INTRODUCTION.
350. Part II of these regulations treats only of the basic principles
of combat tactics as applied to infantry and to the special units,
such as machine guns and mounted scouts, which form a part of infantry
regiments and battalions.
The combat tactics of the arms combined are considered in Field
Service Regulations.
351. Modern combat demands the highest order of training, discipline,
leadership, and morale on the part of the infantry. Complicated
maneuvers are impracticable; efficient leadership and a determination
to win by simple and direct methods must be depended upon for success.
352. The duties of infantry are many and difficult. All infantry must
be fit to cope with all conditions that may arise. Modern war requires
but one kind of infantry--good infantry.
353. The infantry must take the offensive to gain decisive results.
Both sides are therefore likely to attempt it, though not necessarily
at the same time or in the same part of a long battle line.
In the local combats which make up the general battle the better
endurance, use of ground, fire efficiency, discipline, and training
will win. It is the duty of the infantry to win the local successes
which enable the commanding general to win the battle.
354. The infantry must have the tenacity to hold every advantage
gained, the individual and collective discipline and skill needed to
master the enemy's fire, the determination to close with the enemy in
attack, and to meet him with the bayonet in defense. Infantry must be
trained to bear the heaviest burdens and losses, both of combat and
march.
Good infantry can defeat an enemy greatly superior in numbers, but
lacking in training, discipline, leadership, and morale.
355. It is impossible to establish fixed forms or to give general
instructions that will cover all cases. Officers and noncommissioned
officers must be so trained that they can apply suitable means and
methods to each case as it arises. Study and practice are necessary to
acquire proper facility in this respect. Theoretical instruction can
not replace practical instruction; the former supplies correct ideas
and gives to practical work an interest, purpose, and definiteness not
otherwise obtainable.
356. After the mechanism of extended order drill has been learned with
precision in the company, every exercise should be, as far as
practicable, in the nature of a maneuver (combat exercise) against an
_imaginary_, _outlined_, or _represented_ enemy.
Company extended order drill may be conducted without reference to a
tactical situation, but a combat exercise, whatever may be the size of
the unit employed, should be conducted under an assumed tactical
situation.
357. An effective method of conducting a combat exercise is to outline
the enemy with a few men equipped with flags. The umpire or inspector
states the situation and the commander leads his troops with due
regard to the assumptions made.
Changes in the situation, the results of reconnaissance, the character
of artillery fire, etc., are made known to the commander when
necessary by the umpire or inspector, who, in order to observe and
influence the conduct of the exercise, remains in rear of the firing
line. From this position he indicates, with the aid of prearranged
signals, the character of the fire and movements of the hostile
infantry. These signals are intended for the men outlining the enemy.
These men repeat the signals; all officers and men engaged in the
exercise and in sight of the outlined enemy are thus informed of the
enemy's action and the exercise is conducted accordingly.
Assistant umpires, about one for each company in the firing line, may
assist in indicating hostile fire and movements and in observing the
conduct of the exercise.
An outlined enemy may be made to attack or defend.
Situations should be simple and natural. During or after the exercise
the umpire or inspector should call attention to any improper
movements or incorrect methods of execution. He will prohibit all
movements of troops or individuals that would be impossible if the
enemy were real. The slow progress of events to be expected on the
battle field can hardly be simulated, but the umpire or inspector will
prevent undue haste and will attempt to enforce a reasonably slow rate
of progress.
The same exercise should not be repeated over the same ground and
under the same situation. Such repetitions lead to the adoption of a
fixed mode of attack or defense and develop mere drill masters. Fixed
or prearranged systems are prohibited.
LEADERSHIP.
_General Considerations._
358. The art of leadership consists of applying sound tactical
principles to concrete cases on the battle field.
Self-reliance, initiative, aggressiveness, and a conception of
teamwork are the fundamental characteristics of successful leadership.
359. A correct grasp of the situation and a definite plan of action
form the soundest basis for a successful combat.
A good plan once adopted and put into execution should not be
abandoned unless it becomes clear that it can not succeed.
Afterthoughts are dangerous, except as they aid in the execution of
details in the original plan.
360. Combats that do not promise success or some real advantage to the
general issue should be avoided; they cause unnecessary losses, impair
the morale of one's own troops, and raise that of the enemy.
361. Complicated maneuvers are not likely to succeed in war. All plans
and the methods adopted for carrying them into effect must be simple
and direct.
362. Order and cohesion must be maintained within the units if success
is to be expected.
363. Officers must show themselves to be true leaders. They must act
in accordance with the spirit of their orders and must require of
their troops the strictest discipline on the field of battle.
364. The best results are obtained when leaders know the capacity and
traits of those whom they command; hence in making detachments units
should not be broken up, and a deployment that would cause an
intermingling of the larger units in the firing line should be
avoided.
365. Leading is difficult when troops are deployed. A high degree of
training and discipline and the use of close order formations to the
fullest extent possible are therefore required.
366. In order to lighten the severe physical strain inseparable from
infantry service in campaign, constant efforts must be made to spare
the troops unnecessary hardship and fatigue; but when necessity
arises, the limit of endurance must be exacted.
367. When officers or men belonging to fighting troops leave their
proper places to carry back, or to care for, wounded during the
progress of the action, they are guilty of skulking. This offense must
be repressed with the utmost vigor.
368. The complete equipment of the soldier is carried into action
unless the weather or the physical condition of the men renders such
measure a severe hardship. In any event, only the pack[2] will be laid
aside. The determination of this question rests with the regimental
commander. The complete equipment affords to men lying prone
considerable protection against shrapnel.
[Footnote 2: The "pack" includes blanket, poncho, and shelter tent.]
369. The post of the commander must be such as will enable him to
observe the progress of events and to communicate his orders.
Subordinate commanders, in addition, must be in position to transmit
the orders of superiors.
Before entering an action the commander should be as far to the front
as possible in order that he personally may see the situation, order
the deployment, and begin the action strictly in accordance with his
own wishes.
During the action, he must, as a rule, leave to the local leaders the
detailed conduct of the firing line, posting himself either with his
own reserve or in such a position that he is in constant, direct, and
easy communication with it.
A commander takes full and direct charge of his firing line only when
the line has absorbed his whole command.
When their troops are victorious, all commanders should press forward
in order to clinch the advantage gained and to use their reserves to
the best advantage.
370. The latitude allowed to officers is in direct proportion to the
size of their commands. Each should see to the general execution of
his task, leaving to the proper subordinates the supervision of
details, and interfering only when mistakes are made that threaten to
seriously prejudice the general plan.
_Teamwork._
371. The comparatively wide fronts of deployed units increase the
difficulties of control. Subordinates must therefore be given great
latitude in the execution of their tasks. The success of the whole
depends largely upon how well each subordinate coordinates his work
with the general plan.
A great responsibility is necessarily thrown upon subordinates, but
responsibility stimulates the right kind of an officer.
372. In a given situation it is far better _to do any intelligent
thing_ consistent with the aggressive execution of the general plan,
than to search hesitatingly for the ideal. This is the true rule of
conduct for subordinates who are required to act upon their own
initiative.
A subordinate who is reasonably sure that his intended action is such
as would be ordered by the commander, were the latter present and in
possession of the facts, has enough encouragement to go ahead
confidently. He must possess the loyalty to carry out the plans of his
superior and the keenness to recognize and to seize opportunities to
further the general plan.
373. Independence must not become license. Regardless of the number of
subordinates who are apparently supreme in their own restricted
spheres, there is but one battle and but one supreme will to which all
must conform.
Every subordinate must therefore work for the general result. He does
all in his power to insure cooperation between the subdivisions under
his command. He transmits important information to adjoining units or
to superiors in rear and, with the assistance of information received,
keeps himself and his subordinates duly posted as to the situation.
374. When circumstances render it impracticable to consult the
authority issuing an order, officers should not hesitate to vary from
such order when it is clearly based upon an incorrect view of the
situation, is impossible of execution, or has been rendered
impracticable on account of changes which have occurred since its
promulgation. In the application of this rule the responsibility for
mistakes rests upon the subordinate, but unwillingness to assume
responsibility on proper occasions is indicative of weakness.
Superiors should be careful not to censure an apparent disobedience
where the act was done in the proper spirit and to advance the general
plan.
375. When the men of two or more units intermingle in the firing line,
all officers and men submit at once to the senior. Officers and
platoon guides seek to fill vacancies caused by casualties. Each
seizes any opportunity to exercise the functions consistent with his
grade, and all assist in the maintenance of order and control.
Every lull in the action should be utilized for as complete
restoration of order in the firing line as the ground or other
conditions permit.
376. Any officer or noncommissioned officer who becomes separated from
his proper unit and can not rejoin must at once place himself and his
command at the disposal of the nearest higher commander.
Anyone having completed an assigned task must seek to rejoin his
proper command. Failing in this, he should join the nearest troops
engaged with the enemy.
377. Soldiers are taught the necessity of remaining with their
companies, but those who become detached must join the nearest company
and serve with it until the battle is over or reorganization is
ordered.
_Orders._
378. Commands are deployed and enter the combat by the orders of the
commander to the subordinate commanders.
The initial combat orders of the division are almost invariably
written; those of the brigade are generally so. The written order is
preferable and is used whenever time permits.
If time permits, subsequent orders are likewise written, either as
field orders or messages.
379. The initial combat orders of regiments and smaller units are
given verbally. For this purpose the subordinates for whom the orders
are intended are assembled, if practicable, at a place from which the
situation and plan can be explained.
Subsequent orders are verbal or in the form of verbal or written
messages. Verbal messages should not be used unless they are short and
unmistakable.
380. The initial combat order of any commander or subordinate is based
upon his definite plan for executing the task confronting him.
Whenever possible the formation of the plan is preceded by a personal
reconnaissance of the terrain and a careful consideration of all
information of the enemy.
381. The combat order gives such information of the enemy and of
neighboring or supporting friendly troops as will enable subordinates
to understand the situation.
