just as well to regress as to progress. Evolution is too often confounded
with progress, but degeneration is just as truly evolutional as is the
contrary movement, and, looking the facts of existence in the face,
mankind has no assurance of any unchangeable course of betterment. The
principles of morals are, however, not dependent upon the benign action
of nature. When the earth’s stock of fuel shall become exhausted, or
when the ice age returns, or when the sun grows cold, there will be no
alteration thereby in the moral law. Good and evil must and will be
the same under all circumstances, and no system of ethics is nor can
be anything but a temporary makeshift, that does not as well fit the
_diastoles_ as it does the _systoles_ of existence. We must look for
a doctrine that shall inform the conduct of men not only for the fore
part of the day, when all is jubilant and bounding and man asks only
for some good task to do, but also for the evening and night, when man
grows weary and craves for rest; for not only youth and maturity, but for
waning strength, old age, and death; for not only the progressive era of
cosmic history, but for the periods when natural conditions may disfavor
mankind, when, say, man may gradually be so reduced in resources that
the same will barely suffice for simple life-preservation; when under
the stress of natural conditions the human intellect, in the course of
generations, becomes step by step eliminated; when indeed humanity itself
tends perhaps slowly, but with certainty, towards permanent extinction.
They who complacently protest that the theory of evolution leaves the
domain of moral science substantially unaffected are surely in great
default either in their comprehension of the nature and implications
of that theory, or in their powers of circumspection, while those who
suppose that moral science becomes evolutional simply because of a little
application of that theory to some of the subordinate questions that are
involved, show themselves in a plight as bad as the others if not worse.
Our author notices without dissent, and even with seeming concurrence,
the various remarks made by many of the writers reviewed by him in
discredit of teleology.
Since as we have before protested the theory of evolution forbids all
suppositions of any ends that are absolutely final, it of course follows
that teleology is in the strictness of its meaning inadmissible, even
in ethics. But in dismissing teleology, let us not pour out the child
with the bath. However it ought to be with the interpretation of the
order of nature as a speculative exercise, something that is analogous
to teleology is an absolute necessity if ethics is to be anything more
than a curious study of human practise. The universe may manifest no
purpose, design or secular tendency, but man is and can be nothing but a
miserable estray on the ocean of existence unless he sails on a course,
instead of merely drifting. To do this he must take something by which to
steer, and any plausible stability is better than no bearings whatever.
At any rate man is insuperably drawn to thus mark out his course. If the
theory of evolution forbids him to suppose any ends that are absolutely
final, it does not prevent him from ascertaining directions. Indeed
evolution affords him data of the very first importance for that behoof.
Instead of ends we have aims and if ethics is to become that counsel and
guide to humanity, which we yearn for so anxiously, it must ascertain
and certify that single paramount aim to which all other tendencies are
naturally subsidiary. Teleology, or rather the determination of the aim
of evolution, must prepare the foundation before any evolutional ethics
that is worthy the name can be established.
Again our author with considerable debate notices the remarks of
the writers reviewed by him on the old question of free will and
necessity,—but like the positing of some end or aim to be subserved,
free will is one of the presuppositions of ethics. When man begins to
debate the possibility of rightly ascertaining the true end or aim for
his pursuit, or when he begins to moot the question of free will, he
is debating not any question of ethics proper, but only whether such a
science is possible. Unless conditions and events are functions, as well
of man’s personality as of his environment; unless persons count for
something in the variations of the course of nature, it is altogether
vain and idle to be troubled with questions of morality.
Free will and somewhat to be achieved are principles which whether well
or ill founded, ethics proper must take for granted before it has or can
have any _raison d’être_. As for free will, however the metaphysicians
may have stumbled over their own feet, the common sense of mankind has
never wavered. As a practical question (and ethics is pre-eminently a
matter of practice) this question is not an open one.
But on the question of what is the true paramount aim for man to pursue,
the decision that shall finally satisfy man is yet to be made. The best
proof that no satisfactory answer has yet been made is the fact that
we are still seeking an answer. As with regard to the needful prime
condition for a truly evolutional ethics we found wisdom in the poetical
insight, so again in this exigency we personally find the most profound
ethical philosophy in that same insight.
“’Tis Life of which our nerves are scant.
’Tis Life, not death for which we pant,
More Life, and fuller that we want.”
FRANCIS C. RUSSELL.
