It is conceded on all sides that, next to the capacity of the American

people for self-government, the United States owe it primarily to the

happy blending of the principles of National Union and State Independence

that, taking all in all, hitherto their history has been the most

striking and convincing vindication of republican institutions; and

it is hardly questioned that, but for the happy blending of these two

principles, a republic comprising half the North American continent and

possessed of all the requisites of vitality never would nor could have

existed. Upon their being “an indestructible Union of indestructible

States,” the vitality of the United States absolutely depends. That,

with this principle as the foundation, the domain of a republic _can_

be almost indefinitely extended, without thereby destroying its vital

energies, has been irrefutably demonstrated. But does that mean, that

the United States have definitively solved the problem of keeping the

vital forces of a republic covering a vast area unimpaired? By no means.

Only the preliminary question has been settled by them for all time to

come, what the indispensable prerequisite of its solution is, and they

have thus far succeeded in preserving their vitality. But even as to

themselves, the solution of the problem itself has to be repeated over

and over again, not only by generation after generation, but every year

and every day. The hour never will, never can come, when the American

people can, with impunity, say: the task is accomplished; let us rest

and enjoy the fruits. It never can come, because the problem itself is

in a continuous state of transformation. Though the changes be so slow,

that they are imperceptible to the keenest eye trying to follow them up

from year to year, they are none the less real, and if they are not duly

heeded, the penalty will have to be paid some time in one way or another.

While the fundamental principle, the blending of National Union and

State Independence, is irreversible, the attempt to make its application

immutable, would be fatal. I say the attempt, for actually to do it, is,

in the nature of things, impossible. The American people are not only

constitutionally a nation. The civil war did not result in the permanent

disruption of the Union, but in welding it more indissolubly together,

because, with the single exception of slavery, the facts coincided with

the law. In spite of the tremendous sectionalising influence exercised

by slavery, the nationalisation in feeling, thinking, and interests had

made such progress under the operation and protection of the law of the

land, that it could stand as severe a test, as any consolidated State can

boast of having stood. The causes, to which it was due, that the facts

were in conformity with the law, have been ever since unremittingly at

work,—the counter-tendencies have disappeared with the abolishment of

slavery,—and, independent of that, those causes are every year acquiring

a greater force. The actual nationalisation, therefore, goes steadily on,

whether we like it or not, and though the constitutional nationalisation

be allowed to remain unchanged. While the legal status under the

Constitution may not be altered for ever so long, we are confronted by

constantly changing conditions. If we do not conform in what we do and

leave undone to the irrepressible changes of this evolutionary process,

the maintenance of the principle of blending National Union and State

Independence will avail us but little. The vital energies will dry up

and ebb away, for while we have kept the form, we have become strangers

to the spirit which renders it a magic force. Nor ought the dividing

line between political parties to run, as in days of yore, on the

question of State rights and consolidation. All discriminating patriots

must be as well State rights men as consolidationists, respectively

conscious supporters and promoters of further nationalisation. Where and

how ought State independence to be strengthened, so as to prevent an

over-consolidation by the silent working of those nationalising causes,

which it is impossible to stem? and: Where and how ought consolidation,

respectively nationalisation, to be promoted, in order to make the

working of those nationalising causes conducive to the true interests

of the people and to the invigorating of republican institutions? These

are the two questions which the American people have constantly to ask

themselves. On the discretion and discernment displayed in trying to find

the correct answers must it depend, whether the federative principle will

work as well in the future, as it has done in the past.

If these propositions must be admitted, it can be proved that in no

respect is conscious and systematic nationalisation more imperatively

needed than in regard to education. At first sight this assertion may

seem worse than extravagant. I am, however, not afraid to submit my case

to the jury of the American people, if I am but conceded the legal right

of every criminal, to be heard ere I am judged.

