Articles in This Slice:
CONVENTION COOPER, THOMAS (1805-1892)
CONVENTION, THE NATIONAL COOPER, THOMAS SIDNEY
CONVERSANO COOPERAGE (system of traffic)
CONVERSION COOPERAGE (making casks & vessels)
CONVEX CO-OPERATION
CONVEYANCE COOPERSTOWN
CONVEYANCING COOPER UNION
CONVEYORS CO-OPTATION
CONVOCATION COORG
CONVOLVULACEAE COORNHERT, DIRCK VOLCKERTSZOON
CONVOY COOT
CONVULSIONS COOTE, SIR EYRE
CONWAY, HENRY SEYMOUR COPAIBA
CONWAY, HUGH COPAL
CONWAY, MONCURE DANIEL COPALITE
CONWAY, SIR WILLIAM MARTIN COPAN
CONWAY (borough of England) COPARCENARY
CONYBEARE, WILLIAM DANIEL COPE, EDWARD DRINKER
CONYBEARE, WILLIAM JOHN COPE, EDWARD MEREDITH
COODE, SIR JOHN COPE (liturgical vestment)
COOK, ALBERT STANBURROUGH COPELAND, HENRY
COOK, EDWARD DUTTON COPENHAGEN
COOK, ELIZA COPERNICUS, NICOLAUS
COOK, JAMES COPIAPO
COOK, THOMAS COPING
COOK ISLANDS COPLAND, ROBERT
COOKE, GEORGE FREDERICK COPLESTON, EDWARD
COOKE, JAY COPLEY, JOHN SINGLETON
COOKE, ROSE TERRY COPPEE, FRANCOIS EDOUARD JOACHIM
COOKERY COPPEE, HENRY
COOKSTOWN COPPER
COOKTOWN COPPERAS
COOKWORTHY, WILLIAM COPPER-GLANCE
COOLGARDIE COPPERHEADS
COOLIE COPPERMINE
COOMA COPPER-PYRITES
COOPER, ABRAHAM COPPICE
COOPER, ALEXANDER COPRA
COOPER, SIR ASTLEY PASTON COPROLITES
COOPER, CHARLES HENRY COPTOS
COOPER, JAMES FENIMORE COPTS
COOPER, PETER COPYHOLD
COOPER, SAMUEL COPYING MACHINES
COOPER, THOMAS (1517-1594) COPYRIGHT
COOPER, THOMAS (1759-1840)
CONVENTION (Lat. _conventio_, an assembly or agreement, from
_convenire_, to come together), a meeting or assembly; an agreement
between parties; a general agreement on which is based some custom,
institution, rule of behaviour or taste, or canon of art; hence extended
to the abuse of such an agreement, whereby the rules based upon it
become lifeless and artificial. The word is of some interest
historically and politically. It is used of an assembly of the
representatives of a nation, state or party, and is particularly
contrasted with the formal meetings of a legislature. It is thus applied
to those parliaments in English history which, owing to the abeyance of
the crown, have assembled without the formal summons of the sovereign;
in 1660 a convention parliament restored Charles II. to the throne, and
in 1689 the Houses of Commons and Lords were summoned informally to a
convention by William, prince of Orange, as were the Estates of
Scotland, and declared the throne abdicated by James II. and settled the
disposition of the realm. Similarly, the assembly which ruled France
from September 1792 to October 1795 was known as the National Convention
(see below); the statutory assembly of delegates which framed the
constitution of the United States of America in 1787 was called the
Constitutional Convention; and the various American state constitutions
have been drafted and sometimes revised by constitutional conventions.
In the party system of the United States the nomination of party
candidates for office or election is in the hands of delegates, chosen
by the primaries, meeting in the convention of the party; the convention
system is universal, from the national conventions of the Republican and
Democratic parties, which nominate the candidates for the presidency and
vice-presidency, down to a ward convention, which nominates the
candidate for a town-councillorship. In diplomacy, "convention" is a
general name given to international agreements other than treaties, but
not necessarily differing either in form or subject-matter from a
treaty, and sometimes used quite widely of all forms of such agreements.
