as in swimming or rowing is the natural one; and the alternating or
independent movements, as in walking or writing, are an acquisition
involving inhibitions of the natural innervations. “Even in adult life,”
says Professor James, “there is an instinctive tendency to revert to
the bilateral movements of childhood.” Professor Münsterberg was led to
doubt this view by observing the unsymmetrical motions of a baby in a
warm bath, and experiment has confirmed his scepticism. Complicated joint
motions of both hands (tracing circles or other geometrical figures on a
surface) do not exhibit any tendency, when the attention is distracted,
to assume the symmetrical form. They rather tend to compensate each other
in such a way as to preserve equilibrium with the minimum strain on the
other muscles of the body, and this law leads as often to alternating as
to symmetrical movements of the arms or legs. The case is different of
course with the muscles of the trunk, and may be different in birds, as
it would in us if we spent our lives in swimming or rowing.
A new method of attacking the problem of localisation is to observe
the effect of altering the circulation in different parts of the
brain. Tentative experiments on one subject seem to show that verbal
associations are readiest when the victim lies on his left side, which
is a happy coincidence with the localisation of the speech centres in
the left frontal convolutions. If these statistics can be trusted, it is
inadvisable to undertake hard mental labor with the head hanging back
over the edge of a chair!
In the last chapter, certain simple experiments in our estimates of
voluntary movements in varying conditions of mind and body are made the
basis of a far-reaching theory of pleasure, pain, and judgment, the
elements of which can be found in Aristotle, Herbert Spencer, and James.
Münsterberg found by repeated experiments that the accuracy of attempted
reproduction of a fixed and familiar amount of centripetal or centrifugal
movement of finger and thumb along a rod perpendicular to his waistcoat
varied with his condition of fatigue, pleasure, or pain. In a pleasurable
state of consciousness the centrifugal movement was exaggerated while the
centripetal fell short. In pain the reverse relation obtained. Hence he
infers a connection between pain and muscular flexion and pleasure and
muscular extension, or rather, he distinguishes the mere sensation of
pain (_Schmerz_) and pleasure (_Lust_) which may depend on integrations
and disintegrations in the nerve-tissue, from the accompanying feelings
of agreeableness (_Wollust_) or disagreeableness (_Unlust_) which are
due to sensations aroused at the centres by movements of flexion and
extension throughout the body. He thus attaches his special theory of
pleasure and pain to Lange’s and James’s theory of the identity of the
emotions with their bodily concomitants—though he protests against the
metaphysical implications of the doctrine. The origin of the existing
coördination of muscular flexions and extensions with pleasure and pain,
he explains teleologically on the principles of the Spencerian psychology
of evolution. He then proceeds, after Sigwart and Brentano, to revive
the old idea of Aristotle (whom he does not mention) that the judgment
(affirmative or negative) is rather the assumption of an attitude toward
a presentation (_Stellungsnehmende Akte_) than a mere conjunction of
presentations. The affirmative judgment is a faint incipient represented
movement of the self towards a suggested conjunction of presentations.
The negative judgment is a similar movement in the opposite direction.
Ontogenetically these inchoate movements are later than the movements
of acceptance or rejection called forth by a painful or pleasurable
stimulus, and must therefore be treated as derivative phenomena. But the
Kantians may derive some comfort from Münsterberg’s final assurance that
he too believes that “_Erkenntnisstheoretisch das Urtheil primär ist_.”
PAUL SHOREY.
THE SPIRIT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By _Josiah Royce_, Ph. D. Boston and New
York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.
We are told by Professor Royce in the preface to this book, that we are
indebted for it to the lady friend to whom it is gracefully dedicated,
who asked him “for some account of the more significant spiritual
possessions of a few prominent modern thinkers,” to be related “in
comparatively brief and untechnical fashion.” The larger portion of the
work is taken up with that subject, exhibiting the general growth of
modern philosophical thought beginning with Spinozism, and terminating
with Monism as the outcome of the doctrine of Evolution. The author’s
purpose is constructive, however, as well as expository. He has his own
philosophical creed, suggested by what he knows of the progress and
outcome of modern thought, and the second portion of the work is the
expression of his thoughts on the world-conception which he regards as
embodying the true spirit of modern philosophy. Professor Royce justly
lays stress on the fact that the theory of evolution is the product
of a genuine and continuous growth. He dwells particularly, moreover,
on the distinction between the _epistemological_ sense of idealism,
which “involves a theory of the nature of our human knowledge,” and
its _metaphysical_ sense, in which it is “a theory as to the nature
of the real world, however we may come to know that nature.” It is in
accord with the latter sense that Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and their
allies, as believing matter to be an expression of the world-spirit, are
referred to as the idealistic school; and it is in the metaphysical and
not the epistemological sense that the term idealism has been used since
Hegel. The opposite of a metaphysical idealist is “one who maintains
the ultimate existence of wholly unspiritual realities at the basis
of experience and as the genuine truth of the world—such unspiritual
realities for instance as an absolute ‘Unknowable,’ or, again, as what
Hobbes meant by ‘Body.’” This is not, however, the view of the author,
who thinks that the metaphysical idealist alone is in possession of a
successful solution for the epistemological problem.
