EXECUTIVE MANSION, _April 22, 1886_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:
The Constitution imposes upon the President the duty of recommending to
the consideration of Congress from time to time such measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient.
I am so deeply impressed with the importance of immediately and
thoughtfully meeting the problem which recent events and a present
condition have thrust upon us, involving the settlement of disputes
arising between our laboring men and their employers, that I am
constrained to recommend to Congress legislation upon this serious and
pressing subject.
Under our form of government the value of labor as an element of
national prosperity should be distinctly recognized, and the welfare
of the laboring man should be regarded as especially entitled to
legislative care. In a country which offers to all its citizens the
highest attainment of social and political distinction its workingmen
can not justly or safely be considered as irrevocably consigned to the
limits of a class and entitled to no attention and allowed no protest
against neglect.
The laboring man, bearing in his hand an indispensable contribution to
our growth and progress, may well insist, with manly courage and as a
right, upon the same recognition from those who make our laws as is
accorded to any other citizen having a valuable interest in charge; and
his reasonable demands should be met in such a spirit of appreciation
and fairness as to induce a contented and patriotic cooperation in the
achievement of a grand national destiny.
While the real interests of labor are not promoted by a resort to
threats and violent manifestations, and while those who, under the
pretext of an advocacy of the claims of labor, wantonly attack the
rights of capital and for selfish purposes or the love of disorder sow
seeds of violence and discontent should neither be encouraged nor
conciliated, all legislation on the subject should be calmly and
deliberately undertaken, with no purpose of satisfying unreasonable
demands or gaining partisan advantage.
The present condition of the relations between labor and capital is far
from satisfactory. The discontent of the employed is due in a large
degree to the grasping and heedless exactions of employers and the
alleged discrimination in favor of capital as an object of governmental
attention. It must also be conceded that the laboring men are not always
careful to avoid causeless and unjustifiable disturbance.
Though the importance of a better accord between these interests is
apparent, it must be borne in mind that any effort in that direction
by the Federal Government must be greatly limited by constitutional
restrictions. There are many grievances which legislation by Congress
can not redress, and many conditions which can not by such means be
reformed.
I am satisfied, however, that something may be done under Federal
authority to prevent the disturbances which so often arise from disputes
between employers and the employed, and which at times seriously
threaten the business interests of the country; and, in my opinion, the
proper theory upon which to proceed is that of voluntary arbitration as
the means of settling these difficulties.
But I suggest that instead of arbitrators chosen in the heat of
conflicting claims, and after each dispute shall arise, for the purpose
of determining the same, there be created a commission of labor,
consisting of three members, who shall be regular officers of the
Government, charged among other duties with the consideration and
settlement, when possible, of all controversies between labor and
capital.
A commission thus organized would have the advantage of being a stable
body, and its members, as they gained experience, would constantly
improve in their ability to deal intelligently and usefully with the
questions which might be submitted to them. If arbitrators are chosen
for temporary service as each case of dispute arises, experience and
familiarity with much that is involved in the question will be lacking,
extreme partisanship and bias will be the qualifications sought on
either side, and frequent complaints of unfairness and partiality will
be inevitable. The imposition upon a Federal court of a duty so foreign
to the judicial function as the selection of an arbitrator in such cases
is at least of doubtful propriety.
The establishment by Federal authority of such a bureau would be
a just and sensible recognition of the value of labor and of its right
to be represented in the departments of the Government. So far as its
conciliatory offices shall have relation to disturbances which interfere
with transit and commerce between the States, its existence would
be justified under the provision of the Constitution which gives to
Congress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
the several States;" and in the frequent disputes between the laboring
men and their employers, of less extent, and the consequences of which
are confined within State limits and threaten domestic violence, the
interposition of such a commission might be tendered, upon the
application of the legislature or executive of a State, under the
constitutional provision which requires the General Government to
"protect" each of the States "against domestic violence."
If such a commission were fairly organized, the risk of a loss of
popular support and sympathy resulting from a refusal to submit to
so peaceful an instrumentality would constrain both parties to such
disputes to invoke its interference and abide by its decisions. There
would also be good reason to hope that the very existence of such an
agency would invite application to it for advice and counsel, frequently
resulting in the avoidance of contention and misunderstanding.
If the usefulness of such a commission is doubted because it might lack
power to enforce its decisions, much encouragement is derived from the
conceded good that has been accomplished by the railroad commissions
which have been organized in many of the States, which, having little
more than advisory power, have exerted a most salutary influence in the
settlement of disputes between conflicting interests.
In July, 1884, by a law of Congress, a Bureau of Labor was established
and placed in charge of a Commissioner of Labor, who is required to
"collect information upon the subject of labor, its relations to
capital, the hours of labor and the earnings of laboring men and women,
and the means of promoting their material, social, intellectual, and
moral prosperity."
The commission which I suggest could easily be ingrafted upon the bureau
thus already organized by the addition of two more commissioners and by
supplementing the duties now imposed upon it by such other powers and
functions as would permit the commissioners to act as arbitrators when
necessary between labor and capital, under such limitations and upon
such occasions as should be deemed proper and useful.
Power should also be distinctly conferred upon this bureau to
investigate the causes of all disputes as they occur, whether submitted
for arbitration or not, so that information may always be at hand to aid
legislation on the subject when necessary and desirable.