1. Some Propositions bring no Increase to our Knowledge.
WHETHER the maxims treated of in the foregoing chapter be of that use to
real knowledge as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered.
This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, That there ARE universal
propositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no
light to our understanding; bring no increase to our knowledge. Such
are--
2. As, First, identical Propositions.
First, All purely IDENTICAL PROPOSITIONS. These obviously and at first
blush appear to contain no instruction in them; for when we affirm the
said term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains
any clear and real idea, it shows us nothing but what we must certainly
know before, whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposed
to us. Indeed, that most general one, WHAT IS, IS, may serve sometimes
to show a man the absurdity he is guilty of, when, by circumlocution or
equivocal terms, he would in particular instances deny the same thing of
itself; because nobody will so openly bid defiance to common sense, as
to affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words; or, if he
does, a man is excused if he breaks off any further discourse with him.
But yet I think I may say, that neither that received maxim, nor any
other identical proposition, teaches us anything; and though in such
kind of propositions this great and magnified maxim, boasted to be the
foundation of demonstration, may be and often is made use of to confirm
them, yet all it proves amounts to no more than this, That the same word
may with great certainty be affirmed of itself, without any doubt of the
truth of any such proposition; and let me add, also, without any real
knowledge.
3. Examples.
For, at this rate, any very ignorant person, who can but make a
proposition, and knows what he means when he says ay or no, may make a
million of propositions of whose truth he may be infallibly certain, and
yet not know one thing in the world thereby; v.g. 'what is a soul, is a
soul;' or, 'a soul is a soul;' 'a spirit is a spirit;' 'a fetiche is a
fetiche,' &c. These all being equivalent to this proposition, viz. WHAT
IS, IS; i.e. what hath existence, hath existence; or, who hath a soul,
hath a soul. What is this more than trifling with words? It is but like
a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other: and had he but
words, might no doubt have said, 'Oyster in right hand is subject, and
oyster in left hand is predicate:' and so might have made a self-evident
proposition of oyster, i.e. oyster is oyster; and yet, with all this,
not have been one whit the wiser or more knowing: and that way of
handling the matter would much at one have satisfied the monkey's
hunger, or a man's understanding, and they would have improved in
knowledge and bulk together.
4. Secondly, Propositions in which a part of any complex Idea is
predicated of the Whole.
II. Another sort of trifling propositions is, WHEN A PART OF THE
COMPLEX IDEA IS PREDICATED OF THE NAME OF THE WHOLE; a part of the
definition of the word defined. Such are all propositions wherein the
genus is predicated of the species, or more comprehensive of less
comprehensive terms. For what information, what knowledge, carries this
proposition in it, viz. 'Lead is a metal' to a man who knows the complex
idea the name lead stands for? All the simple ideas that go to the
complex one signified by the term metal, being nothing but what he
before comprehended and signified by the name lead. Indeed, to a man
that knows the signification of the word metal, and not of the word
lead, it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead,
by saying it is a metal, which at once expresses several of its simple
ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a body very
heavy, fusible, and malleable.
5. As part of the Definition of the Term Defined.
Alike trifling it is to predicate any other part of the definition of
the term defined, or to affirm anyone of the simple ideas of a complex
one of the name of the whole complex idea; as, 'All gold is fusible.'
For fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up
the complex one the sound gold stands for, what can it be but playing
with sounds, to affirm that of the name gold, which is comprehended
in its received signification? It would be thought little better than
ridiculous to affirm gravely, as a truth of moment, that gold is yellow;
and I see not how it is any jot more material to say it is fusible,
unless that quality be left out of the complex idea, of which the sound
gold is the mark in ordinary speech. What instruction can it carry with
it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed
to know before? For I am supposed to know the signification of the word
another uses to me, or else he is to tell me. And if I know that the
name gold stands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fusible,
malleable, it will not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in
a proposition, and gravely say, all gold is fusible. Such propositions
can only serve to show the disingenuity of one who will go from the
definition of his own terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry
no knowledge with them, but of the signification of words, however
certain they be.
6. Instance, Man and Palfrey.
'Every man is an animal, or living body,' is as certain a proposition as
can be; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things than to say, a
palfrey is an ambling horse, or a neighing, ambling animal, both being
only about the signification of words, and make me know but this--That
body, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving, are three of
those ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word man: and
where they are not to be found together, the NAME MAN belongs not to
that thing: and so of the other--That body, sense, and a certain way of
going, with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I
always comprehend and signify by the WORD PALFREY; and when they are not
to be found together, the name palfrey belongs not to that thing. It is
just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any
one or more of the simple ideas, that altogether make up that complex
idea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man:--v.g. suppose a
Roman signified by the word HOMO all these distinct ideas united in one
subject, CORPORIETAS, SENSIBILITAS, POTENTIA SE MOVENDI, RATIONALITAS,
RISIBILITAS; he might, no doubt, with great certainty, universally
affirm one, more, or all of these together of the word HOMO, but did no
more than say that the word HOMO, in his country, comprehended in its
signification all these ideas. Much like a romance knight, who by
the word PALFREY signified these ideas:--body of a certain figure,
four-legged, with sense, motion, ambling, neighing, white, used to have
a woman on his back--might with the same certainty universally affirm
also any or all of these of the WORD palfrey: but did thereby teach no
more, but that the word palfrey, in his or romance language, stood for
all these, and was not to be applied to anything where any of these was
wanting But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing sense, motion,
reason, and laughter, were united, that thing had actually a notion of
God, or would be cast into a sleep by opium, made indeed an instructive
proposition: because neither having the notion of God, nor being cast
into sleep by opium, being contained in the idea signified by the word
man, we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what
the word MAN stands for: and therefore the knowledge contained in it is
more than verbal.
