Those who maintain the doctrine of what is called the immortality of the

soul, contend for the existence of a living, thinking spirit, which,

they say, is not the body, and which, they urge, will continue when the

body has ceased. The burden of proving this "soul" rests on those who

maintain and assert it. It is clear that there is no identity between

life and "soul;" life commences, varies, and ceases, in accordance with

the growth, decay, and dissolution of the body. The orthodox contention

for soul must be that its existence is independent of the body, and this

shows that soul is not life. Nor is there any identity between mind and

soul. All perception is dependent on the (bodily) perceptive ability and

its exercise. All thought has some action of the bodily organism for its

immediate antecedent and accompaniment. As the soul is not life, is not

mind, and cannot be body, what is it? To call it spirit, and to leave

the word spirit undefined is to do nothing. Religionists talk to me of

my "soul;" that is, an individual soul continuing to exist, they say,

with a continuing consciousness of personal identity after "I" am dead.

But if a baby two months old dies, what consciousness of personal

identity continues in such a case? Or, if an idiot from birth dies at

the age of eighteen: or if a person, sane until twenty, becomes insane,

lives insane until forty, and then dies: in either of these two cases

what is it that is supposed to be the personal identity which continues

after death? And what is meant by my "soul" living after "I" am dead?

The word "I" to me represents the bodily organism, its vital and mental

activities. To tell me that my body dies and that yet my life continues

is a contradiction in terms. To declare that my life has ended, but that

I continue to think is to affirm a like contradiction. Religionists seem

to think that they avoid the difficulty, or turn it upon us, by

propounding riddles. They analyse the body, and, giving a list of what

they call elementary substances, they say: Can oxygen think? can carbon

think? can nitrogen think? and when they have triumphantly gone through

the list, they add, that as none of these by itself can think, thought

is not a result of matter, but is a quality of soul. This reasoning at

best only amounts to declaring, "We know what body is, but we know

nothing of soul; as we cannot understand how body, which we do know, can

think, we therefore declare that it is soul, which we do not know, that

does think." There is a still greater fault in this theological

reasoning in favor of the soul, for it assumes, contrary to experience,

that no quality or result can be found in a given combination which is

not also discoverable in each or any of the modes, parts, atoms, or

elements combined. Yet this is monstrously absurd. Sugar tastes sweet,

but neither carbon, nor oxygen, nor hydrogen, separately tasted,

exhibits sweetness; yet sugar is the word by which you describe a

certain combination of carbon, oxygen, and hydrogen. I contend that the

word "soul," in relation to human, vital, and mental phenomena, occupies

an analagous position to that which used to be occupied by such words as

"demon," "genii," "gnome," "fairy," "gods," in relation to general

physical phenomena.

The ability to think is never found except as an ability of animal

organisation, and the ability is always found higher or lower as the

organisation is higher or lower: the exercise of this ability varies in

childhood, youth, prime, and old age, and is promoted or hindered by

climate, food, and mode of life; yet the orthodox maintainers of soul

require us to believe that the ability to think might be found without

animal organisation, and might, nay will, exist independent of all vital

conditions. They contend that what they call the soul will live when the

human being has ceased to live; but they do not explain whether it did

live before the human being began to live. The orthodox contend that as

what they call the elementary substances, taken separately, do not

think, therefore man without a soul cannot think, and that as man does

think he must have a soul. This argument, if valid at all, goes much too

far; a trout thinks, a carp thinks, a rat thinks, a dog thinks, a horse

thinks, and, by parity of reasoning, all these animals should have

immortal souls.

It is sometimes urged that to deny the immortality of the soul is to

reduce man to the level of the beast, but it is forgotten that mankind

are not quite on a level. Take the savage, with lower jaw projecting far

in advance, and compare him with Dante, Shakspere,

Milton, or Voltaire. Take the Papuan and Plato; the Esquimaux and

Confucius; and then ask whether it is possible to contend that all human

beings have equal souls?

The orthodox man declares that my soul is spirit, that my body is

matter; that my soul has nothing in common with my body; that it exists

entirely independently of my body; that my soul lives after my body has

ceased to live; that, after my body has decayed, is disintegrated, and

become absorbed in and commingled with the elements, my soul still

continues uncorrupted and unaffected. But not a shadow of proof or even

of reasonable explanation is offered in support of any clause in this

declaration. The word "spirit" is left utterly undefined. No sort of

explanation is given of the nexus between the two alleged distinct

existences, "body" and "soul." Not a trace is suggested of "soul,"

otherwise than through what are admittedly material conditions.

Those who allege that there is a distinct "soul" which is to live for

ever should also explain whether or not this soul has always

existed--i.e. whether my soul existed prior to the commencement and

clearly traceable growth of my body? And where? And for how long? If it

did exist prior to my commencement in the womb, how was it then

identifiable as my soul? If prior to my body it was not so identifiable,

how will it be identifiable after my body has ceased? If the soul

existed prior to my body, had it always existed? If yes, do you mean

that each soul is eternal? That no soul has ever begun to be?

If you argue for the eternity of the soul, you deny God as universal

creator; if you contend that soul commenced or was commenced, you should

also admit that it may finish or be finished. If the soul existed prior

to my body, had it been waiting inactive, but ready to occupy my body?

And if yes, when did the occupation commence? And was the soul always

existing perfect and unimprovable? If after vitalisation the unborn

child dies, what becomes of the soul? and what is it in such a case that

evidences that the particular soul had ever existed? If after birth the

baby dies before it thinks, though after it has breathed, where in this

case is the trace of the soul? If it should be conceded that my soul

only began with my body, why is it to be maintained that it will not

cease with my body? If, as is pretended, my "soul" is not identifiable

with my body, how is it that all intellectual manifestations are

affected by my bodily condition, growth, health, decay? If the soul is

immortal and immaterial, how is it that temporary pressure on the brain

may paralyse and prevent all mental manifestation, and that fracture by

a poker or by a bullet may annihilate the possibility of any further

mental activity? Henri Taine and Charles Darwin have very carefully

noted for us the evidence of gradual growth of sensitive ability and of

mind in children. Those who tell us of soul--which is, they say, not

body, nor quality of body, nor result of body, nor influenced by

body--should at least explain to us how it is that all manifestations

which they say are peculiar to soul keep pace with, and are limited by,

the development of body.

What the orthodox claim under the word soul is really the totality of

mental ability--founded in perception--and its exercise; dependent,

first, on the perceptive ability of the perceiver, and, secondly, on the

range of the activity of such ability. Even two individuals of similar

perceptive ability may have a varied store of perceptions, and later

perceptions in each case, even of identical phenomena, may in

consequence have different values. The memory of perception, comparison

of and distinguishment between perceptions, thoughts upon and concepts

as to perceptions, memory, comparison and distinguishment of all or any

of these, the various mental processes included in doubting, believing,

reasoning, willing, etc., all these--which I contend are the

consequences of vital organisation, commence with it, are strengthened

and weakened, and, which I maintain, cease with it--are included by the

orthodox under the word "soul." None of the orthodox, and few of the

spiritualists, contend that the "memory" of the rat, the cow, or the

horse is to survive the decease of rat, cow, and horse. Scarcely anyone

is hardy enough to maintain that the ghost of the thinking sheep

persists with active thought after the slaughterhouse and dinner of

roast mutton. Yet if one range of animal mental ability is to be

classified as immortal, why not all? Why claim immortality for the

"soul" of the idiot, and deny it to the thought, memory, reason, faith,

doubt, and will of the retriever? None claim immortality for the

brightness of the steel when oxidation has so disfigured the surface

that rust has superseded all brilliance; none claim immortality for the

sweet odor of the rose when the vegetable mass emits only unpleasant

smells and exhibits unsightly rottenness; none claim immortality for the

color of the beautiful lily decayed and withered away. Those who claim

immortality for what they call the "soul" should first clearly define

it, and then at least try to prove that the attributes they claim for

soul are not the attributes of what we know as living body.

The word "mind" describes all the possible states of consciousness of

each animal; but as after its death there is no longer in that case any

continuing animal, so neither is there any possibly continuing mind. But

it is only in connexion with the mental and vital processes that there

is any shadow of attempt by theologians to in any fashion identify soul,

and therefore when life has ceased and consciousness is consequently no

longer, there is not even the faintest trace of aught remaining to which

the word "soul" can with any reasonableness be applied from the

theological standpoint. Dr. John Drysdale says: "The mind, looked at in

its complete state, in its unity, personality, obedience to laws of its

own, apparent spontaneity of action and controlling power over the body,

and in the total dissimilarity of all its phenomena from all known

bodily and material effects, has been almost universally ascribed to the

working of an immaterial substance added to organised matter. But such a

substance is quite as hypothetical as the potentiality of mind lying in

matter, and hence it explains nothing; whereas, if we grant the

possibility of consciousness as a concomitant of certain material

changes, the peculiarities of mind as an action or function require no

further explanation than the conditions of those changes;" and, he adds,

"it may be held proved in physiology that for every feeling, every

thought, and every volition, a correlative change takes place in the

nerve-matter, and, given this special change in every respect identical,

a similar state of circumstances will always arise; that this process

occupies time, that it requires a due supply of oxygenated blood, that

it is interrupted or destroyed by whatever impairs the integrity of the

nerve-matter, and, lastly, it is exhausted by its own activity and

requires rest."

"If," says the same writer, "the mind is merely a function of the

material organism, it must necessarily perish with it. If mind and life

are a compound of matter and some diffused ethereal spiritual substance,

then at death a personal continuance is equally impossible. If mind is a

spirit at all, it must be a definite, indivisible piece of spiritual

substance; and if naturally indestructible and immortal as the personal

human individual, it must be equally so in all individuals which display

mind. Now, it is too late in the day to require a single sentence in

proof of the existence of mind in animals; therefore, if the possession

of mind naturally involves the immortality of the soul, the latter must

be shared equally with the animals who certainly also possess the

conscious Ego;" and Dr. J. Drysdale maintains that mind is essentially

of the same nature in animals and in man, although of higher and wider

scope in the latter, and that in all cases mind is a function of

organised matter and necessarily perishes when that organisation ceases.

In all animals the living brain is essential to all phases of thought.

The thought-ability of any animal is always in precise proportion to the

perfection and activity of the brain. The power of developing thought

grows, diminishes, and ceases, the cessation always being complete when

the brain ceases to perform its vital functions. If the brain is injured

the thought-ability is impaired, the thinking deranged. Yet who to-day

would think it wise or necessary, with evidence of aberration of thought

resulting from local injury, to treat it as a case of demoniacal

possession?

One other difficulty in the discussion of this question is that new

discoveries are not taken into account by our spiritual antagonists in

estimating the value of old formulas. Two thousand three hundred years

ago demonology had not yet passed into the region of fable. Socrates

spoke of the soul as if it had been specially infused into the body by

the Gods, and declared "that the soul which resides in thy body can

govern it at pleasure;" but such discoveries have since been made in

physiology and psychology that were Socrates alive to-day Aristodemus

might now well make answers to the old Greek sage which were then

impossible. Plato, too, contended for the immortality of the human soul,

but under cover of this line of reasoning he also offered proof that the

world was an animal and had a like soul. Plato's orthodox admirers today

carefully avoid Plato's presentation of the earth as an animal with an

immortal soul. David Masson attributes to Auguste Comte the first open

and clear adoption of a position on the soul question which rendered

evasion difficult. "Previous physiological psychologists, including

phrenologists, had generally shrunk from the extreme to which their

opponents had said they were committed. They had kept up the

time-honored distinction between mind and body; they had used language

implying a recognition of some unknown anima, or vital principle,

concealed behind the animal organism; some of them had even been anxious

to vindicate their belief in the immateriality or transcendental nature

of this principle. But Comte ended all that shilly-shallying. Mind, he

said, is the name for the functions of brain and nerve; mind is brain

and nerve. This destroyed, that ceases."

