disturbances; and the inhabitants of the village of Waterloo could not
leave their homes without being murdered, or, at all events, fired
upon. A handful of men was accordingly sent out from the garrison of
Freetown, a few Timmanee villages burned, and order restored. During
this small campaign a surgeon who accompanied the force committed a
most unheard-of outrage. The bodies of a number of friendly natives,
who had been killed by the Timmanees, had been placed in a pit, but
not covered with earth, in order that the officers who were sent to
restore order might actually see what the Timmanees had done. Upon
this pit, about a week after the corpses had been placed in it, the
surgeon chanced to light. To the astonishment and disgust of those who
were with him he immediately sprang into it, and, drawing his sword,
proceeded to hack off three or four heads from the bodies. Some of the
relatives of the murdered men came running up, and their indignation
and horror at this mutilation can be better imagined than described.
Notwithstanding all they could say the surgeon continued his work
until he had obtained sufficient specimens. He then clambered out,
put the heads in a calabash, and walked off: remarking in a jocular
manner that he had fleshed his maiden sword. On arriving at his boat
he appeared surprised and annoyed that any one should blame him for
what he had done, and when the officer in charge of the boat refused to
take his ghastly cargo on board his indignation knew no bounds. Should
a Turk impale a Bulgarian, or a Montenegrin cut the ears off a dead
Turk, the whole of England is convulsed with horror, and the entire
diplomatic machinery of the country set at work to discover and punish
the offender; but in West Africa, when a British officer wantonly
mutilates the dead, nothing is said about the matter. Can it be a
subject for surprise that the natives of this part of the world should
be barbarous, when such examples as this are set them by those whom
they consider their superiors?
CHAPTER X.
British Sherbro--The Bargroo River Expedition--Professional
Poisoners--An African Bogey--A Secret Society--A Strange Story--A
Struggle with Sharks--Startling News from the Gold Coast.
To the south of the peninsula of Sierra Leone lies the tract of
low-lying country called British Sherbro, which was acquired by treaty
with the natives in 1862, though Sherbro Island has been British for a
much longer period. It is intersected by numerous rivers such as the
Valtucker, Tittibul, Bargroo, Jong, Mongray, and Boom Kittam, which
with their numberless tributaries form a complete network over the
country.
The King of Sherbro was formerly one of the largest and most notorious
slave-dealers in this part of the world; and, on three different
occasions, the British naval squadron destroyed his town and slave
barracoons. Even to the present day, though domestic slavery is
nominally abolished, the inland traffic in slaves still flourishes in
this region.
The Sherbros, like the Timmanees, are utter savages, and it is to
these people that the world is largely indebted for the practices of
Obeah and professional poisoning. They, however, show more aptitude
for manufactures than the Timmanees, and weave a cloth of a beautiful
texture and curious pattern, from indigenous cotton dyed with vegetable
dyes. Some travellers have professed to discover some affinity between
this tribe and the Kaffirs of South Africa, but upon what they based
their assumption I have never been able to discover. There is no
similarity in language, and but very slight resemblance in customs;
in fact no greater than might be expected between the customs of the
races inhabiting the same continent, and both equally plunged in
barbarism. Their architecture, if hut-building may be so termed, is
entirely different; and they sometimes use the bow and arrow, while
it is the absence of that implement of war that has always specially
distinguished the Kaffirs from the negro tribes living to the north,
and the Hottentots and Bushmen to the south.
The Sherbros are a turbulent and restless people, and disturbances in
British Sherbro are of almost yearly occurrence. Beginning from 1848,
when Captain Monypenny, R.N. destroyed a stockaded fort in Sherbro
river, hardly a year has passed without an expedition of some kind
having been undertaken. The year 1875 was unusually prolific. In
October of that year some Mongray people plundered Mamaiah, a village
on the frontier, and kidnapped several British subjects. A gunboat,
with some troops and police, was accordingly sent up the Mongray
river, and scarcely had this expedition returned to Freetown when
news of another difficulty on the Bargroo river arrived. A party of
Mendis crossed the border about the middle of November and plundered
and destroyed thirteen villages in British territory, carrying off
most of the inhabitants as slaves. On receipt of this intelligence
Mr. Darnell Davis, the Civil Commandant of Sherbro, left Bonthe, the
headquarters of the local Government, accompanied by nineteen armed
policemen, and proceeded to Conconany, the scene of the outrages, to
endeavour to restore tranquillity. Hearing there that some of the
captives were at Paytaycoomar, a village about ten miles inland from
Conconany, he landed to proceed there, in company with a friendly chief
and about a hundred of his followers. On his way to Paytaycoomar Mr.
Davis and his party were attacked by a body of men lying in ambush,
and himself and several others wounded; but he nevertheless proceeded
and arrived before the village, which he found to be defended by three
strong stockades. The Mendis opened fire from their “war-fences,” and
the friendly chief and his followers at once took to flight, carrying
away with them the axes with which the Commandant had intended cutting
his way into the place. Nothing daunted, however, by this desertion,
he broke through the first and second gates of the stockades, ten
policemen, who were old soldiers, alone following him. Between the
second and third stockades they were met with a heavy fire that
killed four policemen almost at once, and wounded the Commandant
very severely; and the latter, seeing that it would be mere folly to
persevere longer, retired with the remnant of his men to Conconany;
being again attacked by an ambuscade on his way there, and wounded a
third time with several of his men.
In consequence of this a force consisting of a detachment of the First
West India Regiment and a body of armed police left Freetown for
Sherbro with Lieutenant-Governor Rowe; a number of stockaded towns were
shelled and burned, the leaders of the invading Mendis captured, and
order restored. The defences of some of these towns were, considering
the difficult nature of the country, formidable. Ordinarily they were
surrounded by triple stockades, 20 feet high, and formed of posts about
10 inches in diameter. A space some 20 feet broad intervened between
each stockade, nor were the entrances of these opposite each other. The
town of Tyama-Woro was further fortified by two encircling mud-walls,
15 feet high and 12 feet thick at the base, inside which were two broad
and deep ditches. In some of the towns machicoulis galleries had been
constructed over the gates, and the entrance further protected by
semicircular flanking bastions.
Expeditions such as these appear small affairs when compared with our
South African wars, but they are at least as worthy of recognition as
the numerous “Hill Tribe” wars of India, for which the troops employed
are invariably granted a medal. In West Africa the difficulties
attending such expeditions are very much greater than in India, and
there can be no comparison between the hardships experienced by both
officers and men. The country consists of dense forest, through which
the only roads are narrow paths, wide enough only for the passage of
men in single file, obstructed by fallen trees, swamps, and unbridged
streams, and where continual precautions have to be taken against
surprises and ambuscades. Everything has to be carried on the heads of
terror-stricken carriers, who bolt at the least alarm, and render the
difficulties of the transport service almost insurmountable. Supplies
are precarious, and of bad quality; while, in addition to all this, the
climate is the worst in the world, and the constitution of a European
does not for years recover from the injury caused to it by the exposure
incidental to such expeditions. Some wars, such as the Quiah war of
1861, are serious affairs; and it is difficult to understand upon what
principle of justice rewards should be granted for such services in one
part of the world and not in another. It would be a very simple matter
to establish a West African medal similar to the Indian one, the clasp
to which would show for what particular service it had been granted.
The professional poisoners of Sherbro, Rossu, and Timmanee, are
notorious: the practice of getting rid of any objectionable individual
by secret poisoning is only too prevalent throughout the whole of
West Africa, but usually it is carried out through the agency of
fetish men, whereas in this portion of the continent it is elevated to
the dignity of a profession on its own account. These poisoners, or
necromancers, since they pretend to compound spells by means of which
they attain their ends, are acquainted with various deadly vegetable
poisons entirely unknown to the European pharmacopœia, and many persons
yearly fall victims to them, whose deaths, as the medical men are
unable to recognise any of the symptoms attributable to known poisons,
are ascribed to other causes. They are also equally well acquainted
with the antidotes for their deadly drugs; and, when an individual
has reason to suspect that he has had poison administered to him, his
sole chance of recovery is to call in one of these practitioners, if
possible the one who has been paid to make away with him, and offer
him a bribe for a counter-charm, as these people like to call it. When
any vindictive savage has a grudge against a European, or against any
one else, all he has to do to obtain revenge is to go to one of these
poisoners, and, stating his wishes, pay a small sum of money, and the
victim is then doomed to certain death, sometimes sudden and sometimes
lingering, unless, in the latter case, he succeeds in discovering what
is going on and outbids his secret enemy. Old residents in Sierra
Leone and the Gambia know of several cases on record in which member
after member of a family has wasted away and died of an unknown and
inexplicable disease, and where the survivors have only been saved from
a like doom by calling in one of these diabolical wretches. If native
accounts may be believed, these poisoners are as well versed in their
destructive study as were their kindred spirits in the age of Catherine
de Medici; and, besides drugs which are deadly when placed in food or
drink and taken into the stomach, know and use others which scattered
about a room poison the atmosphere, or, sprinkled upon wearing apparel,
cause death by absorption through the skin, and perfumes, to inhale
which is fatal. The manner of compounding and preparing these poisons
is preserved with great secrecy and mystery, and transmitted from
father to son in certain families of hereditary poisoners; but the
natives popularly believe that there is a kind of college, situated in
an impenetrable forest somewhere near the Jeba river, at which would-be
professors of this art enter themselves as students, where they learn
their nefarious calling, and finally emerge with a degree as full-blown
murderers. In Sierra Leone proper, this practice, euphoniously called
witchcraft, or laying spells or charms, is forbidden by law, and is not
now very common.
Another custom peculiar to the three above mentioned tribes is that
of Egugu, which, however, is neither secret nor vindictive, and the
Egugu man himself might not inaptly be described as the personification
of the English “bogey” with which nurses terrify children. This
arch-impostor is supposed to have revealed to him, by unknown powers,
the name or appearance of every wife in the country who has been guilty
of infidelity; and he makes periodical visits to each town and village
for the purpose of exposing and punishing these frail fair ones, he and
his following being entertained and feasted on these occasions at the
expense of the inhabitants. When the Egugu man is approaching a village
his retainers go ahead and announce his presence by the beating of
drums, accompanied by wild howls and cries; and consternation at once
falls upon the entire feminine portion of the community, for, as they
are nearly all equally guilty, the only difference being that some
have already been detected by their husbands while others have not,
they all equally dread the threatening punishment and public exposure.
On such occasions, those fair creatures, who have hitherto been so
fortunate as to bear an unblemished reputation, generally find that
they have pressing business which requires their immediate presence in
the bush, and some thus contrive to escape the ordeal, though usually
each husband takes care that all his wives shall be present; while
those whose guilt has been already declared by the Egugu man, and
who have consequently already experienced the worst, alone prepare
themselves for the ceremony with a certain amount of indifference.
The Egugu man enters the town, or village, wrapped in a piece of
country cloth, which entirely covers the face and head, and which
covering he never removes except when alone with his immediate
associates; while curious persons of either sex are restrained from
pulling it aside, or endeavouring to obtain a glimpse of his face, by
the belief that to look upon his countenance is certain death. He then
traverses the village and enters every house in succession; while the
female occupants, anxious to propitiate their judge, lay before him
the most _recherché_ dishes of savage African cookery, viz., the palm
oil stew, the cassava cakes and the “stink-fish,” while to wash down
this regal banquet jars of palm wine and bottles of rum are provided.
