world of reality, and he declares that “We cannot Know or Explain how
this Absolute Unity is also Many” (Sec. XXI); and even if an unconscious
being could be a Many-in-One, yet it could not, according to Lotze,
generate consciousness (Sec. XXV). We do not believe that this problem
is insolvable, and do not, as does Lotze, feel constrained to fall back
on idealism. In fact, our position is so different from Lotze’s that in
spite of the full recognition of his genius, we feel as much severed from
him as if he belonged to ages long gone by.
Mr. Conybeare’s translation is most certainly an invaluable work and is
indispensable for any English student of Lotze’s philosophy.
κρς.
ON THE PERCEPTION OF SMALL DIFFERENCES, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
EXTENT, FORCE, AND TIME OF MOVEMENT. By _George Stuart Fullerton_ and
_James McKeen Cattell_. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
1892. Pp. 159.
This volume of the Philosophical Series of Publications of the University
of Pennsylvania gives an account of a large number of experiments
made for the purpose of testing the perception of small differences
of movement, of weight, and of light. The most noticeable conclusion
arrived at by the authors, is that they cannot accept any of the received
explanations of Weber’s law. They found from their experiments, by the
method of estimated amount of difference, that “we tend to estimate
the intensity of sensation as directly proportional to the intensity
of the stimulus; consequently, in so far as any deduction concerning
quantitative relations in sensation can be made from such estimation,
the sensation increases as the stimulus and not as its logarithm,”
thus invalidating Fechner’s law. The authors believe also that Weber’s
law does not hold for the perception of movement, as they find that
the error of observation usually increases “as the stimulus is taken
greater but more slowly,” and that it is proportional to the square
root of the stimulus. Accordingly, they substitute for Weber’s law the
following: “The error of observation tends to increase as the square
root of the magnitude, the increase being subject to variation, whose
amount and cause must be determined for each special case.” It is proper
to add, that Professor Fullerton gives only a qualified assent to these
conclusions, on the grounds that mathematicians are not agreed as to the
soundness of the theory upon which the law is based, and that the errors
in question may not be independent errors. He considers, however, the
results obtained by the authors “as sufficiently in accord with the laws
to justify them in holding it tentatively, and subject to criticism.”
As Fechner’s law rests on that of Weber, and on assumptions which appear
to be incorrect, it also fails, and it follows that the psycho-physical,
physiological, and psychological theories put forward to account for
the supposed logarithmic relation between mental and physical processes
are superfluous. From these conclusions we may judge of the importance
of the experiments made by Professors Fullerton and Cattell, whose work
requires to be carefully studied by all those interested in the special
questions to which it relates.
Ω.
PSYCHOLOGIE DU PEINTRE. By _Lucien Arréat_. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1892. Pp.
LIX, 264. Price, 5 fr.
The author of this interesting work informs us that it does not aim
at being a natural history of society, nor is it even a study in
professional psychology. This is hardly correct, however, as such a
study must be based on that of individuals, and a writer of M. Arréat’s
reputation cannot treat of a large group of individuals without throwing
light on the psychology of the whole class to which they belong. He
very aptly likens artists as a whole to a large family, the artist in
design to a genus of this family, and painters to a species. This has
its varieties, and it is by the study of these that the author seeks to
arrive at a knowledge of the psychology of the painter.
Believing that there exists a relation between the temperament and the
qualities of the mind and that this is influenced by heredity, he devotes
the first part of the work to questions of physiology and heredity. The
second part deals with the painter’s vocation, his æsthetic sentiments,
his professional memory, and, as the evolution of art is connected with
the progress of visual analysis, with his sense of sight. Then comes
an examination of the general mental qualities of the painter, his
intellectual character, his various phases of memory and aptitudes, and
the influences which affect his work. The fourth part of the book treats
of the painter’s character, his egoistic and sympathetic traits, his
will, and his moral and social traits. And finally reference is made
to questions of pathology, particularly defects of vision, and to “the
miseries of genius.”
On all these subjects M. Arréat has many acute remarks supported by
numerous facts, often derived from painters themselves, who thus, says
the author, will be found “living and speaking on each page, just as
they are, and making themselves known by their works, sympathetic or
disagreeable, indifferent or superior, but always interesting.” It is
noticeable, in connection with the important subject of heredity, that
in a list of about three hundred painters almost two-thirds are sons of
painters or of workers in art, and M. Arréat thinks that if more complete
information were obtainable the proportion would be increased.
In the chapter on the miseries of genius, the author takes exception to
the view expressed by M. Lombroso that the creative inspiration of genius
is, at least in some cases, the equivalent of epileptic convulsion.