In his "Enigmas of Life" William Rathbone Greg concedes that "visible

and ascertainable phenomena give no countenance to the theory of a

future or spiritual life." He urges that a sense of identity, a

conscious continuity of the Ego, is an essential element of the

doctrine, and Mr. Greg speaks of this as accounting for "the astonishing

doctrine of the resurrection of the body which has so strangely and

thoughtlessly found its way into the popular creed. The primitive

parents or congealers of that creed--whoever they may have

been--innocent of all science, and oddly muddled in their metaphysics,

but resolute in their conviction that the same persons who died here

should be, in very deed, the same who should rise

hereafter--systematised their anticipations into the notion that the

grave should give up its actual inmates for their ordained

transformation and their allotted fate. The current notion of the

approaching end of the world, no doubt helped to blind them to the

vulnerability, and indeed the fatal self-contradictions, of the form in

which they had embodied their faith. Of course, if they had taken time

to think, or if the Fathers of the Church had been more given to

thinking in the rigid meaning of the word, they would have discovered

that this special form rendered that faith absurd, indefensible, and

virtually impossible. They did not know, or they never considered, that

the buried body soon dissolves into its elements, which, in the course

of generations and centuries, pass into other combinations, form part of

other living creatures, feed and constitute countless organisations one

after another; so that when the graves are summoned 'to give up the dead

that are in them,' and the sea 'the dead that are in it,' they will be

called on to surrender what they no longer possess, and what no

supernatural power can give back to them. It never occurred to those

creed makers, who thus took upon themselves to carnalise an idea into a

fact, that for every atom that once went to make up the body they

committed to the earth, there would be scores of claimants before the

Great Day of Account; and that even Omnipotence could scarcely be

expected to make the same component part be in two or ten places at

once. The original human frames, therefore, _could not be had when_, as

supposed, they would be wanted." And in his "Creed of Christendom" he

writes: "Appearances all testify to the reality and permanence of death;

a fearful onus of proof lies upon those who contend that these

appearances are deceptive. When we interrogate the vast universe of

organisation, we see not simply life and death, but gradually growing

life and gradually approaching death. After death, all that we have ever

_known_ of man is gone; all we have ever seen of him is dissolved into

its component elements; it does not _disappear_ so as to leave us at

liberty to imagine that it may have gone to exist elsewhere, but is

actually used up as materials for other purposes." There is one alleged

"indication of immortality" which Mr. Greg twice repeats, and to which

we will offer a word of reply. His statement is as follows:

"I refer to that _spontaneous_, irresistible, and, perhaps, nearly

universal, feeling we all experience on watching, just after death, the

body of someone we have intimately known; the conviction, I mean a

sense, a consciousness, an impression _which you have to fight against

if you wish to disbelieve or shake it off_ that the form lying there is

not the Ego you have loved. It does not produce the effect of that

person's personality. You miss the Ego though you have the frame. The

visible Presence only makes more vivid the sense of actual Absence.

Every feature, every substance, every phenomenon is there, and is

unchanged. You have seen the eyes as firmly closed, the limbs as

motionless, the breath almost as imperceptible, the face as fixed and

expressionless before, in sleep or in trance, without the same peculiar

sensation. The impression made is indefinable, and is not the result of

any conscious process of thought--that that body, quite unchanged to the

eye, is not, and never was your friend--the Ego you were conversant

with; and that his or her individuality was not the garment before you

_plus_ a galvanic current; that, in fact, the Ego you knew once and seek

still, _was not that--is not there_. And if not there, it must be

_elsewhere or nowhere_, and 'nowhere,' I believe, modern science will

not suffer us to predicate of either force or substance that once has

been."

Undoubtedly the dead body is not the living human being you loved. It

has ceased to live. Every phenomenon is not there unchanged, the whole

of the vital phenomena are wanting; there is a complete change so far as

organic functional activity is concerned. Even the body itself is not

quite unchanged to the eye. There is in most cases, and especially to

skilled vision, an easily detectible difference between a living man and

a corpse. To say that the Ego is not there, and if not there must be

elsewhere, is to use an absurd phrase. Take an ordinary drinking-glass

and crush it into powder, or shatter it into fragments, the

drinking-glass is not there, nor is it elsewhere; the combination which

made up drinking-glass no longer exists. Ego does not denote body only,

it denotes living body with personal characteristics. Take a bright

steel blade, let the surface be oxidised, and the brightness is no

longer there, nor is it elsewhere; it is only that the conditions which

were resultant in brightness no longer exist.

It used to be the fashion to argue at one time as if the majority of, if

not the whole of, the human race accepted, without doubt, the dogma of

the immortality of the soul; but such a contention is to-day utterly

impossible. Strauss, Buechner, Haeckel, Clifford, and a host of others,

take ground as representatives of thousands of heterodox Europeans, and

even in the pulpit itself orthodoxy is suspect. The Reverend Edward

White declares the "natural eternity of souls as a positive dogma to be

destitute of all evidence from nature or revelation;" and he refers to

"scientific biologists of the first rank, who, after careful study of

the phenomena of brain-production and mind-evolution throughout living

nature, and of the phenomena of waste and destruction in unfinished

organisms, declare it to be the height of absurdity to maintain" this

immortality doctrine; and Mr. White reminds us that 480 millions of

Buddhists on the continent of Asia all believe in the "extinction of

individual being." It is only fair, however, to add here that scholars

still dispute as to whether or not "nirvana" should be read as meaning

annihilation.

A quotation from Dr. Henry Maudsley may fitly terminate this brief

essay: "To those who cannot conceive that any organisation of matter,

however complete, should be capable of such exalted functions as those

which are called mental, is it really more conceivable that any

organisation of matter can be the mechanical instrument of the complex

manifestations of an immaterial mind? It is strangely overlooked by many

who write on this matter that the brain is not a dead instrument, but a

living organ, with functions of a higher kind than those of any other

bodily organ, insomuch as its organic nature and structure far surpass

those of any other organs. What, then, are those functions if they are

not mental? No one thinks it necessary to assume an immaterial liver

behind the hepatic structure, in order to account for its functions. But

so far as the nature of nerve and the complex structure of the cerebral

convolutions exceed in dignity the hepatic elements and structure, so

far must the material functions of the brain exceed those of the liver.

Men are not sufficiently careful to ponder the wonderful operations of

which matter is capable, or to reflect on the changes effected by it

which are continually before their eyes. Are the properties of a

chemical compound less mysterious essentially because of the familiarity

with which we handle them? Consider the seed dropped into the ground; it

swells with germinating energy, bursts its integuments, sends upwards a

delicate shoot, which grows into a stem, putting forth in due season its

leaves and flowers. And yet all these processes are operations of

matter, for it is not thought necessary to assume an immaterial or

spiritual plant which effects its purposes through the agency of the

material structure which we observe. Surely there are here exhibited

properties of matter wonderful enough to satisfy anyone of the powers

that may be inherent in it. Are we, then, to believe that the highest

and most complex development of organic structure is not capable of even

more wonderful operations? Would you have the human body, which is a

microcosm containing all the forms and powers of matter, organised in

the most delicate and complex manner, to possess lower powers than those

forms of matter exhibit separately in nature? Trace the gradual

development of the nervous system through the animal series, from its

first germ to its most complex evolution, and let it be declared at what

point it suddenly loses all its inherent properties as living structure,

and becomes the mere mechanical instrument of a spiritual entity. In

what animal, or in what class of animals, does the immaterial principle

abruptly intervene, and supersede the agency of matter, becoming the

entirely distinct cause of a similar, though more exalted, order of

phenomena? The burden of proving that the _deus ex machina_ of a

spiritual entity intervenes somewhere, and where it intervenes, clearly

lies upon those who make the assertion, or who need the hypothesis. They

are not justified in arbitrarily fabricating a hypothesis entirely

inconsistent with experience of the orderly development of nature, which

even postulates a domain of nature that human senses cannot take any

cognisance of, and in then calling upon those who reject their

assumption to disprove it."

IS THERE A GOD

THE initial difficulty is in defining the word "God." It is equally

impossible to intelligently affirm or deny any proposition unless there

is at least an understanding, on the part of the affirmer or denier, of

the meaning of every word used in the proposition. To me the word "God"

standing alone is a word without meaning. I find the word repeatedly

used even by men of education and refinement, and who have won

reputation in special directions of research, rather to illustrate their

ignorance than to explain their knowledge. Various sects of Theists do

affix arbitrary meanings to the word "God," but often these meanings are

in their terms selfcontradictory, and usually the definition maintained

by one sect of Theists more or less contradicts the definition put

forward by some other sect. With the Unitarian Jew, the Trinitarian

Christian, the old Polytheistic Greek, the modern Universalist, or the

Calvinist, the word "God" will in each case be intended to express a

proposition absolutely irreconcilable with those of the other sects. In

this brief essay, which can by no means be taken as a complete answer to

the question which forms its title, I will for the sake of argument take

the explanation of the word "God" as given with great carefulness by Dr.

Robert Flint, Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh, in

two works directed by him against Atheism. He defines God ("Antitheistic

Theories," p. 1,) as "a supreme, self-existent, omnipotent, omniscient,

righteous and benevolent being who is distinct from and independent of

what he has created;" ("Theism," p. 1,) as "a self-existent, eternal

being, infinite in power and wisdom, and perfect in holiness and

goodness, the maker of heaven and earth;" and (p. 18,) "the creator and

preserver of nature, the governor of nations, the heavenly father and

judge of man;" (p. 18,) "one infinite personal;" (p. 42,) "the one

infinite" being" who "is a person--is a free and loving intelligence;"

(p. 59,) "the creator, preserver, and ruler of all finite beings;" (p.

