THE OPERATION ORDER, ORDERS, LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION
Before August, 1914, the _Operation order_ was the English term for
our _Field order_. Both orders had the same functions and about the
same form. At times, the term _operation order_ was used by us to
include only battle orders, but on the whole, the terms _Operation
orders_ and _Field orders_ practically amounted to American and
English designations of the same thing.
In the beginning of the present war, after a few weeks of open
conflict, this kind of fighting in France gave way to a vast siege.
The English found themselves, after some cross-country fighting,
in the trenches. There the operation order which had provided for
situations of march, halt, bivouac, and battle, was gradually made
over to suit the peculiar needs of defenses, raids, and frontal
attacks. The barrage fire, bombs, mortars, machine guns, and
intricate lines of communication added to the number of details to
be considered. Little by little the will of the commander expressed
itself in such completeness that the former size of his operation
order passed all bounds. It was natural, then, that although the
scope and character of the English order steadily changed, its name
remained the same.
When the Americans came to take part in the war, the operation
order had during the previous years of struggle developed out of
all resemblance to its former self. It was no longer a field order
as we know the term. It was fully grown to meet the tremendous
progress of English experience in the trenches. The consequence was
that the American, finding both the state of siege and the order
to cover it beyond his experience, associated the English name with
the novel warfare. Thus, today, the operation order is a term used
in connection with the disposition of troops on the battle fronts of
Europe.
We should bear in mind, then, that the operation order is nothing
more than a field order fitted to trench conditions. We must not gain
the idea that it has supplanted the order which goes with mobile
exercises on open ground. Open warfare began this conflict, and will,
provided it be ended by martial victory, bring it to a close. Open
warfare has been the rule on the long Russian, Italian, Serbian,
Turkish, and Roumanian fronts. We must not be led astray in our
estimate of the proportions because the front in France and Belgium
is the most vital one to us from a strategic standpoint. Field
orders, which are the accompaniments of open warfare, should still
form the larger part of our study.
Nevertheless, the operation order is the order next in importance to
the field order. It must be framed with mathematical precision under
fire.
It has the greatest conciseness, but is not brief. It goes into
the minutest details, but its details are tersely put. In certain
parts it is telegraphic like the field message; in others it has
completed sentences like those of the field order. It has an orderly
arrangement of paragraphs and brief and unmistakable language. If
we are able to compose a good field message and order, we should
find, after we have familiarized ourselves with the technique of the
trenches, that the construction of the operation order will fall
naturally into place in our minds.
Unfortunately, we are forbidden to place an example of one of our own
operation orders upon these pages. But we may have the opportunity of
viewing a German one, which contains the principles of our own. The
example given was issued by a regimental commander for a raid. The
action actually took place near La Boisselle, April 11, 1916.
110th Reserve Infantry Regiment. In the field, 6th April, 1916.
REGIMENTAL ORDERS FOR A RAID ON THE SPION
1. The raid will probably take place at dusk the 11th of
April.
2. _Organization of the raiding party_—
_In command._—Captain Wagener, assisted by Lieutenant
Boening, Assistant-Surgeon Wisser, one bugler and six
stretcher bearers.
_Patrol commanders._—Lieutenants Stradtmann, Freund,
Dumas, and Böhlefeld.
_Raiding party._—50 men of the 110th Reserve Infantry
Regiment and four Pioneers of the 1st Reserve Company,
13th Pioneer Battalion.
3. Upon the day fixed, _the raiding party_ will be
assembled in Dug-outs Nos. 1-10, on the right wing of
the left-hand battalion. Dug-out No. 9 will be used as
advanced regimental command post.
The assaulting party must not exceed three officers and
30 men. The remaining officers and men will be at Captain
Wagener’s disposal for use as supports.
