1801.
Sir James sails from England in command of a squadron of six
sail of the line on a particular service.--Arrives off
Cadiz.--Attacks a French squadron at Algeziras.--Captain
Brenton's account of the battle.--Loss of the Hannibal.--Colonel
Connolly's statements.--Logs of the Caesar and ships of the
squadron.--Sir James proceeds to Gibraltar.--Remarks.--Flag of
truce sent to Algeziras.--Correspondence with Linois.--Squadron
refit at Gibraltar.
On the 16th June the signal was made to unmoor; and soon after, for
the squadron to weigh. The wind being fair, the ships quickly cleared
the English Channel, and crossed the Bay of Biscay. Cape Finisterre
was reached on the 22nd; on the 26th the squadron hove to off the
Tagus, and sent letters on shore at Lisbon. The detachment was now
joined by the Phaeton, Captain Morris, and proceeded off Cadiz, where
it arrived on the 28th June: to announce this, the following letter
was written to Admiral Lord Keith, who had then the chief command on
the Mediterranean station:
Caesar, off Cadiz, 26th June 1801.
MY LORD,
I have the honour to inform your lordship of my arrival off
Cadiz with the ships named on the margin[28] under my orders;
having sailed from Cawsand Bay on the 16th instant. On the 26th
I was joined, off Lisbon, by the Phaeton, Captain Morris, from
whom I received the enclosed state of the enemy's ships at
Cadiz.[29] The Venerable and Superb have both joined the
squadron; and I have taken these ships under my orders,
agreeably to my instructions from my Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty.
I shall take the earliest opportunity of transmitting to your
lordship a copy of those instructions; but having at present no
other vessel than the Plymouth, hired lugger, I cannot part with
her further than to Gibraltar.
I have the honour to be,
Your lordship's most obedient humble servant,
JAS. SAUMAREZ.
Right Honourable Lord Keith, K.B. &c.
[28] Caesar, Pompee, Spencer, Hannibal, Audacious, Thames,
Phaeton, and Plymouth, hired lugger.
[29] See list already given.
The squadron continued to cruise off Cadiz, and frequently to
reconnoitre the harbour; while the Superb was stationed off Lagos as a
look-out ship to westward, and the Thames in the Straits of Gibraltar
to the eastward.
Nothing of importance occurred until the 5th, when intelligence was
received as to the situation of a French squadron. Sir James
accordingly despatched the Plymouth lugger with the following letters
to the Secretary of the Admiralty, and to Mr. Frere, the English
ambassador at Lisbon:
Caesar, off Cadiz, 5th July 1801.
SIR
In my letter of the 29th ultimo, I acquainted you, for the
information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of my
arrival before Cadiz with the squadron under my orders, and of
my having been joined by the Venerable and Superb.
You will please to inform their lordships, that, early this
morning, a despatch-boat joined me from Gibraltar, with
intelligence that three French line-of-battle ships and a
frigate were seen, on the 1st instant, endeavouring to pass the
Straits from the eastward; and the Plymouth lugger has since
joined me, whose commander informs me that they anchored
yesterday off Algeziras. As from the different accounts I form
great hopes of being able to attack them with success, I am
proceeding to the eastward, and I hope to reach the bay early
to-morrow morning. The ships in Cadiz are getting in forwardness
to put to sea. Eight appeared this morning with top-gallant
yards across and sails bent, and four others with their
top-masts rigged. I have directed the commander of the Plymouth,
hired lugger, after having landed this letter at Faro, to cruise
off Cape St. Mary's to apprise any of his Majesty's ships of my
rendezvous, giving them such further information as he may be
possessed of.
I am, sir, your most obedient servant,
JAMES SAUMAREZ.
Evan Nepean, Esq. &c. &c. &c. Admiralty.
Caesar, off Cadiz, 5th July 1801.
SIR,
I have the honour to acquaint you with my having this instant
received information, by an express from Gibraltar, that three
sail of French line-of-battle ships and a frigate had anchored
yesterday in Algeziras Bay, after being three days in
endeavouring to pass the Straits from the eastward. They are
supposed to be destined for Cadiz. I am proceeding off
Gibraltar, in hopes it may be practicable to attack them, or
prevent the junction of their other ships, from whom they are
said to be separated. I request you will please to forward the
letters I take the liberty to enclose herewith. I have the
honour to be, sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
JAMES SAUMAREZ.
Governor O'Hara writes that he is without intelligence from
Egypt since the repulse of the French, the 21st March.
His Excellency J.H. Frere, Esq. &c. &c. &c. Lisbon.
It now becomes our duty to give a particular account of the defensive
means of the French Admiral. The road of Algeziras, six miles distant
from Gibraltar, is open to the eastward. It is shallow, with sunken
rocks in several parts. The town is nearly in the centre, at the
bottom of the Bay; about a third of a mile from which there is a tower
standing on a point, and off this point is Isla Verda, whereon is a
battery of seven long 24-pounders. About a mile to the southward of
this battery is Fort Santa Garcia. The English ships had to pass these
fortifications before they could reach the French line. The northward
of the town was no less protected, having at the distance of about
two-thirds of a mile the fort of San Jago, mounting five long
18-pounders, besides the tower Almirante. By referring to the
diagrams, it will be manifest that the road is admirably protected by
these fortifications, while those at a greater distance to the
northward would be of some service in throwing shells, and in
preventing the ships from working up to the attack. There were also
fourteen large gun-boats, whose positions, as shown, were such as to
form a serious opposition to an approaching enemy in light and
variable winds.
