Transcriber's Note:
The original text contained images of three handwritten letters and one
typed letter. Their positions are indicated here as “Illustrations”,
identified as “fac-simile”, and followed by printed transcriptions. The
identifications were not in the original text and have been copied from
the List of Illustrations. The transcriptions were not in the original
text and have been added to this eBook by the transcribers.
LEE AND LONGSTREET
AT HIGH TIDE
[Illustration:
Yours Truly
James Longstreet
Lieutenant-General]
LEE AND LONGSTREET
AT HIGH TIDE
GETTYSBURG IN THE LIGHT OF THE
OFFICIAL RECORDS
BY
HELEN D. LONGSTREET
PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR
GAINESVILLE, GA.
1904
COPYRIGHT, 1904
BY HELEN D. LONGSTREET
Electrotyped and Printed by J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia
TO
LONGSTREET AT GETTYSBURG
FROM HER WHO SINCE CHILDHOOD HAS HELD
HIS HEROIC DEEDS AS SOLDIER AND CITIZEN
AMONG THE PRICELESS INHERITANCES OF THE
GREAT REPUBLIC
PREFACE
This brief story of a gigantic event, and General Longstreet’s part
therein was arranged for publication in book form in the fall of 1903,
before his death, which occurred January 2, 1904. It is the carefully
sifted story of the records and contemporaneous witnesses, and for
clearness I have here and there introduced General Longstreet’s
personal version of some of the disputed points. But the reader will
perceive that at last it is the _story of the records_.
For my undertaking I drew liberally from General Longstreet’s memoirs
of the war, “Manassas to Appomattox;” from his stores of knowledge in
the military art, and his treasure-house of memories of the Titanic
encounter on the field of Gettysburg. The war-pictures included herein
are also from the above-mentioned volume. And I am gratefully indebted
to Captain Leslie J. Perry, formerly of the War Records Office,
Washington City, for valuable assistance.
An appendix, added since General Longstreet’s death, includes a small
selection from the thousands of tributes from every quarter of the
republic.
One of the last of the brilliant generals of the Civil War, whose valor
and skill in the command of great armies, is to-day the common glory
of the restored Union, has contributed an introduction. No survivor
of the great struggle has a better right to speak of Gettysburg than
General Daniel E. Sickles. In this connection the following letter is
appreciatively reproduced.
“WASHINGTON, September 19, 1902.
“GENERAL D. E. SICKLES,
“Gettysburg, Pennsylvania:
“MY DEAR GENERAL SICKLES,--My plan and desire was to meet you at
Gettysburg on the interesting ceremony attending the unveiling
of the Slocum monument; but to-day I find myself in no condition
to keep the promise made you when last we were together. I am
quite disabled from a severe hurt in one of my feet, so that I
am unable to stand more than a minute or two at a time. Please
express my sincere regrets to the noble Army of the Potomac, and
accept them, especially, for yourself.
“On that field you made your mark that will place you prominently
before the world as one of the leading figures of the most
important battle of the Civil War. As a Northern veteran once
remarked to me, ‘General Sickles can well afford to leave a leg
on that field.’
“I believe it is now conceded that the advanced position at the
Peach-Orchard, taken by your corps and under your orders saved
that battle-field to the Union cause. It was the sorest and
saddest reflection of my life for many years; but, to-day, I can
say, with sincerest emotion, that it was and is the best that
could have come to us all, North and South; and I hope that the
nation, reunited, may always enjoy the honor and glory brought to
it by the grand work.
“Please offer my kindest salutations to your governor and your
fellow-comrades of the Army of the Potomac.
“Always yours sincerely,
(Signed) “JAMES LONGSTREET,
“_Lieutenant-General Confederate Army_.”
Early in December advance chapters were given to the press for January
3; by strangely pathetic coincidence that being the date on which
public announcement was made of General Longstreet’s death.
This hour does not clamor for the charity of silence, but for the white
light of truth which I reverently undertake to throw upon the deeds of
the commander who, from Manassas to Appomattox, was the strong right
arm of the Confederate States Army.
I was writing for love of him whose dear name and fame had been
attacked; to place before his fading vision enduring appreciation of
his valiant deeds as a soldier and high qualities as a gentleman.
Providence decreed otherwise. While the opening chapters were running
into type, the Great Captain on High called him hence, where he can at
last have his wrongs on earth forever righted.
The warrior sleeps serenely to-day, undisturbed by all earthly
contentions, the peace of God upon him. And I bring to his tomb
this little leaf fragrant with my love, bedewed with my tears,
heavy-weighted with my woe and desolation.
H. D. L.
GAINESVILLE, GEORGIA, August 1, 1904.