DER PESSIMISMUS IM LICHTE EINER HÖHEREN WELTAUFFASSUNG. By _Dr. J.
Friedländer_ and _Dr. M. Berendt_. Berlin W.: S. Gerstmann. 1893.
The authors’ aim is the refutation of pessimism and the foundation of
a higher world-conception. This latter is a pantheism spiritualised
by moral ideals and contrasted to Darwinism and materialism. Natural
science is said to be the surrounding walls of the new view, furnishing
(1) negative truths of criticism and (2) a knowledge of the positive
features of nature. The negative truths are: the impossibility of the
existence of a personal God, of the efficiency of prayer, of miracles,
of the immortality of the soul, of the separate existence of souls
without bodies. The positive results of natural science are the unity
of nature, the indestructibility of nature, the harmony of the All,
the indivisibility of nature, the irrefragable necessity of natural
processes according to immutable laws, and the freedom or independence of
nature, as having its cause in itself, uncreated and uninfluenced by any
extramundane being.
Natural science alone, according to the authors, is not sufficient to
constitute the new world-conception. A one-sided view of natural science
together with the obsolete conceptions of theism are exactly what has
brought forth the philosophical pessimism of our time. Natural science,
accordingly, is not to be regarded as the sole source of truth; it is
to be corrected by pantheism. The former teaches us “to regard matter
and its motion, so to say, as a dead inert substance to which motion is
attached; it treats matter as an immediate reality. Pantheism, however,
teaches that matter is to be conceived as the interrelation of the
innumerable live acts of will appearing successively in time and side
by side in space,” etc. The authors point out that the necessity of law
which regulates the mechanical processes of nature does not exclude
freedom; for “freedom is not arbitrariness but is controlled by an
immanent _Gesetzmässigkeit_.”
This summary is sufficient to characterise the ideas of the Drs.
Friedländer and Berendt. We cannot say that they admit of no criticism,
(e. g. their conception of natural science must be pronounced as too
narrow if not actually erroneous, nor should the law of the survival
of the fittest be interpreted in the sense that strength means brutal
force,) but we can, nevertheless, express our sympathy with the aim of
the authors as well as with the spirit in which they pursue it.
κρς.
DIE PHILOSOPHIE UND DIE SOCIALE FRAGE. By _Gustav Engel_. Leipsic: C. E.
M. Pfeffer. 1892.
ACHT ABHANDLUNGEN, HERRN PROFESSOR DR. KARL LUDWIG MICHELET ZUM 90.
GEBURTSTAG ALS FESTGRUSS DARGEREICHT VON MITGLIEDERN DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN
GESELLSCHAFT. Leipsic: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1892.
WIE STEHT ES JETZT MIT DER PHILOSOPHIE, UND WAS HABEN WIR VON IHR ZU
HOFFEN? By _Dr. Wilhelm Paszkowski_. Halle a. S.: F. Beyer, 1892.
This lecture by the well-known writer on the science of statistics
and its related subjects was read before the Philosophical Society of
Berlin on the 31st of May, 1890. It discusses the problem of socialism,
or rather the aspirations of the German social democracy from the
philosophical point of view of the lecturer, which is a modernised
Hegelianism. This lecture drew forth on the evening of its delivery
considerable discussion, which was participated in by Herr Kahle, a
socialist, and Herr Runze. The discussions of these gentlemen, together
with Mr. Engel’s reply, are embodied in the pamphlet.
The second of these two pamphlets is also a publication of the
Philosophical Society of Berlin. It consists of eight treatises, essays,
or lectures, which were presented by the members of the society to Prof.
Karl Ludwig Michelet as a festival gift on his ninetieth natal day. The
authors of these eight essays are: Adolf Lasson, August Cieszkowski,
Gustav Engel, Friedrich Kirchner, Wilhelm Paszkowski, Max Runze, Georg
Ulrich, and F. Zelle. They deal with philosophical subjects, chiefly such
as pertain to the Hegelian philosophy. Appended to the pamphlet is a
bibliography of the writings of this Nestor of the Philosophical Society
by F. Ascherson.
The author of the third pamphlet complains about the decay of philosophy:
“Metaphysics, the inner fane in the temple of science, stands desolate,”
and the last disciples of Hegel can no longer prevent the deluge which
sweeps away the idealism of their grand old master.
