Representatives lies considerably lower. Here it is intended that the
people shall be represented with all their diverse interests and
ambitions. The two-thirds majority of lawyers is found, however, even
here; of the 357 members of the last House, 236 had been trained in law,
63 were business men, and 17 were farmers. The House is again like the
Senate, since, in spite of the fact that the membership is elected
entirely anew, it remains in good part made up of the same people. The
fifty-eighth Congress contained 250 members who had already sat in the
fifty-seventh. About one-tenth of the Representatives have been in the
House ten years. The general physiognomy is, however, very different
from that of the Senate. It is more youthful, less serene and
distinguished, and more suggestive of ordinary business. The average age
is forty-eight years, while there are some men under thirty. The total
impression, in spite of several exceptions, suggests that these men come
from the social middle class. However, it is from just this class that
the notably clear-cut personalities of America have come; and the number
of powerful and striking countenances to be seen in the House is greater
than that in the German Reichstag. The Representatives, like Senators,
have a salary of $5,000 and their travelling expenses.
What is now the actual work of these two chambers in Congress, and how
do they carry it on? The work cannot be wholly separated from its manner
of performance. Perhaps the essentials of this peculiar task and method
could be brought together as follows: on the basis of committee reports,
Congress decides whether or not to accept bills which have been proposed
by its members. This is indeed the main part of the story. Congress thus
passes on proposed bills; its function is purely legislative, and
involves nothing of an executive nature. On the other hand, these bills
have to be proposed by members of Congress; they cannot be received from
the President or from members of his Cabinet. Thus the Executive has no
influence in the law-giving body. The method of transacting business,
finally, consists of laying the emphasis on the deliberations in
committees, and it is there that the fate of each bill is virtually
settled. The committee determines whether the proposed measure shall
come before the whole House; and both House and Senate have finally to
decide about accepting the measure. Each of these points requires
further comment.
So far as the separation of the legislative and executive functions of
the government is concerned, it is certainly exaggeration to say that it
is complete, as has often been said. There is, to be sure, a somewhat
sharper distinction than is made in Germany, where the propositions of
the Executive form the basis of legislative activity; and yet even in
the United States the ultimate fate of every measure is dependent on the
attitude taken by the President. We have seen that a bill which is sent
by Congress to the President can be returned with his veto, and in that
case becomes a law only when on a new vote in both Houses it receives a
two-thirds majority. A law which obtains only a small majority in either
one of the Houses can thus easily be put aside by the Executive.
On the other hand, Congress has a very important participation in
executive functions, more particularly through the Senate, inasmuch as
all appointments of federal officers and the ratification of all
treaties require the approval of the Senate. International politics,
therefore, make it necessary for the President to keep closely in touch
with at least the Senate, and in the matter of appointments the right of
the Senators to disapprove is so important that for a large number of
local positions the selection has been actually left entirely to the
Senators of the respective states. The Constitution gives to Congress
even a jurisdictional function, in the case that any higher federal
officers abuse their office. When there is a suspicion of this, the
House of Representatives brings its charges and the Senate conducts the
trial. The last time that this great machinery was in operation was in
1876, when the Secretary of War, Belknap, was charged and acquitted;
thus suspicion has not fallen on any of the higher officials for
twenty-eight years.
The separation of the Legislative from the Executive is most
conspicuously seen in the fact that no member of the Cabinet has a seat
in Congress. At the beginning of the Congressional session the President
sends his message, in which he is privileged politically to pour out his
entire heart. Yet he may only state his hopes and desires, and may not
propose definite bills. The Cabinet ministers, however, are responsible
solely to the President, and in no wise to Congress, where they have no
right to discuss measures either favourably or unfavourably. They do not
come into contact with Congress. This is in extreme contrast with the
situation in England, where the ministers are leaders of the
Parliamentary party. The American sees in this a strong point of his
political system, and even such a man as the former ambassador to
Germany, Andrew D. White, who admired so much of what he saw there,
considers the ministerial benches in the German and French
representative chambers a mistake. It occasions, he says, a constant and
vexatious disagreement between the delegates of the people and the
ministers, which disturbs the order and effectiveness of parliamentary
transactions. The legislative work should be transacted apart, and the
popular representatives ought to have only one another to take care of.
