CHAP. VI.

_Of Pantheism; or of the Natural Ideas of the Divinity._

The false principle that matter is not self-existent; that by its nature

it is in an impossibility to move itself; consequently incompetent to

the production of those striking phenomena which arrest our wondering

eyes in the wide expanse of the universe; it will be obvious, to all who

seriously attend to what has preceded, is the origin of the proofs

upon which theology rests the existence of immateriality. After these

suppositions, as gratuitous as they are erroneous, the fallacy of which

we have exposed elsewhere, it has been believed that matter did not

always exist, but that its existence, as well as its motion, is a

production of time; due to a cause distinguished from itself; to an

unknown agent to whom it is subordinate. As man finds in his own species

a quality which he calls intelligence, which presides over all his

actions, by the aid of which he arrives at the end he proposes to

himself; he has clothed this invisible agent with this quality, which

he has extended beyond the limits of his own conception: he magnified it

thus, because, having made him the author of effects of which he found

himself incapable, he did not conceive it possible that the intelligence

he himself possessed, unless it was prodigiously amplified, would

be sufficient to account for those productions, to which his erring

judgment led him to conclude the natural energy of physical causes were

not adequate.

As this agent was invisible, as his mode of action was inconceivable, he

made him a spirit, a word that really means nothing more than that he

is ignorant of his essence, or that he acts like the breath of which

he cannot trace the motion. Thus, in speaking of spirituality, he

designated an occult quality, which he deemed suitable to a concealed

being, whose mode of action was always imperceptible to the senses. It

would appear, however, that originally the word spirit was not meant to

designate immateriality; but a matter of a more subtile nature than

that which acted coarsely on the organs: still of a nature capable

of penetrating the grosser matter--of communicating to it

motion--of instilling into it active life--of giving birth to those

combinations--of imparting to them those modifications, which his

organic structure rendered him competent to discover. Such was, as

has been shewn, that all-powerful Jupiter, who in the theology of the

ancients, was originally destined to represent the etherial, subtile

matter that penetrates, vivifies, and gives activity to all the bodies

of which nature is the common assemblage.

It would be grossly deceiving ourselves to believe that the idea of

spirituality, such as the subtilty of dreaming metaphysicians present it

in these days, was that which offered itself to our forefathers in the

early stages of the human mind. This immateriality, which excludes all

analogy with any thing but itself--which bears no resemblance to any

thing of which man is capacitated to have a knowledge, was, as we have

already observed, the slow, the tardy fruit of his imagination, after

he had quitted experience, and renounced his reason. Men reared in

luxurious leisure, unceasingly meditating, without the assistance

of those natural helps with which attentive observation would

have furnished them, by degrees arrived at the formation of this

incomprehensible quality, which is so fugitive, that although man has

been compelled to reverence it, to accredit it against all the evidence

of his senses, they have never yet been enabled to give any other

explanation of its nature, than by using a term to which it is

impossible to attach any intelligible idea. Seraphis said, with tears

in his eyes, "that in making him adopt the opinion of spirituality, they

had deprived him of his God." Many fathers of the church have given a

human form to the Divinity, and treated all those as heretics who made

him spiritual. Thus by dint of reasoning, by force of subtilizing, the

word spirit no longer presents any one image upon which the mind can fix

itself; when they are desirous to speak of it, it becomes impossible

to understand them, seeing that each visionary paints it after his own

manner; and in the portrait he forms, consults only his own temperament,

follows nothing but his own imagination, adopts nothing but his own

peculiar reveries; the only point in which they are at all in unison, is

in assigning to it inconceivable qualities, which they naturally

enough believe are best suited to the incomprehensible beings they have

delineated: from the incompatible heap of these qualities, generally

resulted a whole, whose existence they thus rendered impossible. In

short, this word, which has occupied the research of so many learned and

intelligent men; which is considered of such importance to mankind, has

been, in consequence of theological reveries, always fluctuating:

these never bearing the least resemblance to each other, it has become

destitute of any fixed sense, a mere sound, to which each who echoes it

affixes his own peculiar ideas, which are never in harmony with those of

his neighbour; which indeed are not even steady in himself, but like

the camelion, assume the colour of every differing circumstance. This

unintelligible word has been substituted for the more intelligible

one of matter; man, when clothed with power, has entertained the most

rancorous antipathies, pursued the most barbarous persecutions, against

those who have not been enabled to contemplate this changeable idea

under the same point of view with himself.