The Egugu man is cunning enough to know that the innocent, if any,
will seem most unconcerned, and he consequently regards with suspicion
those women who appear most anxious to please him, and usually picks
out those who have treated him most hospitably, and with the greatest
respect, for exposure and punishment. He is commonly very successful in
his choice: it would be difficult in any case to pick out a guiltless
woman, and, even in the remote chance of his doing so, the woman’s
protestations would not be believed; while those who have forgotten the
fidelity due to their liege lords, imagining that everything is known
and about to be proclaimed, confess at once, so that they can give
their own version of the story. The Egugu man then administers a few
stripes to the culprits himself, and leaves them to the tender mercies
of their spouses and the jeers and sarcasms of those more fortunate
females who have gone through the ordeal in safety.
Should the village be pleasantly situated, and the people unusually
hospitable, this flimsy juggler will remain in it for several days,
examining the women in detail; and, when he has eaten up all the good
things, or when he thinks he has nearly exhausted his welcome, for
he is too wary to spoil his pleasant profession by overdoing it, he
moves off to another village and commences anew. As he is sometimes
accompanied by as many as one hundred followers, or disciples, all of
whom are fed and housed at the expense of the village, this absurd
custom must be rather a tax upon the natives; but no village is visited
more than once a year. It has always been a wonder to me that every
negro in these countries does not set up as an Egugu man, or, at all
events, become a follower of one, since it would be impossible to
conceive a mode of life more pleasing to the negro mind. He goes about
from village to village, fêted and honoured, living on the fat of the
land, with no work to do, plenty to drink, the luxury of beating women
and the satisfaction of being regarded with awe and wonder, all this
too for nothing but the trouble of a little humbug; and it is certain
that there would be an immediate rush of the male population for
similar appointments were it not that they are sufficiently credulous
to believe that there is really some sorcery or supernatural power at
the bottom of the business.
Among the Sherbros there exists a secret society, which consists of
various families, bound together by mysterious ceremonies for offensive
and defensive purposes, and other reasons which are unknown. If my
memory serves me rightly, this society is called the Society of Bonn,
and the families composing it meet at stated periods to celebrate
their union with infamous rites; and annually, at one such meeting,
a virgin is put to death, the victim being supplied by each family
in rotation. Each member of the society is bound by diabolical oaths
to preserve the secrets of their rites, and to slay any other member
whom he may suspect of revealing them; thus all that is known about
the fraternity has been gleaned from the reports of natives who do not
belong to it, and who cannot know much about it; though some do assert
that they have been hidden eye-witnesses of the annual human sacrifice.
That such a society does exist, and that its members do put a young
girl to death every year, is, however, well authenticated; and a French
trader residing in the Sherbro on one occasion almost surprised them in
the actual commission of the murder. I will give his story in his own
words: he said--
“M. A---- my principal, sent me from Sherbro island to some chiefs
on the mainland who were large customers of ours. I had six or seven
Krooboys with me, and was away a little more than a week. On the
last day, when I was coming towards the coast, I was delayed by one
of my boys getting into some little trouble at a village, and, about
nightfall, found myself at eleven or twelve miles from the sea. There
was a good path through the forest, so I determined to go on and get
back to the factory that night--I was in a hurry to return to a good
bed and something fit to eat.
“You have walked perhaps in the forest at night _mon ami_, and you know
the feeling of awe which the darkness, the silence, and the sombre
trees, with their long arms reaching towards you, awakes within one.
The night was dark, dark as a pit; not a sound was to be heard but
the rustling of our feet on the dead leaves, and the grey trunks of
the trees stood up all round in the forest like spectres. I was very
tired--I had been walking nearly all day, and we did not get along very
quickly; so that about nine o’clock we were still in the forest, and
neither the Krooboys nor myself were sure that we were in the right
path--we had passed several forks, and had taken the road that seemed
to lead towards the sea, but you know how these paths twist and wind
about.
“Suddenly, in the midst of the dead silence, a chorus of howls and
screams, the most horrible, the most blood-curdling, rose up in the
depths of the forest, and died away in a long, low, melancholy wail. I
was startled--not frightened--for I am not more superstitious than most
men; but the cries had been so sudden, and were so strange, that we all
stopped still. All was as silent as the tomb, and we were so quiet that
I could hear the breathing of the Krooboys. While we were standing with
our ears straining to hear, the sound came again louder and louder--it
seemed to be some little distance away in the direction in which we
were going. I told the boys to go on, and I followed them. Six, seven,
and eight times this long cry--the most despairing--, it made my blood
run cold, was repeated; and then we heard the noise of the beating of
drums. We knew then that it was only some natives observing a custom,
and that there must be a village near; so we walked on. Soon the drums
stopped, and the night was again as still as the grave.
“Suddenly, without any warning, we turned an acute corner in the path;
and I saw before me some few houses, and a crowd of people standing
together round something, in a clearing of the forest--they had with
them two or three little lamps. At the same moment that I turned the
corner and saw this, I heard a shriek, the most horrible--the shriek
of a woman in the agony which is mortal. My hair raised itself on my
head--my Krooboys stopped and muttered to themselves. I ask of them the
cause, and they tell me of some secret brotherhood of the people, who
sacrifice each year a woman. I draw my revolver: I cry to them--‘_En
avant--En avant_;’ and we all run fast to the crowd. Then, pst, pst,
out go all the lights; I hear the rustling of many feet; all again is
black darkness.
“We reach the square of the village: there is nothing--nobody to be
seen. Nobody? Ah! _Mon Dieu_, somebody. I nearly fall over some object
which strikes my feet. I look down to see what it may be, and I see
a corpse. Yes, a corpse of a young girl, _une pucelle_; still warm.
I look for the cause of death, and I find, horrible to speak of, on
the left breast a dreadful wound, a cavity--the flesh tom away. _Mon
ami_, the heart of that poor girl had been torn out. Ah! so young, such
beautiful limbs--It is the work of the accursed fraternity.”
“Well,” said I, when he had arrived at this point, “what did you do?”
“Do? What could I do? Nothing at all. There was not one person left in
the village--I searched each house: all empty. Could I go and hunt in
the dark forest for the murderers? No--I went on my way and arrived at
my factory.”
“I suppose you told the Commandant of Sherbro about this?” I inquired.
“Yes, I told him; but he said he could do nothing, and it was not
advisable to make trouble. It is many years ago now, and Chief Manin
had just signed a treaty with your Government. They did not wish to
have any more palaver.”
When I arrived at Sierra Leone in January 1881 everybody was talking
about an extraordinary instance of tenacity of life which had come
to light three or four days previously. It appeared that a European
madman, who, for safe keeping, had been confined in the Colonial
Hospital, escaped from custody one afternoon; and, being pursued,
jumped, about nightfall, into the sea from the harbour works. Some
boats put out after him, but as nothing was to be seen of him it was
concluded that he was drowned. About 9 p.m. on the same day, the
occupants of a boat returning from Cape Sierra Leone heard, as they
were passing King Tom Point, somebody groaning on the beach; they put
ashore, and found the escaped maniac lying on the rocks in a horrible
condition. During his swim from the harbour works to the spot in which
he was found, a distance of some half-a-mile, he had been pursued and
attacked by the sharks which swarm in the harbour, had lost an arm, and
been dreadfully lacerated about the shoulders and thighs. From his own
account they seemed to have kept up a running fight with him; and how
he contrived to reach the shore, and, in his mutilated condition, draw
himself up out of reach of his pursuers, was as great a mystery as was
his subsequent recovery from his injuries.
About 4·30 p.m. on January 28th, just before parade, we were surprised
by the unusual spectacle of two steamers coming round the cape
together; there was a general rush for telescopes, and we saw that one
of them was the outward-bound steamer “Cameroon,” which had only left
the harbour about half-an-hour previously, and the other the mail from
the Coast. This latter had the signal “Government Despatches” flying;
it was evident that something was wrong down on the Gold Coast, and
that it was of sufficient importance for the “Cameroon” to turn back.
Imagination was at once busy as to what was up: some said it was the
long-expected mutiny of the Houssa constabulary, others a revolt of the
Accra people on account of the imprisonment of their king, Tacki, by
Mr. Ussher, the late Governor, and a third party that the Awoonahs had
risen; but while we were still deliberating, and before the steamers
had dropped anchor in the harbour, the “fall in” sounded and we had to
go on parade.
About five, while the parade was still going on, a Colonial messenger
darted on to the parade ground, seized the commanding officer, and
thrust a voluminous despatch into his hand. The latter cast a hurried
eye over it, and instantly moved off with hasty strides towards a
hammock that was waiting for him outside; calling out to his second in
command that the parade was to be dismissed, but that no officers or
men were to leave barracks. We knew then that something serious was the
matter, and went and sat down by the fountain in front of the mess
to wait for the news. At about 6 p.m., when our patience was nearly
exhausted, an official appeared, panting and blowing up the hill. He
came towards us, and said, in gasps:
“Gentlemen--The fact is this, gentlemen. It’s simply this, gentlemen.
Bloody wars, gentlemen--Bloody wars.”
This was highly satisfactory, but did not enter much into detail, so
we applied for more information. We then learned that King Mensah of
Ashanti had sent the golden axe to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Gold
Coast colony at Cape Coast, to demand the surrender of a fugitive;
and, on the 24th, when the surrender was refused, had, through his
ambassadors, declared war against the British. We heard further that
the homeward-bound steamer was going direct to Madeira to telegraph
the news to England, and that troops were to go down by the S.S.
“Cameroon” next day. The Government of the Gold Coast had asked for
three hundred and fifty men, but, as the entire garrison of Sierra
Leone only consisted of four companies, that is a little over four
hundred men, the authorities had decided that it would not be wise, on
account of the Timmanees, to denude the Colony of troops to so great
an extent, and about two hundred were to be despatched with stores and
ammunition. Of course everybody wanted to be among the two hundred:
the news had spread among the men, and a tremendous cheering broke out
all over the barracks; they were delighted with the prospect of a brush
with the Ashantis, and the band volunteered _en masse_. By 7 p.m. it
was decided which companies were to go, and I found mine was one of the
lucky ones: as we were to embark at 3 p.m. next day there was plenty of
work to be done, while to make matters worse there was a dinner to be
given that very night, and the guests would have to be looked after and
entertained.
That night the excitement rose to boiling point: we who had been
selected to go were objects of envy to all the less fortunate people
who had to remain behind, and who went about with long and melancholy
faces bewailing their ill-fortune and cursing their luck. The guests
quoted Byron, talked of “sounds of revelry by night,” and drew
comparisons, entirely in our favour, between the ball at Brussels on
the eve of Waterloo and our dinner on the eve of departure for the new
Ashanti war. They shook hands with us time after time, their voices
thick with emotion; some almost shed tears as they suddenly awoke to
the fact of their great affection for us, and thought that they might
never see us again; while others, more sanguine, prophesied all kinds
of impossible honours as our share of the coming campaign. It was out
of the question to got away from these warm-hearted partisans, and it
must have been nearly daybreak before we got to bed.