We must not, however, understand that there are practically no relations
existing between Congress and the ministry. A considerable part of the
bills, which have to be discussed, consist, of course, in appropriations
for public expenditures, so far as these come out of the federal rather
than the state treasuries. Such appropriations included at the last time
$139,000,000 for pensions, $138,000,000 for the post office, $91,000,000
for the army, $78,000,000 for the navy, $26,000,000 for rivers and
harbours, and so on; making in all $800,000,000 for the annual
appropriations, besides $253,000,000 for special contracts. Thus the
total sum of appropriations in one session of Congress amounted to over
$1,000,000,000, in America called a billion. This authorized
appropriation has to be made on the basis of proposals, submitted by the
members of Congress; but it is a matter of course that every single
figure of such propositions has to come originally from the bureau of
the army or navy, or whatever department is concerned, if it is to serve
as the basis of discussion. Thus while the Executive presents to
Congress no proposals for the budget, it hands over to the members of
Congress so empowered the whole material; and this is, after all, not
very different from the European practice. However, the voice of the
Executive is indeed not heard when the budget is under debate. The
members of Congress who are to receive the ministerial propositions
through mediation of the Treasury, must belong to the House; for one of
the few advantages which the House of Representatives has over the
Senate is that it has to initiate all bills of appropriation. This is a
remnant of the fundamental idea that all public expenditures should be
made only at the instance of the taxpayers themselves, wherefore the
directly elected members of the House are more fitted for this than are
the Senators, who are indirectly elected. This single advantage is less
than it looks to be, since the Senate may amend at will all bills of
appropriation that it receives from the House.
Thus every measure which is ever to become law must be proposed by
members of Congress. One can see that this privilege of proposing bills
is utilized to the utmost, from the simple fact that during every
session some fifteen thousand bills are brought out. We may here
consider in detail the way in which the House transacts its affairs. It
is clear that if more than three hundred voluble politicians are set to
the task of deliberating in a few months on fifteen thousand laws,
including all proposed appropriations, that a perfect babel of argument
will arise which can lead to no really fruitful result, unless sound
traditions, strict rules and discipline, and autocratic leadership hold
this chaotic body within bounds. The American instinct for organization
introduced indeed long ago a compact orderliness. Here belongs first of
all that above-mentioned committee system, which in the House is
completed by the unique institution of the Speaker. But one thing we
must constantly bear in mind: the whole background of Congressional
doings is the two-party system. If the House or the Senate were to break
out in the prismatic variegation of the German parliamentary parties, no
speaker and no system of committees would be able to keep the elements
in hand. It is, after all, the party in majority which guarantees order,
moulds the committees into effective machines, and lends to the Speaker
his extraordinary influence.
The essential feature of the whole apparatus lies in the fact that a
bill cannot come up before the House until it has been deliberated in
committee. The chairman of the committee then presents it personally at
some meeting. The presiding officer, the so-called Speaker, exerts in
this connection a threefold influence; firstly, he appoints the members
of all the committees, of which, for instance, there were in the last
Congress sixty-three. The most important, and, therefore, the largest,
of these committees are those on appropriations, agriculture, banking,
coinage, foreign and Indian affairs, interstate and foreign commerce,
pensions, the post office, the navy, railroads, rivers and harbours,
patents, and finance. Both the majority and minority parties are
represented in every committee, and its chairman has almost unlimited
control in its transaction of business. All members of the more
important committees are experienced men, who have been well schooled in
the traditions of the House.
The Speaker is allowed further to decide as to what committee each bill
shall be referred. In many cases, of course, there is no choice; but it
not seldom happens that there are several possibilities, and the
decision between them often determines the fate of the bill. In the
third place, the Speaker, as chairman of the Committee on Rules, decides
what reports, of those which have been so far prepared by the
committees, shall come up for discussion at each meeting of the House.
As soon as the committee has agreed on recommendations, its report is
put on the calendar; but whether it then comes up for debate in the
House depends on a good many factors. In the first place, of course,
many of the proposed matters take naturally first rank, as for instance,
the appropriations. The chairman of the Committee on Appropriations is
given the floor whenever he asks for it; thus there are express trains
on this Congressional railroad which have the right-of-way before
suburban trains, and then, too, there are special trains which take
preference before everything else. But aside from such committee reports
as are especially privileged, a very considerable opportunity of
selection exists among those which remain.
It is here that the really unlimited influence of the Speaker comes in.
