The American advance from Puebla to the valley of Mexico was over

the Rio Frio Mountain. The pass is over eleven thousand feet above

the ocean. It was easily susceptible of successful defence, but the

experience of the Mexicans at Cerro Gordo probably led their generals

to conclude that Scott’s strategy was irresistible in a mountain

region. At any rate there was no resistance, and after a toilsome

climb of three days in the mountains, the Americans debouched into the

beautiful valley without firing a shot.

This valley is one of the most singular of natural features. It is

simply a basin in the mountains without any visible outlet. In seasons

of heavy rainfall and snowfall on the stupendous mountains which

surround it, the small lakes in this basin overflow, and sometimes

inundate the capital itself. It is only in recent years that a channel,

or tunnel, has been cut to drain off the superfluous water in time of

need. At some time in the past the basin was probably a lake. There

must have been some unknown subterranean outlet which originally

drained it down and afterwards prevented it refilling. Before the

artificial drain was made, however, there were indubitable signs that

the lakes were much smaller than in the beginning of the sixteenth

century when Cortés conquered the Aztec capital. The bed of this valley

is seven thousand feet above the sea level. There are five shallow

lakes in the basin. The capital is located on the west side of Lake

Tezcuco. It contained about two hundred thousand people in 1847.

The army entered the valley from the east, at first aiming to pass

between Lakes Chalco and Tezcuco, but the fortified hill of El

Penyon and other obstructions made that approach very difficult, if

not impossible, and after the engineers had examined the ground,

Scott concluded to pass around to the southward of Lake Chalco and

Xochimilco. The movement was inaugurated on the 15th of August,

four days after entering the valley. On the 17th, the border of

Lake Xochimilco was skirted, and that night Worth bivouacked in San

Augustin, the Tlalpan of Cortés, on the road approaching the capital

from the south and west of the lakes. It became for the time the depot

and base of the army. These preliminary movements consumed a week’s

time.

CHAPTER VI

FROM CONTRERAS TO CHAPULTEPEC

While rushing up the heights of Chapultepec with the regimental

flag in his hands, Longstreet was severely wounded by a

musket-ball through the thigh. After Longstreet fell, George E.

Pickett carried the old Eighth’s flag to the works on the hill

and to the top of the castle.

On the 18th the brilliant action of Contreras was fought. Here Scott

outmanœuvred the enemy completely, employing again the Cerro Gordo

tactics, and striking him in flank and rear. The routed Mexicans fled

back to the fortified lines about Churubusco. Many prisoners were

captured at Contreras. The attack was pressed against the position

of Churubusco on the 19th and 20th, resulting in the severest battle

of the war, except perhaps Buena Vista. Longstreet’s regiment, the

Eighth Infantry, of which he was adjutant, here distinguished itself,

aiding in the capture of many prisoners and some guns. At one crucial

point Longstreet had the proud honor to carry forward the regimental

colors mentioned in Worth’s despatches. After the surrender some of the

prisoners attempted to escape by a rush, and many of them did get away.

Others were shot down and some were recaptured. A company of Americans

who had deserted the year before from Taylor’s army and joined the

Mexicans were here captured in a body. Their resistance had caused

severe loss to the American army. They were tried for desertion, found

guilty and a score or so of them shot to death.

Scott won Churubusco with less than nine thousand men. The routed enemy

fled into the city and to the fortified hill of Chapultepec, and were

followed pell mell by the American cavalry. It was in this charge that

Phil Kearny lost his arm. He was afterwards killed at Chantilly, in

Pope’s campaign of 1862, a Union major-general. The Americans could

certainly have entered the city that day on the heels of the flying

foe, but Scott thought it wisest to hold back and not disperse the

Mexican government, to give the American peace commissioner, Mr. Trist,

an opportunity to propose terms. An armistice followed, but the Mexican

government declined the basis of peace proposed.

The Americans were in possession of the whole country practically; at

least there was nothing left to successfully oppose their occupation of

its territory to the farthest limits. Yet after these victories, they

proposed to take only Texas, New Mexico, and California, and to pay for

them a large sum of money. Texas was counted our own before the war

began. The terms of our government were so liberal that the Mexicans

probably suspected that there was alarm for the result of future

operations. Perhaps they judged the terms would be no worse after

another trial of arms. And they were not.

Molino del Rey and Chapultepec followed on September 8 and 13

respectively. At the first affair the Americans lost seven hundred

and eighty-seven men in the two hours of severe fighting, but won a

complete victory, as usual. The fight was made by Worth’s division,

and Longstreet’s regiment was engaged, of course. Thus far he had got

through without a scratch.

Scott’s army, at the outset not over-large for the contract he had

undertaken, was now very much reduced, but its morale was still fine.

It was a critical question to determine the point of attack on the

city. On the 11th there was a council of nearly all the generals and

engineer officers at Piedad. Major Smith, Captain Lee, and Lieutenants

Tower and Stevens, of the engineers, reported in favor of attacking

the San Antonio or southern gate. Generals Quitman, Shields, Pierce,

and Cadwalader concurred. General Scott, on the contrary, favored the

Chapultepec route, and General Twiggs supported the general-in-chief.

Alone of the engineers, Lieutenant Beauregard favored the Chapultepec

route. After hearing Beauregard’s reasons, General Pierce changed his

opinion. At the conclusion of the conference General Scott said, “We

will attack Chapultepec and then the western gate.”

“The Hill of the Grasshopper,” Chapultepec, is an isolated mound rising

one hundred and fifty to two hundred feet above the valley. Nearly

precipitous in some parts, it slopes off gradually to the westward.

Heavy batteries frowned from its salient positions, sweeping the

approaches from all directions. To the southward the ground was marshy.

The position was regarded by both belligerents as the key to the

capital.

The American batteries opened fire upon Chapultepec on the 12th,

causing great destruction and killing and wounding many of its

defenders. The Mexican leader, Santa Anna, a very brave fellow with

only one leg, was under this heavy fire for a time, taking observations

of its effect. On the 13th this fire was resumed, followed by an

assault of infantry. The volunteers of Quitman and Pillow, led by

picked storming parties, made the assault on two fronts. The hill was

carried with a rush after Scott gave the signal of attack. Pillow

calling for reinforcements, Longstreet’s brigade was ordered forward by

General Worth, and he went into the enemy’s works on the hill with the

others.

Longstreet did not quite reach the works, for while rushing up the

hill with the regimental flag in his hands he was severely wounded by

a musket-ball through the thigh. The castle, all the enemy’s guns, and

many prisoners were captured. General Scott rode to the summit soon

after and surveyed the work of his gallant army. It was well done.

General Worth chased the fleeing enemy to the city’s gates. After

Longstreet fell George E. Pickett carried the flag to the works on the

hill, and to the top of the castle. The old Eighth’s flag was hoisted

from the staff which but a month before flaunted the Mexican banner.

This was the last action in the valley. There was some fighting at the

gates, and desultory firing from the houses as the American troops

pushed in, but the city fell without much loss after Chapultepec. The

Mexicans evacuated the capital that night, and General Scott entered

the next day. The Mexican War was practically over. In a few months a

treaty was made giving the United States about what was demanded by Mr.

Trist after Churubusco in August, the United States salving up Mexico’s

wounded pride with fifteen million dollars.

CHAPTER VII

LONGSTREET’S HONEYMOON

After reaching home from Mexico, Longstreet soon regained his

strength. He then wrote to Colonel John Garland, of Virginia, his

old brigade commander, asking for his youngest daughter. Colonel

Garland promptly replied, “Yes, with all my heart.”

With several wounded comrades Longstreet was assigned quarters with

the Escandons, a kind-hearted, refined Mexican family. They could

not conceal their deep chagrin at the defeat of their army, and were

doubtless mortified by the enforced presence of the wounded Americans.

Nevertheless they insisted that those officers confined to their beds

should be supplied from their own table. Delicacies without stint were

sent. The days of confinement were greatly brightened by their delicate

attentions. On the 1st of December the accomplished surgeons, Satterlee

and DeLeon, thought that Longstreet was strong enough to travel, and

announced that he was to be ordered out of the country on sick-leave.

With others he left Mexico on December 9. A few days later he sailed

from Vera Cruz with a large number of sick and wounded, among whom

was Brigadier-General Pierce, who was very popular in the army. After

reaching home Longstreet soon regained his strength. He then wrote to

Colonel John Garland, of Virginia, his late brigade commander, asking

for his youngest daughter. Colonel Garland promptly replied, “Yes,

with all my heart.” He had won fame in Mexico and returned home on

leave a month before Longstreet was well enough to travel, and was then

with his family. The young lady and her soldier sweetheart already

had a pretty good understanding on the subject, and her answer was

equally flattering. On the 8th of March, 1848, the marriage occurred at

Lynchburg. After a brief honeymoon orders were received from the War

Department detailing Longstreet for recruiting service, with station

at Poughkeepsie, New York. Before autumn of that year nearly all the

troops in Mexico were withdrawn, and the Eighth, Longstreet’s old

regiment, was ordered to Jefferson Barracks, St. Louis, where he had

been stationed before the war, then a brevet second lieutenant in the

Fourth.

After fifty years General Longstreet found that many of the physical

details of the battle terrain in the valley of Mexico differed quite

materially from the memory conveyed by his younger eyes in the heat

of action. There was no real change in fixed landmarks, but the

depressions were not so deep, nor the impregnable hills the Americans

attacked so high, as they appeared when the Mexicans were defending

them with sword, musket, and cannon. In instants of supreme danger it

is very difficult for the soldier or subordinate officer to see things

exactly as they are on a battle-field. His eye and mind are inevitably

and anxiously concentrated on the enemy or the battery that is dealing

death and destruction round about.

GREAT BATTLES BEFORE AND AFTER GETTYSBURG[G]

THE FIRST MANASSAS

The armies that prepared for the first grand conflict of the Civil

War were commanded by West Point graduates, both of the Class of

1838,--Beauregard and McDowell. The latter had been assigned to the

command of the Federal forces at Washington, south of the Potomac,

in the latter part of May, 1861. The former had assumed command of

the Confederates at Manassas Junction about the 1st of June. To him,

Brigadier-General Longstreet reported for duty.

McDowell marched on the afternoon of the 16th of July at the head

of an army of five divisions of infantry, supplemented by nine

batteries of the regular service, one of volunteers, besides two guns

operating separately, and seven companies of regular cavalry. In his

infantry columns were eight companies of regulars and a battalion of

marines,--an aggregate of thirty-five thousand men.

Beauregard stood behind Bull Run with seven brigades, including

Holmes, who joined on the 19th, twenty-nine guns, and fourteen hundred

cavalry,--an aggregate of twenty-one thousand nine hundred men, all

volunteers. To this should be added, for the battle of the 21st,

reinforcements aggregating eight thousand five hundred men, under

General Johnston, making the sum of the aggregate thirty thousand four

hundred men.

The line behind Bull Run was the best between Washington and the

Rapidan for strategy, tactics, and army supplies.