CONTENTS
LEE AND LONGSTREET AT HIGH TIDE
PAGE
INTRODUCTION 17
CHAPTER I
THE STORY OF GETTYSBURG 31
CHAPTER II
LEE CHANGES PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 40
CHAPTER III
PICKETT’S CHARGE 50
CHAPTER IV
GORDON’S “ESTABLISHED FACTS” AND PENDLETON’S FULMINATIONS 53
CHAPTER V
LONGSTREET’S VERSION OF THE OPERATIONS OF JULY 2 68
CHAPTER VI
PENDLETON’S REPORT 71
CHAPTER VII
PENDLETON’S UNRELIABLE MEMORY 75
CHAPTER VIII
GENERAL LONGSTREET’S AMERICANISM 85
CHAPTER IX
FINALE 89
LONGSTREET THE MAN
HIS BOYHOOD DAYS 93
LIFE-LONG FRIENDSHIP OF GRANT AND LONGSTREET 100
HIS FIRST ROMANCE 109
HEROIC CITIZEN OF THE RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD 112
THE CHRISTIAN PATRIOT LOVED THE SOUTH TO THE LAST 115
WORSHIPPED BY THE SOLDIERS OF THE CONFEDERACY 119
HIS COUNTRY HOME IN PICTURESQUE NORTH GEORGIA 123
LONGSTREET ON THE FIELDS OF MEXICO
CHAPTER I
THE WINNING OF OUR WESTERN EMPIRE 127
CHAPTER II
PECULIARITIES OF SCOTT AND TAYLOR 134
CHAPTER III
UNPRETENTIOUS LIEUTENANT GRANT 139
CHAPTER IV
PLEASANT INCIDENTS OF CAMP LIFE AT CORPUS CHRISTI 144
CHAPTER V
INTO THE INTERIOR OF MEXICO 149
CHAPTER VI
FROM CONTRERAS TO CHAPULTEPEC 156
CHAPTER VII
LONGSTREET’S HONEYMOON 159
GREAT BATTLES BEFORE AND AFTER GETTYSBURG
THE FIRST MANASSAS 163
WILLIAMSBURG 167
FRAYSER’S FARM 170
MARCH AGAINST POPE AND THE SECOND MANASSAS 173
THE INVASION OF MARYLAND AND THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM 180
FREDERICKSBURG 185
CHICKAMAUGA 191
IN EAST TENNESSEE 194
THE WILDERNESS 205
THE CURTAIN FALLS AT APPOMATTOX 208
APPENDIX
LONGSTREET 213
JAMES LONGSTREET 214
THE FUNERAL CEREMONIES 217
TRIBUTES FROM THE PRESS 226
RESOLUTIONS BY CAMPS AND CHAPTERS 272
LETTER OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 330
PERSONAL LETTERS 331
LETTER OF ARCHBISHOP IRELAND 332
LETTER OF GENERAL FREDERICK D. GRANT 334
TRIBUTE FROM THE GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC 345
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
PAGE
General James Longstreet in 1863 (from the painting in
the Corcoran Art Gallery, Washington) _Frontispiece_
General Robert E. Lee 32
Major-General D. E. Sickles 40
Second Day’s Battle, Gettysburg 68
Retreat from Gettysburg (Accident during the Night-Crossing
of the Potomac on a Pontoon Bridge) 78
General Longstreet in 1901 90
Defeat of the Federal Troops by Longstreet’s Corps, Second
Manassas 178
Battle of Fredericksburg (from the Battery on Lee’s Hill) 190
Battle of Chickamauga (Confederates flanking the Union
Forces) 192
The Assault on Fort Sanders, Knoxville 196
The Wounding of General Longstreet at the Wilderness,
May 6, 1864 206
General Alexander arranging the Last Line of Battle formed
in the Army of Northern Virginia, at Appomattox 212
Fac-simile of Letter from President Theodore Roosevelt 330
Fac-simile of Letter from Archbishop John Ireland 332
Fac-simile of Letter from General Frederick D. Grant 334
INTRODUCTION
BY MAJOR-GENERAL D. E. SICKLES, U.S.A.
I am glad to write an introduction to a memoir of Lieutenant-General
Longstreet.
If it be thought strange that I should write a preface to a memoir
of a conspicuous adversary, I reply that the Civil War is only a
memory, its asperities are forgotten, both armies were American, old
army friendships have been renewed and new army friendships have been
formed among the combatants, the truth of history is dear to all of
us, and the amenities of chivalrous manhood are cherished alike by the
North and the South, when justice to either is involved. Longstreet’s
splendid record as a soldier needs neither apologies nor eulogium. And
if I venture, further along in this introduction, to defend him from
unfair criticism, it is because my personal knowledge of the battle
of July 2, 1863, qualifies me to testify in his behalf. It was the
fortune of my corps to meet Longstreet on many great fields. It is now
my privilege to offer a tribute to his memory. As Colonel Damas says in
“The Lady of Lyons,” after his duel with Melnotte, “It’s astonishing
how much I like a man after I’ve fought with him.”
Often adversaries on the field of battle, we became good friends after
peace was restored. He supported President Grant and his successors in
their wise policy of restoration. Longstreet’s example was the rainbow
of reconciliation that foreshadowed real peace between the North and
South. He drew the fire of the irreconcilable South. His statesmanlike
forecast blazed the path of progress and prosperity for his people,
impoverished by war and discouraged by adversity. He was the first
of the illustrious Southern war leaders to accept the result of the
great conflict as final. He folded up forever the Confederate flag he
had followed with supreme devotion, and thenceforth saluted the Stars
and Stripes of the Union with unfaltering homage. He was the trusted
servant of the republic in peace, as he had been its relentless foe in
war. The friends of the Union became his friends, the enemies of the
Union his enemies.
