CHAPTER XIII

SOME ELECTIONEERING IMPRESSIONS

I

German political life is in the main a sealed book to the British

public. Many people take but a tepid interest in the politics of their

own country. To grapple with the intricacies of parties and programmes

in a foreign land is an effort quite beyond the will or the power of

the average citizen. Yet Germany plays, and is bound to play for years

to come, so dominant a part in every calculation and forecast made

by her neighbours, that it is of considerable importance to try and

realise what forces are at work among her own people.

Constitutional life in Germany has had many vicissitudes. When the

tragic history of our own times comes to be written, future historians

will probably regard the failure of the Frankfurt deputies in 1848

to solve the problem of German unity on a democratic basis as the

most fatal date in modern history. The unity which the “Professors’

Parliament” failed to achieve was welded together triumphantly by

Bismarck, twenty-three years later, through blood and iron. To the cult

of blood and iron Germany henceforth dedicated itself, and for many

years, with striking success. But even within the Empire the system had

its challengers, as the spread of Socialist doctrines and the successes

of the Social Democrats proved. When the military régime collapsed

in defeat and confusion in the autumn of 1918, it was to the despised

democratic elements that Germany owed her escape from utter ruin.

Little or no attention has ever been paid to the astonishing feat of

constitutional reorganisation which was carried through after the

flight of the Emperor. Complete military disaster had overtaken the

country; revolution and anarchy were abroad in the land. Yet on the

morrow of these events not only was a Republic proclaimed, but a German

Government came into being which worked out a democratic constitution

based on universal suffrage and full ministerial responsibility of the

cabinet to the elected representatives of the people. The history of

parliaments contains no more surprising page. Women were enfranchised,

lists of voters prepared, and within a few weeks of the Armistice,

elections were held which brought into existence a provisional National

Assembly whose business it was to carry on the hard task of government

till the first Reichstag of the new Republic could subsequently be

elected. How all this was done in the time is a mystery, especially

having in mind the endless delays to which our own last Franchise Bill

gave rise, and the difficulties pleaded as regards the revision of

voters’ lists. The temper of the hour and the mood of the conquering

Allies did not permit of one word of praise for a constitutional _tour

de force_ carried through under conditions of overwhelming difficulty.

But it would be unjust and ungenerous not to recognise to-day with

what dogged determination the German democrats, inexperienced and

untried as they were in government, handled the half-foundering ship

they were called upon to save. To make a success of the task was an

impossibility under the circumstances for them or for any set of men.

But that they kept the ship afloat, in view of the seas breaking over

it, is little short of a marvel.

The man who played a thoroughly creditable part in the hour of collapse

was Hindenburg. Unlike other distinguished members of the ruling class

he did not run away when the game was up, but stood by his country

through the grim business of defeat and surrender. Without a shred of

sympathy for the Republican Government, he gave that government loyal

assistance as regards the withdrawal of the armies. No man in Germany

to-day commands more universal respect than the old Field-Marshall.

Amid the flood of recriminations which German statesmen, generals, and

admirals have poured on each other, Hindenburg has displayed reticence

and generosity which do him entire credit. The inclusion of his name in

the list of War Criminals is of all Allied ineptitudes since the Peace

perhaps the greatest.

The National Assembly lasted for about fifteen months. In June 1920

Germany went to the polls to elect the first Reichstag of the Republic.

Not the faintest interest in the event was taken by the British public.

Yet whatever the result, it could only react on the whole future of

European reconstruction.

Current conceptions at home remain astonishingly crude as to the

position in Central Europe. The man in the street, brought up in the

true milk of the word as preached by the Yellow Press, is still of

opinion that Germany is as militant and as threatening as ever, and

that, should we be so foolish as to stop sitting on her head, she

would promptly overrun Europe again. Suggest that Germany with her

fleet sunk, her merchant shipping confiscated, her colonies lost, her

army disbanded, her war material surrendered, her railway system in

ruins, her food shortage considerable, is hardly in a position at the

moment to make an unprovoked attack on any one, and the said person

hints darkly in reply at hidden divisions on the Eastern Frontier;

at an alliance between the Bolshevists and the German Government;

at a military menace little less serious than what existed in 1914.

It is surprising that people of this type are not more in conceit

with themselves after the Allied victory, and fail so completely in

appreciation of what the conquering armies have done. The German

legions, perfectly trained and equipped after years of preparation,

and with the whole resources of the German Empire behind them, could

not achieve the preliminary pounce on Paris in 1914. Is the present

Republican Government in any better position to succeed where they

failed? A nation broken by hunger and defeat may become a centre of

disease, dangerous to its neighbours owing to the poison spread through

the whole international system. But any talk of external military

adventure, apart from sporadic insurrections, is absurd.

The old united Germany with its strong centralised military government

is a thing of the past. Instead of which we have a Germany, weak,

disorganised, distracted, split into various factions each at mortal

strife with the other. The position is full of danger and grave

internal crisis; it may menace the foundations of European society, but

the danger is disruptive and from within, not the menace of external

legions. Political parties in Germany are split up into numerous and

bewildering subdivisions. The Independent Socialists and Communists

form a group to the extreme left, with more or less Bolshevist ideals.

But, broadly speaking, there are two main sections, the democratically

minded people who desire the evolution of a peaceful and constitutional

republic, and the reactionaries who, while paying a certain lip-service

to democratic principles, at heart detest the whole business.

