Roughly 15 minutes after Company A assaulted the inland terminus of the
ridge, Company I and the attached tanks collided with the main defenses,
which the Japanese had modified since the 26 December landings, cutting
new gunports in bunkers, hacking fire lanes in the undergrowth, and
shifting men and weapons to oppose an attack along the coastal trail
parallel to shore instead of over the beach. Advancing in a drenching
rain, the Marines encountered a succession of jungle-covered, mutually
supporting positions protected by barbed wire and mines. The hour's wait
for tanks paid dividends, as the Shermans, protected by riflemen,
crushed bunkers and destroyed the weapons inside. During the fight,
Company I drifted to its left, and Hankins used Company K, reinforced
with a platoon of medium tanks, to close the gap between the coastal
track and Hell's Point itself. This unit employed the same tactics as
Company I. A rifle squad followed each of the M4 tanks, which cracked
open the bunkers, twelve in all, and fired inside; the accompanying
riflemen then killed anyone attempting to fight or flee. More than 260
Japanese perished in the fighting at Hell's Point, at the cost of 9
Marines killed and 36 wounded.
With the defenses of Hell's Point shattered, the two battalions of the
5th Marines, which came ashore on the morning of 29 December, joined
later that day in the advance on the airfield. The 1st Battalion,
commanded by Major William H. Barba, and the 2d Battalion, under
Lieutenant Colonel Lewis H. Walt, moved out in a column, Barba's unit
leading the way. In front of the Marines lay a swamp, described as only
a few inches deep, but the depth, because of the continuing downpour,
proved as much as five feet, "making it quite hard," Selden
acknowledged, "for some of the youngsters who were not much more than 5
feet in height." The time lost in wading through the swamp delayed the
attack, and the leading elements chose a piece of open and comparatively
dry ground, where they established a perimeter while the rest of the
force caught up.
Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, attacking through that
regiment's 3d Battalion, encountered only scattered resistance, mainly
sniper fire, as it pushed along the coast beyond Hell's Point.
Halftracks carrying 75mm guns, medium tanks, artillery, and even a pair
of rocket-firing DUKWs supported the advance, which brought the
battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Walker A. Reaves, to the edge
of Airfield No. 2. When daylight faded on 29 December, the 1st
Battalion, 1st Marines, held a line extending inland from the coast; on
its left were the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 5th
Marines, forming a semicircle around the airfield.
The Japanese officer responsible for defending the airfields, Colonel
Kouki Sumiya of the _53d Infantry_, had fallen back on 29 December,
trading space for time as he gathered his surviving troops for the
defense of Razorback Hill, a ridge running diagonally across the
southwestern approaches to Airfield No. 2. The 1st and 2d Battalions,
5th Marines, attacked on 30 December supported by tanks and artillery.
Sumiya's troops had constructed some sturdy bunkers, but the chest-high
grass that covered Razorback Hill did not impede the attackers like the
jungle at Hell's Point. The Japanese fought gallantly to hold the
position, at times stalling the advancing Marines, but the defenders had
neither the numbers nor the firepower to prevail. Typical of the day's
fighting, one platoon of Company F from Selden's regiment beat back two
separate _banzai_ attacks, before tanks enabled the Marines to shatter
the bunkers in their path and kill the enemy within. By dusk on 30
December, the landing force had overrun the defenses of the airfields,
and at noon of the following day General Rupertus had the American flag
raised beside the wreckage of a Japanese bomber at Airfield No. 2, the
larger of the airstrips.
[Illustration: Department of Defense (USMC) photo 71589
_On 31 December 1943, the American flag rises beside the wreckage of a
Japanese bomber after the capture of Airfield No. 2, five days after the
1st Marine Division landed on New Britain._]
The 1st Marine Division thus seized the principal objective of the Cape
Gloucester fighting, but the airstrips proved of marginal value to the
Allied forces. Indeed, the Japanese had already abandoned the prewar
facility, Airfield No. 1, which was thickly overgrown with tall, coarse
kunai grass. Craters from American bombs pockmarked the surface of
Airfield No. 2, and after its capture Japanese hit-and-run raiders added
a few of their own, despite antiaircraft fire from the 12th Defense
Battalion. Army aviation engineers worked around the clock to return
Airfield No. 2 to operation, a task that took until the end of January
1944. Army aircraft based here defended against air attacks for as long
as Rabaul remained an active air base and also supported operations on
the ground.
_Clearing the Shores of Borgen Bay_
While General Rupertus personally directed the capture of the airfields,
the Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Lemuel C. Shepherd,
Jr., came ashore on D-Day, 26 December, and took command of the
beachhead. Besides coordinating the logistics activity there, Shepherd
assumed responsibility for expanding the perimeter to the southwest and
securing the shores of Borgen Bay. He had a variety of shore party,
engineer, transportation, and other service troops to handle the
logistics chores. The 3d Battalion of Colonel Selden's 5th Marines--the
remaining component of the division reserve--arrived on 30 and 31
December to help the 7th Marines enlarge the beachhead.
