannot sleep to-night till I record an expression

of the deep feelings of my heart to you, and to the officers and

soldiers of the battalion, for their kind behavior to my poor

child. I realize that you all feel for my family the attachment of

kindred, and I assure you of full reciprocity. Consistent with a

sense of duty to my profession and office, I could not leave my

post, and sent for the family to come to me in that fatal climate,

and in that sickly period of the year, and behold the result! The

child that bore my name, and in whose future I reposed with more

confidence than I did in my own plan of life, now floats a mere

corpse, seeking a grave in a distant land, with a weeping mother,

brother, and sisters, clustered about him. For myself, I ask no

sympathy. On, on I must go, to meet a soldier's fate, or live to

see our country rise superior to all factions, till its flag is

adored and respected by ourselves and by all the powers of the

earth.

But Willie was, or thought he was, a sergeant in the Thirteenth. I

have seen his eye brighten, his heart beat, as he beheld the

battalion under arms, and asked me if they were not real soldiers.

Child as he was, he had the enthusiasm, the pure love of truth,

honor, and love of country, which should animate all soldiers.

God only knows why he should die thus young. He is dead, but will

not be forgotten till those who knew him in life have followed him

to that same mysterious end.

Please convey to the battalion my heart-felt thanks, and assure

each and all that if in after-years they call on me or mine, and

mention that they were of the Thirteenth Regulars when Willie was a

sergeant, they will have a key to the affections of my family that

will open all it has; that we will share with them our last

blanket, our last crust! Your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-general.

Long afterward, in the spring of 1867, we had his body disinterred

and brought to St. Louis, where he is now buried in a beautiful

spot, in Calvary Cemetery, by the side of another child, "Charles,"

who was born at Lancaster, in the summer of 1864, died early, and

was buried at Notre Dame, Indiana. His body was transferred at the

same time to the same spot. Over Willie's grave is erected a

beautiful marble monument, designed and executed by the officers

and soldiers, of that battalion which claimed him as a sergeant and

comrade.

During the summer and fall of 1863 Major-General S. A. Hurlbut was

in command at Memphis. He supplied me copies of all dispatches

from Washington, and all the information he possessed of the events

about Chattanooga. Two of these dispatches cover all essential

points:

WASHINGTON CITY, September 15, 1863--5 p.m.

Major-General S. A. HURLBUT, Memphis:

All the troops that can possibly be spared in West Tennessee and on

the Mississippi River should be sent without delay to assist

General Rosecrans on the Tennessee River.

Urge Sherman to act with all possible promptness.

If you have boats, send them down to bring up his troops.

Information just received indicates that a part of Lee's army has

been sent to reenforce Bragg.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

Washington, September 19, 1868--4 p.m.

Major-General S. A. HURLBUT, Memphis, Tennessee:

Give me definite information of the number of troops sent toward

Decatur, and where they are. Also, what other troops are to

follow, and when.

Has any thing been heard from the troops ordered from Vicksburg?

No efforts must be spared to support Rosecrans's right, and to

guard the crossings of the Tennessee River.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

My special orders were to repair the Memphis & Charleston Railroad

eastward as I progressed, as far as Athens, Alabama, to draw

supplies by that route, so that, on reaching Athens, we should not

be dependent on the roads back to Nashville, already overtaxed by

the demand of Rosecrans's army.

On reaching Memphis, October 2d, I found that Osterhaus's division

had already gone by rail as far as Corinth, and than John E.

Smith's division was in the act of starting by cars. The Second

Division, then commanded by Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith,

reached Memphis at the same time with me; and the Fourth Division,

commanded by Brigadier-General John M. Corse, arrived a day or two

after. The railroad was in fair condition as far as Corinth,

ninety-six miles, but the road was badly stocked with locomotives

and cars, so that it took until the 9th to get off the Second

Division, when I gave orders for the Fourth Division and

wagon-trains to march by the common road.

On Sunday morning, October 11th, with a special train loaded with

our orderlies and clerks, the horses of our staff, the battalion of

the Thirteenth United States Regulars, and a few officers going

forward to join their commands, among them Brigadier-General Hugh

Ewing, I started for Corinth.

At Germantown, eight miles, we passed Corse's division (Fourth) on

the march, and about noon the train ran by the depot at

Colliersville, twenty-six miles out. I was in the rear car with my

staff, dozing, but observed the train slacking speed and stopping

about half a mile beyond the depot. I noticed some soldiers

running to and fro, got out at the end of the car, and soon Colonel

Anthony (Sixty-sixth Indiana), who commanded the post, rode up and

said that his pickets had just been driven in, and there was an

appearance of an attack by a large force of cavalry coming from the

southeast. I ordered the men to get off the train, to form on the

knoll near the railroad-cut, and soon observed a rebel officer

riding toward us with a white flag. Colonel Anthony and Colonel

Dayton (one of my aides) were sent to meet him, and to keep him in

conversation as long as possible. They soon returned, saying it

was the adjutant of the rebel general Chalmers, who demanded the

surrender of the place. I instructed them to return and give a

negative answer, but to delay him as much as possible, so as to

give us time for preparation. I saw Anthony, Dayton, and the rebel

bearer of the flag, in conversation, and the latter turn his horse

to ride back, when I ordered Colonel McCoy to run to the station,

and get a message over the wires as quick as possible to Memphis

and Germantown, to hurry forward Corse's division. I then ordered

the train to back to the depot, and drew back the battalion of

regulars to the small earth redoubt near it. The depot-building

was of brick, and had been punctured with loop-holes. To its east,

about two hundred yards, was a small square earthwork or fort, into

which were put a part of the regulars along with the company of the

Sixty-sixth Indiana already there. The rest of the men were

distributed into the railroad-cut, and in some shallow

rifle-trenches near the depot. We had hardly made these

preparations when the enemy was seen forming in a long line on the

ridge to the south, about four hundred yards off, and soon after two

parties of cavalry passed the railroad on both sides of us, cutting

the wires and tearing up some rails. Soon they opened on us with

artillery (of which we had none), and their men were dismounting and

preparing to assault. To the south of us was an extensive

cornfield, with the corn still standing, and on the other side was

the town of Colliersville. All the houses near, that could give

shelter to the enemy, were ordered to be set on fire, and the men

were instructed to keep well under cover and to reserve their fire

for the assault, which seemed inevitable. A long line of rebel

skirmishers came down through the cornfield, and two other parties

approached us along the railroad on both sides. In the fort was a

small magazine containing some cartridges. Lieutenant James, a

fine, gallant fellow, who was ordnance-officer on my staff, asked

leave to arm the orderlies and clerks with some muskets which he had

found in the depot, to which I consented; he marched them into the

magazine, issued cartridges, and marched back to the depot to assist

in its defense. Afterward he came to me, said a party of the enemy

had got into the woods near the depot, and was annoying him, and he

wanted to charge and drive it away. I advised him to be extremely

cautious, as our enemy vastly outnumbered us, and had every

advantage in position and artillery; but instructed him, if they got

too near, he might make a sally. Soon after, I heard a rapid fire

in that quarter, and Lieutenant. James was brought in on a

stretcher, with a ball through his breast, which I supposed to be

fatal.

[After the fight we sent him back to Memphis, where his mother and

father came from their home on the North River to nurse him. Young

James was recovering from his wound, but was afterward killed by a

fall from his horse, near his home, when riding with the daughters

of Mr. Hamilton Fish, now Secretary of State.]

The enemy closed down on us several times, and got possession of

the rear of our train, from which they succeeded in getting five of

our horses, among them my favorite mare Dolly; but our men were

cool and practised shots (with great experience acquired at

Vicksburg), and drove them back. With their artillery they knocked

to pieces our locomotive and several of the cars, and set fire to

the train; but we managed to get possession again, and extinguished

the fire. Colonel Audenreid, aide-de-camp, was provoked to find

that his valise of nice shirts had been used to kindle the fire.

The fighting continued all round us for three or four hours, when

we observed signs of drawing off, which I attributed to the

rightful cause, the rapid approach of Corse's division, which

arrived about dark, having marched the whole distance from Memphis,

twenty-six miles, on the double-quick. The next day we repaired

damages to the railroad and locomotive, and went on to Corinth.

At Corinth, on the 16th, I received the following important

dispatches:

MEMPHIS, October 14, 1863--11 A.M.

Arrived this morning. Will be off in a few hours. My orders are

only to go to Cairo, and report from there by telegraph. McPherson

will be in Canton to-day. He will remain there until Sunday or

Monday next, and reconnoitre as far eastward as possible with

cavalry, in the mean time.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1863--1 p.m.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Corinth

Yours of the 10th is received. The important matter to be attended

to is that of supplies. When Eastport can be reached by boats, the

use of the railroad can be dispensed with; but until that time it

must be guarded as far as need. The Kentucky Railroad can barely

supply General Rosecrans. All these matters must be left to your

judgment as circumstances may arise. Should the enemy be so strong

as to prevent your going to Athena, or connecting with General

Rosecrans, you will nevertheless have assisted him greatly by

drawing away a part of the enemy's forces.

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

On the 18th, with my staff and a small escort, I rode forward to

Burnsville, and on the 19th to Iuka, where, on the next day, I was

most agreeably surprised to hear of the arrival at Eastport (only

ten miles off) of two gunboats, under the command of Captain

Phelps, which had been sent up the Tennessee River by Admiral

Porter, to help us.

Satisfied that, to reach Athens and to communicate with General

Rosecrans, we should have to take the route north of the Tennessee

River, on the 24th I ordered the Fourth Division to cross at

Eastport with the aid of the gunboats, and to move to Florence.

About the same time, I received the general orders assigning

General Grant to command the Military Division of the Mississippi,

authorizing him, on reaching Chattanooga, to supersede General

Rosecrans by General George H. Thomas, with other and complete

authority, as set, forth in the following letters of General

Halleck, which were sent to me by General Grant; and the same

orders devolved on me the command of the Department and Army of the

Tennessee.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C., October 16, 1863

Major-General U. S. GRANT, Louisville.