At 2 p.m. next day, after such a morning of work as I am in no hurry
to experience again, the two companies paraded, and we marched down
the hill to the harbour, headed by the band. I never saw Freetown in
such a state of excitement; every road was crammed with men, women, and
children, shouting, cheering, laughing, and crying, and the crush was
so great that there was scarcely room for the column to march; but at
last all were safely got on board, and at 5 p.m. the “Cameroon” steamed
off direct for Cape Coast. We had on board forty-five tons of stores,
two 4-2/5-inch howitzers, and almost all the ammunition of the Colony,
the whole of which had been put on board in half-a-day.
CHAPTER XI.
Ashanti Politics since 1874--The Secession of Djuabin--Diplomatic
Mistakes--The Conquest of Djuabin--The Importation of Rifles--The
Attempt on Adansi--The Salt Scare--The Mission to Gaman and
Sefwhee--Dissensions in Coomassie--The War Party.
While the “Cameroon” is on the way to Cape Coast Castle a short
_résumé_ of Ashanti politics from the close of the war of 1874 may,
perhaps, be considered not out of place.
After the burning of Coomassie a bloodless revolution took place.
King Quoffi Calcalli, or, as the natives pronounce it, Karri-Karri,
was deposed, and his brother Osai Mensah reigned in his stead. The
dethroned monarch should, in accordance with Ashanti etiquette, have
committed suicide on being degraded from his position; he did not do
so, however, and was permitted to go into retirement in the country,
with a few followers.
About the same time, Asafu Agai, King of Djuabin, the chief feudatory
of the Ashanti kingdom, seceded, taking with him the chiefs of Assuri,
Affidguassi, and Insula, and formed the independent kingdom of Djuabin.
It was foreseen that the Ashantis, a proud and haughty race, would
not submit tamely to the establishment of a rival power on their very
border, especially when that rival had so recently been subject to
them; and, towards the end of 1874, when matters began to assume a
threatening aspect between the Ashantis and the Djuabins, Captain C. C.
Lees was despatched to Coomassie by the Government of the Gold Coast
Colony to preserve peace. Their recent defeat by the British was so
fresh in their memory that the Ashantis were amenable to reason, and
Captain Lees succeeded in persuading both Osai Mensah and Asafu Agai to
swear to refrain from hostilities.
From that moment the Colonial Government withdrew from all active
interference in the affairs of the tribes living beyond the boundaries
of the Colony; and, although for the next four or five years the
Ashantis left no stone unturned to regain their former position and
undo the work done by Sir Garnet Wolseley, the Colonial Government
merely looked on as passive spectators and allowed them to do it.
The policy of the Government of the Gold Coast appears to have been at
this time one of strict non-intervention, but whether dictated by the
Colonial Office or not, I cannot say. In any case it was diametrically
opposed to the policy which had inaugurated the Ashanti war, and was
most detrimental to British interests and influence. Having committed
ourselves to the war of 1873-4, it was impossible to withdraw and
say we would not interfere further. The chief military power of that
portion of Africa had received a severe blow; the Ashanti kingdom
had almost fallen to pieces; and, as the authors of the shock, we
were responsible for the consequences. What would these consequences
be? Either Ashanti would be split up into a number of insignificant
independent chieftainships or regain its ascendancy, or Djuabin would
assume the place lately held by Ashanti. It was evident that one of
these three things would happen if we decided to take no part in
occurrences beyond our frontier.
But which was the consummation that the wire-pullers at the Colonial
Office desired? Surely not the first; for the breaking-up of Ashanti
into two or three tribes, who would be independent of each other,
would lead to constant petty wars, the closing of the roads, and the
paralysation of commerce. Surely not the second; for, if Ashanti
regained her ascendancy, the lives and treasure expended in the war of
1873-4 would be as so much waste. Surely not the third; for, if Djuabin
became the dominant military power, what guarantee had we that she
would not be equally, perhaps more, aggressive than Ashanti had been;
and with what could we keep her in check?
Our policy at this time should clearly have been to play off Djuabin
against Ashanti, to use the one to keep the other in check, just as
might be required; if necessary, to support the one or the other by
force of arms, so that the balance of power, which had happily taken
place, should not be disturbed. Nothing could have been easier than to
do this. If Ashanti should make war upon the Colony we could employ
Djuabin to threaten Coomassie; and if the latter should menace our
possessions we could let loose the Ashantis upon the Djuabin capital.
As for preserving peace between the two rivals, our position on the
sea-board within easy striking distance of each was admirable, and
the two nations were so nearly equal in power and resources that an
intimation from the Colonial Government to either of them which might
seem disposed to provoke hostilities, that any act of aggression would
be considered a declaration of war against England, would effectually
have prevented any outbreak. This grand opportunity was unfortunately
neglected, and the consequences have still to be suffered.
After Captain Lees’s mission to Coomassie and Djuabin the subtle
Ashantis remained quiet until about July 1875, satisfying themselves
with storing up supplies of salt, powder, and lead, and re-organizing
their army, to the chief command of which Awooah, the brother of the
late general, Amanquatia, succeeded. King Mensah also placed on record
how keenly he felt the injustice of the British in not calling upon the
king of Djuabin to pay a fair proportion of the war indemnity which had
been inflicted on the entire kingdom by Sir Garnet Wolseley, the whole
of which Ashanti, though reduced to half her former area, had now to
pay.
In July, King Mensah addressed a letter to the European merchants of
Cape Coast Castle, complaining of the action of the king of Djuabin,
that he was kidnapping Ashantis living on the Djuabin frontier, and
closing the roads to trade. This letter was duly forwarded to the
Government, but only elicited from the Governor the reply “that he
would act with reference to the affairs of the interior as seemed to
him advisable.”
There can be no doubt but that the head of the king of Djuabin was
turned by his sudden accession to power; he sent insulting messages to
Mensah, invited the tribes within the protectorate to come and share
the spoils of Coomassie with him; and by the middle of August 1875 the
excitement on each side had become so intense that no mere negotiation
or mediation could have averted war, whatever it might have effected if
it had been employed at an earlier period.
Matters were further complicated by the mission to Coomassie of a
Monsieur Bonnat, who was desirous of opening trade with Salagha, a
large and populous Mohammedan town, said to be eight days’ journey to
the north-east of Coomassie. M. Bonnat visited the Ashanti capital in
company with Prince Ansah, the uncle of the king, and appears to have
mixed himself up a great deal with native politics. From Coomassie he
went to Djuabin, where he very naturally was regarded with suspicion,
on account of the circumstances under which he had visited Coomassie.
M. Bonnat was accompanied by a number of Ashantis as carriers and
servants, and some sixty of these were murdered by the Djuabins. In
extenuation of this outrage King Asafu Agai afterwards said the murder
was ordered by the Keratchi fetish, which is the great fetish of
Djuabin and of several other tribes of the interior.
War was now inevitable, but Osai Mensah was so afraid that Great
Britain would interpose that he still delayed. Towards the end of
September a fresh _casus belli_ occurred. The inhabitants of five
villages on the borders of Djuabin notified to King Mensah their desire
to secede from the kingdom of Djuabin and to be incorporated with that
of Ashanti. Mensah accordingly sent some of his officers to these
villages, where they were attacked by the Djuabins. In the skirmish
which ensued the Djuabins were forced to retire, and the inhabitants of
the five villages migrated into Ashanti.
When the news of this affair reached Cape Coast Castle the Government
at last awoke to the fact that something ought to be done. They
accordingly despatched an army surgeon, who was temporarily in their
employ, with instructions, first, to proceed to Eastern Akim, and warn
the king of that territory, who had been tampered with by the Djuabins,
that he was not to take part in the probable hostilities; and,
secondly, to proceed from Akim to Djuabin and Coomassie, and forbid the
war, reminding the two kings of the oaths they had sworn to Captain
Lees.
This officer left Accra on October 23rd, 1875, but his mission had been
kept so little secret that his intended departure had been known for
some time; and, a week before he left Accra, both Djuabin and Ashanti
messengers had started from Cape Coast Castle to carry the intelligence
to their respective masters, and to inform them that if they wanted
to fight they must do so at once, “for the white man was coming to
palaver.”
The Colonial envoy reached Kibbie in Eastern Akim on October 29th, and
next day Djuabin messengers reached him with the intelligence that the
Ashantis had invaded their country in two divisions, one of which was
encamped within a few miles of the capital. On October 31st the town
of Djuabin was attacked by the Ashantis, the conflict raged during the
next two days, and on November 3rd the Djuabins were put to flight in
every direction.
The envoy at once proceeded to Djuabin, which town he found in the
hands of the Ashantis. Foreseeing that the prestige of this victory
would do much to restore Ashanti to her former position, and cancel
the beneficial results of the war of 1873-4, he wrote to the Governor
at Cape Coast Castle recommending that Djuabin should be occupied by
a British force. This proposal was not entertained. Indeed, it would
have been injudicious in the extreme, with the handful of troops at
the disposal of the Government, to endeavour to snatch the fruits of
victory from a warlike people in their hour of triumph. Action of this
kind should have been taken earlier, but the opportunity had been
allowed to pass, and it was now too late.
The Djuabins, being short of munitions of war, could make but little
headway against their opponents. The importation of arms and gunpowder
was then prohibited on the Gold Coast, which embargo, while it did
not affect the Ashantis, who could obtain what they required through
the French port of Assinee, entirely prevented the Djuabins from
replenishing their stock. A large supply of powder was, however,
successfully smuggled up the Volta river by Djuabin agents and sent
into Eastern Akim. A force of Constabulary was stationed there at the
time, partly to disarm the fugitive Djuabins and prevent the Ashantis
pursuing them into the protectorate, and partly to prevent the Akims
aiding the Djuabins. The officer in command of this force somehow got
wind of the smuggled powder. To an ordinary mind it would have appeared
that, as the Djuabins were, in a measure, fighting our battles, this
would have been a good opportunity for a display of that official
blindness which is so frequently conspicuous at other times. The
Constabulary officer thought otherwise; the powder was intercepted on
the Djuabin frontier; and the Djuabins, being unable to continue the
struggle, flocked by thousands into the protectorate. The Ashantis knew
better than to follow the fugitives into our territory, and satisfied
themselves with establishing their authority in Djuabin more firmly
than ever. Some months later the Government discovered that Asafu
Agai was meditating an attempt for the recovery of his throne; he was
arrested with a promptness that is seldom displayed on the Gold Coast,
and transported to Lagos.
The results of the victorious campaign were soon discernible in the
altered tone of Osai Mensah. The surgeon who had proceeded to Djuabin
went thence to Coomassie, where he was treated with but scant courtesy
and could effect nothing. Next by his behaviour, and the threatening
attitude of his people to the officer sent to Coomassie for the
instalment of the war indemnity then due, he, as I have related in
Chapter III., so intimidated the Colonial Government that the question
of the payment of that indemnity was allowed to drop, and has never
since been revived. Thus in less than two years from the burning of
Coomassie the Ashanti diplomacy had met with such success that Mensah
had recovered the whole of the Djuabin territory, repudiated the
payment of the war indemnity, re-established the prestige and power
of the Ashanti name, and outwitted the Colonial Government upon every
point.