I trust I may be pardoned for relating an incident that reveals the
sunny side of Longstreet’s genial nature. When I visited Georgia, in
March, 1892, I was touched by a call from the General, who came from
Gainesville to Atlanta to welcome me to his State. On St. Patrick’s
Day we supped together as guests of the Irish Societies of Atlanta,
at their banquet. We entered the hall arm in arm, about nine o’clock
in the evening, and were received by some three hundred gentlemen,
with the wildest and loudest “rebel yell” I had ever heard. When I
rose to respond to a toast in honor of the Empire State of the North,
Longstreet stood also and leaned with one arm on my shoulder, the
better to hear what I had to say, and this was a signal for another
outburst. I concluded my remarks by proposing,--
“Health and long life to my old adversary, Lieutenant-General
Longstreet,”
assuring the audience that, although the General did not often make
speeches, he would sing the “Star-Spangled Banner.” This was, indeed,
a risky promise, as I had never heard the General sing. I was greatly
relieved by his exclamation:
“Yes, I will sing it!”
And he did sing the song admirably, the company joining with much
enthusiasm.
As the hour was late, and we had enjoyed quite a number of potations of
hot Irish whiskey punch, we decided to go to our lodgings long before
the end of the revel, which appeared likely to last until daybreak.
When we descended to the street we were unable to find a carriage, but
Longstreet proposed to be my guide; and, although the streets were dark
and the walk a long one, we reached my hotel in fairly good form. Not
wishing to be outdone in courtesy, I said,--
“Longstreet, the streets of Atlanta are very dark and it is very late,
and you are somewhat deaf and rather infirm; now I must escort you to
your head-quarters.”
“All right,” said Longstreet; “come on and we’ll have another handshake
over the bloody chasm.”
When we arrived at his stopping-place and were about to separate, as I
supposed, he turned to me and said,--
“Sickles, the streets of Atlanta are very dark and you are lame, and
a stranger here, and do not know the way back to your hotel; I must
escort you home.”
“Come along, Longstreet,” was my answer.
On our way to the hotel, I said to him,--
“Old fellow, I hope you are sorry for shooting off my leg at
Gettysburg. I suppose I will have to forgive you for it some day.”
“Forgive me?” Longstreet exclaimed. “You ought to thank me for leaving
you one leg to stand on, after the mean way you behaved to me at
Gettysburg.”
How often we performed escort duty for each other on that eventful
night I have never been able to recall with precision; but I am quite
sure that I shall never forget St. Patrick’s Day in 1892, at Atlanta,
Georgia, when Longstreet and I enjoyed the good Irish whiskey punch at
the banquet of the Knights of St. Patrick.
Afterwards Longstreet and I met again, at Gettysburg, this time as the
guests of John Russell Young, who had invited a number of his literary
and journalistic friends to join us on the old battle-field. We rode in
the same carriage. When I assisted the General in climbing up the rocky
face of Round Top, he turned to me and said,--
“Sickles, you can well afford to help me up here now, for if you had
not kept me away so long from Round Top on the 2d of July, 1863,
the war would have lasted longer than it did, and might have had a
different ending.”
As he said this, his stern, leonine face softened with a smile as sweet
as a brother’s.
We met in March, 1901, at the reception given to President McKinley on
his second inauguration. In the midst of the great throng assembled on
that occasion Longstreet and I had quite a reception of our own. He
was accompanied on this occasion by Mrs. Longstreet. Every one admired
the blended courtliness and gallantry of the veteran hero towards the
ladies who were presented to him and his charming wife.
At the West Point Centennial Longstreet and I sat together on the
dais, near President Roosevelt, the Secretary of War, Mr. Root, and
the commander of the army, Lieutenant-General Miles. Here among his
fellow-graduates of the Military Academy, he received a great ovation
from the vast audience that filled Cullum Hall. Again and again he was
cheered, when he turned to me, exclaiming,--
“Sickles, what are they all cheering about?”
“They are cheering you, General,” was my reply.
Joy lighted up his countenance, the war was forgotten, and Longstreet
was at home once more at West Point.
Again we stood upon the same platform, in Washington, on May
30,--Memorial Day,--1902. Together we reviewed, with President
Roosevelt, the magnificent column of Union veterans that marched past
the President’s reviewing-stand. That evening Longstreet joined me in a
visit to a thousand or more soldiers of the Third Army Corps, assembled
in a tent near the White House. These veterans, with a multitude of
their comrades, had come to Washington to commemorate another Memorial
Day in the Capitol of the Nation. The welcome given him by this crowd
of old soldiers, who had fought him with all their might again and
again, on many battle-fields, could hardly have been more cordial if he
had found himself in the midst of an equal number of his own command.