General Longstreet always believed that by vigorous and concentrated

work the Confederates, after the battle of the first Manassas, might

have followed McDowell’s fleeing columns into Washington, and held the

capital. But this is not a part of my story.

On the eve of the battle the Confederates had occasional glimpses

behind the lines about Washington, through parties who managed to evade

the eyes of guards and sentinels, which told of McDowell’s work since

May, and heard on the 10th of July that he was ready to march. Most of

the Confederates knew him and of his attainments, as well as those of

Beauregard, to the credit of the latter, and on that point they were

satisfied. But the backing of an organized government, and an army

led by the foremost American war-chief,--that consummate strategist,

tactician, and organizer, General Scott,--together with the splendid

equipment of the field batteries and the presence of the force of

regulars of infantry, gave serious apprehension.

A gentleman who was a boy in Washington during the Civil War, said not

long ago, in speaking of the first Manassas, that he would never forget

the impression made upon his youthful mind by McDowell’s army in moving

towards Manassas Junction. Their arms glistened in the sunshine; the

new uniforms added to the splendid bearing of the ranks; the horses

were garlanded with flowers; the silken folds of regimental flags,

lifted caressingly by the breezes of mid-summer, made an ocean of

color above the noble columns. It was an inspiring sight; every flag

in the capital was a beckoning call to arms in the nation’s defence.

McDowell’s army seemed setting out for some festal occasion, and gayly

moved to the sound of music and song. But oh, what a different sight

after Manassas, when his weary and routed columns straggled back to

Washington, before the victorious Confederates. Their gala day had been

of short duration.

On the 16th of July the Confederates learned that the advance of

McDowell’s army was under definite orders for next day. Longstreet’s

brigade was at once ordered into position at Blackburn’s Ford, and all

others were ordered on the alert.

At eight o’clock A.M. on the 18th McDowell’s army concentrated about

Centerville, his immediate objective being Manassas Junction. His

orders to General Tyler, commanding the advance division, were to look

well to the roads on the direct route to Manassas Junction and _via_

the Stone Bridge, to impress an advance upon the former, but to have

care not to bring on a general engagement.

Under the instructions, as General Tyler construed them, he followed

the Confederates to the heights of Centerville, overlooking the valley

of Bull Run, with a squadron of cavalry and two companies of infantry.

From the heights to the Run, a mile away, the field was open, and

partially disclosed the Confederate position on his right. On the left

the view was limited by a sparse growth of spreading pines.

The enemy was far beyond the range of Confederate guns, his position

commanding as well as his metal, so Longstreet ordered the guns

withdrawn to a place of safety, till a fair opportunity was offered

them. The guns were limbered and off before a shot reached them.

Artillery practice of thirty minutes was followed by an advance of

infantry. The march was quite up to the bluff overlooking the ford,

when both sides opened fire.

The first pouring-down volleys were most startling to the new troops.

Part of Longstreet’s line broke and started at a run. To stop the

alarm he rode with sabre in hand for the leading files, determined to

give them all that was in the sword and his horse’s heels, or stop the

break. They seemed to see as much danger in their rear as in front, and

soon turned and marched back to their places, to the evident surprise

of the enemy. Heavy firing was renewed in ten or fifteen minutes, when

the Federals retired. After about twenty minutes a second advance was

made to the top of the bluff, when another rousing fusilade followed,

and continued about as long as the first, with like result. Longstreet

reinforced the front line with part of his reserve, and, thinking to

follow up his next success, called for one of the regiments of the

reserve brigade.

The combat lasted about an hour, when the Federals withdrew to their

ground about Centerville, to the delight of the Confederates, who felt

themselves christened veterans; their artillery being particularly

proud of the combat against the famed batteries of the United States

regulars.

General McDowell’s order for the battle on the 21st of July was issued

on the afternoon of the 20th.

Beauregard’s order for battle, approved by General Johnston, was issued

at five A.M. on the 21st.

The orders for marching were only preliminary, coupled with the

condition that the troops were to be held ready to move, but to wait

for special order for action. The brigade at Blackburn’s Ford had been

reinforced by the Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia

Regiments, under Lieutenant Jones and Colonel Kemper. Longstreet

crossed the Run under the five o’clock order, adjusted the regiments

to position for favorable action, and gave instructions for their

movements on the opening of the battle.

This first clash of arms tested the fighting qualities of the

Confederates; but the soil was Virginia, and for them it was to be

death or victory.

The close of the battle of the 21st found the Federals beaten and

fleeing towards the shelter of their capital. They had fought

stubbornly. McDowell made a gallant effort to recover his lost power,

riding with his troops and urging them to brave effort. Although his

renewed efforts were heroic, his men seemed to have given confidence

over to despair when fight was abandoned and flight ensued. Over the

contested field of the first battle of the war, Longstreet had borne

the victorious banners of the South.

WILLIAMSBURG

“General Longstreet’s clear head and brave heart left no apology

for interference at Williamsburg.”--JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.

This battle was fairly fought and dearly won by the Confederacy, May

5, 1862. General Joseph E. Johnston was chief in command and General

Longstreet had the active direction of the battle.

In his official report upon the battle, General Johnston said,--

“The action gradually increased in magnitude until about three

o’clock, when General Longstreet, commanding the rear, requested

that a part of Major-General Hill’s troops might be sent to his

aid. Upon this I rode upon the field, but found myself compelled

to be a spectator, for General Longstreet’s clear head and brave

heart left no apology for interference.”

The battle was fought by Sickles’s Federal Third Corps, that heroically

contested every inch of the ground.

It was at the close of the battle that General Hancock distinguished

himself by holding his position in and about the forts with five

regiments and two batteries against the assault of the Fifth North

Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiments, and it was on this field

that he won the title of “The Superb,” given to him by McClellan in his

report.

The object of the battle on the part of the Confederates was to gain

time to haul their trains to places of safety. The effect besides

was to call two of the Federal divisions from their flanking move to

support the battle, thereby greatly crippling their expedition.

General McClellan was at Yorktown during most of the day to see several

of the divisions of his army aboard the transports for his proposed

flanking and rear move up York River. Upon receiving advice that the

Williamsburg engagement was serious and unsatisfactory, he hastened to

the battle with the divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson, which he had

expected to send up the river.

There were about nine thousand Confederates and twelve thousand Union

troops engaged. The Confederate casualties were 1565; the Federal

casualties, 2288. Johnston had anticipated McClellan’s move up the York

River, and considered it very important to cripple or break it up.

Therein he used the divisions of Longstreet, Magruder, D. R. Jones,

McLaws, G. W. Smith, and D. H. Hill.

There was a tremendous downpour of rain the night before the battle,

flooding thoroughfares, by-ways, woodlands, and fields so that many of

the Confederate trains were unable next day to move out of the bogs

that were developed during the night.

General Hooker’s division of the Third Corps, on the Federal side, came

to the open on the Hampton road, and engaged by regiments,--the First

Massachusetts on the left, the Second New Hampshire on the right.

After the advance of his infantry in the slashes, General Hooker, with

the Eleventh Massachusetts and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania, cleared the

way for communication with the troops on the Yorktown road and ordered

Webber’s six-gun battery into action. As it burst from the woods

through which it had come, the Confederate infantry and every gun in

reach opened upon it a fire so destructive that it was unmanned before

it came into practice. New Federal troops immediately came to the

rescue, and the guns reopened fire. Osborn’s and Bramhall’s batteries

joined in, and the two poured an unceasing fire into the Confederate

troops about the fort and redoubts. The Fifth New Jersey Regiment was

added to the battery guard, and the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth were

deployed on the left in the woodland. The brigades of R. H. Anderson,

Wilcox, Pryor, A. P. Hill, and Pickett were taking care of the

Confederate side.

General Longstreet, hearing the swelling noise of battle, rode to the

front and ordered Colston’s brigade and the batteries of Deering and

Stribling to follow, as well as Stuart’s horse artillery under Pelham.

It soon became evident that the fight was for the day. D. H. Hill was

asked to return with the balance of his division. Hooker was bracing

the fight on his left. He directed Emory to reconnoitre on his extreme

left. Grover was called to reinforce the fighting in the edge of

the woods. Several New York regiments came into the action, but the

Confederates nevertheless continued to gain ground until they got

short of ammunition. While holding their line, some of the regiments

retired a little to fill their cartridge-boxes from those of the

fallen enemy and their fallen comrades. This move was misconstrued

into an order to withdraw, and the Confederate line fell back, but the

mistake was soon discovered and the lost ground regained. The Eleventh

Massachusetts, Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania, and Second New Hampshire

came into the action. On the Confederate side, Colston’s brigade, the

Florida regiment, and the Mississippi battalion came to the rescue,

and General Anderson, who was in immediate charge, grouped his forces,

made a concentrated move upon the Federal batteries, cleared them of

the gunners, and captured four of Webber’s guns and forty horses.

General Stuart rode up about this time, decided that the Federals were

in retreat, and insisted upon a charge and pursuit. He was, however,

convinced that Federal reinforcements were coming up and that the break

was only of their front line. About three o’clock Kearny’s division

came to the Federal aid.

Before the reinforcements arrived for Hooker’s relief, Anderson had

established his advanced line of skirmishers so as to cover with their

fire Webber’s guns that were abandoned. The Federal reinforcing column

drove back his advance lines; then he reinforced and recovered his

ground. Then he met General Peck, the leader of the last reinforcing

brigade, who put in his last regiment, the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania;

but the night was approaching, both armies were exhausted, and little

further aggressive work was done.

FRAYSER’S FARM

Stonewall Jackson was in the Shenandoah Valley and the rest of the

Confederate troops were east and north of Richmond. In front General

McClellan’s army was encamped, a hundred thousand strong, about the

Chickahominy River preparing for a regular siege of the Confederate

capital. His army was unassailable from the front, and he had a small

force at Mechanicsville and a much larger force farther back at Beaver

Dam Creek.

A Confederate conference was called. Longstreet suggested that Jackson

be called down from the Valley to the rear of the Federal right, in

order to turn the position behind Beaver Dam, and that the rest of

the Confederate forces who were to engage in the attack cross the

Chickahominy and get ready for action. General Lee then sent General J.

E. B. Stuart on his famous ride around McClellan. He made a favorable

report of the situation. Upon further conference, the 26th was selected

as the day for moving upon the Federal position at Beaver Dam. There

was some spirited fighting between the two armies, but the advance of

Jackson, which had been some time delayed, made the Federals abandon

their position at Beaver Dam. They were closely followed, and were

again encountered at Gaines Mill, where battle followed.

Longstreet came up with reserve forces, and was preparing to support

Hill, when he was ordered by General Lee to make a demonstration

against the Federal left. He threw in three brigades, and for a time

the battle raged with great fierceness. General Jackson could not reach

the point of attack, and General Lee ordered Longstreet to throw in all

the force he could. The position in front of him was very strong. An

open field led to a difficult ravine beyond Powhite Creek. From there

the ground made a steep ascent, and was covered with trees, slashed

timber, and hastily made rifle-trenches. General Whiting came up with

two brigades of Jackson’s men. Longstreet’s column of attack then was

the brigades of R. H. Anderson and Pickett and the divisions of Law,

Hood, and Whiting. They attacked and defeated the Federals on their

left and captured many thousand stands of arms, fifty-two pieces of

artillery, a large quantity of supplies, and many prisoners, among them

General Reynolds, who afterwards fell at Gettysburg.

