CHAPTER XIII

BRUNI

[Illustration:

BRUNI CHANANG OR GONG.]

A good deal has already been said about that blot on the map of Borneo,

Bruni, and of its Rulers, and in this chapter shall be given the history

of the relations between the Sultans and the present Rajah since his

accession, as well as of the policy of the Foreign and Colonial Offices

in regard to that "wretched phantom the Bruni Government."[307]

Many chapters might well be devoted to the past and present history of

Daru'l Salam, the Haven of Peace, the sublime Arabic title by which,

with a characteristic disregard of the fitness of things, the Brunis

proudly dignify their unhappy city, as they do their Sultan with the

title of Kaadil-an, the Just. But like morning dreams, these go by

contraries. The story they would set forth would be a sad one, as may

well be judged from what has already been related and from what will be

told in this chapter, though a great deal more might be said. It would

be interesting, too, as another example of British indifference to

Eastern affairs. From the commencement, when nearly seventy years ago

the attention of the empire was so strongly drawn to this nest of

murderers and robbers, this haven of criminals, by the late Rajah, till

the end, when in 1905 the British Government elected to adopt the

bankrupt and depopulated remnant of the Sultanate, its policy in regard

to that State has been remarkable for neither consistency nor

astuteness.

During the last twenty years of his reign (1852-1885) the old Sultan,

Abdul Mumin, who has been described as having the soul of a huckster,

and who died at the age of over a hundred, devoted his life solely to

the pursuit of wealth, and the unscrupulous means he employed to enrich

himself produced great oppression and misery. Affairs of State were a

secondary matter with him, and the ministers and pangirans went their

ways unrestrained. Some of these pangirans, who are related to royalty,

a few closely, others more or less remotely, exercise "Tulin" or

hereditary feudal rights over districts, the ministers holding,

ex-officio, similar rights over other districts; the unhappy people

therein were completely in their power, and could be squeezed at their

own sweet will. Others, not possessing such rights but armed with

authority from the Sultan, easily obtained at a price, enriched

themselves by forced trading.

The poorer classes of the Bruni Malays are hard-working and law-abiding;

but when no man's property is safe from the rapacious grasp of the

chiefs, thrift and hard work cease to have an object, and the country

becomes dead to industry and enterprise. The inhabitants of the

interior, and the Kadayans, an industrious, agricultural people,

suffered under the same disadvantages. Like the Chinese, these people

once cultivated pepper, but for the same cause gave up doing so, which

is not surprising when even their harvests of rice were not spared to

them.

The late Mr. C. A. C. de Crespigny,[308] who had a considerable

experience of Bruni and the country around it, writing upon the

condition of the place in the seventies, says:

"A Pangiran of high rank, but of small means, went from Bruni to Kalias,

and with his own hands murdered a Chinaman, his retainers keeping their

hands in by the slaughter of one or more of the man's relations and

dependants. The murderer then gutted the shop and returned to Bruni. It

was stated that the Pangiran belonged to a Chinese secret society, as

young Bruni in general is said to do, and that the head of the society,

having a trade grudge against the poor fellow at Kalias actually paid

the Pangiran $800 for the deed. Whether this was true or not would be an

interesting subject for investigation; but that the man was murdered by

the Pangiran's own hand, and his goods and chattels carried away to

Bruni, is undoubtedly the case; and further that the Pangiran was not

punished except by verbal reproof. Herein is anarchy.

"On another occasion at Kalias mouth, twenty-eight Chinese were killed

by a band of marauders from up the river and neighbouring streams. A

fine was imposed upon the river, but no murderers were caught. Herein

was want of power.

"On another and later occasion, a Chinaman, also living at Kalias, was

murdered by a band of ruffians from Padas Damit and other streams,

together with his wife, child, and only servant. On this occasion two of

the murderers were caught, taken to Bruni, and as they were men of no

consequence, summarily executed. Herein is inconsistency.

"Men are enslaved without proper cause, and slaves are torn from their

families and pass to other owners and other countries, against their

wish."

The Bruni of the old days, the Bruni of yesterday, and the Bruni of

to-day, are all one.

Although by treaty and by decree the trade of the coast of Bruni

territory was thrown open to all, the Bruni pangirans used their utmost

endeavours to retain it, and traders from Sarawak and Labuan were

incessantly obstructed and interfered with. Competition, coupled with

free trade, was not to the taste of these pangirans, and as the old

Sultan was himself too much mixed up in trading transactions to exert

himself to see that foreign traders received due protection, the

pangirans were left a free hand to deal with them, and their high-handed

proceedings were winked at by Sultan Mumin, if not actually encouraged.

A Sarawak Nakoda, who had been trading with Bruni for some time, was

suddenly attacked when leaving, and fired into by seven boats which had

been lying in wait for him. He managed to escape himself, but lost his

property to the value of $700. His boat was destroyed, and the Sarawak

flag torn to pieces. Orders were sent down the coast closing some of the

ports to Sarawak traders, and imposing prohibitive duties in others. One

order recommended the people to go out of the country and "live under

the white man in Sarawak till they rotted" if they would not pay the

exorbitant taxes demanded of them. Sarawak people, collecting produce in

the jungle, or even when fishing along the coast, had their goods and

boats seized.

In reply to the Rajah's despatches complaining of these outrages, the

Sultan expressed friendship for Sarawak and a desire to foster trade,

and in one or two cases actually made reparation; but he excused himself

in general by his helplessness to enforce his will on the turbulent and

headstrong nobles. And, in fact, the difficulties did not lie in lack of

a clear understanding and of formal agreements, perhaps not in a languid

desire on the part of the Sultan to stand on good terms with the Rajah,

but in the arbitrary conduct of the leading pangirans holding authority

along the coast. Respect for treaties and for fair dealing formed no

part of the mental equipment of these feudal tyrants, and the central

power at Bruni was either too weak, or too timid, or too deeply involved

to interfere with them.

In January, 1870, the Rajah wrote to Lord Clarendon:

"In regard to matters relating to the interests and welfare of the coast

of Borneo to the northward and eastward of the territory under my

control, I am led to understand that her Majesty's Government has no

desire to direct attention to this part, with a view to bringing about a

better system to further the ends of peace and trade, and to relieve the

honester and lower classes from the gross and degraded position to which

they are now reduced by the oppressive measures of the Bruni Government.

H.H. the Sultan permits anarchy and bloodshed throughout his dominions,

and there is no exaggeration in saying that this is carried on within

sight of the British flag at Labuan."

The authorities at Labuan, which was a fully constituted Crown Colony,

the Governor being also Consul-General for Borneo, were either purposely

blind to what was going on at Bruni, which was but a few miles off, or

were too much hampered in their actions by instructions from home to

effect any reforms in the State. But, to quote from the letter of a

Naval Officer of high rank, "Mr. J. Pope Hennessy" (afterwards Sir John

Pope Hennessy, who was Governor of Labuan from 1867-1871), "had an

object in upholding the Sultan and encouraging him in the oppression of

his subjects, as that caused many to take refuge in Labuan." A little

judicious advice, backed by the immense power which the Sultan and his

nobles knew the Governor had behind him, would have effected much

towards the amelioration of the lot of the natives, but nothing whatever

was done. The Bruni Malays must "stew in their own juice," it was no

concern of her Majesty's Government that Sarawak trade should be

interfered with, for what was Sarawak to Britain? It was no concern of

her Majesty's Government that the Sultan and his pangirans were breaking

the heart of the people, killing the incentive to industry. It looked on

with a cold eye, and with a callous heart.

As a colony Labuan was a failure. Only a few natives and Chinese had

settled there, and there was little trade. Instead of being the medium

through which reforms on the coast might be effected, Labuan for long

stood in the way, by checking the spread of the influence of Sarawak

along the coast. The Foreign Office was guided by the advice of their

Consul-General, and was rarely other than ill-advised, though the late

Sir Henry Keppel "had pleaded the cause of civilisation that the Rajah

of Sarawak should be encouraged and not thwarted in his attempt to

advance." And he expressed "a hope that he might live to see the Sarawak

territory extended to Bruni itself." Mr. J. Pope Hennessy in his address

to the Legislative Council of Labuan in June, 1871, said: "The policy

promulgated thirty years ago by some enterprising and benevolent

Englishmen that the Dayaks could be civilised, and that Europeans could

conduct the details of trade and administration in the rivers of Borneo

has proved to be visionary."

It is easy to imagine what would be the nature of advice tendered to the

Foreign Office upon Bornean affairs by such a man. At the time when he

made this statement Sarawak was in absolute tranquillity, and the trade

of 1870 had nearly doubled that of the preceding year.

And, with exceptions, the Governors of Labuan were always more or less

hostile to Sarawak, because jealous of it. Labuan was stagnant and

Sarawak steadily advancing in vigorous life.

In April, 1872, the Rajah, accompanied by a staff of English and Malay

officers, visited Bruni in the Government steamers _Heartsease_ and

_Royalist_. It was perhaps not unnatural that this visit was at first

regarded with suspicion as being in the form of a demonstration against

Bruni, to back unheeded protests against the maltreatment of Sarawak

subjects, and the nonfulfilment of treaty engagements. But this

impression was soon dispelled, and the Rajah was received by the Sultan,

"a fat, kindly-faced old man of some eighty years of age," with

cordiality and honour. The Rajah's main object in visiting Bruni was to

obtain an effective guarantee that his subjects trading in Bruni

territory should not be molested and unwarrantably interfered with. A

treaty conceding all that the Rajah asked for was accordingly drawn up

and ratified by the Sultan, and was satisfactory enough on paper. The

Sultan solemnly undertook the redressing of injuries, guaranteed

protection to traders, and the imposition of fair and moderate customs

duties only.

But this treaty, owing to the Sultan being powerless to enforce its

provisions outside the capital, soon became worse than useless; for,

relying on it being observed, Sarawak traders again ventured into the

Bruni ports, only to meet with the same treatment as before. The

extortion of outrageous customs dues went on as formerly. The Bruni

nobles, "the most useless race that ever encumbered the earth,"[309] set

themselves deliberately to frustrate every object aimed at in the

treaty, and, so that they might keep the trade with its enormous profits

to themselves, they plundered, and even killed those who ventured to

compete with them. But their day was not to last for ever. The Kayans,

driven to exasperation by the heavy fines and other extortions imposed

upon them, eventually rose against these tyrants, and drove them out.

