INTRODUCTION

Froude had this merit--a merit he shared with Huxley alone of

His contemporaries--that he imposed his convictions. He fought

against resistance. He excited (and still excites) a violent

animosity. He exasperated the surface of his time and was yet

too strong for that surface to reject him. This combative and

aggressive quality in him, which was successful in that it was

permanent and never suffered a final defeat should arrest any

one who may make a general survey of the last generation in letters.

It was a period with a vice of its own which yet remains to be

detected and chastised. In one epoch lubricity, in another

fanaticism, in a third dulness and a dead-alive copying of the

past, are the faults which criticism finds to attack. None of

these affected the Victorian era. It was pure--though tainted

with a profound hypocrisy; it was singularly free from violence

in its judgments; it was certainly alive and new: but it had this

grievous defect (a defect under which we still labour heavily)

that thought was restrained upon every side. Never in the history

of European letters was it so difficult for a man to say

what he would and to be heard. A sort of cohesive public spirit

(which was but one aspect of the admirable homogeneity of the

nation) glued and immobilised all individual expression. One

could float imprisoned as in a stream of thick substance: one

could not swim against it.

It is to be carefully discerned how many apparent exceptions to

this truth are, if they be closely examined, no exceptions at

all. A whole series of national defects were exposed and

ridiculed in the literature as in the oratory of that day; but

they were defects which the mass of men secretly delighted to

hear denounced and of which each believed himself to be free.

They loved to be told that they were of a gross taste in art,

for they connected such a taste vaguely with high morals and

with successful commerce. There was no surer way to a large

sale than to start a revolution in appreciation every five years,

and from Ruskin to Oscar Wilde a whole series of Prophets

attained eminence and fortune by telling men how something new

and as yet unknown was Beauty and something just past was to be

rejected, and how they alone saw truth while the herd around them

were blind. But no one showed us how to model, nor did any one

remark that we alone of all Europe had preserved a school of

water-colour.

So in politics our blunders were a constant theme; but no one

marked with citation, document, and proof the glaring progress

of corruption, or that, for all our enthusiasm, we never once

in that generation defended the oppressed against the oppressor.

There was a vast if unrecognised conspiracy, by which whatever

might have prevented those extreme evils from which we now suffer

was destroyed as it appeared. Efforts at a thorough purge were

dull, were libellous, were not of the "form" which the Universities

and the public schools taught to be sacred. They were rejected as

unreadable, or if printed, were unread. The results are with us to-day.

In such a time Froude maintained an opposing force, which was

not reforming nor constructive in any way, but which will obtain

the attention of the future historian, simply because it was an

opposition.

It was an opposition of manner rather than of matter. The matter

of it was common enough even in Froude's chief decade of power.

The cause to which he gave allegiance was already winning when he

proceeded to champion it, and many a better man, one or two greater

men, were saying the same things as he; but they said such things

in a fashion that suggested no violent effort nor any demand for

resistance: it was the peculiar virtue of Froude that he touched

nothing without the virile note of a challenge sounding throughout

his prose. On this account, though he will convince our posterity

even less than he does ourselves, the words of persuasion, the

writings themselves will remain: for he chose the hardest wood in

which to chisel, knowing the strength of his hand.

What was it in him which gave him that strength, and

which permitted him, in an age that would tolerate no formative

grasp upon itself, to achieve a permanent fame? I will not

reply to this question by pointing to the popularity

of his History of England; the essays that follow will

afford sufficient material to answer it. He produced the

effect he did and remained in the eminence to which he

had climbed, first because his manner of thought was rigid

and of a hard edge; secondly, because he could use that

steel tool of a brain in a fashion that was general; he could

use it upon subjects and with a handling that was

comprehensible to great masses of his fellow-countrymen.

It is not certain that such a man with such interests would

have made his voice heard in any other society. It is

doubtful whether he will be translated with profit. His field

was very small, the points of his attack might all be found

contained in one suburban villa. But in our society his

grip and his intensity did fall, and fall of choice, upon such

matters as his contemporaries either debated or were ready

to debate. He therefore did the considerable thing we

know him to have done.

I say that his mind was rigid and of a close fibre: it was

a mind (to repeat the metaphor) out of which a strong

graying-tool could be forged. Its blade would not be

blunted: it could deal with its material. Of this character,

which I take to be the first essential in his achievement, the

few essays before us preserve an ample evidence.

Thus you will find throughout their pages the presence of

that dogmatic assertion which invariably proceeds from such

a mind, and coupled with such assertion is a continual

consciousness that his dogmas are dogmas: that he is asserting

unprovable things and laying down his axioms before he

begins his process of reasoning.

The contrary might be objected by some foreign observer,

or by some one who had a larger acquaintance with European

history than had he. I can imagine a French or an Irish

critic pointing to a mass of assertion with no corresponding

admission that it is assertion only: such a critic might quote

even from these few pages phrase after phrase in which

Froude poses as certain what are still largely matters of

debate. Thus upon page 144 he takes it for granted that

no miracles have been worked by contact with the bodies

of saints. He takes it for granted on page 161 that the

checking of monastic disorders, and the use of strong

language in connection with them, was peculiar to the

generation which saw at its close the dissolution of the

monasteries. He takes it for granted on page 125 that what

we call "manifestations" or what not,--spirit rappings,

table-turnings, and the rest--are deceptions of the senses to

which superstition alone would give credence.

He ridicules (upon p. 128) the tradition of St. Patrick which

all modern research has come to accept. He says downright

(upon pp. 186-187) that the Ancient world did not inquire

into the problem of evil. On p. 214 he will have it that the

ordinary man rejects, "without hesitation," the interference

of will with material causes. In other words, he asserts that

the ordinary man is a fatalist--for Froude knew very well

that between the fatalist and the believer in a possibility of

miracle there is no conceivable position. He will have it (on

p. 216) that a modern doctor always regards a "vision" as

an hallucination. On p. 217 he denies by implication the

stigmata of St. Francis--and so forth--one might multiply

the instances indefinitely. All Froude's works are full of

them, they are part and parcel of his method--but their

number is to no purport. One example may stand for all,

and their special value to our purpose is not that they are

mere assertions, but that they are assertions which Froude

must have known to be personal, disputable, and dogmatic.

He knew very well that the vast majority of mankind

accepted the virtue of relics, that intellects the equals of his

own rejected that determinism to which he was bound, and

that the Pagan world might be presented in a fashion very

different from his own. And in that perpetual--often gratuitous

--affirmation you have no sign of limitation in him but

rather of eagerness for battle.

It is an admirable fault or perhaps no fault at all, or if a

fault an appendage to the most considerable virtue a writer

of his day could have had: the virtue of courage.

See how he thrusts when he comes to lay down the law,

not upon what the narrow experience of readers understands

and agrees with him about, but upon some matter which he

knows them to have decided in a manner opposed to his own.

See how definite, how downright, and how clean are the

sentences in which he asserts that Christianity is Catholic

or nothing:--

". . . This was the body of death which philosophy detected

but could not explain, and from which Catholicism now

came forward with its magnificent promise of deliverance.

"The carnal doctrine of the sacraments, which they are

compelled to acknowledge to have been taught as fully in

the early Church as it is now taught by the Roman Catholics,

has long been the stumbling-block to Protestants. It was

the very essence of Christianity itself. Unless the body could

be purified, the soul could not be saved; or, rather, as from

the beginning, soul and flesh were one man and inseparable,

without his flesh, man was lost, or would cease to be. But

the natural organization of the flesh was infected, and unless

organization could begin again from a new original, no pure

material substance could exist at all. He, therefore, by whom

God had first made the world, entered into the womb of the

Virgin in the form (so to speak) of a new organic cell, and

around it, through the virtue of His creative energy, a

material body grew again of the substance of His mother,

pure of taint and clean as the first body of the first man when

it passed out under His hand in the beginning of all things."

Throughout his essay on the Philosophy of Christianity,

where he was maintaining a thesis odious to the majority of

his readers, he rings as hard as ever. The philosophy of

Christianity is frankly declared to be Catholicism and

Catholicism alone; the truth of Christianity is denied. It is called

a thing "worn and old" even in Luther's time (upon page 194),

and he definitely prophesies a period when "our posterity"

shall learn "to despise the miserable fabric which Luther

stitched together out of its tatters."

His judgments are short, violent, compressed. They are

not the judgments of balance. They are final not as a goal

reached is final, but as a death-wound delivered. He throws

out sentences which all the world can see to be insufficient

and thin, but whose sharpness is the sharpness of conviction

and of a striving determination to achieve conviction in others

---or if he fails in that, at least to leave an enemy smarting.

Everywhere you have up and down his prose those short

parentheses, those side sentences, which are strokes of offence.

Thus on page 199, "We hear---or we used to hear when the

High Church party were more formidable than they are," &c.;

or again, on page 210, "The Bishop of Natal" (Colenso)

has done such and such things, "coupled with certain

arithmetical calculations far which he has a special aptitude."

There are dozens of these in every book he wrote. They

wounded, and were intended to wound.

His intellect may therefore be compared, as I have compared

it, to an instrument or a weapon of steel, to a chisel

or a sword. It was hard, polished, keen, stronger than what

it bit into, and of its nature enduring. This was the first of

the characters that gave him his secure place in English

letters.

The second is his universality--the word is not over-exact,

but I can find no other. I mean that Froude was the exact

opposite of the sciolist and was even other than the student.

He was kneaded right into his own time and his own people.

The arena in which he fought was small, the ideas he combated

were few. He was not universal as those are universal

who appeal to any man in any country. But he was eager

upon these problems which his contemporaries wrangled over.

He was in tune with, even when he directly opposed, the

class from which he sprang, the mass of well-to-do Protestant

Englishmen of Queen Victoria's reign. Their furniture had

nothing shocking for him nor their steel engravings. He

took for granted their probity, their common sense, and their

reading. He knew what they were thinking about and

therefore all he did to praise or blame their convictions,

to soothe or to exasperate them, told. He could see the

target.

Perpetually this looking at the world from the standpoint

of the men around him makes him say things that irritate

more particular and more acute minds than his own, but I

will maintain that in his case the fault was a necessary fault

and went with a power which permitted him to achieve the

sympathy which he did achieve. He talks of the "Celt"

and the "Saxon," and ascribes what he calls "our failures

in Ireland" to the "incongruity of character" between these

two imaginaries. He takes it for granted that "we are

something which divides us from mediaeval Christianity by

an impassable gulf." When he speaks of asceticism he must

quote "the hair shirt of Thomas a Becket." If he is speaking

of Oxford undergraduates one has "pleasant faces, cheerful

voices, and animal spirits," and at the end of the fine but

partial essay on Spinoza we have six lines which might come

bodily from a leader in the Daily Telegraph, or from any

copy of the Spectator picked up at random.

These are grave faults, but, I repeat, they are the faults of

those great qualities which gave him his position.

And side by side with such faults go an exceptional

lucidity, a good order within the paragraph and in the

succession of the paragraphs. A choice of subject suited to

his audience, an excision of that which would have bored or

bewildered it, a vividness of description wherewith to amuse

and a directness of conclusion wherewith to arrest his readers

--all these he had, beyond perhaps any of his contemporaries.

Occasionally that brotherhood in him leads him to faults

more serious. You get gross commonplace and utterly false

commonplace, of which when he came back to them (if

indeed he was a man who read his own works) he must

have been ashamed:--

"Persecutions come, and martyrdoms, and religious wars;

and, at last, the old faith, like the phoenix, expires upon its

altar, and the new rises out of the ashes.

"Such, in briefest outline, has been the history of religions,

natural and moral."

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