The general plan of action is stated in brief terms, but enough of the
commander's intentions is divulged to guide the subsequent actions of
the subordinates.
Clear and concise instructions are given as to the action to be taken
in the combat by each part of the command. In this way the commander
assigns tasks, fronts, objectives, sectors or areas, etc., in
accordance with his plan. If the terms employed convey definite ideas
and leave no loopholes, the conduct of subordinates will generally be
correspondingly satisfactory.
Such miscellaneous matter relating to special troops, trains,
ammunition, and future movements of the commander is added as concerns
the combat itself.
Combat orders should prescribe communication, reconnaissance, flank
protection, etc., when some special disposition is desired or when an
omission on the part of a subordinate may reasonably be feared.
382. When issuing orders, a commander should indicate clearly _what_
is to be done by each subordinate, but not _how_ it is to be done. He
should not encroach upon the functions of a subordinate by prescribing
details of execution unless he has good reason to doubt the ability or
judgment of the subordinate, and can not substitute another.
Although general in its terms, an order must be definite and must be
the expression of a fixed decision. Ambiguity or vagueness indicates
either vacillation or the inability to formulate orders.
383. Usually the orders of a commander are intended for, and are given
to, the commanders of the next lower units, but in an emergency a
commander should not hesitate to give orders directly to any
subordinate. In such case he should promptly inform the intermediate
commander concerned.
_Communication._
384. Communication is maintained by means of staff officers,
messengers, relay systems, connecting files, visual signals,
telegraph, or telephone.
385. The signal corps troops of the division establish lines of
information from division to brigade headquarters. The further
extension of lines of information in combat by signal troops is
exceptional.
386. Each regiment, employing its own personnel, is responsible for
the maintenance of communication from the colonel back to the brigade
and forward to the battalions. For this purpose the regiment uses the
various means which may be furnished it. The staff and orderlies,
regimental and battalion, are practiced in the use of these means and
in messenger service. Orderlies carry signal flags.
387. Connection between the firing line and the major or colonel is
practically limited to the prescribed flag, arm, and bugle signals.
Other means can only be supplemental. Company musicians carry company
flags and are practiced in signaling.
388. The artillery generally communicates with the firing line by
means of its own staff officers or through an agent who accompanies
some unit in or near the front. The infantry keeps him informed as to
the situation and affords him any reasonable assistance. When the
infantry is dependent upon the artillery for fire support, perfect
coordination through this representative is of great importance.
COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE.
389. Combat reconnaissance is of vital importance and must not be
neglected. By proper preliminary reconnaissance, deployments on wrong
lines, or in a wrong direction, and surprises may generally be
prevented.
390. Troops deployed and under fire can not change front and thus they
suffer greatly when enfiladed. Troops in close order formation may
suffer heavy losses in a short time if subjected to hostile fire. In
both formations troops must be protected by proper reconnaissance and
warning.
391. The difficulty of reconnaissance increases in proportion to the
measures adopted by the enemy to screen himself.
The strength of the reconnoitering party is determined by the
character of the information desired and the nature of the hostile
screen. In exceptional cases as much as a battalion may be necessary
in order to break through the hostile screen and enable the commander
or officer in charge to reconnoiter in person.
A large reconnoitering party is conducted so as to open the way for
small patrols, to serve as a supporting force or rallying point for
them, and to receive and transmit information. Such parties maintain
signal communication with the main body if practicable.
392. Each separate column moving forward to deploy must reconnoiter to
its front and flank and keep in touch with adjoining columns. The
extent of the reconnaissance to the flank depends upon the isolation
of the columns.
393. Before an attack a reconnaissance must be made to determine the
enemy's position, the location of his flanks, the character of the
terrain, the nature of the hostile field works, etc., in order to
prevent premature deployment and the resulting fatigue and loss of
time.
It will frequently be necessary to send forward a thin skirmish line
in order to induce the enemy to open fire and reveal his position.
394. It will frequently be impossible to obtain satisfactory
information until after the action has begun. The delay that may be
warranted for the purpose of reconnaissance depends upon the nature of
the attack and the necessity for promptness. For example, in a meeting
engagement, and sometimes in a holding attack, the reconnaissance may
have to be hasty and superficial, whereas in an attack against an
enemy carefully prepared for defense there will generally be both time
and necessity for thorough reconnaissance.
395. In defense, reconnaissance must be kept up to determine the
enemy's line of advance, to ascertain his dispositions, to prevent his
reconnaissance, etc.
Patrols or parties posted to prevent hostile reconnaissance should
relieve the main body of the necessity of betraying its position by
firing on small bodies of the enemy.
396. Reconnaissance continues throughout the action.
A firing or skirmish line can take care of its front, but its flanks
are especially vulnerable to modern firearms. The moral effect of
flanking fire is as great as the physical effect. Hence, combat
patrols to give warning or covering detachments to give security are
indispensable on exposed flanks. This is equally true in attack or
defense.
397. The fact that cavalry patrols are known to be posted in a certain
direction does not relieve infantry commanders of the responsibility
for reconnaissance and security.
To be surprised by an enemy at short range is an unpardonable offense.
398. The commander of a battalion on a flank of a general line
invariably provides for the necessary reconnaissance and security on
that flank unless higher authority has specifically ordered it. In any
event, he sends out combat patrols as needed.
Where his battalion is on a flank of one section of the line and a
considerable interval lies between his battalion and the next section,
he makes similar provision.
399. Battalion commanders in the first line establish patrols to
observe and report the progress or conduct of adjoining troops when
these can not be seen.
FIRE SUPERIORITY.
_PURPOSE AND NATURE._
400. In a decisive battle success depends on gaining and maintaining
fire superiority. Every effort must be made to gain it early and then
to keep it.
Attacking troops must first gain fire superiority in order to reach
the hostile position. Over open ground attack is possible only when
the attacking force has a decided fire superiority. With such
superiority the attack is not only possible, but success is probable
and without ruinous losses.
Defending troops can prevent a charge only when they can master the
enemy's fire and inflict heavy losses upon him.
401. To obtain fire superiority it is necessary to produce a heavy
volume of accurate fire. Every increase in the effectiveness of the
fire means a corresponding decrease in the effectiveness of the
enemy's fire.
The volume and accuracy of fire will depend upon several
considerations:
(_a_) _The number of rifles employed._ On a given front the greatest
volume of fire is produced by a firing line having only sufficient
intervals between men to permit the free use of their rifles. The
maximum density of a firing line is therefore about one man per yard
of front.
(_b_) The _rate_ of fire affects its volume; an excessive rate reduces
its accuracy.
(_c_) _The character of the target_ influences both volume and
accuracy. Larger dimensions, greater visibility, and shorter range
increase the rate of fire; greater density increases the effect.
(_d_) _Training and discipline_ have an important bearing on the rate
or volume of fire, but their greatest influence is upon accuracy.
The firing efficiency, of troops is reduced by fatigue and adverse
psychological influences.
(_e_) _Fire direction and control_ improve collective accuracy. The
importance of fire direction increases rapidly with the range. Control
exerts a powerful influence at all ranges.
_FIRE DIRECTION AND CONTROL._
_Opening Fire._
402. Beyond effective ranges important results can be expected only
when the target is large and distinct and much ammunition is used.
Long-range fire is permissible in pursuit on account of the moral
effect of any fire under the circumstances. At other times such fire
is of doubtful value.
403. In attack, the desire to open fire when losses are first felt
must be repressed. Considerations of time, target, ammunition, and
morale make it imperative that the attack withhold its fire and press
forward to a first firing position close to the enemy. The attacker's
target will be smaller and fainter than the one he presents to the
enemy.
404. In defense, more ammunition is available, ranges are more easily
determined, and the enemy usually presents a larger target. The
defender may therefore open fire and expect results at longer ranges
than the attacker, and particularly if the defenders intend a delaying
action only.
If the enemy has a powerful artillery, it will often be best for the
defending infantry to withhold its fire until the enemy offers a
specially favorable target. Vigorous and well-directed bursts of fire
are then employed. The troops should therefore be given as much
artificial protection as time and means permit, and at an agreed
signal expose themselves as much as necessary and open fire.
405. In unexpected, close encounters a great advantage accrues to the
side which first opens rapid and accurate fire with battle sight.
_Use of Ground._
406. The position of the firers must afford a suitable field of fire.
The ground should permit constant observation of the enemy, and yet
enable the men to secure some cover when not actually firing.
Troops whose target is for the moment hidden by unfavorable ground,
either move forward to better ground or seek to execute cross fire on
another target.
407. The likelihood of a target being hit depends to a great extent
upon its visibility. By skillful use of ground, a firing line may
reduce its visibility without loss of fire power. Sky lines are
particularly to be avoided.
_Choice of Target._
408. The target chosen should be the hostile troops most dangerous to
the firers. These will usually be the nearest hostile infantry. When
no target is specially dangerous, that one should be chosen which
promises the most hits.
409. Frequent changes of target impair the fire effect. Random changes
to small, unimportant targets impair fire discipline and accomplish
nothing. Attention should be confined to the main target until
substantial reason for change is apparent.
410. An opportunity to deliver flanking fire, especially against
artillery protected in front by shields, is an example warranting
change of target and should never be overlooked. Such fire demoralizes
the troops subjected to it, even if the losses inflicted are small.
In this manner a relatively small number of rifles can produce
important results.
_The Range._
411. Beyond close range, the correct setting of the rear sight is of
primary importance, provided the troops are trained and well in hand.
The necessity for correct sight setting increases rapidly with the
range. Its importance decreases as the quality of the troops decrease,
for the error in sight setting, except possibly at very long ranges,
becomes unimportant when compared with the error in holding and
aiming.
412. In attack, distances must usually be estimated and corrections
made as errors are observed. Mechanical range finders and ranging
volleys are practicable at times.
In defense, it is generally practicable to measure more accurately the
distances to visible objects and to keep a record of them for future
use.
