THE INTEREST OF REASON IN THIS SELF-CONFLICT[1535]
This section, though extremely important, requires no lengthy comment.
It is lucid and straightforward. It may be summarised as follows. The
theses and the antitheses rest upon diverse and conflicting interests.
The theses, though expressed in dry formulas, divested of the empirical
features through which alone their true grandeur can be displayed,
represent the proud pretensions of dogmatic Reason. The antitheses give
expression to principles of pure empiricism. The former are supported by
interests of a practical and popular character: upon them morals and
religion are based. The latter, while conflicting with our spiritual
interests, far exceed the theses in their intellectual advantages. This
explains
“...the zelotic passion of the one party, and the calm assurance of
the other, and why the world hails the one with eager approval, and
is implacably prejudiced against the other.”
No legitimate objection could be raised against the principles of the
empirical philosopher, if he sought only to rebuke the rashness and
presumption of Reason when it boasts of _knowledge_, and when it
represents as _speculative insight_ that which is grounded only in
_faith_.
“But when empiricism itself, as frequently happens, becomes
dogmatic ..., and confidently denies whatever lies beyond the
sphere of its intuitive knowledge, it betrays the same lack of
modesty; and that is all the more reprehensible owing to the
irreparable injury which is thereby caused to the practical
interests of Reason.”
Each party asserts more than it knows. The one allows our practical
interests to delude Reason as to its inherent powers; the other would so
extend empirical knowledge as to destroy the validity of our moral
principles. Kant regards the opposition as being historically typified
by the contrasted systems of Platonism and Epicureanism. It befits us,
as self-reflecting beings, to free ourselves, at least provisionally,
from the partiality of those divergent interests, and by application of
“the sceptical method,” unconcerned about consequences, to penetrate to
the primary sources of this perennial conflict. As Kant states in the
next section, the conflict is of such a character as to be genuinely
resolvable.
This section must have been written, or at least first sketched, at the
time when Kant still intended to bring his whole criticism of the
metaphysical sciences within the scope of his doctrine of
antinomy.[1536]