(1805-1894)
[Illustration: Ferdinand de Lesseps.]
If, as Dante sings: "There is no greater grief than in a time of
misery to remember happier days," there are few persons in our time
who can testify more feelingly to the truth of the poet's words than
Ferdinand de Lesseps. For many years he was a bright-shining,
sympathetic figure among those who lead in the van of our material
progress; and the accomplishment, by his initiative and energy, of
the long dream of the Suez Canal, made him the hero, not of his own
nation alone, but of all the civilized world; honors were heaped
upon him, and acclamations greeted him on every side. His name
became a household word.
A few years later, and all is changed. At the advanced age of
eighty-eight, Ferdinand de Lesseps is in deep disgrace. Charged with
the chief responsibility for the ruin brought about by the failure
of another of his great enterprises--the Panama Canal--he has been
condemned by the tribunal to pay a huge fine, and has only been
saved from the shame of actual imprisonment by the knowledge of his
judges that, in his feeble state of health, imprisonment would
speedily be fatal. As at the ceremonies on the occasion of the
opening of the Suez Canal, De Lesseps was compared to Columbus, the
opener of a way to the new world, so we may see the close of the
great discoverer's career reflected in the tragic ending of the
splendid fortunes of De Lesseps.
Ferdinand de Lesseps was the son of a French gentleman who, fifty
years since, was in the Consular service of France in Egypt. He was
born at Versailles in 1805, and after receiving the usual education
given to youth of his class, he was early inducted into the
mysteries of diplomatic life, where his father's services and
influence naturally opened a way for him. In 1833, when
twenty-eight, he was made consul at Cairo, and remained at that post
for over ten years, during which time he laid the foundations for
that knowledge of all matters connected with Egyptian affairs which
was to prove so valuable to him and to the world a few years later.
In 1842, De Lesseps was transferred from Cairo to Spain, and was
made consul at Barcelona. Spain was at this time much disturbed by
factional quarrels and jealousies, partly due to disputed claims to
the succession to the throne, and partly to the angry rivalries of
political leaders, each eager to save the country by his particular
nostrum. In the dynastic struggle, Queen Christina, made regent
after the death of her husband, Ferdinand VII., had been exiled to
France, and General Espartero, who at first had stood for her cause,
now ruled as regent in her place. In 1843, the year after the
arrival of De Lesseps, the city of Barcelona, which in common with
many other places had refused to support Espartero, openly revolted,
and was besieged and bombarded by his forces; and in the course of
the siege, which brought great misery upon the inhabitants, De
Lesseps did so many humane and generous acts at great personal risk,
that he was rewarded by honors from the governments of several
nations whose subjects had been protected by him in his official
capacity.
It was natural that after this proof of his abilities, De Lesseps
should be advanced to a still higher position, and in the spring of
1848 he was made minister to Madrid. This place he held, however,
only until February, 1849, for in May of that year he was sent to
Rome to patch up a peace between the popular party and the French
army of occupation. This proved an unfortunate venture. De Lesseps
was recalled to France in disgrace, in June of the same year, for
having shown too great a sympathy for the party of Mazzini, which
aimed to establish a Roman Republic.
It may be conjectured that the disappointment of De Lesseps at this
abrupt ending of his diplomatic career was not very great. He had
not been drawn to the profession by natural inclination, but had
inherited it, so to speak, from his father, as another man might
inherit the profession of law or medicine, or as the son of a
mechanic might inherit his father's trade. His ambition and tastes
both led him in a different direction; he would play a more active,
a more striking part in the affairs of his time.
