THE INTERVAL FROM JULY 1ST TO THE 12TH.
From its central position on the principal river of the country,
Athlone, at any period of the war, was of the utmost importance to
either belligerent; its loss to the Irish cause was, at this particular
crisis, a misfortune almost irreparable. It was the main link in that
chain of fortresses which the Irish generals had early recommended as
a base of operations, from which they could indefinitely prolong the
war, and eventually roll back the tide of invasion. Their successful
defence of it since the battle of the Boyne had tended to strengthen
that belief, for, notwithstanding the incessant assaults of the enemy,
not a link in the chain had been broken, and every attempt to sever it
had resulted in his repulse or discomfiture.
Well has the Shannon been termed the "principal feature of the island:"
nay more! in a military sense it is the key to it. Though most of its
principal garrisons are approachable by roads at all seasons; yet,
by reason of its high winter floods, rising towards the beginning
of October, and scarce ever receding until the end of May; with its
islands and adjacent callow lands completely inundated, it appears
throughout its whole length a chain of extensive lakes, completely
hiding its main channel, and greatly limiting the number of assailable
points throughout the intervening period. The possession of Limerick,
too, by the native army, deprived the invader of the advantage of any
craft, save such as could be improvised in the interior, and against
the action of cannon these were almost or totally unserviceable. There
were, therefore, only five or six months of the year during which the
invading army could prosecute a vigorous campaign along its environs,
and with its garrisons in a proper state of defence, with the native
army lying conveniently behind them, and the other three provinces
open to its incursions at will, all the power of England alone were
incompetent to the reduction of the country.
Deeply impressed with this conviction, the defence of Athlone had been
tenacious, and desperate even to recklessness.[63] Other considerations,
too, tended to heighten the importance of this siege. It was the
opening event of the campaign; it was carried on under the eye of
their new general, of whom fame had spoken so loudly, and above all,
it was hoped that a successful result would remove all misgivings from
the mind of the French monarch as to the wisdom of his advocacy, and
prompt him to immediate and more effective intervention. But the fall
of Athlone at once dashed all these bright anticipations. The mind
of Louis, continually warped by the misrepresentations of de Lausen
and Louvois, had from the beginning wavered on the sustenance of the
war; the ill success of his generals had been hitherto attributed to
the intractability of the native race; deceived by the subterfuge, he
adopted the accusation, and would, it might now be inferred, refuse any
further support to a cause whose fate was already foreshadowed. Nor
could it be doubted that the error of St. Ruth, though too palpable for
evasion, would have its palliation, while the brave men whom his pride
and arrogance had cheated out of assured victory, would again be the
victims of covert calumny.
It is no wonder, then, that the Irish soldiers felt the loss of Athlone
with a grief bordering on despair, and the Irish officers with a rage
strongly savoring of mutiny. To those it seemed as though they were to
be perpetually the dupes of every adventurer in search of a reputation,
and to these, that their dearest liberties weighed as nothing, and that
their country was but as a diversion from the military chess-board of
Europe, and they deemed the neglect of St. Ruth a crime scarce less
detestable than covert treason. To all it was an overwhelming calamity,
opening at once to the tread of the invader the province which they had
so long and so gallantly defended, and which until this day they could
proudly claim as their country.
It is extremely painful, after the lapse of nearly two hundred years,
to revive the weaker traits of St. Ruth's most singular character: for
it would be far more congenial, in view of his subsequent career, to
revive in him a bright reputation than a clouded one. He came to the
country in good faith; he gave his life as an earnest of his sincerity
in her behalf; and his ashes lie with those of her best and bravest on
their last great battle-field for civil and religious liberty. That
he planned it skilfully and fought it well, all admit; that it was
lost only by the "special interposition of Providence," is generally
conceded. He was brave, intrepid, and collected, in that moment which
tries true heroism, and his fate still awakens a sympathetic chord in
the breast of every generous Irishman. It should be remembered, too,
that his name was one of hatred to the French Huguenots of the time,
who sold their services to every country at war with their lawful
sovereign, and came to Ireland as the crusaders of _that religious
ascendency_ they failed to establish in their own. From them the
English historians who have treated of this war, have taken their
estimate of St. Ruth's character; and such of the Irish historians,
too, as advocate "Protestant ascendency and the dependency of Ireland
upon England." Deeply imbued with the hatred of French influence in the
island, the dissertations of such chroniclers on individual character
is persistently in accordance with that feeling. With them the
character of Tyrconnell and St. Ruth are alike the subjects of bitter
and unmeasured sarcasm; that of the one, because he is said to have
first advanced the theory of a French protectorate over the country;
and that of the other, simply because he was the servant of their
enemy, and a Frenchman; and so much, if not all of their testimony in
this connection, may be regarded as either studied falsehood or gross
exaggeration.