His speech to the men was felicitous, and enthusiastically cheered. In
an eloquent peroration he said, “I hope to live long enough to see my
surviving comrades march side by side with the Union veterans along
Pennsylvania Avenue, and then I will die happy.” This was the last time
I met Longstreet.
Longstreet was unjustly blamed for not attacking earlier in the day,
on July 2, 1863, at Gettysburg. I can answer that criticism, as I know
more about the matter than the critics. If he had attacked in the
morning, as it is said he should have done, he would have encountered
Buford’s division of cavalry, five thousand sabres, on his flank, and
my corps would have been in his front, as it was in the afternoon.
In a word, all the troops that opposed Longstreet in the afternoon,
including the Fifth Army Corps and Caldwell’s division of the Second
Corps, would have been available on the left flank of the Union army in
the morning. Every regiment and every battery that fired a shot in the
afternoon was on the field in the morning, and would have resisted an
assault in the morning as stubbornly as in the afternoon. Moreover,
if the assault had been made in the morning, Law’s strong brigade of
Alabamians could not have assisted in the attack, as they did not
arrive on the field until noon. On the other hand, if Lee had waited
an hour later, I would have been on Cemetery Ridge, in compliance with
General Meade’s orders, and Longstreet could have marched, unresisted,
from Seminary Ridge to the foot of Round Top, and might, perhaps, have
unlimbered his guns on the summit.
General Meade’s telegram to Halleck, dated 3 P.M., July 2, does not
indicate that Lee was then about to attack him. At the time that
despatch was sent, a council of corps commanders was assembled at
General Meade’s head-quarters. It was broken up by the sound of
Longstreet’s artillery. The probability is that Longstreet’s attack
held the Union army at Gettysburg. If Longstreet had waited until a
later hour, the Union army might have been moving towards Pipe Creek,
the position chosen by General Meade on June 30.
The best proof that Lee was not dissatisfied with Longstreet’s
movements on July 2 is the fact that Longstreet was intrusted with
the command of the column of attack on July 3,--Lee’s last hope at
Gettysburg. Of the eleven brigades that assaulted the Union left
centre on July 3, only three of them--Pickett’s division--belonged
to Longstreet’s corps, the other eight brigades belonged to Hill’s
corps. If Longstreet had disappointed Lee on July 2, why would Lee,
on the next day, give Longstreet a command of supreme importance, of
which more than two-thirds of the troops were taken from another corps
commander?
Longstreet did not look for success on July 3. He told General Lee that
“the fifteen thousand men who could make a successful assault over that
field had never been arrayed for battle,” and yet the command was
given to Longstreet. Why? Because the confidence of Lee in Longstreet
was unshaken; because he regarded Longstreet as his most capable
lieutenant.
Longstreet was never censured for the failure of the assault on July
3, although General Lee intimates, in his official report, that it was
not made as early in the day as was expected. Why, then, is Longstreet
blamed by them for the failure on July 2, when no fault was found by
General Lee with Longstreet’s dispositions on that day? The failure
of both assaults must be attributed to insurmountable obstacles,
which no commander could have overcome with the force at Longstreet’s
disposal,--seventeen thousand men on July 2, and fifteen thousand men
on July 3, against thirty thousand adversaries!
In General Lee’s official report not a word appears about any delay in
Longstreet’s movements on July 2, although, referring to the assault of
July 3, General Lee says, “General Longstreet’s dispositions were not
completed as early as was expected.” If General Lee did not hesitate to
point out unlooked for delay on July 3, why was he silent about delay
on July 2? His silence about delay on July 2 implies that there was
none on July 2. _Expresio unius exclusio alterius._
General Lee says, in his report, referring to July 3,--
“General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high,
rocky hills on the enemy’s extreme left, from which his troops
could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations
had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he
now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the
divisions of Hood and McLaws.”
Another embarrassment prevented an earlier attack on July 2. It was
the plan of General Lee to surprise the left flank of the Union army.
General Lee ordered Captain Johnson, the engineer officer of his staff,
to conduct Longstreet’s column by a route concealed from the enemy.
But the formation and movements of the attacking column had been
discovered by my reconnoisance; this exposure put an end to any chance
of surprise. Other dispositions became necessary; fresh orders from
head-quarters were asked for; another line of advance had to be found,
less exposed to view. All this took time. These circumstances were,
of course, known to General Lee; hence he saw no reason to reproach
Longstreet for delay.
The situation on the left flank of the Union army was entirely changed
by my advance to the Emmitsburg road. Fitzhugh Lee says, “Lee was
deceived by it and gave orders to attack up the Emmitsburg road,
partially enveloping the enemy’s left; there was much behind Sickles.”