Many conventions have been made for the formation of international
"unions" to regulate and protect various economic, industrial and other
non-political interests, such as postal and telegraphic services,
trade-marks, patents, copyright, quarantine, &c. Thus the Latin Monetary
Union was created in 1865 by the Convention of Paris, and the abolition
of bounties on the production and exportation of sugar by the Convention
of Brussels in 1902 (see TREATIES).
CONVENTION, THE NATIONAL, in France, the constitutional and legislative
assembly which sat from the 20th of September 1792 to the 26th of
October 1795 (the 4th of Brumaire of the year IV.). On the 10th of
August 1792, when the populace of Paris stormed the Tuileries and
demanded the abolition of the monarchy, the Legislative Assembly decreed
the provisional suspension of the king and the convocation of a national
convention which should draw up a constitution. At the same time it was
decided that the deputies to that convention should be elected by all
Frenchmen 25 years old, domiciled for a year and living by the product
of their labour. The National Convention was therefore the first French
assembly elected by universal suffrage, without distinctions of class.
The age limit of the electors was further lowered to 21, and that of
eligibility was fixed at 25 years.
The first session was held on the 20th of September 1792. The next day
royalty was abolished, and on the 22nd it was decided that all documents
should be henceforth dated from the year I. of the French Republic. The
Convention was destined to last for three years. The country was at war,
and it seemed best to postpone the new constitution until peace should
be concluded. At the same time as the Convention prolonged its powers it
extended them considerably in order to meet the pressing dangers which
menaced the Republic. Though a legislative assembly, it took over the
executive power, entrusting it to its own members. This "confusion of
powers," which was contrary to the philosophical theories--those of
Montesquieu especially--which had inspired the Revolution at first, was
one of the essential characteristics of the Convention. The series of
exceptional measures by which that confusion of powers was created
constitutes the "Revolutionary government" in the strict sense of the
word, a government which was principally in vigour during the period
called "the Terror." It is thus necessary to distinguish, in the work of
the Convention, the temporary expedients from measures intended to be
permanent.
The Convention held its first session in a hall of the Tuileries, then
it sat in the hall of _Manege_, and finally from the 10th of May 1793 in
that of the _Spectacles_ (or _Machines_), an immense hall in which the
deputies were but loosely scattered. This last hall had tribunes for the
public, which often influenced the debate by interruptions or applause.
The full number of deputies was 749, not counting 33 from the colonies,
of whom only a section arrived in Paris. Besides these, however, the
departments annexed from 1792 to 1795 were allowed to send deputations.
Many of the original deputies died or were exiled during the Convention,
but not all their places were filled by _suppleants_. Some of those
proscribed during the Terror returned after the 9th of Thermidor.
Finally, many members were sent away either to the departments or to the
armies, on missions which lasted sometimes for a considerable length of
time. For all these reasons it is difficult to find out the number of
deputies present at any given date, for votes by roll-call were rare. In
the Terror the number of those voting averaged only 250. The members of
the Convention were drawn from all classes of society, but the most
numerous were lawyers. Seventy-five members had sat in the Constituent
Assembly, 183 in the Legislative.
According to its own ruling, the Convention elected its president every
fortnight. He was eligible for re-election after the lapse of a
fortnight. Ordinarily the sessions were held in the morning, but evening
sessions were also frequent, often extending late into the night.
Sometimes in exceptional circumstances the Convention declared itself in
permanent session and sat for several days without interruption. For
both legislative and administrative purposes the Convention used
committees, with powers more or less widely extended and regulated by
successive laws. The most famous of these committees are those of Public
Safety, of General Security, of Education (_Comite de salut public_,
_Comite de surete generale_, _Comite de l'instruction_).
The work of the Convention was immense in all branches of public
affairs. To appreciate it without prejudice, one should recall that this
assembly saved France from a civil war and invasion, that it founded the
system of public education (_Museum_, _Ecole Polytechnique_, _Ecole
Normale Superieure_, _Ecole des Langues orientales_, _Conservatoire_),
created institutions of capital importance, like that of the _Grand
Livre de la Dette publique_, and definitely established the social and
political gains of the Revolution.