Before we proceed to a description of the attack on the enemy's
well-protected squadron, we must intreat the reader to pause, while we
call his attention to the circumstance of the British ships, led by
the gallant Hood, slowly and silently approaching the batteries of an
enemy, strongly reinforced, perfectly prepared to receive them, and
knowing well that they could not suffer any injury from the ships,
while every shot from their cannon must tell. Silence, undoubtedly
derives importance from the circumstances under which it is observed,
and we cannot well refer to an instance where silence could have had a
more solemn and impressive character than that which must have been
observed on this occasion, until broken by the roar of the enemy's
destructive engines.
Captain (now Admiral Sir Jahleel) Brenton, who was flag-captain of the
Caesar, has kindly transmitted the following particular and authentic
account of all that took place on that eventful day, which afforded
the enemy a short-lived triumph. We shall make no apology for giving
it in his own words:
On Sunday, the 5th July 1801, a despatch-boat was seen in the
S.E., and at two P.M. came alongside the Caesar, with
intelligence of a French squadron having anchored in Algeziras
Bay, consisting of three sail of the line and a frigate.[30] The
Admiral immediately decided on attacking them; and ordered the
Thames frigate to proceed off St. Lucar to recall the Superb,
and make sail with the Pompee, Hannibal, Spencer, Audacious, and
Venerable, for the entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar; making
the signal to prepare for action, and for anchoring by the
stern.
[30] Le Formidable, 84. Dessaix, 84. Indomptable, 74: and
Meuron, 38.
The day was beautiful, with a light air from the westward. At
eleven o'clock the ship's company was, as usual, assembled for
the purpose of Divine service. The appearance of this
congregation, under the peculiar circumstances in which they
were placed,--proceeding, as they all knew they were, to engage
in battle with the enemy, with the probability that many had but
a few remaining hours to live,--was solemn and deeply
impressive. The crew were all dressed in white, as is customary
in warm climates; and being arranged according to their
respective divisions on the quarter-deck, with the band and the
marines on the poop, and the Admiral and the officers under the
poop awning, an effect was produced highly animating, solemn,
and appropriate; while the meek, devotional countenance of the
well-tried Admiral indicated that he derived his confidence and
support from its only true source.
Our chaplain, the Rev. Mr. Holliday, gave an excellent
discourse, appropriate to the occasion; and it cannot be doubted
but the impressions it made on that eventful day were deep and
affecting, however temporary.
I had of course much communication with the Admiral during the
course of this day and the ensuing night. He was, as usual,
calm, cheerful, and collected; foreseeing, and endeavouring to
provide for, whatever might be required during the struggle
which we were anticipating. He was quite aware of the
difficulties we had to encounter, and fully determined to
overcome them if possible.[31]
[31] The following memorandum was communicated to the squadron
before bearing up for Gibraltar Bay:
Memorandum
Caesar, 5th July 1801.
If the Rear-admiral finds the enemy's ships in a situation to be
attacked, the following is the order in which it is to be
executed:
The Venerable to lead into the bay, and pass the enemy's ships
without anchoring;
The Pompee to anchor abreast of the inner ship of the enemy's
line;
The Audacious, }
" Caesar, } to anchor abreast of the enemy's ships
" Spencer, } and batteries;
" Hannibal, }
{ to keep under sail, and annoy the enemy's
" Superb, { batteries and gun-boats during the attack
" Thames, { assisted by the Plymouth lugger.
The boats of the different ships to be lowered down and armed,
in readiness to act where required.
Given on board the Caesar, off Tariffa,
5th July 1801.
JAMES SAUMAREZ.
To the respective Captains.
At daylight we were off Tariffa, with light airs from the
westward, which at seven freshened to a strong breeze, and
enabled the Venerable to open the Bay of Algeziras, in which the
French squadron were discovered at anchor. On the Venerable
making the signal that she could weather the enemy, the Admiral
made another to take stations for mutual support. The Pompee,
Venerable, and Audacious were soon at an anchor, and at
thirty-five minutes after eight began the action with the enemy.
The Caesar at nine o'clock opened her fire, and at fifteen
minutes past nine came to an anchor ahead of the Venerable. The
Spencer and Hannibal passed under our lee, nearly becalmed, and
anchored without the Caesar, firing, as the smoke subsided,
through the openings between our ships at the enemy.
About ten o'clock the fire of the French ships appeared to
slacken so much that I ventured to suggest to the Admiral that a
flag of truce might be sent in, with a notice to the Spaniards
that if the British squadron were permitted to take away the
French ships without any further molestation from the batteries,
the town would be respected, and no further injury done to it.