65,) "not only the ultimate cause, but the supreme intelligence;" and

(p. 74,) "the supreme moral intelligence is an unchangeable being." That

is, in the above statements "God" is defined by Professor Flint to be:

_A supreme, self-existent, the one infinite, eternal, omnipotent,

omniscient, unchangeable, righteous, and benevolent, personal being,

creator and preserver of nature, maker of heaven and earth; who is

distinct from and independent of what he has created, who is a free,

loving, supreme, moral intelligence, the governor of nations, the

heavenly father and judge of man._

The two volumes, published by William Blackwood and Son, from which this

definition has been collected, form the Baird Lectures in favor of

Theism for the years 1876 and 1877. Professor Flint has a well-deserved

reputation as a clear thinker and writer of excellent ability as a

Theistic advocate. I trust, therefore, I am not acting unfairly in

criticising his definition. My first objection is, that to me the

definition is on the face of it so self-contradictory that a negative

answer must be given to the question, Is there such a God? The

association of the word "supreme" with the word "infinite" as

descriptive of a "personal being" is utterly confusing. "Supreme" can

only be used as expressing comparison between the being to whom it is

applied, and some other being with whom that "supreme" being is assumed

to have possible points of comparison and is then compared. But "the one

infinite being" cannot be compared with any other infinite being, for

the wording of the definition excludes the possibility of any other

infinite being, nor could the infinite being--for the word "one" may be

dispensed with, as two infinite beings are unthinkable--be compared with

any finite being. "Supreme" is an adjective of relation and is totally

inapplicable to "the infinite." It can only be applied to one of two or

more finites. "Supreme" with "omnipotent" is pleonastic. If it is said

that the word "supreme" is now properly used to distinguish between the

Creator and the created, the governor and that which is governed, then

it is clear that the word "supreme" would have been an inapplicable word

of description to "the one infinite being" prior to creation, and this

would involve the declaration that the exact description of the

unchangeable has been properly changed, which is an absurdity. The

definition affirms "creation," that is, affirms "God" existing prior to

such creation--i.e., then the sole existence; but the word "supreme"

could not then apply. An existence cannot be described as "highest" when

there is none other; therefore, none less high. The word "supreme" as a

word of description is absolutely contradictory of Monism. Yet Professor

Flint himself says ("Anti-Theistic Theories," p. 132), "that reason,

when in quest of an ultimate explanation of things, imperatively demands

unity, and that only a Monistic theory of the universe can deserve the

name of a philosophy." Professor Flint has given no explanation of the

meaning he attaches to the word "self-existent." Nor, indeed, has he

given any explanation of any of his words of description. By

self-existent I mean that to which you cannot conceive antecedent. By

"infinite" I mean immeasurable, illimitable, indefinable; i.e., that of

which I cannot predicate extension, or limitation of extension. By

"eternal" I mean illimitable, indefinable, i.e., that of which I cannot

predicate limitation of duration or progression of duration.

"Nature" is with me the same as "universe," the same as "existence;"

i.e., I mean by it: The totality of all phenomena, and of all that has

been, is, or may be necessary for the happening of each and every

phenomenon. It is from the very terms of the definition, self-existent,

eternal, infinite. I cannot think of nature commencement, discontinuity,

or creation. I am unable to think backward to the possibility of

existence not having been. I cannot think forward to the possibility of

existence ceasing to be. I have no meaning for the word "create" except

to denote change of condition. Origin of "universe" is to me absolutely

unthinkable. Sir William Hamilton ("Lectures and Discussions," p. 610)

affirms: that when aware of a new appearance we are utterly unable to

conceive that there has originated any new existence; that we are

utterly unable to think that the complement of existence has ever been

either increased or diminished; that we can neither conceive nothing

becoming something, or something becoming nothing. Professor Flint's

definition affirms "God" as existing "distinct from, and independent of,

what he has created." But what can such words mean when used of the

"infinite?" Does "distinct from" mean separate from? Does the "universe"

existing distinct from God mean in addition to? and in other place than?

or, have the words no meaning?

Of all words in Professor Flint's definition, which would be appropriate

if used of human beings, I mean the same as I should mean if I used the

same words in the highest possible degree of any human being. Here I

maintain the position taken by John Stuart Mill in his examination of

Sir W. Hamilton (p. 122). Righteousness and benevolence are two of the

words of description included in the definition of this creator and

governor of nations. But is it righteous and benevolent to create men

and govern nations so that the men act criminally and the nations seek

to destroy one another in war? Professor Flint does not deny ("Theism,"

p. 256) "that God could have originated a sinless moral system," and he

adds: "I have no doubt that God has actually made many moral beings who

are certain never to oppose their own wills to his, or that he might, if

he had so pleased, have created only such angels as were sure to keep

their first estate." But it is inaccurate to describe a "God" as

righteous or benevolent who, having the complete power to originate a

sinless moral system, is admitted to have originated a system in which

sinfulness and immorality were not only left possible, but have

actually, in consequence of God's rule and government, become abundant.

It cannot be righteous for the "omnipotent" to be making human beings

contrived and designed by his omniscience so as to be fitted for the

commission of sin. It cannot be benevolent in "God" to contrive and

create a hell in which he is to torment the human beings who have sinned

because made by him in sin. "God," if omnipotent and omniscient, could

just as easily, and much more benevolently, have contrived that there

should never be any sinners, and, therefore, never any need for hell or

torment.

The Rev. R.A. Armstrong, with whom I debated this question, says:--

"'Either,' argues Mr. Bradlaugh, in effect, 'God could make a world

without suffering, or he could not. If he could and did not, he is not

all-good. If he could not, he is not all-powerful.' The reply is, What

do you mean by all-powerful? If you mean having power to reconcile

things in themselves contradictory, we do not hold that God is

all-powerful. But a humanity, from the first enjoying immunity from

suffering, and yet possessed of nobility of character, is a

self-contradictory conception."

That is, Mr. Armstrong thinks that a "sinless moral system from the

first is a self-contradictory conception."

It is difficult to think a loving governor of nations arranging one set

of cannibals to eat, and another set of human beings to be eaten by

their fellow-men. It is impossible to think a loving creator and

governor contriving a human being to be born into the world the

pre-natal victim of transmitted disease. It is repugnant to reason to

affirm this "free loving supreme moral intelligence" planning and

contriving the enduring through centuries of criminal classes,

plague-spots on civilisation.

The word "unchangeable" contradicts the word "creator." Any theory of

creation must imply some period when the being was not yet the creator,

that is, when yet the creation was not performed, and the act of

creation must in such case, at any rate, involve temporary or permanent

change in the mode of existence of the being creating. So, too, the

words of description "governor of nations" are irreconcileable with the

description "unchangeable," applied to a being alleged to have existed

prior to the creation of the "nations," and therefore, of course, long

before any act of government could be exercised.

To speak of an infinite personal being seems to me pure contradiction of

terms. All attempts to think "person" involve thoughts of the limited,

finite, conditioned. To describe this infinite personal being as

distinct from some thing which is postulated as "what he has created" is

only to emphasise the contradiction, rendered perhaps still more marked

when the infinite personal being is described as "intelligent."

The Rev. R.A. Armstrong, in a prefatory note to the report of his debate

with myself on the question "Is it reasonable to worship God?" says: "I

have ventured upon alleging an intelligent cause of the phenomena of the

universe, in spite of the fact that in several of his writings Mr.

Bradlaugh has described intelligence as implying limitations. But though

intelligence, as known to us in man, is always hedged within limits,

there is no difficulty in conceiving each and every limit as removed. In

that case the essential conception of intelligence remains the same

precisely, although the change of conditions revolutionises its mode of

working." This, it seems to me, is not accurate. The word intelligence

can only be accurately used of man, as in each case meaning the totality

of mental ability, its activity and result. If you eliminate in each

case all possibilities of mental ability there is no "conception of

intelligence" left, either essential or otherwise. If you attempt to

remove the limits, that is the organisation, the intelligence ceases to

be thinkable. It is unjustifiable to talk of "change of conditions" when

you remove the word intelligence as a word of application to man or

other thinking animal, and seek to apply the word to the unconditional.

As an Atheist I affirm one existence, and deny the possibility of more

than one existence; by existence meaning, as I have already stated, "the

totality of all phenomena, and of all that has been, is, or may be

necessary for the happening of any and every phenomenon." This existence

I know in its modes, each mode being distinguished in thought by its

qualities. By "mode" I mean each cognised condition; that is, each

phenomenon or aggregation of phenomena. By "quality" I mean each

characteristic by which in the act of thinking I distinguish.

The distinction between the Agnostic and the Atheist is that either the

Agnostic postulates an unknowable, or makes a blank avowal of general

ignorance. The Atheist does not do either; there is of course to him

much that is yet unknown, every effort of inquiry brings some of this

within reach of knowing. With "the unknowable" conceded, all scientific

teaching would be illusive. Every real scientist teaches without

reference to "God" or "the unknowable." If the words come in as part of

the yesterday habit still clinging to-day, the scientist conducts his

experiments as though the words were not. Every operation of life, of

commerce, of war, of statesmanship, is dealt with as though God were

nonexistent. The general who asks God to give him victory, and who

thanks God for the conquest, would be regarded as a lunatic by his

Theistic brethren, if he placed the smallest reliance on God's

omnipotence as a factor in winning the fight. Cannon, gunpowder, shot,

shell, dynamite, provision, men, horses, means of transport, the value

of these all estimated, then the help of "God" is added to what is

enough without God to secure the triumph. The surgeon who in performing

some delicate operation relied on God instead of his instruments--the

physician who counted on the unknowable in his prescription--these would

have poor clientele even amongst the orthodox; save the peculiar people

the most pious would avoid their surgical or medical aid. The "God" of

the Theist, the "unknowable" of the Agnostic, are equally opposed to the

Atheistic affirmation. The Atheist enquires as to the unknown, affirms

the true, denies the untrue. The Agnostic knows not of any proposition

whether it be true or false.

Pantheists affirm one existence, but Pantheists declare that at any rate

some qualities are infinite, e.g. that existence is infinitely

intelligent. I, as an Atheist, can only think qualities of phenomena. I

know each phenomenon by its qualities. I know no qualities except as the

qualities of some phenomenon.

So long as the word "God" is undefined I do not deny "God." To the

question, Is there such a God as defined by Professor Flint, I am

compelled to give a negative reply. If the word "God" is intended to

affirm Dualism, then as a Monist I negate "God."

The attempts to prove the existence of God may be divided into three

classes:--1. Those which attempt to prove the objective existence of God

from the subjective notion of necessary existence in the human mind, or

from the assumed objectivity of space and time, interpreted as the

attributes of a necessary substance. 2. Those which "essay to prove the

existence of a supreme self-existent cause, from the mere fact of the

existence of the world by the application of the principle of causality,

starting with the postulate of any single existence whatsoever, the

world, or anything in the world, and proceeding to argue backwards or

upwards, the existence of one supreme cause is held to be regressive

inference from the existence of these effects." But it is enough to

answer to these attempts, that if a supreme existence were so

demonstrable, that bare entity would not be identifiable with "God." "A

demonstration of a primitive source of existence is of no formal

theological value. It is an absolute zero."

3. The argument from design, or adaptation, in nature, the fitness of

means to an end, implying, it is said, an architect or designer. Or,

from the order in the universe, indicating, it is said, an orderer or

lawgiver, whose intelligence we thus discern.

But this argument is a failure, because from finite instances differing

in character it assumes an infinite cause absolutely the same for all.

Divine unity, divine personality, are here utterly unproved. "Why should

we rest in our inductive inference of one designer from the alleged

phenomena of design, when these are claimed to be so varied and so

complex?"

If the inference from design is to avail at all, it must avail to show

that all the phenomena leading to misery and mischief, must have been

designed and intended by a being finding pleasure in the production and

maintenance of this misery and mischief. If the alleged constructor of

the universe is supposed to have designed one beneficent result, must he

not equally be supposed to have designed all results? And if the

inference of benevolence and goodness be valid for some instances, must

not the inference of malevolence and wickedness be equally valid from

others? If, too, any inference is to be drawn from the illustration of

organs in animals supposed to be specially contrived for certain

results, what is the inference to be drawn from the many abortive and

incomplete organs, muscles, nerves, etc., now known to be traceable in

man and other animals? What inference is to be drawn from each instance

of deformity or malformation? But the argument from design, if it proved

anything, would at the most only prove an arranger of pre-existing

material; it in no sense leads to the conception of an originator of

substance.

There is no sort of analogy between a finite artificer arranging a

finite mechanism and an alleged divine creator originating all

existence. From an alleged product you are only at liberty to infer a

producer after having seen a similar product actually produced.