GENERAL: You will receive herewith the orders of the President of

the United States, placing you in command of the Departments of the

Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee. The organization of these

departments will be changed as you may deem most practicable. You

will immediately proceed to Chattanooga, and relieve General

Rosecrans. You can communicate with Generals Burnside and Sherman

by telegraph. A summary of the orders sent to these officers will

be sent to you immediately. It is left optional with you to

supersede General Rosecrans by General G. H. Thomas or not. Any

other changes will be made on your request by telegram.

One of the first objects requiring your attention is the supply of

your armies. Another is the security of the passes in the Georgia

mountains, to shut out the enemy from Tennessee and Kentucky. You

will consult with General Meigs and Colonel Scott in regard to

transportation and supplies.

Should circumstances permit, I will visit you personally in a few

days for consultation.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 20, 1868.

Major-General GRANT, Louisville.

GENERAL: In compliance with my promise, I now proceed to give you

a brief statement of the objects aimed at by General Rosecrans and

General Burnside's movement into East Tennessee, and of the

measures directed to be taken to attain these objects.

It has been the constant desire of the government, from the

beginning of the war, to rescue the loyal inhabitants of East

Tennessee from the hands of the rebels, who fully appreciated the

importance of continuing their hold upon that country. In addition

to the large amount of agricultural products drawn from the upper

valley of the Tennessee, they also obtained iron and other

materials from the vicinity of Chattanooga. The possession of East

Tennessee would cut off one of their most important railroad

communications, and threaten their manufactories at Rome, Atlanta,

etc.

When General Buell was ordered into East Tennessee in the summer of

1882, Chattanooga was comparatively unprotected; but Bragg reached

there before Buell, and, by threatening his communications, forced

him to retreat on Nashville and Louisville. Again, after the

battle of Perryville, General Buell was urged to pursue Bragg's

defeated army, and drive it from East Tennessee. The same was

urged upon his successor, but the lateness of the season or other

causes prevented further operations after the battle of Stone

River.

Last spring, when your movements on the Mississippi River had drawn

out of Tennessee a large force of the enemy, I again urged General

Rosecrans to take advantage of that opportunity to carry out his

projected plan of campaign, General Burnside being ready to

cooperate, with a diminished but still efficient force. But he

could not be persuaded to act in time, preferring to lie still till

your campaign should be terminated. I represented to him, but

without avail, that by this delay Johnston might be able to

reenforce Bragg with the troops then operating against you.

When General Rosecrans finally determined to advance, he was

allowed to select his own lines and plans for carrying out the

objects of the expedition. He was directed, however, to report his

movements daily, till he crossed the Tennessee, and to connect his

left, so far as possible, with General Burnside's right. General

Burnside was directed to move simultaneously, connecting his right,

as far as possible, with General Rosecrans's left so that, if the

enemy concentrated upon either army, the other could move to its

assistance. When General Burnside reached Kingston and Knoxville,

and found no considerable number of the enemy in East Tennessee, he

was instructed to move down the river and cooperate with General

Rosecrans.

These instructions were repeated some fifteen times, but were not

carried out, General Burnside alleging as an excuse that he

believed that Bragg was in retreat, and that General Rosecrans

needed no reenforcements. When the latter had gained possession of

Chattanooga he was directed not to move on Rome as he proposed, but

simply to hold the mountain-passes, so as to prevent the ingress of

the rebels into East Tennessee. That object accomplished, I

considered the campaign as ended, at least for the present. Future

operations would depend upon the ascertained strength and;

movements of the enemy. In other words, the main objects of the

campaign were the restoration of East Tennessee to the Union, and

by holding the two extremities of the valley to secure it from

rebel invasion.

The moment I received reliable information of the departure of

Longstreet's corps from the Army of the Potomac, I ordered forward

to General Rosecrans every available man in the Department of the

Ohio, and again urged General Burnside to move to his assistance.

I also telegraphed to Generals Hurlbut, Sherman, and yourself, to

send forward all available troops in your department. If these

forces had been sent to General Rosecrans by Nashville, they could

not have been supplied; I therefore directed them to move by

Corinth and the Tennessee River. The necessity of this has been

proved by the fact that the reinforcements sent to him from the

Army of the Potomac have not been able, for the want of railroad

transportation, to reach General Rosecrans's army in the field.

In regard to the relative strength of the opposing armies, it is

believed that General Rosecrans when he first moved against Bragg

had double, if not treble, his force. General Burnside, also, had

more than double the force of Buckner; and, even when Bragg and

Buckner united, Rosecrans's army was very greatly superior in

number. Even the eighteen thousand men sent from Virginia, under

Longstreet, would not have given the enemy the superiority. It is

now ascertained that the greater part of the prisoners parolled by

you at Vicksburg, and General Banks at Port Hudson, were illegally

and improperly declared exchanged, and forced into the ranks to

swell the rebel numbers at Chickamauga. This outrageous act, in

violation of the laws of war, of the cartel entered into by the

rebel authorities, and of all sense of honor, gives us a useful

lesson in regard to the character of the enemy with whom we are

contending. He neither regards the rules of civilized warfare, nor

even his most solemn engagements. You may, therefore, expect to

meet in arms thousands of unexchanged prisoners released by you and

others on parole, not to serve again till duly exchanged.

Although the enemy by this disgraceful means has been able to

concentrate in Georgia and Alabama a much larger force than we

anticipated, your armies will be abundantly able to defeat him.

Your difficulty will not be in the want of men, but in the means of

supplying them at this season of the year. A single-track railroad

can supply an army of sixty or seventy thousand men, with the usual

number of cavalry and artillery; but beyond that number, or with a

large mounted force, the difficulty of supply is very great.

I do not know the present condition of the road from Nashville to

Decatur, but, if practicable to repair it, the use of that triangle

will be of great assistance to you. I hope, also, that the recent

rise of water in the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers will enable

you to employ water transportation to Nashville, Eastport, or

Florence.

If you reoccupy the passes of Lookout Mountain, which should never

have been given up, you will be able to use the railroad and river

from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. This seems to me a matter of vital

importance, and should receive your early attention.

I submit this summary in the hope that it will assist you in fully

understanding the objects of the campaign, and the means of

attaining these objects. Probably the Secretary of War, in his

interviews with you at Louisville, has gone over the same ground.

Whatever measures you may deem proper to adopt under existing

circumstances, you will receive all possible assistance from the

authorities at Washington. You have never, heretofore, complained

that such assistance has not been afforded you in your operations,

and I think you will have no cause of complaint in your present

campaign. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief

General Frank P. Blair, who was then ahead with the two divisions

of Osterhaus and John E. Smith, was temporarily assigned to the

command of the Fifteenth Corps. General Hurlbut remained at

Memphis in command of the Sixteenth Corps, and General McPherson at

Vicksburg with the Seventeenth. These three corps made up the Army

of the Tennessee. I was still busy in pushing forward the repairs

to the railroad bridge at Bear Creek, and in patching up the many

breaks between it and Tuscumbia, when on the 27th of October, as I

sat on the porch of a house, I was approached by a dirty,

black-haired individual with mixed dress and strange demeanor, who

inquired for me, and, on being assured that I was in fact the man,

he handed me a letter from General Blair at Tuscumbia, and another

short one, which was a telegraph-message from General Grant at

Chattanooga, addressed to me through General George Crook,

commanding at Huntsville, Alabama, to this effect:

Drop all work on Memphis & Charleston Railroad, cross the Tennessee

and hurry eastward with all possible dispatch toward Bridgeport,

till you meet further orders from me.

U. S. GRANT.

The bearer of this message was Corporal Pike, who described to me,

in his peculiar way, that General Crook had sent him in a canoe;

that he had paddled down the Tennessee River, over Muscle Shoals,

was fired at all the way by guerrillas, but on reaching Tuscumbia

he had providentially found it in possession of our troops. He had

reported to General Blair, who sent him on to me at Iuka. This

Pike proved to be a singular character; his manner attracted my

notice at once, and I got him a horse, and had him travel with us

eastward to about Elkton, whence I sent him back to General Crook

at Huntsville; but told him, if I could ever do him a personal

service, he might apply to me. The next spring when I was in

Chattanooga, preparing for the Atlanta campaign, Corporal Pike made

his appearance and asked a fulfillment of my promise. I inquired

what he wanted, and he said he wanted to do something bold,

something that would make him a hero. I explained to him, that we

were getting ready to go for Joe Johnston at Dalton, that I

expected to be in the neighborhood of Atlanta about the 4th of

July, and wanted the bridge across the Savannah River at Augusta,

Georgia, to be burnt about that time, to produce alarm and

confusion behind the rebel army. I explained to Pike that the

chances were three to one that he would be caught and hanged; but

the greater the danger the greater seemed to be his desire to

attempt it. I told him to select a companion, to disguise himself

as an East Tennessee refugee, work his way over the mountains into

North Carolina, and at the time appointed to float down the

Savannah River and burn that bridge. In a few days he had made his

preparations and took his departure. The bridge was not burnt, and

I supposed that Pike had been caught and hanged.

When we reached Columbia, South Carolina, in February, 1865, just

as we were leaving the town, in passing near the asylum, I heard my

name called, and saw a very dirty fellow followed by a file of men

running toward me, and as they got near I recognized Pike. He

called to me to identify him as one of my men; he was then a

prisoner under guard, and I instructed the guard to bring him that

night to my camp some fifteen miles up the road, which was done.

Pike gave me a graphic narrative of his adventures, which would

have filled a volume; told me how he had made two attempts to burn

the bridge, and failed; and said that at the time of our entering

Columbia he was a prisoner in the hands of the rebels, under trial

for his life, but in the confusion of their retreat he made his

escape and got into our lines, where he was again made a prisoner

by our troops because of his looks. Pike got some clothes, cleaned

up, and I used him afterward to communicate with Wilmington, North

Carolina. Some time after the war, he was appointed a lieutenant

of the Regular, Cavalry, and was killed in Oregon, by the

accidental discharge of a pistol. Just before his death he wrote

me, saying that he was tired of the monotony of garrison-life, and

wanted to turn Indian, join the Cheyennes on the Plains, who were

then giving us great trouble, and, after he had gained their

confidence, he would betray them into our hands. Of course I wrote

him that he must try and settle down and become a gentleman as well

as an officer, apply himself to his duties, and forget the wild

desires of his nature, which were well enough in time of war, but

not suited to his new condition as an officer; but, poor fellow!

he was killed by an accident, which probably saved him from a

slower but harder fate.

