The constitution of the United States is not that ephemeral erection,

which the enemies of free government would represent it to be.

Its fundamental principles may be partially traced through the

modern theoretical maxims, and the ancient usages of England. This

consideration, however, does not derogate from the wisdom of the

founders of the Republic, who have so successfully availed themselves

of the experience of other countries and other ages, in organizing

the system; and maturing it by the most unremitting diligence through

peace and war. A review of the progress of American politics, and of

the reasonings which guided the patriotic legislators, would be a

work of much interest. It would lay before us a large portion of the

best abilities, and the most tried virtue of the country, engaged

in inquiries conducive to the general interests of the nation. It

would disclose at every important crisis a venerable assembly, which

neither announced their proceedings as the greatest efforts of human

ingenuity, nor assumed the lofty tone of an “omnipotent” legislature,

but recurred to the will of their constituents for ratification, and,

keeping a view to the future as well as to the present circumstances,

provided the {180} means of revising and amending their decisions.

It was in consequence of this philosophical mode of proceeding, that

the present admirable fabric was gradually erected. It was thus that

the declaration of independence of 1776, a temperate, but energetic

manifesto, intimating the determination of the colonies to throw off

the foreign yoke, was succeeded by the articles of confederation in

1778. This compact, although efficient in time of public danger, was,

during the succeeding peace, found to be defective in not admitting

the dignity and promptitude necessary to the general government, and

not furnishing a sufficient guarantee for the permanence of the Union.

Under the articles of confederation, each State retained the right

of voting its own supplies for the common benefit, and to lay taxes

on such articles as were found most convenient; also, to impose such

imposts and duties on foreign trade as they thought proper. The amount

of supplies furnished by each State was apportioned to the value of

the lands,--a criterion that could never be applied with accuracy.

In this state of things, the acts of Congress could in various cases

be only complied with, through the intervention of thirteen separate

State Assemblies. The power given to Congress to adjust the affairs

of foreign relations, was rendered almost nugatory by the diversity

of commercial regulations of separate States. It became possible,

that a separate State might be at variance with a foreign nation, on

affairs not at all interesting to the other members of the Union, and

that internal discord might arise from opposite interests, rivalship

in commerce, the distribution of territory, and a variety of other

latent causes.[112] To avoid {181} these inconveniences and dangers,

the constitution was framed by a convention of delegates from the

States, whose session ended on the 17th of September, 1787. A Congress

was elected on the new establishment, and General Washington was

unanimously appointed President in the succeeding year.[113]

The constitution vests the legislative power in a Congress, consisting

of a House of Representatives, and a Senate, and the executive power in

the President. The members of the House of Representatives are elected

biennially by the people. Each State has at least one representative,

and not more than one for every thirty thousand persons in it, and two

Senators, who are elected by the State legislature, at intervals of

six years, and are distributed into three classes, so that the seats

of a third part of them are vacated biennially. The President, and

Vice-President are elected for four years by the ballot of electors

appointed by the legislatures of the States; the number of electors in

each State being equal to that of the representatives and senators,

whom the same state has a right to send to Congress.

Bills for raising revenue originate in the House of Representatives;

and every bill that passes both {182} houses, must be presented to the

President for his approbation. In the event of his disapproving of a

bill, it must be returned to the house where it was originated, and if

two-thirds of the members of both houses agree, on re-consideration,

to pass it, then the bill becomes a law. The President is

commander-in-chief of the army, navy, and militia, and may in certain

cases, grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United

States. With the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, he appoints

ambassadors, and other public ministers, consuls, judges of the

supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose

appointments are not provided for by the constitution; but the Congress

has the power of making future laws for vesting appointments in the

President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

The President may fill up vacancies in the Senate during recess, by

granting commissions terminating at the end of next session. Whenever

two-thirds of both houses deem it necessary, they shall propose

amendments of the constitution; or shall call a convention for that, on

the application of two-thirds of the state legislatures.

The duties and powers of the general government are concisely defined

by the constitution, and may be expressed summarily, as embracing the

subjects of commerce, finance, negociation, and war. All other objects

are reserved, as falling under the jurisdiction of the separate state

assemblies. These include local legislation, administration of justice

between persons in the same states, and the supervision of agriculture.