[Illustration:

THE SULTAN'S PALACE.]

Next to the Rejang, the Baram is the largest river that flows into the

sea on that coast. In its basin are congregated large populations of

Kayans and Kenyahs.

In 1872, the Rajah, accompanied by the Ranee, visited this river to

ascertain for himself how far it would be safe for Sarawak subjects to

trade there. He steamed a long way up the river, and was everywhere well

received by the natives, who had been much depressed by extortion and

were eager to be relieved from the thraldom in which they were held by

Bruni. There had been no encouragement given to them to work the jungle

produce in which their country was rich, except to purchase necessaries,

and these could be obtained through their Bruni masters alone, and that

at exorbitant prices. There was in consequence little trade at the time.

But what this river is capable of producing may be shown by its trade

returns at present. The exports, entirely of jungle produce, after the

district had been for twenty years under Sarawak, amounted in 1906 to

$272,223.

Although the Sultan had no real authority over the Kayans and Kenyahs

there still existed among them a certain regard for him, and of this the

Bruni Government took advantage. These races had never been subdued by

the Sultans by force of arms. They never had voluntarily tendered

submission. The restraint exercised over them was due mainly to the fact

that the Brunis held the mouths of the rivers and consequently

controlled the trade, and that trade was one in the very necessaries of

existence. It was inevitable that the rulers of Bruni should resent, and

resist to the utmost, the opening of the rivers to Sarawak traders,

which would involve, as they well saw, the drying up of the source of

their wealth.

The natives on the Baram had an exaggerated opinion of the power of

Bruni, but this illusion was dispelled after a feeble attack made on the

Kayans in September, 1870, which resulted in ignominious failure. Still,

they were prepared to submit to such demands which, though extortionate,

custom had taught them to regard as the Sultan's due, and they could not

do without the imports, which they were precluded from obtaining

elsewhere and from others, than Bruni and the hands of pangirans. But

the rapacity of the pangirans became at last intolerable; and we will

here give two instances illustrative of the methods adopted by them,

which were connived at by the Sultan.

In 1873, a mixed party of Dayaks, Tanjongs, and Bukitans from the Rejang

river, working produce in the Baram, were attacked by the Kayans. Six

were killed and one escaped. The survivor stated that the party had been

treacherously attacked; but on the other hand the Kayans asserted that

the behaviour of the strangers had been so suspicious that they had

satisfied themselves that they were a head-hunting party. The Rajah

complained and demanded redress. The Sultan sent an agent in his small

steamer to impose a fine, which in itself was excessive. The agent

proceeded to the house of the chief of the lower Baram Kayans, although

these people had nothing to do with the killing of the subjects of the

Rajah, but it was as far up as he dared to venture, and levied the fine

upon them, demanding double the amount he had been instructed to impose,

the difference, of course, to go into his own pocket. The Rajah had

fixed the fine, but the Sultan had put on his price as well, so that he

might have his pickings out of the affair, and now his agent doubled

that sum. It was in vain for the chief to protest that neither he nor

his people had been concerned in the murders. The Sultan's agent

threatened the chief that if he did not pay, the Rajah would send

several men-of-war, that others would be despatched from Labuan, and

more from Bruni, and that all their country would be laid waste and

their villages burned. After a stormy interview, the chief succeeded in

beating the agent down to a fine amounting to $8000, just thirty times

more than the amount demanded by the Rajah as compensation to the

relatives of those killed. And this fine the chief was constrained to

pay.

Upon the death of the Sultana, a commissioner was sent to Baram by the

Sultan to demand the customary aid towards the obsequies. A meeting of

all the chiefs was summoned by the commissioner, a haji, and, as it

happened, the late Mr. H. Brooke Low, who was then travelling in the

Baram, was present. The Sultan's mandate, requiring so much from each

man, was read and left with the chiefs, the haji not for a moment

suspecting that any one present could read it. Mr. Low, however, was

able to do so, and when it was shown to him he was shocked, though not

surprised, to discover that the haji had read into the mandate a

requirement for amounts more than double that demanded.

But the rebellion of the Kayans and the expulsion of the Brunis from

Baram ensued in the middle of 1874; the river was freed of its

oppressors, and the victorious Kayans menaced every settlement along the

coast from the Baram to Bintulu. The villages were deserted and the

Sultan was in despair, unable to reduce the Kayans, unable even to

protect the Malays. Not only could he draw no revenue thence, but he

dare not even ask for it. This prepared the way for the transfer of the

whole stretch of coast to Sarawak. So far as the Sultan was concerned he

was glad to commute the sovereignty of a district, from which little

before the revolt, and nothing after, could be squeezed by himself out

of the inhabitants, for a certain sum guaranteed to be paid to himself

annually.

To escape Bruni oppression, people were constantly migrating to Sarawak,

principally from the Semalajau, Niah, and Miri rivers, and in 1876 over

2000 came in. These poor people had to effect their escape by stealth,

and consequently had to abandon all their property. Shortly after this

upwards of 500 families of Kenyahs moved over into the Bintulu.

In accordance with the treaty with Great Britain of 1847 the Sultan was

debarred from ceding any territory to any foreign power without the

sanction of her Majesty's Government. This gave the British Government

the right, or rather the power, to prevent Sarawak acquiring the Baram,

and this it was prepared to do. As usual it proved obstructive, and

refused to sanction the transfer; it went so far as to express its

unwillingness to allow any territorial change to be made on the coast of

Bruni. This was insisted on again in 1876, though the Rajah wrote to the

Secretary for Foreign Affairs (March 20) "I may candidly state that a

most pernicious system of robbery and oppression is pursued by the

hirelings of the Bruni Government. It surely can scarcely be conceived

by her Majesty's Government that upholding the authority of the Bruni

Government is tantamount to supporting the cause of oppression and

misrule."

Her Majesty's Government had refused to interfere in any way with that

of Bruni for the amelioration of the condition of the people, and the

maintenance of open ports and free trade; had stood aloof as not

disposed to interfere in the internal affairs of the Sultanate, and yet

now, most inconsistently, it stepped in to forbid the cession to Sarawak

of a portion of that miserably misgoverned and depopulated State.

The fact seems to have been that the Foreign Office had been

persistently misinformed as to the position and prospects of Sarawak,

and as to the conduct of the Rajah towards the Sultan. The latter had

agreed to the cession of Baram to Sarawak; he desired it for monetary

reasons, the only reasons that appealed to or swayed him. But when Sir

Edward Hertslet informed Mr. H. T. Ussher, C.M.G., who was Governor of

Labuan from 1875 to 1879, and who appreciated the motives which guided

the Rajah, that he "in common with others at the Foreign Office had

fancied that the acquisition of the Baram by Sarawak would lead to the

loss of its sago trade with Labuan," the cat was out of the bag.

Incidently we may remark that Baram exported no sago, and that there

could then have been little or no trade between that river and Labuan,

for during the first six months of Sarawak rule the exports amounted in

value to $9000 only. It was a dog-in-the-manger policy, what Labuan

could not have, that it was resolved Sarawak should not have, and the

interests of the people were left out of the question. It is possible

enough that this was inspired by jealousy. No man likes to see his own

field sterile and that of his neighbour producing luxurious crops.

Conceive the feelings of a small mercer in the same street as a Whiteley

or Harrod, who finds his own business dwindling, and is oppressed by the

extension and success of the great firm a few doors off. Such may have

been the feeling of a Governor of Labuan.

The Rajah visited England in 1874, and on July 16 handed in a memorandum

to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, pointing out that the

appropriation by foreign powers of north-west and north-east Borneo and

the Sulu Archipelago[310] should be guarded against, and recommended to

ensure this, and for the benefit of trade and of the native communities,

that Great Britain should assume the sovereign power over those

territories that remained to the Sultanate of Bruni, that the Sultan and

his heirs should be pensioned, as well as the five principal Bruni

Rajahs; and that a town should be built at the mouth of the Bruni river,

which should become the headquarters of her Majesty's Representative, in

place of Labuan. All that the Rajah asked for Sarawak was that Baram

should be incorporated with that State, owing to the fact that the

inland population of that river and that of the Rejang were greatly

intermixed, and should therefore be under one head and government.

A policy somewhat similar to that above indicated was, a year after,

inaugurated with great success in the Malay Peninsula, and it would

doubtless have met with equal success in Borneo had it found favour with

her Majesty's Ministers then, though thirty years afterwards they saw

reason to adopt it, but only after Bruni had become a bankrupt State,

stripped of most of its territories, and with its small remaining

revenue pawned. At the time when the Rajah made his proposal, the whole

of what is now the British North Borneo Company's territory, together

with Lawas, Trusan, Limbang, and Bruni, might have been acquired, and

the Sultan would then have become as powerless to do harm as one of the

native princes of the Federated Malay States, thus relieving the people

of the intolerable oppression of a government which had reduced the

population to a small remnant of what it had been formerly.

The policy adopted in regard to the native States of the Malay Peninsula

in 1875, referred to above, is generally known as that of Sir Andrew

Clarke, who was Governor of the Straits Settlements from 1873 to 1875.

It was the policy, however, that the late Rajah, many years before, had

advocated as one which should be introduced into all native States, and

he then wrote: "The experiment of developing a country through the

residence of a few Europeans and by the assistance of its own native

rulers has never been fully tried, and it appears to me, in some

respects more desirable than the actual possession of a foreign nation;

for if successful, the native prince finds greater advantages, and if a

failure, the European government is not committed. Above all it insures

the independence of the native princes, and may advance the inhabitants

further in the scale of civilisation by means of this very independence,

than can be done when the government is a foreign one, and their freedom

sacrificed."

Compare this with the remark made by Sir Andrew Clarke in his speech

before the Legislative Council of Singapore on the government of the

native States: "We should continue a policy not of aggression upon our

neighbours, but of exercising our own influence, and by giving them

officers to help them."

