EPILOG
The great war is over, and the Powers of the West have conquered. In the
earlier pages I have given my own view of why they won in the tremendous
struggle that now belongs to history. They had on their side moral
forces which were lacking to their adversaries.
Germany went into the war with a conviction that had been carefully
instilled into her people. It was that she was being ringed round with
the intention that she should be crushed, and that presently it would be
too late for her to deliver herself. The lesson so taught to her was not
a true one. She might easily have obtained guarantees of peace which
ought to have satisfied her, without undertaking a risk which in the end
was to prove disastrous. No one here wanted to ruin her, no one who
counted seriously in this country. And if we did not want to, no more in
reality did France or Russia. She brought her fate on her head by the
unwisdom of her methods. But her people hardly desired the dangers of
unnecessary war, and her rulers dared not have ventured these dangers
had they not first of all preached a wrong doctrine to those over whom
they ruled. They had their way in the end, and disaster to sixty-eight
millions of Germans was the consequence. The calculations of their
chiefs were bad from the beginning. It is almost certain that the best
and most eminent among even these really desired peace. They blundered
in method. It was not by continually flashing the saber that peace was
to be secured.
It is scarcely likely that the conditions under which this war became
possible will recur. It is more than unlikely that they will recur in
our time. But it is none the less worth while to consider how the
unlikelihood can be made to approach most nearly to a certainty.
Not, I think, by causing the millions of German-speaking people to feel
that they are in chains without possibility of freedom. More certainly,
surely, by leading them to the faith that if they will play a part in
the great world effort for permanent peace and for reconstruction they
will be welcomed to the brotherhood of nations. The individual German
citizen is more like the individual Anglo-Saxon than he is different
from him. The same hopes and the same fears animate him, and he is
sober and industrious quite as much as we are. He has similar problems
and similar interests.
Time must pass before the angry feeling that a great struggle produces
can die down. But there are already indications that this feeling is not
as intense with us as it was even a short time ago. Germany made a
colossal and unjustifiable blunder. She is responsible for the action of
her late Government. We think so, and we are not likely to change our
opinion on this point. The grief of our people over their dead, over the
lives that were laid down for the nation from the highest kind of
inspiration, will keep the public mind fixed on this conclusion. And so
will the waste and misery to the whole world which an unnecessary war
has brought in its train. But presently we shall ask ourselves, in
moments of reflection, whether this ought to be our final word, and
also, perhaps, whether some want of care on our own part, and certain
deficiencies of which we are now more conscious than we used to be, may
not have had something to do with the failure of other people to divine
our real mood and intentions. I am not sure that in days that are to
come we shall give ourselves the whole benefit of the doubt. However
this may be, we are in no case a vindictive people.
But in any view something serious is at stake. It will be a bad thing
for us, and it will be a bad thing for the world, if the people of the
vanquished nations are left to feel that they have no hope of being
restored to decent conditions of existence. At present despair is
threatening them. Their estimate is that the crushing burden of the
terms of peace, if carried out to their full possibilities, bars them
from the prospect of a better future. Their only way of deliverance may
well come to seem to them to lie in the grouping of the discontented
nationalities, and the faith that by this means, at some time which may
come hereafter, a new balance of power may begin to be set up.
Now this is not a good prospect, and the sooner we succeed in softening
the sense of real hardship out of which it arises the better. Germany
and Austria must pay the penalty they have incurred before the tribunal
of international justice. But that penalty ought to be tempered by
something that depends on even more than mercy. It is intended to be
inflicted for the good of the world, and if it assumes a form which
threatens the future safety of the world it is not wise to press it to
its extreme consequences. We have to work toward a better state of
things than that which is promised to-day. We have never hitherto kept
up old animosities unduly long, and that has been one of the secrets of
our strength in the world. The lessons of history point to the
expediency of trying to heal instead of to keep open the wound which
exists. Those who know the growth in the past of literature, of music,
of science, of philosophy, of industry and of commerce, do not wish the
German people to die out. It is only the ignorant that can desire this,
and, hitherto in the course of our history, the ignorant have neither
proved to be safe guides nor have they prevailed. To-day, as before, we
must think of generations other than our own if we would preserve our
strength.