The Admiral expressed his readiness to do this; but considered
the advantage we had gained, as yet, not sufficiently decisive
to justify such a measure. And his judgment was but too correct.
The decrease of the fire from the French ships arose from their
being occupied in warping close in-shore; and, shortly after
this period, the Pompee having broken her sheer, lost her
commanding position relative to the French Admiral, whom she had
been raking with great effect, and now became raked in her turn.
At twenty minutes after ten, the boats of the squadron were sent
to her assistance, and, having cut her cables, she was towed out
of her exposed situation.
At thirty-five minutes after ten, the Admiral, observing how
much the enemy had increased their distance from us by warping
in-shore, ordered our cables to be cut, and sail to be made upon
the ships, in the hope of being able to close with them. He also
sent me on board the Spencer, with orders to Captain Darby to
weigh, and work up to the enemy. The Hannibal, having already
received these orders, was in the act of obeying them, and soon
after opened her fire upon the French Admiral; but in the
gallant endeavour to get between the Formidable and the shore,
and not being aware of the French Admiral's change of position
by warping in, Captain Ferris unfortunately ran his ship
aground, abreast of the battery of St. Jago, and under the
raking fire of the Formidable. In this helpless state he
continued to engage the enemy until, to use the French Admiral's
words, his decks were _jonche de morts_. He had seventy-three
killed and sixty-four wounded,--a very unusual proportion, as,
in general, the wounded trebles the number of the killed; but
this may be accounted for by the Hannibal being so near that the
enemy's shot passed through her sides without making any
splinters, to which the greater number of wounds are
attributable.
From the time the Caesar cut her cable, she and the Audacious
were constantly engaged with the Indomptable, Meuron, and island
batteries, and occasionally with the Dessaix, as they could
bring their guns-to bear; but the perpetual flaws of wind
rendered this very difficult, and exposed them frequently to a
severe and raking fire from the enemy. The Admiral made the
signal for the marines to be prepared to land on the island;
but, as the boats were all employed in assisting the Pompee and
Hannibal, this was rendered impracticable. At length, finding
every effort fruitless to close with the enemy, the Admiral was
under the necessity of withdrawing his ships from this unequal
contest with winds and batteries; but it was not until all hope
had vanished of saving the Hannibal that he left her in
possession of the enemy.
The accompanying diagram shows first, the position of the hostile
squadrons at the moment the Spencer, and Venerable, and Caesar, had
anchored; secondly, their position when the action ceased, and when
the Hannibal was in possession of the enemy.
The action of Algeziras was certainly obstinately fought, and
gallantly contested on both sides. It is true that the French
had little to do but to attend to their guns, being either at an
anchor in their strong position, or warping towards the shore.
In this operation the Spaniards had the hardest duty, being
employed in their boats in carrying out hawsers, and even in
heaving them in. Success seemed certain to the British squadron
till the Pompee broke her sheer; after that, it was one
continued but unavailing struggle to recover the ground we had
lost by this misfortune: and we retreated to Gibraltar when all
hope was at an end, the Admiral justly considering the
importance of repairing the damages already sustained, and of
preserving the lives of his gallant crew, which would be
uselessly sacrificed by a continuance of a hopeless contest.
Never did I contemplate more real greatness of mind than was
displayed on this occasion by our heroic chief. The calmness and
cheerfulness with which he met and sustained the sad reverses of
this most trying day, were objects worthy of remark and
admiration. Whilst going into the Bay of Algeziras, he desired
me to look over my signal-book, and to mark such signals as
might be likely to be called for. He had already done the same,
and when, during the heat of the action, any of the flags were
destroyed, or the halliards shot away, I was astonished at the
readiness with which he ordered one signal to be substituted for
another, according as the signification might answer the
purpose, without any reference to the book.
On reaching our anchorage off the Mole of Gibraltar, after
giving the necessary orders for the disposal and refitting of
his squadron, he returned to his cabin with a deep sense of the
responsibility he had incurred; but supported by the unqualified
conviction that every exertion had been made to obtain success,
and that the disappointment resulted from circumstances over
which he had no control.
The action terminated, as appears by the log, at thirty-five
minutes after one; and the squadron proceeded to Gibraltar. As
soon as the ship was secured, the Admiral sent me on shore to
the governor, to relate to him the events of the two preceding
days. I found him sitting in his balcony, which commanded a view
of the Bay and Algeziras, evidently deeply affected by the
unlooked-for termination of an attack upon the French squadron,
and anxiously reflecting on the probable results.
On my return on board, the Admiral had retired to his cot; and I
had no means of communicating with him until next morning. I
could then, however, perceive that under all the severity of
disappointment he experienced from our failure, and the loss of
the Hannibal, he felt that no honour had been lost; that every
effort had been made to obtain success; and that he derived
comfort from the sanguine hopes he entertained that an
opportunity might present itself in which he should be able to
retrieve the loss.