Had the late Rajah's policy been adopted, Sumatra, or that part of it

which had not been relinquished to the Dutch in 1824, might now contain

many States as flourishing as those of the Malay Peninsula. On March 3,

1844, the Rajah wrote: "I was glad of the opportunity I had of seeing

the political state of Achin, as it fully confirmed my views, which I

made known to Sir ——, of the steps necessary to protect and enlarge our

commerce. Achin, like Borneo, is now in such a state of distraction that

no protection can be found for life or property. To protect our trade we

must _make a monarch_, and uphold him; and he would be a British servant

_de facto_. We could always raise the better and depress the worse, in

other words support those who will benefit ourselves."

A policy that both the Rajahs had advocated should be adopted towards

Bruni.

For many years, as we have seen, Sarawak had to contend with the

opposing influence of Governors of Labuan adverse to her advancement,

but in 1875 Mr. Ussher was appointed Governor, and he was not prepared

to take for granted all the stories of Sarawak aggression and

intimidation which were poured into his ears. He sought for independent

testimony, inquired into matters himself, and was not disposed to gloss

over the misdeeds of the Sultan and his pangirans, and to suppress all

mention of these in his despatches home.

Towards the end of his term of office Mr. Ussher wrote to the Rajah, "I

have had an important interview to-day with Mr. Meade at the Colonial

Office. The object in view was to ascertain the advisability of

permitting you to acquire Baram. I ascertained that the objections

against this step were reduced, firstly, to an idea that undue pressure

was put upon the Sultan; secondly, that resident (!) traders, British,

in that river would be damaged thereby.

"I also ascertained that the Colonial Secretary here was not at all

disposed to carry out the views obstructive of Sarawak advance, which

have animated his predecessors; but that, on the contrary, he was

disposed to allow you and the Sultan to arrive at your own terms, so

long as the Sultan was a perfectly free agent in the matter.

"In the course of a rather lengthy, and, I trust, not ineffective

address on my part, I successfully combated these trivial and groundless

objections, and exposed the fallacy of Sir Henry Bulwer's[311] and Mr.

Pope Hennessy's views with regard to your dealings with the Sultan. I

pointed out also the gross injustice and oppression of the Bruni rule in

these territories, and expressed my firm conviction of the general

desire on the part of the industrious and agricultural classes to pass

under your settled and civilised rule. I demonstrated that there were

_no_ resident British traders, either in Baram or elsewhere in these

parts, whose interests could be imperilled. Further, that so long as you

impose no restrictive export duties on native produce from the river,

there was nothing whatever to prevent the sago, etc., coming to Labuan

or anywhere else.

"I admitted that I had at first been disposed to adopt the Sultan's view

with regard to your relations with him generally, but that careful

inquiry and matured experience had proved to me, not only the untruth of

the accusations of intimidation brought against you, but also the

advisability of permitting you to extend your rule by all legitimate

means, instead of supporting from quixotic and mistaken motives the

effete and immoral rule of Bruni. Mr. Meade finally suggested to me,

that the question might be settled by allowing you to make your own

terms with the Sultan, with the proviso, that any agreement or treaty

made between the two should be subject to the ratification of her

Majesty's Government, who would thus have it in their power to nullify

any injustice either to Bruni or British interests.

"From Sir M. Beach's views, and from Mr. Meade's proposal, I argue that

the matter lies now at last in your own hands, as Lord Salisbury is

likely to accept the Colonial Office views in these comparatively small

matters, on account of its necessarily more detailed and minute

experience of the interests of Borneo generally.

"On the whole I think we may congratulate ourselves on the prospect of a

satisfactory solution of this unpleasant affair. You may always, as you

know, depend upon me never to allow an opportunity to pass of helping

you and Sarawak generally. Apart from our personal friendship, I act on

the conviction that Sarawak is the future regenerator of Borneo."

This was in January, 1879, but Government officials move slowly, and in

a mysterious way, and it was not till late in 1882 that the Foreign

Office sanctioned the annexation of Baram by Sarawak. Thus, at length,

after negotiating a transfer with the Sultan in 1874, the obstruction of

the British Government was overcome, but it took eight years to do this.

A new spirit had come over the Governors of Labuan, and the somewhat

ignoble spite, bred partly of ignorance and partly of jealousy, which

had characterised their conduct with regard to Sarawak, and the Rajah in

particular, was exchanged at last for generous and honest recognition of

the excellence of his rule, and of the injustice of forcing the natives

against their will to remain under the cruel oppression of this Old Man

of the Sea astride on their shoulders.

The subsequent administrators of Labuan were favourable to Sarawak, but

in 1889 the Colony was handed over to the British North Borneo Company.

Their officials had no authority outside of Labuan and did not

correspond with the Foreign Office, and Consuls were appointed to Bruni.

In June, 1883, the Rajah visited Bruni, and was received by the aged

Sultan with special marks of distinction. The Sultan waited at the

entrance of the audience chamber, and taking the Rajah by the hand, led

him to the throne where he seated him by his side. Negotiations for the

cession of Baram and the rivers and districts lying between that river

and Bintulu were at once entered upon, and speedily concluded, and on

the 13th, the deed of cession was finally sealed and delivered.

The cession of this district gave great satisfaction to the inhabitants,

and most of those who had migrated to Sarawak returned by degrees. A

fort was erected at Claudetown[312] (Merudi) about sixty miles up the

Baram river, and here Chinese and Malay traders soon settled, and a

brisk trade rapidly sprang up. Minor stations were also established at

Miri and Niah. The turbulent Kayans and Kenyahs speedily became

pacified, and existing feuds were settled. Now, this district is one of

the most peaceful and prosperous in the State.[313] The entrance to the

river is, and has been, a great hindrance to trade, the bar being very

shallow and exposed, so that it is unsafe for sailing vessels and screw

steamers. The Government accordingly had a special steamer of 200 tons

built in England to carry the trade. She is practically flat-bottomed,

and is propelled by paddles. Another, larger, was added as the trade

increased. In January, 1884, the Rajah was notified by Earl Granville

that her Majesty's Government had no objection to the exercise of

jurisdiction over British subjects by the judicial authorities of the

Government of Sarawak in this newly-acquired territory.

Only one chief in Baram gave any trouble; and he was Aban Jau, chief of

the Tinjar Kayans. He persistently interfered, and thwarted the policy

of Government as much as he could without bringing himself into open

conflict with the authorities. He maintained a position of

semi-independence, and flew his own flag. But in May, 1884, he committed

an intolerable act, and had to be humbled. As the affair is illustrative

of the iniquities allowed at Bruni until quite recently, the particulars

may be given. To appease the manes of his daughter-in-law, Aban Jau sent

to Pangiran Nipa of Tutong, asking for a slave, so that he might

immolate the unhappy wretch. His messengers went to Bruni, where two

pangirans, Matusin and Tejudin, handed them a slave, an old and decrepit

man, whom they sent as a present to Aban Jau. The Resident at

Claudetown, hearing of this, had the party intercepted and arrested, but

too late to save the slave. He had been killed and his head taken, as he

was too old to walk, and the messengers did not care to trouble

themselves to carry him. Aban Jau was severely punished; he submitted,

and his power was broken. He was no better than an aged savage, and

there was some excuse for him, as he was complying with ancestral

customs; but there was none for the Muhammadan Bruni pangirans for

despatching a miserable old slave to a death by torture.

In June, 1884, by the Sultan's orders, a Dusun village was attacked—the

time for the attack being chosen when nearly all the able-bodied men

were absent, and over twenty women and children were killed. Oppression

became so rife that many refugees crossed the frontier into Sarawak

territory, abandoning in so doing their property and plantations. In

August of the same year, the people of Limbang broke out into open

rebellion.

The Limbang river waters a wide district that is fertile and populous.

The people possessed extensive sago plantations, and were comparatively

prosperous. On this account they were all the more oppressed by the

pangirans. There was no protection for person and property, and women

and girls were carried off to fill the harems of Bruni. This was the

people that suffered such cruel wrongs at the hands of the Pangiran

Makota, and it was in this river that he met his death in 1860.

The trouble began with two of the agents of the Pangiran Temanggong, the

then Regent and heir apparent, being killed whilst extorting taxes. The

pangiran thereupon went up in his steam-launch with a large following,

and proposed that the chiefs should meet him at a certain place and

discuss matters. The proposal was made in guile, his real purpose being

to seize the opportunity for slaughtering them. But these people had had

many years' experience of pangirans and their little ways, and met guile

with guile. The proposal was acceded to, but whilst the pangiran was on

his way to the appointed rendezvous he himself fell into an ambuscade.

Fire was opened on his party, and he was forced to beat a retreat, his

launch damaged, seventeen of his men killed, and more wounded. Bruni was

thrown into panic, and stockades were erected to resist an expected

invasion. The Limbang people followed up their advantage by raiding the

suburbs of the town, and a house was attacked within half a mile of the

Sultan's palace.

The Sultan, then in his dotage, was helpless, and appealed to the acting

Consul-General, Mr. Treacher (now Sir William Treacher, K.C.M.G.), to

help him out of his difficulties. Mr. Treacher knew that the Limbangs

had been driven to rebellion by the intolerable exactions to which they

had been subjected, and he declined to interfere, unless the Sultan and

his wazirs should concede a charter releasing the Limbangs from all

arbitrarily imposed taxes, and limiting taxation to a small poll tax,

and a 5 per cent _ad valorem_ duty on gutta percha, granting them at the

same time immunity for their property and sago-plantations, and engaging

that no more tax-collectors should be sent from Bruni to the river, and

that a general amnesty should be accorded.

This charter, embodying so many radical reforms, was granted with

ill-concealed reluctance, and without the slightest intent of

performance.

Armed with this document, Mr. Treacher proceeded to the Limbang. But

already the Sultan had sent word to the Muruts to fall on the Limbangs

and kill and pillage as they liked.

Whilst Mr. Treacher was negotiating with the chiefs, news arrived that

these savages had murdered four Kadayan women and two men, and they were

consequently ill-disposed to accept the charter. They knew by experience

that they could not rely upon the good faith of the Sultan and his

wazirs. However, Mr. Treacher was urgent, and hesitatingly they appended

their marks to the document; relying rather on the white man to see that

its provisions were carried out, than feeling that any confidence could

be placed in the word of the Sultan.