A PLEA FOR ATHEISM

THIS essay is issued in the hope that it may succeed in removing some of

the many prejudices prevalent, not only against the actual holders of

Atheistic opinions, but also against those wrongfully suspected of

Atheism. Men who have been famous for depth of thought, for excellent

wit, or great genius, have been recklessly assailed as Atheists by those

who lack the high qualifications against which the malice of the

calumniators was directed. Thus, not only have Voltaire and Paine been,

without ground, accused of Atheism, but Bacon, Locke, and Bishop

Berkeley himself, have, amongst others, been denounced by thoughtless or

unscrupulous pietists as inclining to Atheism, the ground for the

accusation being that they manifested an inclination to push human

thought a little in advance of the age in which they lived.

It is too often the fashion with persons of pious reputation to speak in

unmeasured language of Atheism as favoring immorality, and of Atheists

as men whose conduct is necessarily vicious, and who have adopted

Atheistic views as a desperate defiance against a Deity justly offended

by the badness of their lives. Such persons urge that amongst the

proximate causes of Atheism are vicious training, immoral and profligate

companions, licentious living and the like. Dr. John Pye Smith, in his

"Instructions on Christian Theology," goes so far as to declare that

"nearly all the Atheists upon record have been men of extremely

debauched and vile conduct." Such language from the Christian advocate

is not surprising, but there are others who, while professing great

desire for the spread of Freethought and having pretensions to rank

amongst acute and liberal thinkers, declare Atheism impracticable, and

its teachings cold, barren, and negative. Excepting to each of the above

allegations, I maintain that thoughtful Atheism affords greater

possibility for human happiness than any system yet based on, or

possible to be founded on, Theism, and that the lives of true Atheists

must be more virtuous--because more human--than those of the believers

in Deity, the humanity of the devout believer often finding itself

neutralised by a faith with which that humanity is necessarily in

constant collision. The devotee piling the faggots at the _auto da fe_

of a heretic, and that heretic his son, might notwithstanding be a good

father in every other respect (see Deuteronomy xiii, 6-10). Heresy, in

the eyes of the believer, is highest criminality, and outweighs all

claims of family or affection.

Atheism, properly understood, is no mere disbelief: is in no wise a

cold, barren negative; it is, on the contrary, a hearty, fruitful

affirmation of all truth, and involves the positive assertion of action

of highest humanity.

Let Atheism be fairly examined, and neither condemned--its defence

unheard--on the _ex parte_ slanders of some of the professional

preachers of fashionable orthodoxy, whose courage is bold enough while

the pulpit protects the sermon, but whose valor becomes tempered with

discretion when a free platform is afforded and discussion claimed; nor

misjudged because it has been the custom to regard Atheism as so

unpopular as to render its advocacy impolitic. The best policy against

all prejudice is to firmly advocate the truth. The Atheist does not say

"There is no God" but he says: "I know not what you mean by God; I am

without idea of God; the word 'God' is to me a sound conveying no clear

or distinct affirmation. I do not deny God, because I cannot deny that

of which I have no conception, and the conception of which, by its

affirmer, is so imperfect that he is unable to define it to me. If,

however, 'God' is defined to mean an existence other than the existence

of which I am a mode, then I deny 'God,' and affirm that it is

impossible such 'God' can be. That is, I affirm one existence, and deny

that there can be more than one." The Pantheist also affirms one

existence, and denies that there can be more than one; but the

distinction between the Pantheist and the Atheist is, that the Pantheist

affirms infinite attributes for existence, while the Atheist maintains

that attributes are the characteristics of mode--i.e., the diversities

enabling the conditioning in thought.

When the Theist affirms that his God is an existence other than, and

separate from, the so-called material universe, and when he invests this

separate, hypothetical existence with the several attributes of

personality, omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence, eternity, infinity,

immutability, and perfect goodness, then the Atheist in reply says: "I

deny the existence of such a being;" and he is entitled to say this

because this Theistic definition is selfcontradictory, as well as

contradictory of every-day experience.

If you speak to the Atheist of God as creator, he answers that the

conception of creation is impossible. We are utterly unable to construe

it in thought as possible that the complement of existence has been

either increased or diminished, much less can we conceive an absolute

origination of substance. We cannot conceive either, on the one hand,

nothing becoming something, or on the other, something becoming nothing.

The words "creation" and "destruction" have no value except as applied

to phenomena. You may destroy a gold coin, but you have only destroyed

the condition, you have not affected the substance. "Creation" and

"destruction" denote change of phenomena, they do not denote origin or

cessation of substance. The Theist who speaks of God creating the

universe, must either suppose that Deity evolved it out of himself, or

that he produced it from nothing. But the Theist cannot regard the

universe as evolution of Deity, because this would identify Universe and

Deity, and be Pantheism rather than Theism. There would be no

distinction of substance--no creation. Nor can the Theist regard the

universe as created out of nothing, because Deity is, according to him,

necessarily eternal and infinite. God's existence being eternal and

infinite, precludes the possibility of the conception of vacuum to be

filled by the universe if created. No one can even think of any point in

extent or duration and say: Here is the point of separation between the

creator and the created. It is not possible for the Theist to imagine a

beginning to the universe. It is not possible to conceive either an

absolute commencement, or an absolute termination of existence; that is,

it is impossible to conceive beginning, before which you have a period

when the universe has yet to be; or to conceive an end, after which the

universe, having been, no longer exists. The Atheist affirms that he

cognises to-day effects; that these are, at the same time, causes and

effects--causes to the effects they precede, effects to the causes they

follow. Cause is simply everything without which the effect would not

result, and with which it must result. Cause is the means to an end,

consummating itself in that end. Cause is the word we use to include all

that determines change. The Theist who argues for creation must assert a

point of time--that is, of duration, when the created did not yet exist.

At this point of time either something existed or nothing; but something

must have existed, for out of nothing nothing can come. Something must

have existed, because the point fixed upon is that of the duration of

something. This something must have been either finite or infinite; if

finite it could not have been God, and if the something were infinite,

then creation was impossible: it is impossible to add to infinite

existence.

If you leave the question of creation and deal with the government of

the universe, the difficulties of Theism are by no means lessened. The

existence of evil is then a terrible stumbling block to the Theist.

Pain, misery, crime, poverty, confront the advocate of eternal goodness,

and challenge with unanswerable potency his declaration of Deity as

all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful. A recent writer in the _Spectator_

admits that there is what it regards "as the most painful, as it is

often the most incurable, form of Atheism--the Atheism arising from a

sort of horror of the idea of an Omnipotent Being permitting such a

proportion of misery among the majority of his creatures." Evil is

either caused by God, or exists independently; but it cannot be caused

by God, as in that case he would not be all-good; nor can it exist

hostilely, as in that case he would not be all-powerful. If all-good he

would desire to annihilate evil, and continued evil contradicts either

God's desire, or God's ability, to prevent it. Evil must either have had

a beginning or it must have been eternal; but, according to the Theist,

it cannot be eternal, because God alone is eternal. Nor can it have had

a beginning, for if it had it must either have originated in God, or

outside God; but, according to the Theist, it cannot have originated in

God for he is all-good, and out of all-goodness evil cannot originate;

nor can evil have originated outside God, for, according to the Theist,

God is infinite, and it is impossible to go outside of or beyond

infinity.

To the Atheist this question of evil assumes an entirely different

aspect. He declares that each evil is a result, but not a result from

God nor Devil. He affirms that conduct founded on knowledge of the laws

of existence may ameliorate each present form of evil, and, as our

knowledge increases, prevent its future recurrence.

Some declare that the belief in God is necessary as a check to crime.

They allege that the Atheist may commit murder, lie, or steal without

fear of any consequences. To try the actual value of this argument, it

is not unfair to ask: Do Theists ever steal? If yes, then in each such

theft the belief in God and his power to punish has been insufficient as

a preventive of the crime. Do Theists ever lie or murder? If yes, the

same remark has again force--Theism failing against the lesser as

against the greater crime. Those who use such an argument overlook that

all men seek happiness, though in very diverse fashions. Ignorant and

miseducated men often mistake the true path to happiness, and commit

crime in the endeavor to obtain it. Atheists hold that by teaching

mankind the real road to human happiness it is possible to keep them

from the bye-ways of criminality and error. Atheists would teach men to

be moral now, not because God offers as an inducement reward by-and-bye,

but because in the virtuous act itself immediate good is insured to the

doer and the circle surrounding him. Atheism would preserve man from

lying, stealing, murdering, not from fear of an eternal agony after

death, but because these crimes make this life itself a course of

misery.

While Theism, asserting God as the creator and governor of the universe,

hinders and checks man's efforts by declaring God's will to be the sole

directing and controlling power, Atheism, by declaring all events to be

in accordance with natural laws--that is, happening in certain

ascertainable sequences--stimulates man to discover the best conditions

of life, and offers him the most powerful inducements to morality. While

the Theist provides future happiness for a scoundrel repentant on his

death-bed, Atheism affirms present and certain happiness for the man who

does his best to live here so well as to have little cause for repenting

hereafter.

Theism declares that God dispenses health and inflicts disease, and

sickness and illness are regarded by the Theists as visitations from an

angered Deity, to be borne with meekness and content. Atheism declares

that physiological knowledge may preserve us from disease by preventing

us from infringing the law of health, and that sickness results not as

the ordinance of offended Deity, but from ill-ventilated dwellings and

workshops, bad and insufficient food, excessive toil, mental suffering,

exposure to inclement weather, and the like--all these finding root in

poverty, the chief source of crime and disease; that prayers and piety

afford no protection against fever, and that if the human being be kept

without food he will starve as quickly whether he be Theist or Atheist,

theology being no substitute for bread.

It is very important, in order that injustice may not be done to the

Theistic argument, that we should have--in lieu of a clear definition,

which it seems useless to ask for--the best possible clue to the meaning

intended to be conveyed by the word "God." If it were not that the word

is an arbitrary term, maintained for the purpose of influencing the

ignorant, and the notions suggested by which are vague and entirely

contingent upon individual fancies, such a clue could probably be most

easily and satisfactorily obtained by tracing back the word "God," and

ascertaining the sense in which it was used by the uneducated

worshippers who have gone before us, and collating this with the more

modern Theism, qualified as it is by the superior knowledge of to-day.

Dupuis says: "Le mot _Dieu_ parait destine a exprimer l'idee de la force

universelle et eternellement active qui imprime le mouvement a tout dans

la Nature, suivant les lois d'une harmonie constante et admirable, qui

se developpe dans les diverses formes que prend la matiere organisee,

qui se mele a tout, anime tout, et qui semble etre une dans ses

modifications infiniment variees, et n'appartenir qu'a elle-meme." "The

word God appears intended to express the universal and eternally active

force which endows all nature with motion according to the laws of a

constant and admirable harmony; which develops itself in the diverse

forms of organised matter, which mingles with all, gives life to all;

which seems to be one through all its infinitely varied modifications,

and inheres in itself alone."

In the "Bon Sens" of Cure Meslier, it is asked: "Qu'est-ce que Dieu?"

and the answer is: "C'est un mot abstrait fait pour designer la force

cachee de la nature; ou c'est un point mathematique qui n'a ni longueur,

ni largeur, ni pro-fondeur." "It is an abstract word coined to designate

the hidden force of nature; or is it a mathematical point having neither

length, breadth, nor depth."

The orthodox fringe of the Theism of to-day is Hebraistic in its

origin--that is, it finds its root in the superstition and ignorance of

a petty and barbarous people nearly destitute of literature, poor in

language, and almost entirely wanting in high conceptions of humanity.