He ordered me to take a flag of truce and wait upon the French
Admiral, and propose an exchange of prisoners; which M. Linois
refused, alleging that it was not in his power to establish a
cartel for the purpose until he obtained the sanction of the
Minister of the Marine at Paris, to whom he had sent off an
express as soon as the firing had ceased on the preceding day;
but he consented to send over the officers on parole. The object
of the French Admiral was very obvious. He concluded we wanted
the men to replace those that had been killed and wounded; but
he thought, justly, that sending over officers on parole would
be a harmless act of courtesy, from which we could reap no
immediate benefit. It will be seen that, subsequently to the
second action, (only six days after the first,) when his
despatches from Algeziras had scarcely reached Paris, he did not
wait for an answer from the Minister of the Marine: but
circumstances had altered. We had taken a line-of-battle ship,
and burned two first-rates; and he now wished to get as many of
the crew back as possible.
We shall now transcribe the Rear-admiral's official account of the
battle: this affords additional particulars, and proves that every
step had been taken to insure success; which, but from circumstances
that often blight the fairest prospects, would have had a very
different result. We shall venture to add, that, had the gallant
Admiral hesitated to make the attempt, he would have rendered himself
obnoxious to animadversions, not only from all the squadron under his
command, but from every one on the Rock of Gibraltar who witnessed the
enemy's squadron of inferior force setting, as it were, that of Sir
James at defiance; while it would have afforded the French and
Spaniards a just, or, at least a plausible subject of exultation. But
Sir James, with that decision of character and coolness, when in the
presence of an enemy, for which he was always remarkable, did not
hesitate one moment on the attack, which was made with consummate
skill, and maintained with a perseverance never surpassed.
Caesar, Gibraltar, 6th July 1801.
SIR,
I have to request you will be pleased to inform my Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty that, conformable to my letter of
yesterday's date, I stood through the Straits, with his
Majesty's squadron under my orders, with the intention of
attacking three French line-of-battle ships and a frigate that I
was informed were at anchor off Algeziras. On opening Cabrita
Point, I found the ships lay at a considerable distance from the
enemy's batteries; and having a leading wind up to them, every
reasonable hope of success in the attack was afforded.
I had previously directed Captain Hood in the Venerable, from
his experience and knowledge of the anchorage, to lead the
squadron, which he executed with his accustomed gallantry; and,
although it was not intended he should anchor, he found himself
under the necessity of so doing, from the wind failing,--a
circumstance so much to be apprehended in this country, and to
which I have to attribute the want of success in this
well-intended enterprise. Captain Stirling anchored, conformably
to the enclosed order of attack, opposite to the inner ship of
the enemy, and brought the Pompee to action in the most
spirited and gallant manner; an example which was followed by
the commanders of every ship in the squadron.
Captains Darby and Ferris, owing to light winds, were prevented
for a considerable time from coming into action. At length, the
Hannibal getting a breeze, Captain Ferris had the most
favourable prospect of being alongside one of the enemy's ships,
when the Hannibal unfortunately took the ground; and I am
extremely concerned to acquaint their lordships that, after
having made every possible effort with this ship and the
Audacious to rescue her from the enemy, I was under the
necessity to make sail, being at the time only three cables'
length from one of the enemy's batteries.
My thanks are particularly due to all the captains and men under
my orders; and, although their endeavours have not been crowned
with success, I trust the thousands of spectators from his
Majesty's garrison, and also the surrounding coast, will do
justice to their valour and intrepidity, which were not to be
checked by the fire from the numerous batteries (however
formidable) that surrounded Algeziras.
I feel it incumbent upon me to state to their lordships the
great merits of Captain Brenton of the Caesar, whose cool
judgment and intrepid conduct, I will venture to pronounce, were
never surpassed. I also beg leave to recommend to their
lordships' notice my flag-lieutenant, Mr. Philip Dumaresq, who
has served with me from the commencement of this war, and is a
most deserving officer. Mr. Lamborn and the other lieutenants
are also entitled to great praise; as well as Captain Maxwell of
the Marines, and the other officers of his corps serving on
board the Caesar.
The enemy's ships consisted of two of eighty-four guns and one
of seventy-four, with a large frigate: two of the former are
aground, and the whole are rendered totally unserviceable.
His Majesty's ships have suffered considerably in their masts
and rigging; but I hope will soon be refitted, and in readiness
to proceed on service.
Inclosed is the return of the killed and wounded from the
different ships of the squadron. Amongst other valuable men I
have most sincerely to lament the loss of Mr. William Grave,
master of the Caesar. I cannot close this letter without
rendering the most ample justice to the great bravery of Captain
Ferris: the loss in his ship must have been very considerable
both in officers and men; but I have the satisfaction to be
informed that his Majesty has not lost so valuable an officer.
The Honourable Captain Dundas, of his Majesty's sloop the Calpe,
made his vessel as useful as possible, and kept up a spirited
fire on one of the enemy's batteries. I have also to express my
approbation of Lieutenant Janvrin, commander of the gun-boats;
who, having joined me with intelligence, served as volunteer on
board the Caesar.
I am,
Your most obedient servant,
JAS. SAUMAREZ.
To Evan Nepean, Esq. &c. &c. &c.