That genius may lead to insanity is true; and M. Arréat admits that
remarkable aptitudes have often appeared in a family at the beginning of
its degeneracy. But he adds that painters are for the most part healthy,
and they show hardly any more singularity than other men may have. He
concludes his work with the following words: “Genius makes use of, as
we have sufficiently shown, faculties which are common to nearly all
men, if they are unequally strong and variously distributed with each.
Genius, moreover, in the most elevated sense that it can be understood,
is an exception among artists themselves, and even in genius, the meeting
together of several happy gifts is exceptional. But it is willingly
attributed to all those, whatever may be their art, whose works are able
to touch the human cords that vibrate the most profoundly. Painters
appear to us to compose a well-marked type among such. The reader
has seen the characters of it brought together and discussed in this
volume: he will preserve its living image after having closed the book.”
This in itself furnishes a sufficient recommendation for the perusal
of M. Arréat’s work, which apart from its psychological value, is a
perfect mine of gracefully written information about painters and their
peculiarities.
Ω.
PHYSIOLOGIE DE L’ART. By _Georges Hirth_. Traduit de l’Allemand et
précédé d’une Introduction par _Lucien Arréat_. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1892.
Pp. 247.
We have now occasion to review a work on a subject much akin to the
preceding—a work which has been translated from the German by the same
author, M. Lucien Arréat, and supplied by him with a very interesting
introduction. This Introduction is in reality a résumé by M. Arréat of
a series of studies by M. Hirth on physiological optics. These studies
are of great importance and are classed by the French editor under the
three heads of Form, Illumination, and Movement. The first of these
comprises the subjects of monocular and binocular vision, the depth and
the bilateral enlargement of the visual field, perspective and identical
points. Under the head of illumination the effect of the “double bath of
light” through the two eyes, the “luminous equation,” and the problems
connected with optical measurement are considered.
We have not space to exhibit fully the author’s ideas on these topics,
but we can state what are regarded by M. Arréat as the two principle
propositions which give to them their life and unity. One of these
propositions is, that the first function of our dioptric apparatus
consists in furnishing to our central visual organ, which M. Hirth terms
the _internal eye_, material which the latter has to interpret. The other
is that it is necessary to get rid of mathematical concepts, which are
much too rigid to be applied to the delicate problems of vision, and to
fall back on visual sensation such as it is. These propositions imply,
moreover, the admission of an electro chemical process, “without which
the properties of the eye and the marvels of vision remain inexplicable.”
This last conclusion has a bearing on the nature of memory, or the
recollection of the impressions received by the nerves and brain after
the original excitation has disappeared. Thus, M. Hirth suggests that
when we know the physiological procedure in the impregnation of cerebral
molecules, or in their electric charging, memory will be found to be only
the prolongation of the duration of consecutive images.
The inquiries of M. Hirth throw great light on the difference between
monocular and binocular vision, for information as to which and other
details of his optical theory we must refer our readers to M. Arréat’s
Introduction. This concludes with a consideration of the perception of
light-movement, the reproduction of which is said to require a special
exercise of attention, direct or indirect. Here we have the third degree
of attention, according to the views of M. Hirth, who regards it as
artistic apperception, having its end in itself and capable of being
reproduced through co-ordination of the movements perceived.
A considerable portion of the second and principal part of this work is
occupied with the psychology of attention and of the related subject
memory. The latter is defined by M. Hirth as “a sum of states of
perception gradually accumulated by the various organs of sense,” and it
is thus not a special faculty of the mind. The mental condition which
results from the action of memory is what is known as _disposition_. This
disposition is transmitted from one generation to another, and becomes
innate as the memory of the species. But it is intimately connected
with the nervous system, and with the brain regarded as the electric
storehouse of memories. It is in accordance with these ideas that the
author explains the transmission of hereditary qualities, the problem
which is at present engaging so much attention. The innate organisation
is a conservation of nervous quality or temperaments associated with the
anatomical disposition of the nervous system, and a certain condition
of electrical tension among the cerebral molecules. The transmission of
ancestral qualities depends, however, on the vigor and good condition of
the germ, and as the organisation received from our earliest ancestors
is the most persistent, the primitive “disposition” will subsist even
without exercise whilst nutrition and circulation assure the continuance
of molecular growth.