It might, as Judaism is the foundation of Christianity, be fairly

expected that the ancient Jewish records would aid us in our search

after the meaning to be attached to the word "God." The most prominent

words in Hebrew rendered God or Lord in English, _Ieue_, and _Aleim_.

The first word Ieue, called by our orthodox Jehovah, is equivalent to

"that which exists," and indeed embodies in itself the only possible

trinity in unity--i.e., past, present, and future. There is nothing in

this Hebrew word to help us to any such definition as is required for

the sustenance of modern Theism. The most we can make of it by any

stretch of imagination is equivalent to the declaration "I am, I have

been, I shall be." The word _Ieue_ is hardly ever spoken by the

religious Jews, who actually in reading substitute for it, Adonai, an

entirely different word. Dr. Wall notices the close resemblance in sound

between the word _Iehowa_ or _Ieue_, or Jehovah and Jove. In fact

Jupiter and Ieue-pater (God the father) present still closer resemblance

in sound. Jove is also [--Greek--] whence the word Deus and our Deity.

The Greek mythology, far more ancient than that of the Hebrews, has

probably found for Christianity many other and more important features

of coincidence than that of a similarly sounding name. The word

[--Greek--] traced back, affords us no help beyond that it identifies

Deity with the universe. Plato says that the early Greeks thought that

the only Gods [--Greek--] were the sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven.

The word Aleim, assists us still less in defining the word God, for

Parkhurst translates it as a plural noun signifying "the curser,"

deriving it from the verb _to curse_. Dr. Colenso has collected for us a

store of traditional meanings for the IAO of the Greek, and the _Ieue_

of the Hebrew, but though these are interesting to the student of

mythology, they give no help to the Theistic demonstrator. Finding that

philology aids us but little, we must endeavor to arrive at the meaning

of the word "God" by another rule. It is utterly impossible to fix the

period of the rise of Theism amongst any particular people; but it is,

notwithstanding, comparatively easy, if not to trace out the development

of Theistic ideas, at any rate to point to their probable course of

growth amongst all peoples.

Keightley, in his "Origin of Mythology," says: "Supposing, for the sake

of hypothesis, a race of men in a state of total or partial ignorance of

Deity, their belief in many Gods may have thus commenced: They saw

around them various changes brought about by human agency, and hence

they knew the power of intelligence to produce effects. When they beheld

other and greater effects, they ascribed them to some unseen being,

similar but superior to man." They associated particular events with

special unknown beings (Gods), to each of whom they ascribed either a

peculiarity of power, or a sphere of action not common to other Gods.

Thus, one was God of the sea, another God of war, another God of love,

another ruled the thunder and lightning; and thus through the various

then known elements of the universe, and the passions of humankind.

This mythology became modified with the commencement of human knowledge.

The ability to think has proved itself oppugnant to, and destructive of,

the reckless desire to worship, characteristic of semi-barbarism.

Science has razed altar after altar heretofore erected to the unknown

Gods, and has pulled down Deity after Deity from the pedestals on which

ignorance and superstition had erected them. The priest, who had

formerly spoken as the oracle of God, lost his sway just in proportion

as the scientific teacher succeeded in impressing mankind with a

knowledge of the facts around them. The ignorant, who had hitherto

listened unquestioning during centuries of abject submission to their

spiritual preceptors, at last commenced to search and examine for

themselves, and were guided by experience rather than by church

doctrine. To-day advancing intellect challenges the reserve guard of the

old armies of superstition, and compels a conflict in which humankind

must in the end have great gain by the forced enunciation of the truth.

From the word "God" the Theist derives no argument in his favor; it

teaches nothing, defines nothing, demonstrates nothing, explains

nothing. The Theist answers that this is no sufficient objection; that

there are many words which are in common use to which the same objection

applies. Even if this were true, it does not answer the Atheist's

objection. Alleging a difficulty on the one side is not a removal of the

obstacle already pointed out on the other.

The Theist declares his God to be not only immutable, but also

infinitely intelligent, and says: "Matter is either essentially

intelligent or essentially non-intelligent; if matter were essentially

intelligent, no matter could be without intelligence; but matter cannot

be essentially intelligent, because some matter is not intelligent,

therefore matter is essentially non-intelligent; but there is

intelligence, therefore there must be a cause for the intelligence,

independent of matter--this must be an intelligent being--i.e., God."

The Atheist answers: I do not know what is meant, in the mouth of the

Theist, by "matter." "Matter," "nature," "substance," "existence," are

words having the same signification in the Atheist's vocabulary. Lewes

used "matter" as the "symbol of all the known properties, statical and

dynamical, passive and active; i.e., subjectively, as feeling and change

of feeling, or objectively, as agent and action;" and Mill defined

"nature" as "the sum of all phenomena, together with the causes which

produce them, including not only all that happens, but all that is

capable of happening." It is not certain that the Theist expresses any

very clear idea to himself when he uses the words "matter" and

"intelligence;" it is quite certain that he has not yet shown himself

capable of communicating this idea, and that any effort he makes is

couched in terms which are self-contradictory. Reason and understanding

are sometimes treated as separate faculties, yet it is not unfair to

presume that the Theist would include them both under the word

intelligence. Perception is the foundation of the intellect. The

perceptive ability differs in each animal; yet, in speaking of matter,

the Theist uses the word "intelligence" as though the same meaning were

to be understood in every case. The recollection of the perceptions is

the exercise of a different ability from the perceptive ability, and

occasionally varies disproportionately; thus, an individual may have

great perceptive abilities, and very little memory, or the reverse; yet

memory, as well as perception, is included in intelligence. So also the

comparing between two or more perceptions; the judging and the

reflecting; all these are subject to the same remarks, and all these and

other phases of the mind are included in the word intelligence. We

answer, then, that "God" (whatever that word may mean) cannot be

intelligent. He can never perceive; the act of perception results in the

obtaining a new idea, but if God be omniscient, his ideas have been

eternally the same. He has either been always, and always will be,

perceiving, or he has never perceived at all. But God cannot have been

always perceiving, because, if he had, he would always have been

obtaining fresh knowledge, in which case he must at some time have had

less knowledge than now: that is, he would have been less perfect: that

is, he would not have been God. He can never recollect nor forget; he

can never compare, reflect, nor judge. There cannot be perfect

intelligence without understanding; but following Coleridge,

"understanding is the faculty of judging according to sense." The

faculty of whom? Of some person, judging according to that person's

senses. But has "God" senses? Is there anything beyond "God" for God to

sensate? There cannot be perfect intelligence without reason. By reason

we mean that phase of the mind which avails itself of past and present

experience to predicate more or less accurately of possible experience

in the future. To God there can be neither past nor future, therefore to

him reason is impossible. There cannot be perfect intelligence without

will; but has God will? If God wills, the will of the all-powerful must

be irresistible; the will of the infinite must exclude all other wills.

God can never perceive. Perception and sensation are identical. Every

sensation is pleasurable or painful. But God, if immutable, can neither

be pleased nor pained. Every fresh sensation involves a change in mental

and perhaps in physical condition. God, if immutable, cannot change.

Sensation is the source of all ideas, but it is only objects external to

the mind which can be sensated. If God be infinite there can be no

objects external to him, and therefore sensation must be to him

impossible. Yet without perception where is intelligence?

God cannot have memory nor reason--memory is of the past, reason for the

future, but to God immutable there can be no past, no future. The words

past, present, and future imply change: they assert progression of

duration. If God be immutable, to him change is impossible. Can you have

intelligence destitute of perception, memory, and reason? God cannot

have the faculty of judgment--judgment implies in the act of judging a

conjoining or disjoining of two or more thoughts, but this involves

change of mental condition. To God the immutable, change is impossible.

Can you have intelligence, yet no perception, no memory, no reason, no

judgment? God cannot think. The law of the thinkable is, that the thing

thought must be separated from the thing which is not thought. To think

otherwise would be to think of nothing--to have an impression with no

distinguishing mark, would be to have no impression. Yet this separation

implies change, and to God, immutable, change is impossible. In memory,

the thing remembered is distinguished from the thing temporarily or

permanently forgotten. Can God forget? Can you have intelligence without

thought? If the Theist replies to this, that he does not mean by

infinite intelligence as an attribute of Deity, an infinity of the

intelligence found in a finite degree in humankind, then he is bound to

explain, clearly and distinctly, what other "intelligence" he means; and

until this be done the foregoing statements require answer.

The Atheist does not regard "substance" as either essentially

intelligent or the reverse. Intelligence is the result of certain

conditions of existence. Burnished steel is bright--that is, brightness

is the characteristic of a certain condition of existence. Alter the

condition, and the characteristic of the condition no longer exists. The

only essential of substance is existence. Alter the wording of the

Theist's objection:--Matter is either essentially bright, or essentially

non-bright. If matter were essentially bright, brightness should be the

essence of all matter; but matter cannot be essentially bright, because

some matter is not bright, therefore matter is essentially non-bright;

but there is brightness; therefore there must be a cause for this

brightness independent of matter--that is, there must be an essentially

bright being--i.e. God.

Another Theistic proposition is thus stated: "Every effect must have a

cause; the first cause universal must be eternal: ergo, the first cause

universal must be God." This is equivalent to saying that "God" is

"first cause." But what is to be understood by cause? Defined in the

absolute, the word has no real value. "Cause," therefore, cannot be

eternal. What can be understood by "first cause?" To us the two words

convey no meaning greater than would be conveyed by the phrase "round

triangle." Cause and effect are correlative terms--each cause is the

effect of some precedent; each effect the cause of its consequent. It is

impossible to conceive existence terminated by a primal or initial

cause. The "beginning," as it is phrased, of the universe is not thought

out by the Theist, but conceded without thought. To adopt the language

of Montaigne; "Men make themselves believe that they believe." The

so-called belief in Creation is nothing more than the prostration of the

intellect on the threshold of the unknown. We can only cognise the

ever-succeeding phenomena of existence as a line in continuous and

eternal evolution. This line has to us no beginning; we trace it back

into the misty regions of the past but a little way, and however far we

may be able to journey there is still the great beyond. Then what is

meant by "universal cause?" Spinoza gives the following definition of

cause, as used in its absolute signification: "By cause of itself I

understand that, the essence of which involves existence, or that, the

nature of which can only be considered as existent." That is, Spinoza

treats "cause" absolute and "existence" as two words having the same

meaning. If this mode of defining the word be contested, then it has no

meaning other than its relative signification of a means to an end.

"Every effect must have a cause." Every effect implies the plurality of

effects, and necessarily that each effect must be finite; but how is it

possible from finite effect to logically deduce a universal--i.e.,

infinite cause?

There are two modes of argument presented by Theists, and by which,

separately or combined, they seek to demonstrate the being of a God.

These are familiarly known as the arguments _a priori and a posteriori._

The _a posteriori_ argument has been popularised in England by Paley,

who has ably endeavored to hide the weakness of his demonstration under

an abundance of irrelevant illustrations. The reasoning of Paley is very

deficient in the essential points where it most needed strength. It is

utterly impossible to prove by it the eternity or infinity of Deity. As

an argument founded on analogy, the design argument, as the best, could

only entitle its propounder to infer the existence of a finite cause, or

rather of a multitude of finite causes. It ought not to be forgotten

that the illustrations of the eye, the watch, and the man, even if

admitted as instances of design, or rather of adaptation, are instances

of eyes, watches, and men, designed or adapted out of pre-existing

substance, by a being of the same kind of substance, and afford,

therefore, no demonstration in favor of a designer alleged to have

actually created substance out of nothing, and also alleged to have

created a substance entirely different from himself.