I hope that a time is near in which we shall no longer proclaim old
grievances, but instead cease to dwell on the past in this case, just as
we have ceased in the cases of the French, the Spanish, the Russians,
and the Boers. It is best in every way that it should come to be so.
It is not with any hope that these pages will satisfy the extremists of
to-day that they have been written. They are intended for those who try
to be dispassionate, and for them only, as a contribution to a vast heap
of material that is being gathered together for consideration. It is
well that those who were in any way directly connected with the story
to which they relate should place on record what they saw. But the whole
story in its fulness is beyond the knowledge of anyone of our time. The
history of the world is, as has been said, the judgment of the world. It
is therefore only after an interval that it can be sufficiently written.
The ultimate and real origin of this war, the greatest humanity has ever
had to endure, was a set of colossal suspicions of each other by the
nations concerned. I do not mean that none of them were in the right or
that some of them were not deeply in the wrong. What I do mean is that
if there had been insight sufficient all round the nations concerned
would not have misinterpreted each other.
To us it looks as tho Germany had been inspired throughout by a bad
tradition, a spirit older than even the days of Frederick the Great. Had
she been wise we think that she would have changed her national policy
after Bismarck had brought it to unexampled success in things material.
There are not wanting indications that he himself had the sense of the
necessity of great caution in pursuing this policy farther, and felt
that it could not be safely continued without modification. It was no
policy that was safe for any but the strongest and sanest of minds, and
even for those it had ceased to be safe. The potential resistance to it
was becoming too serious.
But we do not need to doubt that there were many in Germany itself who
saw this and did not desire to rely merely on blood and iron. The men
and women in every country resemble those in other countries more than
they differ from them. Germany was no exception to the rule. It is a
great mistake to judge her as she was merely from a few newspapers and
by the reports from Berlin of their special correspondents. Sixty-eight
millions of people could not be estimated in their opinions by the
attitude of a handful, however eminent and prominent, in the home of
"_Real politik_." It is, of course, true that the Germans were taught to
believe that they were a very great nation which had not got its full
share of the good things of this world, a share of which they were more
worthy and for which they were better organized than any other. But it
is also true that we here thought that we ourselves were entitled to a
great deal to which other people did not admit our moral title. It was
not only Germany that was lacking in imagination. No doubt many Germans
had the idea that we wished to hem them in and that we did not like
them. Our failure to make ourselves understood left them not without
reason for this belief. But dislike of Germany was not the attitude of
the great mass of sober and God-fearing Englishmen, and I do not believe
that the counter-attitude was that of the bulk of sober and God-fearing
Germans. They and we alike mutually misjudged each other from what was
written in newspapers and said in speeches by people who were not
responsible exponents of opinion, and neither nation took sufficient
trouble to make clear that what was thus written and said was not
sufficient material on which to judge it. It is very difficult to
diagnose general opinion in a foreign nation, and one of the reasons of
the difficulty is that people at home do not pay sufficient attention to
the fact that their unfriendly utterances about their neighbors are
likely to receive more publicity and attention than the utterances that
are friendly. It makes little difference that the latter may greatly
preponderate in number. They are read in the main only in the country in
which they are made.
Neither Germans nor Englishmen were careful before the war always to be
pleasant to each other, and the same used to be true of Frenchmen and
Englishmen. But just as we are coming to understand why and how France
and England misinterpreted each other systematically a century and a
half ago, so we may yet learn how we came to present, more than a
hundred years later, difficulties to the Germans not wholly unlike those
which they presented to us. No mere record of the dry facts will be
enough to render this intelligible in its full significance. The
historian who is to carry conviction must do more than present
photographs. He must create a picture inspired by his own study and from
the depth of his own mind, and presented in its real proportions with
its proper lights and shadows, as a true artist alone can present it.
Browning has told us something worth remembering. It is at the end of
"The Ring and the Book":
Art may tell a truth
Obliquely, do the thing shall breed the thought,
Nor wrong the thought, missing the mediate word.
So may you paint your picture, twice show truth,
Beyond mere imagery on the wall,--
So, note by note, bring music from your mind,
Deeper than ever e'en Beethoven dived,--
So write a book shall mean beyond the facts,
Suffice the eye and save the soul beside.