There have, however, been men who had sufficient courage to resist this

torrent of opinion--to oppose themselves to this delirium; who have

believed, that the object which was announced as the most important

for mortals, as the sole object worthy of their thoughts, demanded an

attentive examination; who apprehended that if experience could be of

any utility, if judgment could afford any advantage, if reason was of

any use whatever, it must, most unquestionably be, to consider this

quality so opposed to every thing in nature, which was said to regulate

all the beings which she contains. These quickly saw they could not

subscribe to the general opinion of the uninformed, who never examine

any thing, who take every thing upon the credit of others; much less was

it consistent with sound sense to agree with their guides, who, either

deceivers or deceived, forbade others to submit it to the scrutiny of

reason; who were themselves frequently in an utter incapacity to pass it

under such an ordeal. Thus some thinkers, disgusted with the obscure

and contradictory notions which others had through habit mechanically

attached to this incomprehensible property, had the temerity to shake

off the yoke which had been imposed upon them from their infancy:

calling reason to their aid against those terrors with which they

alarmed the ignorant, revolting at the hideous descriptions under which

they attempted to defend their hypothesis, they had the intrepidity to

tear the veil of delusion; to rend asunder the barriers of imposture;

they considered with calm resolution, this formidable prejudice,

contemplated with a serene eye this unsupported opinion, examined with

cool deliberation this fluctuating notion, which had become the object

of all the hopes, the source of all the fears, the spring of all the

quarrels which distracted the mind, and disturbed the harmony of blind,

confiding mortals.

The result of these inquiries has uniformly been, a conviction that no

rational proof has ever been adduced in support of this hypothesis;

that from the nature of the thing itself, none can be offered; that

an incorporeity is inconceivable to corporeal beings; that these only

behold nature acting after invariable laws, in which every thing is

material; that all the phenomena of which the world is the theatre,

spring out of natural causes; that man as well as all the other beings

is the work or this nature, is only an instrument in her hand, obliged

to accomplish the eternal decrees of an imperious necessity.

Whatever efforts the philosopher makes to penetrate the secrets of

nature, he never finds more, as we have many times repeated, than

matter; various in itself, diversely modified in consequence of the

motion it undergoes. Its whole, as well as its parts, displays only

necessary causes producing necessary effects, which flow necessarily

one out of the other: of which the mind, aided by experience, is more

or less competent to discover the concatenation. In virtue of their

specific properties, all the beings that come under our review,

gravitate towards a centre--attract analogous matter--repel that which

is unsuitable to combination--mutually receive and give impulse--acquire

qualities--undergo modifications which maintain them in existence for a

season--are born and dissolved by the operation of an inexorable

decree, that obliges every thing, we behold to pass into a new mode of

existence. It is to these continued vicissitudes that are to be

ascribed all the phenomena, whether trivial or of magnitude; ordinary

or extraordinary; known or unknown; simple or complicated; which are

operated in the universe. It is by these mutations alone that we have

any knowledge of nature: she is only mysterious to those who contemplate

her through the veil of prejudice: her course is always simple to those

who look at her without prepossession.

To attribute the effects to which we are witnesses, to nature, to

matter, variously combined with the motion that is inherent to it, is

to give them an intelligible and known cause; to attempt to penetrate

deeper, is to plunge ourselves into imaginary regions, where we find

only a chaos of obscurities--where we are lost in an unfathomable abyss

of incertitude. Let us then be content with contemplating nature, who,

being self-existent, must in her essence possess motion; which cannot

be conceived without properties, from which result perpetual action

and re-action; or those continual efforts which give birth to such a

numerous train of circumstances; in which a single molecule cannot be

found, that does not necessarily occupy the place assigned to it, by

immutable and necessary laws--that is for an instant in an absolute

state of repose. What necessity can there exist to seek out of matter

for a power to give it play, since its motion flows as necessarily out

of its existence as its bulk, its form, its gravity, &c. since nature in

inaction would no longer be nature?

If it be demanded, How can we figure to ourselves, that matter by its

own peculiar energy can produce all the effects we witness? I shall

reply, that if by matter it is obstinately determined to understand

nothing but a dead, inert mass, destitute of every property, incapable

of moving itself, we shall no longer have a single idea of matter; we

shall no longer be able to account for any thing. As soon, however,

as it exists, it must have properties; as soon as it has properties,

without which it could not exist, it must act by virtue of those

properties; since it is only by its action we can have a knowledge of

its existence, be conscious of its properties. It is evident that if

by matter be understood that which it is not, or if its existence

be denied, those phenomena which strike our visual organs cannot be

attributed to it. But if by nature be understood (that which she really

is), an heap of existing matter, possessing various properties, we shall

be obliged to acknowledge that nature must be competent to move herself;

by the diversity of her motion, must have the capability, independent

of foreign aid, to produce the effects we behold; we shall find that

nothing can be made from nothing; that nothing is made by chance; that

the mode of action of every particle of matter, however minute, is

necessarily determined by its own peculiar, or by its individual

properties.