It is with the visual memory that the author is chiefly concerned, and he
affirms that the optical phenomena referred to in the Introduction compel
us to admit the existence in the brain of a central organ, which he terms
the internal eye. In order to determine the position of this organ, which
is the real seat of visual perception, to the exclusion of the retina,
whose function has been overestimated, M. Hirth considers the anatomical
and physiological aspects of the question, and he accepts the conclusion
arrived at by H. Munk in his _Functions de l’écorce cerebrale_, that
perception is the function of a particular portion of the cerebral
cortex. There thus exist two visual centres or “internal eyes,” one
in each convexity of the occipital lobes, as shown in Plate V. of the
present work. Munk’s researches would seem to prove, moreover, that not
only is there a general localisation of visual memories, but that each
memory is fixed in a precise and determined place. The centres of memory
and the centres of perception, which M. Hirth supposes to be simply a
phase of memory, are the same. Moreover attention is connected with
perception, but it is an imperfect state of memory. Attention requires
the expenditure of force, while perfect memory acts spontaneously; and it
is only in this form, “exempt from fatigue, that it becomes the passive
servant of our instincts and sensations, of our voluntary acts, of our
labor.” Memory when perfect is automatic, and according to the theory
of M. Hirth, who does not accept M. Ribot’s monoideistic theory, it is
accompanied with automatic attention, which is the result of a gradual
transformation of “energetic” attention, and attains in a normal adult
an incredible development both in quantity and quality. This _latent_
attention is required by the existence of latent memory, which is
properly spoken of by M. Hirth as an organic attribute of the highest
moment, seeing that it forms the basis of all individual acquirements.
It would seem to answer, however, to what is often spoken of as the
subconsciousness.
We can understand how this doctrine of latent memory and latent attention
can have an important bearing on the question of the origin of the
artistic sense, especially as each brain centre may be supposed to have
its own memory, and each fundamental memory its special temperament.
The activity of such centres is due in great measure, as pointed out by
M. Ribot, to nutrition and blood-circulation but M. Hirth adds a third
factor, electrical tension. According to his theory, cerebral activity
rests ultimately on electricity, the invisible currents of which,
maintaining the whole system in a state of tension, are “the inferior
currents of the latent memory,” the brain centres being electrical
accumulators. This idea, which the author applies also to the explanation
of colored visual memories, is open to strong critical objections. In
relation to the particular subject of art, the author shows that the
hereditary transmission of talent depends on the active maintenance
of the special temperament of certain fundamental memories and their
associations, and talent itself therefore depends on the existence of
such a temperament. We here come in contact with M. Lombroso’s theory
of the physiological degeneracy of genius, which M. Hirth opposes with
much force, and we think on the whole with success. This discussion
occupies the last chapter of a work that, as our readers will be able to
judge from the glance given here at some of its leading topics, has a
scientific value quite apart from the special subject of art which it is
intended to illustrate, and which it goes far towards establishing on a
physiological basis.
Ω.
LES ALTÉRATIONS DE LA PERSONNALITÉ. By _Alfred Binet_. Paris: Félix Alcan
1892. Pp. 323. Price, 6 fr.
In the present work, the accomplished director of the laboratory of
physiological psychology at the Sorbonne has brought together and
systematised all the most reliable phenomena bearing on one of the most
curious subjects of inquiry now engaging attention. Notwithstanding the
disagreement between different experimenters as to particular facts,
all have arrived at the conclusion that, under special conditions, the
normal unity of consciousness may be broken, and that then there is
the production of several distinct consciousnesses “each of which can
have its perceptions, its memory, and even its moral character.” No
one is better fitted than M. Binet to perform the eclectic work he has
undertaken of discussing the recent researches on the alteration of
personality, without regard to the special views of particular schools.
The subject is considered by him under the three heads of Successive
Personalities, Coexisting Personalities, and The Alterations of
Personality in the Experiences of Suggestion. The two first parts deal
chiefly with phenomena presented by somnambulic and hysteric subjects.
In the third part M. Binet applies the fact of the duplication of
personality to the explanation of the phenomena of spiritism, the term he
very properly gives to so-called spiritualism. He regards the supposed
spirit agent as the subconscious personality of the medium acting under
the influence of suggestion, a view which undoubtedly meets most of the
actual facts of spiritism.
Notwithstanding the divisibility of the ego, there can be no doubt of
the unity of the personality under normal conditions. The question is
as to the nature of this unity, and the author follows M. Ribot in
affirming that it consists in the coördination of the elements which
compose it. He repudiates the idea that memory is the sole foundation of
consciousness, as not only may one memory embrace different states, but
the same individual may have several memories, several consciousnesses,
and several personalities. For the opinion of M. Binet on other points
we must refer our readers to the work itself, which forms an important
addition to the International Scientific Library.
Ω.
