1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God.
THOUGH God has given us no innate ideas of himself; though he has
stamped no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his
being; yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are
endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we have
sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as
long as we carry OURSELVES about us. Nor can we justly complain of our
ignorance in this great point; since he has so plentifully provided us
with the means to discover and know him; so far as is necessary to the
end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But,
though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and though
its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty: yet
it requires thought and attention; and the mind must apply itself to a
regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge,
or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other
propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration. To
show, therefore, that we are capable of KNOWING, i.e. BEING CERTAIN that
there is a God, and HOW WE MAY COME BY this certainty, I think we need
go no further than OURSELVES, and that undoubted knowledge we have of
our own existence.
2. For Man knows that he himself exists.
I think it is beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his own
being; he knows certainly he exists, and that he is something. He that
can doubt whether he be anything or no, I speak not to; no more than I
would argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince nonentity that
it were something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical as to deny his
own existence, (for really to doubt of it is manifestly impossible,) let
him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing, until hunger or
some other pain convince him of the contrary. This, then, I think I may
take for a truth, which every one's certain knowledge assures him of,
beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. that he is SOMETHING THAT ACTUALLY
EXISTS.
3. He knows also that Nothing cannot produce a Being; therefore
Something must have existed from Eternity.
In the next place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare
NOTHING CAN NO MORE PRODUCE ANY REAL BEING, THAN IT CAN BE EQUAL TO TWO
RIGHT ANGLES. If a man knows not that nonentity, or the absence of all
being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he should
know any demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is some
real being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being, it is an
evident demonstration, that FROM ETERNITY THERE HAS BEEN SOMETHING;
since what was not from eternity had a beginning; and what had a
beginning must be produced by something else.
4. And that eternal Being must be most powerful.
Next, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another,
must also have all that which is in and belongs to its being from
another too. All the powers it has must be owing to and received from
the same source. This eternal source, then, of all being must also be
the source and original of all power; and so THIS ETERNAL BEING MUST BE
ALSO THE MOST POWERFUL.
5. And most knowing.
Again, a man finds in HIMSELF perception and knowledge. We have then got
one step further; and we are certain now that there is not only some
being, but some knowing, intelligent being in the world. There was a
time, then, when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began to
be; or else there has been also A KNOWING BEING FROM ETERNITY. If it
be said, there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that
eternal being was void of all understanding; I reply, that then it
was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge: it being as
impossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly,
and without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it is
impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than
two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter,
that it should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it
is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself
greater angles than two right ones.
6. And therefore God.
Thus, from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find
in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this
certain and evident truth,--THAT THERE IS AN ETERNAL, MOST POWERFUL, AND
MOST KNOWING BEING; which whether any one will please to call God, it
matters not. The thing is evident; and from this idea duly considered,
will easily be deduced all those other attributes, which we ought to
ascribe to this eternal Being. [If, nevertheless, any one should be
found so senselessly arrogant, as to suppose man alone knowing and wise,
but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance; and that all the rest
of the universe acted only by that blind haphazard; I shall leave with
him that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully (1. ii. De Leg.),
to be considered at his leisure: 'What can be more sillily arrogant
and misbecoming, than for a man to think that he has a mind and
understanding in him, but yet in all the universe beside there is no
such thing? Or that those things, which with the utmost stretch of his
reason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any
reason at all?' QUID EST ENIM VERIUS, QUAM NEMINEM ESSE OPORTERE TAM
STULTE AROGANTEM, UT IN SE MENTEM ET RATIONEM PUTET INESSE IN COELO
MUNDOQUE NON PUTET? AUT EA QUOE VIZ SUMMA INGENII RATIONE COMPREHENDAT,
NULLA RATIONE MOVERI PUTET?]
From what has been said, it is plain to me we have a more certain
knowledge of the existence of a God, than of anything: our senses have
not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more
certainly know that there is a God, than that there is anything else
without us. When I say we KNOW, I mean there is such a knowledge within
our reach which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that,
as we do to several other inquiries.