At Iuka I issued all the orders to McPherson and Hurlbut necessary

for the Department of the Tennessee during my absence, and,

further, ordered the collection of a force out of the Sixteenth

Corps, of about eight thousand men, to be commanded by General G.

M. Dodge, with orders to follow as far east as Athens, Tennessee,

there to await instructions. We instantly discontinued all

attempts to repair the Charleston Railroad; and the remaining three

divisions of the Fifteenth Corps marched to Eastport, crossed the

Tennessee River by the aid of the gunboats, a ferry-boat, and a

couple of transports which had come up, and hurried eastward.

In person I crossed on the 1st of November, and rode forward to

Florence, where I overtook Ewing's division. The other divisions

followed rapidly. On the road to Florence I was accompanied by my

staff, some clerks, and mounted orderlies. Major Ezra Taylor

was chief of artillery, and one of his sons was a clerk at

head-quarters. The latter seems to have dropped out of the column,

and gone to a farm house near the road. There was no organized

force of the rebel army north of the Tennessee River, but the

country was full of guerrillas. A party of these pounced down on

the farm, caught young Taylor and another of the clerks, and after

reaching Florence, Major Taylor heard of the capture of his son, and

learned that when last seen he was stripped of his hat and coat, was

tied to the tail-board of a wagon, and driven rapidly to the north

of the road we had traveled. The major appealed to me to do

something for his rescue. I had no cavalry to send in pursuit, but

knowing that there was always an understanding between these

guerrillas and their friends who staid at home, I sent for three or

four of the principal men of Florence (among them a Mr. Foster, who

had once been a Senator in Congress), explained to them the capture

of young Taylor and his comrade, and demanded their immediate

restoration. They, of course, remonstrated, denied all knowledge of

the acts of these guerrillas, and claimed to be peaceful citizens of

Alabama, residing at home. I insisted that these guerrillas were

their own sons and neighbors; that they knew their haunts, and could

reach them if they wanted, and they could effect the restoration to

us of these men; and I said, moreover, they must do it within

twenty-four hours, or I would take them, strip them of their hats

and coats, and tie them to the tail-boards of our wagons till they

were produced. They sent off messengers at once, and young Taylor

and his comrade were brought back the next day.

Resuming our march eastward by the large road, we soon reached Elk

River, which was wide and deep, and could only be crossed by a

ferry, a process entirely too slow for the occasion; so I changed

the route more by the north, to Elkton, Winchester, and Deckerd.

At this point we came in communication with the Army of the

Cumberland, and by telegraph with General Grant, who was at

Chattanooga. He reiterated his orders for me and my command to

hurry forward with all possible dispatch, and in person I reached

Bridgeport during the night of November 13th, my troops following

behind by several roads. At Bridgeport I found a garrison guarding

the railroad-bridge and pontoon bridge there, and staid with the

quartermaster, Colonel William G. Le Due (who was my school-mate at

How's School in 1836). There I received a dispatch from General

Grant, at Chattanooga, to come up in person, leaving my troops to

follow as fast as possible. At that time there were two or three

small steamboats on the river, engaged in carrying stores up as far

as Kelly's Ferry. In one of these I took passage, and on reaching

Kelly's Ferry found orderlies, with one of General Grant's private

horses, waiting for me, on which I rode into Chattanooga, November

14th. Of course, I was heartily welcomed by Generals Grant,

Thomas, and all, who realized the extraordinary efforts we had made

to come to their relief. The next morning we walked out to Fort

Wood, a prominent salient of the defenses of the place, and from

its parapet we had a magnificent view of the panorama. Lookout

Mountain, with its rebel flags and batteries, stood out boldly, and

an occasional shot fired toward Wauhatchee or Moccasin Point gave

life to the scene. These shots could barely reach Chattanooga, and

I was told that one or more shot had struck a hospital inside the

lines. All along Missionary Ridge were the tents of the rebel

beleaguering force; the lines of trench from Lookout up toward the

Chickamauga were plainly visible; and rebel sentinels, in a

continuous chain, were walking their posts in plain view, not a

thousand yards off. "Why," said I, "General Grant, you are

besieged;" and he said, "It is too true." Up to that moment I had

no idea that things were so bad. The rebel lines actually extended

from the river, below the town, to the river above, and the Army of

the Cumberland was closely held to the town and its immediate

defenses. General Grant pointed out to me a house on Missionary

Ridge, where General Bragg's headquarters were known to be. He

also explained the situation of affairs generally; that the mules

and horses of Thomas's army were so starved that they could not

haul his guns; that forage, corn, and provisions, were so scarce

that the men in hunger stole the few grains of corn that were given

to favorite horses; that the men of Thomas's army had been so

demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he feared they could

not be got out of their trenches to assume the offensive; that

Bragg had detached Longstreet with a considerable force up into

East Tennessee, to defeat and capture Burnside; that Burnside was

in danger, etc.; and that he (Grant) was extremely anxious to

attack Bragg in position, to defeat him, or at least to force him

to recall Longstreet. The Army of the Cumberland had so long been

in the trenches that he wanted my troops to hurry up, to take the

offensive first; after which, he had no doubt the Cumberland army

would fight well. Meantime the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, under

General Hooker, had been advanced from Bridgeport along the

railroad to Wauhatchee, but could not as yet pass Lookout Mountain.

A pontoon-bridge had been thrown across the Tennessee River at

Brown's Ferry, by which supplies were hauled into Chattanooga from

Kelly's and Wauhatchee..

Another bridge was in course of construction at Chattanooga, under

the immediate direction of Quartermaster-General Meigs, but at the

time all wagons, etc., had to be ferried across by a flying-bridge.

Men were busy and hard at work everywhere inside our lines, and

boats for another pontoon-bridge were being rapidly constructed

under Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, familiarly known as "Baldy

Smith," and this bridge was destined to be used by my troops, at a

point of the river about four miles above Chattanooga, just below

the mouth of the Chickamauga River. General Grant explained to me

that he had reconnoitred the rebel line from Lookout Mountain up to

Chickamauga, and he believed that the northern portion of

Missionary Ridge was not fortified at all; and he wanted me, as

soon as my troops got up, to lay the new pontoon-bridge by night,

cross over, and attack Bragg's right flank on that part of the

ridge abutting on Chickamauga Creek, near the tunnel; and he

proposed that we should go at once to look at the ground. In

company with Generals Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan, and others, we

crossed by the flying-bridge, rode back of the hills some four

miles, left our horses, and got on a hill overlooking the whole

ground about the mouth of the Chickamauga River, and across to the

Missionary Hills near the tunnel. Smith and I crept down behind a

fringe of trees that lined the river-bank, to the very point

selected for the new bridge, where we sat for some time, seeing the

rebel pickets on the opposite bank, and almost hearing their words.

Having seen enough, we returned to Chattanooga; and in order to

hurry up my command, on which so much depended, I started back to

Kelly's in hopes to catch the steamboat that same evening; but on

my arrival the boat had gone. I applied to the commanding officer,

got a rough boat manned by four soldiers, and started down the

river by night. I occasionally took a turn at the oars to relieve

some tired man, and about midnight we reached Shell Mound, where

General Whittaker, of Kentucky, furnished us a new and good crew,

with which we reached Bridgeport by daylight. I started Ewings

division in advance, with orders to turn aside toward Trenton, to

make the enemy believe we were going to turn Braggs left by pretty

much the same road Rosecrans had followed; but with the other three

divisions I followed the main road, via the Big Trestle at

Whitesides, and reached General Hooker's headquarters, just above

Wauhatchee, on the 20th; my troops strung all the way back to

Bridgeport. It was on this occasion that the Fifteenth Corps

gained its peculiar badge: as the men were trudging along the

deeply-cut, muddy road, of a cold, drizzly day, one of our Western

soldiers left his ranks and joined a party of the Twelfth Corps at

their camp-fire. They got into conversation, the Twelfth-Corps men

asking what troops we were, etc., etc. In turn, our fellow (who

had never seen a corps-badge, and noticed that every thing was

marked with a star) asked if they were all brigadier-generals. Of

course they were not, but the star was their corps-badge, and every

wagon, tent, hat, etc., had its star. Then the Twelfth-Corps men

inquired what corps he belonged to, and he answered, "The Fifteenth

Corps." "What is your badge?" "Why," said he (and he was an

Irishman), suiting the action to the word, "forty rounds in the

cartridge-box, and twenty in the pocket." At that time Blair

commanded the corps; but Logan succeeded soon after, and, hearing

the story, adopted the cartridge-box and forty rounds as the

corps-badge.

The condition of the roads was such, and the bridge at Brown's so

frail, that it was not until the 23d that we got three of my

divisions behind the hills near the point indicated above

Chattanooga for crossing the river. It was determined to begin the

battle with these three divisions, aided by a division of Thomas's

army, commanded by General Jeff. C. Davis, that was already near

that point. All the details of the battle of Chattanooga, so far

as I was a witness, are so fully given in my official report

herewith, that I need add nothing to it. It was a magnificent

battle in its conception, in its execution, and in its glorious

results; hastened somewhat by the supposed danger of Burnside, at

Knoxville, yet so completely successful, that nothing is left for

cavil or fault-finding. The first day was lowering and overcast,

favoring us greatly, because we wanted to be concealed from Bragg,

whose position on the mountain-tops completely overlooked us and

our movements. The second day was beautifully clear, and many a

time, in the midst of its carnage and noise, I could not help

stopping to look across that vast field of battle, to admire its

sublimity.