_Distribution of Fire and Target._
413. The purpose of fire superiority is to get hits whenever possible,
but at all events to keep down the enemy's fire and render it
harmless. To accomplish this the target must be covered with fire
throughout its whole extent. Troops who are not fired upon will fire
with nearly peace-time accuracy.
The target is roughly divided and a part is assigned to each unit. No
part of the target is neglected. In attack, by a system of overlapping
in assigning targets to platoons, the entire hostile line can be kept
under fire even during a rush.
_Observation._
414. The correctness of the sight setting and the distribution of fire
over the target can be verified only by careful observation of the
target, the adjacent ground, and the effect upon the enemy.
415. Observation only can determine whether the fire fight is being
properly conducted. If the enemy's fire is losing in accuracy and
effect, the observer realizes that his side is gaining superiority. If
the enemy's fire remains or becomes effective and persistent, he
realizes that corrective measures are necessary to increase either
volume or accuracy, or both.
_Discipline._
416. Discipline makes good direction and control possible and is the
distinguishing mark of trained troops.
417. The discipline necessary in the firing line will be absent unless
officers and noncommissioned officers can make their will known to the
men. In the company, therefore, communication must be by simple
signals which, in the roar of musketry, will attract the attention and
convey the correct meaning.
_Expenditure of Ammunition._
418. In attack the supply is more limited than in defense. Better
judgment must be exercised in expenditure. Ordinarily, troops in the
firing line of an attack can not expect to have that day more
ammunition than they carry into the combat, except such additions as
come from the distribution of ammunition of dead and wounded and the
surplus brought by reinforcements.
419. When a certain fire effect is required, the necessary ammunition
must be expended without hesitation. Several hours of firing may be
necessary to gain fire superiority. True economy can be practiced only
by closing on the enemy before first opening fire and thereafter
suspending fire when there is nothing to shoot at.
_Supporting Artillery._
420. Artillery fire is the principal aid to the infantry in gaining
and keeping fire superiority, not only by its hits, but by the moral
effect it produces on the enemy.
421. In attack, artillery assists the forward movement of the
infantry. It keeps down the fire of the hostile artillery and seeks to
neutralize the hostile infantry by inflicting losses upon it,
destroying its morale, driving it to cover, and preventing it from
using its weapons effectively.
In defense, it ignores the hostile artillery when the enemy's attack
reaches a decisive stage and assists in checking the attack, joining
its fire power to that of the defending infantry.
422. Troops should be accustomed to being fired over by friendly
artillery and impressed with the fact that the artillery should
continue firing upon the enemy until the last possible moment. The
few casualties resulting from shrapnel bursting short are trifling
compared with those that would result from the increased effectiveness
of the enemy's infantry fire were the friendly artillery to cease
firing.
Casualties inflicted by supporting artillery are not probable until
the opposing infantry lines are less than 200 yards apart.
423. When the distance between the hostile infantry lines becomes so
short as to render further use of friendly artillery inadvisable, the
commander of the infantry firing line, using a preconcerted signal,[3]
informs the artillery commander. The latter usually increases the
range in order to impede the strengthening of the enemy's foremost
line.
[Footnote 3: With a 4-foot white and red regimental signal flag.]
_Fire of Position._
424. Infantry is said to execute fire of position when it is posted so
as to assist an attack by firing over the heads, or off the flank, of
the attacking troops and is not itself to engage in the advance; or
when, in defense, it is similarly posted to augment the fire of the
main firing line.
Machine guns serve a like purpose.
In a decisive action, fire of position should be employed whenever the
terrain permits and reserve infantry is available.
DEPLOYMENT.
425. Troops are massed preparatory to deployment when the nature of
their deployment can not be foreseen or it is desirable to shorten the
column or to clear the road. Otherwise, in the deployment of large
commands, whether in march column, in bivouac, or massed, and whether
forming for attack or for defense, they are ordinarily first formed
into a line of columns to facilitate the extension of the front prior
to deploying.
The rough line or lines of columns thus formed enable troops to take
advantage of the terrain in advancing and shorten the time occupied in
forming the firing line.
426. In deploying the division each brigade is assigned a definite
task or objective. On receipt of his orders, the brigade commander
conducts his brigade in column or in line of regiments until it is
advisable that it be broken into smaller columns. He then issues his
order, assigning to each regiment its task, if practicable. In a
similar manner the regimental commanders lead their regiments forward
in column, or in line of columns, until the time arrives for issuing
the regimental order. It is seldom advisable to break up the battalion
before issuing orders for its deployment.
427. Each subordinate commander, after receiving his order for the
action, should precede his command as far as possible, in order to
reconnoiter the ground personally, and should prepare to issue his
orders promptly.
428. Each commander of a column directs the necessary reconnaissance
to front and flank; by this means and by a judicious choice of ground
he guards against surprise.
429. The premature formation of the firing line causes unnecessary
fatigue and loss of time, and may result in a faulty direction being
taken. Troops once deployed make even minor changes of direction with
difficulty, and this difficulty increases with the length of the
firing line.
430. In the larger units, when the original deployment is found to be
in the wrong direction, it will usually be necessary to deploy the
reserve on the correct front and withdraw and assemble the first line.
431. To gain decisive results, it will generally be necessary to use
all the troops at some stage of the combat. But in the beginning,
while the situation is uncertain, care should be taken not to engage
too large a proportion of the command. On the other hand, there is no
greater error than to employ too few and to sacrifice them by
driblets.
432. When it is intended to fight to a decision, fire superiority is
essential. To gain this, two things are necessary: A heavy fire and a
fire well directed and controlled. Both of these are best obtained
when the firing line is as dense as practicable, while leaving the men
room for the free use of their rifles.
If the men are too widely separated, direction and control are very
difficult, often impossible, and the intensity of fire is slight in
proportion to the front occupied.
433. In an attack or stubborn defense the firing line should have a
density of one man per yard of front occupied.
Where the tactical situation demands the holding of a line too long to
be occupied throughout at this density, it is generally better to
deploy companies or platoons at one man per yard, leaving gaps in the
line between them, than to distribute the men uniformly at increased
intervals.
434. A relatively thin firing line may be employed when merely
covering the movements of other forces; when on the defensive against
poor troops; when the final action to be taken has not yet been
determined; and, in general, when fire superiority is not necessary.
435. The length of the firing line that the whole force may employ
depends upon the density of the line and the _strength in rear_
required by the situation.
Supports and reserves constitute the strength in rear.
In a decisive attack they should be at least strong enough to replace
a heavy loss in the original firing line and to increase the charging
line to a density of at least one and one-half men per yard and still
have troops in rear for protection and for the other purposes
mentioned above.
436. In the original deployment the strength of the reserve held out
by each commander comprises from one-sixth to two-thirds of his unit,
depending upon the nature of the service expected of the reserve.
A small force in a covering or delaying action requires very little
strength in rear, while a large force fighting a decisive battle
requires much. Therefore, depending upon circumstances, the original
deployment, including the strength in rear, may vary from 1 to 10 men
per yard. Against an enemy poorly disciplined and trained, or lacking
in morale, a thinner deployment is permissible.
437. The density of the whole deployment increases with the size of
the command, because the larger the command the greater the necessity
for reserves. Thus, a battalion acting alone may attack with two men
per yard of front, but a regiment, with three battalions, may only
double the front of the one battalion.
438. By the assignment of divisions or larger units to parts of a line
of battle several miles long, a series of semi-independent battle, or
local combat, districts are created.
The general deployment for a long line of battle comprising several
battle districts is not directly considered in these regulations. The
deployments treated of herein are those of the infantry within such
districts.
The density of deployment in these districts may vary greatly,
depending upon the activity expected in each. Within these battle
districts, as well as in smaller forces acting alone, parts of the
line temporarily of less importance may be held weakly, in order to
economize troops and to have more at the decisive point.
439. The front that a unit may occupy when deployed depends also upon
whether its flanks are secured. If both flanks are secured by other
troops, the unit may increase its front materially by reducing its
reserve or supports. If only one flank is so secured, the front may
still be somewhat increased, but the exposed flank must be guarded by
posting the supports or reserve toward that flank.
Natural obstacles that secure the flanks have practically the same
effect upon deployment.
440. Except when assigned as supports or reserve, regiments in the
brigade, battalions in the regiment, and companies in the battalion
are, when practicable, deployed side by side.
441. In the deployment, battalions establish the firing line, each
furnishing its own support.
In each unit larger than the battalion a reserve is held out, its
strength depending upon circumstances. In general, the reserve is
employed by the commander to meet or improve conditions brought about
by the action of the firing line. It must not be too weak or too split
up. It must be posted where the commander believes it will be needed
for decisive action, or where he desires to bring about such action.
When necessary, parts of it reenforce or prolong the firing line.
ATTACK.
442. An attack is bound to succeed if fire superiority is gained and
properly used.
To gain this superiority generally requires that the attack employ
more rifles than the defense; this in turn means a longer line, as
both sides will probably hold a strong firing line.
443. With large forces, a direct frontal attack gives the attacker
little opportunity to bring more rifles to bear. However, if the enemy
is unduly extended, a frontal attack may give very decisive results.
444. Owing to the difficulty of control and the danger of the parts
being defeated in detail, wide turning movements are seldom allowable
except in large forces.
445. If the attack can be so directed that, while the front is
covered, another fraction of the command strikes a flank more or less
obliquely (an enveloping attack) the advantages gained are a longer
line and more rifles in action; also a converging fire opposed to the
enemy's diverging fire.
446. An envelopment of both flanks should never be attempted without a
very decided superiority in numbers.
447. The enveloping attack will nearly always result locally in a
frontal attack, for it will be met by the enemy's reserve. The
advantage of envelopment lies in the longer concentric line, with its
preponderance of rifles and its converging fire.
