PICKETT’S CHARGE
“Pickett swept past our artillery in splendid style, and the men
marched steadily and compactly down the slope. As they started
up the ridge over one hundred cannon from the breastworks of the
Federals hurled a rain of canister, grape, and shell down upon
them; still they pressed on until half-way up the slope, when
the crest of the hill was lit with a solid sheet of flame as the
masses of infantry rose and fired. When the smoke cleared away
Pickett’s division was gone. Nearly two-thirds of his men lay
dead on the field.”--LONGSTREET ON PICKETT’S CHARGE.
General Longstreet’s description of the Pickett charge itself also
throws much light on these old controversies. It is confirmed in all
essential particulars by General Alexander and others who have written
on the subject since the war, and also by the reports:
“The plan of assault was as follows: Our artillery was to be
massed in a wood from which Pickett was to charge, and it was to
pour a continuous fire upon the cemetery. Under cover of this
fire, and supported by it, Pickett was to charge. General E. P.
Alexander, a brave and gifted officer, being at the head of the
column, and being first in position, and being besides an officer
of unusual promptness, sagacity, and intelligence, was given
charge of the artillery. The arrangements were completed about
one o’clock. General Alexander had arranged that a battery of
seven 11-pound howitzers, with fresh horses and full caissons,
were to charge with Pickett, at the head of his line, but General
Pendleton, from whom the guns had been borrowed, recalled them
just before the charge was made, and thus deranged this wise plan.
“Never was I so depressed as upon that day. I felt that my men
were to be sacrificed, and that I should have to order them to
make a hopeless charge. I had instructed General Alexander,
being unwilling to trust myself with the entire responsibility,
to carefully observe the effect of the fire upon the enemy, and
when it began to tell to notify Pickett to begin the assault. I
was so much impressed with the hopelessness of the charge that I
wrote the following note to General Alexander:
“‘If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off
the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our efforts
pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise General
Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your
judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let
Pickett know when the moment offers.’
“To my note the general replied as follows:
“‘I will only be able to judge the effect of our fire upon the
enemy by his return fire, for his infantry is but little exposed
to view, and the smoke will obscure the whole field. If, as I
infer from your note, there is an alternative to this attack, it
should be carefully considered before opening our fire, for it
will take all of the artillery ammunition we have left to test
this one thoroughly, and if the result is unfavorable, we will
have none left for another effort, and even if this is entirely
successful it can only be so at a very bloody cost.’
“I still desired to save my men, and felt that if the artillery
did not produce the desired effect I would be justified in
holding Pickett off. I wrote this note to Colonel Walton at
exactly 1.30 P.M.:
“‘Let the batteries open. Order great precision in firing. If the
batteries at the peach-orchard cannot be used against the point
we intend attacking, let them open on the enemy at Rocky Hill.’
“The cannonading which opened along both lines was grand. In a
few moments a courier brought a note to General Pickett (who was
standing near me) from Alexander, which, after reading, he handed
to me. It was as follows:
“‘If you are coming at all you must come at once, or I cannot
give you proper support; but the enemy’s fire has not slackened
at all; at least eighteen guns are still firing from the cemetery
itself.’
“After I had read the note Pickett said to me, ‘General, shall I
advance?’ My feelings had so overcome me that I would not speak
for fear of betraying my want of confidence to him. I bowed
affirmation and turned to mount my horse. Pickett immediately
said, ‘I shall lead my division forward, sir.’ I spurred my
horse to the wood where Alexander was stationed with artillery.
When I reached him he told me of the disappearance of the seven
guns which were to have led the charge with Pickett, and that
his ammunition was so low that he could not properly support
the charge. I at once ordered him to stop Pickett until the
ammunition had been replenished. He informed me that he had no
ammunition with which to replenish. I then saw that there was
no help for it, and that Pickett must advance under his orders.
He swept past our artillery in splendid style, and the men
marched steadily and compactly down the slope. As they started
up the ridge over one hundred cannon from the breastworks of the
Federals hurled a rain of canister, grape, and shell down upon
them; still they pressed on until half-way up the slope, when
the crest of the hill was lit with a solid sheet of flame as the
masses of infantry rose and fired. When the smoke cleared away
Pickett’s division was gone. Nearly two-thirds of his men lay
dead on the field, and the survivors were sullenly retreating
down the hill. Mortal man could not have stood that fire. In
half an hour the contested field was cleared and the battle of
Gettysburg was over.
“When this charge had failed I expected that of course the enemy
would throw himself against our shattered ranks and try to crush
us. I sent my staff-officers to the rear to assist in rallying
the troops, and hurried to our line of batteries as the only
support that I could give them, knowing that my presence would
impress upon every one of them the necessity of holding the
ground to the last extremity. I knew if the army was to be saved
those batteries must check the enemy.”