On the other hand, this policy of Tyrconnell is that which most endears
his name to the Irish race, and wins it the general approbation of the
native historian. And the wisdom of that policy has grown on them, age
after age, until it has at last settled into a faith, that they are
to be one day freed by the armed intervention of the enemy of their
oppressor. This, too, may account in a great measure for the sympathy
manifested by our native historians for the misfortunes of St. Ruth;
for, in treating of him, the calamities consequent on his errors seem
to be forgotten, and faults that, if committed by a native general,
would call forth execrations, are touched so delicately, that one can
scarce know which to applaud or to condemn.
Yet, weighing all these, and many other extenuating causes, there still
stands out testimony, abundant and reliable, that his errors were
ruinous to Ireland, and that in him a great soul was clouded by a most
inordinate vanity; that his conduct towards Sarsfield was unwise and
untimely, alienating from him the heart of that devoted soldier, and
destroying that mutual confidence so indispensable to success; that the
position of Tyrconnell as commander-in-chief was a canker in his heart,
and not as regarded military affairs only, but that he persistently
denied him that courtesy and consideration due to his age, his
services, and his position as deputy: but, above all, that through his
folly he lost Athlone, and precipitated the country's fate, at a time
when a strong hope pervaded every breast, when the army had reached
a high standard of efficiency, and after he himself, exultant in its
valor, had pronounced it invincible.
Resting his character on its antecedents at this particular juncture,
no special pleading could shield it from obloquy. But following it
to the end, and coupling his faults with the heroic efforts he made
to redeem them, the heart, deeply touched by his vicissitude, cannot
restrain its sympathy; and that his memory can thus hold the heart
divided between love and hatred, between disgust and admiration, is
still the great singularity of his character. At one moment it would
seem that he held the cause he championed unworthy of his desert, and
had concluded to let it go by default; while the next, he appears to be
impressed with its importance, and is seen imparting hope and animation
to all around him. Yet over all his arrogance and folly a native
nobility of soul predominated, and well had it been for his fame,
and for the country that holds his ashes, had some reverse of a less
serious nature overtaken him at a period less critical in its history
and in his.
But whatever were the foibles of St. Ruth, from his advent in the
country to his retreat from Athlone, we have now to look on an entirely
different character. There he had learned, though at a fearful cost,
that his _name_ had no fears for his potent adversary; that deeds alone
were to be the test of high emprise; and that his folly had narrowed
down the campaign, and indeed the whole war, to the last resource of
fallen heroes;--death or victory. With this feeling, all that was
vainglorious in his character at once disappeared; the mist was removed
from his mind, and it shone out to the end of his short career, as
that of a true hero in adversity. Unlike his French predecessors, he
scorned to hide his faults behind the shield of calumny, he candidly
acknowledged his error, and bitterly lamented it. He became courteous
to his officers, affable to his soldiers, changed at once from the
despot to the patriarch, and touched by his sorrows, as much as by
their own calamity, they again rallied round him, and determined on a
final throw for religion and liberty.
On the evening of the first of July he reached the town of Ballinasloe,
about ten miles south-west of Athlone, crossed the river Suck into
the County Galway, and drawing out his army along its western bank,
determined to await the enemy and stake his cause on the issue of a
pitched battle. Here the ruinous effects of his late reverse became
painfully apparent. The army that a few weeks before had marched from
Limerick twenty-three thousand strong, buoyant in hope and spirit, was
now reduced to less than fifteen thousand men. The cavalry was still
powerful and efficient, having suffered little during the interval,
but out of nearly nineteen thousand infantry he mustered somewhat
less than eleven thousand, and the _morale_ of the men had also
deteriorated.[64] Still, his determination was fixed, and his spirit
rose, even as his difficulties multiplied. In order to remove the
disadvantages of divided command, Tyrconnell now resigned his position
as commander-in-chief, but determined to lend all his influence and
power to recruit the army and follow its fortunes to the end. This
self-sacrifice on the part of the viceroy produced a reconciliation
quite beneficial to the cause, and satisfactory to the general, but the
feeling between himself and Sarsfield, never cordial, now bordered on
mutual hatred, deepening to the last, and at the last was fatal.
