the right of the people, when they come to make a State Constitution,
to make it for themselves, and precisely as best suits themselves. I say
again, that is quixotic. I defy contradiction when I declare that the
Judge can find no one to oppose him on that proposition. I repeat,
there is nobody opposing that proposition on principle. Let me not be
misunderstood. I know that, with reference to the Lecompton Constitution,
I may be misunderstood; but when you understand me correctly, my
proposition will be true and accurate. Nobody is opposing, or has opposed,
the right of the people, when they form a constitution, to form it for
themselves. Mr. Buchanan and his friends have not done it; they, too, as
well as the Republicans and the Anti-Lecompton Democrats, have not done
it; but on the contrary, they together have insisted on the right of the
people to form a constitution for themselves. The difference between the
Buchanan men on the one hand, and the Douglas men and the Republicans on
the other, has not been on a question of principle, but on a question of
fact.
The dispute was upon the question of fact, whether the Lecompton
Constitution had been fairly formed by the people or not. Mr. Buchanan and
his friends have not contended for the contrary principle any more than
the Douglas men or the Republicans. They have insisted that whatever of
small irregularities existed in getting up the Lecompton Constitution were
such as happen in the settlement of all new Territories. The question was,
Was it a fair emanation of the people? It was a question of fact, and not
of principle. As to the principle, all were agreed. Judge Douglas voted
with the Republicans upon that matter of fact.
He and they, by their voices and votes, denied that it was a fair
emanation of the people. The Administration affirmed that it was. With
respect to the evidence bearing upon that question of fact, I readily
agree that Judge Douglas and the Republicans had the right on their side,
and that the Administration was wrong. But I state again that, as a
matter of principle, there is no dispute upon the right of a people in
a Territory, merging into a State, to form a constitution for themselves
without outside interference from any quarter. This being so, what is
Judge Douglas going to spend his life for? Is he going to spend his life
in maintaining a principle that nobody on earth opposes? Does he expect to
stand up in majestic dignity, and go through his apotheosis and become a
god in the maintaining of a principle which neither man nor mouse in
all God's creation is opposing? Now something in regard to the Lecompton
Constitution more specially; for I pass from this other question of
popular sovereignty as the most arrant humbug that has ever been attempted
on an intelligent community.
As to the Lecompton Constitution, I have already said that on the question
of fact, as to whether it was a fair emanation of the people or not, Judge
Douglas, with the Republicans and some Americans, had greatly the argument
against the Administration; and while I repeat this, I wish to know what
there is in the opposition of Judge Douglas to the Lecompton Constitution
that entitles him to be considered the only opponent to it,--as being
par excellence the very quintessence of that opposition. I agree to the
rightfulness of his opposition. He in the Senate and his class of men
there formed the number three and no more. In the House of Representatives
his class of men--the Anti-Lecompton Democrats--formed a number of about
twenty. It took one hundred and twenty to defeat the measure, against one
hundred and twelve. Of the votes of that one hundred and twenty, Judge
Douglas's friends furnished twenty, to add to which there were six
Americans and ninety-four Republicans. I do not say that I am precisely
accurate in their numbers, but I am sufficiently so for any use I am
making of it.
Why is it that twenty shall be entitled to all the credit of doing that
work, and the hundred none of it? Why, if, as Judge Douglas says, the
honor is to be divided and due credit is to be given to other parties, why
is just so much given as is consonant with the wishes, the interests, and
advancement of the twenty? My understanding is, when a common job is done,
or a common enterprise prosecuted, if I put in five dollars to your one,
I have a right to take out five dollars to your one. But he does not so
understand it. He declares the dividend of credit for defeating Lecompton
upon a basis which seems unprecedented and incomprehensible.
Let us see. Lecompton in the raw was defeated. It afterward took a sort
of cooked-up shape, and was passed in the English bill. It is said by the
Judge that the defeat was a good and proper thing. If it was a good thing,
why is he entitled to more credit than others for the performance of that
good act, unless there was something in the antecedents of the Republicans
that might induce every one to expect them to join in that good work, and
at the same time something leading them to doubt that he would? Does he
place his superior claim to credit on the ground that he performed a
good act which was never expected of him? He says I have a proneness for
quoting Scripture. If I should do so now, it occurs that perhaps he places
himself somewhat upon the ground of the parable of the lost sheep which
went astray upon the mountains, and when the owner of the hundred sheep
found the one that was lost, and threw it upon his shoulders and came home
rejoicing, it was said that there was more rejoicing over the one sheep
that was lost and had been found than over the ninety and nine in the
fold. The application is made by the Saviour in this parable, thus:
"Verily, I say unto you, there is more rejoicing in heaven over one
sinner that repenteth, than over ninety and nine just persons that need no
repentance."