448. Cooperation between the frontal and enveloping attacks is
essential to success. Both should be pushed vigorously and
simultaneously, and ordinarily both should move simultaneously to the
charge; but at the final stage of the attack conditions may sometimes
warrant one in charging while the other supports it with fire.
The envelopment of a flank is brought about with difficulty when made
by troops already deployed in another direction or by their reserves.
The two attacks should be deployed at a suitable distance apart, with
the lines of attack converging in rear of the hostile position. The
troops that are to make the enveloping attack should deploy in the
proper direction at the start and should be given orders which enable
them to gain their point of deployment in the most direct and
practical manner.
The enveloping attack is generally made the stronger, especially in
small forces.
_DEPLOYMENT FOR ATTACK._
449. Where open terrain exposes troops to hostile artillery fire it
may be necessary to make the deployment 2 miles or more from the
hostile position.
The foreground should be temporarily occupied by covering troops. If
the enemy occupies the foreground with detachments, the covering
troops must drive them back.
450. To enable large forces to gain ground toward the enemy, it may
sometimes be cheaper and quicker in the end to move well forward and
to deploy at night. In such case the area in which the deployment is
to be made should, if practicable, be occupied by covering troops
before dark.
The deployment will be made with great difficulty unless the ground
has been studied by daylight. The deployment gains little unless it
establishes the firing line well within effective range of the enemy's
main position. (See Night Operations.)
451. Each unit assigned a task deploys when on its direction line, or
opposite its objective, and when it has no longer sufficient cover for
advancing in close order. In the firing line, intervals of 25 to 50
yards should be maintained as long as possible between battalions. In
the larger units it may be necessary to indicate on the map the
direction or objective, but to battalion commanders it should be
pointed out on the ground.
452. The reserve is kept near enough to the firing line to be on hand
at the decisive stage. It is posted with reference to the attack, or
to that part of the attacking line, from which the greater results are
expected; it is also charged with flank protection, but should be kept
intact.
Supports are considered in paragraphs 225 to 228, inclusive, and 298
to 302, inclusive.
_ADVANCING THE ATTACK._
453. The firing line must ordinarily advance a long distance before it
is justified in opening fire. It can not combat the enemy's artillery,
and it is at a disadvantage if it combats the defender's long-range
rifle fire. Hence it ignores both and, by taking full advantage of
cover and of the discipline of the troops, advances to a first firing
position at the shortest range possible.
Formations for crossing this zone with the minimum loss are considered
in paragraphs 212 to 220, inclusive. These and other methods of
crossing such zones should be studied and practiced.
454. The best protection against loss while advancing is to escape the
enemy's view.
455. Each battalion finds its own firing position, conforming to the
general advance as long as practicable and taking advantage of the
more advanced position of an adjacent battalion in order to gain
ground.
The position from which the attack opens fire is further considered in
paragraphs 306 to 308, inclusive.
456. It will frequently become necessary for infantry moving to the
attack to pass through deployed artillery. This should be done so as
to interfere as little as possible with the latter's fire, and never
so as to cause that fire to cease entirely. As far as practicable,
advantage should be taken of intervals in the line, if any. An
understanding between artillery and infantry commanders should be had,
so as to effect the movement to the best advantage.
457. In advancing the attack, advanced elements of the firing line or
detachments in front of it should not open fire except in defense or
to clear the foreground of the enemy. Fire on the hostile main
position should not be opened until all or nearly all of the firing
line can join in the fire.
_THE FIRE ATTACK._
458. At the first firing position the attack seeks to gain fire
superiority. This may necessitate a steady, accurate fire for a long
time. The object is to subdue the enemy's fire and keep it subdued so
that the attacking troops may advance from this point to a favorable
place near the enemy from which the charge may be made. Hence, in the
advance by rushes, sufficient rifles must be kept constantly in action
to keep down the enemy's fire; this determines the size of the
fraction rushing.
459. To advance without fire superiority against a determined defense
would result in such losses as to bring the attack to a standstill or
to make the apparent success barren of results.
460. Diminution of the enemy's fire and a pronounced loss in
effectiveness are the surest signs that fire superiority has been
gained and that a part of the firing line can advance.
461. The men must be impressed with the fact that, having made a
considerable advance under fire and having been checked, it is
suicidal to turn back in daylight.
If they can advance no farther, they must intrench and hold on until
the fall of darkness or a favorable turn in the situation develops.
Intrenching is resorted to only when necessary. Troops who have
intrenched themselves under fire are moved forward again with
difficulty.
462. Supports and reserves occupying intrenchments vacated by the
firing line should improve them, but they must not be held back or
diverted from their true missions on this account.
463. Paragraphs 309 to 317, inclusive, deal more in detail with the
conduct of the fire attack.
_THE CHARGE._
464. Fire superiority beats down the enemy's fire, destroys his
resistance and morale, and enables the attacking troops to close on
him, but an actual or threatened occupation of his position is needed
to drive him out and defeat him.
The psychological moment for the charge can not be determined far in
advance. The tactical instinct of the responsible officer must decide.
465. The defenders, if subjugated by the fire attack, will frequently
leave before the charge begins. On the other hand, it may be necessary
to carry the fire attack close to the position and follow it up with a
short dash and a bayonet combat. Hence the distance over which the
charge may be made will vary between wide limits. It may be from 25 to
400 yards.
The charge should be made at the earliest moment that promises
success; otherwise the full advantage of victory will be lost.
466. The commander of the attacking line should indicate his approval,
or give the order, before the charge is made. Subordinate commanders,
usually battalion commanders, whose troops are ready to charge signal
that fact to the commander. It may be necessary for them to wait until
other battalions or other parts of the line are ready or until the
necessary reserves arrive.
At the signal for the charge the firing line and nearby supports and
reserves rush forward. See paragraphs 318 and 319.
The charge is made simultaneously, if possible, by all the units
participating therein, but, once committed to the assault, battalions
should be pushed with the utmost vigor and no restraint placed on the
ardor of charging troops by an attempt to maintain alignment.
467. Before ordering the charge the commander should see that enough
troops are on hand to make it a success. Local reserves joining the
firing line in time to participate in the charge give it a strong
impetus. Too dense a mass should be avoided.
468. The line should be strengthened by prolongation, if practicable,
and remaining troops kept in formation for future use; but rather than
that the attack should fail, the last formed body will be sent in,
unless it is very apparent that it can do no good.
469. To arrive in the hostile position with a very compact firing line
and a few formed supports is sufficient for a victory, but an
additional force kept well in hand for pursuit is of inestimable
value.
470. A premature charge by a part of the line should be avoided, but
if begun, the other parts of the line should join at once if there is
any prospect of success. Under exceptional conditions a part of the
line may be compelled to charge without authority from the rear. The
intention to do so should be signaled to the rear.
471. Confidence in their ability to use the bayonet gives the
assaulting troops the promise of success.
472. If the enemy has left the position when the charging troops reach
it, the latter should open a rapid fire upon the retreating enemy, if
he is in sight. It is not advisable for the mixed and disordered units
to follow him, except to advance to a favorable firing position or to
cover the reorganization of others.
473. The nearest formed bodies accompanying or following the charge
are sent instantly in pursuit. Under cover of these troops order is
restored in the charging line. If the captured position is part of a
general line or is an advanced post, it should be intrenched and
occupied at once.
The exhaustion of officers and men must not cause the neglect of
measures to meet a counterattack.
474. If the attack receives a temporary setback and it is intended to
strengthen and continue it, officers will make every effort to stop
the rearward movement and will reestablish the firing line in a
covered position as close as possible to the enemy.
475. If the attack must be abandoned, the rearward movement should
continue with promptness until the troops reach a feature of the
terrain that facilitates the task of checking and reorganizing them.
The point selected should be so far to the rear as to prevent
interference by the enemy before the troops are ready to resist. The
withdrawal of the attacking troops should be covered by the artillery
and by reserves, if any are available.
See Night Operations.
_PURSUIT._
476. To reap the full fruits of victory a vigorous pursuit must be
made. The natural inclination to be satisfied with a successful charge
must be overcome. The enemy must be allowed no more time to reorganize
than is positively unavoidable.
477. The part of the reserve that is still formed or is best under
control is sent forward in pursuit and vigorously attacks the enemy's
main body or covering detachments wherever found.
The artillery delivers a heavy fire upon the retreating enemy; the
disordered attacking troops secure the position, promptly re-form, and
become a new reserve.
478. If the captured position is a section of the general line, the
breach should be heavily occupied, made wider, and strongly secured by
drawing on all reserves in the vicinity.
479. After the pursuit from the immediate battle field, pursuit by
parallel roads is especially effective where large commands are
concerned.
480. Artillery and cavalry are very effective in pursuit.
_ATTACK OF FORTIFICATIONS._
481. Few modifications enter into the problem of attacking
fortifications. Such as are to be considered relate chiefly to the
greater time and labor of advancing, the more frequent use of darkness
and the use of hand grenades to augment the fire.
482. If the enemy is strongly fortified and time permits, it may be
advisable to wait and approach the charging point under cover of
darkness. The necessary reconnaissance and arrangements should be made
before dark. If the charge is not to be made at once, the troops
intrench the advanced position, using sand bags if necessary. Before
daylight the foreground should be cleared of obstacles.
483. If the distance is short and other conditions are favorable, the
charge may be made without fire preparation. If made, it should be
launched with spirit and suddenness at the break of day. (See Night
Operations.)
484. In siege operations troops are usually advanced to the charging
point by sapping. This method, however, presupposes that an early
victory is not necessary or that it is clearly inadvisable to attempt
more direct methods.
_HOLDING ATTACK._
485. The holding attack must be vigorous enough to hold the enemy in
position and must present a front strong enough to conceal the
secondary nature of the attack.
The holding attack need have comparatively little strength in rear,
but conceals the fact by a firing line not distinguishable from that
of a decisive attack.
486. Supports and reserves are kept at short distances. Their strength
is less if the object is merely to hold the enemy fast than if the
object is, in addition, to compel him to use up reserves.