Being now invested with entire military control, St. Ruth caused the
garrisons of the Upper Shannon to be dismantled, drew in his outposts,
and made speedy requisitions for men and munitions. Jamestown and
Lanesborough were at once abandoned; Shannon Bridge, Banagher, and
Portumna were each reduced to a nominal garrison; Galway sent a
regiment, and Limerick all that could be spared from its defences,
which were few, for the enemy had still ten thousand regulars, and a
strong force of militia in Munster, and a desultory warfare, fierce and
incessant, raged throughout the counties of Cork and Kerry, down to the
vicinity of Limerick. A requisition for troops was also made on the
_Pretender_, _Balldearg_, now holding court between Tuam and Athunree,
surrounded by a force variously estimated at between eight and ten
thousand. But this redoubtable chief would neither furnish the required
levy, nor make any movement to discomfort the enemy; preserving at once
his masterly inactivity and his worthless person.
With his scouts and pickets well advanced towards Athlone, St. Ruth
established his quarters in Ballinasloe, to await his reinforcements,
and to give his troops that rest so necessary after the toils and
privations of the last month.--That Galway was Ginckle's objective
point scarcely admitted of a doubt; but then there were other routes to
it, as practicable, though not so direct, as that on which St. Ruth had
taken up his position, and he determined to hazard no further movement
while the intentions of his adversary remained a matter of conjecture.
Here, then, we will leave him to the duties now imperative: to recruit
and resuscitate his army, and restore that spirit and discipline so
necessary to the coming event, and return to take note of what was
transpiring in the English camp.
Ginckle betrayed no undue haste in following up his adversary;
although his previous movements were indicative of a persistency
scarce admitting of a moment's cessation. Athlone being once in his
possession, he determined to make it his base of operations against
the remaining province, and to hazard no advance until he saw it in
a proper state of defence.--With his army drawn up on the ruins of
the Irish town, he awaited the disappearance of St. Ruth, and when
no longer apprehensive of renewed hostilities, he withdrew it again
across the river to its encampment. The burial of his dead claimed
his earliest attention, and this day being the anniversary of _The
Boyne_, the evening witnessed its first celebration in all the pomp and
circumstance of war. Bonfires blazed on the adjacent hill-tops; the
names of William and Mary were duly glorified, and peals of musketry
and salvos of artillery continuing far into the night, "proclaimed
their conquest to the vanquished Shannon." His sick and wounded were
next sent to Dublin and placed under the care of the most eminent army
surgeons, while all that could contribute to the comfort of the hale,
became subject of immediate requisition. On the 2nd, Paymaster Robinson
arrived at the camp with several "cart-loads" of specie, and the whole
army received full arrear of pay, and further promises of reward and
booty, while pressing demands were made on the Lords-Justices for
reinforcements to fill up its ranks to the regular standard. After this
day, magazines, stores of ammunition, food, provender, and liquors
began to arrive hourly, and one-half the army, divided into relief
parties, were vigorously at work clearing away the _débris_ of the
siege; repairing breaches, raising ramparts, while reinforcements, now
pouring in from all available posts, were placed in their allotted
regiments and subjected to hasty and rigorous discipline. The garrisons
left in their rear, and those along the Shannon, which had been
abandoned by the Irish, were manned with native militia, and four of
St. Ruth's cannon were mounted on carriages and added to his already
enormous train of artillery.
