MILITARY REPLACED BY POLICE
The beginning of 1888 saw the civil administration in a position to
wage a systematic campaign against all disturbers of the peace.
Lower Burma had been reduced almost to its normal condition. The late
Mr. Todd Naylor in the Tharrawaddy district had thoroughly extirpated
the gangs which had troubled it and brought it to a state of quiet
which it had not enjoyed for a very long time.
The disarmament of the whole province had been systematically taken in
hand; the Village Regulation had become law, the military police had
been organized and now numbered 17,880 men. The whole conditions had
been changed. At the beginning of the year (1887) the troops had held
one hundred and forty-two posts and the police fifty posts. At the
end of the year the police held one hundred and seventy-five, and the
troops eighty-four. The concentration of the troops in a few principal
stations, left the work of destroying the remaining gangs to the
military police, who were frequently engaged in action with dacoits.
There were a few petty disasters at first. Nothing else was or could
have been expected of partially trained men scattered about in small
posts. There were only three serious cases in 1888. In one case, in
distinct contravention of my orders, a small picket of ten men had been
put out on the edge of a forest in a small house or shed without even a
bamboo stockade. The picket was two miles from a military police post.
The Burmans set fire to a cooking shed and volleyed the police by the
aid of the firelight. Seven men fell to the first two volleys and only
two were unwounded. These men behaved gallantly and kept the dacoits at
bay until aid came from the post.
In another case and in another district a patrol of one jemadar and
eleven sepoys was ambushed. The jemadar and nine of the men were killed
and one man badly wounded and left for dead. The remaining man with the
aid of two Burmans reached the nearest post. A party was sent out and
the wounded man picked up.
The third disaster was in the Magwè district, where thirty men under
an English Inspector met a large body of dacoits and were forced to
retreat losing seven killed and two wounded. Six Snider rifles and two
ponies were captured by the dacoits. This was an unfortunate affair for
which the men were not responsible. It gave the Magwè dacoits fresh
spirit.
To the responsible head of the administration the year 1888 was one of
much anxiety. The troops were vacating numerous outposts held by them
and they were being replaced by police fresh from India, and most of
them imperfectly trained. The dacoits had learned to fear the soldiers,
and the presence of a large body of men with numerous outlying
detachments under military discipline and keeping touch with each
other, kept districts which had all the elements of disorder and were
perhaps in fact dominated by dacoit leaders in apparent tranquillity.
Sagaing was a notable instance of this. The district was covered
with posts, but the soldiers hardly saw a dacoit, and consequently
no progress was made in breaking up what was a strongly organized
combination against our rule.
The troops, moreover, had learned their work; they were led by trained
and zealous officers, who had acquired in many cases a minute knowledge
of localities which was lost with them. The military police, on the
other hand, were new to the country and the work, and seldom had the
advantage of being led by trained British officers. The effect of the
change began to be felt towards the end of 1887, and the beginning of
1888--that is to say, in the season of the year when life in the forest
is dry and pleasant, the favourite time for the pastime of dacoity.
Hence there was no doubt a revival of disorder in some places, and
the petty disasters which befell the military police were magnified
and made much of by some correspondents who found it profitable to
misrepresent everything connected with the administration of Burma.
The transition stage did not last long. The Indian police picked up
their work with rapidity. No men could have learnt it quicker. They
were constantly engaged with dacoits; they frequently followed up and
inflicted punishment on them and recovered property without loss to
themselves. The few mistakes were seized upon and magnified while the
successes vastly greater in number were not noticed.
In the first orders regarding the military police the minimum garrison
of a post was fixed at twenty-five men. This was found to be too weak
and was raised to forty, and the minimum strength of a patrol was fixed
at ten. I found it necessary to forbid any new post to be established
without my sanction and to lay down the strength of the movable column
to be maintained in each district. The local officers seemed unable
to refrain from putting out posts until there was not a man left at
headquarters.