During the period of his residence in Egypt, as consul for France,
he must often have heard the project of a canal across the Isthmus
of Suez discussed, since the course of events was every year making
the necessity of the undertaking more evident. As is well known, the
idea of such a canal was not a new one: Herodotus speaks of a canal
designed and partly excavated by Pharaoh Necho in the seventh
century before Christ, to connect the city of Bubastis, in the Delta
of the Nile, with the Red Sea. As planned, the canal was to be ten
feet deep with a width sufficient for two triremes to pass abreast,
and it was expected that the voyage would be accomplished in four
days. After the lives of 126,000 Egyptian workmen had been
sacrificed to the hardships of the undertaking, Herodotus says that
Necho, alarmed at the difficulties and expense, consulted the Oracle
as to what was best for him to do, and received the answer: "Thou
art working for barbarians." The Egyptians, like the Greeks,
considered all foreigners as barbarians, and the answer simply
reflected the sentiment of the people, or of their leaders, that
this vast expenditure of labor, time, and money would prove to be,
after all, as much for the benefit of foreigners as for themselves.
The Oracle gave a voice to national and political prejudices, such
as even in our own time are continually evoked to block the wheels
of great enterprises. Necho, we are told, heeded the warning of the
Oracle and abandoned the enterprise, but about one hundred years
later, in the time of Darius Hystaspes, work on the canal was
resumed and the undertaking was completed. From time to time we find
mention made of the canal by later authors, but about the end of the
eighth century of our era it was finally abandoned and left to be
blocked up by the sand.
The project was revived by Napoleon I. at the time of his Egyptian
expedition; but, on the report of his engineer, M. Lepère, now known
to be mistaken, that the Red Sea level was thirty feet higher than
that of the Mediterranean, nothing further was done; nor was it
until so late as 1847 that it was again taken up and an attempt made
to interest the maritime powers of Europe in the scheme; but nothing
serious was accomplished.
In truth, the idea of a canal uniting the two seas, had up to this
time been largely sentimental, if we may so express it; rather
connected with vast schemes of conquest than founded on the vital
needs of commercial development and the material good of the people.
The commerce of the Mediterranean countries with India and the
remoter East had not in those earlier times reached a point where
such a costly undertaking as the Suez Canal could prove
remunerative; what trade there was could be sufficiently and more
cheaply accommodated by the Overland machinery of caravans, while
France, Spain, and England still found the route by the Cape to
answer all their purposes. In fact it was more than doubtful whether
sailing-vessels, by means of which trade was then chiefly carried
on, or even steamers of the build then employed, could use the canal
to profit. It was believed that the advantages promised by a shorter
route would be counterbalanced by the delays and dangers reckoned
inseparable from the navigation of so narrow a water-way.
These objections, really of a serious nature, made it difficult to
win over the business world to a practical interest in the scheme.
De Lesseps had been from the start the chief mover in the
enterprise, to which he had given many years of his time, and he was
not a man to be discouraged by repeated failures to bring others to
his own way of thinking. His long experience, besides, in the ways
of diplomacy had prepared him for delays and obstructions; but the
time came, at last, when his enthusiasm, his confidence in himself,
and his skill in dealing with men were to bring about the
realization of his hopes.
Five years, from 1849 to 1854, had been occupied by De Lesseps in
negotiations with governments and bankers, but it was not until 1854
that the event occurred which insured the success of his great
undertaking. In that year, Mahomet Saïd Pasha became Viceroy of
Egypt, and no sooner was he seated than he sent for De Lesseps to
consult with him as to the possibility of carrying out the project
of the canal. In November of the same year, a commission was signed
at Cairo by the Viceroy charging De Lesseps with the formation of a
company to be named the United Suez Canal Company, with a capital of
two hundred million francs, afterward raised to three hundred
million. From this time the affairs of the canal went on with
comparative smoothness, and by 1858 the money necessary for the work
had been pledged; one-half the loan was placed on the continent,
chiefly in Paris, the other half was taken by the Viceroy.