_Captain Shortly after dusk the assaulting party will leave the
Wagener’s Blaue Stellung by Sap No. 3 with the object of breaking
Orders— into the enemy’s position in the neighborhood of the
Appendix Süd Spion, from which point the enemy’s trenches will
1._ be cleared northwards, if possible, as far as the Spion.
Unless prevented by the enemy’s fire, the raiding party
will return to our Blaue Stellung by the same way.
_Table of 4. For 25 minutes before the commencement of the
distrib- raid, _the artillery_ will prepare for the assault by
ution of shelling the enemy’s trenches between Besenhecke and
artillery the Windmühle, and also the Weisse Steinmauer. During
fire— the raid the artillery will control by its fire all the
Appendix enemy’s trenches likely to prove a source of danger to
2._ the enterprise.
_Special 5. In order to draw the fire of the enemy’s artillery
Orders for away from the spot to be raided, a _feint attack_ against
feint the enemy’s position just north of La Boiselle Cemetery
attack— will start 15 minutes after the artillery opens fire.
Appendix
3._ 6. In order that the registration of the objective by the
heavy artillery and Minenwerfer shall not be apparent, on
_Special the morning of the day before the raid—probably the 10th
Orders for April—a feint bombardment of Target-sectors 76-79 will
this bom- be carried out, combined with a mine explosion, _with
bardment— the object of misleading the enemy_. The exact time will
Appendix be fixed beforehand by the artillery commander, Officer
4._ Commanding Ersatz Abteilung, 76th Artillery Regiment.
7. _The machine gun officer_ will arrange that, during
the whole time of the raid, the enemy’s rear trenches in
Target-sectors 76-81 are kept under a constant fire, with
a view to causing him all possible loss, and, at the same
time, to safeguarding our patrol against counter-attacks.
8. _The Officer Commanding 1st Reserve Company, 13th
Pioneer Battalion_, will arrange for a gallery of the
left-hand minefield to be ready charged by the morning
of the day before the raid, and for a gallery of the
right-hand minefield to be ready charged by the evening
of the raid. The former will be sprung at the conclusion
of the feint bombardment, the latter as an introduction
to the feint attack.
From today, the “earth mortars” (_Erdmörser_) will
systematically cut the enemy’s wire opposite the
Blinddarm. On the day before the raid, they will
coöperate with all other close-range weapons to assist
in the feint bombardment of Target-sectors 76-78. On the
evening of the raid, they will assist in the feint attack
by bombarding Target-sectors 76 and 77 (_see_ Appendices
3 and 4).
Throughout the raid, the “_Albrecht-Mörser_,” in position
on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will heavily bombard the enemy’s
trenches in the Nordrondell. Particular care will be
taken that the enemy’s machine guns do not interfere with
the raid from that quarter (_see_ Appendix 1).
9. _The Officer Commanding 228th Minenwerfer Company_
will register the enemy’s wire at the point of entry
with one heavy and two medium Minenwerfer in the course
of the feint bombardment on the day before the raid.
He will also take part in this bombardment and fire
30 medium Minenwerfer shells at the Weisse Steinmauer
(_see_ Appendix 4). On the afternoon of the same day,
with both medium Minenwerfer mounted in the Minenwerfer
Weg, he will cut the enemy’s wire at 76y, and throughout
the whole night and the following day will keep up a
desultory fire.
On the evening of the raid, the wire in front of
the point of entry of the raiding party will be cut
on a width of 50 meters by the heavy and two medium
Minenwerfer (_see_ Appendix 1). Meanwhile, the two other
medium Minenwerfer will take part in the feint attack
against 76y (_see_ Appendix 3). The light Minenwerfer at
the disposal of the 228th Minenwerfer Company will take
part in the feint bombardment and in the feint attack,
in accordance with the orders (para. 8) issued for the
close-range weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th
Pioneer Battalion (_see_ Appendices 3 and 4). The Officer
Commanding 228th Minenwerfer Company will receive further
detailed instructions from Captain Wagener.