On the 29th General Lee ascertained that McClellan was marching towards

the James, and decided to intercept his forces in the neighborhood of

Charles City Cross-Roads. Longstreet was to march to a point below

Frayser’s Farm with General A. P. Hill. Holmes was to take up position

below on the New Market road; Jackson was to pursue the Federal rear;

Huger to attend to the Federal right flank. Thus the Federal rear was

to be enveloped and a part of McClellan’s army destroyed. Longstreet

found himself in due time in front of General McCall with a division

of ten thousand Federals near Frayser’s Farm. Finally artillery firing

was heard, which was taken for the expected signal for the beginning of

battle, and Longstreet’s batteries replied as the signal that he was

ready. While the order was going around to the batteries, President

Davis and General Lee, with their staff and followers, were with

Longstreet in a little open field near the firing lines, but not in

sight of the Federals.

The Federal batteries opened up spitefully. They did not know of the

distinguished Confederates near by, yet a battery had by chance their

exact range and distance, and poured a terrific fire in their midst.

The second or third shell killed two or three horses and wounded

several men. The little party speedily retired to safer quarters.

Longstreet sent Colonel Micah Jenkins to silence the Federal battery

with his long-range rifles. He charged the battery, and that brought on

a general fight between Longstreet’s division and the troops in front.

The Federal lines were broken and a number of batteries taken. At

points during the day McCall several times regained his lost position.

He was finally pushed back. At length McCall’s division was driven off

and fresh troops came to the Federal relief. Ten thousand men of A. P.

Hill’s division, held in reserve, were now brought into action.

About dark General McCall, while looking up a fragment of his

division, ran into Longstreet’s arms and was taken prisoner. General

Lee was there at the time. Longstreet had served with McCall in the

old Fourth Infantry, and offered his hand as McCall dismounted. The

Federal general did not regard this as an occasion for renewing old

friendships, and he was promptly offered an escort of Longstreet’s

staff to take him to Richmond.

MARCH AGAINST POPE AND THE SECOND MANASSAS

Even as early as 1862 the Union army had been using balloons to

examine the position of the Confederates, and even that early, the

scanty resources of the Confederates made the use of balloons a luxury

that could not be afforded. While gazing enviously upon the handsome

balloons of the Federals floating serenely at a distance that their

guns could not reach, a Confederate genius suggested that all the silk

dresses in the Confederacy be got together and made into balloons. This

was done, and soon a great patch-work ship of many and varied hues

was ready for use. There was no gas except in Richmond, and so the

silk-dress balloon had to be inflated there, tied to an engine, and

carried to where it was to be sent up. One day it was on a steamer down

the James River, when the tide went out and left the vessel and balloon

on a sand-bar. The Federals gathered it in, and with it the last silk

dress in the Confederacy. General Longstreet used to say, laughingly,

that this was the meanest trick of the war.

When General Pope came down into Virginia as Federal

commander-in-chief, with the double purpose of drawing McClellan away

from Westover and checking the advance of the new enemy approaching

from Washington, General Lee sent Stonewall Jackson to Gordonsville and

ordered General Longstreet to remain near Richmond to engage McClellan

if he should attempt an advance on that city. On the 9th of August,

1862, Jackson encountered the Federals near Cedar Mountain and repulsed

them at what is known as the battle of Cedar Run. About five o’clock

in the afternoon of this fight the Federals, by a well-executed move,

were pressing the Confederates back, when the opportune approach of two

brigades converted seeming defeat into victory. The Federals were more

numerous than the Confederates, and Jackson deemed it unwise to follow

in pursuit, so the Confederates retired behind the Rapidan to await the

arrival of General Lee with other forces.

General Lee then began preparations for a vigorous campaign against

General Pope. On the 13th of August Longstreet’s corps was ordered to

Gordonsville, and General Lee accompanied it there. General Jackson’s

troops were near by. The Rapidan River was to the north. Farther on

at Culpeper Court-House was the army of Pope, and the Rappahannock

River was beyond them. Clark’s Mountain, rising several hundred feet

above the surrounding hills, was a little in advance of Longstreet’s

position. The Federal situation was observed from the summit of this

mountain.

The flags of Pope’s army were in full view above the tops of the trees

around Culpeper Court-House. General Lee was very anxious to give

battle as soon as possible, but operations were in some way delayed

until General Pope captured a despatch from Lee to Stewart containing

information of the contemplated advance. Pope then withdrew to a

stronger position behind the Rappahannock River. Longstreet approached

the Rappahannock at Kelly’s Ford, and Jackson approached higher up at

Beverly Ford, near the Orange and Alexandria bridge. They found Pope in

an almost unassailable position, with heavy reinforcements summoned to

his aid.

The Confederate idea was to force a passage and make the attack before

reinforcements could reach Pope. Some sharp marching to this end was

done by Longstreet and Jackson. On the 23d Longstreet had a spirited

artillery combat at Beverly Ford with a Federal force. The Federals

had the superior position, the better guns; the Confederates had more

guns, and fought with accustomed persistence. Before night the Federals

withdrew. Incidentally, they set fire to a number of farm-houses in

the locality. Henry W. Grady, afterwards a distinguished Georgian, who

was a small boy during the war, frequently said that one of the worst

things about the Union forces was the carelessness with which they

handled fire.

Pope was meanwhile on the alert, and Lee found it impracticable to

attack him in his stronghold behind the Rappahannock. Lee then decided

to change his plan of operations by sending Jackson off on a long

march to the rear of the Federal army while keeping Longstreet with

thirty thousand men in front to receive any attack that might be

made. Jackson crossed the Rappahannock at Hinson’s Hill, four miles

above Waterloo Bridge, and that night encamped at Salem. The next

day he passed through Thoroughfare Gap, moved on by Gainesville, and

when the sun next set he was in the rear of Pope’s army and between

it and Washington. The sudden appearance of his army gave much

terror to the Federals in the vicinity; when he arrived at Bristoe

Station just before night the Federal guard at that point sought

safer quarters, and two trains of cars coming from towards Warrenton

were captured. Jackson sent a force forward seven miles and captured

Manassas Junction. He left a force at Bristoe Station and proceeded

himself to the Junction. During the afternoon the Federals attacked the

Confederates at Bristoe Station in such force as to make it appear that

Pope had discovered the situation and was moving upon Jackson with his

entire army. The Confederates then hastened away from Bristoe Station

and the Federals halted there. Jackson’s forces then moved over to a

position north of the turnpike leading from Warrenton to Alexandria,

and there awaited results.

On the evening of the 28th King’s division attacked Jackson, but was

repulsed. That same evening Longstreet arrived at Thoroughfare Gap.

During the time of Jackson’s march he had been engaging Pope’s army at

different points along the Rappahannock, to impress them with the idea

that he was attempting to force a passage in front and with the hope of

preventing his discovery of Jackson’s movement. Pope was not deceived,

however, but turned his army to meet Jackson’s daring and unexpected

move. Longstreet decided to follow at once. To force a passage of the

river, much swollen by recent rains, seemed impossible, and so he took

the route by which Jackson had gone. Finding that Thoroughfare Gap was

unoccupied, he went into bivouac on the west side of the mountain and

sent a brigade under Anderson to occupy the pass.

As the Confederates approached from one side, Ricketts’s division of

Federals approached from the other and took possession of the east

side. Thoroughfare Gap is a rough pass in the Bull Run Mountains, in

some places not more than a hundred yards wide. A swift stream rushes

through it, and the mountains rise on both sides several hundred feet

above. On the north the face of the Gap is almost perpendicular; the

south face is less precipitous, but is covered with tangled mountain

ivy and projecting boulders; the position, occupied by a small force,

was unassailable. The interposition of Ricketts’s division at this

mountain pass showed a disposition to hold Longstreet back while

overwhelming Jackson. This necessitated prompt and vigorous measures by

Longstreet. Three miles north was Hopewell Gap, and it was necessary

to get possession of this in advance of the Federals to provide for a

flank movement while forcing the way by foot-paths over the mountain

heights of Thoroughfare Gap. During the night Longstreet sent Wilcox

with three brigades to Hopewell Gap, while he sent Hood and his forces

by a trail over the mountain at Thoroughfare.

To the great delight of the Confederates, in the morning it was

discovered that Ricketts had given up the east side of the Gap and

was going towards Manassas Junction. Longstreet’s corps then went

along unimpeded. Hearing the artillery combat around Gainesville, they

quickened their steps. As the fire became more spirited their movements

became more rapid. Passing through Gainesville, they filed to the left

down the turnpike, and soon came in sight of the Federal troops held

at bay by Jackson. They were on the left and rear of the Federals; the

artillery was ordered up for action, but the advance was discovered,

and the Federals withdrew from attack and retired behind Groveton on

defensive ground. The battalion of Washington Artillery was thrown

forward to a favorable position on Jackson’s right, and Longstreet’s

general line was deployed so as to extend it to the right some distance

beyond the Manassas Gap Railroad.

The two great armies were now face to face, both in good positions,

each anxious to find a point for an entering wedge into the stronghold

of the adversary. What troubled the Confederates was the unknown

number of Federals at Manassas Junction. Each side watched the

movements of the other until the day was far spent. Orders were

given for a Confederate advance under the cover of night until the

main position of the enemy could be more carefully examined by the

earliest light of the next day. It so happened that a similar order

was issued at the same time by the Federals, and the result was a

spirited engagement, which was a surprise to both sides. Longstreet’s

corps was, however, successful, so far, at least, as to capture a

piece of artillery and make reconnoissance before midnight. The next

day Longstreet did not deem an attack wise, and the Confederate forces

were ordered back to their original positions. Then each side was

apprehensive that the other was going to get away.

Pope telegraphed to Washington that Longstreet was in full retreat and

he was preparing to follow; while Longstreet, thinking Pope was trying

to escape, was arranging to move to the left across Bull Run, so as

to get over on the Little River pike and between Pope and Washington.

Just before nine o’clock that day (the 30th) Pope’s artillery began to

play a little, and some of his infantry was seen in motion. Longstreet

construed this as a display to cover his movements to the rear. Later

a large division of Pope’s army began an attack on the left along

the whole of Jackson’s line. Pope evidently supposed that Longstreet

was gone, and intended to crush Jackson with a terrific onslaught.

Longstreet was meanwhile looking for a place to get in. Riding along

the front of his line, he could plainly see the Federals as they rushed

in heavy masses against Jackson’s obstinate ranks. It was a splendidly

organized attack.

[Illustration: DEFEAT OF THE FEDERAL TROOPS BY LONGSTREET’S CORPS,

SECOND MANASSAS.]

Longstreet received a request from Jackson for reinforcements, and

about the same time an order from General Lee to the same effect.