Actual work on the canal was begun in 1858 and such rapid progress was
made that it was completed in the autumn of 1869, and opened to the
commerce of the world with magnificent ceremonies, lasting for several
days. Religious ceremonies, in which priests of the Catholic Church,
the Greek Church, and the Moslem faith united, were followed by a
naval parade representing the European powers and the United States,
and the whole concluded with a brilliant series of fêtes and
entertainments at Cairo. As the originator of the canal, De Lesseps,
was a Frenchman, and as France had been the chief promoter of the
enterprise, the place of honor at these ceremonies was naturally given
to the Empress Eugénie, who went to Cairo as the representative of the
French nation; while to De Lesseps, as naturally, was given the next
place, a position which he filled with equal dignity and modesty,
winning "golden opinions from all sorts of people."
The Suez Canal, though a vast and important undertaking, presented
almost no engineering difficulties to be overcome. At Port Saïd, the
Mediterranean entrance to the canal, two great piers, to serve as
breakwaters, were built of artificial stone, projecting into the
sea; the western, a distance of 6,940 feet, the eastern 6,020 feet,
and enclosing an area of 450 acres; thus providing a safe and
commodious harbor. At Suez, the Red Sea terminus of the canal, a
less formidable defense was needed; but the necessary docks and
buildings called for a considerable outlay.
From Port Saïd to Suez the land is almost a dead level; the few
sand-dunes that break the monotonous uniformity of the isthmus
nowhere reach a greater height than fifty or sixty feet. Along the
middle line of the isthmus there was a series of depressions; some
shallow, and others, the bottoms of which were lower than the level
of the sea. Although these depressions were at all times dry, yet
they were called "lakes," and as such figure on the maps, where we
read the names "Lake Timsah," "The Bitter Lakes" and others. They
were found to be thickly incrusted with salt on the bottom and
sides, indicating that at one time they had been filled with
sea-water; it is indeed must probable that the whole isthmus was at
a very remote period entirely submerged. In the construction of the
canal these depressions were made to play a very important part. The
line of the canal was carried directly through them; the shallower
were brought to a sufficient depth by dredging; the deeper were
simply filled with water and required nothing more for safe
navigation than an indication of the channel by buoys. Thus, in the
whole length of the canal, reckoned at 88 geographical miles, there
are 66 miles of actual digging; 14 miles of dredging through the
lakes; and 8 miles, where neither digging nor dredging was required.
Water began to flow from the Mediterranean into the canal in
February, 1869, and from the Red Sea in July of the same year; and
by October, the lakes, and the canal in its whole length, were
filled with water navigable by vessels of the highest class. The
water-way thus obtained has a width at the surface varying from 197
feet at deep cuttings, to 225 feet at lower ground. The sides slope
to a width at the bottom of 72 feet, and an average depth of 26 feet
is secured along the whole course. As the water is at one level from
sea to sea, the canal is without obstruction of any kind. No locks,
dams, or water-gates are required, and vessels enter the canal from
either end and pursue their journey without interruption or
detention.
So great, however, was the eagerness of trade to take advantage of
the new route, that the volume of traffic increased within a very
short time after the opening of the canal to such an extent as to
cause serious delays in the transit, and a number of schemes were
brought forward for building other canals by which the two seas
might be united. In the end, all these plans were abandoned, and it
was decided to widen the canal sufficiently to enable it to meet the
increased demand upon its carrying capacity. It may not be without
interest to note the growth of traffic in the canal by a few
figures. From 486 ships which passed through in 1870, the number
rose to 3,100 in 1886; while the receipts increased from $1,031,875
in 1870, to $11,541,090 in 1886. The canal, when completed, was
found to have cost twenty million pounds sterling, a sum far in
advance of the original estimate, but made necessary by the addition
of several important items of expenditure that were not foreseen.
One of these was the substitution of paid labor for the forced labor
promised by the Pasha, but which was made impossible by public
clamor. The Egyptian ruler discovered that he was not living in the
times of the pyramid-building Pharaohs, when men were made
beasts-of-burden. Another item not provided for was the necessity of
supplying the 30,000 workmen employed on the canal with fresh water.
For this purpose, a branch canal had to be dug, by which water could
be brought from the Nile.
