A "BLUFF" AND A BATTLE.
The last days of February, 1901, were very trying for our commandos on
the "Hoogeveld," south of the railway. General French, assisted by
half a dozen other generals, with a force of 60,000 men, crossed the
"Hoogeveld," between the Natal border and the Delagoa Railway, driving
all the burghers and cattle before him, continually closer to the
Swazi frontier, in order to strike a "final blow" there.
These operations the English called "The Great Sweep of February,
1901."
Commandant-General Botha sent word that he was in a bad plight on the
"Hoogeveld," the enemy having concentrated all his available troops
upon him. I was asked to divert their attention as much as possible by
repeated attacks on the railway line, and to worry them everywhere.
To attack the fortified entrenchments in these parts, where we had
only just been taking the offensive, causing the enemy to be on his
guard, would not have been advisable. I therefore decided to make a
feint attack on Belfast.
One night we moved with all the burghers who had horses, about 15
carts, waggons, and other vehicles, guns and pom-pom, to a high
"bult," near the "Pannetjes." When the sun rose the next morning we
were in full sight of the enemy at Belfast, from which we were about
ten miles away.
Here our commando was split into two parts, and the mounted men spread
about in groups of fifty men each, with carts scattered everywhere
among the ranks. We slowly approached Belfast in this order. Our
commando numbered about 800 men, and considering the way we were
distributed, this would look three times as many. We halted several
times, and the heliographers, who were posted everywhere in sight of
the enemy, made as much fuss as possible. Scouts were riding about
everywhere, making a great display by dashing about all over the
place, from one group of burghers to another. After we had waited
again for some little time we moved on, and thus the comedy lasted
till sunset; in fact, we had got within range of the enemy's guns. We
had received information from Belfast to the effect that General
French had taken all the guns with him to Belfast, leaving only a few
of small calibre, which could not reach us until we were at about
4,000 yards from the fort. Our pom-pom and our 15-pounder were divided
between the two divisions, and the officers had orders to fire a few
shots on Belfast at sunset. We could see all day long how the English
near Monument Hill were making ditches round the village and putting
up barbed wire fences.
Trains were running backwards and forwards between Belfast and the
nearest stations, probably to bring up reinforcements.
At twilight we were still marching, and by the light of the last rays
of the sun we fired our two valuable field-pieces simultaneously, as
arranged. I could not see where the shells were falling, but we heard
them bursting, and consoled ourselves with the idea that they must
have struck in near the enemy. Each piece sent half a dozen shells,
and some volleys were fired from a few rifles at intervals. We thought
the enemy would be sure to take this last movement for a general
attack. What he really did think, there is no saying. As the burghers
put it, "We are trying to make them frightened, but the thing to know
is, did they get frightened?" For this concluded our programme for the
day, and we retired for the night, leaving the enemy in doubt as to
whether we meant to give him any further trouble, yet without any
apology for having disturbed his rest.
The result of this bloodless fight was _nil_ in wounded and killed on
both sides.
On the 12th of February, 1901, the first death-sentence on a traitor
on our side was about to be carried out, when suddenly our outposts
round Belfast were attacked by a strong British column under General
Walter Kitchener. When the report was brought to our laager, all the
burghers went to the rescue, in order to keep the enemy as far from
the laager as possible, and beat them back. Meanwhile the outposts
retired fighting all the while. We took up the most favourable
positions we could and waited. The enemy did not come up close to us
that evening, but camped out on a round hill between Dullstroom and
Belfast and we could distinctly see how the soldiers were all busy
digging ditches and trenches round the camp and putting up barbed wire
enclosures. They were very likely afraid of a night attack and did not
forget the old saying about being "wise in time."
Near the spot where their camp was situated were several roads leading
in different directions which left us in doubt as to which way they
intended to go, and whether they wanted to attack us, or were on their
way to Witpoort-Lydenburg.
The next morning, at sunset, the enemy broke up his camp and made a
stir. First came a dense mass of mounted men, who after having gone
about a few hundred paces, split up into two divisions. One portion
moved in a westerly direction, the other to the north, slowly
followed by a long file, or as they say in Afrikander "gedermte" (gut)
of waggons and carts which, of course, formed the convoy. Companies of
infantry, with guns, marched between the vehicles.
I came to the conclusion that they intended to attack from two sides,
and therefore ordered the ranks to scatter. General Muller, with part
of the burghers, went in advance of the enemy's left flank and, as the
English spread out their ranks, we did the same.