Professor Royce divides modern philosophy into three great periods, of
which the first was one of pure and simple naturalism. The supernatural
had then only a secondary interest, and thought was governed by three
ideas—“that nature is a mechanism, that human reason is competent to
grasp the truth of nature, and that, since nature’s truth is essentially
mathematical, geometry is the model science, whose precision and
necessity philosophy, too, must imitate.” During the second period of
modern philosophy there was a gradual change of thought objectivity.
Reason was still the instrument, but it was employed on the mind itself.
It came to be recognised that if man is part of nature’s mechanism,
he is a knowing mechanism. The age was, however, more than one of
self-analysis. Rousseau introduced a sentimental tendency from which came
“a revival of passion, of poetry, and of enthusiasm, whose influence
we shall never outgrow.” To it is traceable the French Revolution
which overthrew all the mechanical restraints of civilisation, and
“demonstrated afresh to the world’s outer sense the central importance of
passion in the whole life of humanity.”
The period of modern philosophy, which still continues, began with the
publication of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason,” the essential doctrine
of which is that man’s nature is the real creator of man’s world, that
visible nature is the expression of the human spirit, the inner structure
of which is therefore the deepest truth for us. This idea is “as old as
deeper spiritual faith itself,” and yet it is the very soul of all our
modern life because it is “the essentially humane view of reality.” For
fifty years Kant’s ideas ruled philosophic thought, and then, through the
progress of science, the doctrine of evolution received formulation, and
confirmation and “external nature has once more gained for us an imposing
authority which makes us in many ways sympathise afresh with the pure
naturalism of the seventeenth century.” We are compelled to omit any
account of the author’s study of the philosophies of Spinoza, Locke, and
Berkeley, or the philosophic systems of Kant and his successors of the
German School of Idealists. Nor can we say anything as to the doctrine of
Evolution, which Professor Royce rightly regards as having had its rise
long before Darwin or Herbert Spencer. Before proceeding to state his
own views, the author takes a cursory glance at modern empirical monism
which he affirms to be rather a suggestion than a philosophy. It is not
surprising, therefore, that he is not content with it although he makes
use of its ideas.
Let us now see what are the “Suggestions” which Professor Royce offers
as his contribution towards the formation of a world-conception. These
occupy the last four chapters of the work, which are supplemented by a
general summary in the appendix, to the book. For the sake of conciseness
we will make use of this summary, according to which there are two
phases of idealistic doctrine, the Analytic Idealism of Berkeley and the
Synthetic Idealism of Kant and his successors. The former shows that if
the world is to be knowable at all, it must be, in its deepest nature, a
world of ideas, that is, it exists “only in so far as beings with minds
actually _know it to be_.” The objection that nobody can _know_ any
reality beyond his own self, is met by the synthetic phase of idealism
which shows us that “there is but one self in the world, the logos or
world-mind. The _finite_ self knows truth beyond its own limitations,
just because it is an organic part of the complete Self.” What are the
demands of idealism as thus stated? They have relation, first, to the
interpretation of the facts of experience, which must be in terms of
the doctrine of the world-mind, and, secondly, to experience itself,
on which we depend “for the revelation of that truth which, for us
finite beings, must remain a fast ‘outer’ truth, just because it is the
content of other mind than our own bits of selfhood, and is universally
true for all intelligences.” The philosophy of experience having to do
with facts and with the interpretation of facts, it is necessary to
distinguish between what is really “outer” and what is “inner” about our
finite experience. The former embraces the world of facts, and a fact
is something which must be describable in some sort of universal terms.
The principle of ordinary realism, “that you must not be sentimental or
otherwise emotional in your account of the truth of things, but rather
_exact in your descriptions of what things are_,” has a thoroughly
idealistic justification. Not appreciation, but description gives us
outer truth, and this is the characteristic presupposition of all natural
science, which is concerned with the universal aspects of things, as
opposed to momentary and transient aspects. That presupposition involves
the assumption that the world is _essentially describable_. But as only
the well-knit, the orderly, that which conforms to law, can be described
science assumes the universality and rigidity of the laws of nature.