In 1876 and 1877 the Ashantis occupied themselves with the internal
administration of their newly-acquired territory, and in the purchase
of breech-loading rifles, which they obtained principally through
Assinee, though a considerable number were smuggled, viâ Danoe, the
Quittah lagoon, and the Volta river, into Djuabin.
In 1878 the Colonial Government at last grasped the fact that the
interdiction on the importation of arms and gunpowder only crippled the
revenue of the Colony and the power of the protected tribes, without
materially affecting those for whom it was specially designed, and
consequently withdrew it. No sooner was the prohibition at an end than
the Ashantis, with an absence of disguise that was either the height of
impudence or the most consummate diplomacy, imported Snider rifles at
Cape Coast itself. On one occasion, towards the end of December 1878,
a batch of some three hundred arrived, consigned to Prince Ansah at
Cape Coast, and were duly received by Ashanti carriers who had been
waiting for them. As they were being transported to Prahou, the Fantis
of Dunquah, who seemed to be of opinion that it was not politic to
allow the Ashantis to possess such weapons, intercepted the convoy and
brought back the rifles to the District-Commissioner at Cape Coast.
To their surprise they were only reprimanded for their pains, and the
Ashantis, protected by an escort, were conducted with their purchases
in safety to Prahou.
Being now the happy possessors of a considerable number of
breech-loaders, the Ashantis conceived the plan of forming a corps
of Houssas, who would instruct the Ashanti army in the use of the
new weapon. To induce trained men of this race to desert from the
Gold Coast Constabulary, Mensah offered pay at double the rate paid
by the Colonial Government, free rations, and some local privileges.
The percentage of desertions from the Constabulary, always alarmingly
high, at once increased: and these deserters assumed the new _rôle_ of
musketry instructors to the Ashanti army. As they knew almost nothing
themselves, they could not impart much information to their pupils. A
German, who had been wandering about the interior for some time, made
himself useful in the formation of this _corps d’élite_, and brought
down Houssas from Salagha for the King.
There was nothing new in this endeavour to induce Houssas in British
pay to betray their trust. About September 1875, when M. Bonnat visited
Djuabin, he found some of the men of the Gold Coast Constabulary
armed, and dressed in the uniform of the force, in the service of
the King of that territory, and Asafu Agai had endeavoured by means
of them to prevent M. Bonnat returning to Coomassie. The causes that
led to the numerous desertions were not difficult to find. The Houssa
Constabulary was and is a purely mercenary body, ready to sell their
services to the highest bidder. In the days when Capt., now Sir John,
Glover, R.N., organised the nucleus of this force at Lagos, a man
enlisted for life service; he looked upon the Government henceforward
as a paternal power, which he would serve as long as his health and
strength admitted, and which, when he became old, would grant him an
annuity or gratuity on retirement. They were satisfied with this state
of things and were loyal to the backbone. In 1876, when the Houssa
Constabulary was being reorganized, by a most short-sighted policy
the term of enlistment was limited to three years. Now short service,
however excellent it may be with Europeans and in countries where
it is desirable to form rapidly a large reserve, is undoubtedly a
mistake with semi-civilized or barbarous peoples. The Houssas now saw
themselves liable to be cast adrift after three years’ service; their
engagement was no longer a life engagement, there was no gratuity or
annuity to be earned by long and faithful service; and so, if a man
had an opportunity of bettering his condition, there was nothing to
be lost by his at once taking advantage of it. At the termination of
his three years he would be discharged without any pension; why then
should he not desert and accept the higher rate of pay offered by King
Mensah? If the latter did not require his services longer than the
Colonial Government would have done, he would still be a gainer; and
the probability was that he would be retained for life. Being bound by
no consideration for their oath of fealty, they argued in this way, and
deserted.
In the spring of 1879, the Ashantis, having perfected their military
arrangements, began to look about for some further accession of
territory. At this time, a Mr. Huydekuper, one of those semi-educated
and unscrupulous negroes with which the English system of Mission
Schools has afflicted the Gold Coast Colony, was at Coomassie. He had
been, I believe, a clerk in a Government office, and was in high favour
with, and a confidential adviser of, King Mensah. This man, using
his knowledge of official forms, drew up fictitious despatches, and,
accompanied by Mr. Nielson (the German who had rendered himself useful
in the formation of the Ashanti corps of Houssas), and a retinue of
court-criers and officials from the Ashanti court, proceeded to Gaman,
a kingdom which lies to the north-west of Ashanti, on a diplomatic
mission. This mission was arranged under the superintendence of Prince
Ansah, and its object was nothing less than to inform the king of
Gaman, in the name of the Governor of the Gold Coast Colony, “that
the Queen of England had given the whole country from Kerinkando,
near Assinee, to Dahomey, to the king of Ashanti, and that the king
of Gaman was to swear to be subject to the king of Ashanti.” Before
reaching Buntuku, the capital of Gaman, Mr. Nielson died of fever, and
the mainspring of the mission, so to speak, was lost. Nevertheless
Mr. Huydekuper proceeded and delivered his message, producing his
manufactured despatches in support of his statement. He stated that the
Queen of England had given Ashanti dominion over all inland tribes,
and that he was ordered to administer to the king of Gaman an oath of
allegiance to King Mensah.
This intelligence, coming, as the Gamans at first believed, from a
fully-accredited ambassador of the Government, created the greatest
consternation among that section of the tribe which was hostile to
the Ashantis. The news spread like wild-fire to the Safwhees, a tribe
inhabiting the country to the west of Ashanti and to the south of
Gaman, and from them to the Denkeras. But for the death of Mr. Nielson
it is impossible to say what authority the Ashantis would not have
succeeded in gaining over these tribes.
While this little comedy was being enacted in the north, the Ashantis
endeavoured to coerce the people of Adansi, which kingdom was formerly
the smallest feudatory state of Ashanti, into returning to their old
allegiance. A portion of the Adansis were anxious to do this, but
the king, not being by any means desirous of resigning his late-won
independence, sent messengers to the Colonial Government at Accra.
Fortunately for the maintenance of British authority on the Gold Coast,
Capt. C. C. Lees, the officer who had succeeded in averting hostilities
between Ashanti and Djuabin in 1874, was administering the Government
of the Colony. Being the exponent of the true and only effective policy
in West Africa, he took up the threads of diplomacy where they had
been dropped by the non-intervening Governor in 1875, and despatched
the acting Colonial Secretary to Adansi with full powers. The mission
was entirely successful, and the Ashantis returned to Coomassie
baffled for once. So wedded, however, were the Colonial Office to their
policy of non-intervention, that, although this was the first success
after several years of diplomatic failures, they found fault with the
Acting-Governor for what he had done. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach in his
despatch said--“the action which you took was of a character which
might possibly have placed the Local Government, and ultimately the
Imperial Government, in some embarrassment, should the Ashantis decline
to comply with the demands made upon them[1] ... Adansi is not within
the protectorate, and the question of requiring the observance of the
third article of the Treaty of Fommanagh[2] is one of external policy,
on which the Government of the Gold Coast should refrain, unless in
case of urgent necessity, from definite action until Her Majesty’s
Government had decided whether the action proposed was proper and
opportune, having regard to the general interests of the empire. I have
to request that in future you will bear this caution in mind, and that
you will take no further steps in the matter now under consideration
without the previous sanction of Her Majesty’s Government.”
Fortunately, before the receipt of this letter, Capt. Lees had taken
further energetic action, which, had it been delayed until permission
had been obtained from England, would have been too late.
Immediately after this success on the part of the Government, Ashantis
appeared simultaneously at all the ports on the Gold Coast, and
purchased salt in immense quantities. Those who were best qualified to
judge of native questions considered that this was one of the worst
signs of the times. No salt is produced in the interior of this portion
of Africa, and in some parts of the inland plateaus it is worth almost
its weight in gold; being a necessary of life it must be had, and large
quantities are exported to the Gold Coast from Europe. Ordinarily, in
peaceable times, the Ashantis buy it as they require it, individually;
when, therefore, there seemed to be a sudden national movement for the
purchase of that commodity, it appeared as if the Ashantis feared that
the supply was about to be cut off, and were storing it up against
that contingency. As the supply could only be cut off by the Colonial
sea-board being closed against them, this action on their part seemed
to show that they premeditated coming into collision with the coast
tribes, that is, ultimately with the British; and when their late
purchases of arms and manœuvre in the north were called to mind this
became still more probable. In 1881 it transpired that an invasion of
Adansi was under consideration at this time, and was only postponed on
account of the Colonial mission to Gaman.
While all this was going on, in April 1879 a mixed embassy of Gamans
and Sefwhees arrived at Cape Coast. These envoys had been sent by
the kings of their respective states to ascertain what truth lay
in the statements which had been made by Mr. Huydekuper. As soon
as they learned that that individual was an impostor, the Gaman
ambassadors stated that their king had made him a prisoner; while
the representatives of both tribes asserted that their countrymen
were unanimous in desiring to maintain their independence, and that
both peoples alike bore a deadly hatred to everything appertaining to
Ashanti. They asked that an officer might return to Gaman with them, as
otherwise they might not be believed in what they had to say about Mr.
Huydekuper; and the Government, following up its more recent and more
enlightened policy, acquiesced.
Mr. John Smith was the officer selected by the Colonial Government
to proceed to Gaman. Of that country nothing was then known beyond
the fact that it had been engaged in several wars with Ashanti in the
last decade of the eighteenth century. Sir John Dalrymple Hay, indeed,
in his “Ashanti and the Gold Coast,” speaks (pp. 28 and 29) of “the
plains of Massa,” “the Gaman cavalry,” and “the Mahometan soldiery of
Gaman”; and that people was popularly believed to be an offshoot of the
Houssa tribes and to possess Houssa characteristics. It was reserved
for Mr. Smith to explode all these theories, and to make it known that
the Gaman territory was covered with forest, like that of Ashanti, and
that the people were fetish-worshippers, differing in no important
particulars from the tribes in their neighbourhood.
Mr. Smith left Cape Coast on May 15th, 1879, and reached Jooquah, the
seat of Quasi Kaye, king of Denkera, on the 16th. He left Jooquah
on the 18th, with the king’s son, an ocrah, and a sword-bearer, and
arrived at Becquai, the first Sefwhee town of importance, on June
6th. He remained at Becquai two days, and reached Yorso, the capital
of Sefwhee, on June 10th. Here the Governor’s message, to the effect
that Mr. Huydekuper’s statements were false, was delivered, after Mr.
Smith had been detained twelve days waiting for the chiefs to assemble.
In the course of conversation the king told him that the events of
1874 had decided him and his chiefs to give up their friendship with
the Ashantis and to ally themselves with the British; but that when
Mr. Huydekuper’s message to King Ajiman of Gaman became current his
two principal chiefs had wished to return to their former friendly
relations with Ashanti. The king wished to take an oath of allegiance
to the British Government, but this was declined.
On June 21st Mr. Smith left Yorso, and, travelling through incessant
rain and by flooded and almost impassable bush-paths, reached the
village of Appemanim, about twelve miles from Buntuku, the capital of
Gaman, on July 21st. Here a messenger from Buntuku met him, desiring
him to wait until the king had prepared for his reception. On the 24th,
having received no further information, he started for the capital, and
met on the road a messenger from the king requesting him to remain a
few days longer at Appemanin, as the king was not quite ready. He took
no notice of this message, and, continuing on his way, reached Buntuku
the same day.