The object of General Hooker's and my attacks on the extreme flanks

of Bragg's position was, to disturb him to such an extent, that

he would naturally detach from his centre as against us, so that

Thomas's army could break through his centre. The whole plan

succeeded admirably; but it was not until after dark that I learned

the complete success at the centre, and received General Grant's

orders to pursue on the north side of Chickamauga Creek:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, CHATTANOOGA,

TENNESSEE, Nov. 25, 1863

Major-General SHERMAN.

GENERAL: No doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in which

Thomas's troops carried Missionary Ridge this afternoon, and can

feel a just pride, too, in the part taken by the forces under your

command in taking first so much of the same range of hills, and

then in attracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to make

Thomas's part certain of success. The neat thing now will be to

relieve Burnside. I have heard from him to the evening of the 23d.

At that time he had from ten to twelve days' supplies, and spoke

hopefully of being able to hold out that length of time.

My plan is to move your forces out gradually until they reach the

railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Granger will move up the

south side of the Tennessee with a column of twenty thousand men,

taking no wagons, or but few, with him. His men will carry four

days' rations, and the steamer Chattanooga, loaded with rations,

will accompany the expedition.

I take it for granted that Bragg's entire force has left. If not,

of course, the first thing is to dispose of him. If he has gone,

the only thing necessary to do to-morrow will be to send out a

reconnoissance to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy. Yours

truly,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

P. S.-On reflection, I think we will push Bragg with all our

strength to-morrow, and try if we cannot out off a good portion of

his rear troops and trains. His men have manifested a strong

disposition to desert for some time past, and we will now give them

a chance. I will instruct Thomas accordingly. Move the advance

force early, on the most easterly road taken by the enemy.

U. S. G.

This compelled me to reverse our column, so as to use the bridge

across the Chickamauga at its mouth. The next day we struck the

rebel rear at Chickamauga Station, and again near Graysville.

There we came in contact with Hooker's and Palmer's troops, who had

reached Ringgold. There I detached Howard to cross Taylor's Ridge,

and strike the railroad which comes from the north by Cleveland to

Dalton. Hooker's troops were roughly handled at Ringgold, and the

pursuit was checked. Receiving a note from General Hooker, asking

help, I rode forward to Ringgold to explain the movement of Howard;

where I met General Grant, and learned that the rebels had again

retreated toward Dalton. He gave orders to discontinue the

pursuit, as he meant to turn his attention to General Burnside,

supposed to be in great danger at Knoxville, about one hundred and

thirty miles northeast. General Grant returned and spent part of

the night with me, at Graysville. We talked over matters

generally, and he explained that he had ordered General Gordon

Granger, with the Fourth Corps, to move forward rapidly to

Burnsides help, and that he must return to Chattanooga to push him.

By reason of the scarcity of food, especially of forage, he

consented that, instead of going back, I might keep out in the

country; for in motion I could pick up some forage and food,

especially on the Hiawassee River, whereas none remained in

Chattanooga.

Accordingly, on the 29th of November, my several columns marched to

Cleveland, and the next day we reached the Hiawassee at Charleston,

where the Chattanooga & Knoxville Railroad crosses it. The

railroad-bridge was partially damaged by the enemy in retreating,

but we found some abandoned stores. There and thereabouts I

expected some rest for my weary troops and horses; but, as I rode

into town, I met Colonel J. H. Wilson and C. A. Dana (Assistant

Secretary of War), who had ridden out from Chattanooga to find me,

with the following letter from General Grant, and copies of several

dispatches from General Burnside, the last which had been received

from him by way of Cumberland Gap:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, CHATTANOOGA,

TENNESSEE, Nov. 29, 1863

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN

News are received from Knoxville to the morning of the 27th. At

that time the place was still invested, but the attack on it was

not vigorous. Longstreet evidently determined to starve the

garrison out. Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but I

have lost all faith in his energy or capacity to manage an

expedition of the importance of this one. I am inclined to think,

therefore, I shall have to send you. Push as rapidly as you can to

the Hiawassee, and determine for yourself what force to take with

you from that point. Granger has his corps with him, from which

you will select in conjunction with the force now with you. In

plain words, you will assume command of all the forces now moving

up the Tennessee, including the garrison at Kingston, and from that

force, organize what you deem proper to relieve Burnside. The

balance send back to Chattanooga. Granger has a boat loaded with

provisions, which you can issue, and return the boat. I will have

another loaded, to follow you. Use, of course, as sparingly as

possible from the rations taken with you, and subsist off the

country all you can.

It is expected that Foster is moving, by this time, from Cumberland

Gap on Knoxville. I do not know what force he will have with him,

but presume it will range from three thousand five hundred to five

thousand I leave this matter to you, knowing that you will do

better acting upon your discretion than you could trammeled with

instructions. I will only add, that the last advices from Burnside

himself indicated his ability to hold out with rations only to

about the 3d of December. Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General commanding,

This showed that, on the 27th of November, General Burnside was in

Knoxville, closely besieged by the rebel General Longstreet; that

his provisions were short, and that, unless relieved by December

3d, he might have to surrender. General Grant further wrote that

General Granger, instead of moving with great rapidity as ordered,

seemed to move "slowly, and with reluctance;" and, although he

(General Grant) hated to call on me and on my tired troops, there

was no alternative. He wanted me to take command of every thing

within reach, and to hurry forward to Knoxville.

All the details of our march to Knoxville are also given in my

official report. By extraordinary efforts Long's small brigade of

cavalry reached Knoxville during the night of the 3d, purposely to

let Burnside know that I was rapidly approaching with an adequate

force to raise the siege.

With the head of my infantry column I reached Marysville, about

fifteen miles short of Knoxville, on the 5th of December; when I

received official notice from Burnside that Longstreet had raised

the siege, and had started in retreat up the valley toward

Virginia. Halting all the army, except Granger's two divisions, on

the morning of the 6th, with General Granger and some of my staff I

rode into Knoxville. Approaching from the south and west, we

crossed the Holston on a pontoon bridge, and in a large pen on the

Knoxville side I saw a fine lot of cattle, which did not look much

like starvation. I found General Burnside and staff domiciled in a

large, fine mansion, looking very comfortable, and in, a few words

he described to me the leading events, of the previous few days,

and said he had already given orders looking to the pursuit of

Longstreet. I offered to join in the pursuit, though in fact my

men were worn out, and suffering in that cold season and climate.

Indeed, on our way up I personally was almost frozen, and had to

beg leave to sleep in the house of a family at Athens.

Burnside explained to me that, reenforced by Granger's two

divisions of ten thousand men, he would be able to push Longstreet

out of East Tennessee, and he hoped to capture much of his

artillery and trains. Granger was present at our conversation, and

most unreasonably, I thought, remonstrated against being left;

complaining bitterly of what he thought was hard treatment to his

men and himself. I know that his language and manner at that time

produced on my mind a bad impression, and it was one of the causes

which led me to relieve him as a corps commander in the campaign of

the next spring. I asked General Burnside to reduce his wishes to

writing, which he did in the letter of December 7th, embodied in my

official report. General Burnside and I then walked along his

lines and examined the salient, known as Fort Sanders, where, some

days before, Longstreet had made his assault, and had sustained a

bloody repulse.

Returning to Burnside's quarters, we all sat down to a good dinner,

embracing roast-turkey. There was a regular dining table, with

clean tablecloth, dishes, knives, forks, spoons, etc., etc. I had

seen nothing of this kind in my field experience, and could not

help exclaiming that I thought "they were starving," etc.; but

Burnside explained that Longstreet had at no time completely

invested the place, and that he had kept open communication with

the country on the south side of the river Holston, more especially

with the French Broad settlements, from whose Union inhabitants he

had received a good supply of beef, bacon, and corn meal. Had I

known of this, I should not have hurried my men so fast; but until

I reached Knoxville I thought his troops there were actually in

danger of starvation. Having supplied General Burnside all the

help he wanted, we began our leisurely return to Chattanooga, which

we reached on the 16th; when General Grant in person ordered me to

restore to General Thomas the divisions of Howard and Davis, which

belonged to his army, and to conduct my own corps (the Fifteenth)

to North Alabama for winter-quarters.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE, BRIDGEPORT,

ALABAMA December 19, 1863

Brigadier-General John A. RAWLINS, Chief of Staff to General GRANT,

Chattanooga.

GENERAL: For the first time, I am now at leisure to make an

official record of events with which the troops under my command

have been connected daring the eventful campaign which has just

closed. Dating the month of September last, the Fifteenth Army

Corps, which I had the honor to command, lay in camps along the Big

Black, about twenty miles east of Vicksburg, Mississippi. It

consisted of four divisions:

The First, commanded by Brigadier-General P. J. Osterhaus, was

composed of two brigades, led by Brigadier-General C. R. Woods and

Colonel J. A. Williamson (of the Fourth Iowa).

The Second, commanded by Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, was

composed of two brigades, led by Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith

and J. A. J. Lightburn.

The Third, commanded by Brigadier-General J. M. Tuttle, was

composed of three brigades, led by Brigadier-Generals J. A. Mower

and R. P. Buckland, and Colonel J. J. Wood (of the Twelfth Iowa).

The Fourth, commanded by Brigadier-General Hugh Ewing, was composed

of three brigades, led by Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, Colonel

Loomis (Twenty-sixth Illinois), and Colonel J. R. Cockerill (of the

Seventieth Ohio).

On the 22d day of September I received a telegraphic dispatch from

General Grant, then at Vicksburg, commanding the Department of the

Tennessee, requiring me to detach one of my divisions to march to

Vicksburg, there to embark for Memphis, where it was to form a part

of an army to be sent to Chattanooga, to reenforce General

Rosecrans. I designated the First Division, and at 4 a. m. the

same day it marched for Vicksburg, and embarked the neat day.

On the 23d of September I was summoned to Vicksburg by the general

commanding, who showed me several dispatches from the general-

in-chief, which led him to suppose he would have to send me and my

whole corps to Memphis and eastward, and I was instructed to

prepare for such orders. It was explained to me that, in

consequence of the low stage of water in the Mississippi, boats had

arrived irregularly, and had brought dispatches that seemed to

conflict in their meaning, and that General John E. Smith's

division (of General McPherson's corps) had been ordered up to

Memphis, and that I should take that division and leave one of my

own in its stead, to hold the line of the Big Black. I detailed

my third division (General Tuttle) to remain and report to

Major-General McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, at

Vicksburg; and that of General John E. Smith, already started for

Memphis, was styled the Third Division, Fifteenth Corps, though it

still belongs to the Seventeenth Army Corps. This division is also

composed of three brigades, commanded by General Matthias, Colonel

J. B. Raum (of the Fifty-sixth Illinois), and Colonel J. I.

Alexander (of the Fifty-ninth Indiana).

The Second and Fourth Divisions were started for Vicksburg the

moment I was notified that boats were in readiness, and on the

27th of September I embarked in person in the steamer Atlantic,

for Memphis, followed by a fleet of boats conveying these

two divisions. Our progress was slow, on account of the

unprecedentedly low water in the Mississippi, and the scarcity of

coal and wood. We were compelled at places to gather fence-rails,

and to land wagons and haul wood from the interior to the boats;

but I reached Memphis during the night of the 2d of October, and

the other boats came in on the 3d and 4th.

On arrival at Memphis I saw General Hurlbut, and read all the

dispatches and letters of instruction of General Halleck, and

therein derived my instructions, which I construed to be as

follows:

To conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps, and all other troops which

could be spared from the line of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad,

to Athens, Alabama, and thence report by letter for orders to

General Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, at

Chattanooga; to follow substantially the railroad eastward,

repairing it as I moved; to look to my own line for supplies; and

in no event to depend on General Rosecrans for supplies, as the

roads to his rear were already overtaxed to supply his present

army.

I learned from General Hurlbut that General Osterhaus's division

was already out in front of Corinth, and that General John E. Smith

was still at Memphis, moving his troops and material by railroad as

fast as its limited stock would carry them. General J. D. Webster

was superintendent of the railroad, and was enjoined to work night

and day, and to expedite the movement as rapidly as possible; but

the capacity of the road was so small, that I soon saw that I could

move horses, mules, and wagons faster by land, and therefore I

dispatched the artillery and wagons by the road under escort, and

finally moved the entire Fourth Division by land.

The enemy seems to have had early notice of this movement, and he

endeavored to thwart us from the start. A considerable force

assembled in a threatening attitude at Salem, south of Salisbury

Station; and General Carr, who commanded at Corinth, felt compelled

to turn back and use a part of my troops, that had already reached

Corinth, to resist the threatened attack.

On Sunday, October 11th, having put in motion my whole force, I

started myself for Corinth, in a special train, with the battalion

of the Thirteenth United States Regulars as escort. We reached

Collierville Station about noon, just in time to take part in the

defense made of that station by Colonel D. C. Anthony, of the

Sixty-sixth Indiana, against an attack made by General Chalmers

with a force of about three thousand cavalry, with eight pieces of

artillery. He was beaten off, the damage to the road repaired, and

we resumed our journey the next day, reaching Corinth at night.

I immediately ordered General Blair forward to Iuka, with the First

Division, and, as fast as I got troops up, pushed them forward of

Bear Creek, the bridge of which was completely destroyed, and an

engineer regiment, under command of Colonel Flag, was engaged in

its repairs.

Quite a considerable force of the enemy was assembled in our front,

near Tuscumbia, to resist our advance. It was commanded by General

Stephen D. Lee, and composed of Roddy's and Ferguson's brigades,

with irregular cavalry, amounting in the aggregate to about five

thousand.

In person I moved from Corinth to Burnsville on the 18th, and to

Iuka on the 19th of October.

Osterhaus's division was in the advance, constantly skirmishing

with the enemy; he was supported by General Morgan L. Smith's, both

divisions under the general command of Major-General Blair.

General John E. Smith's division covered the working-party engaged

in rebuilding the railroad.

Foreseeing difficulty in crossing the Tennessee River, I had

written to Admiral Porter, at Cairo, asking him to watch the

Tennessee and send up some gunboats the moment the stage of water

admitted; and had also requested General Allen, quartermaster at

St. Louis, to dispatch to Eastport a steam ferry-boat.

The admiral, ever prompt and ready to assist us, had two fine

gunboats at Eastport, under Captain Phelps, the very day after my

arrival at Iuka; and Captain Phelps had a coal-barge decked over,

with which to cross our horses and wagons before the arrival of the

ferry-boat.

Still following literally the instructions of General Halleck, I

pushed forward the repairs of the railroad, and ordered General

Blair, with the two leading divisions, to drive the enemy beyond

Tuscumbia. This he did successfully, after a pretty severe fight

at Cane Creek, occupying Tuscumbia on the 27th of October.

In the meantime many important changes in command had occurred,

which I must note here, to a proper understanding of the case.

General Grant had been called from Vicksburg, and sent to

Chattanooga to command the military division of the Mississippi,

composed of the three Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, and

Tennessee; and the Department of the Tennessee had been devolved on

me, with instructions, however, to retain command of the army in

the field. At Iuka I made what appeared to me the best disposition

of matters relating to the department, giving General McPherson

full powers in Mississippi and General Hurlbut in West Tennessee,

and assigned General Blair to the command of the Fifteenth Army

Corps; and summoned General Hurlbut from Memphis, and General Dodge

from Corinth, and selected out of the Sixteenth Corps a force of

about eight thousand men, which I directed General Dodge to

organize with all expedition, and with it to follow me eastward.

On the 27th of October, when General Blair, with two divisions, was

at Tuscumbia, I ordered General Ewing, with the Fourth Division, to

cross the Tennessee (by means of the gunboats and scow) as rapidly

as possible at Eastport, and push forward to Florence, which he

did; and the same day a messenger from General Grant floated down

the Tennessee over Muscle Shoals, landed at Tuscumbia, and was sent

to me at Iuka. He bore a short message from the general to this

effect: "Drop all work on the railroad east of Bear Creek; push

your command toward Bridgeport till you meet orders;" etc.

Instantly the order was executed; the order of march was reversed,

and all the columns were directed to Eastport, the only place where

we could cross the Tennessee. At first we only had the gunboats

and coal-barge; but the ferry-boat and two transports arrived on

the 31st of October, and the work of crossing was pushed with all

the vigor possible. In person I crossed, and passed to the head of

the column at Florence on the 1st of November, leaving the rear

divisions to be conducted by General Blair, and marched to

Rogersville and Elk River. This was found impassable. To ferry

would have consumed to much time, and to build a bridge still more;

so there was no alternative but to turn up Elk River by way of

Gilbertsboro, Elkton, etc., to the stone bridge at Fayetteville,

where we crossed the Elk, and proceeded to Winchester and Deckerd.

At Fayetteville I received orders from General Grant to come to

Bridgeport with the Fifteenth Army Corps, and to leave General

Dodge's command at Pulaski, and along the railroad from Columbia to

Decatur. I instructed General Blair to follow with the Second and

First Divisions by way of New Market, Larkinsville, and Bellefonte,

while I conducted the other two divisions by way of Deckerd; the

Fourth Division crossing the mountain to Stevenson, and the Third

by University Place and Sweden's Cove.

In person I proceeded by Sweden's Cove and Battle Creek, reaching

Bridgeport on the night of November 13th. I immediately

telegraphed to the commanding general my arrival, and the positions

of my several divisions, and was summoned to Chattanooga. I took

the first steamboat daring the night of the 14th for Belly's Ferry,

and rode into Chattanooga on the 16th. I then learned the part

assigned me in the coming drama, was supplied with the necessary

maps and information, and rode, during the 18th, in company with

Generals Grant, Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan, and others, to the

positions occupied on the west bank of the Tennessee, from which

could be seen the camps of the enemy, compassing Chattanooga and

the line of Missionary Hills, with its terminus on Chickamauga

Creek, the point that I was expected to take, hold, and fortify.

Pontoons, with a full supply of balks and chesses, had been

prepared for the bridge over the Tennessee, and all things had been

prearranged with a foresight that elicited my admiration. From the

hills we looked down on the amphitheatre of Chattanooga as on a

map, and nothing remained but for me to put my troops in the

desired position. The plan contemplated that, in addition to

crossing the Tennessee River and making a lodgment on the terminus

of Missionary Ridge, I should demonstrate against Lookout Mountain,

near Trenton, with a part of my command.

All in Chattanooga were impatient for action, rendered almost acute

by the natural apprehensions felt for the safety of General

Burnside in East Tennessee.

My command had marched from Memphis, three hundred and thirty

miles, and I had pushed them as fast as the roads and distance

would admit, but I saw enough of the condition of men and animals

in Chattanooga to inspire me with renewed energy. I immediately

ordered my leading division (General Ewing's) to march via

Shellmound to Trenton, demonstrating against Lookout Ridge, but to

be prepared to turn quickly and follow me to Chattanooga and in

person I returned to Bridgeport, rowing a boat down the Tennessee

from Belly's Ferry, and immediately on arrival put in motion my

divisions in the order in which they had arrived. The bridge of

boats at Bridgeport was frail, and, though used day and night, our

passage was slow; and the road thence to Chattanooga was dreadfully

cut up and encumbered with the wagons of the other troops stationed

along the road. I reached General Hooker's headquarters during a

rain, in the afternoon of the 20th, and met General Grant's orders

for the general attack on the next day. It was simply impossible

for me to fulfill my part in time; only one division (General John

E. Smith's) was in position. General Ewing was still at Trenton,

and the other two were toiling along the terrible road from

Shellmound to Chattanooga. No troops ever were or could be in

better condition than mine, or who labored harder to fulfill their

part. On a proper representation, General Grant postponed the

attack. On the 21st I got the Second Division over Brown's-Ferry

Bridge, and General Ewing got up; but the bridge broke repeatedly,

and delays occurred which no human sagacity could prevent. All

labored night and day, and General Ewing got over on the 23d; but

my rear division was cut off by the broken bridge at Brown's Ferry,

and could not join me. I offered to go into action with my three

divisions, supported by General Jeff. C. Davis, leaving one of my

best divisions (Osterhaus's) to act with General Hooker against

Lookout Mountain. That division has not joined me yet, but I know

and feel that it has served the country well, and that it has

reflected honor on the Fifteenth Army Corps and the Army of the

Tennessee. I leave the record of its history to General Hooker, or

whomsoever has had its services during the late memorable events,

confident that all will do it merited honor.