κρς.
DER MATERIALISMUS, EINE VERIRRUNG DES MENSCHLICHEN GEISTES, WIDERLEGT
DURCH EINE ZEITGEMÄSSE WELTANSCHAUUNG. By _Dr. Eugen Dreher_. Berlin: S.
Gerstmann. 1892.
The author of this pamphlet, at present a docent at the University of
Halle, feels somewhat oppressed by the materialistic tendencies of our
times. His desire is to establish in the world a province of the ideal,
and this domain of idealistic aspirations and hopes, he says, must and
can be based upon a scientific foundation. To reach this goal, the author
propounds a philosophy which is confessedly dualistic, and which must be
made a kind of religion. Descartes’s _Cogito, ergo sum_, is to him the
beginning of all philosophy. The existence of the All is devoid of sense,
unless there is an ego to think it. This dualism, if made a religion,
will throw light upon the problems of the labyrinth of life.
The aspirations of the author are serious and noble. We cannot, however,
agree with the results of his reasonings. He does not seem to have
considered Kant’s objections to the fallacy of the _cogito, ergo “ego”
sum_. Nor is he familiar with Lichtenberg’s famous remark, that “we
should say by rights ‘it thinks,’ exactly as we say ‘it rains.’” The
same moral conclusions at which the author arrives may be reached, the
same province for ideal aspirations in the world may be gained, the same
religious comfort may be found, without any surrender of the monistic
view of the world. Materialism is an error of human thought. But the
error cannot be cured by dualism.
κρς.
UEBER DIE GRUNDFORMEN DER VORSTELLUNGSVERBINDUNG. Psychologische Studie.
By _Max Offner_. Marburg: R. Friedrich. 1892.
This little brochure is a carefully worked out study of the phenomena of
association. The author’s view is summed up in the following statement:
“The attempt to reduce the phenomena of association, in conformity with
their real nature, to one single ultimate process cannot be regarded as
successful, and we shall have to control our aspirations after a unitary
conception and rest satisfied with reducing the various phenomena of
association to two processes which are closely related, namely: (1) to
an association of simultaneity; and (2) to an association of immediate
succession.” There is much that is suggestive in the sixty-seven pages of
this pamphlet.
κρς.
FINITE HOMOGENEOUS STRAIN, FLOW, AND RUPTURE OF ROCKS. Bulletin of
the Geological Society of America. By _George F. Becker_. Rochester:
Published by the Society. 1893.
This is a purely technical research, concerning the causes and form of
the discontinuity of rock masses. The studies presented are the outgrowth
of field-work in the Sierra Nevada of California. This range is so
intersected by false joints, schistose and slaty cleavages, that on a
scale of one mile to the inch their average separation would be for the
most part microscopic. The dynamic manifestations in these regions are
very systematic. Some of the strains which have produced this phenomenon
have been infinitesimal, and others have been finite. Only the latter
are here treated. Finite strain, the relations of stress to strain,
the nature of finite shear, viscosity, flow, plasticity, ductility,
and rupture, the relation of plastic solids to fluids, the spacing of
fissures formed by inclined pressures, jointing, and slaty cleavage,
are the chief subjects discussed. The most important result of the
investigation is that jointing, schistosity, and slaty cleavage all imply
relative movement and are thus as truly orogenic as falls of notable
throw. “In the light of this conclusion,” says the author, “it appears
that if one could reproduce the orogeny of the Sierra in a moderate
interval of time on a model made to a scale of one mile to the inch, it
would seem to yield to external and bodily forces much like a mass of
lard of the same dimensions.”
This pamphlet is neatly got up, and reflects credit upon the author and
publisher.
μκρκ.
DER ECHTE UND DER XENOPHONTISCHE SOKRATES. By _Karl Joël_. Volume I.
Berlin: R. Gaertner. 1893.
There are two sources from which we have derived the main bulk of
our knowledge concerning Socrates; namely, the writings of Plato and
Xenophon. The former is generally regarded as an idealiser, and the
latter as an historical biographer; for Plato simply uses the impressive
figure of Socrates to expound his own philosophy, while Xenophon, the
general, the politician, the historian, is supposed to give in the
“Memorabilia” a simple and faithful account of what appeared to him
worthy of being preserved. As Xenophon was not a philosopher himself, it
is tacitly assumed that he had no reason to alter, to suppress, or to add
his own personal views to the historical account of the great master whom
he bore in grateful remembrance as a faithful disciple. There are some
other sources; but they are less rich than those of Plato and Xenophon.