7. Our idea of a most perfect Being, not the sole Proof of a God.
How far the IDEA of a most perfect being, which a man, may frame in his
mind, does or does not prove the EXISTENCE of a God, I will not here
examine. For in the different make of men's tempers and application of
their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another,
for the confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think, this I may
say, that it is an ill way of establishing this truth, and silencing
atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this upon
that sole foundation: and take some men's having that idea of God in
their minds, (for it is evident some men have none, and some worse than
none, and the most very different,) for the only proof of a Deity; and
out of an over fondness of that darling invention, cashier, or at least
endeavour to invalidate all other arguments; and forbid us to hearken to
those proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our own existence, and
the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our
thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand
them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth as can anywhere be
delivered, that 'the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the
creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made,
even his eternal power and Godhead.' Though our own being furnishes us,
as I have shown, with an evident and incontestible proof of a Deity; and
I believe nobody can avoid the cogency of it, who will but as carefully
attend to it, as to any other demonstration of so many parts: yet this
being so fundamental a truth, and of that consequence, that all religion
and genuine morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I shall be forgiven
by my reader if I go over some parts of this argument again, and enlarge
a little more upon them.
8. Recapitulation Something from Eternity.
There is no truth more evident than that SOMETHING must be FROM
ETERNITY. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could
suppose so manifest a contradiction, as a time wherein there was
perfectly nothing. This being of all absurdities the greatest, to
imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence of all
beings, should ever produce any real existence.
It being, then, unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude, that
SOMETHING has existed from eternity; let us next see WHAT KIND OF THING
that must be.
9. Two Sorts of Beings, cogitative and incogitative.
There are but two sorts of beings in the world that man knows or
conceives.
First, such as are purely material, without sense, perception, or
thought, as the clippings of our beards, and parings of our nails.
Secondly, sensible, thinking, perceiving beings, such as we find
ourselves to be. Which, if you please, we will hereafter call COGITATIVE
and INCOGITATIVE beings; which to our present purpose, if for nothing
else, are perhaps better terms than material and immaterial.
10. Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogitative Being.
If, then, there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of being
it must be. And to that it is very obvious to reason, that it must
necessarily be a cogitative being. For it is as impossible to conceive
that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent
being, as that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose
any parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in
itself, able to produce nothing. For example: let us suppose the matter
of the next pebble we meet with eternal, closely united, and the parts
firmly at rest together; if there were no other being in the world, must
it not eternally remain so, a dead inactive lump? Is it possible to
conceive it can add motion to itself, being purely matter, or produce
anything? Matter, then, by its own strength, cannot produce in itself so
much as motion: the motion it has must also be from eternity, or else
be produced, and added to matter by some other being more powerful than
matter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in
itself. But let us suppose motion eternal too: yet matter, INCOGITATIVE
matter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk,
could never produce thought: knowledge will still be as far beyond the
power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power
of nothing or nonentity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own
thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by
NOTHING, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when, before, there
was no such thing as thought or an intelligent being existing? Divide
matter into as many parts as you will, (which we are apt to imagine a
sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it,) vary the
figure and motion of it as much as you please--a globe, cube, cone,
prism, cylinder, &c., whose diameters are but 100,000th part of a GRY,
will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk, than
those of an inch or foot diameter; and you may as rationally expect to
produce sense, thought, and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain
figure and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are the
very minutest that do anywhere exist. They knock, impel, and resist one
another, just as the greater do; and that is all they can do. So that,
if we will suppose NOTHING first or eternal, matter can never begin to
be: if we suppose bare matter without motion, eternal, motion can never
begin to be: if we suppose only matter and motion first, or eternal,
thought can never begin to be. [For it is impossible to conceive that
matter, either with or without motion, could have, originally, in and
from itself, sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident from hence,
that then sense, perception, and knowledge, must be a property eternally
inseparable from matter and every particle of it. Not to add, that,
though our general or specific conception of matter makes us speak of it
as one thing, yet really all matter is not one individual thing, neither
is there any such thing existing as ONE material being, or ONE single
body that we know or can conceive. And therefore, if matter were
the eternal first cogitative being, there would not be one eternal,
infinite, cogitative being, but an infinite number of eternal, finite,
cogitative beings, independent one of another, of limited force, and
distinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony, and
beauty which are to be found in nature. Since, therefore, whatsoever is
the first eternal being must necessarily be cogitative; and] whatsoever
is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and actually
have, at least, all the perfections that can ever after exist; nor can
it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not either actually
in itself, or, at least, in a higher degree; [it necessarily follows,
that the first eternal being cannot be matter.]
11. Therefore, there has been an Eternal Wisdom.
If, therefore, it be evident, that something necessarily must exist from
eternity, it is also as evident, that that something must necessarily
be a cogitative being: for it is as impossible that incogitative matter
should produce a cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of
all being, should produce a positive being or matter.