Longstreet quickly ordered out three batteries. Lieutenant Chapman’s

Dixie Battery of four guns was the first to report, and was placed in

position to rake the Federal ranks. In a moment a heavy fire of shot

and shell was poured into the thick columns of the Federals, and in ten

minutes their stubborn masses began to waver. For a moment there was

chaos; then there was order, and they reformed to renew the attack.

Meanwhile, Longstreet’s other eight pieces had begun deadly work. The

Federal ranks broke again and again, only to be reformed with dogged

determination.

A third time the Longstreet batteries tore the Federals to pieces, and

as they fell back under this terrible fire Longstreet’s troops leaped

forward with the famous rebel yell. They pressed onward until, at ten

o’clock at night, they had the field. Pope was across Bull Run and the

victorious Confederates lay down to sleep on the battle-ground, while

around them thousands of friend and foe slept the last sleep together.

The next morning the Federals were in a strong position at Centerville.

Longstreet sent a brigade across Bull Run under General Pryor to occupy

a point near Centerville. General Lee ordered Jackson to cross Bull

Run near Sudley’s and turn the position of the Federals occupying

Centerville. On the next day (September 1) Longstreet followed, but

the Federals discovered the move, abandoned Centerville, and started

towards Washington. On that evening a part of the Federal force at Ox

Hill encountered Jackson and gave him a sharp fight. Longstreet went to

Jackson’s rescue.

With the coming darkness it was difficult to distinguish between the

scattered ranks of the opposing armies. General Philip Kearny, a

magnificent Federal officer, rode hastily up looking for the broken

lines of his command. At first he did not know that he was in the

Confederate line, and the Confederates did not notice that he was a

Federal. He began quietly to inquire about some command, and was soon

recognized. He was called upon to surrender, but instead of doing so

he wheeled his horse, pressed spurs to his sides, lay flat on the

animal’s neck, and dashed away like the wind. A dozen shots rang out,

and in less time than it takes to tell the story the heroic Kearny fell

dead. He had been in the army all his life; the Confederate generals

who had formerly been in the Union army knew him; Longstreet loved him

well; General A. P. Hill, who was standing by, said, sorrowfully, “Poor

Kearny! he deserved a better death than this.” The next day his body

was sent over the lines with a flag of truce and a note from General

Lee referring tenderly to the manner in which he had met his death. The

Federal forces which had been fighting the Ox Hill battle proved to be

the rear guard covering the retreat of the Federals into Washington.

THE INVASION OF MARYLAND AND THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM

General Longstreet always thought that the division of the Confederate

army after they moved into Maryland proved their downfall. This,

however, is not a part of my story.

At this time General Pope had been relieved and General McClellan

restored to the command of the Union army. With ninety thousand troops,

he marched towards Antietam to avenge the second Manassas.

General D. H. Hill was at South Mountain with five thousand men;

Longstreet’s First Corps was at Hagerstown, thirteen miles farther on;

General Lee was with him, and on the night of the 13th of September,

1862, information was received that McClellan was at the foot of South

Mountain with his great army. It was decided to withdraw the forces

of Longstreet and Hill from their respective positions and unite

at Sharpsburg, which afforded a strong defensive position. On the

afternoon of the 15th of September the commands of Longstreet and Hill

crossed the Antietam Creek and took position in front of Sharpsburg,

Longstreet on the right and Hill on the left. They soon found their

weak point was on the left at the famous Dunkard Church. Hood, with

two brigades, was put to guard that point. That night, after the fall

of Harper’s Ferry, General Lee ordered Stonewall Jackson to come to

Sharpsburg as quickly as possible.

On the forenoon of the 15th the blue uniforms of the Federals appeared

among the trees that crowned the heights on the eastern bank of the

Antietam. Their numbers increased in proportions distressing to their

opponents, who were shattered by repeated battles, tired by long

marches, and fed most meagrely. On the 16th Jackson arrived and took

position on Longstreet’s left. Before night the Federals attacked, but

were driven back. Hood was ordered to replenish his ammunition during

the night and resume his position on Longstreet’s right in the morning.

General Jackson’s forces were extended to the left, and reached well

back towards the Potomac, where most of the Confederate cavalry was.

General Robert Toombs was placed as guard on the bridge at Longstreet’s

right.

On the Federal side General Hooker, who had been driven back in the

afternoon, was reinforced by the corps of Sumner and Mansfield; Sykes’s

division was also drawn into position for battle; Burnside was over

against Longstreet’s right threatening the passage of the Antietam.

On the morning of the 17th the Federals were in good position and in

good condition. Back of McClellan’s line was a high ridge, upon which

he had a signal-station overlooking every point of the field. D. R.

Jones’s brigades of Longstreet’s command deployed on the right of the

Sharpsburg pike, while Hood’s brigades awaited orders; D. H. Hill was

on the left towards the Hagerstown-Sharpsburg pike; Jackson extended

out from Hill’s left towards the Potomac.

The battle opened heavily with attacks by Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner

against Longstreet’s left centre, which consisted of Jackson’s right

and D. H. Hill’s left. So persistent were the attacks that Longstreet

sent Hood to support the Confederate centre. The Confederates were

forced back somewhat; McClellan’s forces continued the attacks; the

line swayed forward and back like a rope exposed to rushing currents;

a weak point would be driven back and then the Confederate fragments

would be collected and the lost ground recovered; the battle ebbed and

flowed with fearful slaughter on both sides. The Federals came forward

with wonderful courage, and the Confederates heroically held their

ground, while they were mown down like grass.

How Lee’s ragged army withstood McClellan’s troops no one will ever

be able to tell. Hood’s ammunition gave out; he retired for a fresh

supply; the Federals continued to come up in great masses. At one

point, under the crest of a hill occupying a position that from four

to six brigades should have held, there were only the stranded troops

of Cooke’s regiment of North Carolina Infantry, who were without a

cartridge. As Longstreet rode along the line of his staff, he saw

two pieces of Washington Artillery (Miller’s battery), but there

were not enough men to handle them. The gunners had all been killed

or wounded--and this was the Confederate centre. Longstreet held the

horses of his staff-officers, put them to man the guns, and calmly

surveyed the situation. He saw that if the Federals broke through

the line at that point the Confederate army would be cut in two and

probably destroyed. Cooke sent him word that his ammunition was

entirely out. Longstreet replied that he must hold his position as

long as he had a man left. Cooke responded that he would show his

colors as long as there was left a man alive to hold them up. The two

guns were rapidly loaded with canister by the staff-officers, and they

rattled leaden hail into the Federals as they came up over the crest

of the hill. That little battery, with superhuman energy, had to hold

thousands of Federals at bay, or the whole battle would be lost.

The Confederates sought to make the Federals believe that many

batteries were before them. As they came up, they would see the colors

of Cooke’s North Carolina regiment waving as placidly as if the whole

of Lee’s army were back of them, while a shower of canister came from

the two lonely guns. General Chilton, General Lee’s chief of staff,

made his way to Longstreet and asked, “Where are the troops you are

holding your line with?” Longstreet pointed to his two pieces and to

Cooke’s regiment, and replied, “There they are; but that regiment

hasn’t a cartridge.” Chilton, dumb with astonishment, rode back to tell

the story to General Lee. Then an enfilade fire from General D. H.

Hill’s line ploughed the ground across the Federal front and kept them

back; meanwhile, R. H. Anderson and General Hood came to the support

of this fearfully pushed Confederate centre. In a little while another

Federal assault was made against D. H. Hill and extending far to the

Confederate left, where McLaws and Walker were supporting Jackson.

In this fearful combat the lines swung back and forth, the Federals

attacking with invincible motion and the Confederates holding their

positions with irresistible force.

Meanwhile, General Lee was over towards the right, where Burnside was

making the attack. General Toombs, assigned as guard at that point,

had only four hundred weary and footsore soldiers to meet the Federal

Ninth Corps, which pressed the brave little band slowly back. The

delay that Toombs caused, however, saved that part of the battle, for

at the last moment A. P. Hill came in to reinforce him and D. H. Hill

discovered a place for a battery and lost no time in opening it. Thus

the Confederates drove the Federals back, and when night settled down

the army of Lee was still in possession of the field. But it was a

victory that was not a victory, for thousands of Confederates were

dead on the field and gallant commands had been torn into fragments.

Nearly one-fourth of the troops who went into the battle were killed or

wounded. This day has been well called the bloodiest day of the Civil

War.

General Longstreet was fond of telling how during the battle he

and General Lee were riding along his line and D. H. Hill’s when

they started up a hill to make a reconnoissance. Lee and Longstreet

dismounted, but Hill remained on his horse. General Longstreet said

to Hill, “If you insist on riding up there and drawing the fire, give

us time to get out of the line of the fire when they open up anew.”

While they were all standing there viewing with their glasses the

Federal movements, Longstreet noticed a puff of white smoke from a

Federal cannon. He called to Hill, “That shot is for you.” The gunner

was a mile away, but the cannon-shot took off the front legs of Hill’s

horse. The horse’s head was so low and his croup so high that Hill was

in a very ludicrous position. With one foot in the stirrup he made

several efforts to get the other leg over the croup, but failed. Lee

and Longstreet yelled at him to dismount from the other end of the

horse, and so he got down. He had a third horse shot under him before

the close of the battle. General Longstreet said that that shot at Hill

was the second best shot he ever saw. The best was at Yorktown, where a

Federal officer came out in front of the Confederate line, sat down to

a little platting table, and began to make a map. A Confederate officer

carefully sighted a cannon, touched it off, and dropped a shell into

the lap of the man at the little table a mile or more away.

After the battle closed, parties from both sides, by mutual consent,

went in search of fallen comrades.

After riding along the lines, giving instructions for the night and

morning, General Longstreet rode for general head-quarters to make

report, but was delayed somewhat, finding wounded men hidden away under

stone walls and in fence-corners, not yet looked after, and afterwards

in assisting a family whose home had been fired by a shell, so that all

the other officers had arrived, made their reports, and were lounging

about on the sod when General Longstreet rode up. General Lee walked up

as he dismounted, threw his hands upon his shoulders, and hailed him

with, “Here is my old war-horse at last!”

FREDERICKSBURG

When General Lee learned that General McClellan had been succeeded by

General Burnside, he expressed regret at having to part with McClellan,

because, he said, “We always understood each other so well. I fear they

may continue to make these changes till they find some one whom I don’t

understand.”

The Federal army was encamped around Warrenton, Virginia, and was

divided into three grand divisions, under Generals Sumner, Hooker, and

Franklin. Lee’s army was on the opposite side of the Rappahannock

River, divided into two corps, the First commanded by General

Longstreet and the Second by General Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson.

At that time the Confederate army extended from Culpeper Court-House,

where the First Corps was stationed, across the Blue Ridge, down the

Valley of Virginia, to Winchester, where Jackson was encamped with the

Second Corps. Information was received about the 19th of November that

Sumner with his grand division of more than thirty thousand men was

moving towards Fredericksburg. Two of General Longstreet’s divisions

were ordered down to meet him. After a forced march they arrived on the

hills around Fredericksburg about three o’clock on the afternoon of the

21st (November, 1862). Sumner had already arrived, and was encamped on

Stafford Heights overlooking the town from the Federal side.