The illustrations of alleged adaptation or design in animal life in its

embryonic stages are thus dealt with by the late George Henry Lewes:

"What rational interpretation can be given to the succession of phases

each embryo is forced to pass through? None of these phases have any

adaptation to the future state of the animal, but are in positive

contradiction to it, or are simply purposeless; many of them have no

adaptation, even in its embryonic state. What does the fact imply? There

is not a single known organism which is not developed out of simpler

forms. Before it can attain the complex structure which distinguishes

it, there must be an evolution of forms which distinguish the structures

of organisms lower in the series. On the hypothesis of a plan which

pre-arranged the organic world, nothing could be more unworthy of a

supreme intelligence than this inability to construct an organism at

once, without making several tentative efforts, undoing to-day what was

so carefully done yesterday, and repeating for centuries the same

tentatives and the same corrections in the same succession. Do not let

us blink this consideration. There is a traditional phrase which is in

vogue amongst Anthropomorphists--a phrase which has become a sort of

argument--the 'Great Architect.' But if we are to admit the human point

of view, a glance at the facts of embryology must produce very

uncomfortable reflexions. For what shall we say to an architect who was

unable--or, being able, was obstinately unwilling--to erect a palace,

except by first using his materials in the shape of a hut, then pulling

them down and rebuilding them as a cottage, then adding storey to

storey, and room to room, not with any reference to the ultimate

purposes of a palace, but wholly with reference to the way in which

houses were constructed in ancient times? Would there be a chorus of

applause from the Institute of Architects, and favorable notices in

newspapers of this profound wisdom? Yet this is the sort of succession

on which organisms are constructed. The fact has long been familiar; how

has it been reconciled with infinite wisdom?"

The _a posteriori_ argument can never demonstrate infinity for Deity.

Arguing from an effect finite in extent, the most it could afford would

be a cause sufficient for that effect, such cause being possibly finite

in extent and duration. Professor Flint in his late work in advocacy of

Theism concedes that "we cannot deduce the infinite from the finite."

And as the argument does not demonstrate God's infinity, neither can it,

for the same reason, make out his omniscience, as it is clearly

impossible to logically claim infinite wisdom for a God possibly only

finite. God's omnipotence remains unproved for the same reason, and

because it is clearly absurd to argue that God exercises power where he

may not be. Nor can the _a posteriori_ argument show God's absolute

freedom, for as it does nothing more than seek to prove a finite God, it

is quite consistent with the argument that God's existence is limited

and controlled in a thousand ways. Nor does this argument show that God

always existed; at the best, the proof is only that some cause, enough

for the effect, existed before it, but there is no evidence that this

cause differs from any other causes, which are often as transient as the

effect itself. And as it does not demonstrate that God has always

existed, neither does it demonstrate that he will always exist, or even

that he now exists. It is perfectly in accordance with the argument, and

with the analogy of cause and effect, that the effect may remain after

the cause had ceased to exist. Nor does the argument from design

demonstrate one God. It is quite consistent with this argument that a

separate cause existed for each effect, or mark of design discovered, or

that several causes contributed to some or one of such effects. So that

if the argument be true, it might result in a multitude of petty

Deities, limited in knowledge, extent, duration, and power; and still

worse, each one of this multitude of Gods may have had a cause which

would also be finite in extent and duration, and would require another,

and so on, until the design argument loses the reasoner amongst an

innumerable crowd of Deities, none of whom can have the attributes

claimed for God.

The design argument is defective as an argument from analogy, because it

seeks to prove a Creator God who designed, but does not explain whether

this God has been eternally designing, which would be absurd; or, if he

at some time commenced to design, what then induced him so to commence?

It is illogical, for it seeks to prove an immutable Deity, by

demonstrating a mutation on the part of Deity.

It is unnecessary to deal specially with each of the many writers who

have used from different stand-points the _a posteriori_ form of

argument in order to prove the existence of Deity. The objections

already stated apply to the whole class; and, although probably each

illustration used by the Theistic advocate is capable of an elucidation

entirely at variance with his argument, the main features of objection

are the same. The argument _a posteriori_ is a method of proof in which

the premises are composed of some position of existing facts, and the

conclusion asserts a position antecedent to those facts. The argument is

from given effects to their causes. It is one form of this argument

which asserts that a man has a moral nature, and from this seeks to

deduce the existence of a moral governor. This form has the disadvantage

that its premises are illusory. In alleging a moral nature for man, the

Theist overlooks the fact that the moral nature of man differs somewhat

in each individual, differs considerably in each nation, and differs

entirely in some peoples. It is dependent on organisation and education;

these are influenced by climate, food, and mode of life. If the argument

from man's nature could demonstrate anything, it would prove a murdering

God for the murderer, a lascivious God for the licentious man, a

dishonest God for the thief, and so through the various phases of human

inclination. The _a priori_ arguments are methods of proof in which the

matter of the premises exists in the order of conception antecedently to

that of the conclusion. The argument is from cause to effect. Amongst

the prominent Theistic advocates relying upon the _a priori_ argument in

England are Dr. Samuel Clarke, the Rev. Moses Lowman, and William

Gillespie.

An important contribution to Theistic literature has been the

publication of the Baird lectures on Theism. The lectures are by

Professor Flint, who asks: "Have we sufficient evidence for thinking

that there is a self-existent, eternal being, infinite in power and

wisdom, and perfect in holiness and goodness, the Maker of heaven and

earth?"

"Theism," he affirms, "is the doctrine that the universe owes its

existence, and continuance in existence, to the reason and will of a

self-existent Being, who is infinitely powerful, wise, and good. It is

the doctrine that nature has a Creator and Preserver, the nations a

Governor, men a heavenly Father and Judge." But he concedes that "Theism

is very far from co-extensive with religion. Religion is spread over the

whole earth; Theism only over a comparatively small portion of it. There

are but three Theistic religions--the Mosaic, the Christian, and the

Muhammadan. They are connected historically in the closest manner--the

idea of God having been transmitted to the two latter, and not

independently originated by them. All other religions are Polytheistic

or Pantheistic, or both together. Among those who have been educated in

any of these heathen religions, only a few minds of rare penetration and

power have been able to rise by their own exertions to a consistent

Theistic belief. The God of all those among us who believe in God, even

of those who reject Christianity, who reject all revelation, is the God

of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. From these ancient Jewish fathers the

knowledge of him has historically descended through an unbroken

succession of generations to us. We have inherited it from them. If it

had not thus come down to us, if we had not been born into a society

pervaded by it, there is no reason to suppose that we should have found

it out for ourselves, and still less that we should merely have required

to open our eyes in order to see it."

If "Theism is the doctrine that the universe owes its existence to the

reason and will of a self-existing being who is infinitely powerful,

wise, and good," then it is a doctrine which involves many difficulties

and absurdities. It assumes that the universe has not always existed.

The new existence added when the universe was originated was either an

improvement or a deterioration on what had always existed; or it was in

all respects precisely identical with what had therefore always existed.

In the first, if the new universe was an improvement, then the

previously self-existent being could not have been infinitely good. If

the universe was a deterioration, then the creator could have scarcely

been all-wise, or he could not have been all-powerful. If the universe

was in all respects precisely identical with the self-existent being,

then it must have been infinitely powerful, wise and good, and must have

been self-existent.

Any of the alternatives is fatal to Theism. Again, if the universe owes

its existence to God's reason and will, God must, prior to creation,

have thought upon the matter until he ultimately determined to create;

but, if the creation were wise and good, it would never have been

delayed while the infinitely wise and good reasoned about it, and, if

the creation were not wise and good, the infinitely wise and good would

never have commenced it. Either God willed without motive, or he was

influenced; if he reasoned, there was--prior to the definite willing--a

period of doubt or suspended judgment, all of which is inconsistent with

the attributes claimed for deity by Professor Flint. It is hard to

understand how whole nations can have been left by their infinitely

powerful, wise, and good governor--how many men can have been left by

their infinitely powerful, wise, and good father--without any knowledge

of himself. Yet this must be so if, as Professor Flint conceives, Theism

is only spread over a comparatively small portion of the earth. The

moral effect of Christian and Muhammadan Theism on the nations

influenced, was well shown in the recent Russo-Turkish War.

Every Theist must admit that if a God exists, he could have so convinced

all men of the fact of his existence that doubt, disagreement, or

disbelief would be impossible. If he could not do this, he would not be

omnipotent, or he would not be omniscient--that is, he would not be God.

Every Theist must also agree that if a God exists, he would wish all men

to have such a clear consciousness of his existence and attributes, that

doubt, disagreement, or disbelief on this subject would be impossible.

And this, if for no other reason, because that out of doubts and

disagreements on religion have too often resulted centuries of

persecution, strife, and misery, which a good God would desire to

prevent. If God would not desire this, then he is not all-good, that is,

he is not God. But as many men have doubts, as a large majority of

mankind have disagreements, and as some men have disbeliefs as to God's

existence and attributes, it must follow that God does not exist, or

that he is not all-wise, or that he is not all-powerful, or that he is

not all-good.

Many Theists rely on the intuitional argument. It is, perhaps, best to

allow the Baird Lecturer to reply to these:--"Man, say some, knows God

by immediate intuition, he needs no argument for his existence, because

he perceives Him directly--face to face--without any medium. It is easy

to assert this but obviously the assertion is the merest dogmatism. Not

one man in a thousand who understands what he is affirming will dare to

claim to have an immediate vision of God, and nothing can be more likely

than that the man who makes such a claim is self-deluded." And Professor

Flint urges that: "What seem intuitions are often really inferences, and

not unfrequently erroneous inferences; what seem the immediate dictates

of pure reason, or the direct and unclouded perceptions of a special

spiritual faculty, may be the conceits of fancy, or the products of

habits and association, or the reflexions of strong feeling. A man must

prove to himself, and he must prove to others, that what he takes to be

an intuition, is an intuition. Is that proof in this case likely to be

easier or more conclusive than the proof of the Divine existence? The

so-called immediate perception of God must be shown to be a perception

and to be immediate; it must be vindicated and verified; and how this is

to be done, especially if there be no other reasons for believing in God

than itself, it is difficult to conceive. The history of religion, which

is what ought to yield the clearest confirmation of the alleged

intuition, appears to be from beginning to end a conspicuous

contradiction of it. If all men have the spiritual power of directly

beholding their Creator--have an immediate vision of God--how happens it

that whole nations believe in the most absurd and monstrous Gods? That

millions of men are ignorant whether there be one God or thousands?" And

still more strongly he adds: "The opinion that man has an intuition or

immediate perception of God is untenable; the opinion that he has an

immediate feeling of God is absurd."

Every child is born into the world an Atheist, and if he grows into a

Theist, his Deity differs with the country in which the believer may

happen to be born, or the people amongst whom he may happen to be

educated. The belief is the result of education or organisation. This is

practically conceded by Professor Flint, where he speaks of the God-idea

as transmitted from the Jews, and says: "We have inherited it from them.