Education is the bed-rock on which this republic rests. However

excellent its political institutions be, its decay and ultimate

downfall is inevitable, if the people fail to do their full duty by

themselves in this respect. For, in a democratic republic, political

institutions are live forces only so far as the people have the mental

and moral requirements for working them well, and these mental and moral

requirements can be attained only by education. It is, therefore, in the

strictest sense of the word, a _vital_ question for the republic that

every one of its sons and daughters receive not only some schooling, but

that the education of all be proper and adequate. That is a tremendous

task. It constantly grows in scope and intricacy, and at the same time,

it becomes of more and more import that it be well accomplished. With

the people rests the ultimate decision in everything, and the problems

confronting the commonwealth are assuming more and more a character,

taxing the highest statesmanship to the utmost. Thus the claims upon

the intelligence and the moral soundness of the people are fast being

strained far beyond anything ever known by any former generation in this

or any other country. And lack of the required intelligence and moral

soundness in any one State necessarily affects the whole Union. A State

that is derelict to its duty in the education of its people, wrongs not

only itself, but also the nation. By its share in the federal government,

every State is directly instrumental in laying down the law for the whole

country. All the States are thereby made to participate in the payment

of the penalty for its intellectual and moral deficiencies. This is,

however, by no means the only way in which they are made to suffer by

them. What the law does with regard to everything rendered federal by the

Constitution; commerce, travel, and interchange of population do in other

respects. They are unremittingly and with ever increasing intensity at

work, multiplying and rendering more close the organic relations between

all the parts of the vast domain, every water-way, railroad-track, and

telegraph line performing the functions of the veins in the animal

organism. If the blood be poisoned in one limb, the virus cannot be

prevented from working its way into the whole system.

To admit that education is in the highest degree a national

_interest_, and to deny its being a national _concern_, is, however, a

self-contradiction. To contest either the right or the duty of a nation

to acknowledge every national interest a national concern, and to deal

with it accordingly, is a palpable absurdity. Not as to the Whether, but

only as to the How, can the people be restricted by the Constitution. A

constitution imposing upon the people an injunction to minister to the

needs of the commonwealth, would be as great a political monstrosity as a

constitution providing for the dissolution of the state.

This doctrine will not be allowed to pass unchallenged. I shall be

asked whether I set myself against the universally accepted fundamental

principle of American constitutional law, that the federal government

has no powers but those granted to it by the Constitution. I do not.

“Where, then,” my interlocutor will go on, “do you find the express grant

or the implied power?” Nowhere. “Then you advocate a constitutional

amendment to the effect indicated by you?” I do not. I know that such an

amendment could not get the vote of a single state, and if there were a

possibility of its being adopted by the constitutional number of states,

I should be found, to the last, among those fighting it tooth and nail.

I can hardly conceive of a more suicidal measure than the adoption of

such an amendment. Just because education is the bed-rock on which the

republic rests, is it of vital importance that it does not become a

federal affair. Self-reliance and responsibility are the main pillars

supporting a democratic commonwealth. Kill, in the people of a state

and the population of its subdivisions, the habit of self-reliance and

the sense of responsibility in regard to the substratum of the whole

political and social structure, and they will wither and shrivel up in

regard to everything else. The compulsion to tax themselves directly for

the establishment and maintenance of schools and the being in close touch

with those entrusted with the direction of the educational work are an

inestimable boon to the people.

Even if it were economically possible to do without direct taxes,

political reasons would peremptorily forbid their abolishment. On

account of their moral effect, no state could dispense with them, and

least of all a democracy. All indirect taxes are paid more or less

unconsciously; the people, however, must be kept conscious that the

public purse means their own pockets. The more they lose sight of

this, the wider the door is opened to paternalism, and paternalism is

a more deadly enemy of liberty than despotism and tyranny. These, if

any vitality be left in the people, ultimately kindle the desire for

liberty, while paternalism acts upon it as an opiate and ends by killing

it through the systematic enervation of self-government. If this is

to be kept alive not only in form, but also in essence and in spirit,

the people must constantly be held to teach themselves in illustrating

by their own acts the irrefutable truth, that not the rights, but the

self-imposed duties are the vital principle of true democracy. Nothing,

however, is more apt to drive this all-important fact irresistibly

home, implanting it ineradicably in their whole feeling and in their

conscious thinking, than the necessity to vote, as directly as possible,

out of their own pockets the money required for preserving intact and

in vigor the prerequisite of _all_ that is needed for the preservation

of the nation’s vitality. If it be not deemed irreverent, I should

say that every dollar a man voluntarily votes out of his pocket to

provide for the educational needs of the community, preaches to him a

political “Sermon on the Mount.” “Liberty and self-government,” it says,

“must be paid for;—state and society are in their very essence ethical

conceptions;—they must totter, fall, and crumble to pieces, unless

they rest on an ethical foundation;—to preserve, broaden, and deepen

this foundation, by providing for the required intellectual and moral

equipment of the generations in whose hands the future destinies of the

commonwealth will lie, is the paramount duty of the people;—no one has

the right to exempt himself from doing his share in the fulfilment of

this duty, for the heirloom of the past, enjoyed by the present, is but a

trust to be left, with accrued interest, to the future;—the fulfilment of

this duty ought to be considered rather a privilege than a sacrifice, for

every farthing paid for the maintenance of the humblest village school is

an integral part of the nation’s life-insurance premium;—glory in this

responsibility to the whole country, for it constitutes you, with the

wealthiest and mightiest, a joint builder of its greatness;—glory in thus

bearing witness by the fruit of the sweat of your brow, that you, too,

are sworn in on the creed that man does not live by bread alone;—glory in

and render thanks for being thus held to keep ablaze in your own bosom

and help kindle in the bosom of the lowliest child of the community, the

sacred fire of idealism.”