It assumes further, since the most exact descriptions are possible only
in the case of processes in Space and Time, of a mechanical type, that
everything including man himself, is a part of nature’s mechanism. A
closer analysis, however, shows that, as one can only describe what has
been first appreciated, there must be universal types of appreciation,
and therefore, that “Ideals must be deeper than Mechanism, so that, in
order to be relatively describable, nature must embody purposes, and so
be possessed of worth.” The author’s conclusion is that the natural order
is also a moral order, and that therefore “the world of absolute self
must appear to us as having two aspects, one a temporal, the other an
eternal aspect, one of law and one of worth. Man then turns out to be at
once a part of nature’s mechanism, and a part of the moral order; at once
temporally determined and morally free.”
The final lecture presents the author’s views as to the solution of the
problem of evil. Professor Royce believes that all evil is part of a good
order, and hence he agrees with Hegel, who declared that life, however
good, will always be restless, longing, suffering, and who gloried
in the paradox as the very essence of spirituality; rather than with
Schopenhauer, whose recognition, in another light, of the universality
of the same truth led him to abandon all hope in life. The justification
of the existence of an evil impulse comes just at the instant when it is
hated and condemned. Thus “condemning and conquering the evil will, makes
it part of a good will”; as pain and suffering have their compensation in
their chastening effect on the spirit. But to the enlightened soul it is
not so much the painfulness as “the blind irrationality of fortune that
seems to drive God out of our thoughts when we look at our world.” It is
the capriciousness of life, arising from human stupidity, that really
makes it seem like an evil dream. What is the explanation of this caprice
given by the author? It is to be found in the creed of his idealism,
“This world is the world of the Logos.” It is “the suffering God, who is
just our own true self, who actually and in our flesh bears the sins of
the world, and whose natural body is pierced by the capricious wounds
that hateful fools inflict upon him.” And as our defeats are his, so his
triumph and his eternal peace are ours also.
Prof. Royce in making “only one more effort to define a ‘double-aspect’
theory of the relations of the physical and the moral and æsthetic
worlds,” affirms that our philosophic insight teaches us that the world
of matter in motion is simply an external aspect of the appreciable
world, that is, of the world of the Logos. Of this, it is such an aspect
“as can be expressed by finite consciousness in terms of the space and
time forms, and of the categories of empirical science.... Consequently
all its laws, all its necessity, its causation, its uniformity, belong,
not to its inner nature as such, but to the external show of this
nature.” That which actually appears to us is matter in motion, which
furnishes the fact of the double aspect, the inner intelligibility of
which fact is problematical to us, but not so for the Logos, who is our
true Self, and who “completes the insight that for us is so fragmentary.”
This true Self, the Logos, is the only Self, and with it the deeper self
of man is identical. That this deeper self is “the self that knows in
unity all truth,” is declared to be no hypothesis, and therefore the
existence of the Infinite Self is perfectly sure. This Self “infinitely
and reflectively transcends our consciousness, and therefore, since
it includes us, it is at the very least a person, and more definitely
conscious than we are; for what it possesses is self-reflecting
knowledge.” Finally, the true world, that is the world of appreciation,
is the system of the thoughts of the Logos, whose unity we know, just so
far as we ourselves consciously and rationally enter into it and form
part of it. Therefore “in so far as we have inner unity of thinking,
in so far as we commune with our fellows, and in so far as we rightly
see significance in the outer universe, we are in and of the world of
appreciation that embodies the thought of the Logos.”
Ingenious as this theory is, and notwithstanding the elements of truth it
possesses, we cannot accept it as conclusive. Its weakness is revealed
in the last line of the paragraph just quoted. If only the world of
appreciation embodies the thought of the Logos, what becomes of the world
of fact? The latter is said to be the outer aspect of the former, a
notion which is apparently derived from the association with man of body
and mind. But the existence of mind, which we must understand by the term
Logos, in nature, although declared by Professor Royce to be the only
thing certain, is a mere inference, and even if the analogy of the human
organism justifies such an inference; it would require that if priority
has to be given to mind or matter in the universe it must be allowed to
the latter. At birth a human being has no mind, properly so-called, since
it is the result of the activity after birth of the organism, through
the agency of the brain. It is true that the human body possesses from
the first the elements of the mind, or rather of the feeling which thus
exhibits itself; or, better still, the organic structure of which feeling
is the general function. The utmost that can be properly asserted of the
universe, therefore, is that it possesses a certain organic arrangement
of its parts, and therewith such a condition of feeling, or, what in
this relation would be a better term, sensitiveness, as is required by
its organic character. In relation to such a state of things the terms
thought, consciousness, reflection, have no meaning so far as we can
judge. That organic aspect of the universe, moreover, leaves no room for
duality. Just as the human organism constitutes a perfect unity, although
it is made up of various organs and exhibits the properties attributed
to both mind and matter, so must the universe be such a perfect unity
whatever its nature and attributes. The human organism may, however, be
strictly described as matter under organic conditions, a description
which is equally applicable to the universe, without determining what
those conditions are. Professor Royce objects to the Unknowable of
Herbert Spencer, but there is very little practical difference between it
and his own true Self, which, as the Absolute, is unknowable, although
he is known in the inner self of man, as Spencer’s Unknowable is known
in the human consciousness. Both Absolute and Unknowable are, however,
merely names for Organic Nature, which is seen in all things visible and
is known by all her operations. These are governed by the laws of her
very existence, and it is the uniformity of which those laws are the
expression which constitutes the moral law of the universe, the breach
of whose eternal order, whether this is established in the world of
matter or in the human mind, must be attended with consequences that are
designated by man as evil. We find only a world of description, which is
nevertheless one of moral order.