7. For this teaches but the Signification of Words.
Before a man makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand the
terms he uses in it, or else he talks like a parrot, only making a noise
by imitation, and framing certain sounds, which he has learnt of others;
but not as a rational creature, using them for signs of ideas which he
has in his mind. The hearer also is supposed to understand the terms
as the speaker uses them, or else he talks jargon, and makes an
unintelligible noise. And therefore he trifles with words who makes such
a proposition, which, when it is made, contains no more than one of the
terms does, and which a man was supposed to know before: v.g. a triangle
hath three sides, or saffron is yellow. And this is no further tolerable
than where a man goes to explain his terms to one who is supposed or
declares himself not to understand him; and then it teaches only the
signification of that word, and the use of that sign.
8. But adds no real Knowledge.
We can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect
certainty. The one is, of those trifling propositions which have
a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not
instructive. And, secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be certain
in propositions, which affirm something of another, which is a necessary
consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it: as
that, the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the
opposite internal angles. Which relation of the outward angle to either
of the opposite internal angles, making no part of the complex idea
signified by the name triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys with
it instructive real knowledge.
9. General Propositions concerning Substances are often trifling.
We having little or no knowledge of what combinations there be of simple
ideas existing together in substances, but by our senses, we cannot make
any universal certain propositions concerning them, any further than our
nominal essences lead us. Which being to a very few and inconsiderable
truths, in respect of those which depend on their real constitutions,
the general propositions that are made about substances, if they are
certain, are for the most part but trifling; and if they are
instructive, are uncertain, and such as we can have no knowledge of
their real truth, how much soever constant observation and analogy may
assist our judgment in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, that one may
often meet with very clear and coherent discourses, that amount yet to
nothing. For it is plain that names of substantial beings, as well as
others, as far as they have relative significations affixed to them,
may, with great truth, be joined negatively and affirmatively in
propositions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be so
joined; and propositions consisting of such terms, may, with the same
clearness, be deduced one from another, as those that convey the most
real truths: and all this without any knowledge of the nature or reality
of things existing without us. By this method one may make
demonstrations and undoubted propositions in words, and yet thereby
advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things: v. g. he
that having learnt these following words, with their ordinary mutual
relative acceptations annexed to them; v. g. SUBSTANCE, MAN, ANIMAL,
FORM, SOUL, VEGETATIVE, SENSITIVE, RATIONAL, may make several undoubted
propositions about the soul, without knowing at all what the soul really
is: and of this sort, a man may find an infinite number of propositions,
reasonings, and conclusions, in books of metaphysics, school-divinity,
and some sort of natural philosophy; and, after all, know as little of
God, spirits, or bodies, as he did before he set out.
10. And why.
He that hath liberty to define, i.e. to determine the signification of
his names of substances (as certainly every one does in effect, who
makes them stand for his own ideas), and makes their significations at a
venture, taking them from his own or other men's fancies, and not from
an examination or inquiry into the nature of things themselves; may with
little trouble demonstrate them one of another, according to those
several respects and mutual relations he has given them one to another;
wherein, however things agree or disagree in their own nature, he needs
mind nothing but his own notions, with the names he hath bestowed upon
them: but thereby no more increases his own knowledge than he does his
riches, who, taking a bag of counters, calls one in a certain place a
pound, another in another place a shilling, and a third in a third place
a penny; and so proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and cast up a
great sum, according to his counters so placed, and standing for more or
less as he pleases, without being one jot the richer, or without even
knowing how much a pound, shilling, or penny is, but only that one is
contained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve:
which a man may also do in the signification of words, by making them,
in respect of one another, more or less, or equally comprehensive.
11. Thirdly, using Words variously is trifling with them.
Though yet concerning most words used in discourses, equally
argumentative and controversial, there is this more to be complained of,
which is the worst sort of trifling, and which sets us yet further from
the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them;
viz. that most writers are so far from instructing us in the nature and
knowledge of things, that they use their words loosely and uncertainly,
and do not, by using them constantly and steadily in the same
significations make plain and clear deductions of words one from
another, and make their discourses coherent and clear, (how little
soever they were instructive); which were not difficult to do, did they
not find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy under the
obscurity and perplexedness of their terms: to which, perhaps,
inadvertency and ill custom do in many men much contribute.
12. Marks of verbal Propositions. First, Predication in Abstract.
To conclude. Barely verbal propositions may be known by these following
marks:
First, All propositions wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of
another, are barely about the signification of sounds. For since no
abstract idea can be the same with any other but itself, when its
abstract name is affirmed of any other term, it can signify no more but
this, that it may, or ought to be called by that name; or that these two
names signify the same idea. Thus, should any one say that parsimony is
frugality, that gratitude is justice, that this or that action is or is
not temperate: however specious these and the like propositions may at
first sight seem, yet when we come to press them, and examine nicely
what they contain, we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the
signification of those terms.
13. Secondly, A part of the Definition predicated of any Term.
Secondly, All propositions wherein a part of the complex idea which any
term stands for is predicated of that term, are only verbal: v.g. to say
that gold is a metal, or heavy. And thus all propositions wherein more
comprehensive words, called genera, are affirmed of subordinate or less
comprehensive, called species, or individuals, are barely verbal.
When by these two rules we have examined the propositions that make up
the discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books, we
shall perhaps find that a greater part of them than is usually suspected
are purely about the signification of words, and contain nothing in them
but the use and application of these signs.
This I think I may lay down for an infallible rule, That, wherever the
distinct idea any word stands for is not known and considered, and
something not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it,
there our thoughts stick wholly in sounds, and are able to attain no
real truth or falsehood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might save us a
great deal of useless amusement and dispute; and very much shorten our
trouble and wandering in the search of real and true knowledge.