That by many, perhaps by most people, this appeal is not heard in

distinct words, I do not contest. But that is no reason to make light of

it. Utterly lost it never is. Something of it sinks into the mind even

of the dullest and most hard-hearted, though it be but in the form of

a faint and vague feeling. To make them lose this, is to deprive them

of the best they have. Democracy is not a mill-pond, on which a fragile

boat can outride the wildest tempest. It is the open sea, on which the

proudest and stoutest craft is sure to be swamped, sooner or later,

if it be not properly ballasted. True idealism, however, never was a

more essential part of the ballast, than in these times and in this

country. It stands more in need of it than any other state, because its

unparalleled opportunities are appallingly powerful incentives to plunge

headlong into the materialistic tendencies of the age. Therefore, it is

ruthless to lay hands on anything tending to keep alive and foster true

idealism in the people. For this reason it would be, in my opinion,—not

in intention, but in effect,—a dastardly crime, under any plea whatever,

to release the people from the obligation to provide in their local

organisations for the education of their youths.

Therefore, I even deem it upon the whole more beneficial than detrimental

that many of the higher and most of the highest educational institutions

of the country are the free gift of high-minded men and women to the

people. I have never agreed with those who have contended in this country

that the duty of the commonwealth does not extend beyond providing for

primary and, at the most, to some extent for secondary education, and

that it would not be fair and proper to tax all for the establishment

and maintenance of colleges and universities, which, in the nature of

the case, only a small minority can frequent. It would be hard to name

a more promising sign of the times, than that this doctrine has of late

lost so much of its former hold upon public opinion, that one would

have to search long for an advocate of it in its original rigor. It

is eminently in the interest of all, that there be an ample number of

men and women who have received the highest education. Therefore, it

is evidently not only justified, but imperative, that the commonwealth

furnish the means for supplying its want. But if the views held in this

respect on the continent of Europe had prevailed in the United States,

the American people would have been the poorer of one of the vastest and

most grateful fields for manifesting idealistic public-spiritedness. An

inestimable loss, for idealistic public-spiritedness is not the least of

the causes to which it is due that American democracy has stood the test;

and idealistic public-spiritedness, like every virtue, grows stronger and

more fruitful by being practised. Every donation for educational purposes

prompts others to follow suit, and is, apart from its direct beneficent

effects, a most valuable object-lesson to the whole nation. With equal

impressiveness, the rich and the poor are reminded of the treasures which

“neither moth nor rust doth corrupt.” On every educational institution

brought into existence in such a way are indelibly inscribed the two

magic words to which this country owes it greatness: Help yourself,

and Public Spirit; every one of them is a living protest, as well

against paternalism—whether it present itself in the socialistic or

in any other garb—as against the setting up of the golden calf as the

idol of the republic. Therefore, everything tending to seriously check

these manifestations of idealism and public spirit in regard to higher

education would be deplorable, even if it were in itself commendable, for

paternalism and materialism are too rampant to leave anything undone that

is calculated to keep them down.

To contend that the existing decentralisation in regard to education must

be done away with, would, for these reasons, be a truly Quixotic charge

upon windmills: the venture must result in broken bones. It cannot, and,

if it could, ought not to be done, for this decentralisation is the

natural outgrowth of the whole historical development of the commonwealth

and in perfect accordance with the underlying principle of its political

and social structure. But it would be strange logic to conclude from

this that it can have worked no harm, or that the evil consequences it

may have had cannot be remedied. Can it be denied that, apart from the

primary schools, it sounds almost like mockery to speak of an American

system of education? If we look at the schools of a higher grade, we are

confronted by a bewildering chaos, and the nearer the top, the worse the

confusion becomes. That the effects of this are not altogether good, will

be universally admitted, though opinions will differ as to the weight

that ought to be attached to the bad consequences in the aggregate and

severally. To me, some of them seem to be of a very serious character,

and I hold that they must from year to year become of more consequence.

To say that somebody has been through a “high school,” does not convey

sufficiently definite information as to either the kind or the amount of

instruction he has received. To know that somebody is a graduate of an

“academy,” a “college,” a “university,” means to know next to nothing as

to his mental equipment. To gauge our man, we must inquire, What academy,

what college, what university? Having learned that, we are in hundreds

of cases not a whit wiser than before. We have to ask for the calendar

of the institution, and, after having read that, we shall often be still

pretty much at sea, for, as the Germans say, “paper is patient,” and the

printing of a first-class programme implies by no means of necessity

first-class instruction. This may be considered by some of little or no

moment, because the degrees confer no rights whatever. But they are,

nevertheless, not senseless gewgaws. If they be deemed such, their

abolishment must be insisted upon, for then they are as much out of place

in this country as orders or other meaningless titles. They are intended

to be certificates of knowledge and mental training. If they lose this

character, they are nothing, or worse than nothing. It is, however,

self-evident that they must be deprived of this character, exactly to

the extent that the educational institutions bearing the same name and

conferring the same degrees differ from each other. Do you not think it

more than likely that, if a law were passed making it obligatory to add

to the letters indicating a degree the name of the institution by which

it was conferred, an astounding number of ornamental tails to names would

be cut off forever?