And in fact, no sooner was the agreement signed, than the Sultan sent

his emissaries into the Baram district to invite the Kayans to raid the

Limbang, but the Sarawak Government got wind of this, and at once took

prompt and effective measures to prevent the tribes on the Baram from

answering the appeal.

In December, 1884, Mr. Frank R. O. Maxwell,[314] who was administering

the Government in the absence of the Rajah, when at Bruni heard that

sixteen Sarawak Dayaks and four Malays had been killed while collecting

produce in the neighbouring river, Trusan. The Sultan in his impotence

to act, suggested to Mr. Maxwell his willingness to cede the Trusan

district to Sarawak. The feudal rights over this district were held by

the Pangiran Temanggong, and he too consented. Bruni and Sarawak, he

said, were the same country, and in transferring his rights to Sarawak

he would be incorporating himself in the Sarawak Government. Subject to

the approval of the Rajah, Mr. Maxwell accepted this offer of the

Trusan.

[Illustration:

TRUSAN FORT.]

The Sultan, the Pangiran Temanggong, and other wazirs and pangirans were

then all in favour of the cession of the Limbang, as well as the Trusan,

to Sarawak. The Chinese and Malay traders and the lower classes strongly

advocated the transfer; and the Regent and the wazir next to him in rank

gave Mr. Maxwell a written promise with their seals attached that,

pending the return of the Rajah, Limbang should not be transferred to

any foreign government. On the return of the Rajah early in 1885, Trusan

was occupied, and a fort and station established some thirty miles from

the mouth, to which English and native officers were appointed. The

Muruts up the river were a quarrelsome people, and blood-feuds were

common, and gave some trouble at first. The people generally had become

miserably poor through a long course of oppression.

Trusan is a good example of what tact and discretion can do in dealing

with natives, and the Muruts were the most savage of those in that part.

In a very few years they became peaceful, well-to-do, and contented,

enjoying the fruits of their labours in security. Trusan has now a

fairly flourishing trade, and the rich plains through which the river

winds, and which in days gone by had been extensively cultivated with

rice, but which had been rendered desolate by extortion, now afford

large grazing grounds for herds of water-buffaloes, which are bred for

export, and also excellent land for the cultivation of the sago palm.

Barely a month had elapsed since the peace had been patched up with the

Limbang people by the acting Consul-General, before the people were

again in revolt, and many Bruni Malays, men and women, were killed,

large numbers of buffaloes were mutilated, and again the capital, Bruni,

was menaced. Nothing further was done by the British Government, and

nothing could be done, except to establish a firm government in the

disaffected region, and the Foreign Office was not prepared to do this.

As for the authorities in Bruni, they were incapable of doing anything.

Their only idea of keeping rebellious subjects under control was to

invoke the aid of wild interior tribes, and invite them to butcher and

plunder all who resisted their exactions, and this they could no longer

do.

On May 30, 1885, the old Sultan Mumin departed this life, at the

venerable age of over one hundred years, and the Pangiran Temanggong

Hasim, reputed son of the late Sultan Omar Ali,[315] the predecessor of

Sultan Mumin, was elevated to the throne. Sultan Hasim, who was past

middle age when he succeeded, was a shrewd man, though hard and

vindictive. His antecedents had not been exemplary, but hopes were

entertained that, being a man of strength of mind and of advanced ideas,

an improvement would be effected in the administration of Bruni, which

would lead to the establishment of good order and bring the place and

State out of absolute decay into comparative prosperity, but these

hopes, strong man as he was, he was powerless to fulfil.

In order to appreciate much that occurred during the reign of Sultan

Hasim it is necessary to understand the conditions under which he became

Sultan, and the effect that these conditions had upon his power and

position.

His predecessor, Mumin, had an only son, the Pangiran Muda Muhammad

Tejudin, a semi-imbecile, nicknamed Binjai, literally the son of

misfortune, signifying an idiot. Much as Sultan Mumin would have liked

to have proclaimed his son heir to the throne, it was quite impossible

for him to do so in opposition to the natural objections of the nobles,

upheld, as these were, by the laws of Bruni, which preclude the

accession of any prince afflicted with mental or bodily infirmity. The

succession would therefore fall upon either of the Sultan's nephews, the

Pangiran Bandahara, or the Pangiran di Gadong, and both claimed it.

These two powerful princes and wazirs, with their feudal and official

territorial rights, and the many nobles and chiefs who owed them

allegiance, represented the most powerful factions in the country, and

the accession of either to the throne would have plunged the country

into bloodshed. To avert this, the British Government persuaded Sultan

Mumin, but not without bringing considerable pressure to bear upon him,

to nominate the Pangiran Temanggong Hasim, the senior wazir, as his

successor, and to appoint him Regent, the old Sultan being too

feeble-minded to govern.

Hasim's elevation to the throne gave profound offence to the Pangirans

Bandahara and di Gadong, and to the majority of the people, who believed

the story of his mean birth, and that he had no just title to the rank

he held as a prince of blood royal. That his accession was not disputed

was due only to its implied support of the British Government, though

that support would probably have failed him had he been forced to fall

back upon it. The Bandahara and di Gadong, though they retained their

offices, for many years refused him their support, and would neither

attend his Council nor maintain any kind of relation with him,

notwithstanding the fact that they were his two principal Ministers of

State; and he was powerless to force them to do so, or to deprive them

of their offices.

Moreover, his predecessor had left him in sore straits for the means

necessary for the support of his government, and even of his household.

None of the late Sultan's property came to him, and the whole of the

crown-lands in Bruni territory had been illegally granted to others, and

these, though his rightful appurtenances, he had no power to recover.

Sultan Hasim thus came to the throne practically shorn of everything

that goes to the support of a crown. Abandoned by his ministers, and the

loyalty of his people denied him, deprived of his revenues, and with but

a few followers, there was nothing left him but the sovereign rights,

shadowy in nature since he had not the means fully to exert them. A

pathetic picture; but in spite of his faults it says much for his

personal ability and strength of character that he was able, not only to

maintain his position, but gradually to gain sufficient power to exert

his authority, and to make his will felt. It must not be overlooked that

many of his worst acts were the direct outcome of his necessitous

condition, and the constant intriguing against him by his own ministers.

Owing to lack of power to chastise the rebels, though not of will,

Limbang had been let alone by the Sultan, and for some time there were

no aggressive acts committed by either side, but in November, 1885, the

people of Limbang were again in open rebellion and had killed two more

Bruni subjects. The Sultan thereupon sent the Rajah two pressing

messages asking him to visit Bruni, and this the Rajah did. The Sultan

laid the state of affairs before him, and declared that he saw no hope

of peace unless the Rajah would consent to attack the Limbang, and

reduce the people to order for him. Limbang was sufficiently near to be

a menace to the capital. Twice it had been threatened by them, and the

suburbs raided. The third time might be more disastrous. The town might

fall into their hands.

The Rajah, however, declined to interfere. The Limbang people were at

peace with Sarawak, and numbers of his subjects were working produce in

that river, and met with friendliness there. To reduce these people to

submission, and then to hand them over to oppression, after having

deprived them of the power to protect themselves, was what the Rajah

would never consent to do. That something must be done, and done at

once, he felt, but the question of what should be done was for the

representative of her Majesty's Government to decide.

As we have before pointed out, in the Sultanate of Bruni, there are

various rights claimed. The Sultan has his rights, some districts revert

to the holders of certain offices, and others are under the hereditary

feudal rule of the pangirans. Limbang pertained to this last category.

The Sultan was sovereign, but his sovereign rights consisted in this

alone, namely, to send his agents into the country and squeeze it. The

feudal lords were the pangirans, and as they could not oppress the

exasperated and revolted people any more, they were ready to surrender

their rights to the Rajah, but could not do this without the Sultan's

confirmation and seal. What the Sultan wanted was that the Rajah should

crush the rebellion, so that he might work his vengeance on the Limbang

people, and turn the screw on them till nothing more could be extracted

from them. This the Rajah perfectly understood, and he declined to do

the dirty work for the Sultan. The refusal of assistance by the Rajah

produced a coolness on the part of the Sultan. He would not, however,

receive this refusal as final, and he repeated his request to the Rajah

in an altered form; he requested him to place the gunboat _Aline_ with a

strong force of Sarawak Dayaks, also a large sum of money, at his (the

Sultan's) disposal, for the purpose of enabling him to reduce the

Limbang people under his own officers, if the Rajah himself would not

head the expedition.

The Rajah's refusal aroused an angry feeling in the breast of Hasim, and

this was fanned to bitter hostility, when the Consul-General informed

him and the Limbang people simultaneously, in reply to a petition of the

latter that they might be placed under the rule of white men, that her

Majesty's Government was prepared to consent to the transfer of Limbang

to Sarawak. The Sultan's hostile attitude was not shared by his

ministers, or by the Bruni people generally, or even by the hereditary

owners or rulers of the Limbang. These latter, as has been shown, unable

to extract more taxes from the people, hoped to receive from the Sarawak

Government an annual stipulated income in lieu of precarious and

uncertain exactions. They accordingly begged the Rajah to take over the

river. But the Sultan refused to consent, and his refusal was probably

actuated even then by motives other than those of revenge and resentment

as the sequel will show.

In September, 1886, two cold-blooded murders were committed in the

Tutong, within a day's journey overland from Bruni. Two young pangirans,

a man and a woman, had been living together without the sanction of

their respective parents. The girl, after a while, was ordered by her

father, Pangiran Nipa, to return to him. She did so, and he then put her

to death with his own hands. The young man, Pangiran Japar, was brother

to Pangiran Mat, who had been placed in charge of Tutong by the Pangiran

di Gadong, the ex-officio holder of feudal rights in that district.

Japar and Mat were both subjects of Sarawak. A short time after the

murder of the girl, Nipa's brother, the Pangiran Tejudin, son-in-law of

the Sultan, and uncle of the unfortunate girl, sent an armed party to

Pangiran Mat, to inform him that a mandate had been issued by the Sultan

for the execution of Japar. Pangiran Mat did not ask to be shown this

mandate, and in fact Tejudin had none, but was intimidated into allowing

his brother to be killed.

The Rajah was at the time at Bruni, and he at once demanded of the

Sultan that a fair trial of Pangiran Tejudin should be held. There was

very little doubt that the Sultan's name had been misused, and Japar was

a Sarawak subject. As no justice was likely to be obtained in Bruni, the

Rajah further demanded that the murderer should be handcuffed and sent

to Labuan for trial, when the truth would come out. But this was

refused. The Sultan naturally was determined to screen his son-in-law,

who had instigated the murder, and who was then in the palace enjoying

his protection. The Rajah indignantly declined to meet the Sultan so

long as the murderer was sheltered under his roof. So the matter ended,

but it widened the rift between the Rajah and the Sultan.

In June, 1887, Sir Frederick Weld, Governor of Singapore, went to Bruni

to settle a dispute between the North Borneo Company and the Sultan over

a debateable strip of land. Sultan Hasim seized the occasion to pour

into the ear of Sir Frederick a tissue of accusations against Sarawak,

and no Sarawak official was allowed to be present to refute them. The

Government of the Rajah was charged with disturbing the peace, and with

sending its emissaries into the Limbang to foster discontent, and to

keep the rebellion simmering, in the hopes of being able to find an

excuse for annexing the district. Sir Frederick listened, but apparently

believed little he heard, for he recommended the Sultan to hand over the

Limbang to the Rajah. He further strongly urged the Sultan to accept a

British Protectorate over his remaining dominions, and to receive a

Resident, who might act as adviser in the administration of the State.

The Sultan consented to this latter recommendation; his intention,

however, to accept a British Resident at Bruni, to prevent his misrule,

and to curb the tyranny of his adherents, was only pretence. Sir

Frederick Weld was perhaps acting beyond his instructions in proposing

the appointment of a Resident, but the proposal was sound. In September,

1888, the late Sir Hugh Low, then Resident of Perak, was despatched to

Bruni to conclude an agreement with the Sultan by which Bruni became a

Protectorate.

In the Federated Malay States, as in the Indian Protectorates, British

Residents are placed who can advise as to the conduct of government, and

it is perfectly understood by the native rulers that their advice must

be followed. Now, a British Protectorate had been extended over Bruni,

and as a consequence a Resident should have been placed there to control

the Sultan and check the misdoings of his chiefs. But nothing of the

sort was done. The Limbang was left in a condition of disorder, and a

menace to its neighbours, and the Brunis to the arbitrary injustice and

cruelty of their rulers. Trusan now offered a near haven of refuge to

which many fled, both slaves and free-born people, the latter chiefly to

save their daughters from a fate worse than slavery—a short period in a

harem, and then domestic drudgery for life. The British Government would

do nothing, and looked very much as if it were not disposed to allow any

one else to do anything. Sir Hugh Low,[316] who had an exceptional

experience of Bruni and the people, had urged the Sultan to place the

Limbang under the Rajah, tendering the same advice as had Sir Frederick

Weld; but to this, also, Hasim turned a deaf ear.

The Limbang chiefs, after having maintained their independence for six

years, early in 1890 decided to settle the question of their future for

themselves. They assembled, and of their own free will and accord placed

their country under the protection of Sarawak, and themselves under the

authority of its Government; in token of which they hoisted the Sarawak

flag. In justice to the claims of the inhabitants, and in conformity

with a promise he had made to them to tender such assistance as lay in

his power, the Rajah accepted the responsibility thus placed upon him,

and annexed the country on March 17, subject to the approval of her

Majesty's Government.

The Rajah had already frequently approached the Sultan on behalf of

these unfortunate people to urge that justice should be done to them,

and that they should not be given over to be preyed upon by rapacious

pangirans. The Pangiran Muda, son of the late Rajah Muda Hasim, who by

birth was the nearest to the throne, and who possessed feudal rights

over a part of the Limbang, having abandoned all hope of being able to

exercise those rights and draw any revenue from the district, ascended

the river and openly proclaimed to his people that he had handed over

all his rights to the Rajah. The other hereditary holders of feudal

authority in the district had again approached the Rajah, and had

entreated him to annex Limbang, which had become not only unprofitable

to them, but a menace to Bruni. The Rajah would have been untrue to his

word passed to the Limbang chiefs had he left them to their fate, after

the failure of his negotiations and repeated attempts to intercede for

them with the Sultan. Although he was averse to taking this step, yet he

felt that it was not possible for him to refuse the appeals that came to

him from all sides to interfere, and it was the only solution of the

difficulty, failing the appointment of a British Resident, for the

people could not be expected to again place themselves under the power

of a Sultan who would keep no promises, and who intended no mercy.

The Sultan, however, mortified in his pride, and being thus prevented

from giving vent to his vindictive feeling, had remained obdurate. For

some time he had been accumulating arms and ammunition at Bruni for a

great attempt upon the Limbang, whilst through his minister, the di

Gadong, he was keeping up a pretence of peace. If he succeeded, the

horrors that would have ensued in the Limbang may well be conceived; but

if he failed, he would draw on Bruni hordes of desperate savages,

infuriated by years of ill-treatment, and the Brunis feared that the

capture of their town and a general massacre would be the result.

These were the reasons that led the Rajah to act promptly, and to appeal

to her Majesty's Government to sanction such action. The Foreign Office

approved, after having kept the Rajah in anxious suspense for a year,

and fixed the annual sum to be paid by the Sarawak Government for the

Limbang at $6000, but failing the Sultan's acceptance of this for three

consecutive years, this indemnity would be forfeited.

The Sultan declined to receive this compensation, not, however, so much

as a protest against the action of the Rajah,—a purpose with which he

has generally been accredited, with not a little misplaced sympathy,—but

mainly to punish his recalcitrant ministers, the Pangirans Bandahara and

di Gadong. Hitherto he had been quite powerless to do this, but an

opportunity was now afforded him, and he did not hesitate to avail

himself of it. The two pangirans were the principal holders of the

feudal rights over the Limbang, which of late years had yielded them

nothing, and they naturally desired, badly off as they were, that the

Sultan should sanction the acceptance of the indemnity, the greater part

of which would have reverted to them, and would have afforded them a

fixed and ensured revenue, even more than they had ever been able to

extort from the people. The remainder would have gone to the Pangiran

Muda, and not a cent of it would have gone to the Sultan. But by the

laws of Bruni, feudal rights cannot be alienated without the sanction of

the Sultan; and he subsequently informed the British Consul that he had

withheld his sanction, and would do so as long as he lived, a

determination to which he vindictively adhered, solely that he might

deprive his two ministers of the revenues to which they were entitled.

He went so far as to tell the Consul that he had no real grievance

against the Rajah, but it being necessary to find some plausible pretext

for his decision he had invented one, which no one in Bruni could call

into question.

Sir Spenser St. John, writing privately to the Rajah at this time said,

"If the Foreign Office could understand how the Bruni Rajahs govern

Limbang, they would make no objection to your taking it over. It is a

most interesting river, and when no longer harassed by Kayan raids[317]

and plundered by Bruni Rajahs, it will be one of the richest on the

coast. Sago can be planted to any extent, and it used to be famous for

its pepper gardens. In fact Chinese were working there nearly to the

foot of Mulu mountain"—over one hundred miles from the coast.

But in his life of _Rajah Brooke_ published in 1899, Sir Spenser St.

John alters his tone. He remarks that "unless we are to adopt the

principle that 'the end justifies the means,' it is difficult to approve

the action of Sarawak in seizing by force any part of the Sultan's

dominions. A little gentle, persevering diplomacy would have secured

Limbang without violating any principle of international law. I am

convinced, however, that the present Rajah was deceived by some one as

to the political position of that district, as he wrote that, for four

years previous to his action, Limbang was completely independent of the

Sultan, which his officers subsequently found was not the case."

As to the first part of this statement, Sir Spenser when he wrote it,

had severed his connexion with Borneo for nearly forty years, and it

shows how little he was kept in touch with Bornean affairs since he

left; or does Sir Spenser imagine that he would have succeeded where

such men as the Rajah and Sir Hugh Low had failed; both of whom had

continually urged reforms on the Sultan, to which he had turned a deaf

ear?

With regard to the second part of the statement, the Rajah certainly did

not place himself in a position in which he could be deceived. He

conducted all negotiations and all inquiries himself, and on the spot.

He was no more deceived as to the true state of affairs than were Sir

William Treacher, Dr. Leys (Consul-General), Sir F. Weld, and Sir Hugh

Low. It is, moreover, not correct that the Rajah's officers subsequently

made the great discovery that is attributed to them. Sir Spenser might

well have been a little more explicit as to this last remark. He agrees,

however, that there can be no doubt that the inhabitants of Limbang

rejoiced to be placed under the Sarawak flag.

"I knew them well, and how they suffered from the exactions of the

Pangirans, and their rapacious followers, and no one would have more

rejoiced than myself to hear that they had been put under Sarawak rule

in a less forcible way. As poverty increased in Bruni, so had the

exactions augmented, and Limbang, being near, suffered the most. Perhaps

some of my readers may think that in this case the 'end _did_ justify

the means.' At all events, that appears to have been the view taken by

the Foreign Office."

Sir Spenser might very well have accepted the view taken by the Foreign

Office, under which he has served with distinction for many years. The

Foreign Office judged upon facts that were placed before it, and these

facts Sir Spenser had not under his eye when basing this unfair

criticism upon the Rajah's proceedings.

The Limbang having been annexed in 1890, a Government station was

established some fifteen miles from the river's mouth, and settlers,

both Malay and Chinese, soon arrived, and took up their quarters there;

indeed, a good many quitted Bruni, and applied for sites upon which to

build shops and houses directly the flag was raised.

The station is now a flourishing little place, and has been well laid

out by Mr. O. F. Ricketts,[318] who has been Resident there since its

establishment. It is the prettiest out-station in Sarawak; has miles of

good riding roads, a bazaar that is well attended; and, being another

refuge for the oppressed, the Malay population is continually

increasing. Mr. Ricketts, who also has over-charge of the Trusan and

Lawas districts, has been eminently successful in his management of the

Muruts and Bisayas, of whom he has had some twenty years' experience,

and is popular with all classes at Bruni.