At about 9 a.m. our outposts near the right flank of the English were
already in touch with the enemy, and rifle-fire was heard at
intervals.
I still had the old 15-pounder, but the stock of ammunition had gone
down considerably and the same may be said of the pom-pom of
Rhenosterkop fame. We fired some shots from the 15-pounder at a
division of cavalry at the foot of a kopje. Our worthy artillery
sergeant swore he had hit them right in the centre, but even with my
strong spy-glass I could not see the shells burst, although I admit
the enemy showed a little respect for them, which may be concluded
from the fact that they at once mounted their horses and looked for
cover.
A British soldier is much more in awe of a shell than a Boer is, and
the enemy's movements are therefore not always a criterion of our
getting the range. We had, moreover, only some ordinary grenades left,
some of which would not burst, as the "schokbuizen" were defective,
and we could not be sure of their doing any harm.
The other side had some howitzers, which began to spit about lyddite
indiscriminately. They also had some quick-firing guns of a small
calibre, which, however, did not carry particularly far. But they were
a great nuisance, as they would go for isolated burghers without being
at all economical with their ammunition.
Meanwhile, the enemy's left reached right up to Schoonpoort, where
some burghers, who held good positions, were able to fight them. This
caused continual collisions with our outposts. Here, also, the
assailants had two 15-pounder Armstrong's, which fired at any moving
target, and hardly ever desisted, now on one or two burghers who
showed themselves, then on a tree, or an anthill, or a protruding
rock. They thus succeeded in keeping up a deafening cannonade, which
would have made one think there was a terrific fight going on, instead
of which it was a very harmless bombardment.
It did no more harm than at the English manoeuvres, although it was no
doubt a brilliant demonstration, a sort of performance to show the
British Lion's prowess. I could not see the practical use of it,
though.
It was only on the enemy's right wing that we got near enough to feel
some of the effect of the artillery's gigantic efforts, which here
forced us to some sharp but innocent little fights between the
outposts. At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the British cavalry
stormed our left, which was in command of General Muller. We soon
repulsed them, however. Half an hour after we saw the enemy's carts go
back.
I sent a heliographic message to General Muller, with whom I had kept
in close contact, to the effect that they were moving away their carts
and that we ought to try and charge them on all points as well as we
could.
"All right," he answered; "shall we start at once?" I flashed back
"Yes," and ordered a general charge.
The burghers now appeared all along the extended fighting line.
The enemy's guns, which were just ready to be moved, were again placed
in position and opened fire, but our men charged everywhere, a sort of
action which General Kitchener did not seem to like, for his soldiers
began to flee with their guns, and a general confusion ensued. Some of
these guns were still being fired at the Boers but the latter stormed
away determinedly. The British lost many killed and wounded.
The cavalry fled in such a hurry as to leave the infantry as the only
protection of the guns, and although these men also beat a retreat
they, at least, did it while fighting.
I do not think I overstate the case by declaring that General Walter
Kitchener owed it to the stubborn defence of his infantry that his
carts were not captured by us that day.
Their ambulance, in charge of Dr. Mathews and four assistants, and
some wounded fell into our hands, and were afterwards sent back.
We pursued the enemy as well as we could, but about nine miles from
Belfast, towards which the retreating enemy was marching, the forts
opened fire on us from a 4.7 naval gun and they got the range so well
that lyddite shells were soon bursting about our ears.
We were now in the open, quite exposed and in sight of the Belfast
forts. Two of our burghers were wounded here.
Field-Cornet Jaapie Kriege, who was afterwards killed, with about 35
burghers, was trying to cut off the enemy from a "spruit"-drift; the
attack was a very brave one, but our men ventured too far, and would
all have been captured had not the other side been so much in a hurry
to get away from us. Luckily, too, another field-cornet realised the
situation, and kept the enemy well under fire, thus attracting
Kriege's attention, who now got out of this scrape.
When night fell we left the enemy alone, and went back to our laager.
The next morning the outposts reported that the would-be assailants
were all gone.
How much this farce had cost General Kitchener we could not tell with
certainty. An English officer told me afterwards he had been in the
fight, and that their loss there had been 52 dead and wounded,
including some officers. He also informed me that their object that
day had been to dislodge us. If that is so, I pity the soldiers who
were told to do this work.
Our losses were two burghers wounded, as already stated.