King Ajiman promised to summon his chiefs and hold a meeting within two
days, but, what with one excuse and another, eight days elapsed before
any meeting was convened, and then it was held so late in the afternoon
that, before the chiefs had gone through the preliminary hand-shaking
ceremonies, the rain came down in torrents and dispersed them. While
thus delayed, however, Mr. Smith acquired the following information:--
1. That Mr. Huydekuper had left Buntuku immediately after the Gaman
messengers had started for Cape Coast, and was not, nor had been at any
time, a prisoner.
2. That the messengers sent to Cape Coast did not represent the entire
Gaman nation, as they had stated, but merely King Ajiman, Princess
Akosuah Ayansuah, the chief of Saiquah and chief Quabina Fofea of
Tackiman; and that the majority of the chiefs had declined to send
messengers, as they did not wish to break with Ashanti.
3. That the Gaman chiefs were dissatisfied with King Ajiman, and wished
to depose him and elect his half-brother Prince Korkobo to the stool.
4. That Prince Korkobo, who was strongly in favour of an Ashanti
alliance, was then at Banna, in Ashanti, with Mr. Huydekuper; and had
but recently plundered and burned some villages belonging to King
Ajiman.
Mr. Smith found in Buntuku an Ashanti captain, Opoku by name, who,
having come to demand the surrender of chief Quabina Fofea of Tackiman,
was living on the most friendly terms with the chiefs of the Korkobo
faction, and domineering over King Ajiman himself. From this it will
be seen how little reliance can be placed upon the statements of West
African ambassadors.
King Ajiman informed Mr. Smith that the chiefs would assemble on
August 7th, but, on proceeding to the place of meeting on the appointed
day, the latter found only the king himself there with the chiefs of
Tackiman and Saiquah, and one other. The king said the other chiefs
would appear shortly, and Mr. Smith waited. After waiting two hours he
was told that one chief was drunk and could not come, that another had
a sore leg which incapacitated him from attending, and that a third was
making fetish. He left the place of meeting, telling the king that if
he were again trifled with he would at once return to the coast.
Finally, on August 8th, a palaver was held and the Governor’s message
delivered to the assembled chiefs. No enthusiasm of any kind was
displayed. The king promised to hand over Mr. Huydekuper to Mr. Smith
in thirteen days, and, in answer to a question from that gentleman,
said publicly that he had full confidence in the fidelity of his chiefs.
Two days after this meeting King Ajiman paid Mr. Smith a private visit,
during which he said that he had told a falsehood when he had affirmed
that he had confidence in the fidelity of his chiefs, and endeavoured
to excuse it by saying that he dared not put them to shame at a public
meeting. He added that all his chiefs, with the exception of one, were
against him, and begged Mr. Smith to hold another meeting and compel
them to take an oath of allegiance to him.
On August 15th the meeting was held. The chiefs said that they had
many grievances against their king; among others, that he had received
several chiefs into the Gaman alliance without consulting them,
and that he had received from such chiefs “alliance money” without
apportioning a share to them, as was customary. On being asked to take
an oath of allegiance to Ajiman, they replied that they would consider
about it, and let Mr. Smith know as soon as possible.
On August 21st the chiefs re-assembled. As this was the day on which
the king had promised to hand over Mr. Huydekuper Mr. Smith asked for
him. The king replied that that individual was not in the town, but
that he would send again for him. Mr. Smith then told him that he need
not try to keep up the deception any longer, since he had known, from
the day of his arrival in Buntuku, that Mr. Huydekuper had never been a
prisoner, and that it was not now in the king’s power to make him one.
The chiefs declared that they could not come to any decision about the
oath of allegiance, because one of their number was absent.
On the 23rd another palaver was held at which the chiefs openly
declared that King Ajiman was their enemy, and refused to take any oath
of allegiance to him. Mr. Smith returned to his house, and in a few
minutes the king followed him. He declared that he would not remain in
Buntuku after Mr. Smith had left, and begged to be allowed to accompany
him to the coast for protection; however, after some trouble, Mr. Smith
succeeded in persuading him to remain and assert his position.
On August 24th Mr. Smith left Buntuku for Dadiasu, a village some
twenty miles from the capital, and was accompanied to that place
by the king, one chief, one captain, and the chiefs of Saiquah and
Tackiman--in fact all the king’s adherents. On the 31st, messengers
reached Mr. Smith at Awhetiaso, forty-five miles from Buntuku,
imploring him, in the name of the king, to return, as Prince Korkobo
had entered Buntuku the day after he had left, and was now trying to
oust the king from the throne, or rather from the stool. Mr. Smith
declined to interfere and proceeded on his journey to the coast.
This mission, though entirely unsuccessful in its aim, clearly
established the fact that, in the event of hostilities with Ashanti,
the Government could not rely upon any assistance from the Gamans.
The Sefwhees, it is true, were more of one mind in the matter, yet it
seemed almost certain, considering their close connection with, and
proximity to, Gaman, that the inaction of the one would paralyse all
movement on the part of the other.
In the latter part of the year 1879 and in 1880 Ashanti was convulsed
by internal dissensions. King Mensah was, and is, an unpopular monarch.
He is much more tyrannical and bloodthirsty than was his predecessor,
and, in defiance of the terms of the treaty of 1874, the number of
human sacrifices has largely increased during his reign. The sorest
point of all, however, with his subjects was that he despoiled them of
their gold on the shallowest pretexts, and imposed exorbitant fines
for the most trivial offences. People began to talk of the good old
times when Quoffi Calcalli was king, and that wily ex-monarch, who had
outlived the contempt with which he had at first been regarded for
outraging Ashanti prejudices by continuing to live when disgraced,
commenced to intrigue with the people of Kokofuah, the most thickly
populated district in Ashanti, and the one which supplies the largest
contingent for the army. In the meantime Mensah was not idle. He turned
his Houssa corps into a body-guard, and ensured its fidelity by gifts
and promises of future favour; he gathered round him his ocrahs and
retainers, and with this force, armed principally with breech-loading
rifles, he easily managed to stifle disaffection and maintain his
position.
There was yet another cause of dissension in Coomassie. Not a few of
the chiefs, at the head of whom was Opokoo, chief of Becquai, and
Awooah, chief of Bantami and general of the Ashanti army, were anxious
to declare war against Adansi. They had re-conquered Djuabin, their
chief feudatory, and had nothing to fear on that side. On their western
or north-western border too there was now nothing to fear, for although
King Ajiman of Gaman had contrived to regain a portion of his kingdom,
and had fought several undecisive skirmishes with the Korkobo faction,
still the latter was quite powerful enough to neutralise any hostile
movement on the part of the former against Ashanti. Further, these
chiefs knew that they could drive the handful of Adansis across the
Prah without any trouble, and they considered that to do this would
wipe out the disgrace of the defeats of 1874.
In fact the only thing which at this time prevented the actual invasion
of Adansi was the belief held by King Mensah and his chiefs that any
act of aggression against Adansi would be equivalent to war with Great
Britain; and they were led to this belief by the action taken by Capt.
Lees in the spring of 1879, and with which the then Secretary of State
for the Colonies had found fault. Notwithstanding this belief, the war
party in Coomassie were desirous of invading Adansi, and were quite
willing to take the risk of another war with England. Opposed to the
war party were the king, the queen-mother, and the court party. Mensah
remembered that he owed his present position to the downfall of Quoffi
Calcalli, who had lost the throne in his conflict with the British;
and, being advised by Prince Ansah at Cape Coast, he knew perfectly
well that should hostilities break out between Ashanti and Great
Britain his own ruin would be the result.
Although Mensah was not prepared to face the Colonial Government in the
field, yet he was as desirous as any of his chiefs to recover Adansi,
which would do so much to re-establish Ashanti in her former position
of supremacy, and so he pursued the traditional policy of the country.
The new Governor of the Gold Coast Colony, Mr. Ussher, sent presents
to the king on taking up his appointment, and the latter seized the
opportunity to send messengers down to Accra, nominally to thank
Governor. Ussher for his presents, but secretly to ascertain the views
and position of the Government with regard to Adansi. These messengers
were duly received and dismissed by the Governor and returned to Cape
Coast, where they remained, collecting information and watching events
on the coast, explaining their delay in returning to their own country
by a number of frivolous excuses.
It appears that about this time Mensah also sent a second mission to
Gaman, for in October or November, 1880, Gaman messengers came to the
Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Griffith, who had administered the Government
since the death of Mr. Ussher, at Accra, saying that the King of
Ashanti had sent a message to the Ajiman section of the Gamans to the
effect that he, Mensah, had paid a sum of money to the Queen of England
in order that the Gaman country should be placed under his rule, and
that, the Queen having consented to it, the Gamans were now his people.
While all this was going on, the war party in Coomassie had fast been
gaining the upper hand. The bellicose chiefs spoke of Quoffi Calcalli
as a man who, whatever might have been his other shortcomings, was,
at all events, not afraid of the white men, and recommenced their
intrigues with that individual. Matters became so serious that, in
December 1880, Mr. Buhl, the Secretary of the Basle Mission Society,
reported to the Lieutenant-Governor that there were rumours in Ashanti
that the country was going to war; and, in the same month, Chief Taboo
of Adansi informed the District Commissioner at Cape Coast that Chief
Opokoo of Becquai had publicly sworn before the king at Coomassie that
he would force Adansi to become again subject to Ashanti. Confusion
began to reign in Coomassie, and the struggle for supremacy between
the court and the war party was fast approaching a crisis, when the
events which led to the sending of the golden axe to Cape Coast in
January 1881 occurred.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Demands that they should return to their own country.
[2] The Treaty of Fommanagh was the one signed by Sir Garnet Wolseley
after the burning of Coomassie. The third article provided for the
independence of Adansi.
CHAPTER XII.
Cape Coast--The Panic--The Golden Axe--Preparations for
Defence--Ansah--A divided Command--A second message from the
King--Native Levies--Ordered to Anamaboe.
At 2 p.m. on February 2nd the “Cameroon” dropped anchor off Cape Coast
Castle, and the whole reinforcement was landed in safety through the
surf by 4 p.m.
The panic reigning on this portion of the Gold Coast would have been
amusing had it not been so disgraceful. Seven thousand men had been
asked for from England, though the last war had been brought to a
successful termination with two West India regiments and two European
battalions, for practically the 23rd Regiment took no part in the
operations. The walls of Elmina Castle, a fortress impregnable at any
time by savages, had been heightened with sand-bags, as though regular
siege approaches were anticipated; and a few days before our arrival
the advisability of abandoning that post, together with Fort St. Jago,
and withdrawing the garrison of Houssa Constabulary to Cape Coast, had
been seriously entertained. One hundred and fifteen Houssas were at
Prahsu and forty at Mansu, but no attempt was to be made to arrest the
advance of the enemy by occupying either of these places in force and
raising field-works; and on February 3rd it was decided that the whole
available force of the Colony should be employed in the defence of the
forts of Anamaboe, Cape Coast, Elmina, and Axim. In other words, the
Ashantis were to be allowed to ravage the whole country from the Prah
to the sea, and the natives were to receive no protection whatever;
while the garrisons were to be shut up in inglorious safety within
stone walls. A high Colonial official said to me:--
“Oh! we’re so glad you fellows have come. There has been no safe place
to go to at all, and hardly a man-of-war about to get on board of.”
