Pascal remarked that, whether Christianity were true or false, the
Christian was on the safe side; and Diderot replied that the priests and
apologists of Mohammedanism, or any other creed, could say the very same
thing with equal force. The argument, if it be an argument, implies the
possibility of error, and what applies to one religion applies to all.
The votaries of every creed may be mistaken if there is no absolute
certitude; or, if there should be one true religion among the multitude,
and but one, only the devotees of that single faith can be on the safe
side. But as no one knows _which_ is the only true religion, it follows,
according to the law of probabilities, that the odds are greatly against
any particular religion being the right one. The Christian therefore
would have one chance of being right, and nine hundred and ninety-nine
chances of being wrong. He has thus one chance in a thousand above the
Atheist.
But, on the other hand, if all religions but one are certainly wrong,
what is the chance of a single one being certainly right? Does not
the Christian's slight percentage of safety fade into something quite
inappreciable in the light of this question? And is what is left--if
_anything_ is left--an adequate price for the abnegation of manhood?
Would it tempt an honest man, with a sense of human dignity, to play
fast and loose with his intellect, and accept a creed because it appeals
to his selfish hopes and fears? Could such a slender chance of profit in
the next life compensate for slavery in this life?
If belief is the safe side, the proper course is to believe
_everything_. And it is useless to cry that this is impossible. Faith
enables men to believe against reason, and one act of credulity is
little easier than a thousand. He whose creed is determined by his fears
should give free scope to such emotions. If they are his guides let him
follow them. Why should he argue when argument may mislead? Why should
he stumble at trifles when he has surmounted the first great obstacle
to credulity? Let him believe all the religions of the world at once.
He can do this as easily as he can believe in the Trinity. And having
embraced all, he may rest satisfied that if there be a true religion he
undoubtedly possesses it.
We do not suppose, however, that this reasoning will have any effect
on Christians, Buddhists, Brahmins, Mohammedans, or Jews. But that very
fact shows the hollow character of the argument from which we started.
When the Christian talks about the safe side he is only displaying the
weakness of his faith, and appealing to timidity when he has no further
appeal to reason.
The argument of "the safe side" would have no pertinency, even with the
imbecile, if man were immortal. It seeks advantage from the fact that
every man must die. It tries to paralyse reason with the clutch of fear.
How frequent is the superstitionist's remark, "Wait till you come to
die!" He does not always use these very words, but this is the meaning
of all his verbiage. He forgets, or does not know, that philosophy
destroys the terror of death. A rational man is aware of the truth
expressed by Mill, that death is but one incident in life, and often the
least important. He recognises with Bacon that we die daily. He knows
that every hour is a step towards death. He does not play, like an
ostrich, with the universal law of mortality; nor, on the other hand,
does he allow the tomb to cast its chill obscurity over the business and
pleasure of life. He lives without hypocrisy, and when the time comes he
will die without fear. As Hamlet says, "the readiness is all." Another
word also comes from the wisest of men--"Cowards do often taste of
death; the valiant die but once."
A belief that will do for life will do for death. The religionists
prove this themselves. Whatever a man is confident of is sustaining. The
Christian dies a Christian, and the Mohammedan a Mohammedan. The one
has dying visions of angels--or may be of devils; the other sees heaven
burst open, and the black-eyed houris of paradise beckon him with rosy
fingers. What they leaned on in life supports them in death. Its truth
or falsity makes no difference at that moment.
Freethinkers are sustained by _convictions_. Intellect and emotion
concur in their case. They have no visions of angels or devils, but dear
loved faces are better than phantoms, and he who has done a little good
in the world, however humbly and obscurely, may dream of the happier and
nobler days to come, when true words and good deeds will have brought
forth the glorious fruit of happiness for the children of men.
We do not mean to assert that no Freethinker, at any time, ever relapsed
on his death-bed. Such cases have apparently occurred during life, and
while one particular religion is in the ascendant it is not difficult to
understand them. The relapses are always to the creed a man finds about
him, or to the creed of his childhood. They simply prove the power of
environment and early training, and that a man needs all his strength
to stand against big majorities. At best they are cases of mental
pathology.
Great historic Freethinkers have always died true to their convictions.
They were used to standing alone. For ample proof of this the reader is
referred to my _Infidel Death Beds_. And when smaller Freethinkers are
numerous enough they avoid the greatest danger of physical weakness.
It is easy for Christian relatives or friends to pester a dying
Freethinker; it is easy even, in the worst moments of weakness, to
put words in his mouth. But if Freethought friends visit him, he feels
strengthened and relieved. Allies may well be needed, sometimes, in such
a battle with bigotry.
After all, "Wait till you die!" is an argument of folly and cowardice.
What can we conjecture of any other life except from our experience of
this? On this earth reason is the safe side, honesty is the safe side,
humanity is the safe side; and what is the safe side here is likely to
be the safe side elsewhere.