It will be the eternal reproach to Allied policy that it has done

nothing whatever to help the better elements in Germany to consolidate

their position. On the contrary, by the intolerable economic penalties

of the Peace it has pushed German democracy into a slough of despond

and handed over all the vantage points to its enemies. The measure

of the vast blunder committed in this respect is clear enough to any

one who, like myself, has had the opportunity of attending political

meetings held in Germany. To be living in a country torn by a fierce

election campaign and to be taking no part in the fray was a novel

experience for me. The placards with which Cologne was covered and

the heated articles in the German newspapers made me, like an old

war-horse, sniff battle from afar. At least I was anxious to try to

gather as a spectator how German men and women were really feeling and

thinking on this critical occasion. Political meetings have their own

atmosphere and tell their own tale, and the opportunity of hearing and

judging for myself was too good a one to miss.

I confess it was with a certain amount of trepidation that I made my

way for the first time into a German public meeting. Naturally I had no

desire to be recognised as an English woman, and, the conditions being

wholly novel, I was not clear beforehand how far I should be able to

lie low and conceal the fact of my nationality. However, seeing that

the Social Democrats advertised a meeting to which women were specially

invited, I plucked up my courage, reflected on the not infrequent and

slightly chastening occasions when I have been addressed by Germans in

German, bought a Socialist paper which I displayed conspicuously, and

walked into the gathering. Neither then nor on any subsequent occasion,

let me say, did I experience the smallest difficulty in slipping in

amongst the crowd and hearing the proceedings in entire comfort.

It was a warm evening, and the great hall of the Gürzenich, the

old banqueting-room of mediaeval Cologne, was only half full. The

audience--about equal numbers of men and women--were well-dressed,

entirely decorous folk. The long hair and red ties of orthodox

Socialism were absent. German meetings are detestably unpunctual.

Advertised generally for 8 P.M., they seldom start till twenty

minutes later, and the audience meekly accepts conditions of delay

which would rouse an English meeting to fury. The principal speaker

of the evening was Fräulein S., of Hamburg, a member of the National

Assembly. At 8.20 a procession of earnest-looking women slowly mounted

the platform. They wore coloured blouses and dark skirts, and their

hair was scratched back tightly off their heads--a true hall-mark of

feminine virtue in all climes and among all nations. The chairwoman had

fortified herself with a large dinner-bell, and rang a peal, apparently

to give herself courage, on opening the proceedings. Restoration of

order was unnecessary, for the audience sat in stolid silence on the

appearance of the speakers, not even extending to them the perfunctory

greeting with which an English audience heartens the platform victims

before the sacrifice. No encouraging cheers greeted the advent of a

pleasant-looking lady who, armed with a folio of MS., made her way to

the reading-desk. Fräulein S. spoke, or rather read, for an hour in a

clear, cultivated voice. She outlined the constructive policy of the

Social Democrats or Majority Socialists, whose platform approximates to

what was known as the Liberal-Labour position in English politics. The

party is, however, definitely pledged to nationalisation. The speaker

led off with the blockade, which is the King Charles’s Head of every

political meeting in Germany. Their enemies, she declared, accused

the Social Democrats of bringing Germany into her present desperate

straits. Not the revolution, however, but the dire consequences of the

blockade were responsible for the troubles of the people. Fräulein

S.’s chief interests lay obviously in the field of social reform. She

outlined a programme which was strangely familiar in many respects.

The unmarried mother and the question of religious education in the

schools were in the forefront of the battle. The temper of the meeting,

it must be owned, was very tepid, but the depressing silence was broken

by a few cheers when these subjects were handled. Another old friend

appeared with Fräulein S.’s emphatic assertion that no school teacher

should be compelled to resign her appointment on marriage. The lady

then dealt at some length with finance and the incidence of taxation. A

thoughtful, well-expressed speech--withal a trifle dull.

The reading of manuscript in a large hall has a curiously deadening

effect on an audience, and judging by what I have heard, the women

politicians of Germany--and be it also said many of the men--have not

as yet learnt to emancipate themselves from the tyranny of elaborately

prepared lectures. This was noticeable in the case of the speakers who

followed Fräulein S. She was succeeded at the reading-desk by a dark,

heavy-browed, energetic-looking girl, who infused a welcome note of

vigour, not to say violence, into the proceedings. This young woman

was a school teacher of obviously advanced views, and spoke well and

fluently. She made short shrift of religious education in schools.

Priests and catechisms vanished under her touch as she flourished the

Socialist banner and belaboured her political adversaries with a series

of witticisms which evoked rounds of applause. Yet she too had a folio

of notes, and now and again when a word failed, a sudden pause in the

flow of oratory, a hasty turning of sheets showed that the thunder,

effective as it was, had been carefully prepared.

These little difficulties were still more noticeable in the case of

the next speaker, an old lady wearing spectacles and a black bonnet,

whose witticisms (the drift of which I was quite unable to follow)

delighted the audience. Her notes had got mixed, and when she lost her

thread--which happened frequently--some moments were spent hunting it.

Quite undismayed, however, by these interruptions, the old lady held

to her task gallantly. She was clearly a favourite, and the carefully

prepared jokes resulted in loud laughter. I was sorry to miss the point

of these jests, but I was left with the impression that public meetings

in Germany, as in England, are ready to be amused with very small beer.

The ladies were succeeded by one or two men speakers, who all chanted

the praises of the Social Democrats and introduced variants of another

familiar theme--poll early and poll straight. After this the chairwoman

performed energetically again on the dinner-bell--did any member of

the audience desire to speak? Hardly had the sounds died away when

she declared the meeting over. I was waiting for the real fun of the

fair to begin with questions, but found myself, with the rest of the

company, in the street.