The truth in its fulness and completeness can not be compassed in any
single narrative of events. It is, of course, the case that history
depends for its value on scientific accuracy, but that is not the only
kind of truth on which it depends. No man, even the most careful and
exacting, can rely on having the whole of the materials before his eye,
and if he had them there they would not only be presented in tints
depending on his outlook, but would be too vast to admit of his using
more than isolated fragments to work into his picture of the whole.
Selection is a necessity, and when to the fact that there must be
selection there is added the other fact that every historian has his
personal equation, the notion of a history constructed by a single man
on the methods of the physicist is a delusion. The best that the great
historian can do is to present the details in the light of the spirit of
the period of which he is writing, and in order that he may present his
narrative aright, as his mind has reconstructed it, he must estimate his
details in the order in importance that was actually theirs. Now for
this the balance and the measuring rod do not suffice. Quality counts as
much as does quantity in determining importance. What is merely inert
and mechanical is the subject neither of the artist nor the historian.
It is, of course, necessary that by close and exact research the
materials should first of all be collected and assembled. But that is
only the first step, and it always has to be followed by a process of
grouping and fashioning. The result may have to be the leaving out (or
the leaving over for presentation by other artists) of aspects which
are not dealt with. We see this when we compare even the best portraits.
They do not wholly agree; it is enough if they correspond. For portraits
may vary in expression, and yet each may be true. The characteristic of
what is alive and is intelligent and spiritual is that it may have many
expressions, every one of which really harmonizes with every other. It
is because they can bring out expression in this fashion that we
continue to set high store on the work of a Gibbon or a Mommsen.
The moral of this is twofold. We must, to begin with, be content for the
present to remain in the stage at which all that can be done is to
collect and assemble facts and personal impressions with as great care
as we can. The whole truth we can not bring out or estimate until the
later period, altho we may be sure enough of what we have before us to
make us feel capable of doing justice of a rough kind, so far as
necessary action is concerned.
And there is yet another deduction to be drawn. It is at all events
possible that the wider view of a generation later than this may be one
in which Germany will be judged more gently than the Allies can judge
her to-day. We do not now look on the French Revolution as our
forefathers looked on it. We see, because recent historians have
impressed it on us, that it was a violent uprising against, not Louis
XVI., but a Louis XIV. What France really made her great Revolution to
bring about was the establishment of a Constitution. Horrible deeds were
perpetrated in the name of Liberty, but it was not due to any horrible
national spirit that they were perpetrated. France was responsible no
doubt for the deeds of the men who acted in her name. But she could
hardly have controlled them even had she passionately desired to do so.
And she did not passionately desire to do so because, however little the
mass of the people outside Paris may have wished to massacre the
adherents of the old regime, the people as a whole welcomed deliverance
from calamity, even at the price of violent action.
We judge the French nation wholly differently to-day from the way we
judged it then, and it judges us differently. Yet it would have been
well had we not in the end of the eighteenth century taken an
exaggerated view of the French state of mind. We now realize that even
so great a man as Burke mistook a fragment for the whole. Much blood and
treasure might have been spared, and Napoleon might never have come into
existence, had we and others been less hasty.
It is therefore a good thing to keep before us that it is at least
possible that the verdict of mankind will be hereafter that when the
victory was theirs the Allies judged the people of Germany in a hurry
and reflected this judgment in the spirit in which certain of the terms
of peace were declared. The war had its proximate origin in the Near
East. It arose out of a supposed menace to Teuton by Slav. The Slavs
were not easy people to deal with, and the Teutons were not easy people
either. It was easy to drift into war. It may well prove true that no
one really desired this, and that it was miscalculation about the
likelihood of securing peace by a determined attitude that led to
disaster. It is certain that the German Government was deeply
responsible for the consequences. In the face of its traditional policy
and of utterances that came from Berlin the members of that Government
can not plead a mere blunder. None the less, a great deal may have been
due to sheer ineptitude in estimating human nature. How much this was
so, or how much an immoral tradition had its natural results, we can not
as yet fully tell, for we have not the whole of the records before us.
No one disputes that we were bound to impose heavy terms on the Central
Powers. The Allies have won the war and they were entitled to
reparation. This the Germans do not appear to controvert. They are a
people with whom logic is held in high esteem. But we have to do
something more than define the mere consequences of victory. We have
also to make plain on what footing we shall be willing to live with the
German nation in days that lie ahead. And here some enlargement of the
spirit seems to be desirable in our own interests. We do not want to
fall again into the mistake that Burke made.