Widely as we disagree on the grounds stated with the conclusions of
Professor Royce’s work, it is undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the
discussion of the world-problem. Its description of the characteristics
of the philosophy of Kant and of the German idealists is clear, though
not intended to do more than exhibit the spirit of their teaching, and
it is written in a style which renders it easy reading. It is a pity,
therefore, that it is disfigured with such colloquialisms as _you’ll_,
_isn’t_, _can’t_, _don’t_, words which neither sound well, nor look well
in print.
Ω.
DIE ARISTOTELISCHE AUFFASSUNG VOM VERHÄLTNISSE GOTTES ZUR WELT UND ZUM
MENSCHEN. By _Dr. Eugen Rolfes_. Berlin: Mayer & Müller. 1892.
This book is a scholastic “survival.” The author believes that Zeller’s
interpretation of Aristotle is wrong, and in five formal theses he
endeavors to prove _secundum artem_ that the philosopher was a theist who
taught the creation of the world from nothing, and the immortality of
the soul. In the defence of his theses he manifests some ingenuity and
industry, but no criticism. The work has no scientific significance.
P. S.
MAX STIRNER UND FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE. Erscheinungen des modernen Geistes
und das Wesen des Menschen. By _Robert Schellwien_. Leipsic: C. E. M.
Pfeffer, 1892. Price 2 m 60 pf.
Individualism is the spirit of the age, and among all the champions
of individualism the most original, the most consistent, the boldest,
are perhaps Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche. Robert Schellwien, in
sketching their views in great outlines, partly admires these courageous
thinkers who dare to draw the consequences of their principles to the
very last even though they will appear absurd to the world, partly
censures the rashness with which they arrive at, and the superciliousness
with which they sometimes state, their opinions. Upon the whole the
author succeeds in impressing the reader that there is in these two
peculiar geniuses a gigantic strength, and that their views of truth,
morality, and justice deserve a greater attention than they have
received. The reviewer is no admirer of either Stirner or Nietzsche; he
believes nevertheless that a careful analysis of their erratic minds and
lives will be very instructive. It will be first of pathological and
then even of more than pathological interest. The actual objective value
of the ideals truth, morality, and justice, will be best illustrated by
showing all the consequences of a consistent individualism. We hope that
this pamphlet will grow into a more comprehensive work; and in that case
we should advise the author to add short biographies of his heroes.
κρς.
THE SOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF KANT’S TELEOLOGY. By _James Hayden Tufts_.
Chicago: University Press. 1892.
This little tract is an inaugural dissertation presented by Mr. Tufts
to the University of Freiburg for the attainment of the doctorate of
philosophy. It is written in English. Mr. Tuft’s dissertation is wholly
historical. He simply seeks to expound Kant’s true views. In this respect
the work bears the marks of much research and of a thorough exploitation
of Kant’s works. Mr. Tuft’s concluding words are that “with every new
discovery of science, every advance in the ideals of art and of the
conduct of life, every development in religious faiths, comes anew the
task for philosophy to criticise, and through criticism to make a fresh
attempt to interpret from the unity of reason the manifold of life.”
μκρκ.
DISTINCTION AND THE CRITICISM OF BELIEFS. By _Alfred Sidgwick_. London:
Longmans, Green, & Co. 1892.
This work might be described as an inquiry into the conflict between
philosophy and common sense, and its central idea as the continuity
of nature. What bearing this idea has on the inquiry is shown by the
statement, that the distinction between philosophy and common sense is
only one of degree. And yet, regarded as methods, or attempts to follow
ideals, they may be sharply contrasted. This implies the existence
of distinctions, and hence arises the question how far distinction
is consistent with continuity in nature. The recognition of such a
continuity requires the admission of the unreality of distinctness, but
this fact is not inconsistent with the use of rough distinctions, which
give rise to what the author terms effective ambiguity. Here we have the
field of the operation of common sense, which exhibits itself as tact in
the use of rough distinctions, while, on the other hand, philosophy may
be said to be concerned with the continuity which, from a superficial
glance, might be supposed to stand in opposition to distinction.