People seemed to imagine that the Ashanti army had been supplied by
some enterprising contractor with seven-leagued boots, and could move
in one spring from the northern border of Adansi to the sea-board
without our receiving any warning, or information concerning their
progress, from the inhabitants of the country. The Lieutenant-Governor,
with his principal officers, had taken refuge in the Castle, and,
although the ambassadors with the axe had only left Cape Coast Castle
on their return journey to Coomassie on January 26th, a scare had taken
place on the night of February 1st, when everybody must have been aware
that the messengers had not had time to reach their capital. Some
intelligent negro alarmed the town in the dead of night by declaring
that he had seen the advancing Ashantis on the Prah road, about three
miles from the Castle. Upon this, the garrison was got under arms, a
patrol sent out, and all the lights in the Castle extinguished. The
object of this last strategic movement is difficult of discovery,
unless it was done in the hope that the Ashantis might not see the
Castle in the dark, and so pass on and go elsewhere.
Europeans professed to feel unsafe even in the forts, when they must
have known from past events, such as the defence of Anamaboe Fort by a
garrison of some thirty-nine men against an entire Ashanti army, that
the Ashantis could never venture seriously to attack them. In fact the
Ashanti is only dangerous in the bush, and when once he comes into
the open, or ventures to attack fortified posts, he is of but little
importance. Had an invasion really been taking place, thousands of
people from the bush villages would have been flocking into Cape Coast
for refuge; but that town remained in its usual stagnant condition, and
the natives declared that no advance of the enemy was imminent.
What had really been said and done by the ambassadors was, moreover,
not very clear. It appeared that on January 18th a refugee from
Coomassie, who had arrived at Cape Coast a day or two previously, had
presented himself at Elmina Castle to claim protection. He stated that
he was an Ashanti prince, named Awoosoo, and that, having incurred King
Mensah’s displeasure, he had sought safety in flight. On January 19th a
messenger from the king, with the golden axe and accompanied by three
court-criers, demanded an audience of the Lieutenant-Governor. This
messenger was a son of the late Ashanti chief, Amanquah Roomah, and he
brought with him to the audience Enguie and Busumburu, the two Ashanti
messengers who had been sent to thank Governor Ussher for his presents,
and who had since been living in Cape Coast collecting information. The
former of these two had signed the Treaty of Fommanah with Sir Garnet
Wolseley, and the latter was an Ashanti captain.
After the usual compliments the messenger stated that the king had
sent him to tell the Governor that a man named Awoosoo, a son of a
prince of Ashanti, whoso ancestors were from Gaman, had been persuaded
by an Assin trader, named Amankrah, to run away from Coomassie to the
Protectorate; and the king had sent him to ask the Governor to send
back Awoosoo. Further the envoy demanded that Amankrah should be given
up, because, although he had been regarded by the king as a friend,
and had been for many years a resident in Coomassie, it had been
reported to the king that he had lately gone to Gaman and obtained
money from the king of that country upon a promise that he would use
his best endeavours to persuade Awoosoo to go to Gaman.
To this the Lieutenant-Governor replied that as Awoosoo had not
committed any crime, and was now under British protection, it was not
in his power to give him up to the king. Enguie then asked if the
Lieutenant-Governor would prevent Awoosoo from going to Gaman; and
was told in reply that he was free to go from British protection or
remain under it, as he pleased, no one having any right to control his
movements.
So far all who were present at the audience were agreed as to what had
occurred, but as to what followed there was a serious difference of
opinion. Some said that Enguie then stated that the Assins were people
who always caused palavers between Ashanti and the Protectorate, and
that the king said if the Lieutenant-Governor would not give up Awoosoo
he would invade Assin. Those who held to this version further stated
that Busumburu at once got up and confirmed this statement, and that
the Lieutenant-Governor thereupon called Enguie’s attention to the
treaty of Fommanah, and pointed out to him that an invasion of Assin
meant war with England.
Other officers who were present at the audience positively declared
that nothing of the sort had occurred, and that Enguie had at the
audience made no threat of invasion; but that, as it had been reported
that he had said to the interpreter, informally, and in the course of
conversation at the interpreter’s house, that if Awoosoo were not given
up the king would take Assin, the treaty of 1874 was shown to him.
For my part I am inclined to believe that this latter account is the
correct one; but it is a question which can never be satisfactorily
settled, as the evidence is so conflicting.
With regard to the golden axe, people spoke of it as being a
declaration of war, and said that it had been sent down in 1873,
which was not a fact. In reality the golden axe alone is neither a
declaration of war nor a menace. It simply means that the embassy which
bears it is no ordinary one, and that the matter on which the envoys
have come is one in which, as the senders think, great interests are at
stake. In this case, however, the axe was accompanied by an additional
emblem which did threaten hostilities. This was a fac-simile in gold of
a portion of the earthen-nest of a mason-wasp, which escaped the notice
of all Colonial officials, with but one exception, or was considered
by them unworthy of notice. This emblem denoted that if the affair on
which the golden axe was sent were not settled to the satisfaction of
the Ashantis they would use their stings, or, in other words, endeavour
to attain their ends by force. So little was this symbol understood in
Colonial circles that no explanation of its presence or meaning was
ever at any time demanded from the Ashantis, not even when, later, they
were protesting that they had never threatened or wished for war.
With reference to the report that Amankrah had induced Awoosoo to
escape from Coomassie, it seems evident that there was no truth in
it. The former stated that he met Awoosoo at Quissah near Fommanah,
and that he, Awoosoo, begged to be conducted to the Governor. Awoosoo
corroborated this, and neither of them could have any motive for
concealing the truth, if the flight had been arranged in Coomassie.
The story that Amankrah had received a sum of money from King Ajiman of
Gaman on a promise to do his best to induce Awoosoo to go to Gaman was
a plausible one. Awoosoo was the real heir of the Gaman throne, and,
if he appeared as a claimant for it, the rival factions of Ajiman and
Korkobo would bury their differences, and the Gamanites would become a
united people. Naturally, under these circumstances, the Ashantis were
very anxious to prevent him from going to Gaman. Awoosoo’s grandmother
was a princess of Gaman, and it was through her that he derived his
right to the throne, the female branches taking precedence of the
male in conferring birthright both in Gaman and Ashanti. She married
in Coomassie, and bore a daughter who married Prince Osai Cudjo of
Ashanti. Awoosoo was the offspring of this union, and was thus a prince
of Ashanti in right of his father and a prince of Gaman in right of his
mother; but, in consequence of the native rule of precedence, he was
considered to be a Gaman, and was always spoken of as a native of that
country.
After the departure of the messengers with the golden axe the Colonial
Government was suddenly seized with a violent craving for information
concerning the tribes of the interior, their relations with Ashanti,
and the position, in a military sense, of Ashanti itself. This was, of
course, a most praiseworthy desire, but all such information ought to
have been collected years before; and the eleventh hour, when all the
officials were more or less in a state of panic, was hardly the time at
which reliable data could be obtained or a temperate judgment formed.
The merest hearsay reports were listened with avidity, and jotted down
as most valuable evidence. Inquiries were made of Quabina Annuoah,
the linguist of King Chiboo of Yancoomassie-Fanti, who, according to
his own statement, had not been to Coomassie for sixteen years, as to
the condition of the Snider rifles which were in the possession of
the Ashantis, and which they had only obtained during the last three
or four years. Quabina promptly replied that Mensah had about three
hundred Sniders, with not many cartridges; that sometimes the rifles
were not cleaned for a week or two, and were now nearly all useless. To
show how utterly unreliable this was I may add that a few weeks later a
man named Amoo Quacoo, a blacksmith and a native of Accra, was brought
to me, and in the course of conversation stated that he had lately
returned from Coomassie, where he had been employed by the king in
looking after three hundred Snider rifles stored in the king’s house.
He said that the rifles were all in good condition, that the Ashantis
took great care of them, cleaning and oiling them daily; and that there
were about four boxes of ammunition to each rifle. Awoosoo had also
seen these three hundred rifles, and the Government at once jumped
to the conclusion that these were all the Ashantis possessed, until
the illusion was rudely dispelled by two Germans, Messrs. Buck and
Huppenbauer, who saw the king in Coomassie on February 5th, and counted
one thousand men armed with Sniders.
The statements of Awoosoo and Quabina Annuoah, to the effect that there
were now no good captains or generals in Ashanti, were gravely written
down; when the Government must, or at all events ought to have been,
aware that both Awooah, chief of Bantama, the conqueror of Djuabin, and
Opokoo, chief of Becquai, who had opposed such a vigorous resistance
to Sir Garnet Wolseley in 1874, were still in the land of the living.
The latter made his statement still more ridiculous by saying that
they could not get any men of his size (about 5 feet 7 inches). These
two men were also questioned as to the number of men King Mensah could
put into the field. The former is stated in the official documents to
have said 20,000 and the latter 30,000. I should like to know how these
figures were arrived at, for in the Tche language there are no words
which can specifically express any such numbers.
On January 30th Prince Ansah returned from Axim, where he had been on
some secret errand, probably superintending the transmission of the
three tons of powder, which were smuggled at Apollonia, to Coomassie;
on the next day, and on February 3rd, he had interviews with the
Lieutenant-Governor. He protested that the Ashantis had no intention
of making war, and that the Government was making a great mistake. He
further added that the golden axe did not denote hostile action, and
that both Enguie and Busumburu denied altogether having said that if
Awoosoo were not given up the king would invade Assin. He seemed much
impressed at the rapidity with which the reinforcement had arrived
from Sierra Leone. The Lieutenant-Governor, adopting a high tone,
told Ansah that he would demand 5,000 ounces of gold as compensation
for the expense to which the Colony had been put, and said that if
the king refused to pay it he would seize some of his territory. As
Ansah was not an accredited ambassador, but merely an agent, the
Lieutenant-Governor committed himself to nothing by this statement; and
probably the former knew quite well that the Imperial Government would
never allow us to take the initiative in any hostile measures.
The advent of the two companies from Sierra Leone had raised the total
strength of regular troops on the Gold Coast to 400 men. Houssas had
also been brought up to Accra, so that there were 295 men of the Gold
Coast Constabulary available, and thus stationed:--At Elmina, 140; at
Prahsu, 115; and at Mansu, 40. H.M.S. “Flirt” had arrived at Elmina,
and fifty of her men were held in readiness to land. These sensible
additions to the local defences had somewhat quieted apprehensions, but
there was still a good deal of excitement. The officials of the colony
had plucked up courage, and some positively bristled with warlike
ardour; the ordinary duties and peaceful habits of life were discarded,
the proverbial phrase “_Cedant arma togæ_” was cast to the dogs, and
high legal functionaries busied themselves in the proposed raising of a
local volunteer corps of native clerks and shopmen.
Earthworks were commenced at Java Hill and in the Government Garden
at Elmina, where, in June 1873, a handful of the Second West India
regiment had repulsed the main Ashanti attack with great slaughter.