[Illustration: Department of Defense (USA) photo SC 188250
_During operations to clear the enemy from the shores of Borgen Bay,
BGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., (left) the assistant division commander,
confers with Col John T. Selden, in command of the 5th Marines._]
Shepherd had sketchy knowledge of Japanese deployment west and south of
the Yellow Beaches. Dense vegetation concealed streams, swamps, and even
ridge lines, as well as bunkers and trenches. The progress toward the
airfields seemed to indicate Japanese weakness in that area and possible
strength in the vicinity of the Yellow Beaches and Borgen Bay. To
resolve the uncertainty about the enemy's numbers and intentions,
Shepherd issued orders on 1 January 1944 to probe Japanese defenses
beginning the following morning.
In the meantime, the Japanese defenders, under Colonel Kenshiro
Katayama, commander of the _141st Infantry_, were preparing for an
attack of their own. General Matsuda entrusted three reinforced
battalions to Katayama, who intended to hurl them against Target Hill,
which he considered the anchor of the beachhead line. Since Matsuda
believed that roughly 2,500 Marines were ashore on New Britain, 10
percent of the actual total, Katayama's force seemed strong enough for
the job assigned it.
Katayama needed time to gather his strength, enabling Shepherd to make
the first move, beginning at mid-morning on 2 January to realign his
forces. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, stood fast in the vicinity of
Target Hill, the 2d Battalion remained in place along a stream already
known as Suicide Creek, and the regiment's 3d Battalion began pivoting
to face generally south. Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,
pushed into the jungle to come abreast of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,
on the inland flank. As the units pivoted, they had to cross Suicide
Creek in order to squeeze out the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, which would
become Shepherd's reserve.
The change of direction proved extremely difficult in vegetation so
thick that, in the words of one Marine: "You'd step from your line, take
say ten paces, and turn around to guide on your buddy. And nobody
there.... I can tell you, it was a very small war, and a very lonely
business." The Japanese defenders, moreover, had dug in south of Suicide
Creek, and from these positions they repulsed every attempt to cross the
stream that day. A stalemate ensued, as Seabees from Company C, 17th
Marines, built a corduroy road through the damp flat behind the Yellow
Beaches so that tanks could move forward to punch through the defenses
of Suicide Creek.
[Illustration: Department of Defense (USMC) photo 69013
_Marines and Seabees struggle to build a corduroy road leading inland
from the beachhead. Without the log surface trucks and tanks cannot
advance over trails turned into quagmire by the unceasing rain._]
While the Marine advance stalled at Suicide Creek, awaiting the arrival
of tanks, Katayama attacked Target Hill. On the night of 2 January,
taking advantage of the darkness, Japanese infantry cut steps in the
lower slopes so the troops could climb more easily. Instead of
reconnoitering the thinly held lines of Company A, 7th Marines, and
trying to infiltrate, the enemy followed a preconceived plan to the
letter, advanced up the steps, and at midnight stormed the strongest of
the company's defenses. Japanese mortar barrages fired to soften the
defenses and screen the approach could not conceal the sound of the
troops working their way up the hill, and the Marines were ready.
Although the Japanese supporting fire proved generally inaccurate, one
round scored a direct hit on a machine-gun position, killing two Marines
and wounding the gunner, who kept firing the weapon until someone else
could take over. This gun fired some 5,000 rounds and helped blunt the
Japanese thrust, which ended by dawn of 3 January. Nowhere did the
Japanese crack the lines of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, or loosen
its grip on Target Hill.
The body of a Japanese officer killed at Target Hill yielded documents
that cast new light on the Japanese defenses south of Suicide Creek. A
crudely drawn map revealed the existence of Aogiri Ridge, an enemy
strongpoint unknown to General Shepherd's intelligence section.
Observers on Target Hill tried to locate the ridge and the trail network
the enemy was using, but the jungle canopy frustrated their efforts.
While the Marines on Target Hill tabulated the results of the fighting
there--patrols discovered 40 bodies, and captured documents, when
translated, listed 46 Japanese killed, 54 wounded, and two missing--and
used field glasses to scan the jungle south of Suicide Creek, the 17th
Marines completed the road that would enable medium tanks to test the
defenses of that stream. During the afternoon of 3 January, a trio of
Sherman tanks reached the creek only to discover that the bank dropped
off too sharply for them to negotiate. The engineers sent for a
bulldozer, which arrived, lowered its blade, and began gouging at the
lip of the embankment. Realizing the danger if tanks succeeded in
crossing the creek, the Japanese opened fire on the bulldozer, wounding
the driver. A volunteer climbed onto the exposed driver's seat and took
over until he, too, was wounded. Another Marine stepped forward, but
instead of climbing onto the machine, he walked alongside, using its
bulk for cover as he manipulated the controls with a shovel and an axe
handle. By dark, he had finished the job of converting the impassable
bank into a readily negotiated ramp.
[Illustration: Department of Defense (USMC) photo 72292
_Target Hill, where the Marines repulsed a Japanese counterattack on the
night of 2-3 January, dominates the Yellow Beaches, the site of the main
landings on 26 December._]
On the morning of 4 January, the first tank clanked down the ramp and
across the stream. As the Sherman emerged on the other side, Marine
riflemen cut down two Japanese soldiers trying to detonate magnetic
mines against its sides. Other medium tanks followed, also accompanied
by infantry, and broke open the bunkers that barred the way. The 3d
Battalion, 7th Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, surged onward
past the creek, squeezing out the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, which
crossed in the wake of those two units to come abreast of them on the
far right of the line that closed in on the jungle concealing Aogiri
Ridge. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, thereupon joined the southward
advance, tying in with the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, to present a
four-battalion front that included the 2d Battalion and 3d Battalions,
7th Marines.
[Illustration: DRIVE TO THE SOUTHEAST (I) SUICIDE CREEK]
Once across Suicide Creek, the Marines groped for Aogiri Ridge, which
for a time simply seemed to be another name for Hill 150, a terrain
feature that appeared on American maps. The advance rapidly overran the
hill, but Japanese resistance in the vicinity did not diminish. On 7
January, enemy fire wounded Lieutenant Colonel David S. MacDougal,
commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. His executive
officer, Major Joseph Skoczylas, took over until he, too, was wounded.
Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. Puller, temporarily in command of the 3d
Battalion, 7th Marines, assumed responsibility for both battalions until
the arrival on the morning of 8 January of Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W.
Walt, recently assigned as executive officer of the 5th Marines, who
took over the regiment's 3d Battalion.
[Illustration: Department of Defense (USMC) photo 72283
_From Hell's Point, athwart the route to the airfields, to Suicide Creek
near the Yellow Beaches, medium tanks and infantry team up to shatter
the enemy's log and earthen bunkers._]
Upon assuming command of the battalion, Walt continued the previous
day's attack. As his Marines braved savage fire and thick jungle, they
began moving up a rapidly steepening slope. As night approached, the
battalion formed a perimeter and dug in. Random Japanese fire and sudden
skirmishes punctuated the darkness. The nature of the terrain and the
determined resistance convinced Walt that he had found Aogiri Ridge.
[Illustration: DRIVE TO THE SOUTHEAST (II) AOGIRI RIDGE AND HILL 660]
Walt's battalion needed the shock action and firepower of tanks, but
drenching rain, mud, and rampaging streams stopped the armored vehicles.
The heaviest weapon that the Marines managed to bring forward was a
single 37mm gun, manhandled into position on the afternoon of 9 January,
While the 11th Marines hammered the crest of Aogiri Ridge, the 1st and
3d Battalions, 7th Marines, probed the flanks of the position and Walt's
3d Battalion, 5th Marines, pushed ahead in the center, seizing a narrow
segment of the slope, its apex just short of the crest. By dusk, said
the 1st Marine Division's special action report, Walt's men had "reached
the limit of their physical endurance and morale was low. It was a
question of whether or not they could hold their hard-earned gains." The
crew of the 37mm gun opened fire in support of the afternoon's final
attack, but after just three rounds, four of the nine men handling the
weapon were killed or wounded. Walt called for volunteers; when no one
responded, he and his runner crawled to the gun and began pushing the
weapon up the incline. Twice more the gun barked, cutting a swath
through the undergrowth, and a third round of canister destroyed a
machine gun. Other Marines then took over from Walt and the runner, with
new volunteers replacing those cut down by the enemy. The improvised
crew kept firing canister rounds every few yards until they had wrestled
the weapon to the crest. There the Marines dug in, as close as ten yards
to the bunkers the Japanese had built on the crest and reverse slope.
At 0115 on the morning of 10 January, the Japanese emerged from their
positions and charged through a curtain of rain, shouting and firing as
they came. The Marines clinging to Aogiri Ridge broke up this attack and
three others that followed, firing off almost all their ammunition in
doing so. A carrying party scaled the muddy slope with belts and clips
for the machine guns and rifles, but there barely was time to distribute
the ammunition before the Japanese launched the fifth attack of the
morning. Marine artillery tore into the enemy, as forward observers,
their vision obstructed by rain and jungle, adjusted fire by sound more
than by sight, moving 105mm concentrations to within 50 yards of the
Marine infantrymen. A Japanese officer emerged from the darkness and ran
almost to Walt's foxhole before fragments from a shell bursting in the
trees overhead cut him down. This proved to be the high-water mark of
the counterattack against Aogiri Ridge, for the Japanese tide receded as
the daylight grew brighter. At 0800, when the Marines moved forward,
they did not encounter even one living Japanese on the terrain feature
they renamed Walt's Ridge in honor of their commander, who received the
Navy Cross for his inspirational leadership.
One Japanese stronghold in the vicinity of Aogiri Ridge still survived,
a supply dump located along a trail linking the ridge to Hill 150. On 11
January, Lieutenant Colonel Weber's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,
supported by a pair of half-tracks and a platoon of light tanks,
eliminated this pocket in four hours of fighting. Fifteen days of combat
since the landings on 26 December, had cost the division 180 killed and
636 wounded in action.
[Illustration: _LtCol Lewis W. Walt earned the Navy Cross leading an
attack up Aogiri Ridge, renamed Walt's Ridge in his honor._