Among them must be mentioned several passages in Aristotle, especially in
“Magna Moralia” I, p. 1182, a 15. Our author urges with good reason that
the Xenophontic Socrates is radically different from and even opposed
to the real Socrates, and that we ought to rely more on Aristotle than
on Xenophon. Xenophon’s “Memorabilia,” Karl Joël declares, is not an
historical writing but a _Tendenzschrift_, and we have to be on our guard
wherever Xenophon’s special tendency comes in.
Socrates is the representative of the philosophical spirit of Attica,
and the character of his teachings may in a word be described as a noble
and sublimated subjectivism. Socrates is a rationalist and as such he
opposes the mysticism of the soothsayer and mantic. He goes so far in his
rationalism as to identify knowledge and virtue. He cannot understand,
from his point of view, (which regards the soul as a rational being
only and leaves out of sight the existence of impulses,) that a man can
knowingly neglect to choose the better thing and choose the worse. Plato,
in order to avoid the error of Socrates, invented the distinction between
the rational and irrational part of the soul and Aristotle criticises
Socrates saying τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐποίει.
The subjectivism of Socrates appears in his trust in the δαιμόνιον, the
divine voice within his soul, his rationalism in his constant request
to gather information before beginning to act. He exhibits in his talks
great irony; for instance, when telling a politician that as a shoemaker
must know his trade before making shoes, so he, the politician, ought to
know _his_ business before undertaking to manage affairs of state. Again
and again he satirises the bungling levity of men who imagine that in the
greatest and gravest things of life they can act without any information.
Both the subjectivism and rationalism of Socrates appear in his constant
inculcation of the Delphian motto “know thyself.”
What a different character is Xenophon! He was a convinced believer in
manticism. There are more than a hundred passages in his writings in
which not rational forethought but the art of the soothsayer is left
to decide the most important questions of practical life. When the
courageous ten thousand offered him the leadership in their dangerous
retreat, his ambition urged him to accept, but he first asks the God,
and the omens being unfavorable, he refuses. He did not accept the offer
until he had received another more auspicious omen. In the same way
Xenophon acts throughout. All important decisions which prudence would
urge, are made dependent upon sacrifices, dreams, or the flight of birds,
and more than once the safety of the army is greatly endangered by a
fatal passivity caused through unfavorable omens which prevent Xenophon’s
acting with decision at the right moment. It is no exaggeration to
say that these ten thousand Greek soldiers escaped only by good luck
the fate of the Athenian army in Sicily under Nikias. And this man,
a zealous believer in manticism, should be an impartial and reliable
historian of the doctrines of Socrates? The δαιμόνιον of Socrates is
changed into a mystic power, a kind of _spiritus familiaris_. It has
ceased to be the divinity of man’s inner self as which it appears in
Plato’s account, and is represented by Xenophon as some peculiarity of
Socrates which was given him as a special favor by the gods. Socrates
dethroned the old fate that was supposed to rule the affairs of men
and pointed out the importance of knowledge, for through knowledge we
can learn to regulate our fate ourselves. The philosopher who thought
little of well-being, of εὐτυχία, and demanded above all a well-doing,
an εὐ πράττειν (“Memorabilia,” III, 9, 14, 15,) did not recommend asking
soothsayers questions where we should better ask ourselves, although it
is probable that he recommended the Athenians to apply to the Delphic
oracle instead of relying upon omens not so much because he believed in
prophesies, but because he thought that they would be influenced by the
authority of this venerable institution whose wisdom and conservative
spirit were beyond question, so that good advice could be expected from
it. Karl Joël, accordingly, advises us to read the “Memorabilia” with
an inversion of the points, viz., to convert the sentences qualified by
“although” and “to be sure” into the main sentences and _vice versa_. In
this way we shall be able to distinguish between the pagan orthodoxy of
Xenophon and the rationalism of Socrates. Why does Xenophon not state
directly and simply (1) Socrates advised his friend to ask the oracles in
all cases of uncertainty, (2) manticism is indispensable in the economy
of a household as well as of a state, and (3) the gods have not granted
us any real knowledge as to a final success and reveal it through special
revelations. Why must he add long sentences introduced by “although”?