On the 4th, as the works approached completion, he sent out a party
under one Higgins, "a converted priest," and a native of that
locality, to reconnoitre the Irish position; but, being attacked by
a picket-guard in the wood of Clonoult, fifteen of them killed, four
taken prisoners, the rest escaping with their worthy leader, who was
himself "sadly wounded." At length, on the evening of the 6th, orders
were issued to the army to be ready at dawn next morning in marching
order, and with fifteen rounds of ammunition to a man; and, on the
morning, the whole army crossed the river and drew out beyond the
town, where they again went into encampment to await Ginckle's final
preparations.
The Dublin commissioners had not yet taken cognizance of the situation,
and, as usual, after such events, were preparing another of those
parchment manifestoes, which, under a specious verbiage, were meant
to delude the people, and to affect their cause as fatally as bomb or
bullet. It was a proclamation of _amnesty_, and began with:--"Since
it hath pleased Almighty God," &c., &c.--It offered pardon to all
private soldiers;--with pay for their horses and furniture,--who within
three weeks would surrender themselves to the commander-in-chief; and
to colonels who would surrender their regiments, and to governors
who would surrender their garrisons within the same period; and
to such of the inhabitants of Limerick and Galway, in particular,
as would be instrumental in delivering up said places, pardon and
_possession of their estates_,--"_where it could be done_;" and that
all such soldiers, captains, colonels, governors, etc., should be
received into their Majesties' service and pay; and that "_as soon
as their Majesties' affairs would permit_," a Parliament would be
called, when they would endeavor to secure their protection from
"religious persecution," etc.--It praised the mildness of the English
Government,--as the proclamations of to-day do,--denounced the tyranny
of France,--another favorite theme.--It was given at the Castle of
Dublin, July 7th, 1691, signed by Porter and Coningsby, and ended
with--"God save the King and Queen."
With this was issued, by way of supplement, an address from Ginckle
himself; more brief and more pertinent, offering rewards to deserters
from the royal army, who would renounce their allegiance, and take
service under his standard. To soldiers serving without pay, as those
of the Irish army had been for several months, this twofold inducement
of amnesty and reward was a terrible temptation; but it had little
or no effect. The defection caused by St. Ruth's misconduct before
Athlone had already done its worst, and the desertion rather tended
to O'Donnell behind them, than to Ginckle in their front. Others,
preferring a middle course, had joined the Rapparees, and the rest,
true to their antecedents, resolved to retrieve their cause in the
field, or depart the country forever.
Of the manifesto of the Lords-Justices, it may be finally said, that
had it been meant in good faith, it would have won for them a very
fair claim to justice and humanity. But when it is known that all
their proffers were illusory, and that their subsequent conduct was
cruel beyond description; that the lands to which they had promised
reinstatement had already been sequestrated beyond redemption; that the
plighted faith of themselves, the general, and their sacred Majesties
were wantonly violated; and that a hundred years of more than barbaric
cruelty elapsed after their "Majesties _had_ found it convenient to
convene a Parliament;"--the character of all--Lords-Justices, general,
and "Sacred Majesties"--is too infamous for a single epithet.
On the same day that those proclamations were issued, Captain Villers
returned from a reconnoissance, and reported St. Ruth as still holding
the passes of the river Suck, and apparently determined to dispute
them. But it being deemed advisable to give these missives time for the
desired effect, a further postponement of action was the consequence,
and the interval was spent in endeavoring to repress the excesses
of the army. All religious exhortations having failed, a stringent
military code was adopted. This held forth at once the severest
punishment for crime, and the most liberal promises of booty and reward
to the men, and of "lands and livings" to the officers. This comported
so strangely with the "amnesty," etc., of the Lords-Justices, as to
render it entirely nugatory, by exposing their covert hypocrisy in the
same breath in which their manifesto was announced.
The morning of the 9th dawned bright and sultry, but towards noon the
unusual drought of the last month was broken by a violent tornado.
Trees were uprooted, houses levelled; several men and horses were
struck dead by lightning; and the march of the army was suspended
until the morning of the 10th; when, having left Colonel Lloyd with
his own, and half of the Douglas's regiment in command of the town,
Ginckle advanced as far as Kilcashel, seven miles farther westward, and
encamped for the night. Taking a strong escort of cavalry, he advanced
towards Ballinasloe, and found that St. Ruth had decamped from his
position. Crossing the river and advancing to the hills of Dunloe, he
ascertained that St. Ruth was still in the vicinity, for his outguards
were seen hovering along the hills of Garbally, and retiring slowly
as he advanced without offering any opposition. Continuing still to
advance, he at length beheld the whole Irish army drawn out in line
of battle upon an opposite hill, when, after a close inspection, he
ordered a map of the ground to be prepared, and returned to the camp;
when the Irish pickets again advanced, and occupied the hills along the
western bank of the river. From Kilcashel he advanced to Ballinasloe
the next day, and halted opposite the ground lately occupied by the
royal army, where he summoned a council and submitted the result of his
reconnoissance for the consideration of his generals.