On the return of the squadron to the Mole of Gibraltar, the following
public order was issued by the Admiral.
Caesar, in Rosia Bay, 6th July 1801.
Rear-admiral Sir James Saumarez desires to express in the
strongest terms the high sense he entertains of the gallantry
and valiant conduct of all the captains, officers, and men
belonging to the squadron under his orders, in the attack made
this day on the enemy's ships and batteries; and, although the
result has not proved so successful as his expectations had
framed, he trusts that the glory they have acquired on this
occasion will ever be acknowledged by their country.
JAS. SAUMAREZ.
To the respective Captains.
The following addition to Sir James's despatch gives the account of
the capture of the Hannibal, from Captain Ferris, then a prisoner at
Algeziras.
Caesar, Gibraltar, 9th july 1801.
SIR,
I herewith enclose a letter from Captain Ferris of his Majesty's
late ship Hannibal, which I request you will please to lay
before their lordships; and I have only to express my deep
regret that his well-meant endeavours to bring his ship to close
action should have occasioned so severe a loss. I have the
honour to be, sir,
Your most obedient servant,
JAS. SAUMAREZ.
Evan Nepean, Esq. Admiralty.
Algeziras Bay, 7th July 1801.
SIR,
I have little more to tell you of the fate of his Majesty's ship
Hannibal than yourself must have observed; only, that from the
number of batteries, and ships' gun-boats, &c. we had to
encounter, our guns soon got knocked up; and I found it was
impossible to do anything, either for the preservation of the
ship, or for the good of the service. Our boats, sails, rigging,
and springs being all shot away, and having so many killed and
wounded, as will appear by the annexed list, I thought it
prudent to strike, and thereby preserve the lives of the brave
men that remained.
Had I been successful in the view before me previously to the
ship taking the ground, my praises of the conduct of my officers
and ship's company could not have exceeded their merits; but I
have, notwithstanding, the satisfaction to say, that every order
was obeyed and carried into execution with that promptitude and
alacrity becoming British officers and seamen.
I am, sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
S. FERRIS.
To Rear-admiral Sir James Saumarez.
It has now become necessary that we should notice a controversy which
has taken place between the authors of the different naval histories
on the subject of the Battle of Algeziras; and we have been led to
make minute inquiries, first, into the cause of the discrepancies of
the different accounts; and, secondly, into the truth, which we have
been the better able to do from our personal knowledge and recent
communication with some of the officers of the Hannibal and Caesar, on
whose veracity we can depend. We are happy to add that the result of
our inquiries has been satisfactory, and, we trust, will completely
clear up and reconcile the facts, while it will leave no reflection of
a dubious character on the conduct of the heroic commander of the
squadron.
It appears that no difference of opinion arose on this subject until
the court-martial of Captain Ferris, which took place on the 1st
September 1801, at Portsmouth, Rear-admiral Holloway president; when,
as usual on trials for the loss of a ship, Captain Ferris read his
narrative, which he begins thus:
"In giving a detail of the circumstances which led to the loss of his
Majesty's late ship Hannibal, I am sorry that, owing to my clerk being
killed, whose remarks were lost,[32] I cannot be so particular as to
the exact times of signals being made as I otherwise should have been;
but I shall state them to you to the best of my recollection."
[32] The captain's clerk is stationed in action to take minutes
of the events as they occur.
After this admission, is it not surprising that the controversy should
be mainly founded on the time at which the Hannibal struck her
colours? Captain Ferris says, "about two o'clock;" while by the log of
the Caesar the action had entirely ceased at thirty-five minutes past
one. It may be asked, why did not the court, which must have seen the
discrepancy between his narrative and the public and other documents
before it, inquire into the truth by requiring the evidence of the
officers and crew, none of whom were examined as to the time the ship
struck: but the duty of the court being confined to the trial of
Captain Ferris, his officers and crew, and it being (whether
supported or not) evident and notorious that they had defended their
ship to the last extremity, they had (unluckily for Sir James) nothing
to do but to pronounce an honourable acquittal.
The next contradiction which appears, relates to the boats which were
sent to the assistance of the Hannibal. Captain Ferris says, "The
Admiral, having previously made my signal of recall, sent a boat from
the Caesar, and another from the Venerable, to my assistance; but,
finding they could afford me none, I sent the Venerable's boat back,
and the crew of the Caesar in one of my own cutters, their pinnace
having been sunk by a shot alongside."
I am bound to say that this assertion is not borne out either by the
testimony of those who were in the boats of the Caesar and the
Venerable, or by the officers of the Hannibal; because, as will be
seen hereafter, these boats never reached the Hannibal, when aground,
until after she had struck her colours.
Captain Ferris next relates that "About twelve o'clock our ships were
all out of gun-shot of the enemy, and we had the fire of the whole
French squadron, batteries, and gun-boats, to contend with alone;
against which we continued to keep up as brisk a fire as could be
expected, even by men in the most sanguine anticipation of victory,
until near two o'clock."
