THE GERMAN DRIVE IN GALICIA
Dated:
ROVNA,
_June 26, 1915_.
It is utterly impossible at this time to give anything like an accurate
story of the past two months in Galicia. It will be years before the
information necessary for definite history can be accumulated from the
various units engaged. Even then there will be gaps and inaccuracies
because hundreds of the men engaged have been killed, and so few even
of the Generals know more than their own side of the case, that the
difficulties of the historian will be enormous.
I shall not attempt then, in this brief chapter, anything but to trace
the merest outline of the causes and effects of the German drive in
Galicia.
It has been apparent to all of us here from the start of the war
that Warsaw was becoming increasingly the German objective. Attempts
from the north and on the centre failed absolutely, the latter both
in October and in January-February, and the former in September
and in March. The fall of Przemysl and the Russian advance in the
Carpathians, with the even greater menace to the Hungarian plain by
the army operating in Bukovina, was threatening Austria with absolute
collapse. The extreme eastern army with its drives further and further
toward Hungary is said to have brought Hungary to the verge of openly
demanding a separate peace. All these causes, then, rendered it
necessary for Germany to do something for Austria, and by clearing out
Galicia she hoped, not only to restore to her broken ally something
of hope and spirit, but no doubt conceived the belief that by the
time she had done this, she would be sufficiently far east and south
of Warsaw to threaten it from the south and rear, and possibly cause
its abandonment without a real battle near Warsaw at all. Many people
here believe that the Germans want merely to secure and hold the line
of the Vistula and Galicia, and then concentrate all their attention
on the west. After the echoes of the fighting north of Warsaw in
February-March were dying away, it became clear to all of us here that
there would soon be another blow in some other quarter. Russia, as one
so often repeats, has this enormous line. She cannot be in strength at
every point, and though she saw for several weeks that the Germans
were concentrating on the Dunajec line in Galicia, she could not
reinforce it sufficiently to hold it without weakening other more vital
points. As a fact, under the conditions which actually developed there
she could not have held it, nor I think could any other army.
The world’s history records nothing that has even approximated to
this German drive which fell on one Russian Army, the bulk of which
remained at its post and perished. The total number of German army
corps sent down to do this job is uncertain. I have heard from many
in high authority estimates differing so widely that I can supply no
statement as absolutely correct. Perhaps sixteen is not far from the
actual number, though probably reinforcements and extra divisions sent
in pretty steadily to fill losses, brought up the total to a larger
number than the full strength of sixteen corps. However the details
at this time are immaterial. The main point is that the Russians were
entirely outnumbered in men, guns and ammunition. The statements about
the German massed guns also vary as widely as from 2,000 to 4,000.
Certainly they had not less than 200 guns equal to or exceeding 8-inch
types. These were concentrated on the front which was held by three or
four corps of the devoted Dunajec army.
Men who know have told me that what followed was indescribable. I have
not heard that there was any panic, or attempt to retreat on the part
of the troops. In characteristic Russian fashion they remained and took
their gruelling. For whole versts behind the line, I am told that the
terrain was a hash of earth, mangled bodies, and fragments of exploded
shell. If the statement that the Germans fired 700,000 shells in three
hours is true, and it is accepted in the Russian Army, one can readily
realize what must have been the condition of the army occupying that
line of works. Much criticism has been brought against the General
commanding because he had no well-prepared second line of trenches. No
doubt he ought to have had it, but it would have made little difference
beyond delaying the advance a few days. The German machine had been
preparing for two months, and everything was running as smooth as a
well-oiled engine, with troops, munitions and supplies being fed in
with precision and regularity.
Russia is not an industrial nation, and cannot turn her resources into
war material overnight as the Germans have been able to do. She was
outclassed in everything except bravery, and neither the Germans nor
any other army can claim superiority to her in that respect. With the
centre literally cut away, the keystone of the Russian line had been
pulled out, and nothing remained but to retire. In this retirement five
Russian Armies were involved. Beginning on the right was that of Evert
lying entirely in Poland on the Nida river. His army has been usually
successful and always full of fight, and its retirement was purely that
it might keep symmetrical with the Russian line as a whole. I have
written in an earlier chapter of Evert’s retreat, of how in falling
back on to his new line he accounted for between 20,000 and 30,000 of
the German and Austrian troops. Of this it is unnecessary to say more
at present, save that his army is in a good position and stronger and
more spirited than ever.