Deeply impressed with the importance of St. Ruth's position, this
council had serious misgivings as to the wisdom of pressing an
engagement while he occupied it, and the necessity of adopting a more
circuitous route was urged. But the majority considering that they had
advanced so far that they could not recede without danger and disgrace,
a forward movement was adopted, and the plan of battle finally
arranged. It was, however, determined not to disturb their present
encampment, lest the movement should be attended with a reverse, but
to leave two regiments under Colonel Foulke for its protection, and
that none should be allowed to proceed any farther, save such as bore
arms. Ammunition was then distributed, the pioneers and grenadiers
were ordered to the heads of their respective regiments, and it was
arranged that the whole army should cross the river at daybreak, and be
formed in array of battle by six o'clock, on ground already selected
about a mile beyond it. The soldiers revelled, yet rested on their arms
throughout the night, while the generals matured their plan, and the
pass-word was--"Dublin."
St. Ruth remained several days on the river Suck, in a state of
uncertainty as to whether Ginckle would advance directly on him, or,
by taking a north-westerly route to Galway, induce him from the ground
of his own selection. While there his army was also recruited by
detachments from all the available garrisons still under his control;
and he soon found himself again at the head of an army of 20,000 men.
This force, according to the most reliable estimates, consisted of
16,000 foot of all arms and 4,000 horse; and the artillery, which
had been greatly reduced by the reverse at Athlone, was now but nine
brass field-pieces. Of this army, it may be said that the soldiers and
officers of the subordinate rank were almost exclusively of the old
Celtic race of the island, while the division and regimental commands
were held by men of the same race, and by descendants of the Palesmen
who had remained faithful to their king and country; and that at this
time all, with hardly an exception, were of the Roman Catholic faith.
Having waited until Ginckle's design was clearly indicated, he decamped
on the evening of the 9th,[65] and retiring still farther westward,
halted at the village of Aughrim, and as if he had already selected his
ground, pointed to the hill of Kilcommodon, and announced that there he
was determined to die or retrieve his fallen fortune.
From its marked inferiority in numbers and ordnance, the Irish army
here, as at the Boyne, was compelled to act strictly on the defensive,
and few places in that section of country were better adapted to this
purpose than that which St. Ruth had now selected.
The hill of Kilcommodon, now known as the field of Aughrim, is about
three miles south-west of Ballinasloe, and is the most considerable
of an irregular chain of hills extending from the western bank of the
river Suck for a distance of several miles in the direction of Galway.
Its position is such, that if a straight line be drawn from Drogheda,
on the east of the island, to Galway on the west, none of those
memorable battle-fields in its history--Drogheda, The Boyne, Athlone,
Athunree, or Galway--will deviate more than a mile from it, while most
of them will be directly under it; and Aughrim adds still another link
to that long chain of classic associations. Notwithstanding the many
changes that time has wrought since the period under consideration,
the hill and the country around it look still as sad and gloomy as
the thoughts they impart, and few of the old race ever pass that
way without uncovering the head and offering a fervent prayer--for,
together with being the last battle-field for religion and liberty,
which is sufficient in itself to awaken a melancholy interest, it is
also remembered by them as _the field of their unburied dead_.