Now this is quite impossible, as, by the log of every ship, the
squadron was engaging much later: by the Caesar, until 1h. 35m.; by the
Audacious, until 1h. 20m.; by the Venerable, until 1h. 30m. &c.;
before which, the ensign of the Hannibal was seen, from every ship,
_Union down_.
It has been unwarrantably alleged by some that the Hannibal hauled the
ensign down, and then hoisted it reversed, as a signal of distress,
and afterwards, when she struck, hauled it down; and that the French
hoisted it union down to decoy the Calpe. But, for the refutation of
these absurdities, we must refer the reader to the testimony of
Colonel Connolly, who was then acting captain of the marines, an
officer of the highest character, whose veracity cannot be questioned;
and who, moreover, from being the only officer on the poop when the
colours were struck, had a better opportunity of knowing the facts
than any other. The following are the questions which we put to
Colonel Connolly, with his answers, given verbatim:
Did the enemy take possession of the Hannibal before the colours
were hoisted union down?
The colours were hauled down by Captain Ferris's orders, and
remained so; but, being so near the Formidable, the captain of
her was on board of us in two minutes after we had struck, and
the colours were hoisted _union downwards_ by the Frenchmen.[33]
[33] When the French happen to take one of our men-of-war,
they do not, as we would do, hoist their own colours over
their opponents', but hoist the English ensign union
downwards. It so seldom happened that an English man-of-war
was taken by the French, that this circumstance was known to
very few in the navy, and consequently, the ensign reversed
was known only as the signal of distress used by
merchant-ships.
Were the colours hoisted union down by the enemy; or, at any
time, by Captain Ferris's orders?
By the enemy.
Did the boats come _before_ or _after_ the colours were hoisted
union downwards, to render her assistance?
The boats from our ships did not get near us till after we were
in possession of the enemy; and I called to an old shipmate of
mine in the Venerable's barge, and told him so, as he came under
the starboard quarter; but he persisted in coming on board, and
was taken.
What boats were taken; and what boats escaped?
A good many were taken. The Venerable's barge and her first
lieutenant; and another lieutenant, in the Caesar's boat, of some
ship lying at Gibraltar; beside the mids. I am not aware indeed
that any escaped.
What French officer took possession of the Hannibal?
I am not quite certain whether it was the captain of the
Formidable or the Dessaix; they were both very close to us:
however, he was a very little fellow.
To what prison were you taken?
The ship's company were divided into two prisons, which appeared
to have been stables. There was no water in one of them, and the
distress of our poor fellows, on that account, was truly
shocking: often, when they would give money to the people
outside to bring them some to drink, they would walk off with
it, and never bring the water.
On this occasion Colonel Connolly recognised a French officer who had
been a short time previously a prisoner on board the Warrior, to whom
he had been particularly civil, supplying him with linen, &c.; and who
left the ship with protestations of his desire to make every return in
his power, if the "fortune of war" should give him an opportunity: but
when he claimed the performance of his promise, his reply was,
"Monsieur de Connolly, I very sorry for your misfortune; but I wish
you good morning!" and left him with a sarcastic sneer.
It is evident, from this testimony, that the colours were only struck
once, and hoisted once union down, and only hoisted union down by the
Frenchmen; and that the boats of the Caesar and Venerable were only
once on board the Hannibal after she was aground; namely, when their
crews were taken prisoners. But both these boats were actually sent to
her assistance at a previous period, when the Hannibal was directed by
the Admiral to endeavour to obtain a position to rake the Formidable;
and it was then that they were sent back. Captain Brenton first
received the report of the Hannibal having her colours union downwards
between twelve and one, while the Caesar was engaging the island
battery, and the Dessaix and the Muiron.
The Caesar's boat was sent with others to the assistance of the
Hannibal, according to the log, at seventeen minutes past one, and
must have reached her certainly before the action ceased, and found
her in the hands of the enemy, as described by Colonel Connolly.
It is absurd to suppose that, while actually engaging the enemy,
Captain Ferris would haul down his colours, to hoist them as a signal
of distress, when he had other ensigns to hoist, and when there was a
signal in the book, "In distress, and in want of immediate
assistance:" this is a circumstance which, I will venture to assert,
never occurred in any naval action.
Captain Brenton, being decidedly of the same opinion, adds, "I can
only say, when it was reported to me, _while in action_, that the
Hannibal's colours were reversed, I considered her to be in possession
of the enemy: that the Admiral took the same view of the subject, I
have not the least doubt; and I think nothing would have induced him
to abandon the Hannibal while she was engaged. I will further add,
that I never remember the slightest doubt being expressed of the
Hannibal having struck before the action terminated, until I read the
narrative of Captain Ferris, at his court-martial, some time
afterwards."
The moment these champions of "liberte, egalite, et la mort," entered
the Hannibal, plunder was the order of the day; and, in their furious
haste to get at the officers' trunks, they cruelly trod over the
wounded in the cockpit and cable-tiers. Colonel Connolly relates that
in a few minutes one of them had taken his new cocked-hat, and
appeared on deck with it. He himself had given up seeking his desk,
which contained a considerable sum of money besides valuable papers,
because he could not get at it without creeping over the wounded; but
the French, not so particular, soon found it.