Although it appears, that much care has been bestowed in drawing the

line that separates the prerogatives of the general government, from

those {183} of its individual members, still duties or powers derived

from implication, are occasionally assumed by both departments. We

have two recent examples in view. In 1819, the legislatures of several

states imposed a heavy tax on the branches of the United States Bank,

situated in the respective states. The United States Bank, it must be

noticed, is chartered by Congress, and is the organ through which the

national government transacts its pecuniary affairs. The bank refused

payment, and obtained a judgment in its favour by the supreme or

federal court.[114] Again, the admission of the territory of Missouri

as a State in the Union, has lately been discussed in Congress. One

of the principal points of the debate was the question, Whether the

pre-existing States have a right to dictate to States about to be

admitted into the Union, any restriction against slave-keeping? And

it is understood that scruples on this question of right have induced

several members to vote against the restriction, whose sentiments are

opposed to slavery.

The distribution of business, of which a brief outline has just been

given, is admirably adapted to an extensive sphere of action. The

national councils are thus devoted to national concerns, and not to

such petty affairs as framing public acts for demolishing the fences of

private property to make room for highways, nor in borough politics,

nor in deciding in the disputes of private individuals. Local affairs

are regulated by local authorities, who are best able to judge of them;

and this prevents any ground of complaint to arise against the national

government on account of these. The State legislatures are, besides,

filled annually by a free vote of the people, who have frequent

opportunities of allaying their own discontents by a change of men, and

a change of measures.

Those who predict an early dissolution of the {184} American Union,

and who affirm that the country is naturally divided into two nations

by the Allegany ridge, might with equal propriety say, that the Thames

and the Severn are destined to water the territories of two distinct

governments. And the remark that, in the event of the navigation of the

Mississippi being interrupted by an enemy, the western country would be

subjugated, is another position that may be applied to other rivers,

and to other countries. It is not to be forgotten that, previously to

the cession of Louisiana in 1801, the Spanish government claimed the

exclusive benefit of that river, and that the privilege of navigation

was the principal object that induced the government of the United

States to purchase the territory, in 1803. Louisiana being acquired

at the general expense, and not by the inhabitants of the western

country alone, makes it evident that the transaction was viewed as

an important national affair. Perhaps it was with the intention of

producing a dismemberment, that the ministry of England made the

attack on New Orleans. The defence was conducted in a national form,

and not exclusively by the people of the western country; and the

British government was not gratified by any overture of the inhabitants

for becoming tributary. The supposed conspiracy of Aaron Burr, for

detaching the transmontane country from the Eastern States, was not

found to amount to levying war against the Union.[115] The evidence

that could be obtained from his small party of associates and others,

was not sufficient to convict him. The demagogue is not looked on as

a personage dangerous to public tranquillity;--a decisive proof that

the American people are confident in the strength of the ties by which

they are knit together. The western settlements have the strongest

incitements to remain in close conjunction, with their eastern

neighbours. {185} A separation from them in times of war would cut off

all communication by land with the eastern coast; an inconvenience

that would greatly aggravate any attempt to blockade the mouth of the

Mississippi. A separation would retard the ingress of population; it

would injure internal trade; it would occasion an additional expense

in supporting a separate government, and it would deprive them of the

protection of the United States’ Navy. It will scarcely be alleged,

that the Eastern States have an interest in dissolving the compact

with the Western; as by that step they would not only forego a rapid

accumulation of strength, but would incur the danger of converting

fellow citizens into the most powerful enemies. They would lose that

important branch of revenue, which arises from the sale of public

lands, and they would no longer participate in the fur trade.

To infer the instability of the American republic from the frequency

of revolutions in Europe, is altogether preposterous. A different

state of society, and the difference of the political institutions to

be compared, remove that parity of condition essential to analogical

deduction. The executive power in America, does not extend to declaring

war at pleasure; nor to dissolving the legislature. The president,

whose term of service is only four years, has not the means nor the

motives for family aggrandizement which prevail under hereditary

succession. The members of the House of Representatives have their

seats from the universal suffrage of the people; and the senators get

their dignity and seats from the representatives in State Assemblies,

who are themselves popularly elected, and who cannot promote obnoxious

men without incurring public odium and future exclusion. The

representation is equally distributed. Placemen and pensioners {186}

are effectually debarred from being members of either house; under

these conditions the few have it not in their power to dictate to the

many. Ambitious projects, such as disfigure the histories of other

countries, are precluded. Accessions of territory are not obtained

by conquest, but by purchase. The object sought in these treaties is

the right of soil; and not the power of taxing or enslaving men. No

yoke is imposed but that upon the labouring steer. The domestic policy

of the United States exhibits twenty-four republics, each having its

own constitution, without any other restriction than conformity

to that of the nation. In regard of foreign relations and general

interests, all the States are cemented into one nation. If one or

more States are invaded, the citizens have a right to the protection

of the Union; and in the case of controversies or disputes between

States, the judicial power provided under the general constitution

is the umpire between them. Had the individual members of the United

States placed a hereditary sovereign at the head of each, and put the

reins of government in the hands of a few, we might have heard, before

this time, of American courtiers making treaties to last forever; and

violating them so soon as the strong found it convenient to attack the

weak; of wars furnishing pretexts for raising vast sums to support the

views of a party or a faction, perhaps for depriving the people of

their liberties, and subjugating their neighbours; and of winding up

the whole with holy leagues, admitting of no subsequent arbitrator but

the sword.