Encouraged by this first attempt, I made a round of the meetings

held by the leading parties, gatherings at which night after night I

listened to views as wide asunder as the poles. The proceedings were

considerably more lively than at the women’s meeting, and on more than

one occasion feeling ran high. Yet the proceedings were astonishingly

orderly as compared with the uproarious election meetings which are

common enough at home. Interruptions were not of a sustained character,

and during the campaign I saw no meeting broken up. I can only marvel,

however, at the easy lot of a German candidate, for questions and

heckling play a very small part in the campaign. The carefully prepared

conundrums which harass the existence of the British Parliamentary

candidate, the game of thrust and tierce, are unknown here. I was

disappointed by the absence of the familiar figure in the back row who

rises, waggling a minatory forefinger, and the words, “I want to ask

the candidate,” etc. The odds are against the heckler in Germany, for

what is called the “discussion” consists of objectors coming on to the

platform and making speeches of protest, surrounded by the candidate or

candidates and their supporters. As I have already remarked, meetings

begin late, speeches are very lengthy, and by the time the party

candidates sitting in a row on the platform have each said his say the

hour stands long after 10 P.M., and the audience begins to go home.

Naturally I was specially interested in the women speakers and the

general bearing of women at these gatherings. The impression made upon

me was that if German women attained full political emancipation at

a bound through the revolution in November 1918, they have already

laid a firm hand on their new rights. Large numbers of women were

present at every meeting I attended--a fact which made my own presence

possible. A fair proportion of women had sat in the National Assembly

(the first provisional Parliament elected after the revolution), and

were candidates for the new Reichstag. It is a satisfactory feature

that, though the progressive feminist spirits are naturally more

numerous among the Social Democrats and Minority Socialists, the

various Conservative parties also support women candidates. If the

British voters at the last General Election showed no mind of any kind

to return women to Parliament, German women have fared better. But the

difference in the electoral system probably tells in their favour.

II

German political organisation differs widely from anything with which

we are familiar. The small constituencies represented by one or two

members have no existence here. The country is divided into large

electoral areas, and each party has a list of candidates qualified for

the position by the votes of their respective supporters. On polling

day you are implored to vote, therefore, not for a person but for a

list, the list being headed by the name of the leading candidate. A

definite quota of votes given to a party elects a member automatically.

The personal element in elections which is so conspicuous a feature

of our own public life has practically no existence in Germany. The

struggle is one of principles far more than of personalities. This

state of affairs tells against a candidate of special gifts, but on the

other hand it neutralises the unfair influence of the purse, and gets

rid of much of the polite bribery which enters into political life at

home. There is no question here as at Eatonswill of kissing the babies

or shaking hands specially washed for the occasion. Further, areas are

too large to make handsome subscriptions to local charities a factor

in success. A millionaire could not stand the strain of subsidising

portions of a province.

Another curious feature of a General Election in Germany is the

inadequacy of the Press arrangements. The papers supporting the various

factions give the list of their own candidates, and these lists

appear on the electioneering placards which are in great evidence.

But I wholly failed to obtain any general list of the candidates in

the Cologne area, let alone a list for the whole country. Equally

difficult was it after the poll to get a detailed list of the losses

and gains. Totals appeared but no names. It was necessary to hunt

through a variety of party organs to find which of the candidates had

been qualified as members by the quota of votes given to the party.

Though I spent my time buying newspapers, I was never able to find a

list setting out the new Reichstag in tabular form, with parties and

localities attached to the various names. Electioneering literature

was poor stuff, and the occasional picture posters not inspiring.

The Deutschnationale had a dramatic placard of a drowning man sinking

beneath heavy seas, to whom a lifebuoy with D.N.P. is being thrown

as his one chance of salvation. But the subject of the placard could

hardly have thrilled the electors. Posters devoted to the general

turpitude of the other man’s views were common, and followed familiar

lines. But certainly neither Press nor posters could compare with the

organisation of the written and printed word which exists during a

General Election in the United Kingdom.

It was an interesting experience night after night to watch a country

groping its way along political paths but recently opened. The

multiplicity of parties into which Germany is split is very confusing

to a foreigner. The lines of demarcation in some cases are hard to

grasp, and the political life of the Republic would gain in vigour and

directness if certain of the groups were combined under one banner.

The two main groups, right and left, into which German political life

falls are split up into various factions. The Socialist Party is

divided into a constitutional right wing, the Social Democrats, and a

revolutionary left wing, the “Unabhängige” or Independent Socialists.

Since the revolution, various parties have been busily engaged changing

their names, a fact which does not simplify the situation, as the old

ones still survive in current conversation. The former Liberals--whose

views have nothing in common with Liberalism in the English sense--are

included to-day in a variety of Capitalist and Conservative groups from

the Demokraten (mildly Liberal in our sense of the word) on the left to

the Deutschnationale Partei on the right. This last-named tabernacle

shelters the Junker and Agrarian elements, and is reactionary to the

core. But it is less dangerous than the party which has risen into

power of late and bids fair to be thoroughly mischievous, namely, the

Deutsche Volkspartei. This is the party of Herr Stinnes and the “schwer

Industrie.” It includes the great manufacturers and capitalists,

as well as large sections of the Bourgeoisie, has ample funds at

its command, and despite some perfunctory patter about democracy,

is bitterly anti-democratic in feeling and outlook. These two main

divisions of the Socialists and the Bourgeoisie face each other with

uncompromising hostility. But the situation is further complicated by

a clerical element standing between them, with which happily our own

politics are untroubled.

The fervour and depth of Catholicism on the Rhineland has been one

of the many surprises of Germany to me. In the Rhineland, therefore,

questions affecting Church and State are much to the fore, especially

the burning question of religious education in the schools. But the

cross-correspondences between the Zentrum, the orthodox Catholic

party, and the other groups are most bewildering. There are Christian

Socialists and Socialists who are very much the reverse. The Zentrum

has cooperated for certain purposes with the Social Democrats, which

has resulted in a split in its own ranks and the formation of a new

party of clerical extremists known as the Christliche Volkspartei.