At last, on the 28d of November, my three divisions lay behind the

hills opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga. I dispatched the

brigade of the Second Division, commanded by General Giles A.

Smith, under cover of the hills, to North Chickamauga Creek, to man

the boats designed for the pontoon-bridge, with orders (at

midnight) to drop down silently to a point above the mouth of the

South Chickamauga, there land two regiments, who were to move along

the river-bank quietly, and capture the enemy's river-pickets.

General Giles A. Smith then was to drop rapidly below the month of

the Chickamauga, disembark the rest of his brigade, and dispatch

the boats across for fresh loads. These orders were skillfully

executed, and every rebel picket but one was captured. The balance

of General Morgan L. Smith's division was then rapidly ferried

across; that of General John E. Smith followed, and by daylight of

November 24th two divisions of about eight thousand men were on the

east bank of the Tennessee, and had thrown up a very respectable

rifle-trench as a tete du pont. As soon as the day dawned, some of

the boats were taken from the use of ferrying, and a pontoon-bridge

was begun, under the immediate direction of Captain Dresser, the

whole planned and supervised by General William F. Smith in person.

A pontoon-bridge was also built at the same time over Chickamanga

Creek, near its mouth, giving communication with the two regiments

which had been left on the north side, and fulfilling a most

important purpose at a later stage of the drama. I will here bear

my willing testimony to the completeness of this whole business.

All the officers charged with the work were present, and manifested

a skill which I cannot praise too highly. I have never beheld any

work done so quietly, so well; and I doubt if the history of war

can show a bridge of that extent (viz., thirteen hundred and fifty

feet) laid so noiselessly and well, in so short a time. I

attribute it to the genius and intelligence of General William F.

Smith. The steamer Dunbar arrived up in the course of the morning,

and relieved Ewing's division of the labor of rowing across; but by

noon the pontoon-bridge was done, and my three divisions were

across, with men, horses, artillery, and every thing.

General Jeff. C. Davis's division was ready to take the bridge, and

I ordered the columns to form in order to carry the Missionary

Hills. The movement had been carefully explained to all division

commanders, and at 1 p.m. we marched from the river in three

columns in echelon: the left, General Morgan L. Smith, the column

of direction, following substantially Chickamauga Creek; the

centre, General, John E. Smith, in columns, doubled on the centre,

at one brigade interval to the right and rear; the right, General

Ewing, in column at the same distance to the right rear, prepared

to deploy to the right, on the supposition that we would meet an

enemy in that direction. Each head of column was covered by a good

line of skirmishers, with supports. A light drizzling rain

prevailed, and the clouds hung low, cloaking our movement from the

enemy's tower of observation on Lookout Mountain. We soon gained

the foothills; our skirmishers crept up the face of the hills,

followed by their supports, and at 3.30 p.m. we had gained, with no

loss, the desired point. A brigade of each division was pushed

rapidly to the top of the hill, and the enemy for the first time

seemed to realize the movement, but too late, for we were in

possession. He opened with artillery, but General Ewing soon got

some of Captain Richardson's guns up that steep hill and gave back

artillery, and the enemy's skirmishers made one or two ineffectual

dashes at General Lightburn, who had swept round and got a farther

hill, which was the real continuation of the ridge. From studying

all the maps, I had inferred that Missionary Ridge was a continuous

hill; but we found ourselves on two high points, with a deep

depression between us and the one immediately over the tunnel,

which was my chief objective point. The ground we had gained,

however, was so important, that I could leave nothing to chance,

and ordered it to be fortified during the night. One brigade of

each division was left on the hill, one of General Morgan L.

Smith's closed the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of General John E.

Smith's were drawn back to the base in reserve, and General Ewing's

right was extended down into the plain, thus crossing the ridge in

a general line, facing southeast.

The enemy felt our left flank about 4 p.m., and a pretty smart

engagement with artillery and muskets ensued, when he drew off; but

it cost us dear, for General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded,

and had to go to the rear; and the command of the brigade devolved

on Colonel Topper (One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois), who managed

it with skill during the rest of the operations. At the moment of

my crossing the bridge, General Howard appeared, having come with

three regiments from Chattanooga, along the east bank of the

Tennessee, connecting my new position with that of the main army in

Chattanooga. He left the three regiments attached temporarily to

Gen. Ewing's right, and returned to his own corps at Chattanooga.

As night closed in, I ordered General Jeff. C. Davis to keep one of

his brigades at the bridge, one close up to my position, and one

intermediate. Thus we passed the night, heavy details being kept

busy at work on the intrenchments on the hill. During the night

the sky cleared away bright, a cold frost filled the air, and our

camp-fires revealed to the enemy and to our friends in Chattanooga

our position on Missionary Ridge. About midnight I received, at

the hands of Major Rowley (of General Grant's staff), orders to

attack the enemy at "dawn of day," with notice that General Thomas

would attack in force early in the day. Accordingly, before day I

was in the saddle, attended by all my staff; rode to the extreme

left of our position near Chickamauga Creek; thence up the hill,

held by General Lightburn; and round to the extreme right of

General Ewing.

Catching as accurate an idea of the ground as possible by the dim

light of morning, I saw that our line of attack was in the

direction of Missionary Ridge, with wings supporting on either

flank. Quite a valley lay between us and the next hill of the

series, and this hill presented steep sides, the one to the west

partially cleared, but the other covered with the native forest.

The crest of the ridge was narrow and wooded. The farther point of

this hill was held-by the enemy with a breastwork of logs and fresh

earth, filled with men and two guns. The enemy was also seen in

great force on a still higher hill beyond the tunnel, from which he

had a fine plunging fire on the hill in dispute. The gorge

between, through which several roads and the railroad-tunnel pass,

could not be seen from our position, but formed the natural place

d'armes, where the enemy covered his masses to resist our

contemplated movement of turning his right flank and endangering

his communications with his depot at Chickamauga Station.

As soon as possible, the following dispositions were made: The

brigades of Colonels Cockrell and Alexander, and General Lightburn,

were to hold our hill as the key-point. General Corse, with as

much of his brigade as could operate along the narrow ridge, was to

attack from our right centre. General Lightburn was to dispatch a

good regiment from his position to cooperate with General Corse;

and General Morgan L. Smith was to move along the east base of

Missionary Ridge, connecting with General Corse; and Colonel

Loomis, in like manner, to move along the west bank, supported by

the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith.

The sun had hardly risen before General Corse had completed his

preparations and his bugle sounded the "forward!" The Fortieth

Illinois, supported by the Forty-sixth Ohio, on our right centre,

with the Thirtieth Ohio (Colonel Jones), moved down the face of our

hill, and up that held by the enemy. The line advanced to within

about eighty yards of the intrenched position, where General Corse

found a secondary crest, which he gained and held. To this point

he called his reserves, and asked for reenforcements, which were

sent; but the space was narrow, and it was not well to crowd the

men, as the enemy's artillery and musketry fire swept the approach

to his position, giving him great advantage. As soon as General

Corse had made his preparations, he assaulted, and a close, severe

contest ensued, which lasted more than an hour, gaining and losing

ground, but never the position first obtained, from which the enemy

in vain attempted to drive him. General Morgan L. Smith kept

gaining ground on the left spurs of Missionary Ridge, and Colonel

Loomis got abreast of the tunnel and railroad embankment on his

aide, drawing the enemy's fire, and to that extent relieving the

assaulting party on the hill-crest. Captain Callender had four of

his guns on General Ewing's hill, and Captain Woods his Napoleon

battery on General Lightburn's; also, two guns of Dillon's battery

were with Colonel Alexander's brigade. All directed their fire as

carefully as possible, to clear the hill to our front, without

endangering our own men. The fight raged furiously about 10 A.M.,

when General Corse received a severe wound, was brought off the

field, and the command of the brigade and of the assault at that

key-point devolved on that fine young, gallant officer, Colonel

Walcutt, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, who fulfilled his part manfully.

He continued the contest, pressing forward at all points. Colonel

Loomis had made good progress to the right, and about 2 p.m.,

General John E. Smith, judging the battle to be most severe on the

hill, and being required to support General Ewing, ordered up

Colonel Raum's and General Matthias's brigades across the field to

the summit that was being fought for. They moved up under a heavy

fire of cannon and musketry, and joined Colonel Walcutt; but the

crest was so narrow that they necessarily occupied the west face of

the hill. The enemy, at the time being massed in great strength in

the tunnel-gorge, moved a large force under cover of the ground and

the thick bushes, and suddenly appeared on the right rear of this

command. The suddenness of the attack disconcerted the men,

exposed as they were in the open field; they fell back in some

disorder to the lower edge of the field, and reformed. These two

brigades were in the nature of supports, and did not constitute a

part of the real attack.

The movement, seen from Chattanooga (five miles off) with

spy-glasses, gave rise to the report, which even General Meiga has

repeated, that we were repulsed on the left. It was not so. The

real attacking columns of General Corse, Colonel Loomis, and

General Smith, were not repulsed. They engaged in a close struggle

all day persistently, stubbornly, and well. When the two reserve

brigades of General John E. Smith fell back as described, the enemy

made a show of pursuit, but were in their turn caught in flank by

the well-directed fire of our brigade on the wooded crest, and

hastily sought cover behind the hill. Thus matters stood about 3

p.m. The day was bright and clear, and the amphitheatre of

Chattanooga sat in beauty at our feet. I had watched for the

attack of General Thomas "early in the day." Column after column

of the enemy was streaming toward me; gun after gun poured its

concentric shot on us, from every hill and spur that gave a view of

any part of the ground held by us. An occasional shot from Fort

Wood and Orchard Knob, and some musketry-fire and artillery over

about Lookout Mountain, was all that I could detect on our side;

but about 3 p.m. I noticed the white line of musketry-fire in

front of Orchard Knoll extending farther and farther right and left

and on. We could only hear a faint echo of sound, but enough was

seen to satisfy me that General Thomas was at last moving on the

centre. I knew that our attack had drawn vast masses of the enemy

to our flank, and felt sure of the result. Some guns which had

been firing on us all day were silent, or were turned in a

different direction.