The hill from north to south is about a mile in length, and has
nowhere an elevation of more than four hundred feet. Near its
southern extremity stood the church of Kilcommodon and the house of
Urrachree,[66] the latter the more eastward and the more prominent
feature in the events then pending; and at its northern extremity the
village of Aughrim, and a castle of the same name, which, during the
Cromwellian war, had been dismantled and untenanted. From its ridge
to its base it was considerably less than half a mile of very gradual
descent, and from the house of Urrachree to the Castle of Aughrim,
along the middle of this declivity, nearly a mile and a half. Along
its eastern base it was traversed by intersecting hedgerows, dividing
its lower half into small fields of meadow and tillage; but from these
up to its crest it was bleak, arid, and heath-covered. Outside of the
hedges, and nearly parallel to them, extended a belt of marshy ground,
of irregular width, scarcely exceeding a furlong at any point, through
the middle of which flowed a small stream, irrigating it from end to
end, losing itself in a large bog which lay on the north, and rendering
the marsh difficult to infantry and impractical to cavalry. This marsh
covered about two-thirds of the face of the hill, and lay closer up to
Aughrim than to Urrachree, while outside of it the north-eastern side
of the hill was further protected by a strip of moorland lying close
to a bog, which protected it on the north and north-west. The road
from Ballinasloe ran straight up to this moor, and diverged abruptly;
one branch of it winding round by Urrachree, and on to Loughrea; and
the other, running between the Castle of Aughrim and the northern
base of Kilcommodon, led on to Kilconel, Athunree, and Galway. That
by Urrachree ran all the way through firm upland; and excepting the
confluents of the stream that watered the marsh, the hill on that side
presented no more than ordinary obstacles to an advancing foe; but that
which led to Aughrim offered considerable impediments from the manner
of its formation. It lay through a common between the moor and the bog;
narrow at its eastern side, and gradually expanding into an esplanade,
or field, of four or five acres, and narrowing again, in its immediate
approach to the castle, until it became passable for only three or four
horsemen abreast.[67]--In fine, it may be said that, from the centre to
the extreme right, this hill was no more than ordinarily defensible;
but from that point round to the extreme left, it was well isolated,
and, with little trouble, could have been rendered impregnable; at
least to cavalry.
On this hill St. Ruth drew up his army, and encamped along its ridge;
selecting as the site of his own tent one of two Danish raths that
stood near its summit, and which commanded a view, not only of the
hill itself, but of the country for several miles around it. On the
morning of the 10th he formed his line of battle; his right resting on
Urrachree, his left towards Aughrim, and his centre on its mid-slope
between his camp and the hedgerows. Each division consisted of two
front and two rear lines; the former of infantry, and the latter of
cavalry; and in this position, with banners displayed and pickets
well advanced to the river, he was observed by Ginckle during his
reconnoissance on the same evening, and this he maintained until the
morning of the 12th, to indicate to his enemy that he accepted and
awaited the battle.
Such was St. Ruth's disposition, and such the ground which he had
selected to countervail the vast superiority of his enemy in men and
resources; and how far his skill contributed to that result now demands
a passing notice. The hedges which wound along the base of the hill
were in themselves no unimportant feature of defence for his infantry.
But as some regiments of these were hastily raised levies, he had them
also adapted to the offensive action of his cavalry, on which, from its
well-established reputation, he had been led to place most reliance.
They were accordingly opened at proper intervals, so as to admit of
flanking and direct charges, both of infantry and cavalry, against
such bodies of the enemy as should succeed in crossing the marsh and
penetrating beyond any of these successive lines; and this disposition
embraced the whole of his centre, and portions of his right and left.
In the squares formed by these hedges his musketeers were to be
stationed, while above them, in the direction of his camp, squadrons of
his choicest cavalry stood opposite to each direct intersection, while
the remainder of the hill, from these up to the camp, was cleared from
all obstructions to the deploying of succors to either wing of battle.
For the defence of the Castle of Aughrim and the pass which approached
it, which were on his extreme left, he selected two regiments of
musketeers and foot dragoons, and placed a battery of two pieces on
an elevation between the castle and Kilcommodon, so directed as to
rake the pass all the way between the esplanade and the grounds around
the castle. On the side of Urrachree, where the country was open, and
the hedges more broken and diversified, he ran additional connecting
trenches, and placed some companies of musketeers in the house and
its outer walls, which stood considerably in advance of his main line
on that side. The seven pieces of artillery which remained, after
detaching two for the defence of the pass at Aughrim, were disposed
in the following manner: On the north-eastern face of Kilcommodon,
almost over against the castle, was constructed a battery of three
pieces, so directed as to throw a raking fire across the pass itself,
a portion of the marsh, and the esplanade beyond it, to prevent the
enemy's enlarging there; and the remaining four pieces were placed on
his inner right, and directed over a portion of the marsh and the road
leading up to Urrachree. But before his centre there were no cannon
whatever; either because he deemed it less necessary, or that he wished
to invite the enemy's infantry to cross, where he was sure to break
them by repeated cavalry charges, and overwhelm them by his more agile
infantry while recrossing the marsh in disorder. His line being quite
an extended one for the number of troops under his control, he had no
reserve of infantry, but a choice body of cavalry was held behind the
north-western side of Kilcommodon, out of view of the enemy, within
convenient support of his right, and actually but a rear line of his
left, and extreme left at Aughrim.