He adds to (1) that everybody ought to act solely according to his own
conviction, to (2) that all the trades up to the highest professions had
to be learned before practiced, and to (3) that those who inquired at the
oracles for things which could be learned and studied in the usual way
are crazy and even blasphemers.
This sketch may suffice to characterise the book which is much better
than could be anticipated after a perusal of the preface, which almost
induced us to lay it aside unread. It is not the modesty of the author
which produces a prejudice but the random talk concerning things which
neither a reader nor a reviewer will care to know. The author has
apparently no talent for writing prefaces, and he would be wise to omit
them in the future entirely. The book might be very much condensed,
repetitions avoided, and an alphabetical index certainly should have been
added.
It contains _five hundred and fifty-four_ pages; and the author says he
is preparing a _second_ volume. We think it would have been better for
his views if he had expressed them in a pamphlet.
κρς.
A PERPLEXED PHILOSOPHER. Being an examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s
various utterances on the land question, with some incidental reference
to his synthetic philosophy. By _Henry George_. New York: Charles L.
Webster & Company. 320 pp.
The “Perplexed Philosopher” herein described is Mr. Herbert Spencer,
and persons who like ginger in their ale will enjoy this book; for its
eloquent invective, hot from the heart, cheers us like that stimulating
drink. Because of this fiery and revengeful attack on Herbert Spencer
much dignified reproof has been aimed at Mr. George by those excellent
people who religiously forgive the injuries done to others, and allow
only to themselves the luxury of retaliation; but when we consider the
provocation given by Mr. Spencer, this counter-blow of Mr. George is
mild. Mr. Spencer had a critic’s right severely or tenderly to condemn
the doctrines of Mr. George; and had he kept himself within his privilege
Mr. George in reply would not have had any right to assail the personal
character and motives of Mr. Spencer; but the older philosopher chose
to treat the younger with supercilious disdain, and this was a personal
affront that fully justified a retort personal. Scorn is an ignoble
argument, lawful only in return for scorn.
Apart from the truth or error they contain, the writings of Mr. George
have achieved a phenomenal popularity; their influence on social opinion
has been in some directions almost revolutionary; they are to-day
the political creed of many men in different parts of the world, and
especially of many thousands in America, Great Britain, and Australia.
They are bold in theories, attractive in illustration, and admirable
in their literary form. Their approval of “Social Statics” was an
advertisement that multiplied by hundreds the readers of that book, and
there is no philosopher great enough to affect ignorance of Mr. George’s
writings, or to dismiss them with a sneer. More copies of “Progress and
Poverty” have been sold than of any other book on social economics that
ever has been written, and when Mr. Spencer spoke of that book as “a
work which I closed after a few minutes on finding how visionary were
its ideas,” he put on airs of aggravating superiority which naturally
provoked the resentment of Mr. George.
After not reading the book Mr. Spencer condemned its heresies and said:
“There is the movement for land nationalisation pressed by Mr. George
and his friends with avowed disregard for the just claims of existing
owners....
“And now this doctrine (that society as a whole has an absolute right
over the possessions of each member) is being openly proclaimed. Mr.
George and his friends, Mr. Hyndman and his friends, are putting their
theory to its logical issue.”
To that Mr. George replies as follows:
“In nothing I have ever written or spoken is there any justification for
such a characterisation. I am not even a land nationalisationist as the
English and German and American nationalisationists well know.... I have
been a staunch denier of the assumption of the right of society to the
possessions of each member, and a clearer and more resolute upholder of
the rights of property than Mr. Spencer has been.”
Without waiting to inquire whether Mr. George includes within the “rights
of property” the right to property in land, it is enough to say that
here at least Mr. Spencer is at a disadvantage. He disarmed himself
before going into battle by refusing to read Mr. George’s writings, and
scorning to examine them he accused them of communism, confiscation,
and land-nationalisation. Mr. Spencer cannot now strike back for he
has thrown his weapons away. He is a prisoner in the hands of Mr.
George, who couples him with Parson Wilbur denouncing a print called the
_Liberator_, “whose heresies,” he said, “I take every opportunity of
combating, and of which, I thank God, I have never read a single line.”
The parallel is well drawn; and the lesson of it is this, never challenge
a man and then treat him with contempt; if you think he is not a foeman
worthy of your steel, let him alone.