We shall now give the extracts of the various logs to which we have
had access. These have never yet been published, and we trust they
will set the matter at rest. It is some satisfaction indeed, that all
authors agree in declaring that nothing more could have been done, and
that the honour of the British flag was to the last gloriously
maintained on the 6th of July 1801.
Extract of the Caesar's log in the Battle of Algeziras, 5th July:
Winds S.W. and variable. At 12h. 30m. P.M. up mainsail and in
royals; at 2h. made the signal for the squadron to prepare for
battle, and, anchoring, bent the sheet cable through the
larboard gun-room port to the sheet anchor; at 4h. set
steering-sails,--fresh breezes and fair; at 8h. moderate
breezes,--Cape Moulinau E.N.E. seven or eight miles; at 12h.
(midnight), light airs inclinable to calm,--squadron in company,
Venerable S.S.E. one mile. At 12h. 30m. (6th), in
steering-sails, and at 12h. 40m. lowered down the yawl; at 3h.
45m. a breeze sprung up,--made the signal for attention; at 4h.
5m. beat to quarters,--Cabrita Point, S.E. by E. three or four
leagues,--made the Pompee's signal to close; at 5h. set
top-gallant steering-sails, and at 6h. the fore-top-mast
steering-sail; at 7h. 45m. made the Venerable's signal to haul
the wind,--took in the starboard steering-sails; at 8h. in
steering-sails; at 8h. 5m. in top-gallant sails,--made the
signal for being at liberty to engage the enemy in passing; at
8h. do. to take stations for mutual support; at 8h. 25m. set
top-gallant sails,--the enemy's ships opened their fire,--saw
the Venerable break round off,--Caesar fired at a Spanish battery
in passing; at 8h. 35m. the action commenced with the Pompee,
Venerable, and Audacious; at 8h. 45m. made the signal for the
ships astern to make more sail; at 9h. light breezes, and
variable,--opened our fire, and the engagement became general;
at 9h. 15m. passed the Venerable, and came to with the
sheet-anchor in nine fathoms,--the sheet-cable became
_taut_,--let go the best bower to steady the ship,--Spencer and
Hannibal passed under our lee,--hailed them to get the boats
ahead, and tow into action,--light airs; at 9h. 35m. the Spencer
opened her fire; at 9h. 40m. the Hannibal, do.--our spanker-boom
shot away; at 10h. 20m. sent boats to the Pompee and Hannibal;
at 10h. 26m. made the Hannibal's signal to tack,--saw the Pompee
had broke her sheer, apparently by a flaw of wind, and was raked
by the French Admiral; at 10h. 30m. made the Pompee's signal to
cut or slip; at 10h. 35m., a breeze springing up from the N.W.,
cut our cable, wore, and made sail, engaging the enemy's ships
while passing them; at 10h. 50m. the Hannibal opened her fire on
the French Admiral; at 10h. 52m. made the signal for the
squadron to come to,--the wind on the starboard tack; at 11h.
5m. made the signal for the boats to tow the Pompee,--Caesar
engaging the southernmost ships,--Audacious, ditto,--Caesar
opened her fire on the island battery,--Audacious and Caesar
becalmed near the island reef,--boats employed towing the ship's
head round; afternoon,--light winds and variable
weather,--engaging the enemy; at 12h. 33m. made the signal for
the Hannibal being aground,--employed engaging the southernmost
ship; at 1h. 17m. Audacious wore,--made the signal for
armed-boats to proceed as denoted; at 1h. 35m. the action
ceased,--found the main-mast shot through in five places, (and
other damage which need not be mentioned,) nine men killed,
twenty-five wounded, and seven missing; at 5h. came-to at
Gibraltar, with the small bower employed warping alongside of
the sheer hulk.
The Venerable's log, which we have examined at the depot at Deptford,
and which is signed by Captain Hood, fully corroborates the above,
with the addition,--"At 12h. 40m. sent the first lieutenant in the
pinnace to assist the Hannibal;" and this officer (Lieutenant Collis)
in his own journal mentions the same fact. When he arrived at the
Hannibal, she was in possession of the enemy; and he was taken
prisoner, with his boat's crew, by persisting to go on board after he
was warned by Lieutenant (now Colonel) Connolly, of the Marines. He
says it was in consequence of the ensign being reversed that the boats
were sent; and, before any of the boats reached her, she was in
possession of the French, who hoisted the colours union downwards
themselves, and that they never were hoisted in that manner at any
other time.
These facts are also corroborated by the logs and journals of the
Audacious and Spencer, which will be given in the next chapter. Every
ship, indeed, mentions the impossibility of affording any assistance
to the Hannibal, and that the signal was not made to leave off action
until her situation was utterly hopeless.