About the 26th it became evident that Fredericksburg would be the scene

of a battle, and Longstreet advised the people who were still in town

to leave. A previous threat from the Federal forces that they might

have to shell the town had already forced many to leave. Distressed

women, little children, aged and helpless men, many of them destitute

and with nowhere to go, trudged away as best they could. Soon the

remainder of Longstreet’s corps came up from Culpeper Court-House, and

it was then known that all the Army of the Potomac was in motion for

the prospective scene of battle, when Jackson was drawn down from the

Blue Ridge. In a short time the Army of Northern Virginia was face to

face with the Army of the Potomac. On the Confederate side nearest

the Rappahannock was Taylor’s Hill, and South of it Marye’s Hill;

next, Telegraph Hill, the highest Confederate elevation, afterwards

known as Lee’s Hill, because General Lee was there during the battle.

Longstreet’s head-quarters in the field were there. Next was a

declination through which Deep Run Creek passed on to the Rappahannock,

and next was Hamilton’s Crossing, upon which Stonewall Jackson massed

thirty thousand men. Upon these hills the Confederates prepared to

receive Burnside whenever he might choose to cross the Rappahannock.

The Federals occupied the noted Stafford Heights beyond the river, and

here they carefully matured their plans of advance and attack. General

Hunt, chief of artillery, skilfully posted one hundred and forty-seven

guns to cover the bottoms upon which the infantry was to form for the

attack, and at the same time play upon the Confederate batteries.

Franklin and Hooker had joined Sumner, and the Federal army were

one hundred and sixteen thousand strong. The Federals had been seen

along the banks of the river investigating the best places to cross.

President Lincoln had been down with General Halleck, who had suggested

that a crossing be made at Hoop-Pole Ferry, about twenty-eight or

thirty miles below Fredericksburg. The Confederates discovered this

movement, and it was then abandoned. There were sixty-five thousand

Confederates well located upon the various hills on the other side

of the river. Anderson, McLaws, Ransom, Hood, A. P. and D. H. Hill,

Longstreet, Stonewall Jackson, and the great Robert E. Lee himself were

all there.

On the morning of the 11th of December, 1862, an hour or so before

daybreak, the slumbering Confederates were awakened by a cannon

thundering on the heights of Marye’s Hill. It was recognized as the

signal of the Washington Artillery, and it told that the Federal

troops were preparing to cross the Rappahannock and give battle. The

Federals came down to the river and began to build their bridges, when

Barksdale and his heroic Mississippians opened fire, which forced them

to retire. The Federals then turned their whole artillery force on

Fredericksburg, demolishing the houses with a cyclone of fire. The

only offence of the little town was that it was situated where the

battle raged. The little band of Mississippians kept up their work, and

like so many angry hornets stung the whole Army of the Potomac into

frenzy. Longstreet ordered Barksdale to withdraw, and the Federals

then constructed their pontoons without molestation, and the next

day Sumner’s grand division passed over into Fredericksburg; General

Franklin’s grand division passed over on pontoon bridges lower down

and massed on the level bottoms opposite Hamilton’s Crossing, in front

of Stonewall Jackson’s corps. Opposite Fredericksburg the formation

along the river bank was such that the Federals were concealed in their

approaches, and they thereby succeeded in getting over and concealing

the grand division of Sumner and a part of Hooker’s grand division in

Fredericksburg, and so disposing of Franklin in the open plain below

as to give out the impression that the great force was there to oppose

Jackson.

Before daylight of the eventful 13th Longstreet rode to the right

of his line, held by Hood’s division, which was in hearing of the

Federals who were marching their troops to the attack on Jackson.

Longstreet ordered Hood, in case Jackson’s line should be broken, to

wheel around to his right and strike in on the attacking bodies, while

he ordered Pickett with his division to join in the flank movement. He

told them at the same time that he himself would be attacked near his

left centre, that he would be personally at that point, and that his

position was so well defended that he would not need their troops. He

returned to Lee’s Hill soon after sunrise.

There was a thick fog that morning, and the preparations of the

Federals were concealed thereby. The Confederates grimly awaited the

onslaught. About ten o’clock the sun burst through the fog and revealed

the mighty panorama in the valley below. Franklin’s forty thousand

men, reinforced by two divisions of Hooker’s grand division, were in

front of Jackson’s thirty thousand. The flags of the Federals fluttered

gayly, their polished arms shone brightly, and the beautiful uniforms

of the buoyant troops gave a holiday air to the scene. A splendid

array it was. Awaiting their approach was Jackson’s ragged infantry,

and beyond was Stuart’s battered cavalry. The majority of the Federal

troops were in Fredericksburg almost in reach of the Confederate guns.

There was some lively firing between a part of Franklin’s command and

a part of Stuart’s Horse Artillery under Major John Pelham. Franklin

advanced rapidly towards Jackson; silently Jackson awaited his approach

until within good range, and then opened with a terrific fire, which

threw the Federals into some confusion. The Federals again massed and

advanced, and pressed through a gap in Jackson’s line. Then they came

upon Gregg’s brigade, and a severe encounter ensued in which Gregg was

mortally wounded. The concentration of the divisions of Taliaferro and

Early against this attack drove the Federals back.

On the Confederate side near the town was a stone wall, shoulder high.

Behind this stone wall Longstreet had placed General T. R. R. Cobb’s

brigade and a portion of the brigade of General Kershaw,--about two

thousand five hundred men in all. To reach Longstreet’s weakest point

the Federals had to pass directly over this wall.

Just before noon Longstreet sent orders to all his batteries to open

fire as a diversion in favor of Jackson. This fire began at once

to develop work for Longstreet. The Federal troops swarmed out of

Fredericksburg and came in double-quick towards Cobb’s wall. From the

moment of their appearance fearful carnage began. The Confederate

artillery from the front, right, and left tore through their ranks,

but the Federals pressed forward with almost invincible determination.

Thus they marched upon the stone fence behind which Cobb’s brigade

was quietly waiting. When the Federals came within its reach they

were swept from the field like chaff before the wind. A vast number

went pell-mell into an old railroad cut to escape fire from the right

and front. A battery on Lee’s Hill saw this, and turned its fire into

the entire length of the cut, and wrought frightful destruction.

Though thus repulsed and scattered in its first attempt to drive the

Confederates from Marye’s Hill, the determined Federal army quickly

formed again and filed out of Fredericksburg to another charge. Again

they were forced to retire before the well-directed guns of Cobb’s

brigade and the fire of the artillery on the heights.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG, FROM THE BATTERY ON LEE’S

HILL.]

Still again they formed and advanced, and again they were driven off.

By this time they had difficulty in walking over the dead bodies of

their comrades. So persistent were they in their continuing advances

that General Lee, who at the time was with Longstreet on Lee’s Hill,

became uneasy and said that he feared the Federals would break through

his line. To this Longstreet replied, “General, if you put every man

now on the other side of the Potomac on that field to approach me over

the same line, and give me plenty of ammunition, I will kill them

all before they reach my line. Look to your right; you are in some

danger there, but not on my line.” As a precaution, General Kershaw

was ordered with the remainder of his brigade down to the stone wall

to carry ammunition to Cobb and to reinforce him if necessary. Kershaw

arrived just in time to succeed Cobb, who was falling from a Federal

bullet, to die in a few minutes from loss of blood. A fifth time

the Federals formed, charged, and were repulsed, and likewise a

sixth time, when they were again driven back, and night came to end

the dreadful carnage. The Federals then withdrew, leaving the field

literally piled up with the bodies of their dead. The Confederate

musketry alone killed and wounded at least five thousand, while the

artillery brought the number of those killed and wounded at the foot of

Marye’s Hill to over seven thousand.

During the night a Federal strayed beyond his line, was taken up by

Longstreet’s troops, and on his person was found a memorandum of

General Burnside’s arrangements and an order for the renewal of the

battle next day. Upon receiving this information General Lee gave

immediate orders for a line of rifle-pits on the top of Marye’s Hill

for General Ransom, who had been held somewhat in reserve, and for

other guns to be placed on Taylor’s Hill. The Confederates were up

before daylight on the morrow, anxious to receive General Burnside

again. The Federal troops, however, had left the field. It was at first

thought that the memorandum was intended as a ruse of war, but it was

afterwards learned that General Burnside expected to resume attack, but

gave it up when he became fully aware of the fate of his soldiers at

the foot of Marye’s Hill.

CHICKAMAUGA

This battle marked the only great Confederate victory won in the

West, and was one of the bloodiest battles of the war. Indeed, the

contest for the bloodiest day in this great war is, I believe, between

Antietam and Chickamauga. Official reports show that on both sides the

casualties embrace the enormous proportion of thirty-three per cent. of

the troops actually engaged. On the Union side there were over a score

of regiments in which the losses in this single fight exceeded 49.4 per

cent. The “Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava,” immortalized by

Tennyson, did not suffer by ten per cent. as much as did thirty of the

Union regiments at Chickamauga; and a number of Confederate regiments

suffered even more than their Federal opponents.

Longstreet’s command in less than two hours lost nearly forty-four

per cent. of its strength. Of the troops that received their splendid

assaults, Steedman’s and Brannan’s commands lost respectively

forty-nine and thirty-eight per cent. in less than four hours. The loss

of single regiments showed a much heavier percentage. For instance, the

Tenth Tennessee Regiment lost sixty-eight per cent.; the Fifth Georgia,

61.1; the Second Tennessee, 60.2; the Sixteenth Alabama, 58.6; a great

number of them more than fifty per cent.

The total Confederate losses were about 18,000 men; the total

Federal losses, about 17,000. Viewed from the stand-point of both

sides, Chickamauga was the fifth greatest battle of the war, being

exceeded only by Gettysburg, Spottsylvania, the Wilderness, and

Chancellorsville. But each of these battles were of a much longer time.

The total Confederates engaged in the battle were 59,242; the total

Federals, 60,867. The battle was fought on the 20th of September, 1863.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. CONFEDERATES FLANKING THE UNION

FORCES.]

The movements of both sides were too complex to be followed here.

During a very hot part of the battle, General Hood, on the Confederate

side, was fearfully wounded; General Benning, of his “Rock Brigade,”

lost his own horse, and thought that General Hood was killed and that

everything was gone to smash. He cut a horse loose from a captured

gun, grabbed a rope trace as a riding whip, mounted, and rode to meet

General Longstreet and report. He had lost his hat in the mêlée, and

everything was in terrible shape. He reported,--

“General Hood killed, my horse killed, my brigade torn to pieces,

and I haven’t a single man left.”

General Longstreet smiled, and quietly asked him if he did not think he

could find _one_ man. Quieted by the tone of the question, he began to

look for his men, found quite a number of them, and quickly joined the

fighting forces at the front, where he discovered that the Confederates

had carried the first line, that Johnson’s division was in the breach

and pushing on, with Hindman spreading battle to the enemy’s limits,

Stuart’s division holding bravely on, and the brigades of Kershaw and

Humphreys coming along to help restore the battle to good organization.