We have elsewhere said, that that which cannot be annihilated--that

which in its nature is indestructible--cannot have been inchoate, cannot

have had a beginning to its existence, but exists necessarily from all

eternity; contains within itself a sufficient cause for its own peculiar

existence. It becomes then perfectly useless to seek out of nature a

cause for her action which is in some respects known to us; with which

indefatigable research may, judging of the future by the past, render us

more familiar. As we know some of the general properties of matter;

as we can discover some of its qualities, wherefore should we seek its

motion in an unintelligible cause, of which we are not in a condition to

become acquainted with any one of its properties? Can we conceive that

immateriality could ever draw matter from its own source? Impossible; it

is not within the grasp of human intellect. If creation is an eduction

from nothing, there must have been a time when matter had not existence;

there must consequently be a time when it will cease to be: this latter

is acknowledged by many theologians themselves to be impossible. Do

those who are continually talking of this mysterious act of omnipotence,

by which a mass of matter has been, all at once, substituted to nothing,

perfectly understand what they tell us? Is there a man on earth who

conceives that a being devoid of extent can exist, become the cause of

the existence of beings who have extent--act upon matter--draw it

from his own peculiar essence--set it in motion? In truth, the more we

consider theology, the more we must be convinced that it has invented

words destitute of sense; substituted sounds to intelligible realities.

For want of consulting experience, for want or studying nature, for

want of examining the material world, we have plunged ourselves into an

intellectual vacuum, which we have peopled with chimeras, We have not

stooped to consider matter, to study its different periods, to follow it

through its numerous, changes. We have either ridiculously or knavishly

confounded dissolution, decomposition, the separation of the elementary

particles of bodies, with their radical destruction; we have been

unwilling to see that the elements are indestructible; although the

forms are fleeting, and depend upon transitory combination. We have

not distinguished the change of figure, the alteration of position, the

mutation of texture, to which matter is liable, from its annihilation,

which is impossible; we have falsely concluded, that matter Was not a

necessary being--that it commenced to exist--that this existence was

derived from that which possessed nothing in common with itself--that

that which was not substance, could give birth to that which is. Thus an

unintelligible name has been substituted for matter, which furnishes us

with true ideas of nature; of which at each instant we experience the

influence, of which we undergo the action, of which we feel the power,

and of which we should have a much better knowledge, if our abstract

opinions did not continually fasten a bandage over our eyes.

Indeed the most simple notions of philosophy shew us, that, although

bodies change and disappear, nothing is however lost in nature; the

various produce of the decomposition of a body serves for elements,

supplies materials, forms the basis, lays the foundation for accretions,

contributes to the maintenance of other bodies. The whole of nature

subsists, and is conserved only by the circulation, the transmigration,

the exchange, the perpetual displacement of insensible atoms--the

continual mutation of the sensible combinations of matter. It is by

this palingenesia, this regeneration, that the great whole, the mighty

macrocosm subsists; who, like the Saturn of the ancients, is perpetually

occupied with devouring her own children.

It will not then be inconsistent with observation, repugnant to reason,

contrary to good sense, to acknowledge that matter is self-existent;

that it acts by an energy peculiar to itself; that it will never be

annihilated. Let us then say, that matter is eternal; that nature has

been, is, and ever will be occupied with producing and destroying;

with doing and undoing; with combining and separating; in short, with

following a system of laws resulting from its necessary existence. For

every thing that she doth, she needs only to combine the elements of

matter; these, essentially diverse, necessarily either attract or repel

each other; come into collision, from whence results either their

union or dissolution; by the same laws that one approximates, the other

recedes from their respective spheres of action. It is thus that she

brings forth plants, fossils, animals, men; thus she gives existence

to organized, sensible, thinking beings, as well as to those who are

destitute of either feeling or thought. All these act for the season of

their respective duration, according to immutable laws, determined by

their various properties; arising out of their configuration; depending

on their masses; resulting from their ponderosity, &c. Here is the true

origin of every thing which is presented to our view; this indicates

the mode by which nature, according to her own peculiar powers, is in

a state to produce all those astonishing effects which assail our

wondering eyes; all that phenomena to which mankind is the witness; as

well as all the bodies who act diversely upon the organs with which

he is furnished, of which he can only judge according to the manner in

which these organs are affected. He says they are good, when they are

analogous to his own mode of existence--when they contribute to the

maintenance of the harmony of his machine: he says they are bad, when

they disturb this harmony. It is thus he ascribes views, ideas, designs,

to the being he supposes to be the power by which nature is moved;

although all the experience we are able to collect, unequivocally

proves, that she acts after an invariable, eternal code of laws.

Nature is destitute of those views which actuate man; she acts

necessarily, because she exists: her system is immutable, and founded

upon the essence of things. It is the essence of the seed of the

male, composed of primitive elements, which serve for the basis of an

organized being, to unite itself with that of the female; to fructify

it; to produce, by this combination, a new organized being; who, feeble

in his origin, not having yet acquired a sufficient quantity of material

particles to give him consistence, corroborates himself by degrees;

strengthens himself by the daily accretion of analogous matter; is

nourished by the modifications appropriate to his existence: matured

by the continuation of circumstances calculated to give vigour to

his frame; thus he lives, thinks, acts, engenders in his turn other

organized beings similar to himself. By a consequence of his temperament

and of physical laws, this generation does not take place, except when

the circumstances necessary to its production find themselves united.

Thus this procreation is not operated by chance; the animal does not

fructify, but with an animal of his own species, because this is the

only one analogous to himself, who unites the qualities, who combines

the circumstances, suitable to produce a being resembling himself;

without this he would not produce any thing, or he would only give

birth to a being who would be denominated a monster, because it would be

dissimilar to himself. It is of the essence of the grain of plants, to

be impregnated by the pollen or seed of the stygma of the flower; in

this state of copulation they in consequence develope themselves in

the bowels of the earth; expand by the aid of water; shoot forth by

the accession of heat; attract analogous particles to corroborate their

system: thus by degrees they form a plant, a shrub, a tree, susceptible

of that life, filled with that motion, capable of that action which

is suitable to vegetable existence. It is of the essence of particular

particles of earth, homogeneous in their nature, when separated by

circumstances, attenuated by water, elaborated by heat, to unite

themselves in the bosom of mountains, with other atoms which are

analogous; to form by their aggregation, according to their various

affinities, those bodies possessing more or less solidity; having more

or less purity, which are called diamonds, chrystals, stones, metals,

minerals. It is of the essence of exhalations raised by the heat of

the atmosphere, to combine, to collect themselves, to dash against each

other, and either by their union or their collision to produce meteors,

to generate thunder. It is of the essence of some inflammable matter

to gather itself together, to ferment in the caverns of the earth, to

increase its active force by augmenting its heat, and then explode,

by the accession of other matter suitable to the operation, with that

tremendous force which we call earthquakes; by which mountains are

destroyed; cities overturned; the inhabitants of the plains thrown into

a state of consternation; these full of alarm, unused to meditate on

natural effects, unconscious of the extent of physical powers, stretch

forth their hands in dismay, heave the most desponding sighs, utter

aloud their complaints, and earnestly implore a cessation of those

evils, which nature, acting by necessary laws, obliges them to

experience as necessarily as she does those benefits by which she fills

them with the most extravagant joy. In short, it is of the essence of

certain climates to produce men so organized, whose temperament is so

modified, that they become either extremely useful or very prejudicial

to their species, in the same manner as it is the property of certain

portions of the land, to bring forth either delicious fruits or

dangerous poisons.

In all this nature acts necessarily; she pursues an undeviating course,

which we are bound to consider the perfection of wisdom; because she

exists necessarily, has her modes of action determined by certain,

invariable laws, which themselves flow out of the constituent properties

of the various beings she contains, and those circumstances, which the

eternal motion she is in must necessarily bring about. It is ourselves

who have a necessary aim, which is our own conservation; it is by this

that we regulate all the ideas we form to ourselves of the causes acting

in nature; it is according to this standard we judge of every thing

we see or feel. Animated ourselves, existing after a certain manner,

possessing a soul endowed with rare and peculiar qualities, we, like the

savage, ascribe a soul and animated life to every thing that acts upon

us. Thinking and intelligent ourselves, we give these, faculties to

those beings whom we suppose to be more powerful than mortals; but as we

see the generality of matter incapable of modifying itself, we suppose

it must receive its impulse from some concealed agent, some external

cause, which our imagination pictures as similar to ourselves.

Necessarily attracted by that which is advantageous to us, repelling by

an equal necessity that which is prejudicial to our manner of existence;

we cease to reflect that our modes of feeling are due to our peculiar

organization, modified by physical causes: in this state, either of

inattention or ignorance, we mistake the natural results of our own

peculiar structure, for instruments employed by a being whom we clothe

with our own passions--whom we suppose actuated by our own views--who,

possessing our ideas, embraces a mode of thinking and acting similar to

ourselves.

If after this it be asked, What is the end of nature? We shall reply

that on this head we are ignorant; that it is more than probable no man

will ever fathom the secret; but we shall also say, it is evidently to

exist, to act, to conserve her whole. If then it be demanded, Wherefore

she exists? We shall again reply, of this we know nothing at present,

possibly never shall; but we shall also say, she exists necessarily,

that her operations, her motion, her phenomena, are the necessary

consequences of her necessary existence. There necessarily exists

something; this is nature or the universe, this nature necessarily acts

as she does. If it be wished to substitute any other word for nature,

the question will still remain as it did, as to the cause of her

existence; the end she has in view. It is not by changing of terms that

a geometrician can solve problems; one word will throw no more light

on a subject than another, unless that word carries a certain degree

of conviction in the ideas which it generates. As long as we speak of

matter, if we cannot develope all its properties, we shall at least have

fixed, determinate ideas; something tangible, of which we have a slight

knowledge, that we can submit to the examination of our senses: but

from the moment we begin to talk of immateriality, of incorporeity,

from thence our ideas become confused; we are lost in a labyrinth of

conjecture--we have no one means of seizing the subject on any

side--we are, after the most elaborate arguments, after the most subtle

reasoning, obliged to acknowledge we cannot form the most slender

opinion respecting it, that has any thing substantive for its support.

In short, that it is precisely that thing "of which every thing may be

denied, but of which nothing can with truth be affirmed." Let us clothe

this incomprehensible being with whatever qualities we may, it will be

always in ourselves we seek the model; they will be our own faculties

that we delineate, our own passions that we describe. In like manner

man, as long as he is ignorant, will always conjecture that it is for

himself alone the universe was formed; not withstanding, he has nothing

more to do, than to open his eyes in order to be undeceived. He will

then see, that he undergoes a common destiny, equally partakes with all

other beings of the benefits, shares with them without exception the

evils of life; like them he is submitted to an imperious necessity,

inexorable in its decrees; which is itself nothing more than the sum

total of those laws which nature herself is obliged to follow.

Thus every thing proves that nature, or matter, exists necessarily; that

it cannot in any moment swerve from those laws imposed upon it by its

existence. If it cannot be annihilated, it cannot have been inchoate.

The theologian himself agrees that it requires a miracle to annihilate

an atom. But is it possible to derogate from the necessary laws of

existence? Can that which exists necessarily, act but according to the

laws peculiar to itself? Miracle is another word invented to shield our

own sloth, to cover our own ignorance; it is that by which we wish to

designate those rare occurrences, those solitary effects of natural

causes, whose infrequency do not afford us means of diving into their

springs. It is only saying by another expression, that an unknown cause

hath by modes which we cannot trace, produced an uncommon effect which

we did not expect, which therefore appears strange to us. This granted,

the intervention of words, far from removing the ignorance in which we

found ourselves with respect to the power and capabilities of nature,

only serves to augment it, to give it more durability. The creation

of matter becomes to our mind as incomprehensible, and appears as

impossible as its annihilation.

Let us then conclude that all those words which do not present to the

mind any determinate idea, ought to be banished the language of those

who are desirous of speaking so as to be understood; that abstract

terms, invented by ignorance, are only calculated to satisfy men

destitute of experience; who are too slothful to study nature, too timid

to search into her ways; that they are suitable only to content those

enthusiasts, whose curious imagination pleases itself with making

fruitless endeavours to spring beyond the visible world; who occupy

themselves with chimeras of their own creation: in short, that these

words are useful only to those whose sole profession it is to feed the

ears of the uninformed with pompous sounds, that are not comprehended

by themselves--upon the sense of which they are in a state of perpetual

hostility with each other--upon the true meaning of which they have

never yet been able to come to a common agreement; which each sees after

his own peculiar manner of contemplating objects, in which there never

was, nor probably never will be, the least harmony of feeling.

Man is a material being; he cannot consequently have any ideas, but of

that which like himself is material; that is to say, of that which is

in a capacity to act upon his organs, which has some qualities analogous

with his own. In despite of himself, he always assigns material

properties to his gods; the impossibility he finds in compassing them,

has made him suppose them to be spiritual; distinguished from the

material world. Indeed he, must be content, either not to understand

himself, or he must have material ideas of the Divinity; the human mind

may torture itself as long as it pleases, it will never, after all its

efforts, be enabled to comprehend, that material effects can emanate

from immaterial causes; or that such causes can have any relation with

material beings. Here is the reason why man, as we have seen, believes

himself obliged to give to his gods, these morals which he so much so

highly esteems, in those beings of his race, who are fortunate enough

to possess them: he forgets that a being who is spiritual, adopting the

theological hypothesis, cannot from thence either have his organization,

or his ideas; that it cannot think in his mode, nor act after his

manner; that consequently it cannot possess what he calls intelligence,

wisdom, goodness, anger, justice, &c. as he himself understands those

terms. Thus, in truth, the moral qualities with which he has clothed

the Divinity, supposes him material, and the most abstract

theological notions, are, after all, founded upon a direct, undeniable

_Anthropomorphism_.

In despite of all their subtilties, the theologians cannot do otherwise;

like all the beings of the human species, they have a knowledge of

matter alone: they have no real idea of a pure spirit. When they speak

of the intelligence, of the wisdom, of the designs of their gods, they

are always those of men which they describe, that they obstinately

persist in giving to beings, of which, according to their own shewing,

to the evidence they themselves adduce, their essence does not render

them susceptible; who if they had those qualities with which they clothe

them, would from that very moment cease to be incorporeal; would be in

the truest sense of the word, substantive matter. How shall we reconcile

the assertion, that beings who have not occasion for any thing--who are

sufficient to them selves--whose projects must be executed as soon as

they are formed; can have volition, passions, desires? How shall we

attribute anger to beings without either blood or bile? How can we

conceive an omnipotent being (whose wisdom we admire in the striking

order he has himself established in the universe,) can permit that this

beautiful arrangement should be continually disturbed, either by the

elements in discord, or by the crimes of human beings? In short, this

being cannot have any one of the human qualities, which always depend

upon the peculiar organization of man--upon his wants--upon his

institutions, which are themselves always relative to the society

in which he lives. The theologian vainly strives to aggrandize, to

exaggerate in idea, to carry to perfection by dint of abstraction, the

moral qualities of man; they are unsuitable to the Divinity; in vain it

is asserted they are in him of a different nature from what they are

in his creatures; that they are perfect; infinite; supreme; eminent; in

holding this language, they no longer understand themselves; they can

have no one idea of the qualities they are describing, seeing that

man can never have a conception of them, but inasmuch as they bear an

analogy to the same qualities in himself.

It is thus that by force of metaphysical subtilty, mortals have no

longer any fixed, any determinate idea of the beings to which they have

given birth. But little contented with understanding physical causes,

with contemplating active nature; weary of examining matter, which

experience proves is competent to the production of every thing, man

has been desirous to despoil it of the energy which it is its essence

to possess, in order to invest it in a pure spirit; in an immaterial

substance; which he is under the necessity of re-making a material

being, whenever he has an inclination either to form an idea of it to

himself, or make it understood by others. In assembling the parts

of man, which he does no more than enlarge, which he swells out to

infinity, he believes he forms an immaterial being, who, for that

reason, acquires the capability of performing all those phenomena, with

the true causes of which he is ignorant; nevertheless those operations

of which he does comprehend the spring, he as sedulously denies to be

due to the powers of this being; time, therefore, according to these

ideas, as he advances the progress of science, as he further developes

the secrets of nature, is continually diminishing the number of actions

ascribed to this being--is constantly circumscribing his sphere of

action. It is upon the model of the human soul that he forms the soul

of nature, or that secret agent from which she receives impulse. After

having made himself double, he makes nature in like manner twofold, and

then he supposes she is vivified by an intelligence, which he borrows

from himself, Placed in an impossibility of becoming acquainted with

this agent, as well as with that which he has gratuitously distinguished

from his own body; he has invented the word spiritual to cover up

his ignorance; which is only in other words avowing it is a substance

entirely unknown to him. From that moment, however, he has no ideas

whatever of what he himself has done; because he first clothes it with

all the qualities he esteems in his fellows, and then destroys them by

an assurance, that they in no wise resemble the qualities he has been

so anxious to bestow. To remedy this inconvenience, he concludes this

spiritual substance much more noble than matter; that its prodigious

subtilty, which he calls simplicity, but which is only the effect

of metaphysical abstraction, secures it from decomposition, from

dissolution, from all those revolutions, to which material bodies, as

produced by nature, are evidently exposed.

It is thus, that man always prefers the marvellous to the simple; the

unintelligible to the intelligible; that which he cannot comprehend, to

that which is within the range of his understanding; he despises those

objects which are familiar to him; he estimates those alone with which

he is incapable of having any intercourse: that of which he has only

confused vague ideas, he concludes must contain something important for

him to know--must have something supernatural in its construction.

In short, he needs mystery to move his imagination--to exercise his

mind--to feed his curiosity; which never labours harder, than when it is

occupied with enigmas impossible to be guessed at; which from that very

circumstance, he judges to be extremely worthy of his research.

This, without doubt, is the reason he looks upon matter, which he

has continually under his eyes, which he sees perpetually in action,

eternally changing its form, as a contemptible thing--as a contingent

being, that does not exist necessarily; consequently, that cannot exist

independently: this is the reason why he has imagined a spirit, which he

will never be able to conceive; which on that account he declares to be

superior to matter; which he roundly asserts to be anterior to nature,

and the only self-existent being. The human wind found food in these

mystical ideas, they unceasingly occupied it; the imagination had play,

it embellished them after its own manner: ignorance fed itself with the

fables to which these mysteries gave rise; habit identified them with

the existence of man himself: when each could ask the other concerning

these ideas, without any one being in a capacity to return a direct

answer, he felt himself gratified, he immediately concluded that the

general impossibility of reply stamped them with the wondrous faculty

of immediately interesting his welfare; of involving his most prominent

interests, more than all the things put together, with which he had

any possible means of becoming intimately acquainted. Thus they became

necessary to his happiness; he believed he fell into a vacuum without

them; he became the decided enemy to all those who endeavoured to lead

him back to nature, which he had learned to despise; to consider only as

an impotent mass, an heap of inert matter, not possessing any energy

but what it received from causes exterior to itself; as a contemptible

assemblage of fragile combinations, whose forms were continually subject

to perish.

In distinguishing nature from her mover, man has fallen into the same

absurdity as when he separated his soul from his body; life from the

living being; the faculty of thought from the thinking being: deceived

on his own peculiar nature, having taken up an erroneous opinion upon

the energy of his own organs, he has in like manner been deceived upon

the organization of the universe; he has distinguished nature from

herself; the life of nature from living nature; the action of nature

from active nature. It was this soul of the world--this energy of

nature--this principle of activity, which man first personified, then

separated by abstraction; sometimes decorated with imaginary attributes;

sometimes with qualities borrowed from his own peculiar essence. Such

were the aerial materials of which man availed himself to construct the

incomprehensible, immaterial substances, which have filled the world

with disputes--which have divided man from his fellow--which to this day

he has never been able to define, even to his own satisfaction. His own

soul was the model. Deceived upon the nature of this, he never had any

just ideas of the Divinity, who was, in his mind, nothing more than a

copy exaggerated or disfigured to that degree, as to make him mistake

the prototype upon which it had been originally formed.

If, because man has distinguished himself from his own existence, it has

been impossible for him ever to form to himself any true idea of his

own nature; it is also because he has distinguished nature from herself,

that both herself and her ways have been mistaken. Man has ceased to

study nature, that he might, recur by thought to a substance which

possesses nothing in common with her; this substance he has made the

mover of nature, without which she would not be capable of any thing; to

whom every thing that takes place in her system, must be attributed;

the conduct of this being has appeared mysterious, has been held up as

marvellous, because he seemed to be a continual contradiction: when if

man had but recurred to the immutability of the laws of nature, to the

invariable system she pursues, all would have appeared intelligible;

every thing would have been reconciled; the apparent contrariety

would have vanished. By thus taking a wrong view of things, wisdom and

intelligence appeared to be opposed by confusion and disorder; goodness

to be rendered nugatory by evil; while all is only just what it must

inevitably be, under the given circumstances. In consequence of these

erroneous opinions, in the place of applying himself to the study of

nature, to discover the method of obtaining her favors, or to seek the

means of throwing aside his misfortunes; in the room of consulting his

experience; in lieu of labouring usefully to his own happiness; he has

been only occupied with expecting these things by channels through

which they do not flow; he has been disputing upon objects be never can

understand, while he has totally neglected that which was within the

compass of his own powers; which he might have rendered propitious to

his views, by a more industrious application of his own talent; by a

patient investigation, for the purpose of drawing at the fountain of

truth, the limpid balsam that alone can heal the sorrows or his heart.

Nothing could be well more prejudicial to his race, than this

extravagant theory; which, as we shall prove, has become the source of

innumerable evils. Man has been for thousands of years trembling before

idols of his own creation--bowing down before them with the most servile

homage--occupied with disarming their wrath--sedulously employed in

propitiating their kindness, without ever advancing a single step on

the road he so much desires to travel. He will perhaps continue the same

course for centuries to come, unless by some unlooked for exertion on

his part, he shall happen to discard the prejudices which blind him; to

lay aside his enthusiasm for the marvellous; to quit his fondness for

the enigmatical; rally round the standard of his reason: unless, taking

experience for his guide, he march undauntedly forward under the banner

of truth, and put to the rout that host of unintelligible jargon, under

the cumbrous load of which he has lost sight of his own happiness;

which has but too frequently prevented him from seeking the only means

adequate either to satisfy his wants, or to ameliorate the evils which

he is necessarily obliged to experience.

Let us then re-conduct bewildered mortals to the altar of nature; let us

endeavour to destroy that delusion which the ignorance of man, aided by

a disordered imagination, has induced him to elevate to her throne; let

us strive to dissipate that heavy mist which obscures to him the paths

of truth; let us seek to banish from his mind those visionary ideas

which prevent him from giving activity to his experience; let us teach

him if possible not to seek out of nature herself, the causes of the

phenomena he admires--to rest satisfied that she contains remedies for

all his evils--that she has manifold benefits in store for those, who,

rallying their industry, are willingly patiently to investigate her

laws--that she rarely withholds her secrets from the researches of those

who diligently labour to unravel them. Let us assure him that reason

alone can render him happy; that reason is nothing more than the science

of nature, applied to the conduct of man in society; that this reason

teaches that every thing is necessary; that his pleasures as well as

his sorrows are the effects of nature, who in all her works follows only

laws which nothing can make her revoke; that his interest demands he

should learn to support with equanimity of mind, all those evils

which natural means do not enable him to put aside. In short, let us

unceasingly repeat to him, it is in rendering his fellow creature happy,

that he will himself arrive at a felicity he will in vain expect from

others, when his own conduct refuses it to him.

Nature is self-existent; she will always exist; she produces every

thing; contains within herself the cause of every thing; her motion is a

necessary consequence of her existence; without motion we could form

no conception of nature; under this collective name we designate the

assemblage of matter acting by virtue of its peculiar energies. Every

thing proves to us, that it is not out of nature man ought to seek the

Divinity. If we have only an incomplete knowledge of nature and her

ways--if we have only superficial, imperfect ideas of matter, how shall

we be able to flatter ourselves with understanding or having any certain

notions of immateriality, of beings so much more fugitive, so much more

difficult to compass, even by thought, than the material elements;

so much more shy of access than either the constituent principles of

bodies, their primitive properties, their various modes of acting, or

their different manner of existing? If we cannot recur to first causes,

let its content ourselves with second causes, with those effects which

we can submit to experience, let us collect the facts with which we have

an acquaintance; they will enable us to judge of what we do not know:

let us at least confine ourselves to the feeble glimmerings of truth

with which our senses furnish us, since we do not possess means whereby

to acquire broader masses of light.

Do not let us mistake for real sciences, those which have no other

basis than our imagination; we shall find that such can at most be but

visionary: let us cling close to nature which we see, which we feel,

of which we experience the action; of which at least we understand the

general laws. If we are ignorant of her detail, if we cannot fathom the

secret principles she employs in her most complicated productions,

we are at least certain she acts in a permanent, uniform, analogous,

necessary manner. Let us then observe this nature; let us watch her

movements; but never let us endeavour to quit the routine she prescribes

for the beings of our species: if we do, we shall not only be obliged to

return, but we shall also infallibly be punished with numberless errors,

which will darken our mind, estrange us from reason; the necessary

consequence will be countless sorrows, which we may otherwise avoid.

Let us consider we are sensible parts of a whole, in which the forms are

only produced to be destroyed; in which combinations are ushered into

life, that they may again quit it, after having subsisted for a longer

or a shorter season. Let us look upon nature as an immense elaboratory

which contains every thing necessary for her action; who lacks nothing

requisite for the production of all the phenomena she displays to our

sight. Let us acknowledge her power to be inherent in her essence; amply

commensurate to her eternal march; fully adequate to the happiness of

all the beings she contains. Let us consider her as a whole, who can

only maintain herself by what we call the discord of the elements; that

she exists by the continual dissolution and re-union of her parts; that

from this springs the universal harmony; that from this the general

stability has its birth. Let us then re-establish omnipotent nature, so

long mistaken by man, in her legitimate rights. Let us place her on that

adamantine throne, which it is for the felicity of the human race she

should occupy. Let us surround her with those ministers who can never

deceive, who can never forfeit our confidence--_Justice and Practical

Knowledge_. Let us listen to her eternal voice; she neither speaks

ambiguously, nor in an unintelligible language; she may be easily

comprehended by the people of all nations; because _Reason_ is her

faithful interpreter. She offers nothing to our contemplation but

immutable truths. Let us then for ever impose silence on that enthusiasm

which leads us astray; let us put to the blush that imposture which

would riot on our credulity; let us discard that gloomy superstition,

which has drawn us aside from the only worship suitable to intelligent

beings. Above all, never let us forget that the temple of happiness can

only be reached through the groves of virtue, which surround it on every

side; that the paths which lead to these beautiful walks can only be

entered by the road of experience, the portals of which are alone opened

to those who apply to them the key of truth: this key is of very simple

structure, has no complicated intricacy of wards, and is easily formed

on the anvil of social intercourse, merely by _not doing unto others

that which you would not wish they should do unto you._

The System of Nature, or, the Laws of the Moral and Physical World. Volume 2 · 第 17 / 31 题