As the battle of Aughrim, together with deciding the fate of Ireland
and the dynasty of the House of Stuart, had also an indirect bearing,
of scarcely secondary import, on the military affairs of the continent,
it has been a subject of much more critical comment than that
ordinarily bestowed on military events; and the historians of each
successive period, down to the present, have visited the disposition
of St. Ruth's army with praise or animadversion, each, no doubt, in
accordance with his own peculiar views of what should or should not
have been done by a general. While all approve the selection of the
ground, as manifesting a keen perception of what a defensive position
should be, nearly all censure some one or other of the arrangements
made for its defence. His design of letting the enemy cross at his
centre and beating them afterwards; the placing of his cavalry reserve
so far from his right; and his neglect of the Pass of Aughrim, which
was by nature so defensible; have been the subject of severe criticism,
and the whole plan, or that of allowing the enemy to cross at any
point, has been compared by the Duke of Berwick, to a similar error
of the celebrated Marshal Crequi, which had been attended by a great
disaster. But as the cavalry reserve had not been needed on the right
during the action, and as all the enemy's forces which crossed at the
centre had been successfully repulsed, the testimony of the duke, who
was not on the ground, and of all who sustained that view, may be
dismissed without comment. But what does really seem defective in his
plan of defence, was the neglect of the Pass of Aughrim, which could
have been rendered, with little labor, impregnable to either infantry
or cavalry; and in view of his very inferior artillery, this omission
seems totally irreconcilable, excepting on the ground that he believed
the force left for its defence entirely adequate, as indeed they should
have been, had they looked in time to their appointments.
Of the ground, also, it may be said that subsequent writers have
attached more importance to it than it really deserved. Whatever
features the hand of time may have defaced, it could never have been
more than ordinarily defensible, excepting on its northern extremity,
where it is still hemmed round by an extensive bog. Its advantages are
thus briefly summed up in one sentence by the English chaplain: "_Here_
we had a view of their whole army, posted as before described, by which
posture they had the advantage by at least 1,000 men"[68]--no unusual
advantage in the selected site of a battle-field.
Of the generals who commanded the respective divisions of St.
Ruth's army, or of the regiments that constituted them, little can
be established from contemporary or subsequent historians, beyond
this:--That Colonel Walter Burke and his brother, Colonel David
Burke, held the Castle of Aughrim and its defences; that Lord Bophin,
Brigadier Henry Luttrell, Colonels Simon Luttrell, and Ulick Burke
commanded on the left; that Major-Generals Dorrington, H. M. J. O'Neil,
Brigadier Gordon O'Neil, Colonels Felix O'Neil, and Anthony Hamilton,
held the centre; and that Lords Kilmallock, Galmoy, Galway, Clare,
and Colonel James Talbot commanded on the right. And judging from
the positions held by those leaders respectively, and the regiments
they indicate, it may be inferred that the Munster troops were on the
right, the Leinster and Ulster troops in the centre, and that those of
Connaught held the left and its surroundings.
In addition to those division and regimental commanders, the
marshalling of the entire infantry was deputed to General William
Mansfield Barker, and that of the cavalry to Major-General John
Hamilton;[69] and the whole was commanded by the Marquis de St. Ruth
and Lieutenant-General Sarsfield,[70] aided by Generals d'Usson and de
Tessé, and other officers of established reputation.
Having completed his arrangements, and allotted every division its
service, St. Ruth drew up his army and reviewed it in front of its
encampment. Then, in an eloquent and animated address, he set before
all the great issues dependent on the coming battle. He reminded them
that, unlike the mercenary army of the Prince of Orange, they were
about to contend for all that man holds dear, and for all that exalts
and ennobles the profession of arms--their homes and kindred; their
country and its altars. The duty of allegiance to their king who had
staked his crown to free them from an odious religious bondage, and
the certainty of immediate and adequate succor from his own sovereign,
should their arms be crowned with success, were set before them in
language calculated to awaken loyalty and enkindle enthusiasm. His
own services in the cause of religion were alluded to as an earnest
of that sincerity in their cause which tended to awaken sympathy and
establish confidence, and his troubles, and even his errors, since he
came to the country, were reviewed with an earnest ingenuousness that
removed all traces of discontent and restored general harmony. This
address was delivered in the French language, and interpreted to the
soldiers by their officers and chaplains in their native tongue, till
every eye kindled with devotion, and every bosom glowed in the hope of
anticipated victory. Then exhorting them to prepare themselves by those
religious observances that should distinguish the Christian soldier, he
retired to his tent to digest the thoughts that labored in his mind,
and to shape them to purpose and to action.
The eve of battle had come:--that hour which best attunes the soldier's
heart to sympathy and devotion; and many associations contributed
to render that one more than usually impressive. It was at once the
season of full moon and perpetual twilight, and the sultry glare of
day was succeeded by that chastened yet abundant radiance that at once
soothes and spiritualizes; and, above all, it was the Sabbath eve,
which more than any other awakens the sacred memories of love, home,
and kindred.--The crest of Kilcommodon, studded from end to end with
the white tents of the soldiers, stood out in its isolation like a city
of silver, while the castles of Urrachree and Aughrim on the front,
and the churches of Kilcommodon and Kilconel in the rear, seemed as
sentinels of the place, and carried back the mind to the ages of faith
and chivalry. Nor was the scene passing throughout the encampment less
characteristic of the time and the event.--From sunset until the hours
that precede the dawn, the chaplains of the army knew no repose: the
voice of prayer arose on all hands, and the soldiers approached the
confessional to prepare for the great sacrifice of the Mass, by which
the human ordeal of the morrow was to be inaugurated. Towards morning
heavy clouds obscured the moon, and darkness deepened over hill and
valley, until all became as drear and dismal as it had before been
full of grandeur and celestial loveliness:--nothing was heard but the
challenge of the sentinels on their rounds, and the occasional neigh of
the war-horse; and nothing seen but the distant watch-fires where the
pickets on the eastern hills kept watch above the camp of the enemy.
How commendable is the spirit of religion on such occasions! History,
sacred and profane, delights to record this manifestation of the
divinity in man. The Israelites never joined battle without offering
sacrifice, and even the pagan nations always propitiated their gods
on the eve of battle. And yet we find this instance of it in the
Irish people made a subject of the lowest ribaldry, even by the
reverend historian of William's army. Without, however, entering on a
disquisition as to the efficacy of prayer, or what providence, or good
or evil directs the destiny of nations, a precedent in point may not be
considered inappropriate.
The battle of Hastings was to England what that of Aughrim was to
Ireland. Each established a new dynasty, and each accomplished the
subjugation of the native race. That of the Saxon was but the work of a
day; that of the Irish was an incessant warfare of centuries. The one
was the extinction of Thanes and Heptarchs; the other of chieftains and
princes.--And there were still other traces of similarity.
At Hastings, the Saxons revelled while the Normans prayed. At Aughrim,
the Irish prayed while the English revelled. Yet the same historians
who appreciate the devotion of the Norman, and indicate its efficacy,
make it a subject of ridicule in the Irish, and couple it with defeat.
Providence and faith are often too lightly used to link a defective
argument, or to round a happy period. Few will now deny that the Saxons
were a more virtuous people than their Norman conquerors, or that the
Irish were not much more so than the heterogeneous mass that followed
the Prince of Orange. If the Saxons bent to the yoke of a conquering
race, and prospered under it, let them glory in their wisdom and
servility; but that the Celtic race, through every vicissitude, spurned
it, hated the connection, and have still an undying faith in their
ability to sever it, constitute, it is believed, a truer nobility of
character.