CHAPTER XVI.

BATTLE OF DONKERHOEK ("DIAMOND HILL").

Our first and best positions were now obviously the kopjes which

stretched from Donkerhoek past Waterval and Wonderboompoort. This

chain of mountains runs for about 12 miles E. and N.E. of Pretoria,

and our positions here would cut off all the roads of any importance

to Pietersburg, Middelburg, as well as the Delagoa Bay railway. We

therefore posted ourselves along this range, General De la Rey forming

the right flank, some of our other fighting generals occupying the

centre, whilst Commandant-General Botha himself took command of the

left flank.

On the 11th of June, 1900, Lord Roberts approached with a force of

28,000 to 30,000 men and about 100 guns, in order, as the official

despatches had it, "to clear the Boers from the neighbourhood of

Pretoria." Their right and left flanks were composed of cavalry,

whilst the centre was formed of infantry regiments; their big guns

were placed in good positions and their field pieces were evenly

distributed amongst the different army divisions.

Towards sunset they began booming away at our whole 13 miles of

defence. Our artillery answered their fire from all points with

excellent results, and when night fell the enemy retired a little with

considerable losses.

The battle was renewed again next day, the enemy attempting to turn

our right with a strong flanking movement, but was completely

repulsed. Meanwhile I at Donkerpoort proper had the privilege of being

left unmolested for several hours. The object of this soon became

apparent. A little cart drawn by two horses and bearing a white flag

came down the road from Pretoria. From it descended two persons,

Messrs. Koos Smit, our Railway Commissioner and Mr. J. F. de Beer,

Chief Inspector of Offices, both high officials of the South African

Republic. I called out to them from a distance.

"Halt, you cannot pass. What do you want?"

Smit said, "I want to see Botha and President Kruger. Dr. Scholtz is

also with us. We are sent by Lord Roberts."

I answered Mr. Smit that traitors were not admitted on our premises,

and that he would have to stay where he was. Turning to some burghers

who were standing near I gave instructions that the fellows were to be

detained.

Mr. Smit now began to "sing small," and turning deadly pale, asked in

a tremulous voice if there were any chance of seeing Botha.

"Your request," I replied, "will be forwarded." Which was done.

An hour passed before General Botha sent word that he was coming.

Meanwhile the battle continued raging fiercely, and a good many

lyddite bombs were straying our way. The "white-flaggists" appeared to

be very anxious to know if the General would be long in coming, and if

their flag could not be hoisted in a more conspicuous place. The

burghers guarding them pointed out, however, that the bombs came from

their own British friends.

After a while General Botha rode up. He offered a far from cordial

welcome to the deputation.

Dr. Scholtz produced a piece of paper and said Lord Roberts had sent

him to enquire why Botha insisted on more unnecessary bloodshed, and

why he did not come in to make peace, and that sort of thing.

Botha asked if Scholtz held an authoritative letter or document from

the English general, to which the Doctor replied in the negative.

Smit now suggested that he should be allowed to see Mr. Kruger, but

Botha declared, with considerable emphasis, "Look here, your conduct

is nothing less than execrable, and I shall not allow you to see Mr.

Kruger. You are a couple of contemptible scoundrels, and as for Dr.

Scholtz, his certificate looks rather dubious. You will go back and

give the following message to Lord Roberts:--

"That this is not the first time messages of this

description are sent to me in an unofficial manner; that

these overtures have also sometimes been made in an

insulting form, but always equally unofficially. I have to

express my surprise at such tactics on the part of a man in

Lord Roberts' position. His Lordship may think that our

country is lost to us, but I shall do my duty towards it all

the same. They can shoot me for it or imprison me, or banish

me, but my principles and my character they cannot assail."

One could plainly see that the conscience-stricken messengers winced

under the reproach. Not another word was said, and the noble trio

turned on their heels and took their white flag back to Pretoria.

Whether Botha was right in allowing these "hands-uppers" to return, is

a question I do not care to discuss, but many burghers had their own

opinion about it. Still, if they had been detained by us and shot for

high treason, what would not have been said by those who did not

hesitate to send our own unfaithful burghers to us to induce us to

surrender.

I cannot say whether Lord Roberts was personally responsible for the

sending of these messengers, but that such action was extremely

improper no one can deny. It was a specially stupendous piece of

impudence on the part of these men, J. S. Smit and J. F. de Beer,

burghers both, and highly placed officials of the S. A. Republic. They

had thrown down their arms and sworn allegiance to an enemy, thereby

committing high treason in the fullest sense of the word. They now

came through the fighting lines of their former comrades to ascertain

from the commanders of the republican army why the whole nation did

not follow their example, why they would not surrender their liberty

and very existence as a people and commit the most despicable act

known to mankind.