In reporting on Limbang in February, 1891, Mr. Ricketts observes: "since

the occupation of the river in March last, matters have progressed

satisfactorily, and the inhabitants have shown themselves well disposed

and satisfied with the new order of things, with the exception of three

or four of the Danau chiefs, who have been incited to be otherwise from

Bruni.

"Little has been done with the exception of visiting the people, who at

all times have been allowed to trade freely with Bruni; no import or

export duties have been collected. A number of Brunis have come into the

river at different times to wash sago, who previously were unable to do

so, owing to the unsettled state of the place.

"Most of the principal Chinese of Bruni have been over here at different

times, and have expressed their wish to commence business here. One firm

already holds one of the shops, of which there are six, the others being

held by Sarawak and Labuan Chinese; one sago factory is in course of

erection.

"There has been no revenue for the year; the expenditure amounting to

$11,812. No revenue was demanded, until the natives settled down, and

had recovered from their previous unsettled state. The expenditure was

chiefly in public buildings, bungalows, court house, barracks, etc." The

imports and exports in 1906 amounted to $282,277, against only $86,687

in 1891.

There is no fort at Limbang.

If the reader will look at the map he will see that a peninsula or horn

runs out from Bruni, sheltering the bay against the winds and waves from

the north-west. Labuan is actually a continuation of the same, but the

belt of land has been broken through, leaving only Labuan and a few

little islands rising above the surface of the ocean. At the extreme

point of the promontory is a lighthouse erected by the Rajah. This

promontory goes by the name of Muara. The coal-beds that come to the

surface in Labuan, continue in Muara, and Mr. W. C. Cowie[319] had

obtained from the Sultan Mumin a concession of the coal-fields in Muara,

and all rights over this district were ceded to him in perpetuity by the

late Sultan in 1887. These rights confer complete and absolute

possession of all the lands in the district, with power to sell, impose

taxes, rents, and assessments, the possession of the revenue farms, with

power to create new farms of any description, and certain judicial

rights conjoined with power to inflict penalties.

This Muara district, the town in which was founded by Mr. Cowie, and

named by him Brooketon in honour of the Rajah, is the richest portion of

the small and shrunken territory now remaining to the Sultanate of

Bruni, and it remains to it, as may be seen, attached by a thread only.

It is not large, but it is of much importance, as it possesses a good

colliery and an excellent harbour. Previous to the opening of this

colliery the population, consisting of a few Kadayan peasants and Malay

fishermen, was small and scattered, and, in common with the lower

classes throughout the Sultanate, led a miserable existence under

misrule.

Mr. Cowie found that a much larger capital was needed to develop the

colliery than he possessed, without which the workings would be

unremunerative. Every year entailed increasing loss, and in 1888, two

years before the acquisition of the Limbang by the Rajah, he sold to him

all his rights in Muara.

Previous to the transfer, for want of capital, the mines had been worked

in a hand-to-mouth fashion by a few coolies under a manager with but

little experience, the output being confined to meeting the very limited

local demand in Labuan. There was practically no plant, and only a small

ricketty wharf, to which the surface coal was conveyed in buffalo-drawn

waggons over a roughly constructed line.

Those who knew Brooketon in those days and know it now, can testify to

the great improvements that have been made by the Rajah's persistent

efforts. The greatest possible benefits have been conferred upon the

people by the establishment of a large and growing industry among them,

but it has been effected at a heavy financial loss. The colliery has

been placed under experienced managers; expensive, though necessary,

machinery, locomotives, a steam collier, lighters, etc., have been

purchased, extensive and solid wharves built, and a new line laid down.

The cost of these, with the many other preliminary expenses incidental

to the proper working of a large colliery, have been heavy, and so far

it has proved an unremunerative speculation. The colliery employs

hundreds of miners and workmen, and through it, indirectly, many people

gain a livelihood, and the thriving settlement of Brooketon is solely

dependent upon it. Law and order have been effectively maintained by the

Rajah at his own cost, though in the name and with the consent of the

Sultan. Although financial improvement may be remote, closing the mines

down would mean a loss of all these benefits to the people; the place

would revert to its former condition, and the population would be

dispersed. This consideration has induced the Rajah to continue working

the colliery, with the hope of ultimately lessening the losses, and the

remoter hope of ultimate success. To Brooketon we shall again refer.

In March, 1905, a chief named Lawai, who had been dignified by the

Sultan with the title of Orang Kaya Temanggong, with some 400 of his

numerous following, removed into the Limbang river from the Baram, in

defiance of Government orders. In former days these people had been the

most forward amongst those employed by the Bruni Government to molest

the Limbang people, and a short time previous to their removal to the

Limbang had killed three Kadayans in Bruni territory, who had incurred

displeasure in certain high quarters. After these murders had been

committed, Lawai had been favourably received by the Sultan at Bruni,

and this no doubt encouraged him openly to resist the Government. A

small force was despatched against him, and, taken by surprise, he was

captured.

The rendezvous of this expedition was off Muara island, at the entrance

to Bruni bay, and, as its object was kept a profound secret,

considerable uneasiness arose in the suspicious minds of those at Bruni,

who with good reason feared the displeasure of the Rajah. A secret

meeting of the leading pangirans and chiefs was held; at which it was

decided that should it be the Rajah's intention to sweep away their evil

government they would kill the Sultan and hand over the city to him.

With this exception, from the day that the Sarawak flag had been

hoisted, there have been no disturbances in the Limbang. But in the

neighbouring river, the Trusan, the perpetual petty feuds amongst the

Muruts, which led to isolated cases of murder, wounding, and

cattle-lifting, caused the Government considerable trouble. In 1900, it

became necessary to administer a severe lesson. Some Muruts living in

the far interior under their chief, Okong, aided by those of the Lawas,

not then under the Sarawak Government, having killed twenty-one Muruts

of the lower Trusan, an expedition, with which the Rajah Muda went, was

sent to punish them. This was so effectually done, that it resulted in

the people of the interior coming in from all quarters to renounce their

feuds; and since that Trusan has also been free from such troubles.

Commenting upon Bornean affairs, the _Singapore Free Press_ in August,

1900, remarked that: "Bruni, though independent, is in a state of

bankruptcy and decay, and would not be a desirable acquisition for any

one. Its revenues, such as they are, are all leased and sold, and those

who should benefit from them have long parted with their interests. The

aged Sultan, troubled with debts and worried by creditors, has given

powers to the most importunate in their claims, which action has

alienated the support of those hereditary chiefs who are entitled to

share with him the government of the country. These chiefs assume

semi-independence, and each goes his own way unchecked, a method which

tends to bring affairs of State to chaos. It is erroneously supposed

that the British Government is responsible for this condition of the

country. As a matter of fact the British Government has no right, and

certainly no inclination, to interfere in the internal affairs of an

independent kingdom."

This is a very accurate description of the situation at Bruni; but,

unless we accept the theory that might makes right, how can the action

of the British Government in appointing a Resident to take charge of

Bruni a few years later on be justified? No one, however, can quarrel

with the statement that the British Government had no inclination to

interfere. That had been made manifest enough by many years of

indifference to the sufferings of a people, and of shirking moral

responsibilities. It is stretching a point to say that the British

Government had no right to interfere; it was their duty to do so, and

that duty involved the right. Not content with this neglect of an

obvious duty, the Government stood in the people's way, by preventing

them from turning to others for the aid they so sorely needed.

What these sufferings were, Mr. Keyser, who was Consul at Bruni, fully

sets forth in his report to the Foreign Office for 1899. He wrote: "Such

trade as there was has completely fallen off, and the monthly steamer

from Singapore has ceased its visits. The debts and difficulties of the

Sultan and his chiefs have so increased with time that this state of

affairs naturally reacts upon the people. With the exception of catching

fish, no one does any work, and all live in poverty and constant want of

food. Hundreds of families have left, and continue to leave, to escape

the seizure of their women and children by impecunious headmen, who wish

to relieve their own necessities by selling them as slaves.[320] Others

are driven from the country by the infliction of fines, and the

exorbitant demands of those Chinese and money-lenders to whom the

collection of taxes and all saleable rights have been long since

transferred for cash. Those traders have full power to oppress the

people, and they do so remorselessly. In a short space of time, if the

present Government continues, Bruni will be empty of inhabitants."

The two small provinces, the river districts of Tutong and Belait, now

remaining to the Sultan, have been in a constant state of revolt. In

June, 1899,[321] the people of these rivers openly threw off their

allegiance and hoisted the Sarawak flag, an act which caused some

excitement in the East, and a good deal of comment in English papers.

The principal chiefs then waited upon the Rajah, and begged him to take

over their country, a petition that was repeated shortly afterwards. The

British Consul was informed by them that they absolutely refused to

remain under Bruni rule, and they prayed to be placed under that of

Sarawak. But the Consul could only report; and that Government, which

had "no right and certainly no inclination to interfere," again proved

obstructive, and the people were forced to continue a hopeless effort to

gain their liberty.

A desultory war commenced, weak in attack from want of power,[322] and

weak in resistance from lack of ammunition and supplies. Treachery was

resorted to by those sent to suppress the revolt. As an instance of one

cold-blooded deed, Pangiran Tejudin, the Sultan's son-in-law, of whom

one infamous act has already been recorded, persuaded the inhabitants of

some of the Tutong villages to submit, under a guarantee that their

lives and property would be spared. To ratify the terms, the pangiran

took twenty-five men from these villages to the Tutong town, and there

they were bound and confined. Then one man from each village was

selected, placed bound within a fence, and there at intervals slashed at

until all had bled to death. Seven only managed to escape.

In October, 1902, many of the inhabitants of Belait and Tutong, unable

to continue the struggle, having sought a refuge in the Trusan and

Limbang rivers, and the Sultan being wearied into granting an amnesty on

the payment of a heavy fine, those remaining surrendered; their

principal chiefs, however, the Datus Kalim and De Gadong, with their

people, elected to place themselves under Sarawak rule by also moving

into the Limbang.