The spirit is at least as important as the letter in the doctrine of a
League of Nations. Such a League has for its main purpose the
supersession of the old principle of balancing the Powers. In the
absence of a League of Nations, or--what is the same thing in a less
organized form--of an entente or concert of Powers so general that none
are left shut out from it, the principle of balancing may have to be
relied on. I believe this to have been unavoidable when the Entente
between France, Russia and Great Britain was found to be required for
safety if the tendency to dominate of the Triple Alliance was to be held
in check. But in that case, and probably in every other case, reliance
on the principle could only be admissible for self-protection and never
for the mere exhibition of the power of the sword. If the principle is
resorted to with the latter object the group that is suspected of
aggressive intentions will by degrees find itself confronted with
another group of nations that have huddled together for self-protection
and may become very strong just because they have a moral justification
for their action. It was this that happened before the war which broke
out in 1914, and it was the state of tension which ensued that led up to
that war. Had there been no counter-grouping to that of the Central
Powers there would probably have been war all the same, but with this
difference, that defeat and not victory would have been the lot of the
Entente Powers.
Now the German-speaking peoples in the world amount to an enormous
number, at least to a hundred millions if those outside Germany and
Austria, and in the New World, as well as the Old, are taken into
account. It may be difficult for them to organize themselves for war,
but it will be less difficult for them to develop a common spirit which
may penetrate all over the world. It is just this development that
statesmen ought to watch carefully, for, given an interval long enough,
it is impossible to predict what influence these hundred millions of
people may not acquire and come to exercise. We do not want to have a
prolonged period of growing anxiety and unrest, such as obtained in our
relations with the French, notwithstanding the peace established by the
Treaty of Vienna. Of the anxiety and unrest which were ours for more
than one generation, the history of the Channel fortifications, of the
Volunteer force and of several other great and often costly
institutions, bears witness. Let us therefore take thought while there
is time to do so. We do not wish to see repeated anything analogous to
our former experience. The one thing that can avert it is the spirit in
which a League of Nations has been brought to birth. That spirit alone
can preclude the gradual nascence of desire to call into existence a new
balance of power. It is not enough to tell Germany and Austria that if
they behave well they will be admitted to the League of Nations. What
really matters is the feeling and manner in which the invitation is
given, and an obvious sincerity in the desire that they should work with
us as equals in a common endeavor to make the best of a world which
contains us both. One is quite conscious of the difficulties that must
attend the attempt to approach the question in the frame of mind that is
requisite. We may have to discipline ourselves considerably. But the
people of this country are capable of reflection, and so are the people
of the American Continent. The problem to be solved is one that presses
on our great Allies in the United States, where the German-speaking
population is very large, quite as much as it does on us. France and
Belgium have more to forgive, and France has a hard past from which to
avert her eyes. But she is a country of great intelligence, and it is
for the sake of everybody, and not merely in the interest of our recent
enemies, that enlargement of the spirit is requisite.
How the present situation is to be softened, how the people of the
Central Powers are to be brought to feel that they are not to remain
divided from us by an impassable gulf, this is not the occasion to
suggest. It is enough to repeat that the question is not one simply of
the letter of a treaty but is one of the spirit in which it is made.
Conditions change in this world with a rapidity that is often startling.
The fashion of the day passes before we know that what is novel and was
unexpected has come upon us. The foundations of a peace that is to be
enduring must therefore be sought in what is highest and most abiding in
human nature.