The obvious purpose of my advance was to hold Lee’s force in check
until General Meade could bring his reserves from his right flank,
at Rock Creek, to the Round Tops, on the left. Fortunately for me,
General Lee believed that my line from the Peach-Orchard north--about a
division front--was all Longstreet would have to deal with. Longstreet
soon discovered that my left rested beyond Devil’s Den, about twelve
hundred yards easterly from the Emmitsburg road, and at a right
angle to it. Of course, Longstreet could not push forward to Lee’s
objective,--the Emmitsburg road ridge,--leaving this force on his flank
and rear, to take him in reverse. An obstinate conflict followed, which
detained Longstreet until the Fifth Corps, which had been in reserve on
the Union right, moved to the left and got into position on the Round
Tops. Thus it happened that my salient at the Peach-Orchard, on the
Emmitsburg road, was not attacked until six o’clock, the troops on my
line, from the Emmitsburg road to the Devil’s Den, having held their
positions until that hour. The surprise Lee had planned was turned
upon himself. The same thing would have happened if Longstreet had
attacked in the morning; all the troops that resisted Longstreet in the
afternoon--say thirty thousand--would have opposed him in the forenoon.
The alignment of the Union forces on the left flank at 11 A.M., when
Lee gave his preliminary orders to Longstreet for the attack, was
altogether different from the dispositions made by me at 3 P.M.,
when the attack was begun. At eleven in the morning my command was
on Cemetery Ridge, to the left of Hancock. At two o’clock in the
afternoon, anticipating General Lee’s attack, I changed front,
deploying my left division (Birney’s) from Plum Run, near the base
of Little Round Top, to the Peach-Orchard, at the intersection of
Millerstown and Emmitsburg roads. My right division (Humphrey’s) was
moved forward to the Emmitsburg road, its left connecting with Birney
at the Orchard, and its right _en echelon_ with Hancock, parallel with
the Codori House.
Longstreet was ordered to conceal his column of attack, for which the
ground on Lee’s right afforded excellent opportunities. Lee’s plan was
a repetition of Jackson’s attack on the right flank of the Union army
at Chancellorsville. In the afternoon, however, in view of the advance
of my corps, General Lee was obliged to form a new plan of battle. As
he believed that both of my flanks rested on the Emmitsburg road, Lee
directed Longstreet to envelop my left at the Peach-Orchard, and press
the attack northward “up the Emmitsburg road.”
Colonel Fairfax, of Longstreet’s staff, says that Lee and
Longstreet were together at three o’clock, when the attack began.
Lieutenant-General Hill, commanding the First Corps of Lee’s army, says
in his report,--
“The corps of General Longstreet (McLaws’s and Hood’s divisions)
was on my right, and in a line very nearly at right angles to
mine. General Longstreet was to attack the left flank of the
enemy, and sweep down his line, and I was ordered to co-operate
with him with such of my brigades from the right as could join
in with his troops in the attack. On the extreme right, Hood
commenced the attack about two o’clock, McLaws about 5.30
o’clock.”
Longstreet was not long in discovering, by his artillery practice,
that my position at the Peach-Orchard was a salient, and that my left
flank really rested twelve hundred yards eastward, at Plum Run, in the
valley between Little Round Top and the Devil’s Den, concealed from
observation by woods; my line extended to the high ground along the
Emmitsburg road, from which Lee says, “It was thought our artillery
could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground
beyond.”
General J. B. Hood’s story of his part in the battle of July 2, taken
from a communication addressed to General Longstreet, which appears
in Hood’s “Advance and Retreat,” pages 57-59, is a clear narrative of
the movements of Longstreet’s assaulting column. It emphasizes the
firm adherence of Longstreet to the orders of General Lee. Again and
again, as Hood plainly points out, Longstreet refused to listen to
Hood’s appeal for leave to turn Round Top and assail the Union rear,
always replying, “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg
road.”[A]
These often repeated orders of General Lee to “attack up the Emmitsburg
road” could not have been given until near three in the afternoon of
July 2, because before that hour there was no Union line of battle on
the Emmitsburg road. There had been only a few of my pickets there in
the morning, thrown forward by the First Massachusetts Infantry. It
distinctly appears that Lee rejected Longstreet’s plan to turn the
Federal left on Cemetery Ridge. And Hood makes it plain enough that
Longstreet refused to listen to Hood’s appeal for permission to turn
Round Top, on the main Federal line, always replying, “No; General
Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road.” Of course, that
plan of battle was not formed until troops had been placed in positions
commanding that road. This, we have seen, was not done until towards
three in the afternoon.
The only order of battle announced by General Lee on July 2 of which
there is any record was to assail my position on the Emmitsburg
road, turn my left flank (which he erroneously supposed to rest on
the Peach-Orchard), and sweep the attack “up the Emmitsburg road.”
This was impossible until I occupied that road, and it was then that
Longstreet’s artillery began its practice on my advanced line.
I am unable to see how any just person can charge Longstreet with
deviation from the orders of General Lee on July 2. It is true enough
that Longstreet had advised different tactics; but he was a soldier,--a
West Pointer,--and once he had indicated his own views, he obeyed
the orders of the general commanding,--he did not even exercise the
discretion allowed to the chief of a _corps d’armée_, which permits
him to modify instructions when an unforeseen emergency imposes fresh
responsibilities, or when an unlooked-for opportunity offers tempting
advantages.