About one o’clock in the day lunch was ordered spread for a number of

the officers. General Longstreet meanwhile rode with General Buckner

and the staffs to view the changed conditions of the battle. He could

see but little of the enemy’s line, and only knew it by the occasional

exchange of fire between the skirmishers. Suddenly the party discovered

that they had passed the Confederate line and were within the fire of

the Federal sharp-shooters, who were concealed behind the trees and

under the brush. They came back in more than double-quick. General

Longstreet ordered General Buckner to establish a twelve-gun battery on

the right and enfilade the Federal works. Then he rode away to enjoy a

sumptuous spread of Nassau bacon and Georgia sweet potatoes. They were

not accustomed to potatoes of any kind in Virginia, and the Georgia

variety was a peculiar luxury. While the lunch was in its first stages

a fragment of shell came tearing through the woods, passed through

a book in the hands of a courier who sat his horse hard by reading,

and struck down the chief of ordnance, Colonel T. P. Manning. Friends

sprang forward to look for the wound and give relief. Manning had

just taken an unusually large bite of sweet potato, and was about

suffocating thereby. He was supposed to be gasping for his last breath

when General Longstreet suggested that he be relieved of the potato and

given a chance to breathe. This done, he soon revived, and was ready

to be taken to the hospital, and in a few days he was again ready for

either a Federal shell or a Georgia potato.

The vicissitudes of the battle were many and varied, but finally

the Federal forces quit the field and the different wings of the

Confederate army came together and greeted each other with loud huzzas.

The Army of the Tennessee was ready to celebrate its first grand

victory, in spite of the great losses sustained. The twilight dews

hung heavy over the trees, as if to hush the voice of victory in the

presence of death, but nevertheless, the two lines, which neared as

they advanced, united their shouts in increasing volume, not as the

cannon’s violent noise, but as one great burst of harmony that seemed

almost to lift from their rooted depths the great forest trees. Before

greetings and congratulations upon the success had passed it was night,

and the mild beams of the quartering moon were more suggestive of Venus

than of Mars, as Longstreet rested in the white light of the one great

triumph of Confederate arms in the West.

IN EAST TENNESSEE

About the 1st of November, 1863, it was determined at Confederate

head-quarters that Longstreet should be ordered into East Tennessee

against General Burnside’s army.

On the 22d of October General Grant joined the army, and it was known

that General Sherman was marching to join him.

On the 20th of October General Burnside reported by letter to General

Grant an army of twenty-two thousand three hundred men, with ninety-odd

guns, but his returns for November gave a force of twenty-five thousand

two hundred and ninety, and over one hundred guns. Eight thousand of

his men were on service north of Knoxville and about Cumberland Gap.

To march, capture, and disperse this formidable force, fortified at

points, Longstreet had about fifteen thousand men, after deducting

camp guards and foraging parties. Marching and fighting had been his

almost daily occupation from the middle of January, 1863, when he left

Fredericksburg to move down to Suffolk, Virginia, until the 16th of

December, when he found bleak winter again breaking upon him, away from

friends, and dependent upon his own efforts for food and clothing for

his ragged and hungry Confederates.

It is not in the purview of this paper to more than briefly refer to

Longstreet’s work in East Tennessee in the bitter winter of 1863-64. He

has said that Washington’s men at Valley Forge did not suffer more than

his command on the hard campaigns of that severe winter. Much of the

time half-clad and shoeless, the snow-covered ground bore the bloody

imprint of their naked feet. They were compelled to dig holes in the

frozen ground, which were thawed out by fires to furnish their usual

couch. They had nothing to eat but parched corn. But the brave fellows

never lost heart. They undertook to make a joke of their dire straits.

As General Longstreet rode out among them, they would call cheerily to

know if they might not have a little fodder to eat with their corn.

It is now generally conceded that no more valorous service was rendered

the Confederate cause during the four years’ fighting than Longstreet’s

work in East Tennessee, cut off from supplies, improperly supported by

his government, and sent with an inadequate force to attack Burnside in

his stronghold.

Mrs. Grant, a few years before her death, in discussing the events of

those campaigns, said to me that General Grant had come to Nashville

to spend Christmas with her. She had scarcely given him greeting when

a hurried message came from Knoxville,--“Longstreet is coming!” He

was much perturbed at having to forego his Christmas with his family

and return immediately to his works about Knoxville. In parting she

said to him, “Now, Ulysses, you know that you are not going to hurt

Longstreet.” Grant quickly replied, “I will if I can get him; he is in

bad company.”

[Illustration: THE ASSAULT ON FORT SANDERS, KNOXVILLE.]

To “get” Longstreet or to drive him out of Tennessee came to be the

chief concern of Grant and his government. General Halleck was much

concerned about the Confederate army in East Tennessee, the only

strategic field then held by Southern troops. It was inconveniently

near Kentucky and the Ohio River. President Lincoln and his War

Secretary added their anxiety to Halleck’s on account of its

politico-strategic bearing. General Halleck urged his views upon

General Grant, and despatched General Foster that it was of first

importance to “drive Longstreet out of Tennessee and keep him out.”

General Grant ordered: “Drive Longstreet to the farthest point east

that you can.” It was easier to issue that order than to execute it.

And Grant reported to the authorities:

“If Longstreet is not driven out of the valley entirely, and the road

destroyed east of Abingdon, I do not think it unlikely that the last

great battle of the war will be fought in East Tennessee. Reports

of deserters and citizens show the army of Bragg to be too much

demoralized and reduced by desertions to do anything this winter. I

will get everything in order here in a few days and go to Nashville

and Louisville, and, if there is still a chance of doing anything

against Longstreet, to the scene of operations there. I am deeply

interested in moving the enemy beyond Saltville this winter, so as to

be able to select my own campaign in the spring, instead of having the

enemy dictate it to me.”

About the middle of December orders were given the Confederate army,

which was on the west bank of the Holston River, to cross and march for

the railroad, only a few miles away.

The transfer of the army to the east bank of the river was executed

by diligent work and the use of such flatboats and other means of

crossing as could be collected and constructed. They were over by

the 20th, and before Christmas were in camps along the railroad near

Morristown. Blankets and clothes were scarce, shoes more so. But to

the hungry Confederates the beautiful country in which they found

themselves seemed a land of milk and honey. The French Broad River and

the Holston are confluent at Knoxville. The country between and beyond

them contains as fine farming-lands and has as delightful climate as

can be found. Stock and grain were on all farms. Wheat and oats had

been thoughtfully hidden away by the Federals, but the fields were

full of maize, still standing. The country around the French Broad had

hardly been touched by the foragers. The Confederate wagons immediately

on entering the fields were loaded to overflowing. Pumpkins were on the

ground in places like apples under a tree. Cattle, sheep, and swine,

poultry, vegetables, maple sugar, and honey were all abundant for

immediate wants of the troops.

When the Federals found that the Confederates had moved to the east

bank, their cavalry followed to that side. They were almost as much in

want of the beautiful foraging lands as the Confederates, but there

was little left for them. With the plenitude of provisions for the

time, and many things which seemed luxuries, the Confederates were

not altogether happy. Tattered garments, blankets, and shoes (the

latter going, many gone) opened ways, on all sides, for piercing

winter blasts. There were some hand-looms in the country, from which

there was occasionally picked up a piece of cloth, and here and there

other comforts were received, some from kind and some from unwilling

hands, which nevertheless could spare them. For shoes the men were

compelled to resort to the raw hides of beef cattle as temporary

protection from the frozen ground. Then soldiers were discovered who

could tan the hides of beeves, some who could make shoes, some who

could make shoe-pegs, some who could make shoe-lasts; so it came about,

through the varied industries of Longstreet’s men, that the hides

passed rapidly from the beeves to the feet of the soldiers. Thus the

soldier’s life was made, for a time, passably pleasant in the infantry

and artillery. Meanwhile, the Confederate cavalry were looking at

the Federals, and the Federals were looking at them, both frequently

burning powder between their lines.

General Sturgis had been assigned to the cavalry of the other side,

to relieve General Shackelford, and he seemed to think that the dead

of winter was the time for cavalry work; and the Confederate General

Martin’s orders were to have the enemy under his eye at all hours. Both

were vigilant, active, and persevering.

About December 20 a raid was made by General Averill from West Virginia

upon a supply depot of General Sam Jones’s department, at Salem, which

was partially successful, when General Grant, under the impression that

the stores were for East Tennessee, wired General Foster, “This will

give you great advantage.” And General Foster despatched General Parke,

commanding his troops in the field, December 26, “Longstreet will feel

a little timid now, and will bear a little pushing.”

General Grant made a visit to Knoxville about New Year’s, and remained

until the 7th. He found General Foster in the condition of the

Confederates,--not properly supplied with clothing, especially in want

of shoes. So he authorized a wait for clothing, then in transit and

looked for in a week; and that little delay was a great lift for the

Confederates.

Before leaving General Foster, General Grant ordered him, on receipt of

clothing, to advance and “drive Longstreet at least beyond Bull’s Gap

and Red Bridge.” And to prepare for that advance, he ordered the Ninth

and Twenty-third Corps to Mossy Creek, the Fourth Corps to Strawberry

Plains, and the cavalry to Dandridge.

The Union army--equipped--marched on the 14th and 15th of January. The

bitter freeze of two weeks had made the rough angles of mud as firm

and sharp as so many freshly quarried rocks, and the bare feet of the

Confederates on this march left bloody marks along the roads.

General Sturgis rode in advance of the army, and occupied Dandridge by

Elliott’s, Wolford’s, and Garrard’s divisions of cavalry and Mott’s

brigade of infantry. The Fourth and Twenty-ninth Corps followed the

cavalry, leaving the Ninth Corps to guard at Strawberry Plains.

General Martin gave prompt notice that the march was at Dandridge

and in full force. Dandridge is on the right bank of the French

Broad River, about thirty miles from Knoxville. Its topographical

features are bold and inviting of military work. Its other striking

characteristic was the interesting character of its citizens. The

Confederates--a unit in heart and spirit--were prepared to do their

share towards making an effective battle, and the plans were so laid.

At the time ordered for his advance General Foster was suffering from

an old wound, and General Parke became commander of the troops in the

field. The latter delayed at Strawberry Plains in arranging that part

of his command, and General Sheridan, marching with the advance, became

commander, until superseded by the corps commander, General Gordon

Granger.

The Confederate plans were laid before the army was all up. Their

skirmish line was made stronger, and relieved the cavalry of their

dismounted service. A narrow, unused road, practicable for artillery,

was found that opened a way for the Confederates to reach the enemy’s

rearward line of march. Sharp-shooters were organized and ordered

forward by it, to be followed by our infantry columns. It was thought

better to move the infantry alone, as the ringing of the iron axles of

the guns might give notice of the Confederate purpose; the artillery to

be called as the Confederate sharp-shooters approached the junction of

the roads. The head of the turning force encountered a picket-guard,

some of whom escaped without firing. General Granger decided to retire,

and was in time to leave the crossroads behind him, his rear guard

passing the point of intersection before the Confederate advance party

reached it about midnight.