INDEX
Agadir incident, the, 68
Algeciras Conference, the, 69, 114
Alsace-Lorraine, question of, 114
the Kaiser on, 52, 53
America, Tschirsky on, 60
Anglo-French Entente, Bülow on, 56
Tschirsky, 59
views of German Emperor on, 52
Armaments, difficulty of question of, 21
Germany's, 94, 161
Army, British, advantages of voluntary system in, 199
question of compulsory service, 198
Asquith, Mr., consulted by Sir Edward Grey, 45
Premier and War Secretary, 50
presides at Imperial Defense Committee, 182
Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, 70, 113
ultimatum to Serbia, 133
Bagdad Railway, the, William II. and, 63 _et seq._
Balance of power, and the League of Nations, 222
principle of, 20, 22, 119
Balfour, A.J., and Imperial Defense, 184
Ballin, Herr, and Tirpitz, 144
Barnardiston, General, an unfounded charge against, 201
Berchtold, Count, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 153
Berlin, a curious legend originating in, 201
and the Bagdad Railway question, 66
author's visit to, 37
Bethmann-Hollweg, and the Agadir crisis, 69, 71
at Potsdam conference, 151
author's interview with, and the formula of neutrality, 71, 73, 78,
79, 124
desires preservation of peace, 161
his accusation against Entente Powers, 103
informed of Austrian ultimatum, 153
letter to author after the Montreal address, 93
loyalty to the Kaiser, 114
succeeds Prince Bülow as Chancellor, 112
Bismarck, Countess Wilhelm, 146
Bismarck, Prince, a dictum of, 56
and Britain's indefinite policy, 17
and the inevitability of war, 23
and the military party in Germany, 89
and Tirpitz, 145-48
denounces abrogation of Reinsurance Treaty, 146
his affection for Emperor Frederick, 148
his hatred of "prestige politics," 120
Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, 126
Boer War, the, attitude of the Kaiser during, 115
Bosnia, annexation of, 70, 113
Botha, General, co-operates in military preparations, 188
Bridges, Colonel, British Military Attaché at Brussels, 202
Britain's command of the sea, 195
British Army, the reorganization of, 47
British Expeditionary Force, the, mobilization of, 50
organization of, 178
unrecognized work of, 197
British Government, the, paramount duty of, 18
British Navy, a War Staff introduced into, 139, 181
(_See_ also Navy, British)
Bülow, Prince von, author's meeting with, 38
on the Anglo-French Entente, 56
opposes Bagdad Railway proposal, 67
succeeded by Bethmann-Hollweg as Chancellor, 112
Cambon, M. Jules, and relations between France and Germany, 113
informed of Berlin "conversations," 78
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, and Imperial Defense, 182, 184
at Marienbad, 38
Caprivi and the organization of German Navy, 138
and the Reinsurance Treaty, 126, 127
Cassel, Sir Ernest, visits Berlin, 70 (and note)
Central Powers, the, preparations for war, 20
their responsibility for the world war, 22
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J., Tariff Reform policy of, 54
Churchill, Winston, naval policy of, 87, 181
Committee of Imperial Defense, the, and its functions, 158, 159, 177, 182
Compulsory service, author's views on, 198
Cowans, Sir John, and the military preparations, 188
Crewe, Lord, attends meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182
Curzon, Lord, meets German Emperor, 68
Czernin, Count, on William II., 170
D'Aerenthal, Count, diplomatic victory of, 113
Dawson, Harbutt, "German Empire" of, 120
Democracy and war, 27
vindicated by the war, 108
(_See_ also Social Democracy)
Diplomacy before the war, 35 _et seq._
Disarmament, German objections to, 55, 60
Donop, Sir Stanley von, Master General of the Ordnance, 188
Douglas, Sir Charles, and the voluntary system, 199
Education, author's activities for, 39
Edward VII., King, at Marienbad, 38
"encirclement" policy of: Bethmann-Hollweg on, 112
entertains the German Emperor, 62
Einem, General von, at Windsor, 62
author's interview with, 38
Ellison, Colonel, at Berlin, 38
England, a War Staff for the Navy in, 139, 181
commercial rivalry with Germany, 114
conservation of sea power and what it implied, 20, 21
efforts to preserve peace end in failure, 22
her alleged plans to violate Belgian neutrality, 201
propagandists for German military party in, 24
reorganization of army in, 185
voluntary military system of, and its advantages, 199
(_See_ also Great Britain)
England's precautions against Germany's war designs, 168-69