The advancing line of musketry-fire from Orchard Knoll disappeared

to us behind a spar of the hill, and could no longer be seen; and

it was not until night closed in that I knew that the troops in

Chattanooga had swept across Missionary Ridge and broken the

enemy's centre. Of course, the victory was won, and pursuit was

the next step.

I ordered General Morgan L. Smith to feel to the tunnel, and it was

found vacant, save by the dead and wounded of our own and the enemy

commingled. The reserve of General Jeff. C. Davis was ordered to

march at once by the pontoon-bridge across Chickamauga Creek, at

its mouth, and push forward for the depot.

General Howard had reported to me in the early part of the day,

with the remainder of his army corps (the Eleventh), and had been

posted to connect my left with Chickamauga Creek. He was ordered

to repair an old broken bridge about two miles up the Chickamauga,

and to follow General Davis at 4 A.M., and the Fifteenth Army Corps

was ordered to follow at daylight. But General Howard found that

to repair the bridge was more of a task than was at first supposed,

and we were all compelled to cross the Chickamauga on the new

pontoon-bridge at its mouth. By about 11 A.M. General Jeff. C.

Davis's division reached the depot, just in time to see it in

flames. He found the enemy occupying two hills, partially

intrenched, just beyond the depot. These he soon drove away.

The depot presented a scene of desolation that war alone exhibits

--corn-meal and corn in huge burning piles, broken wagons, abandoned

caissons, two thirty-two-pounder rifled-guns with carriages burned,

pieces of pontoons, balks and chesses, etc., destined doubtless for

the famous invasion of Kentucky, and all manner of things, burning

and broken. Still, the enemy kindly left us a good supply of forage

for our horses, and meal, beans, etc., for our men.

Pausing but a short while, we passed on, the road filled with

broken wagons and abandoned caissons, till night. Just as the head

of the column emerged from a dark, miry swamp, we encountered the

rear-guard of the retreating enemy. The fight was sharp, but the

night closed in so dark that we could not move. General Grant came

up to us there. At daylight we resumed the march, and at

Graysville, where a good bridge spanned the Chickamauga, we found

the corps of General Palmer on the south bank, who informed us that

General Hooker was on a road still farther south, and we could hear

his guns near Ringgold.

As the roads were filled with all the troops they could possibly

accommodate, I turned to the east, to fulfill another part of the

general plan, viz., to break up all communication between Bragg and

Longstreet.

We had all sorts of rumors as to the latter, but it was manifest

that we should interpose a proper force between these two armies.

I therefore directed General Howard to move to Parker's Gap, and

thence send rapidly a competent force to Red Clay, or the

Council-Ground, there to destroy a large section of the railroad

which connects Dalton and Cleveland. This work was most

successfully and fully accomplished that day. The division of

General Jeff. C. Davis was moved close up to Ringgold, to assist

General Hooker if needed, and the Fifteenth Corps was held at

Grayeville, for any thing that might turn up. About noon I had a

message from General Hooker, saying he had had a pretty hard fight

at the mountain-pass just beyond Ringgold, and he wanted me to come

forward to turn the position. He was not aware at the time that

Howard, by moving through Parker's Gap toward Red Clay, had already

turned it. So I rode forward to Ringgold in person, and found the

enemy had already fallen back to Tunnel Hill. He was already out

of the valley of the Chickamauga, and on ground whence the waters

flow to the Coosa. He was out of Tennessee.

I found General Grant at Ringgold, and, after some explanations as

to breaking up the railroad from Ringgold back to the State line,

as soon as some cars loaded with wounded men could be pushed back

to Chickamauga depot, I was ordered to move slowly and leisurely

back to Chattanooga.

On the following day the Fifteenth Corps destroyed absolutely and

effectually the railroad from a point half-way between Ringgold and

Graysville, back to the State line; and General Grant, coming to

Graysville, consented that, instead of returning direct to

Chattanooga, I might send back all my artillery-wagons and

impediments, and make a circuit by the north as far as the

Hiawassee River.

Accordingly, on the morning of November 29th, General Howard moved

from Parker's Gap to Cleveland, General Davis by way of McDaniel's

Gap, and General Blair with two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps by

way of Julien's Gap, all meeting at Cleveland that night. Here

another good break was made in the Dalton & Cleveland road. On the

30th the army moved to Charleston, General Howard approaching so

rapidly that the enemy evacuated with haste, leaving the bridge but

partially damaged, and five car-loads of flour and provisions on

the north bank of the Hiawassee.

This was to have been the limit of our operations. Officers and

men had brought no baggage or provisions, and the weather was

bitter cold. I had already reached the town of Charleston, when

General Wilson arrived with a letter from General Grant, at

Chattanooga, informing me that the latest authentic accounts from

Knoxville were to the 27th, at which time General Burnside was

completely invested, and had provisions only to include the 3d of

December; that General Granger had left Chattanooga for Knoxville,

by the river-road, with a steamboat following him in the river; but

he feared that General Granger could not reach Knoxville in time,

and ordered me to take command of all troops moving for the relief

of Knoxville, and hasten to General Burnside. Seven days before,

we had left our camps on the other side of the Tennessee with two

days' rations, without a change of clothing--stripped for the

fight, with but a single blanket or coat per man, from myself to

the private included.

Of course, we then had no provisions save what we gathered by the

road, and were ill supplied for such a march. But we learned that

twelve thousand of our fellow-soldiers were beleaguered in the

mountain town of Knoxville, eighty-four miles distant; that they

needed relief, and must have it in three days. This was enough

--and it had to be done. General Howard that night repaired and

planked the railroad-bridge, and at daylight the army passed over

the Hiawassee and marched to Athens, fifteen miles. I had supposed

rightly that General Granger was about the mouth of the Hiawassee,

and had sent him notice of my orders; that General Grant had sent

me a copy of his written instructions, which were full and

complete, and that he must push for Kingston, near which we would

make a junction. But by the time I reached Athens I had better

studied the geography, and sent him orders, which found him at

Decatur, that Kingston was out of our way; that he should send his

boat to Kingston, but with his command strike across to

Philadelphia, and report to me there. I had but a small force of

cavalry, which was, at the time of my receipt of General Grant's

orders, scouting over about Benton and Columbus. I left my aide,

Major McCoy, at Charleston, to communicate with this cavalry and

hurry it forward. It overtook me in the night at Athens.

On the 2d of December the army moved rapidly north toward Loudon,

twenty-six miles distant. About 11 A.M., the cavalry passed to the

head of the column, was ordered to push to London, and, if

possible, to save a pontoon-bridge across the Tennessee, held by a

brigade of the enemy commanded by General Vaughn. The cavalry

moved with such rapidity as to capture every picket; but the

brigade of Vaughn had artillery in position, covered by earthworks,

and displayed a force too respectable to be carried by a cavalry

dash, so that darkness closed in before General Howard's infantry

got up. The enemy abandoned the place in the night, destroying the

pontoons, running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into the

Tennessee River, and abandoned much provision, four guns, and other

material, which General Howard took at daylight. But the bridge

was gone, and we were forced to turn east and trust to General

Burnside's bridge at Knoxville. It was all-important that General

Burnside should have notice of our coming, and but one day of the

time remained.

Accordingly, at Philadelphia, during the night of the 2d of

December, I sent my aide (Major Audenried) forward to Colonel Long,

commanding the brigade of cavalry at London, to explain to him how

all-important it was that notice of our approach should reach

General Burnside within twenty-four hours, ordering him to select

the best materials of his command, to start at once, ford the

Little Tennessee, and push into Knoxville at whatever cost of life

and horse-flesh. Major Audenried was ordered to go along. The

distance to be traveled was about forty miles, and the roads

villainous. Before day they were off, and at daylight the

Fifteenth Corps was turned from Philadelphia for the Little

Tennessee at Morgantown, where my maps represented the river as

being very shallow; but it was found too deep for fording, and the

water was freezing cold--width two hundred and forty yards, depth

from two to five feet; horses could ford, but artillery and men

could not. A bridge was indispensable. General Wilson (who

accompanied me) undertook to superintend the bridge, and I am under

many obligations to him, as I was without an engineer, having sent

Captain Jenny back from Graysville to survey our field of battle.

We had our pioneers, but only such tools as axes, picks, and

spades. General Wilson, working partly with cut wood and partly

with square trestles (made of the houses of the late town of

Morgantown), progressed apace, and by dark of December 4th troops

and animals passed over the bridge, and by daybreak of the 5th the

Fifteenth Corps (General Blair's) was over, and Generals-Granger's

and Davis's divisions were ready to pass; but the diagonal bracing

was imperfect for, want of spikes, and the bridge broke, causing

delay. I had ordered General Blair to move out on the Marysville

road five miles, there to await notice that General Granger was on

a parallel road abreast of him, and in person I was at a house

where the roads parted, when a messenger rode up, bringing me a few

words from General Burnside, to the effect that Colonel Long had

arrived at Knoxville with his cavalry, and that all was well with

him there; Longstreet still lay before the place, but there were

symptoms of his speedy departure.

I felt that I had accomplished the first great step in the problem

for the relief of General Burnside's army, but still urged on the

work. As soon as the bridge was mended, all the troops moved

forward. General Howard had marched from Loudon, had found a

pretty good ford for his horses and wagons at Davis's, seven miles

below Morgantown, and had made an ingenious bridge of the wagons

left by General Vaughn at London, on which to pass his men. He

marched by Unitia and Louisville. On the night of the 5th all the

heads of columns communicated at Marysville, where I met Major Van

Buren (of General Burnside's staff), who announced that Longstreet

had the night before retreated on the Rutledge, Rogersville, and

Bristol road, leading to Virginia; that General Burnside's cavalry

was on his heels; and that the general desired to see me in person

as soon as I could come to Knoxville. I ordered all the troops to

halt and rest, except the two divisions of General Granger, which

were ordered to move forward to Little River, and General Granger

to report in person to General Burnside for orders. His was the

force originally designed to reenforce General Burnside, and it was

eminently proper that it should join in the stern-chase after

Longstreet.