He is in no way required to give the floor to the committees which ask
for it first. If the chairman of the committee is not called on by the
Speaker for his report, he is said to be not “noticed” and he is
helpless. Of course, whether he is noticed or not depends on the most
exact prearrangement. If now a bill is finally reported to the House, it
is still not allowed an endless debate, for the Speaker is once more
empowered to appoint a particular time when the debate must end, and
thereby he is able to come around any efforts at obstruction. If,
however, the minority wishes to make itself heard by raising the point
of no quorum, then not only those who are voting, but all those who are
present in the House, are counted, and if these are not enough the
delinquents can be hunted out and forced to come in. But in most cases
there is little or no debate, and the resolutions of the committee are
accepted by the House without a word. In certain of the most important
cases, as in matters of appropriation or taxation, the House constitutes
itself a so-called committee of the whole. Then the matter is seriously
discussed under a special chairman, as at the session of an ordinary
committee. Even here it is not the custom to make long speeches, and the
members are often contented with a short sketch of their arguments, and
ask permission to have the rest published in the Congressional Report.
The speeches which thus have never been delivered are printed and
distributed in innumerable copies through the district from which that
speaker comes and elsewhere as well.
Thus if an ordinary Representative proposes a measure, which perhaps
expresses the local wishes of his district, such a bill goes first to
the Secretary and from him to the Speaker. He refers it to a special
committee, and at the same time every Representative receives printed
copies of it. The committee decides whether the bill is worth
considering. If it has the good fortune to be deliberated by the
committee it is often so amended by the members that little remains of
its original substance. If it then has the further good fortune to be
accepted by the committee, it comes on the House calendar, and waits
until the Committee on Rules puts it on the order of the day. If it then
has the exceptional good fortune of being read to the House it has a
fairly good chance of being accepted.
But of course its pilgrimage is not ended here. It passes next to the
Senate, and goes through much the same treatment once more; first a
committee, then the quorum. If it does not there come up before the
quorum, it is lost in spite of everything; but if it does finally come
up, after all hindrances, it may be amended once more by the Senate. If
this happens, as is likely, its consideration is begun all over again. A
composite committee from both Houses considers all amendments, and if it
cannot come to an agreement the measures are doomed. If the committee
does agree, the close of the session of Congress may intervene and
prevent its last hearing in the House, and in the next Congress the
whole process is repeated. But if a measure has passed through all these
dangers and been approved by both Houses, the President then has the
opportunity to put his veto on it.
Thus it comes about that hardly a tenth part of the bills which are
introduced each year ever become laws, and that they are sifted out and
amended surely and speedily. Indeed, it can hardly be doubted that a
large part of the fifteen thousand bills are introduced out of personal
consideration for constituents, or even out of less worthy motives, with
no expectation that they will possibly be accepted. Moreover, the
popular tribunal, the House, spares itself too great pains, because it
knows that the Senate will certainly amend all its provisions; and the
Senate indulges itself in voting unnecessary favours to constituents
because it relies on their negation by the House.
The Senate works on fundamentally the same plan. When a Senator brings
his proposition, it goes likewise to the appropriate committee, then is
read before a quorum, and is passed on to the other chamber.
Nevertheless, there is a considerable difference in procedure; the House
behaves like a restless popular gathering, while the Senate resembles a
conference of diplomats. The House is a gigantic room, in which even the
best orators can hardly make themselves heard, and where hundreds are
writing or reading newspapers without paying any attention to the man
who speaks. But the Senate is a parliamentary chamber, where a somewhat
undue formality prevails. A strict discipline has to be observed in the
House in order to preserve its organization, while the Senate needs no
outward discipline because the small circle of elderly gentlemen
transacts its business with perfect decorum. Thus the Senate tolerates
no Speaker over it, no president with discretionary powers. In the
Senate both parties have the right to appoint the members of the
committees. The Chairman of the Senate must also not fail to notice any
one who asks for the floor; whoever wishes to speak has every chance,
and this freedom implies of course that the debates shall not be
arbitrarily terminated by the Chairman. A debate can be closed only by
unanimous consent. The influence of the Chairman of the Senate is,
therefore, only a shadow beside that of the Speaker, and since the
Chairman is not elected by the Senate itself, but is chosen directly by
the people in the person of the Vice-President of the United States, it
may happen that this Chairman belongs to the party in minority, and that
he has practically no influence at all. Conformably with the extreme
formality and courtesy of the Senate, majorities are counted on the
basis of the votes actually cast, and not, as in the House, on the basis
of members actually present. For both Houses alike it is possible for
those who intend to be absent to be paired off beforehand, so that if
one absentee has announced himself for, and another against, a certain
bill, they can both be counted as having voted.