If it had not come down to us, if we had not been born into a society

pervaded by it, there is no reason to suppose that we should have found

it out for ourselves." And further, he maintains that a child is born

"into blank ignorance, and, if left entirely to itself, would, probably,

never find out as much religious truth as the most ignorant of parents

can teach it." Religious belief is powerful in proportion to the want of

scientific knowledge on the part of the believer. The more ignorant the

more credulous. In the mind of the Theist "God" is equivalent to the

sphere of the unknown; by the use of the word he answers, without

thought, problems which might otherwise obtain scientific solution. The

more ignorant the Theist, the more numerous his Gods. Belief in God is

not a faith founded on reason. Theism is worse than illogical; its

teachings are not only without utility, but of itself it has nothing to

teach. Separated from Christianity with its almost innumerable sects,

from Muhammadanism with its numerous divisions, and separated also from

every other preached system, Theism is a will-o'-the-wisp, without

reality. Apart from orthodoxy, Theism is the veriest dreamform, without

substance or coherence.

What does Christian Theism teach? That the first man, made perfect by

the all-powerful, all-wise, all-good God, was nevertheless imperfect,

and by his imperfection brought misery into the world, where the

all-good God must have intended misery should never come; that this God

made men to share this misery--men whose fault was their being what he

made them; that this God begets a son, who is nevertheless his

unbegotten self, and that by belief in the birth of God's eternal son,

and in the death of the undying who died as sacrifice to God's

vengeance, men may escape the consequences of the first man's error.

Christian Theism declares that belief alone can save man, and yet

recognises the fact that man's belief results from teaching, by

establishing missionary societies to spread the faith. Christian Theism

teaches that God, though no respecter of persons, selected as his

favorite one nation in preference to all others; that man can do no good

of himself or without God's aid, but yet that each man has a free will;

that God is all-powerful, but that few go to heaven, and the majority to

hell; that all are to love God, who has predestined from eternity that

by far the largest number of human beings are to be burning in hell for

ever. Yet the advocates for Theism venture to upbraid those who argue

against such a faith.

Either Theism is true or false. If true, discussion must help to spread

its influence; if false, the sooner it ceases to influence human conduct

the better for human kind. This Plea for Atheism is put forth as a

challenge to Theists to do battle for their cause, and in the hope that,

the strugglers being sincere, truth may give laurels to the victor and

the vanquished: laurels to the victor, in that he has upheld the truth;

laurels which should be even more welcome to the vanquished, whose

defeat crowns him with a truth he knew not of before.

APPENDIX

A few years ago a Nonconformist minister invited me to debate the

question, "Is Atheism the True Doctrine of the Universe?" and the

following was in substance my opening statement of the argument, which

for some reason, although many letters passed, was never replied to by

my reverend opponent.

"By Atheism I mean the affirmation of one existence, of which existence

I know only mode; each mode being distinguished in thought by its

qualities. This affirmation is a positive, not a negative, affirmation,

and is properly describable as Atheism because it does not include in it

any possibility of _Theos_. It is, being without God, distinctly an

Atheistic affirmation. This Atheism affirms that the Atheist only knows

qualities, and only knows these qualities as the characteristics of

modes. By 'existence' I mean the totality of phenomena and all that has

been, is, or may be necessary for the happening of any and every

phenomenon. By 'mode' I mean each cognised condition (phenomenon or

aggregation of phenomena). By 'quality' I mean that characteristic, or

each of those characteristics, by which in thought I distinguish that

which I think. The word 'universe' is with me an equivalent for

'existence.'

"Either Atheism or Theism must be the true doctrine of the Universe. I

assume here that no other theory is thinkable. Theism is either

Pantheism, Polytheism, or Monotheism. There is, I submit, no other

conceivable category. Pantheism affirms one existence, but declares that

some qualities are infinite, e.g. that existence is intelligent. Atheism

only affirms qualities for phenomena. We know each phenomenon by its

qualities; we know no qualities except as qualities of some phenomenon.

By infinite I mean illimitable. Phenomena are, of course, finite. By

intelligent I mean able to think. Polytheism affirms several Theistic

existences--this affirmation being nearly self-contradictory--and also

usually affirms at least one non-theistic existence. Monotheism affirms

at least two existences: that is, the Theos and that which the Theos has

created and rules. Atheism denies alike the reasonableness of

Polytheism, Pantheism, and Monotheism. Any affirmation of more than one

existence is on the face of the affirmation an absolute

self-contradiction, if infinity be pretended for either of the

existences affirmed. The word 'Theos' or 'God' has for me no meaning. I

am obliged, therefore, to try to collect its meaning as expressed by

Theists, who, however, do not seem to me to be either clear or agreed as

to the words by which their Theism may be best expressed. For the

purpose of this argument I take Monotheism to be the doctrine 'that the

universe owes its existence and continuance in existence to the wisdom

and will of a supreme, self-existent, eternal, infinite, omnipotent,

omniscient, righteous, and benevolent personal being, who is distinct

from and independent of what he has created.' By wisdom and will I mean

that which I should mean using the same words of any animal able to

perceive, remember, reflect, judge, and determine, and active in that

ability or those abilities. By supreme I mean highest in any relation of

comparison. By self-existent I mean that the conception of which, if it

be conceivable, does not involve the conception of antecedent or

consequent. By eternal and infinite I mean illimitable in duration and

extent. By 'omnipotent' I mean supreme in power over everything. By

omniscient, knowing everything. By 'righteous and benevolent' I mean

that which the best educated opinion would mean when applying those

words to human beings. This doctrine of Monotheism appears to me to be

flatly contradicted by the phenomena we know. It is inconsistent with

that observed uniformity of happening usually described as law of

nature. By law of nature I mean observed order of event. The word

'nature' is another equivalent for the word universe or existence. By

uniformity of happening I mean that, given certain conditions, certain

results always ensue--vary the conditions, the results vary. I do not

attack specially either the Polytheistic, Pantheistic, or Monotheistic

presentments of Theism. To me any pretence of Theism seems impossible if

Monism be conceded, and, therefore, at present, I rest content in

affirming one existence. If Monism be true, and Atheism be Monism, then

Atheism is necessarily the true theory of the universe. I submit that

'there cannot be more than one ultimate explanation' of the universe.

That any 'tracing back to two or more' existences is illogical, and that

as it is only by 'reaching unity' that we can have a reasonable

conclusion, it is necessary 'that every form of Dualism should be

rejected as a theory of the universe.' If every form of Dualism be

rejected, Monism, i.e. Atheism, alone remains, and is therefore the true

and only doctrine of the universe."

Speaking of the prevalence of what he describes as "a form of

agnosticism," the editor of the _Spectator_ writes: "We think we see

signs of a disposition to declare that the great problem is insoluble,

that whatever rules, be it a mind or only a force, he or it does not

intend the truth to be known, if there is a truth, and to go on, both in

action and speculation, as if the problem had no existence. That is the

condition of mind, we know, of many of the cultivated who are not

sceptics, nor doubters, nor inquirers, but who think they are as certain

of their point as they are that the circle will not be squared. They

are, they think, in presence of a recurring decimal, and they are not

going to spend life in the effort to resolve it. If no God exists, they

will save their time; and if he does exist, he must have set up the

impenetrable wall. A distinct belief of that kind, not a vague, pulpy

impression, but a formulated belief, exists, we know, in the most

unsuspected places, its holders not unfrequently professing

Christianity, as at all events the best of the illusions; and it has

sunk very far down in the ladder of society. We find it catch classes

which have suddenly become aware that there is a serious doubt afloat,

and have caught something of its extent and force, till they fancy they

have in the doubt a revelation as certainly true as they once thought

the old certainty." Surely an active, honest Atheism is to be preferred

to the state of mind described in the latter part of the passage we have

just quoted.

A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE DEVIL

DEALING with the Devil has been a perilous experiment. In 1790, an

unfortunate named Andre Dubuisson, was confined in the Bastille, charged

with raising the Devil. In the reign of Charles I, Thomas Browne,

yeoman, was indicted at Middlesex Sessions, for that he did "wickedly,

diabolically, and feloniously make an agreement with an evil and impious

spirit, that he, the same Thomas Browne, would within ten days after his

death, give his soul to the same impious and evil spirit," for the

purpose of having a clear income of L2,000 a year. Thomas was found not

guilty. In 1682, three persons were hanged at Exeter, and in 1712, five

others were hanged at Northampton, for witchcraft and trafficking with

the Devil, who has been represented as a black-visaged,

sulphurous-constitutioned individual, horned like an old goat, with

satyr-like legs, a tail of unpleasant length, and a reckless disposition

to buy people presumably his without purchase. I intend to treat the

subject entirely from a Biblical point of view; the Christian Devil

being a Bible institution. I say the Christian Devil, because other

religions also have their Devils, and it is well to prevent confusion. I

frankly admit that none of these religions have a Devil so devilish as

that of the Christian.

I am unable to say certainly whether I am writing about a singular Devil

or a plurality of Devils. In many texts "Devils" are mentioned

(Leviticus xvii, 7; Mark i, 34, &c.) recognising a plurality; in others

"the Devil" (Luke iv, 2), as if there was but one. Seven Devils went out

of Mary called Magdalene (Luke viii, 2). The Rev. P. Hains, a Wigan

church clergyman, tells me that where "Devils" are to be found in the

Gospels it is mistranslated and should be "Demons"--these being

apparently an inferior sort of Devils. Hershon (Talmudical Commentary on

Genesis, p. 299), quotes from Rabbi Yochanan, "There were three hundred

different species of male demons in Sichin, but what the female demon is

like I know not;" and from Rava, "If anyone wishes to see the demons

themselves let him burn and reduce to ashes the offspring of a

first-born black cat; let him put a little of it in his eyes and he will

see them." Assuming that either there is one Devil, more than one, or

less than one, and having thus cleared away mere numerical difficulties,

we will proceed to give the Devil his due. The word Satan occurs 1

Samuel xxix, 4, and is there translated "adversary," (Cahen) "obstacle,"

see also I Kings xi, 14. Satan appears either to have been a child of

God or a most intimate acquaintance of the family, for, on "a day when

the children of God came to present themselves before the Lord, Satan

came also amongst them," (Job I, 6) and no surprise or disapprobation is

manifested at his presence. Some trace in this the Persian demonology

where the good spirits surround Ormuzd and where Ahriman is the spirit

of evil. The conversation in the Book of Job between God and the Devil

has a value proportioned to the rarity of the scene and to the high

characters of the personages concerned, despite the infidel criticism of

Martin Luther, who condemns the Book of Job as "a sheer _argumentum

fabula_." A Christian ought to be surprised to find "God omniscient"

putting to Satan the query: Whence comest thou? for he cannot suppose

God, the all-wise, ignorant upon the subject. Satan's reply: "From going

to and fro in the earth, and from going up and down it," increases our

surprise and augments our astonishment. The true believer should be

astonished to find from his Bible that Satan could have gone to and fro

in the earth, and walked up and down it, and yet not have met God, if

omnipresent, at least occasionally, during his journeying. It is not

easy to conceive omnipresence absent, even temporarily, from every spot

where the Devil promenaded. The Lord makes no comment on Satan's reply,

but says: "Hast thou considered my servant Job, that there is none like

him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God and

escheweth evil?" It seems extraordinary that God should wish to have the

Devil's judgment on the only good man then living: the more

extraordinary, as God, the all-wise, knew Satan's opinion without asking

it, and God, the immutable, would not be influenced by the expression of

the Devil's views. Satan's answer is: "Doth Job fear God for naught?