On the morning of December 6th I rode from Marysville into

Knoxville, and met General Burnside. General Granger arrived later

in the day. We examined his lines of fortifications, which were a

wonderful production for the short time allowed in their selection

of ground and construction of work. It seemed to me that they were

nearly impregnable. We examined the redoubt named "Sanders,"

where, on the Sunday previous, three brigades of the enemy had

assaulted and met a bloody repulse. Now, all was peaceful and

quiet; but a few hours before, the deadly bullet sought its victim

all round about that hilly barrier.

The general explained to me fully and frankly what he had done, and

what he proposed to do. He asked of me nothing but General

Granger's command; and suggested, in view of the large force I had

brought from Chattanooga, that I should return with due expedition

to the line of the Hiawassee, lest Bragg, reenforced, might take

advantage of our absence to resume the offensive. I asked him to

reduce this to writing, which he did, and I here introduce it as

part of my report:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE OHIO

KNOXVILLE, December 7, 1863

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding, etc.

GENERAL: I desire to express to you and your command my most hearty

thanks and gratitude for your promptness in coming to our relief

during the siege of Knoxville, and I am satisfied your approach

served to raise the siege. The emergency having passed, I do not

deem, for the present, any other portion of your command but the

corps of General Granger necessary for operations in this section;

and, inasmuch as General Grant has weakened the forces immediately

with him in order to relieve us (thereby rendering the position of

General Thomas less secure), I deem it advisable that all the

troops now here, save those commanded by General Granger, should

return at once to within supporting distance of the forces in front

of Bragg's army. In behalf of my command, I desire again to thank

you and your command for the kindness you have done us.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General commanding.

Accordingly, having seen General Burnside's forces move out of

Knoxville in pursuit of Longstreet, and General Granger's move in,

I put in motion my own command to return. General Howard was

ordered to move, via Davis's Ford and Sweetwater, to Athena, with a

guard forward at Charleston, to hold and repair the bridge which

the enemy had retaken after our passage up. General Jeff. C.

Davis moved to Columbus, on the Hiawaesee, via Madisonville, and

the two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps moved to Tellico Plains,

to cover movement of cavalry across the mountains into Georgia, to

overtake a wagon-train which had dodged us on our way up, and had

escaped by way of Murphy. Subsequently, on a report from General

Howard that the enemy held Charleston, I diverted General Ewing's

division to Athena, and went in person to Tellico with General

Morgan L. Smith's division. By the 9th all our troops were in

position, and we held the rich country between the Little Tennessee

and the Hiawassee. The cavalry, under Colonel Long, passed the

mountain at Tellico, and proceeded about seventeen miles beyond

Murphy, when Colonel Long, deeming his farther pursuit of the

wagon-train useless, returned on the 12th to Tellico. I then

ordered him and the division of General Morgan L. Smith to move to

Charleston, to which point I had previously ordered the corps of

General Howard.

On the 14th of December all of my command in the field lay along

the Hiawassee. Having communicated to General Grant the actual

state of affairs, I received orders to leave, on the line of the

Hiawassee, all the cavalry, and come to Chattanooga with the rest

of my command. I left the brigade of cavalry commanded by Colonel

Long, reenforced by the Fifth Ohio Cavalry (Lieutenant-Colonel

Heath)--the only cavalry properly belonging to the Fifteenth Army

Corps--at Charleston, and with the remainder moved by easy marches,

by Cleveland and Tyner's Depot, into Chattanooga, where I received

in person from General Grant orders to transfer back to their

appropriate commands the corps of General Howard and the division

commanded by General Jeff. C. Davis, and to conduct the Fifteenth

Army Corps to its new field of operations.

It will thus appear that we have been constantly in motion since

our departure from the Big Black, in Mississippi, until the present

moment. I have been unable to receive from subordinate commanders

the usual full, detailed reports of events, and have therefore been

compelled to make up this report from my own personal memory; but,

as soon as possible, subordinate reports will be received and duly

forwarded.

In reviewing the facts, I must do justice to the men of my command

for the patience, cheerfulness, and courage which officers and men

have displayed throughout, in battle, on the march, and in camp.

For long periods, without regular rations or supplies of any kind,

they have marched through mud and over rocks, sometimes barefooted,

without a murmur. Without a moment's rest after a march of over

four hundred miles, without sleep for three successive nights, we

crossed the Tennessee, fought our part of the battle of

Chattanooga, pursued the enemy out of Tennessee, and then turned

more than a hundred and twenty miles north and compelled Longstreet

to raise the siege of Knoxville, which gave so much anxiety to the

whole country. It is hard to realize the importance of these

events without recalling the memory of the general feeling which

pervaded all minds at Chattanooga prior to our arrival. I cannot

speak of the Fifteenth Army Corps without a seeming vanity; but as

I am no longer its commander, I assert that there is no better body

of soldiers in America than it. I wish all to feel a just pride in

its real honors.

To General Howard and his command, to General Jeff. C. Davis and

his, I am more than usually indebted for the intelligence of

commanders and fidelity of commands. The brigade of Colonel

Bushbeck, belonging to the Eleventh Corps, which was the first to

come out of Chattanooga to my flank, fought at the Tunnel Hill, in

connection with General Ewing's division, and displayed a courage

almost amounting to rashness. Following the enemy almost to the

tunnel-gorge, it lost many valuable lives, prominent among them

Lieutenant-Colonel Taft, spoken of as a most gallant soldier.

In General Howard throughout I found a polished and Christian

gentleman, exhibiting the highest and most chivalric traits of the

soldier. General Davis handled his division with artistic skill,

more especially at the moment we encountered the enemy's

rear-guard, near Graysville, at nightfall. I must award to this

division the credit of the best order during our movement through

East Tennessee, when long marches and the necessity of foraging to

the right and left gave some reason for disordered ranks:

Inasmuch as exception may be taken to my explanation of the

temporary confusion, during the battle of Chattanooga, of the two

brigades of General Matthias and Colonel Raum, I will here state

that I saw the whole; and attach no blame to any one. Accidents

will happen in battle, as elsewhere; and at the point where they so

manfully went to relieve the pressure on other parts of our

assaulting line, they exposed themselves unconsciously to an enemy

vastly superior in force, and favored by the shape of the ground.

Had that enemy come out on equal terms, those brigades would have

shown their mettle, which has been tried more than once before and

stood the test of fire. They reformed their ranks, and were ready

to support General Ewing's division in a very few minutes; and the

circumstance would have hardly called for notice on my part, had

not others reported what was seen from Chattanooga, a distance of

nearly five miles, from where could only be seen the troops in the

open field in which this affair occurred.

I now subjoin the best report of casualties I am able to compile

from the records thus far received:

Killed; Wounded; and Missing............... 1949

No report from General Davis's division, but loss is small.

Among the killed were some of our most valuable officers: Colonels

Putnam, Ninety-third Illinois; O'Meara, Ninetieth Illinois; and

Torrence, Thirtieth Iowa; Lieutenant-Colonel-Taft, of the Eleventh

Corps; and Major Bushnell, Thirteenth Illinois.

Among the wounded are Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith, Corse, and

Matthias; Colonel Raum; Colonel Waugelin, Twelfth Missouri;

Lieutenant-Colonel Partridge, Thirteenth Illinois; Major P. I.

Welsh, Fifty-sixth Illinois; and Major Nathan McAlla, Tenth Iowa.

Among the missing is Lieutenant-Colonel Archer, Seventeenth Iowa.

My report is already so long, that I must forbear mentioning acts

of individual merit. These will be recorded in the reports of

division commanders, which I will cheerfully indorse; but I must

say that it is but justice that colonels of regiments, who have so

long and so well commanded brigades, as in the following cases,

should be commissioned to the grade which they have filled with so

much usefulness and credit to the public service, viz.: Colonel J.

R. Cockerell, Seventieth, Ohio; Colonel J. M. Loomis, Twenty-sixth

Illinois; Colonel C. C. Walcutt, Forty-sixth Ohio; Colonel J. A.

Williamson, Fourth Iowa; Colonel G. B. Raum, Fifty-sixth Illinois;

Colonel J. I. Alexander, Fifty-ninth Indiana.

My personal staff, as usual, have served their country with

fidelity, and credit to themselves, throughout these events, and

have received my personal thanks.

Inclosed you will please find a map of that part of the

battle-field of Chattanooga fought over by the troops under my

command, surveyed and drawn by Captain Jenney, engineer on my

staff. I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

[General Order No. 68.]

WAR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1884

Joint resolution tendering the thanks of Congress to Major-General

W. T. Sherman and others.

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks of

Congress and of the people of the United States are due, and that

the same are hereby tendered, to Major-General W. T. Sherman,

commander of the Department and Army of the Tennessee, and the

officers and soldiers who served under him, for their gallant and

arduous services in marching to the relief of the Army of the

Cumberland, and for their gallantry and heroism in the battle of

Chattanooga, which contributed in a great degree to the success of

our arms in that glorious victory.

Approved February 19, 1864.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the 19th of December I was at Bridgeport, and gave all the

orders necessary for the distribution of the four divisions of the

Fifteenth Corps along the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur, and

the part of the Sixteenth Corps; commanded by General Dodge, along

the railroad from Decatur to Nashville, to make the needed repairs,

and to be in readiness for the campaign of the succeeding year; and

on the 21st I went up to Nashville, to confer with General Grant

and conclude the arrangements for the winter. At that time General

Grant was under the impression that the next campaign would be up

the valley of East Tennessee, in the direction of Virginia; and as

it was likely to be the last and most important campaign of the

war, it became necessary to set free as many of the old troops

serving along the Mississippi River as possible. This was the real

object and purpose of the Meridian campaign, and of Banks's

expedition up Red River to Shreveport during that winter.