CHAPTER V

ABSOLUTE VALUE

It may appear fantastic to assert that art is the only sphere where

absolute values appear, and that the function of art in the Universe

is to create absolute values, but it may be true. It is impossible

to avoid the insistent demand of the human instinct for absolute

values. This exists, an insatiable craving which will not rest content

with the good but demands the better. And yet it is impossible to

discover values that are absolute in themselves. The very notion is

a meaningless abstraction. I do not even believe we can prove that

Beethoven’s music is better music than Mozart’s or that Shakespeare’s

poetry is better than Milton’s, or _vice versa_, unless we first of

all limit the idea of music or poetry to something intellectually

measurable. For example it would be difficult to convince all

music-lovers that Bach’s counterpoint was better than Beethoven’s, or

that Palestrina’s was better than Bach’s; for what is to determine

“good” counterpoint? Very few musicians would accept any individual

theorist’s rules--all rules being mere abstractions or generalizations

from practice, and varying according to their historic date, so that

even the academic theory of one age differs from that of another. Even

in judging a fugue, one has ultimately to fall back upon expression,

significance, or meaning, and who is to say--and on what universally

acceptable principle is it to be said--that Bach’s “St. Anne” fugue is

better than Beethoven’s “Grosse Fuge,” Op. 133?

There is exactly the same difficulty in poetry. In an excellent and

well-known book on the English Sonnet a definition is given of perfect

sonnet form which is intellectually satisfactory. But we find that most

of the greatest English sonnets are not written in this form, while

thousands of mediocre sonnets observe it correctly. The same is true of

Bach’s Fugues. You cannot value them according to their correctness.[4]

What then becomes of our “perfect” sonnet and our “perfect” fugue?

Each is apparently an unreal abstraction--like all other attempts at

creating absolute value. But are these “absolute” ideas necessarily

valueless in themselves? I do not think so, for they correspond to and

are the formalization or _death-shapes_ of desires ineradicably rooted

in the human soul, those desires which create all values, and that

profounder urge which is satisfied with none.

What is important to recognize is the diversity of these desires and

to understand that it is the diversity (in itself profoundly desired)

which nullifies standards. We can say that this fugue is more perfect

than that fugue--having made an abstract and definable conception

of the fugue form and separated it from all life. Criticism is an

application of such abstract conceptions--derived by analysis from the

practice of artists--from all past works of art to one present work of

art and, again, backwards, from all existent works of art to one past

work of art. The former is historical criticism (when a composer is

judged only on what preceded him) and the latter is, or should be, the

absolute æsthetic criticism. But what prevents its being so is that it

leaves out the future. The work of art is judged by the present and

the past but the future is unknown and the judgment is thereby vitiated

and is not and cannot be an absolute judgment. But this does not mean

that the future does not exist _now_, somewhere. To demonstrate this,

however, would take me on too far-stretching a parabola. I would merely

draw attention to this reservation, and say that its relevance will

appear later.

My belief is that when I say, as I do emphatically say, that Beethoven

is a greater composer than Bach and find my assertion difficult

or impossible to prove I am judging by an instinctive but not yet

intellectually formalized sense of value, or values, which will only

emerge in the future to take a place among all the other principles

and standards--the totality of life in its sum of _death-shapes_

so far created. So we see there can be no such thing as a perfect

fugue-in-itself but only the idea of one. The actual fugue must

have a meaning, it must be an expression of life; a fugue-in-itself

without relation to life, perfect and completely, is an impossibility.

Nevertheless a musician like Bach finds in himself the fugue-idea as

well as the fugue-emotion, the fugue-form as well as the fugue-content,

and there is a constant struggle between them to coincide exactly and

to materialize in one indivisible unity. Sometimes the fugue idea

prevails and sometimes the fugue-emotion prevails, and the result

always is an imperfect fugue. But this imperfection in all its varying

degrees is the musical reality. Absolute perfection, absolute unity is

annihilation, the end of all things and the attainment of Nirvana. But

even the fugue-idea is not a constant unchangeable abstraction or fixed

shape. It is modified by the actual fugues which are created, for it

is an abstraction, a general principle from examples, an induction

from particulars; and as fresh particulars arise, the induction must

be modified. Again, I spoke of the content or fugue-emotion, but this

fugue-emotion is not--except perhaps in the simplest and most feeble

examples--single but, on the contrary, multiple. Who is to appraise

or range in order of value these emotions? How is it to be done? The

belief that any single judgment may do it--the mind of any one critic,

expert or practitioner--is preposterous. But this does not suspend

individual judgment or make it vain, since it is through the conflict

or discord of all genuine individual judgments that new conceptions

or attempts at concord emerge. This conflict arises from unsatisfied

desire and, in the end, we think Beethoven better than Bach only

because Beethoven more profoundly satisfies our desire or satisfies

a deeper desire than any satisfied by Bach. Just as new conceptions

emerge or are induced from discordant or unrelated conceptions so

new emotions and new desires are induced from the discordance or

conflict of our desires. This process of organization would seem

infinite--a conception which I, personally, find intolerable and

incomprehensible--were it not for a strange phenomenon, and this

phenomenon is that ultimately at the core of all men there seems to be

the same desire.

The world is not really divided as to who are its greatest painters,

sculptors, scientists, mathematicians, musicians and poets. We may not

be able to prove to our own logical satisfaction that Beethoven is

greater than Bach, that Bach is greater than Haydn, that Palestrina

is greater than Verdi, but we are all strangely certain that it is so.