We have seen that many circumstances required General Lee to modify
his plans and orders on July 2 between daybreak, when his first
reconnoisance was made, and three o’clock in the afternoon, when my
advanced position was defined. We have seen that if a morning attack
had been made the column would have encountered Buford’s strong
division of cavalry on its flank, and that it would have been weakened
by the absence of Law’s brigade of Hood’s division. We have seen that
Longstreet, even in the afternoon, when Law had come up and Buford had
been sent to Westminster, was still too weak to contend against the
reinforcements sent against him. We have seen that Lee was present all
day on July 2, and that his own staff-officer led the column of attack.
We have seen that General Lee, in his official report, gives no hint of
dissatisfaction with Longstreet’s conduct of the battle of July 2, nor
does it appear that Longstreet was ever afterwards criticised by Lee.
On the contrary, Lee points out that the same danger to Longstreet’s
flank, which required the protection of two divisions on July 3,
existed on July 2, when his flank was unsupported. We have seen that
again and again, when Hood appealed to Longstreet for leave to swing
his column to the right and turn the Round Tops, Longstreet as often
refused, always saying, “No; General Lee’s orders are to attack up
the Emmitsburg road.” The conclusion is irrefutable, that whilst the
operations were directed with signal ability and sustained by heroic
courage, the failure of both assaults, that of July 2 and the other
of July 3, must be attributed to the lack of strength in the columns
of attack on both days, for which the commanding general alone was
responsible.
It was Longstreet’s good fortune to live until he saw his country hold
a high place among the great powers of the world. He saw the new South
advancing in prosperity, hand in hand with the North, East, and West.
He saw his people in the ranks of our army, in Cuba, Porto Rico, the
Philippines, China, and Panama; he saw the Union stars and the blue
uniform worn by Fitzhugh Lee, and Butler, and Wheeler. He witnessed the
fulfilment of his prediction,--that the hearty reunion of the North
and South would advance the welfare of both. He lived long enough to
rejoice with all of us in a reunited nation, and to know that his name
was honored wherever the old flag was unfurled. His fame as a soldier
belongs to all Americans.
Farewell, Longstreet! I shall follow you very soon. May we meet in the
happy realm where strife is unknown and friendship is eternal!
LEE AND LONGSTREET AT HIGH TIDE
CHAPTER I
THE STORY OF GETTYSBURG
Back of the day that opened so auspiciously for the Confederate
cause at the first Manassas, and of the four years that followed,
lies Longstreet’s record of a quarter of a century in the Union
army, completing one of the most lustrous pages in the world’s
war history. That page cannot be dimmed or darkened; it rests
secure in its own white splendor, above the touch of detractors.
The detractors of General Longstreet’s military integrity assert that,
being opposed to fighting an offensive battle at Gettysburg, he was
“balky and stubborn” in executing Lee’s orders; that he disobeyed the
commanding general’s orders to attack at sunrise on the morning of July
2; that, again ordered to attack with half the army on the morning
of July 3, his culpably slow attack with only Pickett’s division,
supported by some of Hill’s troops, caused the fatal Confederate defeat
in that encounter.
General Gordon has seen fit, in a recent publication, to revive this
cruel aspersion.
When General Longstreet surrendered his sword at Appomattox his war
record was made up. It stands unassailable--needing no defenders. Back
of the day that opened so auspiciously for the Confederate cause at
the first Manassas, and of the four years that followed, lies the
record of a quarter of a century in the Union army.
In those times General Longstreet, at Cerro Gordo, Molino del Rey,
and Chapultepec, was aiding to win the great empire of the West; in
subsequent hard Indian campaigns lighting the fagots of a splendid
western civilization, adding new glory to American arms and, in the
struggles of a nation that fell, a new star of the first magnitude to
the galaxy of American valor, completing one of the most lustrous pages
in the world’s war history. That page cannot be dimmed or darkened; it
rests secure in its own white splendor, above the touch of detractors.
General Longstreet has of late years deemed it unnecessary to make
defence of his military integrity, save such as may be found in his
memoirs, “Manassas to Appomattox,” published nearly ten years since. He
has held that his deeds stand on the impartial pages of the nation’s
records--their own defender.
The cold historian of our Civil War of a hundred years hence will
not go for truth to the picturesque reminiscences of General John B.
Gordon, nor to the pyrotechnics of General Fitzhugh Lee, nor yet to
the somewhat hysterical ravings of Rev. Mr. Pendleton and scores of
other modern essayists who have sought to fix the failure of Gettysburg
upon General Longstreet. The coming chronicler will cast aside the
rubbish of passion and hate that followed the war, and have recourse
to the nation’s official war records, and in the cool, calm lights of
the letters and reports of the participants, written at the time, will
place the blunder of Gettysburg where it belongs. Longstreet’s fame has
nothing to fear in that hour.
[Illustration: R. E. Lee]
But for the benefit of the present--of the young, the busy, who
have neither time nor inclination to study the records, and for that
sentiment that is increasingly shaped by the public press,--for these
and other reasons it appears fitting that in this hour historical truth
should have a spokesman on the Gettysburg contentions. In the absence
of one more able to speak, this little story of the truth is written.