The organization, of which a brief outline has just been given, is, in

theory, well adapted to insure internal tranquillity, and protection

against invasion. In practice, it has hitherto been conducive {187}

to both these objects; and to a degree of national prosperity, that

is unparalleled in the present age. The people govern for themselves,

and are too sensible of the value of their rights to allow them to

pass into other hands. Power is delegated only for a short period;

and the representatives are closely watched by their constituents.

Should a congress propose to disfranchise a part of the people; or to

engraft a borough system on the present equal representation; or to

establish septennial elections; every member voting for the obnoxious

motion might expect to be marked out and expelled for ever. A case

somewhat in point occurred in 1817.[116] Congress then passed a law

for increasing the very moderate compensation for the services of

members. The act was conceived to be unconstitutional: an alarm was

sounded all over the country; the supporters of increased compensation

were left out in the election of 1818; and the offensive law was

repealed in the ensuing session. A veneration for the constitution is

probably the most universal characteristic of American citizens: but

they act, as if their united exertions were necessary to keep it in

force; and are sensible, that neglect on their part might soon render

the important document a dead letter. Every timely check given to the

progress of corruption, is removing the necessity of convulsion to a

later date. The people having the means of correction in their own

hands, the political institutions of this country are to be esteemed

as less mutable than the systems that consist entirely of the unmixed

ingredients of disease and death. It would be too sanguine to suppose

that the American people shall preserve their liberties for ever; but

it may be safe to affirm, that nothing decisive in the fate of this

country {188} is to be augured from the histories of republics without

representation, or of monarchies without popular control. Before

Americans relinquish free government, they must be ignorant of their

present knowledge; they must cease to teach their children to prize

their privileges; and no longer inculcate esteem for the memory of

their dauntless ancestors, who fought for the inheritance. Washington,

Franklin, and an host of other patriots, must be forgotten. The

avarice of foreign governments, and the sufferings of foreign people,

must pass into oblivion, and cease to be monitors. In short, a dark age

must arrive before the throne of despotism can be erected here.

FOOTNOTES:

[112] Those who would wish to have a collected view of the principles

of this subject, may consult the Federalist, a collection of

interesting essays on the new constitution, written in 1788, by Messrs.

Hamilton, Jay, and Madison.--FLINT.

[113] Some pious observers of the occurrences of Providence, have

remarked that the Spanish Armada, equipped for the invasion of Britain,

was destroyed in the year 1588; that the Revolution in that country

happened in 1688; and, in seeking for an event to mark the commencement

of another century, it has been observed by the loyal in Britain,

that his Majesty, George the Third, recovered from a most deplorable

visitation in 1788. If there be any American descendants of Britain,

who are pleased with a system of chronology that contemplates the great

events of Providence as revolving in a centenarian orbit, they may

also notice a corresponding occurrence in the consummation of their

liberties in the otherwise memorable year 1788.--FLINT.

[114] The power of a state to tax the United States Bank was settled in

the celebrated case of McCulloch _versus_ Maryland, handed down March

6, 1819 (4 Wheaton, 316). Ohio refused to be bound by this decision,

and her case was decided in 1824 (9 Wheaton, 738).--ED.

[115] A recent contribution to the history of the Aaron Burr

conspiracy, drawn largely from material in the Mexican archives, is

McCaleb’s _Aaron Burr Conspiracy_ (New York, 1903). Isaac Jenkinson’s

_Aaron Burr_ (Richmond, Indiana, 1902), throws new light on Burr’s

relations to Hamilton and Jefferson.--ED.

[116] This law was passed in March, 1816, and its effect was felt in

the elections of that same year. From Ohio, Delaware, and Vermont not

one congressman was re-elected; in Kentucky, but three out of ten;

in South Carolina, three out of nine; in Maryland, four out of nine;

and in Pennsylvania, thirteen out of twenty-three. Jefferson wrote to

Gallatin: “There has never been an instance before of so unanimous an

opinion of the people, and that through every state of the Union.”--ED.

LETTER XVI

State Legislatures--A predilection for dividing Counties, laying out

New Towns and Roads--The influence of Slavery on the habits of People

who live in the neighbourhood of Slave-Keeping States--Elopements from

Kentucky--Banking.