And now, if the Judge claims the benefit of this parable, let him repent.
Let him not come up here and say: "I am the only just person; and you are
the ninety-nine sinners!" Repentance before forgiveness is a provision
of the Christian system, and on that condition alone will the Republicans
grant his forgiveness.
How will he prove that we have ever occupied a different position in
regard to the Lecompton Constitution or any principle in it? He says he
did not make his opposition on the ground as to whether it was a free or
slave constitution, and he would have you understand that the Republicans
made their opposition because it ultimately became a slave constitution.
To make proof in favor of himself on this point, he reminds us that he
opposed Lecompton before the vote was taken declaring whether the State
was to be free or slave. But he forgets to say that our Republican
Senator, Trumbull, made a speech against Lecompton even before he did.
Why did he oppose it? Partly, as he declares, because the members of the
convention who framed it were not fairly elected by the people; that the
people were not allowed to vote unless they had been registered; and that
the people of whole counties, some instances, were not registered. For
these reasons he declares the Constitution was not an emanation, in any
true sense, from the people. He also has an additional objection as to the
mode of submitting the Constitution back to the people. But bearing on the
question of whether the delegates were fairly elected, a speech of his,
made something more than twelve months ago, from this stand, becomes
important. It was made a little while before the election of the delegates
who made Lecompton. In that speech he declared there was every reason
to hope and believe the election would be fair; and if any one failed to
vote, it would be his own culpable fault.
I, a few days after, made a sort of answer to that speech. In that answer
I made, substantially, the very argument with which he combated his
Lecompton adversaries in the Senate last winter. I pointed to the facts
that the people could not vote without being registered, and that the time
for registering had gone by. I commented on it as wonderful that Judge
Douglas could be ignorant of these facts which every one else in the
nation so well knew.
I now pass from popular sovereignty and Lecompton. I may have occasion to
refer to one or both.
When he was preparing his plan of campaign, Napoleon-like, in New York,
as appears by two speeches I have heard him deliver since his arrival in
Illinois, he gave special attention to a speech of mine, delivered here on
the 16th of June last. He says that he carefully read that speech. He told
us that at Chicago a week ago last night and he repeated it at Bloomington
last night. Doubtless, he repeated it again to-day, though I did not hear
him. In the first two places--Chicago and Bloomington I heard him; to-day
I did not. He said he had carefully examined that speech,--when, he did
not say; but there is no reasonable doubt it was when he was in New York
preparing his plan of campaign. I am glad he did read it carefully. He
says it was evidently prepared with great care. I freely admit it
was prepared with care. I claim not to be more free from errors than
others,--perhaps scarcely so much; but I was very careful not to put
anything in that speech as a matter of fact, or make any inferences, which
did not appear to me to be true and fully warrantable. If I had made any
mistake, I was willing to be corrected; if I had drawn any inference in
regard to Judge Douglas or any one else which was not warranted, I was
fully prepared to modify it as soon as discovered. I planted myself upon
the truth and the truth only, so far as I knew it, or could be brought to
know it.
Having made that speech with the most kindly feelings toward Judge
Douglas, as manifested therein, I was gratified when I found that he
had carefully examined it, and had detected no error of fact, nor any
inference against him, nor any misrepresentations of which he thought fit
to complain. In neither of the two speeches I have mentioned did he make
any such complaint. I will thank any one who will inform me that he, in
his speech to-day, pointed out anything I had stated respecting him as
being erroneous. I presume there is no such thing. I have reason to be
gratified that the care and caution used in that speech left it so that
he, most of all others interested in discovering error, has not been able
to point out one thing against him which he could say was wrong. He seizes
upon the doctrines he supposes to be included in that speech, and declares
that upon them will turn the issues of this campaign. He then quotes,
or attempts to quote, from my speech. I will not say that he wilfully
misquotes, but he does fail to quote accurately. His attempt at quoting is
from a passage which I believe I can quote accurately from memory. I shall
make the quotation now, with some comments upon it, as I have already
said, in order that the Judge shall be left entirely without excuse for
misrepresenting me. I do so now, as I hope, for the last time. I do this
in great caution, in order that if he repeats his misrepresentation it
shall be plain to all that he does so wilfully. If, after all, he still
persists, I shall be compelled to reconstruct the course I have marked
out for myself, and draw upon such humble resources, as I have, for a new
course, better suited to the real exigencies of the case. I set out in
this campaign with the intention of conducting it strictly as a gentleman,
in substance at least, if not in the outside polish. The latter I shall
never be; but that which constitutes the inside of a gentleman I hope I
understand, and am not less inclined to practice than others. It was
my purpose and expectation that this canvass would be conducted upon
principle, and with fairness on both sides, and it shall not be my fault
if this purpose and expectation shall be given up.