Amid the welter of parties two conclusions force themselves on the

observer. First, the orderly democratic elements in Germany are having

a hard struggle to survive; second, it is essential for the Allies to

have a responsible Government in Germany with principles approximating

to those of the democratic peoples. To such a Government alone can

they look for the execution of Germany’s Treaty obligations. Yet they

have taken no steps to secure this end. I often think that Europe will

make final shipwreck over the mistaken idea of German military unity

still so firmly screwed into popular imagination at home. Could we but

grasp the profound internal cleavage of ideas and ideals in Germany

itself, common-sense, if no higher consideration, might suggest the

importance of strengthening the hands of the only party from which we

have anything to hope.

The democratic Government which came into existence at the time of the

revolution has had an impossible task. It was confronted by hunger,

defeat, despair, and the miseries which resulted from the blockade.

It was not a strong Government--how could it be? Democracy is but a

plant of struggling growth in Germany. The nation has had no training

in self-government, and the efficient bureaucracy which still more or

less survives is steeped in the old bad traditions. That under these

circumstances the new Government was open to suspicion at every turn

is natural enough. A more far-sighted policy, however, inspired by

some faith and hope for the future would have realised that these

struggling democratic ideals, if feeble, were sincere and would not

have withheld all help from them. Also that the powerful internal

enemies, the revolutionaries on the one hand, the reactionaries on the

other, were waiting their opportunity to destroy them. Such a policy,

could it have illumined the councils of Versailles, might at least

have seen the folly of associating the first efforts in democratic

government in Germany with rebuffs and humiliations of all kinds. The

German working-man means to stand by the revolution, but hunger and

general demoralisation are openings on which the reactionaries and

revolutionaries are not slow to seize.

These reflections were driven home to me in a most emphatic way

at a meeting of the Deutsche Volkspartei which was addressed by a

distinguished professor from Berlin. The Deutsche Volkspartei excites

peculiar wrath in Socialist circles. The Junkers and the Right Wing

extremists, left to themselves, are not dangerous. But this great

Conservative capitalist block, fortified? by the funds of the big

business men and the “schwer Industrie,” is considered, and rightly, a

formidable adversary.

The Professor’s speech was in its own way first-rate. From premises

which personally I detested he developed his theme with extraordinary

ability, piling argument upon argument with a cumulative force which

swept everything before it. Personally I was very thankful it did not

fall to my lot to answer some of the points scored.

The Gürzenich Hall was crowded on this occasion, and the fashionable

ladies who sat on the platform belonged to a different world from

that of the Social Democratic women of an earlier meeting. As regards

the masculine supporters of the Volkspartei, I was reminded of Mr.

Keynes’s famous description of the present House of Commons, “a lot

of hard-faced men who looked as though they had done very well out of

the war.” This was particularly the case with the chairman, who had

“schwer Industrie” written all over him. The Professor’s personality

was more attractive than that of many of his supporters--a grey-haired,

grey-bearded man, with a fine head and full strong voice. He spoke

without a note of any kind, never once hesitating for a word. He

dealt skilfully with occasional interruptions, for the meeting was not

composed of unanimous supporters.

The speech began characteristically with a eulogy of Bismarck.

Bismarck had been reproached for a policy of blood and iron and force.

But blood and iron and force, not the pratings of the democratic

visionaries of the National Assembly at Frankfurt in 1848, had created

and sustained modern Germany. It was the absence of blood and iron

which was responsible for their present downfall. Not that the armies

in the field were ever defeated; Germany’s downfall sprang from the

blockade and the fanatical hatred of England. Yet not from the blockade

alone: all might have been saved but for the revolution which had

brought about their final undoing. It was the traitors from within,

not the enemies from without, who had finally wrecked and destroyed

Bismarck’s work. Social Democracy had been the ruin of the country.

It had delivered the nation tied and bound into the hands of their

enemies. Democracy, what was democracy? The firstfruits of German

democracy had been the Treaty of Versailles with its intolerable

burdens. Belief in democratic principles; trust in the professions of

democratic leaders? The speaker laughed bitterly. Had not President

Wilson proclaimed that America was fighting German militarism, not the

German people? Had not Lloyd George said the same thing, and that no

yard of German soil was desired by the Alliance? The Social Democrats

might believe these fables, on the strength of which they sold the pass

to the bitter enemies of the Fatherland. The result was the Treaty of

Versailles. The Socialists talked of a peace of reconciliation, of

international relations, of stretching out hands to the democracies

in other countries. What folly to trust to such shifting sands, which

had resulted in the German people being swallowed up in misery. The

Social Democrats had promised them freedom. “Freedom,” said the speaker

with bitter scorn; “are you free in the Rhineland?” No; there was only

one way by which a happier future could be reached--the re-creation

of Germany on strong nationalist lines; a Germany resting on force,

purged of democratic and international follies, with her eyes fixed

on herself and the principles of Bismarck well to the fore again. To

do this the defeat of Social Democracy and Socialism at the polls was

the first essential. A Government must be returned which would know

how to safeguard the welfare of the Fatherland. Unceasing work was an

essential of reconstruction; the eight hours’ day was another colossal

blunder recently made. Here and there the speaker threw an occasional

sop to the democratic Cerberus. Perhaps it was true that they had

relied a little too much on force alone in the past, and had forgotten

the old idealistic teaching of the poets and philosophers. And again

the rule of bayonets was over; government now rested on the will of the

people--a good old tag which appeared towards the end of the speech.

If the Volkspartei have their way, how much will shortly remain of the

will of the people in Germany?

Now for an English woman sitting unperceived and unrecognised among a

German audience this speech was not pleasant hearing. Naturally, the

speaker glided easily over the rotten ice of Germany’s responsibility

for the war. He had nothing to say as to the original crime of German

militarism, the real starting point of his tale of woe. For him

history began with the Peace, an indefensible position. Nevertheless

all he had to say on that subject drove home every doubt people like

myself have felt as to the scrapping by the Peace of the fundamental

principles for which we fought the war. The speech was a practical

illustration of how the Treaty itself has played straight into the

hands of the German reactionaries, how it has brought democratic

professions into utter contempt, how it has made the lot of a German

democratic Government practically impossible.