It is clear what the consequences of this unlimited exchange of
Senatorial courtesy must be; the concessions in outward form must lead
immediately to compromises and tacit understandings. If a debate can be
closed only by unanimous agreement, it is possible for a single opposing
politician to obstruct the law-making machinery. A handful of opponents
can take the stand for weeks and block the entire Senate. Such
obstructionist policy has to be prevented at any cost, and therefore on
all sides and in every least particular friendly sympathy must be
preserved. Of course, the opposition between the two parties cannot be
obviated; so much the more, then, it is necessary for each man to be
bound by personal ties to every other, and to feel sure of having a free
hand in his own special interests so long at least as he accords the
same right to others in theirs. Thus, merely from the necessity of
preserving mutual good feeling, it too often happens that the other
members close their eyes when some willing Senator caters to local greed
or to the special wishes of ambitious persons or corporations, by
proposing a Congressional bill.
This “Senatorial courtesy” is most marked in the matter of the
appointment of officials, where matters go smoothly only because it has
been agreed that no proposals shall be made without the approval of the
Senators of the state concerned. Every Senator knows that if to-day one
local delegate is outvoted, the rebellion may to-morrow be directed
against another; and thus many a doubtful appointment, given as hush
money or as a reward for mean political services, is approved with
inward displeasure by courteous colleagues merely in order to save the
principle of individual omnipotence. There is no doubt that in this way
the individual Senator comes to have much more power than does a single
Representative. The latter is really the member of a party, with no
special opportunities for satisfying his individual wishes; while the
Senator may have his personal points of view, and is really an
independent factor.
If to-day the Senate, contrary to the expectation of former times,
really plays a much more important rôle before the public than the
House, this is probably not because more important functions are given
to the Senate, but because it is composed of persons of whom every one
has peculiar significance in the political situation, while the House is
nothing but a mass-meeting with a few leaders. This increased importance
before the public eye works back again on the Senator’s opinion of
himself, and the necessary result is a steady increase in the Senate’s
aspirations and the constant growth of its rights. Perhaps the most
characteristic exhibition of this has been the gradual evolution of the
part taken by the Senate in the matter of foreign treaties. The
Constitution requires the ratification of the Senate, and the original
construction was that the Administration should present a treaty all
made out, which the Senate had to accept or reject as it stood. But soon
the Senate arrogated to itself the right to amend treaties, and then it
came about that the Senate would never accept a treaty without injecting
a few drops of its own diplomatic wisdom. It might be that these would
be merely a change of wording, but just enough to let the President feel
the Senatorial power. The result has been that the treaties that are now
presented to the Senate are called nothing but proposals.
Looking behind the scenes one discovers that at bottom, even in the
Senate, only a few have real influence. The more recently appointed
Senators earn their spurs in unimportant committees, and even if they
get into more important ones they are constrained by tradition to fall
in line behind the more experienced members. In the House there is half
a dozen, and in the Senate perhaps a dozen men who shape the politics of
the country. Here, as in all practical matters, the American is ready to
submit to an oligarchical system so long as he knows that the few in
question derive their power from the free vote of the many. In fact
nothing but oligarchy is able to satisfy the profoundly conservative
feeling of the American. Behind the scenes one soon discovers also that
the Senatorial courtesy, which neutralizes the party fanaticism and
encourages compromises to spring up like mushrooms, still leaves room
for plenty of fighting; and even intrigue thrives better on this
unctuous courtesy than in the coarser soil of the lower house. The
sanctified older Senators, such as Allison, Frye, Platt, Aldrich, and
Hale, know where to place their levers so as to dislodge all opposition.
Perhaps McKinley’s friend, Hanna, who was the grand virtuoso in
Republican party technique, knew how always to overcome such political
intrigue; but even Roosevelt’s friend, Lodge, has sometimes found that
the arbitrarily shaped traditions of the seniors weigh more than the
most convincing arguments of the younger men.
The moral level of Congress is, in the judgment of its best critics,
rather high. The fate of every one of the thousands of bills is settled
virtually in a small committee, and thus, time after time, the weal and
woe of entire industries or groups of interests depend on one or two
votes in the committee. The possible openings for corruption are thus
much greater in Congress than in any other parliament, since no other
has carried the committee system to such a point. In former times
political scoundrels went around in great numbers through the hotels in
Washington and even in the corridors of the Capitol trying to influence
votes with every device of bribery. To be sure, it is difficult to prove
that there are no such hidden sins to-day; but it is the conviction of
those who are best able to judge that nothing of the sort any longer
exists. To be sure, there are still lobbyists in Washington, who as a
matter of business are trying to work either for or against impending
bills, but direct bribery is no longer in question. On the slightest
suspicion the House itself proceeds to an investigation and appoints a
committee, which has the right of collecting sworn testimony; and time
after time these suspicions have been found to be unjust.