He charges, in substance, that I invite a war of sections; that I
propose all the local institutions of the different States shall become
consolidated and uniform. What is there in the language of that speech
which expresses such purpose or bears such construction? I have again and
again said that I would not enter into any of the States to disturb the
institution of slavery. Judge Douglas said, at Bloomington, that I used
language most able and ingenious for concealing what I really meant;
and that while I had protested against entering into the slave States, I
nevertheless did mean to go on the banks of the Ohio and throw missiles
into Kentucky, to disturb them in their domestic institutions.
I said in that speech, and I meant no more, that the institution of
slavery ought to be placed in the very attitude where the framers of this
government placed it and left it. I do not understand that the framers
of our Constitution left the people of the free States in the attitude of
firing bombs or shells into the slave States. I was not using that passage
for the purpose for which he infers I did use it. I said:
"We are now far advanced into the fifth year since a policy was created
for the avowed object and with the confident promise of putting an end to
slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy that agitation has
not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will
not cease till a crisis shall have been reached and passed. 'A house
divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe that this government
cannot endure permanently half slave and half free; it will become all one
thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the
further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the
belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates
will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States,
old as well as new, North as well as South."
Now, you all see, from that quotation, I did not express my wish on
anything. In that passage I indicated no wish or purpose of my own; I
simply expressed my expectation. Cannot the Judge perceive a distinction
between a purpose and an expectation? I have often expressed an
expectation to die, but I have never expressed a wish to die. I said
at Chicago, and now repeat, that I am quite aware this government has
endured, half slave and half free, for eighty-two years. I understand
that little bit of history. I expressed the opinion I did because I
perceived--or thought I perceived--a new set of causes introduced. I did
say at Chicago, in my speech there, that I do wish to see the spread of
slavery arrested, and to see it placed where the public mind shall rest
in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction. I said that
because I supposed, when the public mind shall rest in that belief,
we shall have peace on the slavery question. I have believed--and now
believe--the public mind did rest on that belief up to the introduction of
the Nebraska Bill.
Although I have ever been opposed to slavery, so far I rested in the hope
and belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. For that
reason it had been a minor question with me. I might have been mistaken;
but I had believed, and now believe, that the whole public mind, that is,
the mind of the great majority, had rested in that belief up to the repeal
of the Missouri Compromise. But upon that event I became convinced that
either I had been resting in a delusion, or the institution was being
placed on a new basis, a basis for making it perpetual, national, and
universal. Subsequent events have greatly confirmed me in that belief. I
believe that bill to be the beginning of a conspiracy for that purpose. So
believing, I have since then considered that question a paramount one.
So believing, I thought the public mind will never rest till the power
of Congress to restrict the spread of it shall again be acknowledged and
exercised on the one hand or, on the other, all resistance be entirely
crushed out. I have expressed that opinion, and I entertain it to-night.
It is denied that there is any tendency to the nationalization of slavery
in these States.
Mr. Brooks, of South Carolina, in one of his speeches, when they were
presenting him canes, silver plate, gold pitchers, and the like, for
assaulting Senator Sumner, distinctly affirmed his opinion that when this
Constitution was formed it was the belief of no man that slavery would
last to the present day. He said, what I think, that the framers of our
Constitution placed the institution of slavery where the public mind
rested in the hope that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. But
he went on to say that the men of the present age, by their experience,
have become wiser than the framers of the Constitution, and the invention
of the cotton gin had made the perpetuity of slavery a necessity in this
country.
As another piece of evidence tending to this same point: Quite recently in
Virginia, a man--the owner of slaves--made a will providing that after his
death certain of his slaves should have their freedom if they should so
choose, and go to Liberia, rather than remain in slavery. They chose to be
liberated. But the persons to whom they would descend as property claimed
them as slaves. A suit was instituted, which finally came to the Supreme
Court of Virginia, and was therein decided against the slaves upon the
ground that a negro cannot make a choice; that they had no legal power to
choose, could not perform the condition upon which their freedom depended.
I do not mention this with any purpose of criticizing it, but to connect
it with the arguments as affording additional evidence of the change of
sentiment upon this question of slavery in the direction of making it
perpetual and national. I argue now as I did before, that there is such
a tendency; and I am backed, not merely by the facts, but by the open
confession in the slave States.
And now as to the Judge's inference that because I wish to see slavery
placed in the course of ultimate extinction,--placed where our fathers
originally placed it,--I wish to annihilate the State Legislatures, to
force cotton to grow upon the tops of the Green Mountains, to freeze ice
in Florida, to cut lumber on the broad Illinois prairie,--that I am in
favor of all these ridiculous and impossible things.