12. The Attributes of the Eternal Cogitative Being.
Though this discovery of the NECESSARY EXISTANCE OF A ETERNAL MIND does
sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God; since it will hence
follow, that all other knowing beings that have a beginning must depend
on him, and have in other ways of knowledge or extent of power than what
He gives them; and therefore, if he made those, he made all the less
excellent pieces of this universe,--all inanimate beings whereby his
omniscience, power, and providence will be established, and all his
other attributes necessarily follow yet, to clear up this a little
further, we will see what doubt can be raised against it.
13. Whether the Eternal Mind may be also material or no.
FIRST, Perhaps it will be said, that, though it be as clear as
demonstration can make it, that there must be an eternal Being, and that
Being must also be knowing: yet it does not follow but that thinking
Being may also be MATERIAL. Let it be so, it equally still follows that
there is a God. For there be an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent Being,
it is certain that there is a God, whether you imagine that Being to be
material or no. But herein, I suppose, lies the danger and deceit of
that supposition:--there being no way to avoid the demonstration,
that there is an eternal knowing Being, men devoted to matter, would
willingly have it granted, that that knowing Being is material;
and then, letting slide out of their minds, or the discourse, the
demonstration whereby an eternal KNOWING Being was proved necessarily
to exist, would argue all to be matter, and so deny a God, that is, an
eternal cogitative Being: whereby they are so far from establishing,
that they destroy their own hypothesis. For, if there can be, in their
opinion, eternal matter, without any eternal cogitative Being, they
manifestly separate matter and thinking, and suppose no necessary
connexion of the one with the other, and so establish the necessity of
an eternal Spirit, but not of matter; since it has been proved already,
that an eternal cogitative Being is unavoidably to be granted. Now, if
thinking and matter may be separated, the eternal existence of matter
will not follow from the eternal existence of a cogitative Being, and
they suppose it to no purpose.
14. Not material: First, because each Particle of Matter is not
cogitative.
But now let us see how they can satisfy themselves, or others, that this
eternal thinking Being is material.
I. I would ask them, whether they imagine that all matter, EVERY
PARTICLE OF MATTER, thinks? This, I suppose, they will scarce say;
since then there would be as many eternal thinking beings as there are
particles of matter, and so an infinity of gods. And yet, if they will
not allow matter as matter, that is, every particle of matter, to be as
well cogitative as extended, they will have as hard a task to make out
to their own reasons a cogitative being out of incogitative particles,
as an extended being out of unextended parts, if I may so speak.
15. II. Secondly, Because one Particle alone of Matter cannot be
cogitative.
If all matter does not think, I next ask, Whether it be ONLY ONE ATOM
that does so? This has as many absurdities as the other; for then this
atom of matter must be alone eternal or not. If this alone be eternal,
then this alone, by its powerful thought or will, made all the rest of
matter. And so we have the creation of matter by a powerful thought,
which is that the materialists stick at; for if they suppose one single
thinking atom to have produced all the rest of matter, they cannot
ascribe that pre-eminency to it upon any other account than that of its
thinking, the only supposed difference. But allow it to be by some other
way which is above our conception, it must still be creation; and these
men must give up their great maxim, EX NIHILO NIL FIT. If it be said,
that all the rest of matter is equally eternal as that thinking atom,
it will be to say anything at pleasure, though ever so absurd. For to
suppose all matter eternal, and yet one small particle in knowledge and
power infinitely above all the rest, is without any the least appearance
of reason to frame an hypothesis. Every particle of matter, as matter,
is capable of all the same figures and motions of any other; and I
challenge any one, in his thoughts, to add anything else to one above
another.
16. III. Thirdly, Because a System of incogitative Matter cannot be
cogitative.
If then neither one peculiar atom alone can be this eternal thinking
being; nor all matter, as matter, i. e. every particle of matter, can be
it; it only remains, that it is some certain SYSTEM of matter, duly put
together, that is this thinking eternal Being. This is that which, I
imagine, is that notion which men are aptest to have of God; who would
have him a material being, as most readily suggested to them by the
ordinary conceit they have of themselves and other men, which they take
to be material thinking beings. But this imagination, however more
natural, is no less absurd than the other; for to suppose the eternal
thinking Being to be nothing else but a composition of particles of
matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to ascribe all the wisdom and
knowledge of that eternal Being only to the juxta-position of parts;
than which nothing can be more absurd. For unthinking particles of
matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them,
but a new relation of position, which it is impossible should give
thought and knowledge to them.