487. Holding attacks which may later develop into decisive attacks
should be correspondingly strong in rear.
488. All feint attacks should employ dense firing lines. Their
weakness is in rear and is concealed.
DEFENSE.
_POSITIONS AND INTRENCHMENTS._
489. The first requirement of a good position is a clear field of fire
and view to the front and exposed flanks to a distance of 600 to 800
yards or more. The length of front should be suitable to the size of
the command and the flanks should be secure. The position should have
lateral communication and cover for supports and reserves. It should
be one which the enemy can not avoid, but must attack or give up his
mission.
A position having all these advantages will rarely, if ever, be found.
The one should be taken which conforms closest to the description.
490. The natural cover of the position should be fully utilized. In
addition, it should be strengthened by fieldworks and obstacles.
The best protection is afforded by deep, narrow, inconspicuous
trenches. If little time is available, as much as practicable must be
done. That the fieldworks may not be needed should not cause their
construction to be omitted, and the fact that they have been
constructed should not influence the action of a commander, if
conditions are found to be other than expected.
491. When time and troops are available the preparations include the
necessary communicating and cover trenches, head cover, bombproofs,
etc. The fire trenches should be well supplied with ammunition.
The supports are placed close at hand in cover trenches when natural
cover is not available.
492. Dummy trenches frequently cause the hostile artillery to waste
time and ammunition and to divert its fire.
493. The location, extent, profile, garrison, etc., of fieldworks are
matters to be decided by the infantry commanders. Officers must be
able to choose ground and properly intrench it. (See Intrenchments.)
494. In combat exercises, when it is impracticable to construct the
trenches appropriate to the exercise, their trace may be outlined by
bayonets, sticks, or other markers, and the responsible officers
required to indicate the profile selected, method and time of
construction, garrisons, etc.
_DEPLOYMENT FOR DEFENSE._
495. The density of the whole deployment depends upon the expected
severity of the action, the character of the enemy, the condition of
the flanks, the field of fire, the terrain, and the available
artificial or natural protection for the troops.
496. If exposed, the firing line should be as dense in defense as in
attack. If the firing line is well intrenched and has a good field of
fire, it may be made thinner.
Weaker supports are permissible. For the same number of troops the
front occupied on the defensive may therefore be longer than on the
offensive, the battalions placing more companies in the firing line.
497. If it is intended only to delay the enemy, a fairly strong
deployment is sufficient, but if decisive results are desired, a
change to the offensive must be contemplated and the corresponding
strength in rear provided. This strength is in the reserve, which
should be as large as the demands of the firing line and supports
permit. Even in a passive defense the reserve should be as strong as
in the attack, unless the flanks are protected by other means.
498. Supports are posted as close to the firing line as practicable
and reinforce the latter according to the principles explained in the
attack. When natural cover is not sufficient for the purpose,
communicating and cover trenches are constructed. If time does not
permit their construction, it is better to begin the action with a
very dense firing line and no immediate supports than to have supports
greatly exposed in rear.
499. The reserve should be posted so as to be entirely free to act as
a whole, according to the developments. The distance from firing line
to reserve is generally greater than in the attack. By reason of such
a location the reserve is best able to meet a hostile enveloping
attack; it has a better position from which to make a counter attack;
it is in a better position to cover a withdrawal and permit an orderly
retreat.
The distance from firing line to reserve increases with the size of
the reserve.
500. When the situation is no longer in doubt, the reserve should be
held in rear of the flank which is most in danger or offers the best
opportunity for counterattack. Usually the same flank best suits both
purposes.
501. In exceptional cases, on broad fronts, it may be necessary to
detach a part of the reserve to protect the opposite flank. This
detachment should be the smallest consistent with its purely
protective mission.
502. The commander assigns to subordinates the front to be occupied by
them. These, in turn, subdivide the front among their next lower units
in the firing line.
503. An extended position is so divided into sections that each has,
if practicable, a field of fire naturally made distinct by the
terrain.
Unfavorable and unimportant ground will ordinarily cause gaps to exist
in the line.
504. The size of the unit occupying each section depends upon the
latter's natural strength, front, and importance. If practicable,
battalions should be kept intact and assigned as units to sections or
parts of sections.
505. Where important dead space lies in front of one section, an
adjoining section should be instructed to cover it with fire when
necessary, or machine guns should be concealed for the like purpose.
506. Advanced posts, or any other form of unnecessary dispersion,
should be avoided.
507. Unless the difficulty of moving the troops into the position be
great, most of the troops of the firing line are held in rear of it
until the infantry attack begins. The position itself is occupied by a
small garrison only, with the necessary outguards or patrols in front.
508. Fire alone can not be depended upon to stop the attack. The
troops must be determined to resort to the bayonet, if necessary.
509. If a night attack or close approach by the enemy is expected,
troops in a prepared position should strengthen the outguards and
firing line and construct as numerous and effective obstacles as
possible. Supports and local reserves should move close to the firing
line and should, with the firing line, keep bayonets fixed. If
practicable, the front should be illuminated, preferably from the
flanks of the section.
510. Only short range fire is of any value in resisting night attacks.
The bayonet is the chief reliance. (See Night Operations.)
_COUNTERATTACK._
511. The passive defense should be assumed only when circumstances
force it. Only the offensive wins.
512. An active defense seeks a favorable decision. A favorable
decision can not be expected without counterattack.
513. A passive defense in a position whose flanks are not protected by
natural obstacles is generally out of the question.
514. Where the defense is assumed with a view to making a
counterattack, the troops for the counterattack should be held in
reserve until the time arrives for such attack. The defensive line
should be held by as few troops as possible in order that the force
for the offensive may be as large as possible.
The force for the counterattack should be held echeloned in rear of
the flank which offers it the greatest advantage for the proposed
attack.
515. The counterattack should be made vigorously and at the proper
time. It will usually be made:
By launching the reserve against the enemy's flank when his attack is
in full progress. This is the most effective form of counterattack.
Straight to the front by the firing line and supports after repulsing
the enemy's attack and demoralizing him with pursuing fire.
Or, by the troops in rear of the firing line when the enemy has
reached the defensive position and is in disorder.
516. Minor counterattacks are sometimes necessary in order to drive
the enemy from important positions gained by him.
_DELAYING ACTION._
517. When a position is taken merely to delay the enemy and to
withdraw before becoming closely engaged, the important considerations
are:
The enemy should be forced to deploy early. The field of fire should
therefore be good at distances from 500 to 1,200 yards or more; a good
field of fire at close range is not necessary.
The ground in rear of the position should favor the withdrawal of the
firing line by screening the troops from the enemy's view and fire as
soon as the position is vacated.
518. A thin firing line using much ammunition will generally answer
the purpose. Supports are needed chiefly to protect the flanks.
The reserve should be posted well in rear to assist in the withdrawal
of the firing line.
519. Artillery is especially valuable to a delaying force.
MEETING ENGAGEMENTS.
520. Meeting engagements are characterized by the necessity for hasty
reconnaissance, or the almost total absence of reconnaissance; by the
necessity for rapid deployment, frequently under fire; and usually by
the absence of trenches or other artificial cover. These conditions
give further advantages to the offensive.
521. The whole situation will usually indicate beforehand the proper
general action to be taken on meeting the enemy.
522. Little fresh information can be expected. The boldness,
initiative, and determination of the commander must be relied upon.
523. A meeting engagement affords an ideal opportunity to the
commander who has intuition and quick decision and who is willing to
take long chances. His opponent is likely to be overcautious.
524. The amount of information that the commander is warranted in
awaiting before taking final action depends entirely upon his mission.
One situation may demand a blind attack; another may demand rapid,
partial deployment for attack, but careful and time-consuming
reconnaissance before the attack is launched.
525. A great advantage accrues to the side which can deploy the
faster. The advantage of a close-order formation, favoring rapid
deployment, becomes more pronounced with the size of the force.
526. The first troops to deploy will be able to attack with longer
firing lines and weaker supports than are required in the ordinary
case. But if the enemy succeeds in deploying a strong, defensive line,
the attack must be strengthened accordingly before it is wasted.
527. If the situation warrants the advance, the leading troops seek to
deploy faster than the enemy, to reach his flanks, check his
deployment, and get information. In any event, they seek to cover the
deployment of their own troops in rear--especially the artillery--and
to seize important ground.
528. The commander of a long column which meets the enemy should be
with the advance guard to receive information promptly and to
reconnoiter. If he decides to fight, the advance guard must hold the
enemy while the commander formulates a plan of action, issues the
necessary orders, and deploys the main body. Meantime, the column
should be closing up, either in mass or to form line of columns, so
that the deployment, when determined upon, may be made more promptly.
529. The action of the advance guard, prior to the receipt of orders,
depends upon the situation. Whether to attack determinedly or only as
a feint, or to assume the defensive, depends upon the strength of the
advance guard, the terrain, the character of the hostile force
encountered, and the mission and intentions of the commander of the
whole.
530. If the enemy is beforehand or more aggressive, or if the advance
guard is too weak, it may be necessary to put elements of the main
body into action as fast as they arrive, in order to check him. This
method should be avoided; it prevents the formation and execution of a
definite plan and compels piecemeal action. The best results are
obtained when the main body is used as a whole.
WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION.
531. The withdrawal of a defeated force can generally be effected only
at a heavy cost. When it is no longer possible to give the action a
favorable turn and the necessity for withdrawal arises, every effort
must be made to place distance and a rear guard between the enemy and
the defeated troops.
532. Artillery gives especially valuable assistance in the withdrawal.
The long-range fire of machine guns should also be employed. Cavalry
assists the withdrawal by charging the pursuing troops or by taking
flank positions and using fire action.
533. If an intact reserve remains it should be placed in a covering
position, preferably on a flank, to check the pursuit and thus enable
the defeated troops to withdraw beyond reach of hostile fire.