This would not be done, if the degrees merely failed to be definite and

reliable certificates of knowledge and mental training. They do positive

harm, because the institutions conferring them have little more in common

than the name, their educational standard differing in the extremes,

as much as the crippled shrub and the sturdy oak. While the public do

not know what value to attach to the degree, a large percentage of the

recipients are betrayed into offensive and pernicious self-deception.

Upon the official averment of their _alma mater_, they lay the flattering

unction to their soul that they have received a much better intellectual

outfit than they really possess. These institutions practically reverse

the precept of the Greek sage: not “know thyself,” but “deceive thyself”

is the maxim imprinted on their diplomas. And this self-deception is a

subtle, contagious virus. It is at least doubtful, whether more will

take warning by looking through the false pretense, or be lured by it

into the same mistaken notions as to the requirements of genuine higher

education. To have practically no fixed standards for the different

grades of higher education must as inevitably have mischievous effects

upon the intellectual life of a people, as its economic life must be

demoralised by allowing everybody to coin money of the same outward

appearance, but of any alloy he pleases. Not that harm has been done by

the almost unlimited freedom enjoyed by the educational institutions

owing their existence to private munificence, is to be wondered at; it

is astonishing that the deleterious effects have not been much worse.

A premium is offered for sailing under a false flag. If a college may

be called a university, and an academy a college, it would be more

than surprising if the grander name were not frequently preferred, for

it flatters alike the vanity of the donors, the instructors, and the

pupils, and will—with more or less reason—be expected to work as a bait.

With the name goes the right to confer degrees, and the exercising of

this privilege is to serve the same purposes. But the name renders it

necessary to keep up appearances, and that is an expensive pleasure. The

masquerading in a pretentious guise cuts down the allowance of wholesome

food. Worthless universities instead of good colleges, inferior colleges

instead of satisfactory academies and fitting schools, are but too often

the result. No name will deprive the rose of its sweet scent; but the

buttercup cannot, with impunity, call itself a rose.

The worst, however, is, that even the best institutions of the higher

order are made to pay a heavy penalty for the shortcomings of those of

the lower rank. Not getting the proper material, they do not turn out

as good work as they in themselves might do. Much valuable time, which

ought to be devoted to going on with the building, must be spent in

mending and strengthening the deficient foundation, which, after all,

does not acquire the requisite solidity, because mending is necessarily

patchwork. Nor is the damage confined to the pupils that have been sent

up from inefficient schools. These act as a drag upon those who have

come adequately prepared. To render matters worse, the deficiencies are

neither the same with all, nor is it known beforehand where they will be

found and how far they will extend. Neither are the curricula the same,

nor is there any guaranty that the same curriculum means the same work

done. Here so many things have been taught, that everything has suffered

in regard to thoroughness. There, specialisation has commenced so early,

that the basis is too narrow and too shallow. Training for a special

purpose has encroached upon education. All these difficulties greatly

hamper the institution. But they do more. They exercise a strong pressure

upon it to stray from the right path, for they are powerful incentives to

yield to the evil tendency, more to measure, than to weigh the work done.

This is, in my opinion, the most deplorable of all the bad consequences

which the lack of a uniform system, resulting from the decentralisation

of education, has thus far had; and it is all the more dangerous, because

the measuring principle is so well fitted to be clad in the seductive

garb of a lucid and clear-cut system.

I do not expect that every one of my propositions will be universally

assented to. But can any unprejudiced observer dispute that there is

enough truth in what I have said to prompt the people seriously to

ponder the question, where this is going to end? If no conscious,

energetic, and concerted effort be made to counteract the evil effects

of decentralisation, the very fact of higher education having assumed

such a kaleidoscopic character renders inevitable its becoming more

and more kaleidoscopic. The founders, boards of trustees, presidents,

and faculties of new institutions are almost compelled to give their

individual notions on higher education, to a dangerous extent,

free scope. Having a hundred different patterns presented to their

consideration, the temptation is well-nigh irresistible not to adopt any

one of them, but to devise a new one. A new experimenting laboratory is

set up. That its experiments will be, positively or negatively, of some

value, is to be supposed. In most cases, however, the public interest

would have been better served by a good factory, renouncing the risky

ambition of dabbling with new inventions.

The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 · 第 50 / 65 段