17. And whether this corporeal System is in Motion or at Rest.
But further: this corporeal system either has all its parts at rest, or
it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its thinking consists. If it
be perfectly at rest, it is but one lump, and so can have no privileges
above one atom.
If it be the motion of its parts on which its thinking depends, all the
thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited; since all the
particles that by motion cause thought, being each of them in itself
without any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, much less be
regulated by the thought of the whole; since that thought is not the
cause of motion, (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without
it,) but the consequence of it; whereby freedom, power, choice, and all
rational and wise thinking or acting, will be quite taken away: so
that such a thinking being will be no better nor wiser than pure blind
matter; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of
blind matter, or into thought depending on unguided motions of blind
matter, is the same thing: not to mention the narrowness of such
thoughts and knowledge that must depend on the motion of such parts. But
there needs no enumeration of any more absurdities and impossibilities
in this hypothesis (however full of them it be) than that before
mentioned; since, let this thinking system be all or a part of the
matter of the universe, it is impossible that any one particle should
either know its own, or the motion of any other particle, or the whole
know the motion of every particle; and so regulate its own thoughts or
motions, or indeed have any thought resulting from such motion.
18. Matter not co-eternal with an Eternal Mind.
SECONDLY, Others would have Matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that
they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This, though it
take not away the being of a God, yet, since it denies one and the first
great piece of his workmanship, the creation, let us consider it a
little. Matter must be allowed eternal: Why? because you cannot conceive
how it can be made out of nothing: why do you not also think yourself
eternal? You will answer, perhaps, Because, about twenty or forty years
since, you began to be. But if I ask you, what that YOU is, which began
then to be, you can scarce tell me. The matter whereof you are made
began not then to be: for if it did, then it is not eternal: but it
began to be put together in such a fashion and frame as makes up your
body; but yet that frame of particles is not you, it makes not that
thinking thing you are; (for I have now to do with one who allows an
eternal, immaterial, thinking Being, but would have unthinking Matter
eternal too;) therefore, when did that thinking thing begin to be? If it
did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking thing from
eternity; the absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one
who is so void of understanding as to own it. If, therefore, you can
allow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing, (as all things that
are not eternal must be,) why also can you not allow it possible for a
material being to be made out of nothing by an equal power, but that you
have the experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Though,
when well considered, creation [of a spirit will be found to require
no less power than the creation of matter. Nay, possibly, if we would
emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as far
as they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be
able to aim at some dim and seeming conception how MATTER might at first
be made, and begin to exist, by the power of that eternal first Being:
but to give beginning and being to a SPIRIT would be found a more
inconceivable effect of omnipotent power. But this being what would
perhaps lead us too far from the notions on which the philosophy now in
the world is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from
them; or to inquire, so far as grammar itself would authorize, if the
common settled opinion opposes it: especially in this place, where the
received doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose, and leaves
this past doubt, that] the creation or beginning of any one [SUBSTANCE]
out of nothing being once admitted, the creation of all other but the
Creator himself, may, with the same ease, be supposed.
19. Objection: Creation out of nothing.
But you will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the making anything
out of nothing, SINCE WE CANNOT POSSIBLY CONCEIVE IT? I answer, No.
Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite being,
because we cannot comprehend its operations. We do not deny other
effects upon this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive the manner
of their production. We cannot conceive how anything but impulse of body
can move body; and yet that is not a reason sufficient to make us deny
it possible, against the constant experience we have of it in ourselves,
in all our voluntary motions; which are produced in us only by the free
action or thought of our own minds, and are not, nor can be, the effects
of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter in or upon
our own bodies; for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter
it. For example: my right hand writes, whilst my left hand is still:
What causes rest in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my
will,--a thought of my mind; my thought only changing, the right hand
rests, and the left hand moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be
denied: explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next step
will be to understand creation. [For the giving a new determination to
the motion of the animal spirits (which some make use of to explain
voluntary motion) clears not the difficulty one jot. To alter the
determination of motion, being in this case no easier nor less, than
to give motion itself: since the new determination given to the animal
spirits must be either immediately by thought, or by some other body put
in their way by thought which was not in their way before, and so must
owe ITS motion to thought: either of which leaves VOLUNTARY motion as
unintelligible as it was before.] In the meantime, it is an over-valuing
ourselves to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities; and to
conclude all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds
our comprehension. This is to make our comprehension infinite, or God
finite, when what He can do is limited to what we can conceive of it.
If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind, that
thinking thing within you, do not deem it strange that you cannot
comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite Mind, who made and
governs all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain.