PRIVATE LANDOWNERSHIP A NATURAL RIGHT
The conclusions of the preceding chapter include the statement that
individuals are morally justified in becoming and remaining
landowners. May we take a further step, and assert that private
landownership is a natural right of the individual? If it is, the
abolition of it by the State, even with compensation to the owners,
would be an act of injustice. The doctrine of natural rights is so
prominent in the arguments of both the advocates and the opponents of
private landownership that it deserves specific treatment. Moreover,
the claim that private landownership is a natural right rests upon
precisely the same basis as the similar claim with regard to the
individual ownership of capital; and the conclusions pertinent to the
former will be equally applicable to the latter.
A natural right is a right derived from the nature of the individual,
and existing for his welfare. Hence it differs from a civil right,
which is derived from society or the State, and is intended for a
social or civil purpose. Such, for example, is the right to vote, or
the right to hold a public office. Since a natural right neither
proceeds from nor is primarily designed for a civil end, it cannot be
annulled, and it may not be ignored, by the State. For example: the
right to life and the right to liberty are so sacred to the
individual, so necessary to his welfare, that the State cannot
rightfully kill an innocent man, nor punish him by a term in prison.
_Three Principal Kinds of Natural Rights_
Although natural rights are all equally valid, they differ in regard
to their basis, and their urgency or importance. From this point of
view, we may profitably distinguish three principal types.
The first is exemplified in the right to live. The object of this
right, life itself, is intrinsically good, good for its own sake, an
end in itself. It is the end to which even civil society is a means.
Since life is good intrinsically, the right to life is also valid
intrinsically, and not because of consequences. Since there is no
conceivable equivalent for life in the case of any individual in any
contingency, the right to life is immediate and direct in all possible
circumstances.
Among the natural rights of the second class, the most prominent are
the right to marry, to enjoy personal freedom, and to own
consumption-goods, such as food and clothing. The objects of these
rights are not ends in themselves, but means to human welfare.
Confining our attention to marriage, we see that membership in the
conjugal union is an indispensable means to reasonable life and self
development in the majority of persons. The only conceivable
substitutes are free love and celibacy. Of these the first is
inadequate for any person, and the second is adequate only for a
minority. Marriage is, therefore, _directly_ and _per se_ necessary
for the majority of individuals; for the majority it is an
_individual_ necessity. If the State were to abolish marriage it would
deprive the majority of an indispensable means of right and reasonable
life. Consequently the majority have a _direct_ natural right to the
legal power of marrying.
In the case of the minority who do not need to marry, who can live as
well or better as celibates, the legal opportunity of marriage is
evidently not directly necessary. But it is necessary indirectly,
inasmuch as the _power of choice_ between marriage and celibacy is an
individual necessity. No argument is required to show that the State
could not decide this matter consistently with individual welfare or
social peace. Whence it follows that even the minority who do not wish
or do not need to marry, have a natural right to embrace or reject the
conjugal condition. In their case the right to marry is indirect, but
none the less inviolable.[34]
Private ownership of land belongs in a third class of natural rights.
Inasmuch as it is not an intrinsic good, but merely a means to human
welfare, it differs from life and resembles marriage. On the other
hand, it is unlike marriage in that it is not _directly_ necessary for
any individual whatever.[35] The alternative to marriage, namely,
celibacy, would not even under the best social administration enable
the majority to lead right and reasonable lives. The alternative to
private landownership (and to private ownership of capital as well),
namely, some form of employment as wage receiver, salary receiver, or
fee receiver enables the individual to attain all the vital ends of
private ownership: food, clothing, shelter, security of livelihood and
residence, and the means of mental, moral, and spiritual development.
None of these vital ends or needs is essentially dependent upon
private ownership of land; for millions of persons satisfy them every
day without becoming landowners. Nor are they exceptions, as those who
can get along without marriage are exceptions. The persons who live
reasonable lives without owning land are average persons. What they do
any other person could do if placed in the same circumstances.
Therefore, private landownership is not directly necessary for the
welfare of any individual.
_Private Landownership Indirectly Necessary for Individual Welfare_
In our present industrial civilisation, however, private landownership
is _indirectly_ necessary for the welfare of the individual. It is
said to be indirectly necessary because it is necessary as a _social
institution_, rather than as something immediately connected with
individual needs as such. It is not, indeed, so necessary that society
would promptly go to pieces under any other form of land tenure. As we
have seen in the last chapter, it is necessary in the sense that it is
capable of promoting the welfare of the average person, of the
majority of persons, to a much greater degree than State ownership. It
is necessary for the same reason and in the same way as a civil police
force. As the State is obliged to maintain a police force, so it is
obliged to maintain a system of private landownership. As the citizen
has a right to police protection, so he has a right to the social and
economic advantages which are connected with the system of private
ownership of land. These rights are natural, derived from the needs of
the individual in society, not dependent upon the good pleasure of the
city or the State. They are individual rights to the presence and
benefits of these social institutions.
But man's rights in the matter of land tenure are more extensive than
his rights with regard to a police force. They are not restricted to
the presence and functioning of a social institution. Every citizen
has a natural right to police protection, but no citizen has a natural
right to become a policeman. The welfare of the citizen is
sufficiently looked after when the members of the police are selected
by the authorities of the city. On the contrary, his welfare would not
be adequately safeguarded if the State were to decide who might and
who might not become landowners. In the first place, the ideal
condition is that in which _all_ persons can easily become actual
owners. In the second place, the mere legal opportunity of becoming
owners is a considerable stimulus to the energy and ambition of all
persons, even of those who are never able to convert it into an
economic opportunity. Therefore, only a very powerful reason of social
utility would justify the State in excluding any person or any class
from the legal power to own land. No such reason exists; and there are
many reasons why the State should not attempt anything of the sort. As
a consequence of these facts, every person, whether an actual owner or
not, has a natural right to acquire property in land. This right is
evidently a necessary condition of a fair and efficient system of
private ownership, which is in turn a necessary condition of
individual welfare. The right of private landownership is, therefore,
an indirect right; but it is quite as valid and quite as certain as
any other natural right.
Now this right is certainly valid as against complete Socialism, which
includes State management and use, as well as State ownership. Is it
valid against the Single Tax system, or against such modified forms of
Socialism as would allow the individual to rent and use the land as an
independent cultivator with security of tenure? Would the introduction
of some such scheme in a country in which only a small minority of the
population were actual owners, constitute a violation of individual
rights? While we cannot with any feeling of certainty return an
affirmative answer to these questions, we can confidently affirm that
reform within the lines of private ownership would in the long run be
more effective, and, therefore, that the right of private ownership is
_probably_ valid even against these modified forms of common
ownership.[36]
_Excessive Interpretations of the Right of Private Landownership_
The indirect character of the right of private landownership, its
relativity to and dependence upon social conditions, is not always
sufficiently grasped by either its advocates or its opponents. In the
writings of the former we sometimes find language which suggests that
this right is as independent of social conditions as the right to
marriage or the right to life. "The State has no right to abolish
private property [in land] because private property is not a social
right, but an individual right derived from nature, not derived from
the State." It exists for _human_ welfare, not merely for _civil_
welfare.[37] The only defect in this reasoning is that the premises do
not justify the conclusion. Undoubtedly the State may not abolish
private ownership, _so long as it is necessary for human or individual
welfare_; but, when this necessity ceases, the moral justification of
the institution likewise disappears. The institution may then be
abolished, somehow, by some agency, without any violation of
individual rights. Why may not the task of abolition be performed by
the State? No other agency is available. The assertion that the State
is incompetent to decide whether the institution of private ownership
has outlived its usefulness, is entirely gratuitous; besides, it
implies that a small minority of selfishly interested persons may
justly require the continuation of a system of land tenure which has
become harmful to the overwhelming majority of the community. Extreme
defences of the right of private landownership are largely
responsible for the misconceptions of many of its opponents.
Occasionally the latter represent this right as an _a priori_
monstrosity which is serenely independent of the facts of life and
industry. While such persons are at liberty to reject the
interpretations of facts contained in the preceding paragraphs, they
cannot reasonably deny the logic of the process which has led to the
conclusion that the individual has a natural right to own land.
So much for the natural right of landownership as seen in the light of
reason. Let us now consider it briefly from the side of doctrinal
authority, namely, the writings of the Fathers and Theologians of the
Church, and the formal pronouncements of the Popes.
_The Doctrine of the Fathers and Theologians_
Some of the Church Fathers, particularly Augustine, Ambrose, Basil,
Chrysostom, and Jerome, denounced riches and the rich so severely that
they have been accused of denying the right of private ownership. The
facts, however, are that none of the passages upon which this
accusation is based proves it to be true, and that in numerous other
passages all of these writers explicitly affirm that private ownership
is lawful.[38] Speaking generally, we may say that they taught the
moral goodness of private ownership without insisting upon its
necessity. Hence they cannot be cited as authorities for the doctrine
that the individual has a natural right to own land.
Some of the great theologians of mediæval and post-mediæval times
denied this right, inasmuch as they denied that the institution of
private ownership was imposed or commanded by the natural law. Among
them are Scotus,[39] Molina,[40] Lessius,[41] Suarez,[42]
Vasquez,[43] and Billuart.[44] Since private ownership is not
absolutely necessary to human welfare in all forms of society, it
cannot, in their view, be regarded as strictly prescribed by the
natural law, nor be instituted without the positive action of civil
authority, or the consent of the community. Nevertheless they all
admit that it is much better than common ownership in contemporary
societies. The difference between their position and that of de Lugo,
for example, seems to be two-fold: First, they put stronger emphasis
upon the doctrines that the earth belongs to all men in common, that
in the absence of original sin ownership would likewise have been
common, and that this arrangement is therefore in a fundamental sense
normal, agreeing with nature and the natural law; and, second, they
put a lower estimate upon the superiority of private ownership even in
contemporary conditions. In a word, they denied that private ownership
was so much better than any alternative system as to confer upon the
individual a natural right in the strict sense; that is, a right which
laid upon the State the correlative obligation of maintaining the
institution of private landownership.
On the other hand, many of the ablest theologians of the same period
declared that private ownership was enjoined by the natural law and
right reason, and consequently that it was among the individual's
natural rights. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, private property is
"necessary for human life," and is one of those social institutions
which are prescribed by the _jus gentium_; and the content of the _jus
gentium_ is not determined by positive law, but by the dictates of
"natural reason," by "natural reason itself."[45] These statements
seem to convey the doctrine of natural right as clearly as could be
expected in the absence of an explicit declaration. Cardinal de Lugo
sets forth the same teaching somewhat more compactly, but in
substantially the same terms: "Speaking generally, a division of goods
and of ownership-titles proceeds from the law of nature, for natural
reason dictates such division as necessary in the present
circumstances of fallen nature and dense populations."[46] This view
is to-day universally accepted among Catholic writers.
_The Teaching of Pope Leo XIII_
The official teaching of the Church on the subject is found in the
Encyclical, "On the Condition of Labour," by Pope Leo XIII. In this
document we are told that the proposals of the Socialists are
"manifestly against justice"; that the right of private property in
land is "granted to man by nature"; that it is derived "from nature
not from man, and the State has the right to control its use in the
interest of the public good alone, but by no means to abolish it
altogether." These statements the Pope deduces from a consideration of
man's needs. Private property in land is necessary to satisfy the
wants, present and future, of the individual and his family. Were the
State to attempt the task of making this provision, it would exceed
its proper sphere, and produce manifold domestic and social confusion.
While Pope Leo defines the natural right of private ownership as
incompatible with complete Socialism, that is, collective use as well
as collective ownership, his statements cannot fairly or certainly be
interpreted as condemning the Single Tax system, or any other
arrangement which would leave to the individual managerial use and
secure possession of his holding, together with the power to transmit
and transfer it, and full ownership of improvements. These are the
only elements of ownership which the Holy Father defends, and which he
insists upon as necessary. The one element of private ownership which
the Single Tax system would exclude; namely, the power to take rent
from and profit by the changes in land values, finds no place among
the advantages of private ownership enumerated in the Encyclical.