In January, 1905, the British North Borneo Company, with the sanction of

her Majesty's Government, transferred their cession of the Lawas river

to the Sarawak Government. The inhabitants of this river are closely

allied to those of the Trusan, and, in a lesser degree, to those of the

Limbang. It is a beautiful and fertile district, but sparsely inhabited.

If the yearly cession money paid upon the districts that have been

acquired by Sarawak during the sovereignty of the present Rajah is taken

into consideration, not one of these districts has yet paid its way, and

even Limbang, upon which no cession money is paid, showed a deficit of

expenditure over revenue in 1906, but the increased trade, of these

districts, which in 1906 amounted to just a million dollars in value

shows them to be in a flourishing state, and this has added to the

general prosperity of the raj.

In 1905, an agreement was made between his Majesty's Government and the

Sultan, by which the latter accepted a Resident, by whose counsel the

affairs of the State were to be guided, and on January 1, 1906, this

agreement came into effect, and the Sultan and his wazirs were

practically laid aside, the rule becoming British under the _de facto_

ruler, the Resident.

The reason given for this step was not so much that the iniquitous

conditions of affairs at Bruni could no longer be tolerated, but that

the country was bankrupt, and therefore something had to be done. There

were two alternatives presented, the absorption of Bruni by Sarawak, or

the introduction of the same system of government that prevails in the

Federated Malay States. The latter was adopted as being, in the opinion

of the Foreign Office, likely to be more beneficial to the Sultanate, as

well as being a healthy example to the neighbouring protectorates, and

it has been expressly stated by the Foreign Secretary that this was done

not merely with a view to the future interests of Bruni, but to those of

the other British Protectorates in Borneo.[323] The only pretext that

has been advanced for not allowing the natural absorption of Bruni by

Sarawak was the supposed animosity the Sultan bore towards the Rajah,

though, had it still existed, this might well have been regarded only in

the light of a compliment to the latter.

[Illustration:

ON THE LAWAS RIVER.]

But undue importance has been placed upon the ill-feeling the Sultan had

formerly borne to the Rajah, and the fact that a complete reconciliation

had taken place long before this time appears to have been ignored.

Apart from this, however, the likings and dislikings of an isolated, and

now defunct, old tyrant were not quite a sufficient basis upon which to

establish a policy antagonistic to the natural fate of Bruni and the

pronounced wishes of the people. But, many months before it was proposed

to establish a British Residency in Bruni, the Sultan, completely at the

end of his resources, had confided to the British Consul his unfortunate

situation; had expressed his deep regret for the estrangement between

himself and the Rajah, and his desire for a reconciliation, which he

begged the Consul would bring about, for he had no one else to turn to

for the help he so sorely needed, and which he knew the Rajah would not

refuse him.

The Rajah, who had never lost his kindly feeling towards the Bruni

rulers, at once visited Bruni, and exchanged visits with the Sultan,

which were marked by extreme cordiality and confidence on the part of

the latter. But by no method short of a clean sweep of its debased

Government and corrupt officials, of whom the Sultan was the most

corrupt, could any improvement be effected in the sad condition of

Bruni, or in the Sultan's miserable plight, and therefore the Rajah,

through the British Consul, offered terms for the transfer of Bruni to

his Government, and these were far more generous to the Sultan than

those which the Foreign Office, with full knowledge of this offer,

subsequently forced the Sultan to accept.

The terms offered by the Rajah were placed before the Sultan by the

British Consul, and were well received by him and his family, and they

were anxious to accept these at once. They were, however, completely in

the power of three of the members of Council,—the Juwatan[324] Abu

Bakar, Orang Kaya Laksamana, and Orang Kaya di Gadong, who had battened

on the Sultan by lending him large sums of money on extortionate

interest, and who, seeing their way to further affluence, prevented the

Sultan accepting the Rajah's offer until he should have assigned to them

all the benefits it would convey to him, when he would have been called

upon to accept it for their advantage.

All who have read these pages will agree there can be no possible doubt

that the Sultan and his ministers had well deserved to have their powers

curtailed, even to the extent of absolute deprivation of all control in

the affairs of their country, but not a few will naturally wonder why

the Foreign Office had not arrived at such an obvious conclusion many

years ago. Then the reasons for interference were tenfold more weighty

than now. Successive years have seen the Sultanate stripped of its

territories, and the capacity of the Sultan and his bureaucracy to do

evil lessened in proportion to the loss of population, revenues, and

power. Then the British Government would have become possessed of a

large territory, nearly as large as England, with a numerous population,

and would have had a reasonable prospect before it of establishing a

State or Colony which might at this time be as flourishing as any of

those in the Malay peninsula; now they have unnecessarily hampered

themselves with a miserable bankrupt remnant of a formerly large State,

some 3000 square miles in area only, with a total population of not more

than 15,000; with no internal resources to develop, and with revenues so

slight as to be inconsiderable, an experiment which appears to be

proving costly.

To contend that the governmental system of the Federated Malay States

would be a good example to Sarawak is to presume a superiority in that

system, and to infer that the conditions prevailing in the former and

latter States are on a parity. So far there has been no convincing

evidence of the superiority of this system in its application to Bruni,

though that is not surprising, as the British Resident can hardly be

expected to make bricks without straw; and Sarawak, which has the credit

of having "the best form of government for a country populated by an

Oriental people of various races," would scarcely be wise to exchange

the simple methods that have been gradually built up to meet the

requirements of her population for an elaborated system, which, however

successful it has been in the States for which it was formed, might not

be altogether conformable to existing conditions in Sarawak. There is

almost as much difference between the populations of the Malay States

and Sarawak, as there is between that of the latter and Java or Ceylon,

and the same difference exists in regard to Bruni. To argue that a form

of government, because it is eminently adapted to the circumstance of

one country would necessarily be suitable to another, is to be

optimistic, and shows a want either of common sense, or of knowledge of

the respective conditions of the countries indicated.

Perhaps the mysterious profession of the Foreign Secretary in regard to

the future interests of all the British Protectorates in Borneo, which

has been noticed, conceals the real motives, yet to be revealed, for

this sudden departure, which red tapeism can hardly explain away, and

which has given rise to a political position that is peculiar, whether

viewed in the light of expediency or as a matter of sheer justice. The

professed motives appear to be scarcely logical, for this fresh policy

involved no obvious advantages to the Empire, was displeasing to the

natives, and unfair to the interests of Sarawak. But, unfortunately,

evidence is not wanting that there are other motives, which are not only

illogical but unwarrantable, and it is only by keeping these in view

that the policy of the British Government becomes intelligible. It is a

policy that has not originated at the Foreign or the Colonial Office,

but has been adopted by both "on advice given with entire knowledge of

place and people"—how, when, and by whom acquired, it would be

interesting to learn.

Whether Bruni was governed from Singapore or absorbed by Sarawak was a

question of little importance to the public, and should have been one of

minor importance to the Foreign Office, for either way its position as a

British Protectorate would remain unaffected. No one can assert that it

is possible to find a man with greater qualifications as a ruler of

natives or with a greater knowledge of Bruni and its people than the

Rajah of Sarawak, or one whose counsel would have greater weight with

chiefs and people, to whom the task of reforming and regenerating that

country might with wisdom have been entrusted. Then comes the question

of means, so necessary to the establishment of an effective government.

To set up such a government in Bruni, and to maintain it, requires a

considerable outlay, and an ever-recurring yearly subsidy. This the

Rajah knew, and this he was willing and able to bear, but those "with

entire knowledge of place and people" thought differently, with the

result that the overflowing Treasury chest of the Federated Malay States

has had to be drawn upon,[325] and within two years yet another burden

in the shape of a debt of some £24,000 has been needlessly put upon an

already bankrupt State; and still, with a newly-imposed tariff, which is

scarcely in harmony with that of the Federated Malay States, or of

Sarawak, Bruni is unable to make both ends meet, and has the pleasant

prospect before it of having to negotiate a further loan with no

security to offer. So much for expediency.

That the Sultan was not averse to Bruni being incorporated with Sarawak

has been shown, and the fact must not be overlooked that he _was_ averse

to the appointment of a British Resident, and the acceptance of the

agreement by himself and his Prime Minister and brother-in-law, the

Pangiran Bandahara, was obtained only under pressure, and was granted in

opposition to the forcibly expressed wishes of his own immediate

relations, of his chiefs, and of his people. He died shortly afterwards,

at a great age, though he retained his faculties until the end, and was

succeeded by his son, Muhammad-ul-Alam, a minor, who was placed under

the regency of his uncle, the Pangiran Bandahara.

That they might pass under the protection of the Rajah and share with

his subjects the liberties and privileges the latter have gained, has

always been and still is the desire of the people. With the methods of

his government they are familiar and in sympathy. They and their chiefs,

from the Regent downwards, have petitioned to be so placed. To them the

Rajah's name is a household word, and by them he is trusted. When the

change came in 1905, many of the principal nobles begged him to become

the guardian of their children, to safeguard their inheritance and

welfare. His great influence, acquired by an intercourse of half a

century, has always been exerted for their benefit, and it is an

influence that, together with his knowledge of the people and what is

best for them, can scarcely be equalled by ever-changing officials.

Between the populations of Sarawak and Bruni there exists community of

origin, and relationship of ideas and customs. Formerly the two

countries were one. Then in a corner of that country arose the little

independent raj of Sarawak, which gradually expanded up to, around, and

beyond Bruni. Now Bruni is but an enclave within Sarawak, and socially,

politically, and commercially, as well as geographically, is undoubtedly

within the sphere of her influence.

A short description of Brooketon has already been given, showing how the

prosperity of that flourishing little settlement is dependent upon the

working of its colliery, and that this has been the Rajah's main reason

for continuing to work it, though with a recurring annual loss which in

the aggregate during the past twenty years has exceeded $800,000; of

course exclusive of purchase money and interest thereon. In no one year

have the receipts exceeded the expenditure, and the chances of financial

improvement appear to be vastly remote; yet, in October, 1906, the

Colonial Office decided, presumably "on advice given with entire

knowledge of place and people," to further hamper this industry by

imposing a duty on the coal exported, thereby seriously compromising the

welfare of the district by taxing the sole factor in its prosperity.