See FRENCH REVOLUTION; GIRONDISTS; MOUNTAIN; DANTON; ROBESPIERRE; MARAT,
&c.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.--The Convention published a _Proces-verbal_ of its
sessions, which, although lacking the value of those published by
assemblies to-day, is an official document of capital importance.
Copies of it are rare, however, and it has been too much neglected by
historians. See F. A. Aulard, _Recueil des actes du comite de Salut
Public avec la correspondance officielle des representants en mission,
et le registre du conseil executif provisoire_ (Paris, 1889 et seq.);
M. J. Guillaume, _Proces-verbaux du comite d'Instruction Publique de
la Convention Nationale_ (Paris, 1891-1904, 5 vols. 4to); F. A.
Aulard, _Histoire politique de la Revolution francaise_ (Paris, 1903);
Mortimer-Ternaux, _Histoire de la Terreur_ (1862-1881), a work based
on and comprising documents, but written with strong royalist bias;
Eugene Despois, _Le Vandalisme revolutionnaire_ (1868), for the
scientific work of the Convention. A detailed bibliography of the
documents relating to the Convention is given in the _Repertoire
general des sources manuscrites de l'histoire de Paris pendant la
Revolution francaise_, vol. viii. &c. (1908), edited by A. Tueley
under the auspices of the municipality of Paris. For a more summary
bibliography see M. Tourneux, _Bibliog. de l'histoire de Paris pendant
la Revolution francaise_, i. 89-95 (Paris, 1890). (R. A.*)
CONVERSANO, a town and episcopal see of Apulia, Italy, in the province
of Bari, 17 m. S.E. by rail from the town of Bari. Pop. (1901) 13,685.
It has a fine southern Romanesque cathedral of the end of the 11th
century, with a modernized interior, and a castle which from 1456
belonged to the Acquaviva family, dukes of Atri and counts of
Conversano. The convent of S. Benedetto is one of the earliest offshoots
of Montecassino. (See S. Simone, _Il Duomo di Conversano_, Trani, 1896).
Here, or in the vicinity, is the site of the unimportant ancient town of
Norba.
CONVERSION (Lat. _conversio_, from _convertere_, to turn or change), a
general term for the operation of converting, changing, or transposing;
used technically in special senses in logic, theology and law.
1. _In logic,_ conversion is one of three chief methods of immediate
inference by which a conclusion is obtained directly from a single
premise without the intervention of another premise or middle term. A
proposition is said to be "converted" when the subject and the predicate
change places; the original proposition is the "convertend," the new one
the "converse." The chief rule governing conversion is that no term
which was not _distributed_[1] in the convertend may be distributed in
the converse; nor may the quality of the proposition (affirmative or
negative) be changed. It follows that of the four possible forms of
propositions A, E, I and O (see article A), E and I can be converted
simply. If no A is B (E), it follows that no B is A; if some A is B, it
follows that some B is A. This form of conversion is called Simple
Conversion; E propositions convert into E, and I into I. On the other
hand, A cannot be converted simply. If all men are mortal, the most that
can follow by conversion is that some mortals are men. This is called
Conversion by Limitation or _Per Accidens_. Only if it be known from
external or non-logical sources that the predicate also is distributed
can there be simple conversion of a universal affirmative. Neither of
these forms of conversion can be applied to the particular negative
proposition O, which has to be dealt with under a secondary system of
conversion, as follows. The terminology by which these secondary
processes are described is not altogether satisfactory, and logicians
are not agreed as to the application of the terms. The following system
is perhaps the most commonly used. We have seen that the converse of
"all A is B" is "some B is A"; we can, in addition, derive from it
another, though purely formal, proposition "no A is not-B"; i.e. an E
proposition. This process is called Obversion, Permutation or Immediate
Inference by Privative Conception; it is applicable to every proposition
including O. A further process, known as Contraposition or Conversion by
Negation, consists of conversion following on obversion. Thus from "all
A is B," we get "no not-B is A." In the case of the O proposition we get
(by obversion) "some A is not-B" and then (by conversion) "some not-B is
A" (i.e. an I proposition). In the case of the I proposition the
contrapositive is impossible, as infringing the main rule of conversion.