10. On the evening of the raid, _battalions_ will
hold themselves in a state of readiness for an alarm.
Arrangements will be made that, in the event of the enemy
opening a barrage on our trenches, as may well happen,
the number of sentries will be reduced to a minimum. Gas
masks and other gas equipment must be held ready for use.
11. I shall be at the regimental command post from the
morning of the day before the raid. From 6 p. m. of
the evening of the raid, I shall be in the advanced
regimental command post in Dug-out No. 9 on the right
wing of the left-hand battalion. Captain Wagener will
maintain constant communication with me. The artillery
liaison officer will also be with me.
(Signed) FRHR. V. VIETINGHOFF.
_Distribution_
{ Headquarters 2
{ 3 Battalions 3
110th { 12 Companies 12
Reserve { Labor Company 1
Infantry { 1st Machine Gun Company 1
Regiment { 2nd Machine Gun Company 2
{ 55th Machine Gun Section 1
{ Captain Wagener 2
29th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 1
Ersatz Abteilung, 176th Field Artillery Regiment 1
1st Abteilung, 29th Regiment Field Artillery 1
1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion 1
228th Minenwerfer Company 1
Division 1
Brigade 1
109th Reserve Infantry Regiment 1
111th Reserve Infantry Regiment 1
Spare copies 5
——
37
APPENDIX I
SPECIAL ORDERS FOR THE RAID ON THE SPION
1. _Organization of the raiding party_—
_Commander._—Captain Wagener; with him, Bugler Held.
_Stradtmann’s patrol._—Lieutenant Stradtmann and 10 men.
_Dumas’ patrol._—Lieutenant Böhlefeld and 10 men.
_Supports_, at my disposal.—Lieutenant Freund and 24 men.
In addition to the latter party, at my disposal—Boening,
and Assistant-Surgeon Wiser and six stretcher bearers.
2. _Dress and equipment._—Attack order without greatcoat
or cap, belts to be worn without pouches, gas masks to be
slung and tucked into tunic.
The Stradtmann, Dumas, and Böhlefeld patrols will each
be equipped, half with rifles and half with pistols and
wire-cutters.
The supports will carry rifles, five men will carry
pistols, each man will carry two grenades.
As a distinguishing mark each man will wear a triangle of
white linen sewn on the breast and back.
_Minutes. 3. _Time table._—_The artillery_ will open fire with gas
O′ The time shells on the enemy’s trenches on both sides of the point
of starting of entry and on the objectives opposite the southwest
will be corner of La Boisselle, where the feint attack is to
communi- take place.
cated, in
good time, For a quarter of an hour, all the enemy’s trenches likely
on the day to prove of importance to the raiding party will be
of the brought under fire. At the same time, the _close-range
raid._ weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer
Battalion_, with the two medium and the light Minenwerfer
of the _228th Minenwerfer Company_, will fire with
maximum rapidity on the enemy’s trenches opposite the
southwest corner of La Boisselle.
7′ The one heavy and two medium Minenwerfer of the _228th
Minenwerfer Company_ will open fire with the object of
cutting the wire in front of the point of entry.
14′45″ On the right flank of the minefield _a shallow gallery
will be fired_.
15′ _The artillery_, which was firing on the southwest corner
of La Boiselle, will increase its range and shell the
trenches in rear.
_The close-range weapons_ will cease fire.
_The machine guns_ will sweep communication trenches in
this sector and in the Galgen.
15′30″ In the Blinddarm and just south of the same, isolated
groups of _dummies_ will be exposed in order to make the
enemy think an attack is pending. From now on, _artillery
and Minenwerfer_ fire will increase to its maximum
intensity on the real objective.
The “Albrecht-Mörser” of the _1st Reserve Company, 13th
Pioneer Battalion_, in position on the Lehmgrubenhöhe,
will bombard the Nordrondell with the utmost intensity.