Hast thou not made an hedge about him, and about all that he hath on

every side? Thou hast blest the work of his hand, and his substance is

increased in the land; but put forth thine hand now and touch all that

he hath, and he will curse thee to thy face." God's reply to this

audacious declaration is: "Behold, all that he hath is in thy power;

only upon himself put not forth thine hand." And this was Job's reward

for being a perfect and upright man, one that feared God and eschewed

evil. He was not actually sent to the Devil, but to the Devil was given

power over all that he had. Job lost all without repining, sons,

daughters, oxen, asses, camels, and sheep, all destroyed, and yet "Job

sinned not." Divines urge that this is a beautiful picture of patience

and contentment under wrong and misfortune. But it is neither good to

submit patiently to wrong, nor to rest contented under misfortune. It is

better to resist wrong; wiser to carefully investigate the causes of

wrong and misfortune, with a view to their removal. Contentment under

wrong is a crime; voluntary submission under oppression is no virtue.

"Again, there was a day when the sons of God came to present themselves

before the Lord [as if God's children could ever be absent from him],

and Satan came also among them to present himself before the Lord. And

the Lord [again] said unto Satan, From whence comest thou? And Satan

answered the Lord and said, From going to and fro in the earth, and from

walking up and down in it. And the Lord said unto Satan, Hast thou

considered my servant Job, that there is none like him in the earth? a

perfect and upright man, one that feareth God, and escheweth evil? and

still he holdeth fast his integrity, ALTHOUGH THOU MOVEDST ME AGAINST

HIM TO DESTROY HIM WITHOUT CAUSE." Can God be moved against a man to

destroy him without a cause? If so, God is neither immutable nor

all-wise. Yet the Bible puts into God's mouth the terrible admission

that the Devil had moved God against Job to destroy him without cause.

If true, it destroys alike God's goodness and his wisdom.

But Satan answered the Lord and said: "Skin for skin, yea, all that a

man hath will he give for his life; put forth thine hand now and touch

his bone and his flesh, and he will curse thee to thy face."

Does the Lord now drive the Devil from his presence? Is there any

expression of wrath or indignation against this tempter? "The Lord said

unto Satan: Behold, he is in thine hand, but save his life." And Job,

being better than everybody else, finds himself smitten in consequence

with sore boils from the sole of his foot unto his crown. The ways of

the Lord are not as our ways, or this would seem the reverse of an

encouragement to virtue.

In the account of the numbering by David, in one place "God," and in

another "Satan," occurs (1 Chron. xxi,1; 2 Sam. xxiv, 1), and to each

the same act of "moving" or "provoking" David to number his people is

attributed. There may be in this more harmony than ordinary men

recognise, for one erudite Bible commentator tells us, speaking of the

Hebrew word Azazel: "This terrible and venerable name of God, through

the pens of Biblical glossers, has been _a devil, a mountain, a

wilderness, and a he-goat._"[13] Well may incomprehensibility be an

attribute of deity when, even to holy and reverend fathers, God has been

sometimes undistinguishable from a he-goat or a Devil. Moncure D. Conway

writes: "There can be little question that the Hebrews, from whom the

Calvinist inherited his deity, had no Devil in their mythology, because

the jealous and vindictive Jehovah was quite equal to any work of that

kind--as the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, bringing plagues upon the

land, or deceiving a prophet and then destroying him for his false

prophecies."[14]

[13] G.R. Gliddon's extract from Land's "Sacra Scritura," chap, iii,

sec. 1. "Demonology and Devil-lore," vol. i, p. 11.

[14] "Christian Records," by the Rev. Dr. Giles, p. 144.

God is a spirit. Jesus is God. Jesus was led up of the Spirit to be

tempted of the Devil. All these propositions are equally credible.

On the temptation of Jesus by the Devil, the Rev. Dr. Giles writes:

"That the Devil should appear personally _to the Son of God is certainly

not more wonderful_ than that he should, in a more remote age, have

appeared _among_ the Sons of God, in the presence of God himself, to

tempt and torment the righteous Job. But that Satan should carry Jesus,

bodily and literally, through the air--first to the top of a high

mountain, and then to the topmost pinnacle of the temple--is wholly

inadmissible; it is an insult to our understanding."[15] It is pleasant

to find clergymen zealously repudiating their own creeds.

[15] "Pilgrim's Progress from Methodism to Christianity."

I am not prepared to speak strongly as to the color of the Devil. White

men paint him black; black men paint him white. He can scarcely be

colorless, as otherwise the Evangelists would have labored under

considerable difficulties in witnessing the casting out of the Devil

from the man in the synagogue (Luke iv, 35, 36).This Devil is described

as an unclean Devil. The Devils were subject to the 70 disciples whom

Jesus appointed to preach (Luke x, 17), and they are not unbelievers:

one text tells us that they believe and tremble (James ii, 19). It is a

fact of some poor Devils that the more they believe the more they

tremble. According to another text the Devil goeth about like a roaring

lion, seeking whom he may devour (1 Peter v, 8), though the Devil's

"doctrines" presumably include vegetarianism (1 Timothy iv, 1, 3). I am

not sure what drinks devils incline to, though it is distinguished from

the wine of the communion (1 Corinthians x, 21). Devils should be a sort

of eternal salamanders, for there is everlasting fire prepared for the

Devil and his angels (Matt. xxv, 41); and there is a lake of brimstone

and fire, into which the Devil was cast (Rev. xx, 10). The Devil has, at

least upon one occasion, figured as a controversialist. For we learn

that he disputed with the arch-angel Michael, contending about the body

of Moses (Jude 9); in these degenerate days of personality in debate, it

is pleasant to know that the religious champion was very civil towards

his Satanic opponent. The Devil was imprisoned for 1,000 years in a

bottomless pit (Rev. xx, 2). If a pit had no bottom, it seems but little

confinement to shut the top. But, with faith and prayer even a good

foundation may be obtained for a bottomless pit. The writer of

Revelation, adopting the view of some Hebrew writers, speaks of "the

dragon, that old serpent which is the devil and Satan" and following

this, it is urged that the Devil was the serpent of Genesis--that is,

that it was really Satan who, in this guise, tempted Eve. There is this

difficulty in the matter--the Devil is a liar (John viii, 44); but in

the interview with Eve the serpent seems to have confined himself to the

strict truth (Gen. iii, 4, 5, 22). There is, in fact, no point of

resemblance--no horns, no hoof, nothing except a tail.

Kalisch notes that "the Egyptians represented the eternal spirit Kneph,

the author of all good, under the mythic form" of the serpent, but they

employed the same symbol "for Typhon, the author of all moral and

physical evil, and in the Egyptian symbolical alphabet, the serpent

represents subtlety and cunning, lust, and sensual pleasure."

The Old Testament speaks a little of the Devils, sometimes of Satan, but

never of "The Devil;" yet Matthew ushers him in, in the temptation

scene, without introduction, and as if he were an old acquaintance. I do

not remember reading in the Old Testament, anything about the lake of

brimstone and fire. Although Malachi iv, 1, speaks of the day "that

shall burn as an oven when the wicked shall be burned up." This feature

of faith was reserved for the warmth of Christian love to develop from

some of the Talmudical writers. The Rev. C. Boutell in his Bible

dictionary says, that, "it is at the least unfortunate that the word

'hell' should have been used as if the translation of the Hebrew

'sheol.'" Zechariah, in a vision, saw "Joshua, the High Priest, standing

before the angel of the Lord, and Satan standing at his right hand to

resist him" (Zach-ariah iii, 1). Why the Devil wanted to resist Joshua

is not clear; but, as Joshua's garments were in a very filthy state, it

may be that he was preaching to the priest the virtues of cleanliness.

Jesus said that one of the twelve disciples was a Devil (John vi, 70).

You are told to resist the devil and he will flee from you (James iv,

7). If this be true, he is a cowardly Devil, and thus does not agree

quite with Milton's picture of his grand defiance, almost heroism. But

then Milton was a poet, and true religion has but little poetry in it.

Jeroboam, one of the Jewish monarchs, ordained priests for the devils (2

Chron. ix, 15). In the time of Jesus, Satan must, when not in the body

of some mad, deaf, dumb, blind, or paralytic person, have been

occasionally in heaven; for Jesus, on one occasion, told his disciples

that he saw Satan, as lightning, fall from heaven (Luke x, 18). Jesus

told Simon Peter that Satan desired to have him, that he might sift him

as wheat (Luke xxii, 31); perhaps Jesus was chafing his disciple. Paul,

the apostle, seems to have looked on the Devil much as some bigots look

on the police, for Paul delivered Hymeneus and Alexander unto Satan,

that they might learn not to blaspheme (1 Timothy i, 20).

Revivalists are much indebted for their evanescent successes to hell and

the Devil. Thomas English, a fair specimen of those very noisy and

active preachers who do so much in promoting revivals, spoke of

"dwelling with devouring fire, bearing everlasting burning, roasting on

the Devil's spit, broiling on his gridiron, being pitched about with his

fork, drinking the liquid fire, breathing the brimstone fumes, drowning

in a red-hot sea, lying on fiery beds."[16] The vulgar tirades of

Reginald Radcliffe, Richard Weaver, and C. H. Spurgeon, will serve to

evidence that the above quotation is no exaggeration. In London, before

crowded audiences, Mr. Weaver, without originality, and with only the

merit of copied coarseness, has called upon the Lord to "shake the

ungodly for five minutes over the mouth of hell." Mr. Spurgeon has drawn

pictures of hell which, if true and revealed to him by God, would be

most disgustingly frightful, and which being but the creation of his own

morbid fancies, induce a feeling of contempt as well as disgust for the

teacher, who uses such horrible descriptions to affright his weaker

hearers.

[16] Sharpe's "History of Egypt," p. 196.

Calmet says that "By collecting all the passages where Satan (or the

Devil) is mentioned, it may be observed, that he fell from Heaven, with

all his company; that God cast him down from thence for the punishment

of his pride; and by his envy and malice, death, and all other evils

came into the world; that by the permission of God he exercises a sort

of government in the world over his subordinates, over apostate angels

like himself; that God makes use of him to prove good men, and to

chastise bad ones; that he is a lying spirit in the mouth of false

prophets, seducers, and heretics; that it is he, or some of his, that

torment, obsess, or possess men, that inspire them with evil designs, as

did _David_, when he suggested to him to number his people, and to

_Judas_ to betray _Jesus Christ_, and to Ananias and Sapphira to conceal

the price of their field. That he roves about full of rage, like a

roaring lion, to tempt, to betray, to destroy, and to involve us in

guilt and wickedness.

"That his power and malice are restricted within certain limits, and

controlled by the will of God; that he sometimes appears to men to

seduce them; that he can transform himself into an angel of light; that

he sometimes assumes the form of a spectre, as he appeared to the

Egyptians while they were involved in darkness in the days of Moses;

that he creates several diseases to men; that he chiefly presides over

death, and bears aways the souls of the wicked to hell; that at present

he is confined to Hell, as in a prison, but that he will be unbound and

set at liberty in the year of _Anti-Christ_; that hell-fire is prepared

for him and his; that he is to be judged at the last day. But I cannot

perceive very clearly from scripture, that he torments the souls of the

wicked in hell, as we generally believe."

In his interesting volume on Elizabethan demonology Mr. Spalding urges

that "the empire of the supernatural must obviously be most extended

where civilization is the least advanced," and he gives three reasons

for the belief in devils--1. "The apparent incapacity of the majority of

mankind to accept a purely monotheistic creed." 2. "The division of

spirits into hostile camps, good and evil." 3. "The tendency of all

theological systems to absorb into themselves the deities extraneous to

themselves, not as gods, but as inferior or even evil spirits."