The levying of such a "harsh and oppressive"[326] tax, was not only

unjust, but distinctly contrary to the terms of the deed under which the

Rajah holds his concession. Whilst protesting against the assumption

that the Bruni Government has the right to impose such a duty, the Rajah

informed the Colonial Office that if it was insisted upon he would be

compelled practically to close down the colliery. In the House, Sir

Edward Sassoon pointedly asked the Under-Secretary for the Colonies "on

what principle such a tax would be imposed upon a nascent industry which

is being created at a sacrifice in an impoverished country, while on the

other hand his Majesty's Government has recently withdrawn the duty

levied on all coal exported from Great Britain." To this question no

direct reply was or could have been given, but it was not until a year

afterwards that the Colonial Office decided that the tax would not at

present be imposed.

The reason given for the imposition of this tax was that all other

sources of revenue at Brooketon having been hypothecated to the Rajah,

it was therefore necessary to levy export duties. It has already been

stated (p. 357) how these revenues had reverted to the Rajah, but it

must not be supposed that they had been obtained for little or no

consideration. To protect his own interests by guarding against any

imposition of harassing taxes, the original lessee of the Brooketon

Collieries had leased the revenues of the district from the Sultan for

an annual sum, and this rent was subsequently capitalised by the payment

of a sum of money equivalent to ten years' rent; thus these revenues

passed from the Sultan's hands for ever, and subsequently became vested

in the Rajah by purchase. A careful consideration of the deed by which

these revenue rights were granted, combined with a competent knowledge

of the prerogatives of the Sultan, would leave little doubt in an

unprejudiced mind that the imposition of any import or export duties at

Brooketon by others than the Rajah would be an infringement of the

rights conveyed by that deed. The revenues derived by the Rajah under

this deed (and he has not exerted his powers to increase them) represent

but a very small return as interest on the purchase money; yet in face

of such kindly moderation, we find the Colonial Office attempting to

impose a tax on the Rajah's property, which would yield to them more

than three times the amount of the legitimate revenue arising from a

benevolent enterprise.

Previously to the appointment of a British Resident at Bruni, the Rajah

had, as we have noticed, administered the government in the Muara

district, with the full approval of the Sultan. In compliance with the

Rajah's desire, the Sultan had placed a Malay chief, as his

representative, at Brooketon, but even his salary had to be paid by the

Rajah. It has already been shown that certain judicial powers have been

vested in the Rajah under the revenue concession, in regard to which the

then British Consul at Bruni had occasion to write to the Rajah's agent

at Labuan in July, 1900, that "the acting High Commissioner for Borneo

believes in and acknowledges the right of Sarawak to exercise

magisterial powers in Brooketon." Nevertheless, on the appointment of

the British Resident at Bruni the Colonial Office called upon the Rajah

to withdraw his officials and police from Brooketon, and notified him

that the administration of the district would be carried on by the

Resident, in the Sultan's name. In a written reply to a question by Sir

Edward Sassoon, the Under-Secretary for the Colonies denied that by the

deed the Rajah was authorised to maintain a police force in Bruni

(_sic_), but passed over in silence the main point of Sir Edward's

question as to the Rajah's powers to adjudicate as well as to impose

fines throughout the district of Muara.

In a leading article which appeared in the issue of the _Straits Budget_

(Singapore) of January 10, 1907, the editor attempts to refute the

issues raised in the questions put by Sir Edward Sassoon in the House of

Commons, and the arguments advanced in an editorial article which

appeared in the _Standard_ dealing with the above matters. He writes

authoritatively in reply to Sir Edward and "the special pleading" of the

_Standard_, and presumably his article is therefore an inspired one, for

his own knowledge of Bornean affairs is restricted to what "the man in

the street" can tell him, and his leader displays a deeper insight into

the political aspect than can usually be found outside of a Government

office. He tells us that: "Bruni wanted better administration. There

were three possible ways of obtaining this—the Protectorate might have

been transferred to the British North Borneo Company; it might have been

handed over to the neighbouring Rajah of Sarawak; or it might have been

incorporated in the territories administered by the Colonial Office

through the Straits Settlements. Of the three alternatives the Foreign

Office chose the last. No doubt Sarawak is an object lesson in

administration, but it must not be forgotten that it has been fortunate

in having two successive rulers of marked capacity for dealing with

native races. It may not always be so fortunate, and perhaps the Foreign

Office, having this possibility in view, hesitated to add to the

territory of Sarawak. On the other hand, the experience of the Federated

Malay States and the Straits Settlements warranted the handing over of

Bruni to the Colonial Office, and we are sure that when consideration is

given to the larger interests involved it will have to be admitted, one

day, that the Foreign Office took the wiser course. There may come a day

when British interests in Borneo will have to be amalgamated and

concentrated under one administration; but until then Bruni affairs can

be best administered and the interests of the natives safeguarded under

the arrangement now in force."

The editor has ignored the fact that the natives of Bruni of all races—

and the small population is a very diversified one—desired incorporation

in Sarawak, and had petitioned for it; and he has overlooked the fact

that such incorporation, whilst saving the Straits Settlements both

money and trouble, could in no way have affected the position of Bruni

as a British Protectorate, or have interfered with any policy which the

Foreign Office may possibly have in view. So far as Sarawak is

concerned, "the possibility in view" can mean only one thing: future

interference with its independence, arising out of anticipated

maladministration by the present Rajah's successor. Such an inuendo is

as uncalled for, as it is unjust, however the suggestion may be

disguised; and it behoves the Foreign and Colonial Offices to dissociate

themselves from such expressions, which unfortunately have derived some

colour from their subsequent actions.

That the system of government in vogue in the Federated Malay States and

the Straits Settlements is irreproachable cannot be denied; but at the

same time it cannot fairly be contended—in the face of all evidence to

the contrary—that it is as well adapted to the requirements of Bruni as

is that in vogue in Sarawak, a system which the editor admits "is an

object lesson in administration," and which his local contemporary, the

_Singapore Free Press_, has before described as "a government for

natives second to none."

What are "the larger interests involved" which appear, in the editor's

opinion, to have necessitated the handing over of Bruni, against the

wishes of the people, to a government foreign to them? The editor

answers the question with a prophecy, which, unless it emanates from his

own fertile brain, throws light on the policy of the British Government,

and hints at a possible disregard of fair-play and treaties, which has

only been made possible by the acceptance of British protection by

Sarawak. The British Government as far back as 1863 fully acknowledged

the independence of Sarawak under the rule of its white Rajah, and the

agreement of 1888, by which the State was placed under British

protection, was not intended, nor accepted, as one which would militate

against that independence, and such a possibility can scarcely be

construed as following in the train of that agreement.

[Illustration:

THE "GAZELLE."

(One of the small Government steamers for river work).]

-----

Footnote 307:

_Forests of the Far East_, S. St. John.

Footnote 308:

Formerly of the Royal Navy, and the Labuan Civil Service. Joined the

Sarawak Civil Service 1871. Was Resident at Muka, and subsequently

Divisional Resident of the 3rd Division. Died 1884.

Footnote 309:

St John's _Forests of the Far East_.

Footnote 310:

It will be remembered that in 1849 the late Rajah, as her Majesty's

Commissioner, had concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu, but this

had to be ratified within two years. The British Government, however,

would not place a man-of-war at the Rajah's disposal, and he was

unable to proceed to Sulu to effect this necessary ratification. The

Spaniards, by force of arms, enforced another treaty upon Sulu, and

before those two years had expired. But the British Government took no

interest in Sulu, and this was allowed to pass unheeded.

Footnote 311:

He had succeeded Mr. Pope Hennessy, and was Mr. Ussher's predecessor.

Footnote 312:

Named after the late Mr. C. A. C. de Crespigny.

Footnote 313:

In a great degree due to the able administration of Mr. Charles Hose,

D.Sc., who served in this district for twenty years, during sixteen of

which he was Resident in charge. In 1904 he became Divisional Resident

of the 3rd Division; he retired in 1907.

Footnote 314:

Joined 1872; was Assistant Resident, and Resident of Batang Lupar and

Saribas, and in 1881 became Divisional Resident of Sarawak proper. He

retired in 1895, and died in 1897.

Footnote 315:

See footnote, p. 69.

Footnote 316:

Sir Hugh Low, G.C.M.G., who was then British Resident of Perak, had

for many years been Colonial Secretary at Labuan.

Footnote 317:

These had long ceased.

Footnote 318:

Mr. Ricketts, who is a son of the first British Consul to Sarawak,

joined in 1881.

Footnote 319:

Now Managing Director of the British North Borneo Company.

Footnote 320:

For this reason a large number of Malays, men, women, and children, in

April, 1904, moved into the Limbang. The men were the ironsmiths of

Bruni, and this useful class was forced to leave to save their girls.

And because some of their women had been seized and sold, the Kadayans

of Bruni, who in former days had been the faithful followers of the

Sultans and their main support, revolted in 1899.

Footnote 321:

Two years previously a Sarawak Chinaman was murdered in the Belait,

and that this was done at the instigation of an Orang Kaya, solely in

the expectation that the murder of a Sarawak subject would lead to

such active interference by the Government of that country in the

affairs of the district that might end in annexation, was proved in a

Court of inquiry held at Claudetown.

Footnote 322:

Many of the peaceable Kadayans removed into the Limbang, having been

driven from their homes, with the loss of all their property, by an

emissary of the Sultan, for refusing to join him in an attack on the

rebels.

Footnote 323:

Sarawak and British North Borneo.

Footnote 324:

High Chamberlain.

Footnote 325:

In reply to a question on December 15, 1906, by Sir Edward Sassoon,

the Under-Secretary for the Colonies found it convenient to take no

notice of Sir Edward's reference to the F.M.S. in this connection.

Footnote 326:

To quote the present Secretary for Foreign Affairs when addressing the

House, but a few years ago upon the subject of an export duty on

English coal.

[Illustration:

SEA-DAYAK WAR-BOAT.]