DRIVEN FROM THE BIGGARSBERGEN.
We spent the next few weeks in entrenching and fortifying our new
positions. General Botha had left with some men for the Orange Free
State which Lord Roberts, having relieved Kimberley, was marching
through. General Joubert died about this time at Pretoria, having been
twenty-one years Commandant-General of the South African Republic. He
was without doubt one of the most prominent figures in the South
African drama.
General Botha now took up the chief command and soon proved himself to
be worthy of holding the reins. He enjoyed the confidence and esteem
of our whole army, a very important advantage under our trying
circumstances.
Assisted by De Wet he was soon engaged in organizing the commandos in
the Orange Free State, and in attempting to make some sort of a stand
against the British, who were now marching through the country in
overwhelming numbers. In this Republic the burghers had been under the
command of the aged General Prinsloo, who now, however, had become so
downhearted that the supreme command was taken from him and given to
General De Wet. Prinsloo surrendered soon after, in doing which he did
his people his greatest service; it was, however, unfortunate that he
should have succeeded in leading with him 900 burghers into the hands
of the enemy.
In the Biggarsbergen we had nothing to do but to sleep and eat and
drink. On two separate occasions, however, we were ordered to join
others in attacking the enemy's camp at Elandslaagte. This was done
with much ado, but I would rather say nothing about the way in which
the attacks were directed. It suffices to say that both failed
miserably, and we were forced to retire considerably quicker than we
had come.
Our generals, meantime, were very busy issuing innumerable circulars
to the different commandos. It is impossible for me to remember the
contents of all these curious manifestos, but one read as follows:--
"A roll-call of all burghers is to be taken daily; weekly
reports are to be sent to headquarters of each separate
commando, and the minimum number of burghers making up a
field-cornetship is therein to be stated. Every 15 men
forming a field-cornetship are to be under a corporal; and
these corporals are to hold a roll-call every day, and to
send in weekly detailed reports of their men to the
Field-Cornet and Commandant, who in his turn must report to
the General."
Another lengthy circular had full instructions and regulations for the
granting of "leave" to burghers, an intricate arrangement which gave
officers a considerable amount of trouble. The scheme was known as the
"furlough system," and was an effort to introduce a show of
organisation into the weighty matter of granting leave of absence. It
failed, however, completely to have its desired effect. It provided
that one-tenth of each commando should be granted furlough for a
fortnight, and then return to allow another tenth part to go in its
turn. In a case of sick leave, a doctor's certificate was required,
which had to bear the counter-signature of the field-cornet; its
possessor was then allowed to go home instead of to the hospital.
Further, a percentage of the farmers were allowed from time to time to
go home and attend to pressing matters of their farms, such as
harvesting, shearing sheep, etc. Men were chosen by the farmers to go
and attend to matters not only for themselves but for other farmers in
their districts as well. The net result of all this was that when
everybody who could on some pretext or other obtain furlough had done
so, about a third of each commando was missing. My burghers who were
mostly men from the Witwatersrand Goldfields, could of course obtain
no leave for farming purposes; and great dissatisfaction prevailed. I
was inundated with complaints about their unfair treatment in this
respect and only settled matters with considerable trouble.
I agree that this matter had to be regulated somehow, and I do not
blame the authorities for their inability to cope with the
difficulty. It seemed a great pity, however, that the commandos should
be weakened so much and that the fighting spirit should be destroyed
in this fashion. Of course it was our first big war and our
arrangements were naturally of a very primitive character.
It was the beginning of May before our friends the enemy at Ladysmith
and Elandslaagte began to show some signs of activity. We discovered
unmistakable signs that some big forward movement was in progress, but
we could not discover on which point the attack was to be directed.
Buller and his men were marching on the road along Vantondersnek, and
I scented heavy fighting for us again. I gathered a strong patrol and
started out to reconnoitre the position. We found that the enemy had
pitched their camp past Waschbank in great force, and were sending out
detachments in an easterly direction. From this I concluded that they
did not propose going through Vantondersnek, but that they intended to
attack our left flank at Helpmakaar. This seemed to me, at any rate,
to be General Buller's safest plan.
Helpmakaar was east of my position; it is a little village elbowed in
a pass in the Biggarsbergen. By taking this point one could hold the
key to our entire extended line of defence, as was subsequently only
too clearly shown. I pointed this out to some of our generals, but a
commandant's opinion did not weigh much just then; nor was any notice
taken of a similar warning from Commandant Christian Botha, who held a
position close to mine with the Swaziland burghers.
We had repeated skirmishes with the English outposts during our
scouting expeditions, and on one occasion we suddenly encountered a
score of men of the South African Light Horse.
We noticed them in a "donk" (a hollow place) thickly covered with
trees and bushes, but not before we were right amongst them. It
appears they mistook us for Englishmen, while we thought at first they
were members of Colonel Blake's Irish Brigade. Many of them shook
hands with us, and a burgher named Vivian Cogell asked them in Dutch:
"How are you, boys?"
To which an Englishman, who understood a little Dutch, answered: "Oh,
all right; where do you come from?"
Vivian replied: "From Viljoen's commando; we are scouting."
Then the Englishman discovered who we were, but Vivian gave the man no
time for reflection. Riding up to him, he asked: "What regiment do you
belong to?"
"To the South African Light Horse," answered the Englishman.
"Hands up!" retorted Vivian, and the English-Afrikander threw down his
gun and put up his hands.
"Hands up! Hands up!" was the cry now universally heard, and although
a few escaped, the majority were disarmed and made prisoners. It had
been made a rule that when a burgher captured a British soldier he
should be allowed to conduct him to Pretoria, where he could then
obtain a few days' leave to visit his family. This did much to
encourage our burghers to make prisoners, although many lost their
lives in attempting to do so.
The next day, General Buller marched on Helpmakaar, passing close to
our position. We fired a few shots from our Creusot gun, and had
several light skirmishes. The enemy, however, concentrated the fire of
a few batteries on us, and our guns were soon silenced.
General L. Meyer had arrived with some reinforcements close to
Helpmakaar, but the position had never been strengthened, and the sole
defending force consisted of the Piet Retief burghers, known as the
"Piet Retreaters," together with a small German corps. The result was
easy to predict. The attack was made, and we lost the position without
seriously attempting to defend it. Buller was now, therefore, in
possession of the key to the Boer position in Natal, a position which
we had occupied for two months--and could therefore, have fortified to
perfection--and whose strategic importance should have been known in
its smallest details. I think our generals, who had a sufficient force
at their disposal, of which the mobility has become world-famed,
should have been able to prevent such a fiasco as our occupation of
the splendid line of defence in the Biggarsbergen turned out to be.
Here, for the first time in the war, General Buller utilised his
success, and followed up our men as they were retreating on Dundee. He
descended by the main waggon track from Helpmakaar, and drove the
commandos like sheep before him. I myself was obliged to move away in
hot haste and join the general retreat. Once or twice our men
attempted to make a stand, but with little success.
When we reached Dundee the enemy gradually slackened off pursuit, and
at dark we were clear of them. Satisfied with their previous day's
success, and sadly hampered by their enormous convoys, the English now
allowed us to move on at our leisure.