The speech of the evening was received with rapturous applause, though

elements of dissent were not unrepresented. But, as I have said before,

German political meetings are not arranged with a view to helping the

heckler. It is one thing to fire off questions from the body of the

hall, quite another to go upon the platform and make a reasoned speech

of protest surrounded by your enemies. Even so the “discussions” are

at times sufficiently lively. A nice old working-man, with clothes so

patched that the original pattern had almost disappeared, sat next

me in my corner. He was obviously full of protest at the speech, and

obviously anxious to explain his objections to me. But the necessities

of my incognito demanded strict silence, for my speech I knew would

betray me if I became involved in conversation however interesting. So

I was forced to assume an attitude of haughty aloofness, much though I

regretted the latter.

When the Berlin gentleman sat down, another prop of the Volkspartei,

an elderly and spectacled lady, advanced to the reading-desk fairly

staggering under a load of MS. “Lieber Gott!” said two young men

sitting in front of me when she had said half a dozen words. Seizing

their hats, they fled forthwith. I bore with the portentous dullness

of the lady for a few minutes and then fled in my turn. The evening

though interesting had not been agreeable. There had been too much

truth in many of the taunts hurled by the Professor at the democratic

professors of the Allies and their “faithful guardianship” of the

principles of liberty and justice. The miserable state of confusion to

which the pundits of the Peace Conference have reduced Europe is only

too apparent to any one living on the Continent. But to have the moral

enforced and adorned by a German is poor work for an English woman.

III

One outstanding impression which I have carried away from political

meetings in Germany is the easy life of a German parliamentary

candidate. So far as I could judge, these happy individuals saunter

through a campaign with relative ease and leisure. Instead of a hectic

evening spent in rushing from one meeting to another, candidates sit

for hours listening to one another’s oratory. The absence of heckling

and questions makes the delivery of long political treatises, which are

but mildly challenged, a simple task. There are of course exceptions,

and some meetings, notably Socialist ones, announce a “discussion,”

at which feeling runs high. But the average German audience is very

long-suffering, and tolerates bores and speeches of inordinate length

which would empty an English gathering. The whole spirit of a German

meeting is hostile to interruptions. I have heard a man who interjected

a harmless remark torn to pieces by the speaker, with the obvious

approval of the audience.

All of which is perhaps a mark of the political inexperience of the

people and that despairing German habit of taking for granted what

is told them. Nowhere more than in Germany does one thank heaven for

the intractability and argumentativeness of the British democracy.

Intellectual docility lies at the root of many German crimes, and along

the path of criticism probably lies the way of political regeneration.

Liberal and Conservative principles are much the same all the world

over, and the German political parties which embody them are easy to

recognize whatever their names. But the clerical element which cuts

across political life in Catholic Germany has no parallel in English

politics, and produces some curious eddies in the stream. The Zentrum,

the orthodox Catholic Party, cannot be reproached with clericalism

in the bad sense of the word. German Catholicism includes mildly

Socialistic elements, and the Zentrum joined with the Social Democrats

in forming the present Government. It is largely a working-class party,

and stands for what we should call moderate Liberal views. But at the

same time it is grounded in principles of religious education and that

religious view of the State to which modern democratic feeling is

increasingly hostile. Joint makers of the Coalition, no two parties

at the moment abuse each other more heartily than the Zentrum and the

Majority Socialists. Despite its present influence, it is difficult,

therefore, to judge what the future holds for the Zentrum. Meanwhile,

a certain section of zealots and intriguers have broken away from the

original Catholic Party to form the Christliche Volkspartei. The

seceders declare that by holding any traffic with the Social Democrats

the Zentrum has been faithless to the first principles of religious

education. It was incumbent on them, therefore, however heart-breaking

the task, to withdraw the hem of their garments from the accursed thing

and stand for Christian fundamentals in their original purity. Behind

all of which professions lurks a very pretty intrigue.

I was favourably impressed at a Zentrum meeting both by the audience

and the speakers. I came away feeling that they were decent people

holding moderate views with honesty and a certain liberality of view.

Unlike the Deutschnationale and the Volkspartei, they do not desire the

destruction of the Republic, while paying it perfunctory lip-service.

One speaker, a priest, declared emphatically against any restoration of

the monarchy, and his remarks were received with cheers. The capitalist

element was clearly unrepresented on the platform. The body of the hall

was filled with the same working-class element largely represented in

the crowds which flock on Sunday mornings to Cologne Cathedral. The

Zentrum is a strong party, and whatever electoral successes it may win

at the polls are not likely to be hostile to social reform on cautious

lines.

Very different is the position as regards the seceding body, that of

the Christliche Volkspartei. I attended a meeting of the new party, and

fell among proceedings which were refreshingly lively. It was a curious

audience, generally speaking on a plane just above working-class level,

but including more well-to-do and moneyed interests. They were not a

pleasant set of people. Some looked fanatics; others undiluted scamps.

A large number of women were present who cheered with great vigour.

Enthusiasm was boundless, but was countered at the back of the hall by

very definite opposition.

When the speakers and candidates took their place on the platform,

cheers greeted the appearance of a sinister-looking priest with

intrigue written all over him. This was the celebrated Father Kastert,

whose political activities of late have made no small stir in the

Rhineland. The various candidates got to work, and I have never heard

texts and Christian ideals hurled about a platform with such vigour,

and, according to English standards, with such entire lack of reserve.

Several of the speakers, judging by their appearance, might have

engaged in shady commerce, which made their declamations about the

supreme importance of religious education the more interesting.