The nature of the well-protected road of Algeziras being fully
manifest in the diagram facing the 346th page, it is unnecessary to
point out the difficulties the squadron had to contend with from the
five strong batteries, which were served with much effect by the
French artillerymen. The numerous gun-boats stationed at Algeziras for
the annoyance of our commerce, were from their constant practice in
that kind of warfare, of themselves a most formidable enemy; besides,
the assistance they afforded in warping their ships in-shore, and
placing them in such a position as to enable the different batteries
to support them. But the failure of the attack must be mainly
attributed to the unsteadiness and faintness of the wind, which
enabled none of the squadron to obtain the position it wished; that
is, in-shore of the enemy: while, by falling calm at a moment the most
disadvantageous, it left the ships exposed to the enemy's fire without
the possibility of returning it.
The loss sustained by each ship was severe. The Caesar had her master,
Mr. William Grave, six seamen, and two marines, killed; her boatswain,
G.W. Forster, seventeen seamen, one boy, and six marines, wounded;
besides the capture of Lieutenant Janvarin, a volunteer, Mr. Richard
Best, and seven seamen, who were taken by boarding the Hannibal when
in possession of the enemy. Her masts, particularly the main-mast, and
yards, were very much injured; her boats were all cut to pieces,
besides that taken at the Hannibal; and there were many shots in her
hull. The Pompee had Mr. P. Roxborough, master, Mr. Stewart,
midshipman, ten seamen, and three marines killed; Lieutenants
Cheesman, Stapleton, and Innes, Messrs. Currie, Hillier, and Hibbert,
fifty-three seamen, and ten marines, wounded. She was so completely
damaged in masts, rigging, and sails, that all hope of refitting her
as promptly as the rest was at an end. The Spencer had Mr. Spencer, a
midshipman, and five seamen, killed; Mr. Chatterton, midshipman,
twenty-three seamen, and three marines wounded. She was damaged
chiefly in her rigging and sails, which were soon repaired. The
Venerable had Mr. W. Gibbons, midshipman, and eight seamen, killed;
Messrs. Austin and Collins, midshipmen, twenty seamen, and four
marines, wounded; and eight missing. The Hannibal had seventy-five
killed, among whom were Mr. D. Lindsay, clerk, and Lieut. James
Williams, R.M.; and seventy wounded and missing. The Audacious had
eight killed; Lieut. Day, of the Marines, thirty-one seamen and
marines, wounded. The total loss of the squadron being one hundred
and twenty-three killed, two hundred and forty-two wounded, and
twenty-two missing.
The loss of the French and Spaniards, by their own accounts, was
considerable; the former having three hundred and six killed,--among
whom were Captains Moncousu, of the Dessaix, seventy-four, and
Lalonde, of the Indomptable, eighty-four,--and near five hundred
wounded; five gun-boats were sunk, and others damaged; and the forts,
in which eleven men were killed, received considerable injury. The
ships suffered a good deal in hull, masts, and rigging; but not so
much as was anticipated.
The French, as might be expected, from their usual disregard to truth,
made this out one of the most brilliant exploits ever performed. Their
account stated that three French ships had completely beaten six
English, which took refuge in Gibraltar after leaving the Hannibal in
their possession, &c.; saying nothing of the heavy batteries and
gun-boats they had to contend with. But the Spaniards, in the Madrid
Gazette extraordinary, represented the "action as very obstinate and
bloody on both sides; and likewise on the part of the batteries, which
decided the fate of the day:" and in another place, "the fire of our
batteries was so hot and well supported that the enemy suffered most
from them; and particularly it is to the St. Jago we owe the capture
of the English ship, for her bold manoeuvre of attempting to pass
between the French Rear-admiral's ship, the Formidable, and the shore,
made her take the ground; and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions to
get her afloat, it was found impossible to move her. Then the fire
from the battery very soon dismasted her, and compelled her to
strike."[34]
[34] James, vol. iii. p. 120.
The diagram, besides pointing out the situations of the five strong
batteries, which so completely protect the harbour, and which did the
greatest execution, shows the first position of the ships about the
time they all anchored, and before the enemy's ships had warped near
the shore. The second, represented by the outlines, shows the
situation of the hostile squadrons at the time the Hannibal struck,
when the Pompee had nearly reached the Mole, the distance of which
from Algeziras is little more than four miles, and the Spencer was
considerably advanced in that direction.
We cannot conclude our account of this action without a few remarks on
the circumstances we have related. There cannot be a doubt that, had
the enemy remained in the position he held at the commencement of the
action, every ship would have been taken. Praise is certainly due to
Admiral Linois for his able manoeuvre of warping his ships aground,
being the only chance he had of escaping; while it was acknowledging
that, as long as his ships were continued afloat, he had no confidence
in protection from the batteries, strong as they were, against the
valour and perseverance of British seamen.
Although the attack was not crowned with the success it merited, in a
national point of view the result was as complete as if the whole
squadron had been destroyed, as the enemy were thereby prevented from
proceeding further in the execution of the ulterior object of their
expedition; and the chance of this alone was sufficient to justify Sir
James in this bold and daring attempt, which, it will be seen,
ultimately led to one of the most glorious achievements which adorn
the annals of the empire.[35]
[35] The discrepancies between the diagram and _some_ of the
statements given in the logs, are easily accounted for by the
changes which took place in the positions of the ships during
the action.