The writer belongs to a generation that has come up since the gloom
of Appomattox closed the drama of the great “Lost Cause” of American
history--a generation that seeks the truth, unwarped and undistorted by
passion, and can face the truth.
In the prosecution of my researches for the origin of the extraordinary
calumnies aimed at General Longstreet’s honor as a soldier, two most
significant facts have continually pressed upon my attention.
First, not one word appears to have been published openly accusing him
of disobedience at Gettysburg until the man who could forever have
silenced all criticism was in his grave--until the knightly soul of
Robert Edward Lee had passed into eternity.
Second, General Longstreet’s operations on the field of Gettysburg
were above the suspicion of reproach until he came under the political
ban in the South, for meeting in the proper spirit, as he saw it, the
requirements of good citizenship in the observance of his Appomattox
parole, and, after the removal of his political disabilities, for
having accepted office at the hands of a Republican President who
happened to be his old West Point comrade,--Grant.
Then the storm broke. He was heralded as traitor, deserter of his
people, deserter of Democracy, etc. In the fury of this onslaught
originated the cruel slander that he had disobeyed Lee’s most vital
orders, causing the loss of the Gettysburg battle and the ultimate fall
of the Confederate cause. Most singularly, this strange discovery was
not made until some years after the battle and General Lee’s death.
Thereafter for two decades the South was sedulously taught to believe
that the Federal victory was wholly the fortuitous outcome of the
culpable disobedience of General Longstreet.
The sectional complaint that he deserted “Democracy” is about as
relevant and truthful as the assertion that he lost Gettysburg. He was
a West Pointer, a professional soldier. He had never cast a ballot
before the Civil War; he had no politics. Its passions and prejudices
had no dwelling-place in his mind. The war was over, and he quietly
accepted the result, fraternizing with all Americans. It was no great
crime.
But the peculiar circumstances favored an opportunity to make
Longstreet the long-desired scape-goat for Gettysburg. There was
an ulterior and deeper purpose, however, than merely besmirching
his military record. Short-sighted partisans seemingly argued that
the disparagement of Longstreet was necessary to save the military
reputation of Lee. But Lee’s great fame needed no such sacrifice.
The outrageous charges against Longstreet have been wholly disproved.
Much of the partisan rancor that once pursued him has died out. Many of
the more intelligent Southerners have been long convinced that he was
the victim of a great wrong.
It was unworthy of Major-General John B. Gordon, once of the army
of Northern Virginia, to revive this dead controversy. He simply
reiterates the old charges in full, produces no evidence in their
support, and gratuitously endorses a false and cruel verdict. His
contribution is of no historical value. It carries inherent evidence
that General Gordon made no critical examination of the documentary
history of Gettysburg. He assumes to render a verdict on the say-so of
others.
Gordon’s unsupported assertions would require no attention but for one
fact. Both South and North there is a widespread impression that Gordon
was a conspicuous figure at Gettysburg. This is erroneous. He was
merely a brigade commander there, stationed five miles from Longstreet.
It is not certain that he personally saw either Lee or Longstreet while
the army was in Pennsylvania.
In his official report Gordon uses this language regarding the
operations of his own small command at Gettysburg when the heaviest
fighting was going on, finely showing the scope of his opportunities
for observation:
“The movements during the succeeding days of the battle, July 2
and 3, I do not consider of sufficient importance to mention.”
It is but just to Gordon, however, to say that in his subordinate
capacity at the head of one of the thirty-seven brigades of infantry
comprising Lee’s army, he performed excellent service on the first
day’s battle. But in estimating his value as a personal witness,
the foregoing undisputed facts must be taken into consideration.
His testimony is obviously of the hearsay kind. In fact, as will be
observed from his own admission, it is no more than his own personal
conclusions, wholly deduced from the assertions of others, based on an
assumed state of facts which did not exist.
In his recent publication, “Reminiscences of the Civil War,” Gordon
says,--
“It now seems certain that impartial military critics, after
thorough investigation, will consider the following facts
established:
“First, that General Lee distinctly ordered Longstreet to attack
early on the morning of the second day, and if Longstreet had
done so two of the largest corps of Meade’s army would not have
been in the fight; but Longstreet delayed the fight until four
o’clock in the afternoon, and thus lost his opportunity of
occupying Little Round Top, the key of the position, which he
might have done in the morning without firing a shot or losing a
man.”
It is competent to point out that Longstreet’s orders from General
Lee were “to move around to gain the Emmitsburg road, on the enemy’s
left.” In short, he was “to attack up the Emmitsburg road,” as all the
authorities agree. He therefore could not well “occupy” Little Round
Top up the Emmitsburg road, because it was but a fraction less than a
mile to the east of that road. It is as clear as noonday that Lee had
no thought at first, if ever, that Little Round Top was the “key to the
position.” Lee merely contemplated driving the enemy from some high
ground on the Emmitsburg road from which the “more elevated ground” of
Cemetery Hill in its rear, more than a mile to the northward of Little
Round Top, could be subsequently assailed.
