Department of Defense (USMC) photo 79181]

Once the Marines realized what Matsuda had in mind, cutting the line of

retreat assumed the highest priority, as demonstrated by the withdrawal

of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, from the Puller patrol on the very

eve of the march toward Gilnit. As early as 3 February, Rupertus

concluded that the Japanese could no longer mount a counterattack on the

airfields and began devoting all his energy and resources to destroying

the retreating Japanese. The division commander chose Selden's 5th

Marines, now restored to three-battalion strength, to conduct the

pursuit. While Petras and his light aircraft scouted the coastal track,

landing craft stood ready to embark elements of the regiment and

position them to cut off and destroy the _Matsuda Force_. Bad weather

hampered Selden's Marines; clouds concealed the enemy from aerial

observation, and a boiling surf ruled out landings over certain beaches.

With about 5,000 Marines, and some Army dog handlers and their animals,

the colonel rotated his battalions, sending out fresh troops each day

and using 10 LCMs in attempts to leapfrog the retreating Japanese. "With

few exceptions, men were not called upon to make marches on two

successive days," Selden recalled. "After a one-day hike, they either

remained at that camp for three or four days or made the next jump by

LCMs." At any point along the coastal track, the enemy might have

concealed himself in the dense jungle and sprung a deadly ambush, but he

did not. Selden, for instance, expected a battle for the Japanese supply

point at Iboki Point, but the enemy faded away. Instead of encountering

resistance by a determined and skillful rear guard, the 5th Marines

found only stragglers, some of them sick or wounded. Nevertheless, the

regimental commander could take pride in maintaining unremitting

pressure on the retreating enemy "without loss or even having a man

wounded" and occupying Iboki Point on 24 February.

Meanwhile, American amphibious forces had seized Kwajalein and Eniwetok

Atolls in the Marshall Islands, as the Central Pacific offensive

gathered momentum. Further to complicate Japanese strategy, carrier

strikes proved that Truk had become too vulnerable to continue serving

as a major naval base. The enemy, conscious of the threat to his inner

perimeter that was developing to the north, decided to pull back his

fleet units from Truk and his aircraft from Rabaul. On 19 February--just

two days after the Americans invaded Eniwetok--Japanese fighters at

Rabaul took off for the last time to challenge an American air raid.

When the bombers returned on the following day, not a single operational

Japanese fighter remained at the airfields there.

The defense of Rabaul now depended exclusively on ground forces.

Lieutenant General Yusashi Sakai, in command of the _17th Division_,

received orders to scrap his plan to dig in near Cape Hoskins and

instead proceed to Rabaul. The general believed that supplies enough had

been positioned along the trail net to enable at least the most vigorous

of Matsuda's troops to stay ahead of the Marines and reach the fortress.

The remaining self-propelled barges could carry heavy equipment and

those troops most needed to defend Rabaul, as well as the sick and

wounded. The retreat, however, promised to be an ordeal for the

Japanese. Selden had already demonstrated how swiftly the Marines could

move, taking advantage of American control of the skies and the coastal

waters, and a two-week march separated the nearest of Matsuda's soldiers

from their destination. Attrition would be heavy, but those who could

contribute the least to the defense of Rabaul seemed the likeliest to

fall by the wayside.

The Japanese forces retreating to Rabaul included the defenders of Cape

Merkus, where a stalemate had prevailed after the limited American

attack on 16 January had sent Komori's troops reeling back beyond the

airstrip. At Augitni, a village east of the Aria River southwest of

Iboki Point, Komori reported to Colonel Sato of the _51st Reconnaissance

Regiment_, which had concluded the rear-guard action that enabled the

Matsuda Force to cross the stream and take the trail through Augitni to

Linga Linga and eastward along the coast. When the two commands met,

Sato broke out a supply of sake he had been carrying, and the officers

exchanged toasts well into the night.

Meanwhile, Captain Kiyomatsu Terunuma organized a task force built

around the _1st Battalion, 54th Infantry_, and prepared to defend the

Talasea area near the base of the Willaumez Peninsula against a possible

landing by the pursuing Marines. The _Terunuma Force_ had the mission of

holding out long enough for _Matsuda Force_ to slip past on the way to

Rabaul. On 6 March, the leading elements of Matsuda's column reached the

base of the Willaumez Peninsula, and Komori, leading the way for Sato's

rear guard, started from Augitni toward Linga Linga.

[Sidenote:

[Illustration: Department of Defense (USMC) photo 86249

_A Piper Cub of the 1st Marine Division's improvised air force snags a

message from a patrol on New Britain's north coast._]

Cape Gloucester: The Green Inferno · 第 10 / 16 题