Shortly after the meeting began, a blind gentleman, venerable

in appearance and with a large white beard, was shepherded with

ostentatious care on to the platform. I suspected a trophy, judging

by the exaggerated marks of respect with which he was received by

Father Kastert and his friends. He was, in fact, a leading supporter of

the Zentrum, who had seceded to the new party. The old gentleman was

propped up, and when he began to speak, despite his tottering steps and

shaking hands, proved a veritable Bull of Bashan. The Sermon on the

Mount and the Temptation in the Wilderness formed part of a political

pot-pourri mixed up with the misdeeds of the Social Democrats. I was

sitting by chance among a nest of zealots, who greeted these remarks

with hysterical applause. A youth, still wearing field grey, suddenly

jumped up in emphatic protest. General uproar resulted. “Aus mit

dem Kerl!” shouted several ladies round me. My spirits rose at the

prospect of seeing some one turned out with German thoroughness, but

the young man thought better of it, and sat down again hastily. The

chairman rang his bell, and after a time the meeting proceeded. Among

this curious company of hypocrites applauding principles clearly remote

from their practice I was struck by one working-man candidate, who

spoke with obvious sincerity as well as simplicity. No workman, he

said, could look for joy in his work unless that work were grounded in

Christ. Christ was the root, Christ was the foundation, Christ was the

workman’s stay and support. Happily in England we do not discuss the

Founder of Christianity on political platforms after the manner of this

meeting. But in this solitary case the note of sincerity rang true, and

I was grateful for it.

The candidates said their say, and then the real “turn” of the

evening began with a lengthy discourse from Father Kastert. Father

Kastert, despite all disclaimers to the contrary, is regarded as the

protagonist of the Rhineland Republic, a matter about which there are

many mutterings and murmurings in the Occupied Area. As such he is

an object of abhorrence to all patriotic Germans. Various elements

enter into the Rhineland Republic intrigue. The annexationist party

in France are naturally in favour of it; good Catholics are told that

self-determination for the Rhineland means getting rid of Prussian

Protestant officials; clericals are promised more power in a State

dominated by clerical influences; greedy financiers are heartened

by the prospect of escaping any way from the full burdens of the

indemnity. Every decent German looks on the movement as one of supreme

treachery to the Fatherland in its hour of defeat and overthrow, and on

Father Kastert as the arch-traitor.

That Father Kastert and his following are violently assailed is only

natural. His lengthy speech on this occasion took the form of an

apologia. His visit to General Mangin was only concerned with securing

a greater measure of liberty for the Rhineland during the Occupation,

and in hastening the close of the Occupation itself; away with the

abominable lie that he was in French pay and serving French ends; all

that he sought was to free the Rhineland from the Jewish influences

rampant both in Prussia and Berlin and to secure the fullest measure of

self-determination. On the whole the Father, though like all priests

a good speaker, proved less of a personality than I expected. I am

quite unable to judge how far the charges brought against him are just.

The Christliche Volkspartei is the political instrument formed by him

for carrying out his projects, whatever they may be. Father Kastert

would appear to draw his support from singularly unworthy elements in

German public life; people who are ready to traffic with the enemies of

yesterday for the sake of such bread-and-butter advantages as may be

obtained from the intercourse. A bad peace opens the door to intrigues

of many kinds. But the security of Europe or France is not to be

achieved by buffer states of the type contemplated by the supporters of

the Rhineland Republic.

The French Chauvinists who air schemes for the annexation of the

left bank of the Rhine are mischievous people. It is hard to believe

that one French person endowed with a grain of good sense could lend

an ear to so mad a proposal. Where Germany failed ignominiously

in Alsace-Lorraine, the French are hardly likely to succeed in the

Rhineland. But foolish talk of this character tends very appreciably

to exasperate and embitter German public opinion, and brings new

elements of hatred and unrest into a situation which was bad enough

already. Many Germans are convinced that France intends to spring some

annexationist coup upon them, and is only waiting for an opportunity

to strike again. Suspicions of this kind destroy any hope of improved

relations between the two countries. Goodwill can be at the best a

plant of very slow and painful growth between the nations. Intrigue

makes its existence impossible. The Rhine is German to the core in

race, language, and sentiment. Even a whisper as to the possibility

of detaching it from the rest of the country is a premium on a fresh

outbreak of anger and exasperation. The unhappy situation existing

in the Saar Basin may have its compensations if it provides an

anti-annexationist moral too strong to be disregarded.

IV

Polling day came and went. Despite a certain amount of nervous chatter

beforehand of disturbances and riots, the elections took place in

complete tranquillity. Not a dog barked through the length and breadth

of Germany. In Cologne, at least, no one would have suspected that

any event of importance was taking place. The ordinary Sunday crowds

promenaded peacefully, as is their habit, to and fro along the Rhine.

The Independent Socialists, with singular delicacy and nice feeling,

plastered the outer walls of the cathedral during the night with their

electioneering placards, and in gigantic red letters painted the

words “Wahlt Liste Fries” on the threshold of the west door. Otherwise

everything about the town was quiet and normal.

As for the result of the Election, it was very much what was to be

expected under the circumstances--a result in the highest degree

unsatisfactory, if they but knew it, to the British democracy. The

reactionaries and the extreme Socialists gained at the expense of the

moderate men. The Independent Socialists--the Unabhängige--negligible

at the last election, increased their strength four-fold, and instead

of twenty-two hold eighty-one seats in the new Reichstag. They swept

the great industrial districts of the west, an ironical commentary

on the hysterics of the English papers which insisted that the Ruhr

disturbances were a put-up job by the German Government destined to

veil a new attack on France. No less striking were the gains of the

Deutsche Volkspartei, who increased their numbers from twenty-one to

sixty-two seats. The Zentrum with sixty-eight instead of eighty-eight

seats lost substantially, but while yielding ground was not routed.

The Christliche Volkspartei was beaten off the field. The discomfiture

of Father Kastert and the upholders of the Rhineland Republic was

complete. The serious feature of the Elections was the downfall of the

Social Democrats, the largest and most influential of the three parties

forming the Müller Government. Their numbers fell from one hundred

and sixty-three to one hundred and twelve. No less complete was the

discomfiture of the Demokraten or Moderate Radicals--the left wing of

the Bourgeois parties--who at the best lived cramped and uncomfortable

lives between the Social Democrats on the one hand and the

Conservative groups on the other. Their numbers fell from seventy-five

to forty-five seats. Secrecy of the ballot does not in Germany prohibit

analysis of the totals polled, and the women’s vote taken as a whole

was clearly thrown on the reactionary side. Gratitude is not a factor

which counts in political life, and the Social Democrats to whom the

women owe their enfranchisement suffered severely at their hands.

On the morrow of the poll, therefore, the Müller Government then in

power found that its majority had disappeared, and that the Bourgeois

groups reckoned together were in a majority as compared with the two

Socialist parties. In the good old days for which many Germans sigh,

nothing would have happened in the seats of the mighty, whatever the

complexion of a Reichstag returned at a General Election. But under

the new constitution established by the revolution, a Government in

power must hold its authority from the elected representatives of the

people. Since, however, both the Zentrum and the Demokraten had been

associated with the Müller Government, a political deadlock of great

difficulty at once arose. For some days the hitherings and thitherings

between the various groups kept political Germany on the tiptoe of

excitement. The Independent Socialists held aloof and refused entirely

to be associated in any Government with the Majority Socialists. The

Majority Socialists refused with equal firmness to have anything to

do with a Cabinet in which their deadly enemies the Volkspartei would

necessarily play a leading part. The Zentrum with its sixty-eight

seats and Liberal leanings clearly held the balance of power between

the conflicting parties. The political crisis lasted for a fortnight,

during which period Germany was practically without a Government.

This state of affairs was considerably aggravated by the approach

of the Spa Conference and the necessity to have a German Cabinet in

existence with whom negotiations could be carried on. Finally, after

many days of uncertainty, a new Coalition Government emerged with Herr

Fehrenbach, the Zentrum leader, as Chancellor. The new Government is

largely Zentrum with a dash of Demokraten, but the sinister influence

of the Volkspartei is dominant in its counsels. The Government can

command no clear majority. It is confronted with a solid block of

Socialist opposition. The Social Democrats, whatever the attitude of

the Independents, are not likely to hamper the new Cabinet in vital

questions of external politics. But in daily life it will be forced to

lead the uneasy existence of playing off the various groups against

each other. It is a weak Government at a moment when strength is

essential, and such strength as it possesses is largely of the wrong

kind.

This upshot, as I see it, is wholly devoid of comfort to any one who

desires the rehabilitation of Germany on right lines. The election is

the writing on the wall which even at the eleventh hour should command

the attention of the little ring of politicians who control the Entente

policy. This shifting of German opinion to the right and to the left is

an ominous sign. The party standing for ordered democratic development

has been knocked out. The British public should try to realise it has

been killed by the Allied policy. That it was worth supporting is

proved by the fact that, despite heavy losses, the Social Democrats

still remain the largest individual group in the new Reichstag. We

have refused to discriminate between the good and bad elements in

political Germany. Our hand has rested as heavily on a democratic as

it would rightly have done on a Junker Government. The shackles forged

by the Allies have in the first place reduced the only administration

to impotence to which they could look for the fulfilment of the just

demands of a revised Treaty. Economic and political recovery has

been made an impossibility owing to the policy pursued. As a result,

hunger, despair, and general misery have driven large sections of the

working-classes into the arms of the Communists. They have lost faith

and hope in a constitutional party whose weakness has been so great.

They are out for the short cut of violent means in order to better

conditions which they regard as intolerable.

Meanwhile the Deutsche Volkspartei and all the wealthy and reactionary

elements in the country have been no less eager to stamp upon the

smoking flax of a democratic Germany. On the Friday and Saturday

before the poll I attended meetings respectively of the Volkspartei

and the Social Democrats. In each case speeches were made typical of

the two sets of ideas at war in Germany to-day. On this occasion the

Volkspartei speakers hardly took the trouble to camouflage their real

opinions, though one pastor spoke eloquently of the “Liberalisms”

of which they were the guardians--a claim which moved me to secret

mirth. The arguments were developed on the same lines as those I have

described above, only on this occasion the cloven hoof was still

more obvious. The revolution and the Republic were the root causes

of Germany’s present misery. The view of the Volkspartei that a

Constitutional Monarchy was the best form of government was unchanged,

though they “accepted” the Republic. Soon they hoped the old red and

white and black colours would wave over them again--a remark which

roused frantic applause from the large and enthusiastic audience.

Internationalism and the League of Nations were condemned in unsparing

terms. Who were the Allies to advance these principles? Let them cease

to boycott Germans in all parts of the world, and let France bring to

an end the scandal of her black troops in the Occupied Areas. Then they

might begin to talk about internationalism. As for England, no country

pursued its policy with more consistent and single-eyed devotion to its

own interests. Germany could only be remade on the basis of a strong

and efficient nationalism. A new spirit was abroad in the land and,

granted the defeat of the Socialists and Social Democrats, all that had

been lost might be regained.