Lee’s luminous report of the battle, dated July 31, 1863, only four
weeks after, has escaped Gordon’s notice, or has been conveniently
ignored by him. It is found at page 305 _et seq._, of Part II., Vol.
XXVII., of the printed War Records, easily accessible to everybody. At
page 308, Lee’s report:
“... In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position
from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery
could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground
beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That
officer was directed to carry this position.... After a severe
struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and
holding the desired ground.... The battle ceased at dark.”
The “desired ground” captured was that held by Sickles’s Federal Third
Corps,--the celebrated peach-orchard, wheat-field, and adjacent
high ground, from which Cemetery Hill was next day assailed by the
Confederate artillery as a prelude to Pickett’s infantry assault.
It was the “crest of the ridge,” not the Round Top, that Lee wished
to assail. His eye from the first appears to have been steadily fixed
upon the Federal centre. That is why he ordered the “attack up the
Emmitsburg road.”
Longstreet’s official report is very explicit on this point. It was
written July 27, 1863. On page 358 of the same book he says,--
“I received instructions from the commanding general to move,
with the portion of my command that was up, around to gain the
Emmitsburg road, on the enemy’s left.”
Lieutenant-General R. H. Anderson, then of Hill’s corps, also makes
this definite statement:
“Shortly after the line had been formed, I received notice that
Lieutenant-General Longstreet would occupy the ground on my
right, and that his line would be in a direction nearly at right
angles with mine, and that he would assault the extreme left of
the enemy and drive him towards Gettysburg.”
Just here it is pertinent to say that General Longstreet had the
afternoon previous, and again that morning, suggested to General Lee
the more promising plan of a movement by the Confederate right to
interpose between the Federals and their capital, and thus compel
General Meade to give battle at a disadvantage. On this point General
Longstreet uses the following language in a newspaper publication[B]
more than a quarter of a century ago:
“When I overtook General Lee at five o’clock that afternoon [July
1], he said, to my surprise, that he thought of attacking General
Meade upon the heights the next day. I suggested that this course
seemed to be at variance with the plan of the campaign that had
been agreed upon before leaving Fredericksburg. He said, ‘If the
enemy is there to-morrow, we must attack him.’ I replied: ‘If he
is there, it will be because he is anxious that we should attack
him--a good reason in my judgment for not doing so.’ I urged
that we should move around by our right to the left of Meade and
put our army between him and Washington, threatening his left
and rear, and thus force him to attack us in such position as
we might select.... I called his attention to the fact that the
country was admirably adapted for a defensive battle, and that we
should surely repulse Meade with crushing loss if we would take
position so as to force him to attack us, and suggested that even
if we carried the heights in front of us, and drove Meade out, we
should be so badly crippled that we could not reap the fruits of
victory; and that the heights of Gettysburg were in themselves
of no more importance to us than the ground we then occupied,
and that the mere possession of the ground was not worth a
hundred men to us. That Meade’s army, not its position, was
our objective. General Lee was impressed with the idea that by
attacking the Federals he could whip them in detail. I reminded
him that if the Federals were there in the morning it would be
proof that they had their forces well in hand, and that with
Pickett in Chambersburg, and Stuart out of reach, we should be
somewhat in detail. He, however, did not seem to abandon the idea
of attack on the next day. He seemed under a subdued excitement
which occasionally took possession of him when ‘the hunt was up,’
and threatened his superb equipoise.... When I left General Lee
on the night of the 1st, I believed that he had made up his mind
to attack, but was confident that he had not yet determined as to
when the attack should be made.”
But General Lee persisted in the direct attack “up the Emmitsburg
road.” Hood, deployed on Longstreet’s extreme right, at once perceived
that the true direction was by flank against the southern slopes of
Big Round Top. He delayed the advance to advise of the discovery he
had made. Soon the positive order came back: “General Lee’s orders are
to attack up the Emmitsburg road.” He still hesitated and repeated
the suggestion. Again it was reiterated: “General Lee’s orders are to
attack up the Emmitsburg road.” Then the troops moved to the attack.
There was no alternative. Lee’s orders were imperative, and made after
he had personally examined the enemy’s position. Longstreet was ordered
to attack a specific position “up the Emmitsburg road,” which was _not_
Little Round Top, as assumed by Gordon. This point is particularly
elaborated because in it lies the “milk in the cocoanut” of the
charges against Longstreet. Without consulting the records Gordon
has merely followed the lead of some of General Lee’s biographers,
notably Fitzhugh Lee, who asserts that his illustrious uncle “expected
Longstreet to seize Little Round Top on the 2d of July.” The records
clearly show that nothing was farther from General Lee’s thoughts.
After the war it was discovered that a very early attack on Little
Round Top would perhaps have found it undefended, hence the afterthought
that General Longstreet was ordered to attack at sunrise. But whatever
the hour Longstreet was ordered to attack, it was most certainly not
Little Round Top that was made his objective.