20′ _The patrols_ will leave their dug-outs and take up their
positions in readiness, in accordance with direct orders
received from me, in the Hohlweg by Sap No. 3.
23′ _Stradtmann’s patrol_ will leave the Hohlweg at “_a_” and
crawl forward as far as “_b_.”
_Lieutenant Boening_ will post the _stretcher bearers_ as
connecting files between _Stradtmann’s patrol_ and myself.
25′ _The artillery_ will lift its fire from the objective
between Besenhecke and the Windmühle to the targets in
rear, and will open a barrage on those of the enemy’s
trenches which may prove a source of danger to the raid.
_The Minenwerfer_ will cease fire.
_The machine guns_ will open fire on positions in rear
and on the communication trenches which lead to the
objective from both sides.
The “Albrecht-Mörser” of the _1st Reserve Company, 13th
Pioneer Battalion_, on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will continue
to bombard the Nordrondell. _All close-range weapons and
the artillery_, which from 0′ to 15′ had been bombarding
the enemy’s position opposite the southwest corner of La
Boisselle, will reopen fire on these targets with renewed
vigor.
25′15″ _Stradtmann’s patrol_ will break into the enemy’s
trenches at the Süd Spion and, at point 1 (_see_ Sketch
No. 1), will defend the point of entry from the direction
of the enemy.
On orders received from me personally, _Dumas’ patrol_
will follow Stradtmann’s patrol and advance southwards
along the enemy’s trench as far as point 2.
On orders received from me personally also, _Böhlefeld’s
patrol_ will follow Dumas’ patrol and, once in the
enemy’s trench, will push on towards the Spion.
_The stretcher bearers_ will act as connecting files
between Stradtmann’s patrol and myself.
_The supports_ will hold themselves in readiness at 4,
so as to be able to push on after the other patrols
immediately on receipt of an order from me.
If the enemy opens a barrage on our position and on the
Hohlweg before the patrols come out of their dug-outs, I
shall either lead the patrol to the enemy’s position by
another route, or cancel the raid.
4. _Duty of the patrols._—As many of the enemy as
possible must be made prisoners; in addition, rifles,
machine guns, rifle grenade stands, trench mortars, etc.,
as well as filled packs are to be brought back. Should it
be found impossible to carry back all the booty owing to
the small numbers of the raiding party, but if, as far as
regards the enemy’s fire it could be done, report will be
passed on to me by Stradtmann’s patrol.
5. _Return._—On a signal given by Lieutenant Stradtmann,
or on the “Charge” being blown by my bugler, the raiding
party will make its way back from the Süd Spion to the
Hohlweg by the shortest way, and immediately make for the
same dug-outs whence it started. In the dug-outs, I shall
ascertain whether everyone has returned. Prisoners and
booty will be taken into the dug-outs.
During the raid, if the enemy should open a heavy barrage
on the trenches on the Schwabenhohe and on the Hohlweg,
the raiding party will remain in the enemy’s trench and
acquaint me of the fact by firing a red flare. I shall
then endeavor to reach the party and lead them back by
some other way. Should I not arrive, the senior officer
present will lead the entire party.
6. Assistant-Surgeon Wisser will organize No. 1 Dug-out
as a first aid post and will remain there until the
conclusion of the raid.
7. Until the 15th minute I shall be in the advanced
regimental command post; after that time in the Hohlweg,
which will be connected by telephone with the advanced
regimental command post.
(Signed) WAGENER,
_Captain and Company Commander_.
Verbally and in writing to
participants in the raid.
Copy to the regiment.
W.
To quote Appendices 2, 3, and 4 would take up too much space and
would add very little to the purpose of the example. Number 2
consists of a five-page table of the kinds and time of fire, the
batteries of fire, and the targets; number 3, of detailed orders for
a feint attack; and number 4, for a feint bombardment.
The object of the quotation is to show the accuracy and detail of an
operation order. Since the German subject matter and treatment are
about the same as our own, we ought to gain from it a conception of
the requirements of framing an operation order.