The covering position of the reserve should be at some distance from
the main action, but close enough to bring the withdrawing troops
quickly under the protection of its fire. It should have a good field
of fire at effective and long ranges and should facilitate its own
safe and timely withdrawal.
534. If the general line is divided, by terrain or by organization,
into two or more parts, the firing line of the part in the least
danger from pursuit should be withdrawn first. A continuous firing
line, whose parts are dependent upon one another for fire support,
should be withdrawn as a whole, retiring by echelon at the beginning
of the withdrawal. Every effort must be made to restore the
organizations, regain control, and form column of march as soon as the
troops are beyond the reach of hostile fire.
As fast as possible without delaying the march, companies, and the
larger units should be re-formed, so that the command will again be
well in hand.
535. The commander of the whole, having given orders for withdrawal,
should go to the rear, select a rendezvous point, and devote himself
to the reorganization of his command.
The rendezvous point is selected with regard to the natural channels
of movement approximately straight to the rear. It should be distant
from the battle field and should facilitate the gathering and
protection of the command.
SUMMARY.
536. 1. Avoid combats that offer no chance of victory or other
valuable results.
2. Make every effort for the success of the general plan and avoid
spectacular plays that have no bearing on the general result.
3. Have a definite plan and carry it out vigorously. Do not vacillate.
4. Do not attempt complicated maneuvers.
5. Keep the command in hand; avoid undue extension and dispersion.
6. Study the ground and direct the advance in such a way as to take
advantage of all available cover and thereby diminish losses.
7. Never deploy until the purpose and the proper direction are known.
8. Deploy enough men for the immediate task in hand; hold out the rest
and avoid undue haste in committing them to the action.
9. Flanks must be protected either by reserves, fortifications, or the
terrain.
10. In a decisive action, gain and keep fire superiority.
11. Keep up reconnaissance.
12. Use the reserve, but not until needed or a very favorable
opportunity for its use presents itself. Keep some reserve as long as
practicable.
13. Do not hesitate to sacrifice the command if the result is worth
the cost.
14. Spare the command all unnecessary hardship and exertion.
MISCELLANEOUS.
_MACHINE GUNS._
537. Machine guns must be considered as weapons of emergency. Their
effectiveness combined with their mobility renders them of great value
at critical, though infrequent, periods of an engagement.
538. When operating against infantry only, they can be used to a great
extent throughout the combat as circumstances may indicate, but they
are quickly rendered powerless by efficient field artillery and will
promptly draw artillery fire whenever they open. Hence their use in
engagements between large commands must be for short periods and at
times when their great effectiveness will be most valuable.
539. Machine guns should be attached to the advance guard. In meeting
engagements they will be of great value in assisting their own
advance, or in checking the advance of the enemy, and will have
considerable time to operate before hostile artillery fire can silence
them.
Care must be taken not to leave them too long in action.
540. They are valuable to a rear guard which seeks to check a vigorous
pursuit or to gain time.
541. In attack, if fire of position is practicable, they are of great
value. In this case fire should not be opened by the machine guns
until the attack is well advanced. At a critical period in the attack,
such fire, if suddenly and unexpectedly opened, will greatly assist
the advancing line. The fire must be as heavy as possible and must be
continued until masked by friendly troops or until the hostile
artillery finds the machine guns.
542. In the defense, machine guns should be used in the same general
manner as described above for the attack. Concealment and patient
waiting for critical moments and exceptional opportunities are the
special characteristics of the machine gun service in decisive
actions.
543. As part of the reserve, machine guns have special importance. If
they are with the troops told off to protect the flanks, and if they
are well placed, they will often produce decisive results against a
hostile turning movement. They are especially qualified to cover a
withdrawal or make a captured position secure.
544. Machine guns should not be assigned to the firing line of an
attack. They should be so placed that fire directed upon them is not
likely to fall upon the firing line.
545. A skirmish line can not advance by walking or running when
hostile machine guns have the correct range and are ready to fire.
Machine-gun fire is not specially effective against troops lying on
the ground or crawling.
546. When opposed by machine guns and without artillery to destroy
them, infantry itself must silence them before it can advance.
An infantry command that must depend upon itself for protection
against machine guns should concentrate a large number of rifles on
each gun in turn and until it has silenced it.
_AMMUNITION SUPPLY._
547. The method of supply of ammunition to the combat trains is
explained in Field Service Regulations.
548. The combat train is the immediate reserve supply of the
battalion, and the major is responsible for its proper use. He will
take measures to insure the maintenance of the prescribed allowance at
all times.
In the absence of instructions, he will cause the train to march
immediately in rear of his battalion, and, upon separating from it to
enter an engagement, will cause the ammunition therein to be issued.
When emptied, he will direct that the wagons proceed to the proper
rendezvous to be refilled. Ordinarily a rendezvous is appointed for
each brigade and the necessary number of wagons sent forward to it
from the ammunition column.
549. When refilled, the combat wagons will rejoin their battalions,
or, if the latter be engaged, will join or establish communication
with the regimental reserve.
550. Company commanders are responsible that the belts of the men in
their companies are kept filled at all times, except when the
ammunition is being expended in action. In the firing line the
ammunition of the dead and wounded should be secured whenever
practicable.
551. Ammunition in the bandoleers will ordinarily be expended first.
Thirty rounds in the right pocket section of the belt will be held as
a reserve, to be expended only when ordered by an officer.
552. When necessary to resupply the firing line, ammunition will be
sent forward with reenforcements, generally from the regimental
reserve.
Men will never be sent back from the firing line for ammunition. Men
sent forward with ammunition remain with the firing line.
553. As soon as possible after an engagement the belts of the men and
the combat wagons are resupplied to their normal capacities.
Ammunition which can not be reloaded on combat wagons will be piled up
in a convenient place and left under guard.
_MOUNTED SCOUTS._
554. The mounted scouts should be thoroughly trained in patrolling and
reconnaissance. They are used for communication with neighboring
troops, for patrolling off the route of march, for march outposts,
outpost patrols, combat patrols, reconnaissance ahead of columns, etc.
Their further use is, in general, confined to escort and messenger
duty. They should be freely used for all these purposes, but for these
purposes only.
555. When infantry is acting alone, or when the cavalry of a mixed
command has been sent to a distance, the mounted scouts are of special
importance to covering detachments and should be used to make the
reconnaissance which would otherwise fall to cavalry.
556. In reconnaissance, scouts should be used in preference to other
troops as much as possible. When not needed for mounted duty, they
should be employed for necessary dismounted patrolling.
557. Battalion staff officers should be specially trained in
patrolling and reconnaissance work in order that they may be available
when a mounted officer's patrol is required.
_NIGHT OPERATIONS._
558. By employing night operations troops make use of the cover of
darkness to minimize losses from hostile fire or to escape
observation. Night operations may also be necessary for the purpose of
gaining time. Control is difficult and confusion is frequently
unavoidable.
It may be necessary to take advantage of darkness in order to assault
from a point gained during the day, or to approach a point from which
a daylight assault is to be made, or to effect both the approach and
the assault.
559. Offensive and defensive night operations should be practiced
frequently in order that troops may learn to cover ground in the dark
and arrive at a destination quietly and in good order, and in order to
train officers in the necessary preparation and reconnaissance.
Only simple and well-appointed formations should be employed.
Troops should be thoroughly trained in the necessary details--e.g.,
night patrolling, night marching, and communication at night.
560. The ground to be traversed should be studied by daylight and, if
practicable, at night. It should be cleared of hostile detachments
before dark, and, if practicable, should be occupied by covering
troops.
Orders must be formulated with great care and clearness. Each unit
must be given a definite objective and direction, and care must be
exercised to avoid collision between units.
Whenever contact with the enemy is anticipated, a distinctive badge
should be worn by all.
561. Preparations must be made with secrecy. When the movement is
started, and not until then, the officers and men should be acquainted
with the general design, the composition of the whole force, and
should be given such additional information as will insure cooperation
and eliminate mistakes.
During the movement every precaution must be taken to keep secret the
fact that troops are abroad.
Unfriendly guides must frequently be impressed. These should be
secured against escape, outcry, or deception.
Fire action should be avoided in offensive operations. In general,
pieces should not be loaded. Men must be trained to rely upon the
bayonet and to use it aggressively.
562. Long night marches should be made only over well-defined routes.
March discipline must be rigidly enforced. The troops should be
marched in as compact a formation as practicable, with the usual
covering detachments. Advance and rear guard distances should be
greatly reduced. They are shortest when the mission is an offensive
one. The connecting files are numerous.
563. A night advance made with a view to making an attack by day
usually terminates with the hasty construction of intrenchments in the
dark. Such an advance should be timed so as to allow an hour or more
of darkness for intrenching.
An advance that is to terminate in an assault at the break of day
should be timed so that the troops will not arrive long before the
assault is to be made; otherwise the advantage of partial surprise
will be lost and the enemy will be allowed to reenforce the threatened
point.
564. The night attack is ordinarily confined to small forces, or to
minor engagements in a general battle, or to seizure of positions
occupied by covering or advanced detachments. Decisive results are not
often obtained.
Poorly disciplined and untrained troops are unfit for night attacks or
for night operations demanding the exercise of skill and care.
Troops attacking at night can advance close to the enemy in compact
formations and without suffering loss from hostile artillery or
infantry fire. The defender is ignorant of the strength or direction
of the attack.
A force which makes a vigorous bayonet charge in the dark will often
throw a much larger force into disorder.
565. Reconnaissance should be made to ascertain the position and
strength of the enemy and to study the terrain to be traversed.
Officers who are to participate in the attack should conduct this
reconnaissance. Reconnaissance at night is especially valuable.
Features that are distinguishable at night should be carefully noted,
and their distances from the enemy, from the starting point of the
troops, and from other important points should be made known.
Preparations should have in view as complete a surprise as possible.
An attack once begun must be carried to its conclusion, even if the
surprise is not as complete as was planned or anticipated.