_Jeffersonville, (Indiana,) March 10, 1820._

The legislatures of new States consist only of a few members. The

consequence is, that public acts for the exclusive advantage of

private individuals are occasionally passed through influence or

intrigue; and the commendations which I have bestowed on the general

government of America must not be held to apply indiscriminately to

the administration of the _local_ governments, at least in newly

established {189} states. Much of the business (it is said) is

privately arranged, before the questions are discussed in the house.

Combinations are formed for effecting particular purposes. These are

called _log rolling_; a very significant metaphor, borrowed from the

practice of several farmers uniting in rolling together large timber to

be burnt. A number of bills are frequently conjoined by their movers,

so that a member who takes a deep interest in one must vote for all

of them, to obtain the suffrage of the separate partizans. The member

who deserts from the cabal might be leaving his own motion without any

other supporter but himself. An enlightened gentleman told me, that

he was induced to vote for the ridiculous law of this State regarding

intercourse between white and coloured people, in consequence of its

being previously conjoined with other bills.

The laying out of new counties, county towns, and lines of road,

seems to be a gratifying duty to back-wood legislators. Where a

county includes a considerable tract of country, it must be divided

into two. Where it is not large enough to admit of bisection, the

county wanted must be made up from the extremities of four or five

which are contiguous. A large population is not a prerequisite: yet

the convenience of the people is the pretext. A few neighbours who

propose that their settlement should be made the nucleus of the new

establishment, petition the Assembly for a subdivision. If this is

granted, commissioners are appointed to fix the new seat of justice. An

eager contest for private advantage ensues, and although the ostensible

object is public convenience, the new city is perhaps placed near the

outline of its jurisdiction.

You will be much surprised to hear of the avidity which prevails

in this country for towns consisting of a very few log cabins. For

a convenient {190} distribution of seats of justice, and for roads

that are at best openings cut through the woods, with the stumps

remaining, without side ditches, and without any other bridges through

marshes or streams, than a few pieces of timber laid down side by

side across the way. But an explanation is made, when you are told

that pettifoggers by this means create situations for themselves, and

a few of their constituents who are in the employment of squires,

county commissioners, prosecuting attornies, supervisors of roads, and

constables. With numbers the design is to increase the value of their

contiguous lands at the public expense, instead of improving them by

their own industry. By such means, they frequently succeed in selling

at an advance of fifty, or even a hundred per cent, per annum; and

remove to more recent settlements, where they are able to purchase a

larger extent of land, and where they can continue their favourite

trade of making counties, towns, and roads.

Towns are laid out by persons who sell lots of about a fourth or a

fifth part of an acre: these sometimes sell at from a hundred to three

hundred dollars, even in situations where scarcely a single spot of

the neighbouring woods is cleared. After a town has made some progress

in point of improvement and population, lots usually rise in price,

from three hundred to a thousand dollars; and, in the larger towns, to

a much higher value. At present the mania of purchasing town lots is

rather declining. Holders are unwilling to see the prices reduced. They

continue to talk of former rates, and to keep them up; on exchanging

one lot for two, say, that for the better one, one thousand dollars

is paid in two lots worth five hundred each. Their conduct very much

resembles that of a person who said, that he sold a dog at forty

guineas, and explained the transaction by stating, {191} “that he was

paid in two dogs, each worth half that sum.” I lately saw a town lot

sold for state or county taxes, at a fourth part of the price paid

for it two years ago. The rents of the worst kind of houses amount

to upwards of fifty per cent, per annum, on the price of erection. A

miserable cabin, that could scarcely be let at all in your country, or

would not rent at £1 10s. a-year, gives here as much per month. The

people are of consequence closely crowded together; several families

frequently inhabiting a house of one apartment, without any inner door,

so that when the street door is open, passengers may see the inmates

at table, and the other particulars of the house. The beds are ranged

round the walls, like so many looms in a weaver’s work-shop. In various

instances I have seen families living in temporary huts, built of small

pieces of decayed timber collected in the woods, laid upon one another

in the manner in which sawyers erect piles of timber to be dried. The

roofs were covered with bark, and the interstices of the walls left

open, so that at a distance I could count the persons within, as if

they had been birds in a cage. Near to this place a family lately

lived, for several weeks, under an old waggon that was turned upside

down. In towns along the banks of the Ohio, a class of people are to

be seen, who depend on traffic with travellers, and with the scanty

population in the rear of them. Without extravagant profits on the

trifling capital employed, they could not subsist. Many of them seem to

be immoral, dissipated, and without rural or domestic industry. Few of

their lots are cultivated as gardens; and the spinning-wheel, (so far

as I have observed,) is not to be seen in their houses.

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