Englishmen, defects and failings of, 28
psychology of, 17
Entente, the, England's entry into--and the alternative, 118, 119, 162
policy of, 106
Ewart, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184
Expeditionary Force (_see_ British Expeditionary Force)
Falkenhayn, von, commanded to Potsdam, 150, 151
France, apprehensive of Germany's intentions, 44
army of, 180
_Frankfurter Zeitung_ opposes Tirpitz's war objectives, 143
Free Trade, Prince von Bülow's views on, 58
William II. on, 54
French Revolution, the, 217
French, Sir John, and reorganization of British Army, 48
George V., King, entertains German Emperor, 67
George, Lloyd, and the Agadir crisis, 70
at meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182
German desire of commercial development, 55, 58, 60
foreign policy: divided control of, 85
Germans, psychology of, 40
Germany, and the Agadir incident, 68
and the Hague Conference, 60
attitude of, before the war, 101 _et seq._
cause of her downfall, 167
Chauvinist party in, 81
commercial rivalry with England, 114
decides upon war, 88
defect of Imperial system in, 109
desire for commercial expansion, 103
Fleet Laws passed in the Reichstag, 142
her responsibility for the world war, 90
increases her armaments, 21, 94, 161
influence of General Staff, 41, 107
militarist party of, 39, 89, 108
miscalculations at outbreak of war, 83, 159
naval program of, 142, 156
new Military Law passed, 136
organization of her Navy, 138
over-ambition of, 16
peaceful penetration policy of, 39, 41
politics in: an anecdote of, 85 (note)
result of military spirit in, 15, 22
scaremongers in, 24
shipbuilding program of, 74
the new Fleet Law, 75, 79, 87, 128
the Press and Tirpitz, 143
two inconsistent policies in, 107
why she entered the war, 207
Goltz, von der, his "Nation in Arms," 180
Goschen, Sir Edward, demands his passports, 44
Gosse, Edmund, meets the Emperor, 68
Grant Duff, Colonel, 185
Great Britain and Belgian neutrality, 202
ante-war policy of, 13, 17
deficiencies in military organization of, 46
enters the war, 95
her sea power before the war, 19
indefinite policy of, 17, 28, 30
question of her preparedness for war, 18, 177
the educational problem in, 39
Great War, the, and Germany's responsibility, 15
causes of, 161
Greindl, Baron, and a curious legend, 201
Grey, Sir Edward (Lord Grey of Fallodon), an historical speech by, 44
and the Bagdad Railway question, 64
at meetings of Imperial Defense Committee, 182
Bethmann-Hollweg on, 113
denies an insinuation originating in Berlin, 203
his efforts for peace, 88, 154, 155
negotiates with Germany, 163
presses Serbia to accept ultimatum, 155
proposes a conference, 154
Grierson, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184
Hague Conference, the, 55
Germany's difficulty, 60
Haig, Sir Douglas, and military preparations for war, 188
and the reorganization of British Army, 48
Haldane, Lord, a luncheon to the German Emperor, 67
a visit to the United States and Canada, 37
addresses at Montreal and Oxford, 92, 145
advocates improved system of education, 39
and Expeditionary and Territorial Forces, 48, 50, 178
and the Bagdad Railway question, 63 _et seq._
becomes Lord Chancellor, 37, 87
"conversations" at Berlin, 72, 124
criticizes Bethmann-Hollweg's book, 101 _et seq._
dines with the Chancellor, 77
entertained by General Staff, 41
examines organization of German War Office, 38
frank conversation with William II., 52 _et seq._
lunches with Emperor and Empress, 74
on military preparations, 177 _et seq._
post-war problems and how they should be met, 208 _et seq._
rebuts a statement by Tirpitz, 164
Secretary of State for War, 36
studies in Germany, 36
visits German Emperor, 37
witnesses review of German troops, 51
Hankey, Sir Maurice, his work recognized by Parliament, 185
Harcourt, Lord, at Imperial Defense Committee meetings, 182
Harnack, Professor, author's meeting with, 77
Herzegovina, annexation of, 70, 113
Hindenburg, General von, author's meeting with, 77
Huguet, Colonel, interviewed by author, 45
Imperial Defense Committee, the, 158, 159, 177, 182
Isvolsky, M., 113, 162
Jagow, Herr von, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 133
Kiaochow (_see_ Tsingtau)
Kiderlen-Waechter, Herr von,
a talk with, 77
and the Agadir incident, 69
Kitchener, Lord,
meets the Emperor, 68
personality of, 179
Kitchener's Army, 50, 178
Lansdowne, Lord, and the agreement with France, 21
Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, co-operates in military preparations, 188
League of Nations, the, 220, 222
Lucanus, von, snubbed by Bismarck, 148
Lyncker, von, commanded to Potsdam, 150, 151
Lyttelton, Sir Neville, 188
MacDonald, Ramsay, lunches with German Emperor, 68
Mahan, Admiral, his works studied by Tirpitz, 141
McKenna, Mr., and the Navy, 87
Metternich, Count, and Bagdad Railway question, 66
at Windsor, 62
author's relations with, 57
Miles, Sir Herbert, assists in military preparations, 188
Military preparations, the, 177 _et seq._
Moltke, Count von, his scheme for rapid mobilization, 38
Moltke, General von, a chat with, 42
present at meeting of Bismarck and Kaiser, 148
Morley, Lord, at luncheon to the Emperor, 68
attends meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182
Morocco difficulty, the, 115
France's request to England, 44
Moulton, Lord, meets German Emperor, 68
National philosophy, German, 30
Navy, British, mobilization of, 50
sea power the dominant element in military policy, 200
why strengthened and increased, 87, 129, 181
Navy, German, Bülow on, 57
William II. and, 54
Nicholson, Lord, and a new military system, 196
chief of General Staff, 188
Officers' Training Corps, organization of, 192
Ottley, Admiral Sir Charles, secretary of Committee of Imperial
Defense, 185
_Panther_ sent to Agadir, 68
Peace terms, the, burden of, 210
Post-war problems, and how they should be met, 208
Potsdam, a reported Crown Council at, and Tirpitz's version of, 131, 149
Reinsurance Treaty of 1884, 126, 146
Repington, Col. A'Court, 191
Reventlow, Count, 38 (note)
Richter opposes Tirpitz on the naval program, 142
Russia, army of, 180
her hostility to Austria, 113
not wishful for war, 162
Russo-Japanese War, William II. and, 116
Sargent, J.S., lunches with the Emperor, 68
Schoen, Baron von, accompanies William II. to England, 62
and the Bagdad Railway question, 65
Serbia as "provocative neighbor," 23
ultimatum to, 133
Skiernevice (_see_ Reinsurance Treaty)
Social Democracy, and militarism, 108
in Germany, 84, 144
Special Reserve, the, organization of, 178
Spender, J.A., meets the Emperor, 68
Stosch, and the German Navy, 138
Tangier, William II. at, 53, 115
Tariff Reform, the Kaiser on, 55
Teaching universities, author and, 39
Technical colleges in England, 40
Territorial Force, the, its part in the world war, 49
mobilization of, 50
organization of, 48, 178
Tirpitz, Admiral von, an admission by, 138
an interview with, 74
and Bethmann-Hollweg's policy, 141
criticizes author, 160
demands a definite policy for war, 143
his "Erinnerungen" discussed, 137 _et seq._
his influence in Germany, 82
informed of Austria's demands to Serbia, 153
mentality of, 137
outstanding thesis of his book, 141
tribute to British sea power, 161
visits Bismarck, 145, 148
Trench warfare, unpreparedness for, 191
Tschirsky, Herr von, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 153
author's interview with, 38
on Anglo-French Entente, 59
on the English Press, 61
Tsingtau as German naval base, 140
Two-Power standard, discussed with German Emperor and Prince Bülow, 54, 57
Tirpitz and, 76
United States (_see_ America)
Voluntary system, the, advantages of, 199
William II., Emperor, an ominous admission by, 43
and the Agadir crisis, 69, 70
and the Anglo-French Entente, 52
Bismarck's message to, 148
consults Bethmann-Hollweg and Zimmermann, 132
Count Czernin on, 170
desires exchange of views between Berlin and London, 70, 71
Emperor of Austria's letter to, and memorandum on policy, 131
frank speech with author, 52 _et seq_.
his proposal on Bagdad Railway question, 66
his reception in London, 68
incautious speeches of, 69, 117, 161
pays surprise visit to Bismarck, 148
promises support to Austria, 150
reads a poem to author, 165
reviews his troops, 51
Tirpitz and, 142
visits King Edward and King George, 62, 67
Wilson, Admiral Sir Arthur, meets the Emperor, 68
Wilson, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184
Windsor, the German Emperor's visit to, 62
Zimmermann, Herr, at Potsdam conference, 151
meets author, 77
* * * * *
+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| Typographical errors corrected in text: |
| |
| Page 231: Landsdowne replaced by Lansdowne |
| |
| Unusual spellings left in the text: |
| |
| maneuvers |
| altho |
| tho |
| Bethmann Hollweg versus Bethmann-Hollweg |
+--------------------------------------------------------------+