L’HOMME DANS LA NATURE. By _Paul Topinard_. With 101 Illustrations in the
text. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1891. Pp. 350. Price, 6 fr.
The present is the third work in which Dr. Paul Topinard, the well-known
pupil and successor of M. Broca, the founder of French Anthropology,
has given to the public his general ideas in relation to the science
of which he has made so profound a study. In 1876 he published his
_Anthropologie_, which reflected in great measure the teaching of his
master, Broca. Ten years later, in 1886, appeared his larger and more
important work, _Eléments d’anthropologie générale_, which treated of
the history and methods of anthropology, with various other subjects.
Now Dr. Topinard gives us his matured ideas on “Man in Nature,” by which
is meant physical nature, the object of the present work being to show
the place that man occupies physically among animals, and his probable
origin or descent. It is not surprising that a writer who was the pupil
of Professor de Quatrefages as well as of Professor Broca should declare
himself a supporter of the principle of unity of composition, formulated
by M. Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, from which flows that of evolution,
that is the natural derivation of beings from one another. As to the
means by which this is brought about, the author reserves his opinion
until the publication of a further work which he has in preparation.
Dr. Topinard devotes the second chapter of the present work to a
consideration of the position to be accorded to anthropology in relation
to the other sciences. He declares it to be a pure, concrete science,
essentially anatomical and observatory, and thus distinguishes it from
ethnography, which has to do with peoples under all their aspects.
Both alike are branches of the science of man in its broadest sense.
If anything can be added to the author’s explanation, it is that
anthropology has to do with mankind as a series of _individuals_, while
ethnography is concerned with the _groups_ into which such individuals
are collected. This is not inconsistent with Dr. Topinard’s definition
of anthropology as the science “which studies human races, the human
species, and the place of man in the classification of animals.” For
all the facts on which it is based are derived from the observation
of individuals, and when races are compared with each other, they are
compared as ideal individuals, formed by a generalisation of certain
prevailing qualities, just as mankind by a similar process becomes an
ideal individual, a scientific Adam, who is compared with other animals.
There is an apparent difficulty in relation to psychology which Dr.
Topinard claims entirely for anthropology, but it disappears when we
see how closely he associates psychology with physiology. He says, and
we quite agree with him, that “characters of a psychological nature,
reduced to their most simple expression, whether attributed to human
races, or to the general human type, belong to ordinary physiological
characters; the corresponding anatomical part takes its place by the side
of other physical characters; the theory and explanation of intellectual
operations, of feelings and volitions, belong to the special physiology
of man and to the application of the ideas of general physiology.”
While accepting as correct the division of anthropology, in its
restricted sense into general and special, as proposed by Broca and
Bertillon, the author thinks it does not conform to the plan which
should be adopted if it is desired to proceed, by the method of analysis
and synthesis, from the known to the unknown. The plan adopted by Dr.
Topinard is, by analogy with the procedures of general zoölogy, to
begin by recalling the general notions applicable to his subject as to
the distribution of animals by groups of varying values, the choice
of characters on which they repose, and the differences between the
race, the species, the family, and the order, these last forming the
pivoting point of his views as to the place of man in classification.
Then commences the study of characteristics, the mode of ascertaining
them, of putting them to use and of appreciating their value, accompanied
by examples, drawn from special anthropology, proper to illustrate the
methods employed. Finally, a parallel is drawn between man and animals,
that a conclusion may be arrived at as to the place of man in the series
of beings, and his probable genealogy.
All these points are carefully considered by the author, who has framed
a canon of the medium adult man of the European type, a figure based
on which forms the frontispiece to the work. The proportions of this
figure are derived from a comparison of all the most authentic published
measurements, and the canon framed from them conforms closely to that
recognised in artists’ studios, except that in the latter the arm is too
short and the neck too long.
The most generally interesting subjects discussed by the author are
those connected with the relationship of man to other animals, and
particularly the structure of the brain. Dr. Topinard makes a careful
comparison of the cerebral convolutions of various animals and man,
with numerous illustrations, and he arrives at the conclusion that none
of the characters said to distinguish man from the anthropoid apes are
absolute; all are reducible to a question of degree of evolution, the
superior degree being sometimes found among the anthropoids, and the
inferior degree with man. The cerebral type of the anthropoids is a human
type not completely developed, or the cerebral type of man is a developed
simian type. Man thus undoubtedly belongs to the order of the Primates.
After considering the form and volume of the simian and human brains,
the author remarks that “man alone has a frontal lobe developed in all
its parts, and filling up a large, concave, and deep frontal shell which
externally gives place to the forehead, one of the characteristics of
man.”