Another term, Inversion, has been used by some logicians for a still
more complicated process by the alternative use of conversion and
obversion, which is applicable to A and E, and results in obtaining a
proposition concerning the contradictory of the original subject; thus
"all A is B" becomes "some not-A is not B."
Considerable discussion has centred on the problem as to whether the
process of conversion can properly be regarded as inference. The essence
of inference is that the conclusion should embody knowledge which is not
in the premise or premises, and many logicians have contended that no
fact is stated in the converse which was not in the convertend, or, in
other words, that conversion is merely a transformation or verbal change
of the same statement. Hence the term Eductions and Equivalent
Propositional Forms have been given to converse propositions. It is
clear, for instance, that if the universal affirmative is taken
connotatively as a scientific law, and not historically, no real
inference is achieved by stating as another scientific fact its
converse, the particular affirmative. Moreover, even if the convertend
is stated as an historic fact, though there is acquired a certain new
significance, it may well be argued that the inference is not immediate
but syllogistic.
For this controversy see J. S. Mill, _Logic_, II. i. 2; Bradley,
_Logic_, III. pt. i. chap. ii. 30-37; H. W. B. Joseph, _Introduction
to Logic_ (1906), pp. 209 foll.; J. N. Keynes, _Formal Logic_ (3rd
ed., 1894).
2. _In theology_, conversion (the equivalent of the Gr. [Greek:
strephein, epistrephein]) is originally the acceptation of Christianity
by heathens. It is also used generally for a change from one religion to
another, or in a narrower sense for a complete change of attitude
towards God, involving a deeper conviction of the ultimate religious and
moral truths. Considerable difference of opinion has always existed, and
still exists, within the Christian Church as to the true nature and the
causes of conversion, especially in the sense last described. Some have
held that man is merely the passive recipient of the Divine Grace, a
view based largely on the rendering of the Authorized Version of Isaiah
vi. 10 as quoted in Matt. xiii. 15, Mark iv. 12, and John xii. 40.
Others again hold that baptism, as involving a second birth of the
baptized person, makes subsequent conversion unnecessary or even
meaningless, or conversely that conversion is this very second birth and
renders baptism unnecessary. The reply generally made to such arguments
is that baptism implies regeneration only, which is a change wrought
from the outside by the Divine Spirit in general disposition or
spiritual status, while conversion is a positive or concrete
demonstration of that change, not merely the negative beginning of a new
life but the positive "returning" to God in faith and repentance. The
precise connexion between conversion and repentance is again a vexed
question. How far and in what sense does man take an active part in his
own conversion? To this it is frequently answered that while the initial
stage of conversion is and can be the work of the Holy Spirit alone, it
lies with man to make it complete by accepting the proffered grace in
repentance and faith (cf. Acts vii. 51, "Ye stiffnecked and
uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost"). A
man may of his own free will avoid those surroundings which predispose
him to such "resistance." The view that man cannot convert himself is
clearly stated in Article X. by the Church of England. "The condition of
man after the fall of Adam is such that he cannot turn (_sese
convertere_) and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good
works, to faith, and calling upon God: wherefore we have no power to do
good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by
Christ preventing us that we may have a good will, and working with us,
when we have that good will." Further problems are connected with the
possibility of repeated conversions of the same man, the necessity of a
single strongly marked conversion completed in a single process, the
significance of sudden conversion of persons in a highly emotional
state, such as has been common in revivalist meetings, especially in
Wales and the United States of America. Conversions of the last kind
have followed frequently on striking physical phenomena, perceived in
many cases only by the convert himself, such as a sudden bright light or
a noise like a clap of thunder.[2] In all cases of conversion, however,
the criterion of its validity is generally taken to be the resultant
change of a man's character as manifested in his mode of life and
thought, in the abstention from sin, and in devotion to good works. (X.)