In April, 1888, the Viceroy asked me if I saw any sensible signs of the
reduction of our troops and the substitution of the police encouraging
the dacoits or loosening our hold on the country. After explaining
that the districts where the dacoits were most active and organized
there had been no reduction of troops, but, on the contrary, constant
military activity under keen commanders, I wrote:--
"I have carefully watched events and thought over the matter, and my
conclusion is that the dacoits know that the troops have retired and
that the police move in small numbers and have taken advantage of the
occasion. If this is allowed to go on they will get bolder and will
give trouble.... I am inclined to sit tight and wait until the men have
learnt their work. The native officers will learn the language and the
country.... The commissioners and district officers like to cover their
districts with a perfect network of posts at short distances from each
other. If they were allowed their own way there would not be a man left
to move about. Last August (1887) this was foreseen, and the strength
of the movable column to be kept for active operations in each district
was laid down, and orders have been given and have been enforced
forbidding the formation of new posts without my sanction."
Lord Dufferin accepted my views, saying that he would not go into the
various considerations which I had placed before him, "except to say
that I fully appreciate the calmness and good sense with which you have
discussed the matter. A more excitable man might have gone off at a
tangent and have been frightened into measures which would certainly
have been very expensive and might not have been necessary. I have
taken the Commander-in-Chief into counsel, and after going fully and
very carefully into the whole matter we are content to accept your
views."
There was in point of fact no reason for anxiety. Week by week the
police improved. The first combined movement attempted with military
police was in the difficult Popa country where four small columns under
Captain Hastings, Commandant of the Myingyan battalion, succeeded in
running Ya Nyun's gang hard, but did not capture him. And in various
encounters in this district alone the dacoit gangs loss amounted to:
killed, 105; wounded and captured, 29; captured, 486. Eighteen ponies
were taken, 316 firearms, and many dahs and spears.
The casualties of the military police in Upper Burma, during 1888,
were 46 killed and 76 wounded, whilst the dacoits lost 312 killed
(actually counted after action), and 721 captured. The casualties in
the Army in Upper Burma between the 1st of May, 1887, and the 31st of
March, 1889, were: killed or died of wounds 60, and wounded 142. (Par.
26 of the Despatch of Major-General Sir George White, K.C.B., V.C.,
late Commanding the Upper Burma Force. Dated Simla, July 6, 1889.) The
police could not have been more active than the soldiers had been. They
probably suffered more in proportion to their numbers owing to their
inferior training. During the year 1888 the military police were in the
field constantly in almost every district in the province.
It became evident that we had not a sufficient number of British
officers; if a man fell sick or was wounded, there was no one to take
his place. Sixteen additional officers were sanctioned for the police,
but they did not arrive until after the close of the year. They added
much to the strength and efficiency of the force.
On the whole, it became evident before the middle of 1888 that the
police were getting a hold of the province and that no danger had been
incurred by reducing the military garrison and bringing the troops into
quarters. We had still to rely on the assistance of the soldiers in
work that belonged more properly to the police.
Hence in Sagaing, Magwè, the Chindwin district, and some other places
where the insurgents showed special activity, I was compelled in some
cases to ask for aid. If it was sought unwillingly, it was given
most readily by the Major-General commanding, and was invaluable.
The civil administration was not yet able to stand alone. It was not
so much the rank and file but the many British officers, keen and
experienced, whose withdrawal was felt; for it will be remembered each
police battalion had at the most two British officers, while very few
districts had an area of less than three thousand square miles.
As an example of the invaluable aid rendered by the soldiers, two of
the most noted leaders on the Ava side, Shwè Yan and Bo Tok, who had
been the scourge of the country since the annexation, fell to parties
of British Infantry. Bo Tok was killed by Mounted Infantry of the
Rifle Brigade led by Major Sir Bartle Frere, and a few months later,
Lieutenant Minogue, with some Mounted Infantry of the Royal Munster
Fusiliers, ran down Shwè Yan. The deaths of these two men, who kept the
borders of Ava, Myingyan, and Kyauksè in a ferment, enabled the civil
power to bring this country into order in a short time.
The military police, however, took their full share of work. A man
who had given endless trouble to the troops since the annexation and
made his lair on the east side of the Kyauksè district was the Setkya
leader. He was attacked by the Kyauksè military police under Captain
Gastrell, Commandant of the Mandalay battalion, and his band dispersed.
The Setkya escaped, but he was caught and delivered up by the Shan
Sawbwa of Lawksawk. After his defeats on former occasions he had found
a safe refuge in the Shan hills. The Shan leaders were now our loyal
subjects, and the Setkya's career came to an end.