The weather moderated before night, and after dark a mild, gentle rain

began to fall.

When Longstreet rode into Dandridge in the gray of the morning the

ground was thawing and hardly firm enough to bear the weight of his

horse. When the cavalry came at sunrise the last crust of ice had

melted, letting the animals down to their fetlocks in heavy limestone

soil. The mud and want of a bridge to cross the Holston made pursuit by

the heavy Confederate columns useless. The cavalry was ordered on, and

the troops at Morristown, on the Strawberry Plains road, were ordered

to try that route, but the latter proved to be too heavy for progress

with artillery.

While General Longstreet rode through the streets of Dandridge, giving

directions for such pursuit of the fleeing Federals as could be made, a

lady came out upon the sidewalk and invited him into her parlors. When

the orders for pursuit were completed, he dismounted, and with some

members of his staff walked in. After the compliments of the season

were passed, the Confederates were asked to be seated, and the lady

told, with evident great enjoyment, of General Granger during the night

before. She had never heard a person swear about another as General

Granger did about General Longstreet. Some of the officers proposed to

stop and make a battle, but General Granger swore, and said, “It’s no

use to stop and fight Longstreet. You can’t whip him. It don’t make any

difference whether he has one man or a hundred thousand.” Presently she

brought out a flask that General Granger had forgotten, and presented

it to General Longstreet. It had about two horizontal fingers left

in it. Though not left with compliments, it was accepted. Although

the weather had moderated, it was very wet and nasty, and as General

Longstreet had taken his coffee at three o’clock, it was resolved to

call it noon and divide the spoils. Colonel Fairfax, who knew how to

enjoy good things, thought the occasion called for a sentiment, and

offered, “General Granger--may his shadow never grow less.”

The cavalry found the road and its side-ways so cut up that the

pursuit was reduced to a labored walk. The previous hard service and

exposure had so reduced the animals that they were not in trim for real

effective cavalry service. They found some crippled battery forges and

a little of other plunder, but the enemy passed the Holston and broke

his bridges behind him, and Longstreet’s men returned to their huts and

winter homes.

To seek some of the fruits of his advantage at Dandridge, the roads

being a little firmer, General Longstreet ordered his leading division,

under General Jenkins, on the 21st, to proceed to march towards

Strawberry Plains, and the Richmond authorities were asked to send a

pontoon bridge, tools of construction, and to hurry forward such shoes

as they could send.

On the 24th, as the official records show, General Grant sent word to

General Halleck of Longstreet’s return towards Knoxville; that he had

ordered General Foster to give battle, if necessary, and that he would

send General Thomas with additional troops to insure that Longstreet

would be driven from the State. He also directed General Thomas to

go in person and take command, and said, “I want Longstreet routed

and pursued beyond the limits of Tennessee.” And he ordered General

Foster to put his cavalry on a raid from Cumberland Gap to cut in upon

Longstreet’s rear.

On the 6th of February General Grant reported from Nashville,--

“MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK,

“General-in-Chief:

“I am making every effort to get supplies from Knoxville for the

support of a large force--large enough to drive Longstreet out.

“U. S. GRANT,

“_Major-General Commanding_.”

* * * * *

“MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS:

“Reports of scouts make it evident that Joe Johnston has removed

most of his force from our front, two divisions going to

Longstreet. Longstreet has been reinforced by troops from the

east. This makes it evident the enemy intends to secure East

Tennessee if they can, and I intend to drive them out or get

whipped this month. For this purpose you will have to detach at

least ten thousand men besides Stanley’s division (more will be

better). I can partly relieve the vacuum at Chattanooga by troops

from Logan’s command. It will not be necessary to take artillery

or wagons to Knoxville, but all the serviceable artillery horses

should be taken to use on artillery there. Six mules to each two

hundred men should be taken, if you have them to spare. Let me

know how soon you can start.

“GRANT,

_Major-General_.”

On the 9th Major-General J. M. Schofield arrived at Knoxville, and

assumed command of the Army of the Ohio.

General Grant reported on the 11th,--

“MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK,

“General-in-Chief:

“I expect to get off from Chattanooga by Monday next a force to

drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee. It has been impossible

heretofore to subsist the troops necessary for this work.

“U. S. GRANT,

“_Major-General_.”

* * * * *

“MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD,

“Knoxville, Tennessee:

“I deem it of the utmost importance to drive Longstreet out

immediately, so as to furlough the balance of our veterans, and

to prepare for a spring campaign of our own choosing, instead of

permitting the enemy to dictate it for us. Thomas is ordered to

start ten thousand men, besides the remainder of Granger’s corps,

at once. He will take no artillery, but will take his artillery

horses, and three mules to one hundred men. He will probably

start next Monday.

“U. S. GRANT,

“_Major-General_.”

How General Grant abandoned the move against Longstreet, while

Longstreet kept Schofield bottled up all through that trying winter in

his works about Knoxville, is old history.

The Confederate government finally abandoned the plan of occupying

East Tennessee, and on the 7th of April Longstreet was ordered, with

the part of his command that had originally served with the Army of

Northern Virginia, to join General Lee on the Rapidan.

I have gone thus far into the East Tennessee campaigns for the pleasure

it gives me to reproduce the following resolutions passed by the

Confederate Congress during General Longstreet’s arduous work in the

winter of 1863-64:

“No. 42. Joint Resolutions of Thanks to Lieutenant-General

Longstreet and the officers and men of his command.

“_Resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States of America_,

That the thanks of the Congress are due, and hereby cordially

tendered, to Lieutenant-General James Longstreet and the

officers and men of his command, for their patriotic services

and brilliant achievements in the present war, sharing as they

have the arduous fatigues and privations of many campaigns in

Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Tennessee, and

participating in nearly every great battle fought in those

States, the commanding general ever displaying great ability,

skill, and prudence in command, and the officers and men the most

heroic bravery, fortitude, and energy, in every duty they have

been called upon to perform.

“_Resolved_, That the President be requested to transmit a copy

of the foregoing resolutions to Lieutenant-General Longstreet for

publication to his command.

“Approved February 17, 1864.”

THE WILDERNESS

The Wilderness is a forest land about fifteen miles square, lying

between and equidistant from Orange Court-House and Fredericksburg.

It is broken occasionally by small farms and abandoned clearings, and

two roads,--the Orange Plank Road and the turnpike, which are cut at

right angles by the Germania road,--in general course nearly parallel,

open ways through it between Fredericksburg and the Court-House. The

Germania Ford road joins the Brock road, the strategic line of the

military zone, and crosses the turnpike at Wilderness Tavern and the

plank road about two miles south of that point.

General Grant was making his head-quarters near the Army of the

Potomac, in Culpeper County, Virginia, commanded by Major-General

George G. Meade. The aggregate of the Federal command was about one

hundred and thirty thousand men.

The Army of Northern Virginia was on the west side of the Rapidan

River. Its total number at the beginning of the campaign was then put

by Colonel Taylor, chief of staff, at about sixty-four thousand.

However, the numerical strength of the armies did not decide the

merits of the campaign. The commanders on both sides had chosen their

ground after mature deliberation. They knew of each other’s numbers

and resources, and made their plans accordingly. A number of their

respective leaders had known each other personally for more than

twenty years. They had the undivided support and confidence of their

governments and their armies. General Lee was as always the trusted

leader of the Confederates; General Grant by his three years’ service

in the West had become known as an all-round soldier seldom if ever

surpassed. General Longstreet, who thought most highly of General

Grant from every stand-point, always said that the biggest part of him

was his heart.

In this case General Grant had no fixed plan of campaign except to

avoid the strong defensive line occupied by General Lee, and to draw

him out to open battle.

General Lee’s orders were against a general engagement until the

Federal forces should attack, but in the midst of varied manœuvrings

the battle was begun in half a dozen quarters before either commanding

general had expected it. Hancock advanced before sunrise ready

for battle, just as Longstreet’s command, which had come up from

Mechanicsville, reported to General Lee. Longstreet’s line was formed

along the right and left of the plank road, Kershaw on the right,

Field on the left. Hancock’s musketry was doing considerable damage to

the forces in front, and as Longstreet’s lines were forming the men

broke files to give free passage for their comrades to the rear. The

advancing fire was getting brisk, but not a shot was fired in return by

Longstreet’s troops until the divisions were ready. Three of Field’s

brigades were formed in the line of the left, and three of Kershaw’s on

the right. The advance of the six brigades was ordered, and Hancock’s

lines, thinned by their previous fighting and weaker than the fresh

men now coming against them, were checked and pushed back to their

intrenched lines. Then the fighting became steady and firm.

[Illustration: THE WOUNDING OF GENERAL LONGSTREET AT THE WILDERNESS,

MAY 6, 1864.]

Finally Hancock’s line began to break. As they retreated and the

Confederates advanced, a fire was started in the dry leaves and began

to spread. The Confederate forces, in spite of the fire, moved on.

As the battle waged, General Wadsworth, who was gallantly leading

a division of the Federal forces, fell mortally wounded, and there

was then a general break in the Union line. Jenkins’s brigade was

conspicuous among the Confederates in pursuit. Jenkins exclaimed to

those around him, “I am happy; I have felt despair of the cause for

some months, but am relieved, and feel assured that we will put the

enemy back across the Rapidan before night.” A few minutes later he

fell mortally wounded. In the general mêlée Longstreet was leading in

advance of his troops, and in the midst of close firing was shot by his

own men. This caused the Confederate lines to slow up in their advance.

Orders were given General Field by Longstreet to push on before the

enemy could have time to rally, but in the midst of the general

confusion, General Lee ordered the broken lines to be reformed, and the

advantage already gained was not followed up.

General Field, in his subsequent account of the day, said,--

“I was at Longstreet’s side in a moment, and in answer to my

anxious inquiry as to his condition, he replied that he would be

looked after by others, and directed me to take command of the

corps and push on. Though at this moment he could not have known

the extent or character of his wounds (that they were severe was

apparent), he seemed to forget himself in the absorbing interest

of the movement he was making.

“Had our advance not been suspended by this disaster, I have

always believed that Grant would have been driven across the

Rapidan before night; but General Lee was present, and ordered

that our line, which was nearly a right angle, should first

be straightened out. The difficulty of manœuvring through the

brush made this a tedious operation, so that when we did advance

with large reinforcements from Ewell’s Corps placed under my

orders, the enemy was found awaiting us behind new breastworks,

thoroughly prepared.”

In a letter touching this subject to General Longstreet, Colonel

Fairfax said,--

“On reaching the line of troops you were taken off the horse and

propped against a tree. You blew the bloody foam from your mouth

and said, ‘Tell General Field to take command, and move forward

with the whole force and gain the Brock road,’ but meantime hours

were lost.”

A Northern historian[H] said, on the same point,--

“It seemed indeed that irretrievable disaster was upon us; but in

the very torrent and tempest of the attack it suddenly ceased and

all was still. What could cause this surcease of effort at the

very height of success was then wholly unknown to us.”

Some years after, General Hancock said to General Longstreet,--

“You rolled me up like a wet blanket, and it was some hours

before I could reorganize the battle.”