_Note._—The meager space devoted to the Operation Order in this
course of lessons should in no way reflect on its relative importance
among military communications. Only because the treatment of our
own examples is forbidden and because our experience is slight, do
we leave it without further practice. Those who are armed with the
confidential documents of the War Department may look into our own
operation order more closely; and those who have conscientiously
applied themselves to the work of the preceding lessons ought to have
no trouble with its composition.
THE ORDER
Our Field Service Regulations state[16] that “_orders_ in
contra-distinction to field, general, and special orders, are used
by commanders of divisions and separate brigades for regulating the
movements and resupply of the field trains, fixing the position
of distributing points (rations and forage), authorizing the use
of reserve rations, providing for the refilling of combat trains
after combat or a march, providing for ambulance or hospital
service in camps, and for furnishing such other similar information
or instructions as it is desired to communicate to troops. They
also include such instructions as may be sent to the commander of
trains, relative to the movements and disposition of the trains and
information with regard to the arrangements made with the line of
communication relative to the positions of refilling, rendezvous, and
evacuation points.”
Thus, when separate orders are necessary for such conditions as
cited, they are called simply _orders_. They may be transmitted as
field messages between commanders or as more formal documents. In
either case they are usually addressed to the person concerned.
Examples of _orders_ follow:
51st Division, 9th Corps,
Gettysburg,
3 June ’19, 6-30 p. m.
To Commander of Trains:
Have one wagon company small arms ammunition at cross-roads near
EPPLEY at 8 p. m.
Have one wagon company artillery ammunition at north edge of
McPHERSON RIDGE at 8 p. m.
Have 1st Section, supply, ready to issue at Central Square in
GETTYSBURG at 8 p. m.
Have empty wagons return to LITTLESTOWN tonight to refill; have
them report en route to Field Hospital No. 1 at the crossing of
ROCK CREEK to carry back wounded. Have them well filled with straw
or hay.
MABIE,
_Chief of Staff_.
Telegraphed to Commander of Trains.
Copies to Regimental Commanders.
19th Division,
Marysville,
5 Oct. ’22, 6-45 p. m.
To Officer in Charge of Trains:
You will move with your trains at 3-45 a. m., by corduroy road
JEPSOM-SMALLEY-SAINT MARYS.
Arrange your columns as follows: one section artillery ammunition,
one section small arms ammunition, bridge train, supply column,
field hospitals, remainder of ammunition column.
On reaching SAINT MARYS have the two sections ammunition turn north
and, when they have cleared the road, halt and await orders.
Have the remainder of the ammunition columns halt beside the road
between SAINT MARYS and ALEXANDER and await orders. Have the field
hospitals park off the road near HILLIS.
On the march, as you overtake, or are joined by, the field trains
of the troops, you will assume command.
Hasten your march until you are clear of JEPSOM.
SMITH,
_Chief of Staff_.
Copies to all Commanders.
By Lieut. Jones to officer in charge of trains.
Birmingham,
8 Sept. ’25, 9-50 a. m.
To Captain Mott, commanding trains:
Our advance guard met at 9-30 a. m. two battalions hostile infantry
at GARLINGTON.
Have trains keep well closed and follow main body without distance.
NORTON,
_Colonel, commanding_.
The first two examples are of the formal type. The third one is less
so.
_Verbal orders_ are usually transmitted by officers. However, if the
order consists of a single sentence such as, “The trains will halt
two hours at Bingham,” it may be transmitted by an enlisted man.
Although there is more latitude in the form of written _order_
than in that of the field order, the one should be as brief and
unmistakable in its construction as the other. The paragraph
structure and sequence should be as logical and unified as English
composition can make them.
With your book open at the extract from Field Service Regulations in
regard to _the order_, compose enough imaginary _orders_ to cover all
the instances therein given.
LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION
_Letters of Instruction_ chiefly differ from orders, operation
orders, and field orders in their lack of definition of specific
tactical duties. They are truly instructions. They deal mainly with
strategic considerations and general plans, because the writer is
usually far away from, or not in direct command of, the units which
are going to carry out the general plans.
At the beginning of campaigns _letters of instruction_ enumerate the
troops of the various commands and the corresponding leaders.
“In armies, combat orders will often be in the form of, or a part
of, letters of instruction to the commanding generals in the field
armies composing the army. But where the field armies are within
supporting distance of each other and can mutually coöperate in the
task assigned them, formal combat orders may be issued. Such orders
are necessarily general in character and consist of a statement
of the objective sought by the army commander, and of the part he
expects each field army to play in attaining this objective. The army
commander, either by means of letters of instruction or by personal
conferences with his field army commanders, fully acquaints them not
only with the immediate end in view, but also with so much of his
future plans as may be necessary to insure thorough cooperation on
their part.”[17]
In the illustration which follows, President Lincoln outlines a
general offensive to the various armies. As commander-in-chief he
issues the substance of a letter of instructions in the form of an
executive order. In it we shall notice that he does not prescribe any
specific movement of troops.
Executive Mansion, Washington, Jan. 27, 1862.
_President’s General War Order, No. 1._
Ordered: That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a
general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States
against the insurgent forces.
That, especially,
The army at and about Fortress Monroe,
The army of the Potomac,
The army of West Virginia,
The army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky,
The army and flotilla at Cairo,
And a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that
day.
That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective
commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey
additional orders when duly given.
That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries
of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the
General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of
land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and
full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
The following is a more usual form of letter of instructions.
This time it goes directly from the commander-in-chief to the
general-in-chief:
May 24, 1862.
From Washington, 24th.
Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,—
I left General McDowell’s camp at dark last evening. Shield’s
command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before
Monday morning, the twenty-sixth (26th). We have so thinned our
line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday
at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one (1) regiment
infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some
peril.
The enemy’s forces under General Anderson, now opposing General
McDowell’s advance, have as their line of supply and retreat the
road to Richmond.
If, in conjunction with McDowell’s movement against Anderson, you
could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy’s supplies
from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two (2)
forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy’s retreat, you will
prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession
of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men, and if you
succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad
for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do
this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy
bridges? McDowell and Shields both say you can, and positively
will, move Monday morning. I wish you to march cautiously and
safely.
You will have command of McDowell after he joins you, precisely
as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the twenty-first
(21st).
A. LINCOLN,
_President_.
As you see, the above example does no more than suggest to General
McClellan from a strategic standpoint certain courses open to him.
The general-in-chief on the spot is the one to make the decision.
To progress in our examples, let us take one issued by the
general-in-chief to one of his subordinate generals.
Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, Feb. 23, 1862.
Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler,
U. S. Volunteers,—
_General_:—You are assigned to the command of the land forces
destined to coöperate with the navy, in the attack upon New
Orleans. You will use every means to keep your destination a
profound secret, even from your staff officers, with the exception
of your chief-of-staff, and Lieut. Weitzel, of the engineers. The
force at your disposal will consist of the first 13 regiments named
in your memorandum handed to me in person, the 21st Indiana, 4th
Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan (old and good regiments from Baltimore).
The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and the 6th Michigan, will await
your orders at Fort Monroe.
Two companies of the 21st Indiana, are well-drilled as heavy
artillery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship Island, will
be sufficient for your purposes.
After full consultation with officers well acquainted with the
country in which it is proposed to operate, I have arrived at the
conclusion that (2) two light batteries fully equipped and (1) one
without horses, will be all that are necessary.
This will make your force about 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 680
artillery; total 15,255 men.
The commanding general of the Department of Key West, is authorized
to loan you, temporarily, 2 regiments; Fort Pickens can probably
give you another, which will bring your force to nearly 18,000.