[Illustration: Cutting the Canal at Panama.]
The enterprise thus brought to a happy ending, has already proved of
great service to the world. It must be looked upon not merely as a
benefit to commerce, but as one of the many powerful agents now
at work binding the nations closer together. It is indissolubly
connected with the name of De Lesseps, and had he been contented
with the fortune and the reputation gained by his work in forwarding
the canal, few names would have shone brighter in the list of those
who have helped on man's material well-being. But in an evil hour he
was persuaded to lend his support to the Panama Canal scheme, and
along with the ruined fortunes and ruined reputations sunk in that
abyss, the name and fortune of De Lesseps and his family have
suffered irretrievable blight.
The Panama Canal was not first proposed in our day; the scheme is as
old as the discovery of the isthmus. "The early navigators," says J.
C. Rodrigues, "could not help noticing how near to each other were
the two oceans, and how comparatively easy would be (they thought)
the cutting of a canal through that narrow strip of land between
them. The celebrated Portuguese navigator Antonio Galväo, as early
as 1550, wrote an essay on the subject wherein he suggested four
different lines, one of which was through the Lake of Nicaragua, and
another by the Isthmus of Panama." England, in 1779, was the first
to make an attempt to control the river and lake communications, but
her forces sent under Nelson to begin the work were driven away by
the terrible fever that has thus far been the best defence of the
isthmus from attack. Various schemes were entertained by other
nations, but, although the United States kept a jealous eye upon its
own interests in the enterprise, it was not until the discovery of
gold in California that it saw a vital reason for insisting upon its
paramount claims, and the outbreak of the Civil War, with its
threats of European intervention, made an easier communication with
the rising States of the Pacific Coast seem an absolute necessity.
But we moved slowly and with vacillating steps. We were divided in
opinion as to the best route to take, as to the sort of canal that
was desirable, as to the advisability of building any canal. When
the war was over, the rapid increase of railroad communication with
the Pacific Coast made public opinion still more indifferent to the
enterprise. Meanwhile the French had started with great energy a
scheme for a canal at Panama, and De Lesseps had been induced to
lend his name to the scheme, and to take an active part in carrying
it out. For this purpose he visited the United States and used his
best diplomatic arts to induce our Government to unite with him in
his plans. But he could do nothing on this side the water and
returned to France to fight the battle alone. There the interest in
the scheme, artificially excited by speculators and still further
aided by the efforts of De Lesseps and his friends, increased to
such an extent as to swamp all considerations of prudence. The name
of De Lesseps, consecrated by the brilliant success of Suez, proved
to be a powerful charm. Thousands and tens of thousands of people in
the cities and in the country put the hard-earned savings of years
into the venture; senators, deputies, men of high social rank in
public life, shamelessly sold their votes and their voices to secure
the moral aid and the money of the state to aid their gambling
enterprise, and the newspaper press of Paris, at all times venal,
betrayed for bribes the trust that was reposed in it.
Such a state of things could not last forever. The end, long
prophesied, came at last; the exposure was complete, and the whole
stupendous scheme of fraud was unmasked. Something might have been
saved from the wreck had the canal itself been a real thing so far
as it had gone, a practical enterprise, sure in time to pay its
investors and serve the public. But it was found that everything
connected with the construction of the canal had been grossly
misrepresented; the estimates of expense; the reports of the
engineering difficulties to be overcome; the dangers from the
climate; the bills of mortality; everything, in short, was enveloped
in a cloud of lies. So great was the shock to public confidence that
followed this exposure, that for a time the Republic itself seemed
in danger of overthrow. The eyes of the world were fixed upon De
Lesseps and his son Charles as the chief authors of the mischief,
and when the crisis was passed, and the smoke of the upheaval had
passed away, the Panama Canal was seen to be a ruined enterprise,
and buried deep underneath it was the once-honored name of Ferdinand
De Lesseps.
[Signature: Clarence Cook.]