What are we to make of this? Evidently there is a unity somewhere in

our diversity, and it is more than a lowest common factor--a far-away

dim primitive element, never quite lost sight of but growing ever

fainter, linking all men and all art. It is not that touch of nature

making the whole world kin, for that--although it might enable us to

have some sympathy with all things--would not enable us to range them

in value. Such a minute dose of common kinship could not so vitally

relate us. It is, on the contrary, by our very essence, by the most

spiritual and intense of our desires that we are united. We are not

unanimous about Scriabin, Puccini, Tchaikovsky, Liszt, Rimsky-Korsakov,

Schumann, Chopin, Mendelssohn and Dvorak, just as we are not unanimous

about Aubrey Beardsley, Sargent, El Greco, or about Byron, Tennyson,

and Conrad.

Apparently each of us carries within him a fundamental note which

picks out all the notes struck upon us by nature and mankind and

ranges them in a series. And it is this which gives to each one his

values. The fundamental note which any individual carries may not be

the fundamental note of mankind, or of the Universe, but it must have

a more or less simple relationship with them. Thus the values of one

individual are true for all others, within their limits. They are real

values though not necessarily ultimate values; they can and will be

related to all other values but can only be so related through a more

fundamental note--hence the importance of such a note. It is my belief

that the profoundest, most fundamental note in music, so far, has

been struck by Beethoven. There is nothing in the music of any other

composer which his does not comprehend. But his, on the other hand, has

a new foundation to which no other music reaches.

[Illustration]

But this analogy of the fundamental note must be understood merely as

an analogy, suggestive rather than explanatory. Of all the simpler

musical intervals I find that of the seventeenth the most satisfying

to my ear. I may wonder what is the secret of the purity of its

concord--so much greater than that of the perfect fifth or the perfect

fourth, which at first sight seem to be more intimate relationships.

Then I discover that the ratio of the vibrations of the two notes

of the seventeenth is 1:5, whereas that of the perfect fifth is 2:3,

of the perfect fourth 3:4. Stated thus this may not mean much to the

non-mathematically minded reader but it denotes that the seventeenth

is a perfect and not a syncopated interval. That is to say there is no

syncopation of the vibrations of the two notes, but they beat together

in a closer more united rhythm than that of a perfect fifth or perfect

fourth.

But the twelfth

[Illustration]

(I use the tenor or C clef partly because it is more obscure and will

annoy those who are only accustomed to the treble and bass clefs)

has a ratio of 1:3 which also is not a syncopated interval but has

the same kind of perfection as that of the octave (1:2) and the

seventeenth (1:5). Yet the twelfth is not so pleasing an interval as

the seventeenth, and the octave is inferior to them both. Nevertheless

the twelfth and octave are mathematically closer relationships than the

seventeenth. Evidently there is another principle to be discovered, and

I will call it the principle of affinity in unlikeness and illustrate

it by an analogy which may seem far-fetched but which I believe to be

illuminating and significant.

Let us imagine that the unison or note A represents oneself; that

the relationship of the octave (1:2) represents that of father and

daughter; the relationship of the perfect fifth (2:3) that of brother

and sister; the relationship of the perfect fourth (3:4) that of two

brothers; the relationship of the twelfth (1:3) that of male and

female cousins--in which a new element that of sexual affinity, is

introduced, bringing with it a deeper reverberation although the blood

relationship is more distant. And, finally, the relationship of the

seventeenth, that of unrelated lovers which--although the most distant

of all in blood--strikes a still profounder sympathy and beauty. It is

now possible to understand more clearly why my analogy of the relation

of Beethoven to the rest of music as that of a more fundamental note is

not to be taken in its literal meaning. With Beethoven, a new element

came into music, an element of such sublimity and beauty that its

advent into the world of imagination is comparable in importance with

that of sex in the physical world.

Sex as we know it did not always exist; it does not exist in the

inorganic world, hardly in the vegetable world, but dimly in the animal

world. It is a human discovery, and upon that new more fundamental

note (fundamental not in the vertical sense but in a focal sense)

rises the whole wealth of man’s intellectual and physical harmony.

But even in sex we have not touched an absolute. The presage of a

still profounder intimacy trembles fitfully here and there in music

throughout the historical European period. In the music of Palestrina,

of Byrd, of all the rarer spirits up to Bach, Mozart and Wagner there

are fitful gleams of a more central desire until, finally, a love that

plumbs deeper than even the love of sex rings forth unmistakeably in

the music of Beethoven and immediately creates for us a new hierarchy

of values. And so here we find for the time being an Absolute. The

world of art, we find, resembles both the world of the atom and the

world of solar space. There are greater and lesser planets and greater

and lesser satellites. We can imagine that if there were inhabitants

upon the Moon they might think the Earth was the primary fact of

their being, since it was the focal point of their orbit, whereas

the Sun would seem so eccentrically placed as to be an irregular and

incomprehensible singularity; until by a process of more profound

imagining they conceived the more fundamental though more distant

relationship in which it stood to them.

Just as the Sun is the centre of the only system of the physical

universe so far formulated--for no centre has been found to the

innumerable suns of the stellar universe--so Beethoven is our temporary

Absolute in the world of music. And just as the Sun is the source of

all vegetable and animal life upon the earth, so I believe that in art

we find the vital spirit which animates our human life. Thus it would

seem to be true--as I suggested we might discover--that the function of

art in the world is to create absolute values in the imagination upon

which the human species can continually re-create its intellectual,

moral, and physical structures. And if this is so it means that in the

values of art we approach most nearly to Truth.

FOOTNOTES:

[4] See Mr. Harvey Grace’s excellent book on the organ works of J. S.

Bach.

Orpheus; or, The music of the future · 第 5 / 7 章