The object of your expedition is one of vital importance, the
capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi
River, and the first obstacle to be encountered (perhaps the only
one) is in the resistance of Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is
expected that the navy can reduce these works; in that case, you
will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garrison in them
to render them perfectly secure; and it is recommended, that on
the upward passage, a few heavy guns, and some troops, be left at
Pilot Station (at the forks of the river), to cover a retreat in
the event of disaster. These troops and guns, will, of course, be
removed as soon as the forts are captured.
Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces
and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence their
fire, and carry them by assault.
The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there
are some earthen batteries; here it may be necessary for you to
land your troops and coöperate with the naval attack, although it
is more than probable, that the navy, unassisted, can accomplish
the result. If these works are taken, the city of New Orleans
necessarily falls. In that event, it will probably be best to
occupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, also, the eastern
bank of the river above the city; it may be necessary to place
some troops in the city to preserve order, but if there appears
sufficient Union sentiment to control the city, it may be best for
purposes of discipline to keep your men out of the city.
After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be necessary to
reduce all the works guarding its approaches from the east, and
particularly to gain the Manchac Pass. Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay,
and Fort Livingston will next claim your attention.
A feint at Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in view. I
need not call your attention to the necessity of gaining possession
of all the rolling stock you can on the different railways, and of
obtaining control of the roads themselves. The occupation of Baton
Rouge by a combined naval and land force, should be accomplished
as soon as possible after you have gained New Orleans. Then
endeavor to open your communication with the northern column by
the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying
Jackson, Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either
after, or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to
divert you from obtaining possession of all the approaches to New
Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it
will be necessary to make a combined attack on Mobile, in order to
gain possession of the harbor and works, as well as to control the
railway terminus at the city.
In regard to this, I will send more detailed instructions as the
operations of the northern column develop themselves.
I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition
are: _First_, The reduction of New Orleans and all its approaches:
then Mobile and its defenses: then Pensacola, Galveston, etc. It
is probable that by the time New Orleans has been reduced it will
be in the power of the government to reinforce the land forces
sufficiently to accomplish all these objects; in the meantime you
will please give all the assistance in your power to the army
and navy commanders in your vicinity, never losing sight of the
fact, that the great object to be achieved is the capture and firm
retention of New Orleans.
I am, etc.,
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
_Maj.-Gen. Com’g U. S. A._
General McClellan goes more into detail than does the President. He
is considering the situation on more technical lines. Yet he does
not go beyond the limits of strategy in outlining the general plan.
He still conforms to the principles of letters of instruction. If we
were to follow General Butler in his journey to the Gulf, we should
perceive in his orders the disappearance of the strategic and the
appearance of the tactical idea. Later we should discover one of his
brigade commanders actually issuing a field order.
Notice in the last example how, on account of its length, General
McClellan has made a neat summary of the whole. Notice that in all of
these letters the writers have adhered to the principles of rhetoric;
and that they have given to the recipient a unified and coherent
production. Why? Because the will of the commander is transmitted
more quickly in that way.
We have now completed the consideration of the expression which
directly affects troops in the field. We have written the _field
message_ which brings information to commanders and which helps them
to make an estimate of a situation. We have framed the _field order_
which grows out of that estimate and which transforms the decision
into action. We have viewed the _operation order_ which is no more
than a field order made to fit trench warfare. We have seen _orders_
which are issued in connection with combat so as to govern the
movement of trains. We have read letters of _instruction_ which are
written by higher commanders in order to regulate in a general way
extensive movements. All of these communications bear specifically
upon the effort of troops toward success in battle—the ultimate
object of all military training.
In leaving this most important part of our professional work, we
might take with us this one idea. We can best express ourselves
in any of the communications we have studied by having all the
thoughts of one kind together and the different kinds in an orderly
arrangement. Whenever it is possible we should keep the paragraph
sequence,
(a) Enemy.
(b) Own troops.
(c) Plan.