Very different was the tone and temper of the meeting of the Social

Democrats on the following night. From first to last not one word was

said with which I, as an English Liberal, was out of harmony. Any

democratic audience in Great Britain would have found itself in entire

sympathy with the general views expressed. The audience was typically

working-class; quiet, orderly people, who made on me an unmistakable

impression of underfeeding and suffering. The shabby field-grey

uniforms converted to civilian use served to heighten the curious

earthen look noticeable on so many faces here. Food is plentiful now

in the Occupied Area, but the cost of living is so high, many families

remain ill-nourished. Fresh milk is unobtainable; during the many

months I have been in Cologne I have never seen a drop. Over and over

again the same question is driven home with overwhelming force: can

even the most volatile and opportunist of politicians imagine that the

unspecified millions of the indemnity, or, indeed, any indemnity at

all, can be collected from a nation which is not in a position to eat

or work?

Herr Meerfeld, the leader of the Social Democrats in Cologne, and Frau

Röhl were the principal speakers at this final gathering. Both were

members of the National Assembly; Frau Röhl unfortunately has not

survived the deluge which has overwhelmed many of her colleagues. A

capable-looking woman with golden hair, she reminded me a little of

Mary Macarthur, though lacking in the magnetism and stature, moral no

less than physical, of the English trade-union leader. Herr Meerfeld’s

speech was a merciless indictment of the former militarist Government

and its colossal blunders in connection with the war. In his first

words he struck the keynote of all that followed: “We will have no more

war. What we want in future is a ‘Peace-Kultur’”--that untranslatable

word which in so many varied forms finds its place in the political

utterances of all parties--“we seek a revision of the Treaty of

Versailles, but we seek it through a policy of reconciliation and

understanding with the democracies in other countries.” The failures

of the military party to make peace when an honourable peace was still

possible, the rejection of President Wilson’s offers of mediation,

the folly and crime of the unrestricted U-boat campaign--all these

subjects were handled in a spirit which astonished me. A pamphlet on

sale at the meeting, “Wer trägt die Schuld an unserem Elend?” (Who

bears the responsibility for our misery?), of which I bought a copy,

was packed with a damning array of facts, many of them unknown to me,

as to the part played by the Kaiser’s Government during the war. “The

German people have been lied to, and deceived, and betrayed,” cried the

speaker. “We were told that the U-boat campaign would bring England

to her knees in three months!” German mentality is a baffling thing,

but I hardly expected that this remark would be received with shouts

of good-natured laughter. The long arm of England’s sea-power has been

no laughing matter for Germany, but throughout this campaign I was

specially struck with the absence of hostility shown to England. Even

at the Volkspartei meetings I listened in vain for the note which shows

itself unmistakable when an audience is deeply roused. The justice and

fair dealing which have marked the British Occupation have contributed

primarily to this end.

A quaint little woman dressed in black came on to the platform to make

a few remarks during the discussion. At first she was almost inaudible,

but her voice gathered force and courage as she proceeded. She had

been a Red Cross nurse during the war, so she said. Nothing could have

been more scandalous than the pilfering by the officers in charge of

stores and comforts destined for wounded men. She had to stand by

helplessly and watch robbery and corruption of all kinds going on at

the expense of the sufferers. “These heroes who filled their pockets,”

she concluded naïvely, “always declared they were great patriots.

Please vote to-morrow for the patriotism of the Social Democrats, which

won’t rob sick men.” Even more pathetic was the appeal of a working-man

on whom disease had clearly laid a fatal hand. He addressed the meeting

as “dear brothers and sisters,” which raised a laugh. But there was

nothing comic about the few words spoken. He had starved, so he said,

during the war. Wars meant nothing but misery and starvation. Let them

support the Social Democrats and then there would be no more war. He

was followed by a Communist youth, who in languid and superior tones

struck the first note of dissent by adjuring those present at the

meeting not to vote at all. If, however, they felt irresistibly driven

to the polls, the only mitigation of a bad act would be to vote for

the Independent Socialists. General uproar resulted from this advice,

a fat man near me rising from his seat and shouting with fury, “I know

how you’ll vote. You’re the sort that votes Zentrum.” The Communist

highbrow did not stop to see the end of the storm he had provoked, but,

having said his say, discreetly fled before Herr Meerfeld could deliver

a highly chastening reply. He left the hall pursued by the execrations

of my neighbour, who showed signs of vaulting over the chairs and

continuing the argument in more forcible fashion in the street. The

general tone of the meeting, apart from this incident, was serious and

appreciative, but it lacked any of that electric quality which thrills

a party on the eve of victory. I came away uneasy as to the result--an

uneasiness more than justified by the issue.

As for the future, it lies, as I write, on the knees of dark and

doubtful gods. The British people found it hard to acquire the habit

of war and to make war thoroughly. To-day it seems as hard a task to

recover the habit of peace and make peace thoroughly. As I have said

before, so long as we persist in regarding Germany as a political

unit solidly inspired by the old military spirit, and of using a

sledge-hammer to it on all occasions, the resettlement of Europe

becomes an impossibility. The moral of the Kapp Putsch has been

completely ignored in Allied countries. Yet it was highly suggestive as

to the changed conditions which now rule. A militarist plot was nipped

in the bud by the German working-classes who retaliated with the weapon

of a general strike. I do not know what better proof of good faith the

German democrats could have given as to their determination to have no

more to do with the old régime. The cry of “give us back our Junkers”

will never arise unless democracy itself is wholly discredited. We can

take no risks with Germany, and there is no question of her escape

from the penalties of the war she provoked, and the burdens which in

consequence she must bear. Common-sense points, however, to the Allies

giving a fair chance to the democratic elements from whom, and from

whom alone, we have anything to hope as regards the future. We may make

Germany’s burden impossible, in which case, sooner or later, general

collapse and chaos must follow--chaos and collapse which will certainly

not be confined within the borders of this country. Or we may make the

burden possible, and not deny a place for repentance to the men and

women who are struggling against heavy odds to remake their country on

principles which are the basis of our own freedom.

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