"Pretoria was in British hands!" As if, forsooth, the existence of our

nationality began and ended in Pretoria! Pretoria was after all only a

village where "patriots" of the Smit and de Beer stamp had for years

been fattening on State funds, and, having filled their pockets by

means of questionable practices, had helped to damage the reputation

of a young and virile nation.

Not only had they enjoyed the spoils of high office in the State

Service offices, to which a fabulous remuneration was attached, but

they belonged to the Boer aristocracy, members of honourable families

whose high birth and qualities had secured for them preference over

thousands of other men and the unlimited confidence of the Head of

State. Little wonder these gentlemen regarded the fall of Pretoria as

the end of the war!

The battle continued the whole day; it was fiercest on our left flank,

where General French and his cavalry charged the positions of the

Ermelo and Bethel burghers again and again, each time to be repulsed

with heavy losses. Once the lancers attacked so valiantly that a

hand-to-hand fight ensued. The commandant of the Bethel burghers

afterwards told me that during the charge his kaffir servant got among

the lancers and called upon them to "Hands up!" The unsophisticated

native had heard so much about "hands up," and "hands-uppers," that he

thought the entire English language consisted of those two simple

words, and when one lancer shouted to him "Hands up," he echoed "Hands

up." The British cavalryman thrust his lance through the nigger's

arm, still shouting "Hands up," the black man retreating, also

vociferously shrieking "Hands up, boss; hands up!"

When his master asked him why he had shouted "Hands up" so

persistently though he was running away, he answered: "Ah, boss, me

hear every day people say, 'Hands up;' now me think this means kaffir

'Soebat' (to beg). I thought it mean, 'Leave off, please,' but the

more I shouted 'Hands up' English boss prod me with his assegai all

the same."

On our right General De la Rey had an equally awkward position; the

British here also made several determined attempts to turn his flank,

but were repulsed each time. Once during an attack on our right, their

convoy came so close to our position that our artillery and our

Mausers were enabled to pour such a fire into them that the mules

drawing the carts careered about the veldt at random, and the greatest

confusion ensued. British mules were "pro-Boer" throughout the War.

The ground, however, was not favourable for our operations, and we

failed to avail ourselves of the general chaos. Towards the evening of

the second day General Tobias Smuts made an unpardonable blunder in

falling back with his commandos. There was no necessity for the

retreat; but it served to show the British that there was a weak point

in our armoury. Indeed, the following day the attack in force was made

upon this point. The British had meantime continued pouring in

reinforcements, men as well as guns.

About two o clock in the afternoon Smuts applied urgently for

reinforcements, and I was ordered by the Commandant-General to go to

his position. A ride of a mile and a half brought us near Smuts; our

horses were put behind a "randje," the enemy's bullets and shells

meantime flying over their heads without doing much harm. We then

hurried up on foot to the fighting line, but before we could reach the

position General Smuts and his burghers had left it. At first I was

rather in the dark as to what it all meant until we discovered that

the British had won Smuts' position, and from it were firing upon us.

We fell down flat behind the nearest "klips" and returned the fire,

but were at a disadvantage, since the British were above us. I never

heard where General Smuts and his burghers finally got to. On our left

we had Commandant Kemp with the Krugersdorpers; on the right

Field-Cornet Koen Brits. The British tried alternately to get through

between one of my neighbours and myself, but we succeeded,

notwithstanding their fierce onslaught, in turning them back each

time. All we could do, however, was to hold our own till dark. Then

orders were given to "inspan" all our carts and other conveyances as

the commandos would all have to retire.

I do not know the extent of the British losses in that engagement. My

friend Conan Doyle wisely says nothing about them, but we knew they

had suffered very severely indeed. Our losses were not heavy; but we

had to regret the death of brave Field-Cornet Roelf Jansen and some

other plucky burghers. Dr. Doyle, referring to the engagement, says:

"'The two days' prolonged struggle (Diamond Hill) showed that there

was still plenty of fight in the burghers. Lord Roberts had not routed

them," etc.

Thus ended the battle of Donkerhoek, and next day our commandos were

falling back to the north.

My Reminiscences of the Anglo-Boer War · 第 16 / 52 章