There is, indeed, one passage of the Encyclical in which Pope Leo
seems to allude to the Single Tax, or to some similar proposal. He
expresses his amazement at those persons who "assert that it is right
for private persons to have the use of the soil and its various
fruits, but that it is unjust for any one to possess outright either
the land on which he has built, or the estate which he has brought
under cultivation. But those who deny these rights do not perceive
that they are defrauding man of what his own labour has produced. For
the soil which is tilled and cultivated with toil and skill utterly
changes its conditions: it was wild before, now it is fruitful; was
barren, but now brings forth in abundance. That which has thus altered
and improved the land becomes so truly a part of itself as to be in
great measure indistinguishable and inseparable from it. Is it just
that the fruit of a man's own labour should be possessed and enjoyed
by any one else? As effects follow their cause, so is it just and
right that the results of labour should belong to those who have
bestowed their labour."
In this passage we find two principal statements: first, that those
persons are in error who declare full private ownership of land to be
unjust; and, second, that it is wrong to deprive a man of the
improvements which he makes in the soil. Now the first of these
propositions does not touch the Single Tax system as such; it only
condemns the assertion of Henry George that private ownership is
essentially unjust. It is directed against one of the arguments for
the system, not against the system itself. More specifically, it is a
refutation of an argument against private land ownership, rather than
a positive attack upon any other system. It could be accepted by any
Single Taxer who does not agree with Henry George that the present
system is essentially unjust. The second proposition does not apply to
the Single Tax system at all; for the latter would concede to the
individual holder the full ownership and benefit of improvements; and
it could easily be so administered as to protect him against injury in
any case in which improvement values were not exactly and clearly
distinguishable from land values.
While Henry George opposed the doctrines of the Encyclical in his
"Open Letter to Pope Leo XIII," all his arguments are directed against
the proposition that private ownership is right and just. The "Letter"
is an attack upon private ownership rather than a defence of the
Single Tax. Apparently its author did not find that Pope Leo condemned
any positive or essential element of the Single Tax as a proposed
system of land tenure.
If the rejoinder be made that Pope Leo could have had no other group
of persons in mind than the Single Taxers, when he wrote the paragraph
quoted above, our answer must be that he did not definitely identify
them, either by naming them, as he named the Socialists, or by any
other sufficiently explicit designation. Applying to this paragraph
the customary and recognised rules of interpretation, we are obliged
to conclude that it does not contain an explicit condemnation of the
Single Tax system.
To put the substance of this chapter in two sentences: Private
landownership is a natural right because in present conditions the
institution is necessary for individual and social welfare. The right
is certainly valid as against complete Socialism, and probably valid
as against any such radical modification of the present system as that
contemplated by the thoroughgoing Single Taxers.
FOOTNOTES:
[34] The marriage rights of criminals, degenerates, and other socially
dangerous persons, are passed over here as not pertinent to the
present discussion. For the same reason nothing is said of the
perfectly valid _social_ argument in favour of the individual right of
marriage.
[35] Cf. Vermeersch, "Quaestiones de Justitia," no. 204.
[36] The argument in the text is obviously empirical, drawn from
consequences. There is, however, a putatively intrinsic or
metaphysical argument which is sometimes urged against the justice of
the Single Tax system. It runs thus: since the fruits of a thing
belong to the owner of the thing, "res fructificat domino," rent,
which is the economically imputed fruit of land, necessarily and as a
matter of natural right should go to the owner of the land. As will be
shown later, the formula at the basis of this contention is not a
metaphysical principle at all, but a conclusion from experience. Like
every other formula or principle of property rights, it must find its
ultimate basis in human welfare.
[37] Liberatore, "Principles of Political Economy," pp. 130, 134.
[38] Cf. Vermeersch, op. cit., no. 210; Ryan, "Alleged Socialism of
the Church Fathers."
[39] "In IV Sent.," d. 15, q. 2, n. 5; and "Reportata parisiensia," d.
15, q. 4, n. 7-12.
[40] "De Justitia et Jure," tr. 2, d. 18 and 20.
[41] "De Justitia et Jure," c. 5, n. 3.
[42] "De Legibus," l. 2, c. 14, n. 13 and 16.
[43] "In Summa," 1ma 2ae, d. 157, n. 17.
[44] "De Justitia et Jure," d. 4, a. 1.
[45] "Summa Theologica," 2a 2ae, q. 57, a. 2 and 3.
[46] "De Justitia et Jure," d. 6, s. 1, n. 6.