566. The time of night at which the attack should be made depends upon
the object sought. If a decisive attack is intended, it will generally
yield the best results if made just before daylight. If the object is
merely to gain an intrenched position for further operations, an
earlier hour is necessary in order that the position gained may be
intrenched under cover of darkness.
567. The formation for attack must be simple. It should be carefully
effected and the troops verified at a safe distance from the enemy.
The attacking troops should be formed in compact lines and with strong
supports at short distances. The reserve should be far enough in rear
to avoid being drawn into the action until the commander so desires.
Bayonets are fixed, pieces are not loaded.
Darkness causes fire to be wild and ineffective. The attacking troops
should march steadily on the enemy without firing, but should be
prepared and determined to fight vigorously with the bayonet.
In advancing to the attack the aim should be to get as close as
possible to the enemy before being discovered, then to trust to the
bayonet.
If the assault is successful, preparations must be made at once to
repel a counterattack.
568. On the defense, preparations to resist night attacks should be
made by daylight whenever such attacks are to be feared.
Obstacles placed in front of a defensive position are especially
valuable to the defense at night. Many forms of obstacles which would
give an attacker little concern in the daytime become serious
hindrances at night.
After dark the foreground should be illuminated whenever practicable
and strong patrols should be pushed to the front.
When it is learned that the enemy is approaching, the trenches are
filled and the supports moved close to the firing line.
Supports fix bayonets, but do not load. Whenever practicable and
necessary they should be used for counterattacks, preferably against a
hostile flank.
The defender should open fire as soon as results may be expected. This
fire may avert or postpone the bayonet combat, and it warns all
supporting troops. It is not likely that fire alone can stop the
attack. The defender must be resolved to fight with the bayonet.
Ordinarily fire will not be effective at ranges exceeding 50 yards.
A white rag around the muzzle of the rifle will assist in sighting the
piece when the front sight is not visible.
See paragraphs 450, 482, 483, 509, 510.
_INFANTRY AGAINST CAVALRY._
569. A cavalry charge can accomplish little against infantry, even in
inferior numbers, unless the latter are surprised, become
panic-stricken, run away, or can not use their rifles.
570. A charge from the front is easily checked by a well-directed and
sustained fire.
If the charge is directed against the flank of the firing line, the
supports, reserves, or machine guns should stop it. If this
disposition is impracticable, part of the line must meet the charge by
a timely change of front. If the flank company, or companies, in the
firing line execute _platoons right_, the successive firing lines can
ordinarily break a charge against the flank. If the cavalry line
passes through the firing line, the latter will be little damaged if
the men retain their presence of mind. They should be on the watch for
succeeding cavalry lines and leave those that have passed through to
friendly troops in rear.
571. Men standing are in the best position to meet a charge, but other
considerations may compel them to meet it lying prone.
572. In a mêlée, the infantryman with his bayonet has at least an even
chance with the cavalryman, but the main dependence of infantry is
rifle fire. Any formation is suitable that permits the free use of the
necessary number of rifles.
Ordinarily there will be no time to change or set sights. Fire at will
at battle sight should be used, whatever the range may be. It will
usually be unwise to open fire at long ranges.
573. An infantry column that encounters cavalry should deploy at once.
If attacked from the head or rear of the column, and if time is
pressing, it may form a succession of skirmish lines. Infantry, by
deploying 50 or 100 yards in rear of an obstacle, may check cavalry
and hold it under fire beyond effective pistol range.
In any situation, to try to escape the issue by running is the worst
and most dangerous course the infantry can adopt.
574. In attacking dismounted cavalry, infantry should close rapidly
and endeavor to prevent remounting. Infantry which adopts this course
will not be seriously checked by delaying cavalry.
Every effort should be made to locate and open fire on the led
horses.
_INFANTRY AGAINST ARTILLERY._
575. A frontal attack against artillery has little chance of
succeeding unless it can be started from cover at comparatively short
range. Beyond short range, the frontal fire of infantry has little
effect against the artillery personnel because of their protective
shields.
Machine guns, because their cone of fire is more compact, will have
greater effect, but on the other hand they will have fewer
opportunities and they are limited to fire attack only.
As a rule, one's own artillery is the best weapon against hostile
artillery.
576. Artillery attacked in flank by infantry can be severely damaged.
Oblique or flank fire will begin to have decisive effect when
delivered at effective range from a point to one side of the
artillery's line of fire and distant from it by about half the range.
Artillery is better protected on the side of the caisson.
577. Guns out of ammunition, but otherwise secure against infantry
attack, may be immobilized by fire which will prevent their
withdrawal, or by locating and driving off their limbers. Or they may
be kept out of action by fire which will prevent the receipt of
ammunition.
578. Artillery when limbered is helpless against infantry fire. If
caught at effective range while coming into action or while limbering,
artillery can be severely punished by infantry fire.
In attacking artillery that is trying to escape, the wheel horses are
the best targets.
_ARTILLERY SUPPORTS._
579. The purpose of the artillery support is to guard the artillery
against surprise or attack.
Artillery on the march or in action is ordinarily so placed as to be
amply protected by the infantry. Infantry always protects artillery in
its neighborhood.
580. The detail of a support is not necessary except when the
artillery is separated from the main body or occupies a position in
which its flanks are not protected.
The detail of a special support will be avoided whenever possible.
581. The formation of an artillery support depends upon circumstances.
On the march it may often be necessary to provide advance, flank, and
rear protection. The country must be thoroughly reconnoitered by
patrols within long rifle range.
582. In action, the formation and location of the support must be such
as to gain and give timely information of the enemy's approach and to
offer actual resistance to the enemy beyond effective rifle range of
the artillery's flanks. It should not be close enough to the artillery
to suffer from fire directed at the artillery. In most cases a
position somewhat to the flank and rear best fulfills these
conditions.
583. The support commander is charged only with the protection of the
artillery. The tactical employment of each arm rests with its
commander. The two should cooperate.
_INTRENCHMENTS._
(Plate V.)
584. Ordinarily, infantry intrenches itself whenever it is compelled
to halt for a considerable time in the presence of the enemy.
Infantry charged with a resisting mission should intrench whenever
there is any likelihood that the cover constructed will be of use.
585. Except in permanent fortifications or in fortifications prepared
long in advance, the infantry plans and constructs the field works
that it will occupy.
When performing their duties in this connection officers should bear
in mind that profile and construction are simple matters compared with
location and correct tactical use.
586. Intrenchments enable the commander to hold a position with the
least possible number of men and to prolong his line or increase his
reserve.
They are constructed with a view to giving cover which will diminish
losses, but they must not be so built or placed as to interfere with
the free use of the rifle. Fire effect is the first consideration.
587. The trace of a fire trench or of a system of fire trenches
depends upon the ground and the proposed density of the entire firing
line. The trenches are laid out in company lengths, if possible.
Adjoining trenches should afford each other mutual support. The flanks
and important gaps in the line should be protected by fire trenches
echeloned in rear. (Fig. 6).
588. To locate the trace, lie on the ground at intervals and select
the best field of fire consistent with the requirements of the
situation.
A profile should be selected which will permit the fire to sweep the
foreground, require the minimum of labor and time, and permit the best
concealment. No fixed type can be prescribed. The type must be
selected with due regard to the terrain, the enemy, time, tools,
materials, soil, etc.
589. _Hasty cover._ With the intrenching tool, troops can quickly
throw up a low parapet about 3 feet thick which will furnish
considerable cover against rifle fire, but scarcely any against
shrapnel. Such cover is frequently of value to an attack that is
temporarily unable to continue. In time, and particularly at night, it
may be developed into a deep fire or cover trench.
590. _Fire trenches_ should be placed and constructed so as to give a
good field of fire and to give the troops protection behind a vertical
wall, preferably with some head or overhead cover. They should be
concealed or inconspicuous in order to avoid artillery fire or to
decrease its accuracy. They should have natural or artificial
communication with their supports, but in establishing the trace this
is a secondary consideration.
The simplest form of fire trench is deep and narrow and has a flat,
concealed parapet. (Fig. 1.) In ordinary soil, and on a basis of two
reliefs and tasks of 5 feet, it can be constructed in about two hours
with intrenching tools.
This trench affords fair cover for troops subjected to fire, but not
actually firing. When it is probable that time will permit
elaboration, the simple trench should be planned with a view to
developing it ultimately into a more complete form. (Figs. 2 and 3.)
Devices should be added to increase the security of the trench and the
comfort of the men.
Where the excavated earth is easily removed, a fire trench without
parapet may be the one best suited to the soil and other conditions
affecting the choice of profile. (Fig. 4.) The enemy's infantry, as
well as his artillery, will generally have great difficulty in seeing
this type of trench.
In very difficult soil, if the time is short, it may be necessary to
dig a wider, shallower trench with a higher parapet.
[Illustration: Plate V.]
Head cover, notches, and loop holes are of value to troops when
firing, but many forms weaken and disclose the location of the
parapet. Filled sandbags kept in the trench when the men are not
firing may be thrown on the parapet to form notches or loopholes when
the troops in the trench open fire and concealment of the trench is no
longer necessary or possible.
By the use of observation stations the maximum rest and security is
afforded the troops. Stations are best located in the angles of
traverses or at the end of the trench.
591. Where the nature of the position makes it advisable to construct
traverses at regular intervals it is generally best to construct a
section of trench for each squad, with traverses between squads. (Fig.
5.)
592. _Cover trenches_ are placed as closely as practicable to their
respective fire trenches. Where natural cover is not available, each
fire trench should have artificial cover in rear for its
support--either a cover trench of its own or one in common with an
adjoining fire trench.
The cover trench is simple and rectangular in profile. Concealment is
indispensable. It is generally concealed by the contour of the ground
or by natural features, but to guard against hostile searching fire
overhead cover is frequently advisable.
Cover trenches should be made as comfortable as possible. It will
often be advisable to make them extensive enough to provide cooking
and resting facilities for the garrisons of the corresponding fire
trenches.