[Illustration: General Brussilov.]
The unfortunate army of the Dunajec, whose commander and number are
as well known in England as here, began then to fall back with what
there was left of it on the San, tearing up railroads and fighting a
rearguard action with what strength it could command. In the meantime
the army of Brussilov, which up to this time had never been defeated,
was well through the Carpathians and going strong. The crumbling of
their right neighbour left them in a terrible plight, and only skilful
and rapid manœuvring got them back out of the passes in time to get
in touch with the fragments of the retreating centre, which by the
time it reached the San had got reinforcements and some ammunition.
Brussilov’s right tried to hold Przemysl, but as the commander assured
me, there was nothing left of the fortifications. Besides, as I gather
from officers in that part of his army, further retirements of the next
army kept exposing their flank, and made it imperative for the whole
army to commence its retreat toward the Russian frontier.
I have good reason for believing that the Russian plan to retire to
their own frontier was decided on when they lost Przemysl, and that the
battles on the Grodek line, around Lwow, were merely rearguard actions.
In any case, I do know that while the fighting was still in progress
on the San, and just as Przemysl was taken, work was commenced on a
permanent line of defence south of Lublin and Cholm, the line in fact
which is at this moment being held by the Russians. My belief, then,
is that everything that took place between the San and the present
line must be considered inevitable in the higher interests of Russian
strategy. The interim between leaving the San and taking up what is
now approximately the line on which they will probably make a definite
stand, will make a very fine page in Russian history. I cannot at this
time go into any details, but the Allies will open their eyes when
they know exactly how little the Russians had in the way of ammunition
to hold off this mass of Germans and Austrians whose supply of shell
poured in steadily week after week.
Next to the army of Brussilov is that army which had been assaulting
and making excellent headway in the Eastern Carpathians. They, too,
were attacked with terrible energy, but taken independently could
probably have held on indefinitely. As it was they never moved until
the retirement of all the other armies west of them rendered their
position untenable. The German and Austrian communiques have constantly
discussed the defeat of this army. The world can judge whether it
was demoralized when it learns that in six weeks, from Stryj to the
Zota Lipa, it captured 53,000 prisoners. During this same period, the
army of Bukovina in the far left was actually advancing, and only
came back to preserve the symmetry of the whole line. The problem of
falling back over this extremely long front with five great armies,
after the centre was completely broken, was as difficult an one as
could well be presented. In the face of an alert enemy there were here
and there local disasters and bags of Russian prisoners, but with all
their skill, and with all their railroads, and superiority in both men
and ammunition, the Germans and the Austrians have not been able to
destroy the Russian force, which stands before them to-day on a new and
stronger line. The further the Russians have retired, the slower has
been their retreat and the more difficult has it been for the enemy
to follow up their strokes with anything like the same strength and
energy. In other words the Russians are pretty nearly beyond the reach
of enemy blows which can hurt them fatally.
The Austrians have followed up the Eastern armies and claim enormous
victories, but it must be pretty clear now, even to the Austrians and
Germans, that these victories, which are costing them twice what they
are costing the Russians, are merely rearguard actions. In any case
the Austrian enthusiasm is rapidly ebbing away. After two months of
fighting the Germans have finally swung their main strength back toward
the line of Cholm-Lublin, with the probable intent of finishing up
the movement by threatening Warsaw and thus closing up successfully
the whole Galician campaign, which as many believe, had this end in
view. But now they find a recuperated and much stronger Russian Army
complacently awaiting them on a selected position which is in every way
the best they have ever had.
As I write there is still much doubt as to whether the Germans will try
and go further ahead here, for it is pretty clear that they are checked
at this point, and that the Galician movement has reached its low-water
mark as far as the Russians are concerned. The next blow will no
doubt fall either north of Warsaw or possibly on the much-battered
Bzura-Rawka Front itself, which for so many months has stood the wear
and tear of many frantic efforts to break through.
THE FRONT OF IVANOV