3. _In English law_, conversion is the unauthorized exercise of dominion
by one person over the property (other than money or chattels real) of
another, in a manner inconsistent with his rights of possession, or the
unauthorized assumption by another of the powers of the true owner of
goods. The history and exact definition of this form of actionable wrong
have occupied the attention of many learned writers, and the incidents
of actions to assert the rights of the true owner form a considerable
part of treatises on the rules and forms of civil pleading. There are
many ways in which the wrong may be committed. In some cases the
exercise of the dominion may amount to an act of trespass or to a crime,
e.g. where the taking amounts to larceny, or fraudulent appropriation by
a bailee or agent entrusted with the property of another (Larceny Acts
of 1861 and 1901). But in such cases, except where money is taken, the
civil remedy of the owner is by action for conversion or detention of
the property, subject in the case of larceny to the rule that criminal
prosecution should precede restitution by the taker. The remedy in use
in these cases used to be by what was called an action on the case for
trover and conversion, the plaintiff putting aside all suggestions of
trespass and of crime, and resting his case on the fiction that the
defendant had found and used goods not his own. The fictitious averment
of loss was abolished in 1852, and under the present procedure, in which
the old forms of action are not in use, the remedy is by a claim (still
usually called conversion) for wrongfully depriving the true owner of
personal property of its use by some specified act inconsistent with his
dominion over it, usually by dealing with the property in a manner
inconsistent with the owner's rights. Originally, the action of trover
and conversion was limited to goods and chattels, but it is now accepted
as applying to valuable securities, such as cheques and bills of
exchange.
The gist of the action is in the unauthorized dealing, for however short
a time and for however limited a purpose, with the personal property of
another. Even refusal to deliver up to the owner is sufficient to prove
conversion, though it is often made the ground of an action for
detinue, if the plaintiff desires to have the property returned in
specie. The knowledge, motive or good faith of the person wrongfully
dealing with the property of another is for civil purposes immaterial,
and the action is often brought to try the title of two claimants to the
same goods; e.g. where a person who has innocently bought or taken in
pledge goods stolen or illegally procured resists the claim of the
original owner for the return of the goods. A warehouseman may render
himself liable to the owner of goods deposited with him, through
delivering the goods to a third person on a forged authority or without
authority, or by issuing a warehouse receipt representing the goods to
be in his possession or control when they have ceased to be so.
The exact measure of compensation due to a plaintiff whose goods have
been wrongfully converted may be merely nominal if the wrong is
technical and the defendant can return the goods; it may be limited to
the actual damage where the goods can be returned, but the wrong is
substantial; but in ordinary cases it is the full value to the owner of
the goods of which he has been deprived.
Fraudulent conversion by any person to his own use (or that of persons
other than the owner) of property entrusted to him is a crime in the
case of custodians of property, factors, trustees under express trusts
in writing (Larceny Act, 1861, ss. 77-85; Larceny Act, 1901).
The law of Ireland, of most British possessions, and of the United
States, follows that of England as to the civil or criminal remedies for
conversion.
The term "conversion" is also used in English law with reference to the
rule of courts of equity which, in certain cases (following the maxim of
treating as done what ought to have been done), treats as converted into
personalty land which has been directed so to be converted by a will,
contract or settlement, or as converted into land personalty which has
been by such instrument directed to be applied for purchase of realty.
The rule is also applied where a vendor of land dies between the making
of the contract of sale and its completion by conveyance of the land.
The importance of the rule lies in the different destination of realty
and personalty under the laws relating to inheritance and succession.
See Bullen and Leake, _Precedents of Pleading_ (3rd ed., 1868, 6th ed.
by Dodd and Chitty, 1905); F. Pollock, on _Torts_ (7th ed., 1904);
Clerk and Lindsell, on _Torts_ (3rd ed., 1904); Lewin, on _Trusts_
(11th ed., 1904); Jarman, on _Wills_ (5th ed., 1893); Dart, _Vendors
and Purchasers_ (11th ed., p. 301). (W. F. C.)