593. _Communicating trenches_ are frequently necessary in order to
connect fire trenches with their corresponding cover trenches where
natural, covered communication is impracticable. They are generally
rectangular in profile, deep, and narrow. They are traversed or
zigzagged to escape enfilade.
Returns or pockets should be provided for use as latrines, storerooms,
dressing stations, passing points for troops, etc.
Cover from observation while passing through the trench may insure
against loss as effectively as material cover from the enemy's fire.
_Communicating ways_, naturally or artificially screened from the
enemy's view, sometimes provide sufficient cover for the passage of
troops.
594. _Dummy trenches_ frequently draw the enemy's attention and fire
and thus protect the true fire trench.
Any type is suitable which presents to the enemy the appearance of a
true trench imperfectly concealed.
595. When it is uncertain whether time will permit the completion of
all the work planned, work should proceed with due regard to the order
of importance of the several operations. Ordinarily the order of
importance will be:
1. Clearing foreground to improve the field of fire and construction
of fire trench.
2. Head or overhead cover; concealment.
3. Placing obstacles and recording ranges.
4. Cover trenches for supports and local reserves.
5. Communicating trenches.
6. Widening and deepening of trenches; interior conveniences.
See paragraph 568.
_MINOR WARFARE._
596. Minor warfare embraces both regular and irregular operations.
Regular operations consist of minor actions involving small bodies of
trained and organized troops on both sides.
The tactics employed are in general those prescribed for the smaller
units.
597. Irregular operations consist of actions against unorganized or
partially organized forces, acting in independent or semi-independent
bodies. Such bodies have little or only crude training and are under
nominal and loose leadership and control. They assemble, roam about,
and disperse at will. They endeavor to win by stealth or by force of
superior numbers, employing ambuscades, sudden dashes or rushes, and
hand-to-hand fighting.
Troops operating against such an enemy usually do so in small units,
such as platoons, detachments, or companies, and the tactics employed
must be adapted to meet the requirements of the situation. Frequently
the enemy's own methods may be employed to advantage.
In general, such operations should not be undertaken hastily; every
preparation should be made to strike suddenly and to inflict the
maximum punishment.
598. In general, the service of information will be insufficient;
adequate reconnaissance will rarely be practicable. March and bivouac
formations must be such as to admit of rapid deployment and fire
action in any direction.
599. In the open country, where surprise is not probable, troops may
be marched in column of squads preceded, within sight, by a squad as
an advance party.
600. In close country, where surprise is possible, the troops must be
held in a close formation. The use of flank patrols becomes difficult.
Occasionally, an advance party--never less than a squad--may be sent
out. In general, however, such a party accomplishes little, since an
enemy intent on surprise will permit it to pass unmolested and will
fall upon the main body.
Under such conditions, especially when the road or trail is narrow,
the column of twos or files is a convenient formation, the officers
placing themselves in the column so as to divide it into nearly equal
parts. If rushed from a flank, such a column will be in readiness to
face and fire toward either or both flank, the ranks being back to
back; if rushed from the front, the head of the column may be
deployed, the rest of the column closing up to support it and to
protect its flanks and rear. In any event, the men should be taught to
take some form of a closed back-to-back formation.
601. The column may often be broken into two or more approximately
equal detachments separated on the march by distances of 50 to 100
yards. As a rule the detachments should not consist of less than 25
men each. With this arrangement of the column, it will rarely be
possible for an enemy to close simultaneously with all of the
detachments, one or more being left unengaged and under control to
support those engaged or to inflict severe punishment upon the enemy
when he is repulsed.
602. The site for camp or bivouac should be selected with special
reference to economical and effective protection against surprise.
Double sentinels are posted on the avenues of approach and the troops
sleep in readiness for instant action. When practicable, troops should
be instructed in advance as to what they are to do in case of attack
at night.
603. Night operations are frequently advisable. With the small forces
employed, control is not difficult. Irregular troops rarely provide
proper camp protection, and they may frequently be surprised and
severely punished by a properly conducted night march and attack.
_PATROLS._
604. The following paragraphs on patrols are placed here for
convenience. They relate in particular to the conduct of the patrol
and its leader, and apply to patrols employed in covering detachments
as well as in combat reconnaissance.
605. A patrol is a detachment sent out from a command to gain
information of the country or of the enemy, or to prevent the enemy
from gaining information. In special cases patrols may be given
missions other than these.
606. The commander must have clearly in mind the purpose for which the
patrol is to be used in order that he may determine its proper
strength, select its leader, and give the latter proper instructions.
In general, a patrol should be sent out for one definite purpose only.
607. The strength of a patrol varies from two or three men to a
company. It should be strong enough to accomplish its purpose, and no
stronger.
If the purpose is to gain information only, a small patrol is better
than a large one. The former conceals itself more readily and moves
less conspicuously. For observing from some point in plain view of the
command or for visiting or reconnoitering between outguards two men
are sufficient.
If messages are to be sent back, the patrol must be strong enough to
furnish the probable number of messengers without reducing the patrol
to less than two men. If hostile patrols are likely to be met and must
be driven off, the patrol must be strong.
In friendly territory, a weaker patrol may be used than would be used
for the corresponding purpose in hostile territory.
608. The character of the leader selected for the patrol depends upon
the importance of the work in hand.
For patrolling between the groups or along the lines of an outpost, or
for the simpler patrols sent out from a covering detachment, the
average soldier will be a competent leader.
609. For a patrol sent out to gain information, or for a distant
patrol sent out from a covering detachment, the leader must be
specially selected. He must be able to cover large areas with few men;
he must be able to estimate the strength of hostile forces, to report
intelligently as to their dispositions, to read indications, and to
judge as to the importance of the information gained. He must possess
endurance, courage, and good judgment.
His instructions should be full and clear. He must be made to
understand exactly what is required of him, where to go and when to
return. He should be given such information of the enemy and country
as may be of value to him. He should be informed as to the general
location of his own forces, particularly of those with whom he may
come in contact. If possible, he should be given a map of the country
he is to traverse, and in many cases his route may be specified.
Besides his arms and ammunition, the patrol leader should have a
compass, a watch, a pencil, a note book, and, when practicable, field
message blanks and a map of the country.
The patrol leader assembles the men detailed for the patrol. He
inspects their arms and ammunition and satisfies himself that they are
in suitable condition for the duty. He sees that none has any papers,
maps, etc., that would be of value to the enemy if captured. He sees
that their accouterments do not glisten or rattle when they move. He
then repeats his instructions to the patrol and assures himself that
every man understands them. He explains the signals to be used and
satisfies himself that they are understood. He designates a man to
take his place should he be disabled.
610. The formation and movements of the patrol must be regulated so as
to render probable the escape of at least one man should the patrol
encounter a superior force. The formation will depend upon the nature
of the ground traversed and the cover afforded. The leader must adopt
the formation and measures best suited to the accomplishment of his
object.
In general, it should have the formation of a main body with advance,
rear, and flank guards, though each be represented only by a single
man.
611. The distances separating the members of the patrol vary according
to the ground. If too close together, they see no more than one man;
if too widely separated they are likely to be lost to the control of
the leader.
With a patrol of four or five men the distances may vary from 25 to 50
yards; with a larger patrol they may be as great as 100 yards.
At times a column of files, separated by the distances prescribed, is
a satisfactory formation.
612. The country must be carefully observed as the patrol advances. In
passing over a hill, the country beyond should first be observed by
one man; houses, inclosures, etc., should be approached in a similar
manner or avoided entirely; woods should generally be reconnoitered in
a thin skirmish line.
613. The strength and composition of hostile troops must be observed.
If they can not be counted, their strength may be estimated by the
length of time a column consumes in passing a given point, or by the
area covered if in camp.
Patrol leaders should know, if practicable, the uniforms, guidons,
etc., of the enemy, as it will assist in determining the class of
troops seen when no other means for doing so are available.
Insignia from the enemy's uniforms, picked up by patrols, often convey
valuable information by indicating what troops are in the vicinity.
614. Patrols avoid fighting, except in self-defense or in order to
prevent the enemy's patrols from gaining valuable information, or when
necessary in order to accomplish their mission. In such cases, a
patrol should fight resolutely even though inferior in numbers.
615. Information gained by patrols is generally of no value unless
received in time to be of use to the commander. Patrol leaders must
therefore send back information of importance as soon as it is gained
unless the patrol itself is to return at once.
616. If written, messages should state the place, date, hour, and
minute of their dispatch. The information contained in them should be
clearly and concisely expressed. They should be signed by the patrol
leader.
The authorized message book should be used and the form therein
adhered to.
617. If the message be an oral one, the patrol leader should require
the messenger to repeat it before starting back. In general, an oral
message should cover but one point. Except when there is little chance
of error in transmission, messages should be written.
618. When in friendly territory and not very far from friendly troops,
one messenger is sufficient unless the message is very important. In
hostile territory, either two men should go together or the message
should be sent in duplicate by different routes.
619. Whether the information gained is of sufficient importance to be
reported at once or may await the return of the patrol is a question
which must be decided in each case. In case of reasonable doubt, it is
generally better to send the report promptly. If the patrol leader has
received proper instructions before starting out and has the requisite
ability to lead a patrol, he can generally decide such questions
satisfactorily as they arise.
620. Infantry patrols are generally used for work within 2 miles of
supporting troops, but cases arise where they must go to greater
distances.
621. Patrols composed of mounted scouts are conducted like cavalry
patrols and should be trained in accordance with the Cavalry Drill
Regulations.
For distant patrolling, a mounted patrol under an officer should be
used.
622. For controlling the movements of the patrol, the leader should,
when necessary, make use of the arm signals prescribed in these
regulations.
On account of the short distances separating them, ordinary
communication between members of the patrol is best effected quietly
by word of mouth.
When a member of a patrol is sent to a distant point, communication
may be effected by means of simple, prearranged signals.
When practicable, the patrol leader may communicate with the main body
by means of visual signaling.