This work, when completed, was to be garrisoned by the seamen and
marines from the men-of-war now lying off Elmina; but the senior
naval officer refused to land his men unless he was allowed to take
charge of the military operations. As there is a paragraph in the
Queen’s Regulations expressly stating that naval officers shall not
command troops on shore, this rather created a difficulty, which,
however, the Lieutenant-Governor met by placing, much to the disgust
of the military, the Houssa Constabulary under the orders of the naval
officer. The seamen and marines, to the number of some fifty, were then
landed, and remained in Elmina Castle for three days, at great peril to
their health, as they were not provided with helmets.
During his short reign the senior naval officer withdrew all the
Houssas from Prahsu and Mansu, on the grounds that if they were left
there they would be defeated and cut off. He did not seem to be aware
that it was the duty of outposts to delay the advance of an enemy
without compromising their own retreat, and to fall back slowly,
sending full information to the main body. When the Houssas were
withdrawn several thousand rounds of Snider ammunition were left at
Prahsu, which the Ashantis could have taken had they so pleased; and
had the enemy advanced we should have had to depend upon the ignorant
and panic-stricken natives for intelligence, and should have had no
reliable information as to the number, line of march, and armament of
the foe. In fact, it would be difficult to imagine a more inexpedient
step than this withdrawal of our frontier post, for, in addition
to weakening our military position, it naturally disheartened the
protected tribes, and encouraged the Ashantis.
Before, however, this division in the command was made, the Ashanti
messengers, both men of low origin, which in itself, considering the
serious state of affairs, was a slight to the Government, arrived
at Cape Coast, and had an audience with the Lieutenant-Governor on
February 8th. These messengers were Quabina Ewah, a court-crier, and
Quabina Oyentaki, a sword-bearer. They were accompanied by Enguie and
Busumburu.
These envoys had left Coomassie before the ambassadors with the golden
axe had returned, having in fact met them one day’s journey from the
capital, and brought the following message:--
“The king has heard that Houssas and officers are at Prahsu, building
a bridge. As all that is past is gone and done with, he wishes to know
what this means, and why the Governor is going to fight?”
The messengers complained that the Adansis had illtreated them on their
way through Adansi territory, and that they had seen them seize two
Ashanti traders from the Kokofuah district, and plunder them of their
goods and gunpowder. They further stated that the messengers with the
golden axe had told them that at an Adansi village, named Ansah, a
trader who had joined the retinue had been ill-treated and robbed of
his gun. They applied to the Lieutenant-Governor for redress, and were
evidently fully under the impression that Adansi was either included
in the British protectorate or that we were bound by treaty to protect
them from the Ashantis, and were consequently under the obligation of
seeing that no Ashantis were maltreated by them.
In fact the Adansis appear to have laboured under the delusion that we
were bound to support them, and so behaved in this manner. A renegade
is always more bitter than a foe who has not changed sides, and the
Adansis, having _ratted_ from the Ashanti kingdom when they conceived
it to be falling to pieces, were now displaying their animosity by
the--in this part of the world--unheard-of insult of molesting a
person in the retinue of an ambassador. As they are numerically an
insignificant tribe, they would not have dared to do this had they not
believed that Great Britain was bound to save them from the vengeance
of Ashanti; and, now that King Mensah fully understands that they are
not a protected people, and provided that our non-intervention policy
is still persevered in, their day of reckoning is not far distant.
One of the messengers, Quabina Eunah, having remarked that the Adansis
were clearing the roads, the Lieutenant-Governor said that they were
bound to do so by the treaty of Fommanah, and expressed a hope that the
king of Ashanti was also fulfilling his treaty obligations by keeping
the main road to his capital clear of bush, which expression elicited
nothing from the messengers but a laugh. Now whether he was annoyed at
this, or whether it was simply through ignorance of native customs (he
being quite new to the country and people), the Lieutenant-Governor
at once questioned the authenticity of the message, and asked the
messengers how he was to know that they came from the king. They
pointed to the gold plates on their breasts as being their insignia of
office, and the Lieutenant-Governor then said that the king ought to
have sent him something which he had seen before, and could therefore
recognise. Upon this Enguie sarcastically observed that hitherto the
Governor had seen nothing from the king but the golden axe, and as they
had left Coomassie before that state weapon had been returned to the
capital it was impossible that they could have brought it down; adding,
“even if his Excellency would like to see it again, which I doubt.”
Everybody felt that the Lieutenant-Governor had not got the best of
this little exchange of words, which had arisen through his groundless
suspicion.
The ignorance of the country and mode of thought of the natives
displayed by the Lieutenant-Governor’s advisers militated very much
against the taking of vigorous measures. A combination of native tribes
against Ashanti was talked of, and men who ought to have known better
did not hesitate to include the Gamans in this confederation. The truth
was, that the fact that a Gaman embassy had visited the coast in 1879,
and had stated that the whole nation was actuated by a bitter hostility
to Ashanti, was remembered; while all the information gained by Mr.
Smith in his mission to Buntuku, which tended to show that no such
feeling of ill-will existed, was forgotten. No doubt that gentleman’s
report had long since been lost sight of in one of the pigeon-holes in
the Private Secretary’s office. Native report concerning Gaman asserted
that King Ajiman had contrived to retain possession of the throne, but
that Prince Korkobo was, in all but name, the actual ruler, and had
been nominated Ajiman’s successor.
The only tribes in the British protectorate who could be relied upon
to furnish a certain quota of men are those of Denkera, Assin, Western
Akim, and Fanti. Wassaw, Ahanta, and Eastern Akim would not move in
1873, and do not seem to have any feeling of enmity to Ashanti; while
to utilize the men of King Blay of Apollonia away from their own
country would only be to tempt the disaffected natives surrounding his
territory to take up arms.
That the tribes in the neighbourhood of Axim and Apollonia were
disaffected was evident from the reports of the District Commissioner
there, Mr. Firminger, a young officer who had taken the trouble to
study what is too frequently neglected by the Colonial officers on
the Gold Coast, namely, the political relations of the tribes with
which he was brought in contact. He reported that the Awooins were on
the most intimate terms with the Ashantis, and that their disregard
for English law was owing to advice from Coomassie. The king of Bayin
was also on friendly terms with King Mensah, and in January 1881 had
sent one of his cane-bearers to Coomassie to reside there, and had
received in return an Ashanti agent to reside at Bayin. Mr. Firminger
says:--“Should any trouble occur with Ashanti I am assured that the
people from Bayin to the frontier would join them.”[3]
Under the general name of Fanti are included the petty kingdoms of
Cape Coast, Elmina, Effutu, Abrali, Dunquah, Dominassi, Anamaboe,
Mankessim, Ajimacong, and Mumford; and, generally speaking, the men of
these sub-divisions are worthless as soldiers, while Elmina and Effutu
are more than half friendly to the Ashantis. The number of men which
each chief could put into the field is enormously exaggerated; thus the
Anamaboe contingent is estimated at from 2,500 to 3,000, whereas it
would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to raise more than
500 men from that district. By using strong measures 4,000 men might
be got together from the Fanti tribes collectively, but they would all
rather carry than fight, and it would be better so to employ them.
On February 8th I received orders to proceed next day to Anamaboe
with 100 men and two 4-2/5-inch howitzers, and occupy the fort there,
which had hurriedly been put into a state of preparation, after having
been without a garrison for some fifty years. With some difficulty I
obtained permission to march to my destination instead of going by sea,
as fears were entertained as to the liability of my being cut off;
but I pointed out that as no enemy had yet crossed the Prah, and as
that frontier was seventy-four miles distant, there could be no danger
in a march which would only occupy a few hours. At that time war was
considered inevitable: the axe, accompanied by the wasp’s nest, was
a clear declaration of war; and Ansah’s declarations, and the second
message from the king, viewed by the light of similar protestations in
1873, were not considered of much account.
Under such circumstances, to garrison Anamaboe with 100 men was, from
a military point of view, a grievous mistake. In the first place it
reduced the already sufficiently small force at Cape Coast; in the
second place the Ashantis had never been near Anamaboe since 1807, and
were not likely to go there in 1881, since they had considered it too
insignificant in 1814, 1824, 1863, and 1873; and in the third place,
should the presence there of troops attract them, the force, being so
small, could only act on the defensive. Held with a force sufficiently
large to permit of offensive measures being adopted, Anamaboe would
be an excellent position, as it is some miles nearer to Dunquah, and
consequently to the Prah, than Cape Coast, and the flank of an army
threatening the latter town might most effectually be harassed from it.
FOOTNOTE:
[3] This opinion, which is based upon unmistakeable facts, shows how
precarious would be the position of the various Goldmining Companies
now endeavouring to induce the British public to take shares in
their enterprises. I have been asked by persons connected with these
Companies to state that in the event of complications with Ashanti the
Tarquah district would be quite free from molestation. I regret that I
am unable to do so; but I believe that immediately upon the outbreak of
hostilities the mining camps would be pillaged, the “plant” destroyed,
and the persons employed only able to save their lives by instant
flight. Of course, if the Colonial Government adopt measures for the
protection of these Companies, that is another matter; but the main
road from Assinee to Coomassie passes through Awooin, and the Ashantis
would not allow their main artery for the supply of munitions of war to
be cut off without opposition.
CHAPTER XIII.
A Teacher of the Gospel--Anamaboe--A third Message from the
King--Affairs in Coomassie--Downfall of the War Party--False
Rumours--Arrival of the Governor--A fourth Message from the
King--Further Complications.
At 5 a.m. on February 9th the company paraded, and we marched off to
Anamaboe, a distance of some twelve miles. We followed the Prah road as
far as Inquabim market, that is for about four and a half miles, and
then branched off to the right by a narrow and irregular bush-path over
the Iron Hills: the track was too narrow for two men to walk abreast,
and the procession consequently was strung out to some length. The
few natives we met, astonished at the unusual spectacle of soldiers
in this part of the country, and fancying we were going to seize them
as carriers, as was done in 1874, bolted into the bush directly they
caught sight of us, dropping their pots of water or loads of plantains
in their flight.
After three hours’ marching over vile roads and steep hills we halted
for an hour for breakfast at a small village in the bush about nine
miles from Cape Coast; the men piled arms and bivouacked under some
umbrella-trees in the centre of the village, while we, the officers,
went towards a fairly good sort of house that stood close by; The
owner and occupier of this mansion was a local preacher belonging to
some missionary society, and he at once said, like any other native
would have said, that we might make use of his house during our stay;
but added, unlike any other native, provided we paid him: we made
no difficulty about this, and proceeded to breakfast. While we were
discussing that meal the preacher came in accompanied by two young
girls, about twelve or thirteen years of age, attired in gorgeous
native cloths, with their wool distorted into the latest Fanti fashion,
and bedecked with brilliant handkerchiefs. We asked our host if he
required anything, and he said “No,” he had only come to do a little
business with us; we then inquired what that business might be, and,
after a little beating about the bush, he informed us that, as Anamaboe
was rather a dull place for Europeans, he thought we might like to buy
these two girls, and, if so, we could have them for 4_l._ a piece.