It seems to me it is a complete answer to all this to ask if, when
Congress did have the fashion of restricting slavery from free territory;
when courts did have the fashion of deciding that taking a slave into a
free country made him free,--I say it is a sufficient answer to ask if
any of this ridiculous nonsense about consolidation and uniformity did
actually follow. Who heard of any such thing because of the Ordinance of
'87? because of the Missouri restriction? because of the numerous court
decisions of that character?
Now, as to the Dred Scott decision; for upon that he makes his last point
at me. He boldly takes ground in favor of that decision.
This is one half the onslaught, and one third of the entire plan of the
campaign. I am opposed to that decision in a certain sense, but not in
the sense which he puts it. I say that in so far as it decided in favor
of Dred Scott's master, and against Dred Scott and his family, I do not
propose to disturb or resist the decision.
I never have proposed to do any such thing. I think that in respect for
judicial authority my humble history would not suffer in comparison with
that of Judge Douglas. He would have the citizen conform his vote to that
decision; the member of Congress, his; the President, his use of the veto
power. He would make it a rule of political action for the people and
all the departments of the government. I would not. By resisting it as a
political rule, I disturb no right of property, create no disorder, excite
no mobs.
When he spoke at Chicago, on Friday evening of last week, he made this
same point upon me. On Saturday evening I replied, and reminded him of a
Supreme Court decision which he opposed for at least several years. Last
night, at Bloomington, he took some notice of that reply, but entirely
forgot to remember that part of it.
He renews his onslaught upon me, forgetting to remember that I have turned
the tables against himself on that very point. I renew the effort to draw
his attention to it. I wish to stand erect before the country, as well as
Judge Douglas, on this question of judicial authority; and therefore I
add something to the authority in favor of my own position. I wish to
show that I am sustained by authority, in addition to that heretofore
presented. I do not expect to convince the Judge. It is part of the plan
of his campaign, and he will cling to it with a desperate grip. Even turn
it upon him,--the sharp point against him, and gaff him through,--he will
still cling to it till he can invent some new dodge to take the place of
it.
In public speaking it is tedious reading from documents; but I must beg
to indulge the practice to a limited extent. I shall read from a letter
written by Mr. Jefferson in 1820, and now to be found in the seventh
volume of his correspondence, at page 177. It seems he had been presented
by a gentleman of the name of Jarvis with a book, or essay, or periodical,
called the Republican, and he was writing in acknowledgment of the
present, and noting some of its contents. After expressing the hope that
the work will produce a favorable effect upon the minds of the young, he
proceeds to say:
"That it will have this tendency may be expected, and for that reason I
feel an urgency to note what I deem an error in it, the more requiring
notice as your opinion is strengthened by that of many others. You seem,
in pages 84 and 148, to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of
all constitutional questions,--a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one
which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our judges are
as honest as other men, and not more so. They have, with others, the same
passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps. Their
maxim is, 'Boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem'; and their power is
the more dangerous as they are in office for life, and not responsible, as
the other functionaries are, to the elective control. The Constitution has
erected no such single tribunal, knowing that, to whatever hands confided,
with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots.
It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and co-sovereign with
themselves."
Thus we see the power claimed for the Supreme Court by Judge Douglas, Mr.
Jefferson holds, would reduce us to the despotism of an oligarchy.
Now, I have said no more than this,--in fact, never quite so much as this;
at least I am sustained by Mr. Jefferson.
Let us go a little further. You remember we once had a National Bank. Some
one owed the bank a debt; he was sued, and sought to avoid payment on the
ground that the bank was unconstitutional. The case went to the Supreme
Court, and therein it was decided that the bank was constitutional. The
whole Democratic party revolted against that decision. General Jackson
himself asserted that he, as President, would not be bound to hold a
National Bank to be constitutional, even though the court had decided it
to be so. He fell in precisely with the view of Mr. Jefferson, and acted
upon it under his official oath, in vetoing a charter for a National Bank.
The declaration that Congress does not possess this constitutional power
to charter a bank has gone into the Democratic platform, at their
National Conventions, and was brought forward and reaffirmed in their last
Convention at Cincinnati. They have contended for that declaration, in the
very teeth of the Supreme Court, for more than a quarter of a century.
In fact, they have reduced the decision to an absolute nullity. That
decision, I repeat, is repudiated in the Cincinnati platform; and still,
as if to show that effrontery can go no further, Judge Douglas vaunts in
the very speeches in which he denounces me for opposing the Dred Scott
decision that he stands on the Cincinnati platform.