THE CURTAIN FALLS AT APPOMATTOX

In discussing the war, General Longstreet always dwelt with peculiar

tenderness on the last days that culminated with the surrender at

Appomattox. His mental belief for two years before the surrender was

that from the very nature of the situation the Union forces would in

all probability finally triumph, but his brave heart never knew how to

give up the fight, and the surrender was at last agreed upon while he

was still protesting against it.

The incident is well known of a number of the leading Confederate

generals, who, having decided that further resistance was useless, went

to General Lee and suggested surrender upon the best terms that could

be had as the wisest thing to do. General Longstreet declined to join

with them. General Pendleton was spokesman for the party. His account

of the conference is thus related by General A. L. Long in his Memoirs

of Lee:

“General Lee was lying on the ground. No others heard the

conversation between him and myself. He received my communication

with the reply, ‘Oh, no; I trust that it has not come to that,’

and added, ‘General, we have yet too many bold men to think of

laying down our arms. The enemy do not fight with spirit, while

our boys do. Besides, if I were to say a word to the Federal

commander, he would regard it as such a confession of weakness as

to make it the condition of demanding an unconditional surrender,

a proposal to which I will never listen.... I have never believed

we could, against the gigantic combination for our subjugation,

make good, in the long run, our independence, unless some foreign

power should, directly or indirectly, assist us.... But such

considerations really make with me no difference. We had, I am

satisfied, sacred principles to maintain, and rights to defend,

for which we were in duty bound to do our best, even if we

perished in the endeavor.’

“Such were, as nearly as I can recall them, the exact words of

General Lee on that most pitiful occasion. You see in them the

soul of the man. Where his conscience dictated and his judgment

decided, there his heart was.”

No words of eulogy show up so clearly the characters of Lee and

likewise of Grant as their own direct words and deeds. On the evening

of April 7, 1865, General Grant wrote General Lee as follows:

“The results of the last week must convince you of the

hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of

Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and

regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of

any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender

of that portion of the Confederate army known as the Army of

Northern Virginia.”

General Longstreet was with General Lee when he received this note.

It was handed to General Longstreet without a word. After reading it

General Longstreet handed it back, saying, “Not yet.” General Lee

replied to General Grant that same evening:

“I have received your note of this day. Though not entertaining

the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance

on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your

desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before

considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on

condition of its surrender.”

While this correspondence was pending, both armies, under the

respective directions of Grant and of Lee, continued their preparations

for battle as if there was no thought of cessation. The next day, April

8, General Grant wrote General Lee as follows:

“Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of the same date

asking the conditions on which I will accept surrender of the

Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply I would say

that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I

would insist upon,--namely, that the men and officers surrendered

shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the United

States government until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or

will designate officers to meet any officers you might name for

the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose

of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the

Army of Northern Virginia will be received.”

To this General Lee replied, under the same date:

“I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of

yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army

of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition.

To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for

the surrender of this army, but as the restoration to peace

should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your

proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you

with a view to the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia;

but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States

forces under my command and tend to the restoration of peace,

I should be pleased to meet you at ten A.M. to-morrow on the

old stage road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two

armies.”

That night General Lee spread his couch about a hundred feet from the

saddle and blanket that were General Longstreet’s pillow for the night,

and it is not probable that either had a more comfortable bed than

the other. Of the early hours of the next day, the last day of active

existence of the Army of Northern Virginia, Colonel Venable, of General

Lee’s staff, has written a touching account, which is published in

General Long’s “Memoirs of General Lee.” When further resistance seemed

useless, he quoted General Lee as saying,--

“Then there is nothing left me but to go and see General Grant,

and I would rather die a thousand deaths.”

Many were the wild words of passionate grief spoken by the officers

around him. Said one, “Oh, General, what would history say of the

surrender of the army in the field?” According to Colonel Venable,

General Lee replied, “Yes, I know they will say hard things of us; they

will not understand how we are overwhelmed with numbers. But that is

not the question; the question is, Is it right to surrender this army?

If it is right, then I will take all the responsibility.”

Presently General Lee called General Longstreet to ride forward with

him. He said that the advance columns stood against a very formidable

force which he could not break through, while General Meade was at

Longstreet’s rear ready to call for all the work that the rear

guard could do. He added that it did not seem possible for him to

make further successful resistance. General Longstreet asked if the

sacrifice of his army could benefit the cause in other quarters. He

thought not. Then, said Longstreet, “The situation speaks for itself.”

Several other leading generals were consulted, and all of them held the

same view.

Meanwhile, the Federal forces appeared plainly to be preparing for

attack. The Confederates continued work on their lines of defence.

General Longstreet ordered parts of the rear guard forward to support

the advance forces, and directed General E. P. Alexander to establish

them with part of his batteries in the best position for support or

rallying line in case the front lines were forced back.

Thus the last line of battle formed in the Army of Northern Virginia

was by the invincible First Corps, twice conqueror of empire!

[Illustration: GENERAL ALEXANDER ARRANGING THE LAST LINE OF BATTLE

FORMED IN THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.]

In talking over the delicate situation, General Lee told General

Longstreet that he feared his refusal to meet General Grant’s

proposition might cause him to demand harsh terms. General Longstreet

assured him that he knew General Grant well enough to be certain that

the best terms possible would be given--even such terms as he himself

would be willing to give a gallant foe under similar circumstances. How

true this estimate proved all the world now knows.

APPENDIX

LONGSTREET

He lies in state, while by his flag-draped bier

Pass the long ranks of men who wore the gray--

Men who heard shriek of shot and shell unmoved--

Sobbing like children o’er the lifeless clay.

Through the fair South the heroes whom he led

Against the blue lines in the stricken field

Muse on the days ere Appomattox wrenched

The laurel wreath from Dixie’s shattered shield.

The glories of Manassas, Chancellorsville,

And all the triumphs those gray legions gained

Seem gathered in a shadowy host beside

That casket and those colors battle-stained!

While in the frozen North the men who strove

Against his squadrons, bartering blow for blow,

Bow silvered heads, exclaiming lovingly,

“May he rest well! He was a noble foe!”

Genius and courage equally were his--

He fought in cause his heart maintained as right,

And when the sword clanked in the rusted sheath

He murmured not against the losing fight,

But made endeavor, with a loyal soul,

To heal the wounds the years of strife had wrought--

And in the fields of peace more glories won

Than in the battles his gray warriors fought!

--W. A. P., in Chicago Journal.

JAMES LONGSTREET

James Longstreet was born in Edgefield District, South Carolina,

January 8, 1821, son of James and Mary Ann (Dent) Longstreet, and a

descendant of the Longstreets and Randolphs of New Jersey and the Dents

and Marshalls of Maryland and Virginia. Richard Longstreet, progenitor

of the name in America, settled in Monmouth County, New Jersey.

James Longstreet, subject of this sketch, removed with his parents to

Alabama in 1831, from which State he received his appointment to West

Point, and was graduated from the United States Military Academy in

1842. He was promoted in the army as brevet second lieutenant of the

Fourth Infantry, July 1, 1842, and served in garrison at Jefferson

Barracks, Missouri, 1842-44; on frontier duty at Natchitoches,

Louisiana, 1844-45; was promoted second lieutenant of the Eighth

Infantry, March 4, 1845; was in military occupation of Texas, 1845-46,

and served in the war with Mexico, 1846-47. He participated in the

battle of Palo Alto; May 8, 1846; the battle of Resaca de la Palma,

May 9, 1846; was promoted first lieutenant Eighth Infantry, February

23, 1847, and participated in the siege of Vera Cruz, March 9-29,

1847; the battle of Cerro Gordo, April 17 and 18, 1847; the capture of

San Antonio and the battle of Churubusco, August 20, 1847; the battle

of Molino del Rey, September 8, 1847; the storming of Chepultepec,

September 13, 1847, where he was severely wounded in the assault on

the fortified convent. He was brevetted captain, August 20, 1847,

“for gallant and meritorious conduct in the battles of Churubusco and

Contreras,” and major, September 8, 1847, “for gallant and meritorious

conduct at the battle of Molino del Rey.” He served as adjutant of

the Eighth Infantry, 1847-49; was in garrison at Jefferson Barracks,

1848-49; and served on frontier duty in Texas in 1849. He was chief

of Commissariat of the Department of Texas, 1849-51, and served on

scouting duty in Texas, Kansas, and New Mexico, 1851-61. He was

promoted captain, December 7, 1852, and major of staff and paymaster

July 19, 1858. He resigned his commission in 1861 and was appointed

brigadier-general in the Confederate States army, and commanded a

brigade at Blackburn’s Ford, Virginia, from July 18 to and including

July 21, 1861. He was promoted major-general and commanded the rear

guard of Joseph E. Johnston’s army during the retreat from Yorktown,

Virginia. He commanded the Confederate forces in the field, composed of

his own and part of D. H. Hill’s division and Stuart’s cavalry brigade,

at the battle of Williamsburg, May 5, 1862; commanded the right wing

of Johnston’s army at Seven Pines, May 31 and June 1, 1862; his own

and A. P. Hill’s division, in the Seven Days’ Battle before Richmond;

and commanded the right wing of Lee’s army of Northern Virginia in the

second battle of Bull Run, August 29 and 30, 1862; and in the Maryland

campaign, September, 1862; the First Corps (Confederate left) at the

battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862. He was on duty south of

the James River in April, 1863, and was ordered to rejoin General Lee

at Chancellorsville, Virginia, but Lee, without awaiting his return

made precipitate battle May 2 to 4, 1863. He commanded the right wing

of the Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg July 1 to 3, 1863. He

served under General Bragg in the Army of the Tennessee, and commanded

the left wing of that army, composed of Hindman’s division, Polk’s

corps, Buckner’s corps, and two divisions and artillery of Longstreet’s

corps, at the battle of Chickamauga, September 19 and 20, 1863. He was

sent with part of his corps and Wheeler’s cavalry against Burnside’s

army in East Tennessee, in November, with orders to recover possession

of that part of the State. He drove Burnside back into his works around

Knoxville, and held him there under siege from November 17 to December

4, 1863, when Sherman approached with twenty thousand of Grant’s army,

near Chattanooga, for relief of the besieged army. Bragg ordered

precipitate attack of the fortifications, but they were too strong

to be carried by assault. Just then orders came from President Davis

for Longstreet to return to Bragg’s army in distress at Chattanooga.

Longstreet held his army in possession of East Tennessee, keeping the

Federal forces close about their works, until January, 1864, when he

was ordered to withdraw towards General Lee’s army in Virginia, and

he participated in the battle of the Wilderness, May 5 and 6, 1864,

when he commanded the two divisions of the First Corps forming the

right of Lee’s army, and was severely wounded. After convalescing he

participated in all the engagements of the Army of Northern Virginia

in 1864. He commanded the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia

from the date of its organization until surrendered by General Lee at

Appomattox Court-House, Virginia, April 9, 1865. He was called the

hardest fighter in the Confederate army, and the fairest military

critics of the century have estimated his military genius as second to

no commander in the Confederate States service.