We asked him what authority he had for disposing of them in this
unceremonious fashion, and he replied that they were his servants; but,
on being pressed for further information, he confessed that they had
been given to him by their parents in payment of some debt--in fact
they were slaves. Much to his disappointment we felt ourselves obliged
to decline his generous offer, which refusal he attributed entirely
to the price, and lowered his terms first to 3_l._ 10_s._ and then to
3_l._, equally without success; while it was easy to see that the dusky
damsels considered our rejection of the proposal as a proof of our
exceedingly bad taste, and were as much disappointed and chagrined as
their master.
A little abashed at the manner in which we had treated his offer, the
preacher sent away the two young ladies to the back of his premises,
and, beginning to have a faint idea that he had somehow not risen in
our estimation, he endeavoured to retrieve his lost ground by falling
back upon his more legitimate occupation, and asked that we should
delay our departure in order that he might preach a sermon to the men.
The hypocrisy of this proposition, coming as it did immediately after
the other, was more than we could stand, and, expressing our thoughts
in unequivocal terms, we paid him what we owed, went out, and got the
men together ready to march off. The village pastor, however, was not
going to be done out of an opportunity of showing forth before his
unsophisticated flock, and, while we were preparing to start, delivered
an exhortation in which “the sword of the Lord and of Gideon,”
“soldiers of the Lord,” “smite with the edge of the sword,” and similar
expressions, were jumbled together in a meaningless jargon; while
when we moved off he strode alongside for some distance, open-mouthed,
shouting in a discordant voice that highly-appropriate hymn called
“Hold the Fort,” the work of those itinerant vendors of religion,
Messrs. Moody and Sankey.
Whenever I meet such creatures as this local preacher I am moved
to anger and restrain myself only with difficulty. Little children
in England stint themselves in the luxury of sweets by giving of
their scarce pence to aid the “poor missionaries,” and people who
can ill afford to be charitable contribute their mite to further the
promulgation of Christianity among heathen negroes; while scoundrels
like this preacher batten upon the subscriptions thus raised, live
in the best house in the village, acquire authority and wealth, and
lead a happy life of idleness and vice. The persons who draw up those
highly-coloured Mission Reports for the benefit of the gullible British
public have a great deal to answer for.
We reached Anamaboe about 10 a.m., and found the fort prepared for our
reception as well as could be expected under the circumstances. Of
late years it had been occupied by two or three Fanti policemen with
their numerous wives and dependents, and consequently was not as clean
as it might have been; while no attempt had been made to make good
the damage resulting from years of neglect. As a military position,
the defects which were the cause of the surrender of the fort to the
Ashantis in 1806 had not been remedied; the loopholes in the curtain
were so made that fire could only be brought to bear on a point some
forty yards from the walls, and persons beyond or within that distance
could not be touched, while the embrasures yawned to such an extent
that it would cost many lives to work guns so exposed to the fire of
an enemy. Added to this, the native swish-houses extended on one side
to within twenty yards of the walls; and on another side stood an
immense house, built of stone, which actually overlooked the bastions
and commanded the whole fort. As neither food nor water fit to drink
were to be obtained here, these necessaries of life had to be forwarded
daily from Cape Coast in surf-boats: sometimes the water, through some
oversight, failed to appear, and we had to use the dysenteric liquid
from the neighbouring pools, or go without; the former alternative was
usually chosen, and, in spite of every precaution, such as boiling and
filtering, a very large percentage of the men were constantly on the
sick-list. As for the officers, three in number, we were always more
or less ill. The town was in a condition of indescribable filth, and
at times the stench which arose was so suffocating that, in spite of
the intense heat, we were obliged to keep the doors and windows of
our rooms closed. The streets, the yards, the bush--in fact the whole
surface of the earth within a radius of half-a-mile from the fort--was
covered with the collected refuse of half-a-century, which, under the
combined influence of sun and rain, gave forth a curious variety of
pestilential odours. Altogether, Anamaboe was an exceedingly salubrious
and, under the circumstances, useful post.
On February 17th a third embassy arrived at Cape Coast from Coomassie,
consisting of a linguist, a sword-bearer, three court-criers, and an
old fetish priestess, the latter of whom threatened to utterly destroy
both the English and the Fantis if they did not at once abandon any
intention they might have of making war upon Ashanti. On the 18th these
ambassadors, with the exception of the old lady, had an interview with
the Lieutenant-Governor at Elmina, Enguie and Busumburu being again in
attendance. After the preliminary formalities, Bendi, the linguist,
said:--
“The king of Ashanti sends his compliments to his friend the Governor,
and bids me to speak to the Governor’s interpreter, and to tell him to
say to the Governor that some time ago an Assin trader, named Amankrah,
came to Coomassie to trade, and stole away the king’s son Awoosoo down
to the coast. When Prince Awoosoo ran away from Coomassie the king’s
messengers came to ask the Governor to give him up. But by the law of
England, if a man runs to the English Government for protection, he
cannot be given up. The king of Ashanti says--‘When my son ran away I
applied to the Governor to see if he could give him up to me. I have
no palaver with the Assins, but Enguie, out of his own head, said to
the Governor--‘If you do not give him up, some palaver will come.’ Your
Excellency must know that that was not the king’s message.’
“The Governor said--‘Give me the paper.’ He said to Enguie--‘Are you
Enguie? Are you the man who signed the treaty that Assin, Gaman, and
Denkera, should be under the English, and now do you come to me to
break the treaty?’ Enguie said--‘I do not break the treaty.’ After
this we wished to leave Elmina in order to go to Cape Coast, but next
morning a messenger came and told our messengers that they must not go,
for the Governor had still something to say. Then our messengers waited
and the Governor said he must make a book,[4] because Enguie had broken
the treaty. Our messengers replied--‘No one can read at Coomassie, but
we will take your letter to the king.’
“Then the letter was carried to the king, and the king said--‘Enguie
did not break the treaty. The words he spoke were his own words. He
was sent to the Governor to be kept on the coast. He is the Governor’s
servant, and it must not be said that he broke the treaty.’ For this
reason the king has sent us, his linguist and sword-bearer, to let the
Governor know that this is the case. We mean to say that Enguie himself
said these words, and not the king. He is the servant of the Governor
as well as of the king, and it was his own speech, and not the king’s
message.
“Again we say to the Governor, the king of Adansi made a report that
the king of Ashanti is going to march upon the Adansis and fight with
them. But, in consequence of the treaty between England and Ashanti,
the Ashantis would not come down to fight with anybody. They would not
bring a single gun across the Prah to fight. As to the people under
the English Government, the king will never come to fight any one of
them. The king says so. If the Governor has heard that the Ashantis are
ready to attack any part of the protectorate, the report is not true.
The king wishes to be a friend to this Governor, as Quacoe Duah was to
Governor Maclean. If any one says that the king of Ashanti intends to
attack the protectorate it is false, and not true. He has sent us to
say that it is not true. He wishes to be friendly with the Governor.
“As to the gold axe, it means nothing. It is not used as a symbol;
you can ask any of the chiefs about here. Amankrah Accoomah, the
axe-bearer, used to bring the axe, but it is no symbol. The king
says--‘You can tell the Governor that the axe is nothing.’ If any one
comes and reports to the Governor this and that of the king, let the
Governor send a messenger to the king, and the king will clear himself.
“We have finished. For this reason have we come, we wish to be friends
with the Governor. As to what Enguie has said, Enguie is the Governor’s
servant, and the Governor can forgive Enguie and let that pass.”
After this some conversation ensued, in the course of which both Enguie
and Busumburu, amid considerable confusion, denied that the former had
ever said that the king would attack Assin. The Lieutenant-Governor
thereupon called the Government interpreter, Davis, and in answer to
questions the latter said that Enguie had told him, at his house, that
if Awoosoo were not given up the Ashantis would attack Assin. It is
worthy of notice that Davis said nothing of any such threat having
been formally made during the audience with the Lieutenant-Governor;
indeed, for some inscrutable reason, the regular interpreter had not
been employed upon that occasion, and the duty of interpretation
had been left to a young clerk employed in the Colonial Office, a
fact which renders the theory of a formal threat having been made
exceedingly doubtful.
This was all that occurred of moment, and as the Governor, Sir Samuel
Rowe, was expected to arrive soon, the Lieutenant-Governor decided to
leave things as they were, and merely returned a message to the effect
that he was glad to hear of King Mensah’s peaceable intentions, and
that so long as these were manifest he would be his friend. Yet, having
heard that Sir Samuel Rowe would arrive in a few days, he thought it
better to leave the matter in his hands, as the Governor coming direct
from the Queen would know her mind on the subject.
Having seen what was taking place in the protectorate it may be now
interesting to know what the Ashantis had been doing in their capital,
and to ascertain the causes which led to the threatening attitude, and
to the subsequent peaceful and apologetic messages.
As I have endeavoured to show in Chapter XI., affairs were in rather a
critical condition in Coomassie owing to the struggle for supremacy
between the war and court parties, and the escape of Awoosoo, happening
at this crisis, placed the winning card in the hands of the former.
As I have already said, it was necessary in the interests of Prince
Korkobo of Gaman, the good friend and ally of Ashanti, that Awoosoo
should be detained in Coomassie, and the unexpected escape of a
person of such importance in Ashanti politics created the greatest
consternation, which feeling, when it became known that the fugitive
had claimed British protection, was soon mingled with a longing for
revenge. Numerous influential chiefs, who had hitherto either belonged
to the court party or had equally held aloof from both sections, now
joined the war party, which carried everything before it, and at the
“palaver” which was held Mensah could do nothing but acquiesce in their
proposals: in fact any attempt on his part to stem the popular current
would only have resulted in his downfall.
From time immemorial in Ashanti it had been the custom when any
important personage sought asylum with the British Government to send
an embassy to demand the surrender of the refugee, with instructions,
in the event of a refusal, to threaten prompt hostilities. At the
meeting of turbulent “caboceers” it was determined to follow this
haughty precedent, and the king was compelled to submit. To use the
words of an eye-witness--“The king said to the messengers who were to
start for Cape Coast--‘All black men are subject to me and I will have
my revenge for all this.’ He then took the golden axe and the golden
hoe, saying: ‘If this man should escape up a tree, here is an axe with
which to cut it down. Should he burrow into the ground, here is a hoe
with which to dig him up. Go, and bring him back.’”
This reference to the axe and hoe meant that the ambassadors were to
hew or make their way through all obstacles; and that, if necessary,
force would be used for the accomplishment of the mission on which they
were sent.
So far, but no further, was Mensah influenced by the powerful war
party. A number of the chiefs wished to declare war at once, without
waiting for any reply from the Government of the Gold Coast to their
demand; and Awooah, the Ashanti general, actually swore the king’s
oath, to break which is death, that he would drive the Adansis over
the Prah. He left Coomassie for Bantama, his town, to call out the
men of his district; but Mensah succeeded in persuading all the other
chiefs, except Opokoo of Becquai, to postpone actual hostilities until
the expected refusal of the Government, had been received, and Awooah,
finding only one chief ready to second him, gave up his project. As
he was too influential a person to be put to death, for in Ashanti as
elsewhere the law seems to be made rather for the poor than for the
rich, he was punished for breaking the king’s oath by the infliction of
a heavy fine.