SIR JOHN FRENCH ATTEMPTS A SURPRISE
The operation of this plan of Sir John French had an excellent
effect in the Ypres region, but it had the opposite effect on the
British who were trying to take Lille. Moreover it was necessary
for the British to continue to occupy the attention of the left
wing of the German army, under the command of the Crown Prince of
Bavaria, in order to keep him from using his men against General
Foch, who was attempting to push his way between Arras and Lille.
Inasmuch as the British artillery had proved ineffective because
of its lack of enough and the proper kind of ammunition, Sir John
French planned another surprise for the Germans. This time he selected
the weapon which the Teutons seemed most to fear when it was in the
hands of the British--the bayonet. The salient on the German front
at Festubert, between La Bassée and Neuve Chapelle, was chosen for
the proposed military feat. The territory occupied by the Teutons
had the appearance, to the casual observer, of being lowlands on
which were wrecked homes, farms, and trees. The actual conditions
of this section of the country were much more serious for any body
of troops which planned to make an attack. The ground was moist
and muddy, in many places being crossed by treacherous ditches
filled with slimy water. Moreover the exact range of practically
every square foot of it was known to the German artillerymen, whose
guns were on the high ground to the west of the lowlands. The British
were in trenches from seventy to three hundred yards from those of
their enemy. If the men there could dash across the intervening
space and get into the German trenches before being annihilated
by the kaiser's cannon, they would use the bayonet with deadly
effect, and, from past experiences, have reasonable hope of gaining
a victory. It was decided to make such an attempt first on that
part of the line between Richebourg on the left and Festubert on
the right.
The British Seventh Division was sent south to support the attack
which was to have been made on May 12, 1915. On that day it was
too foggy for the aviators to see with any degree of accuracy; so
the movement was delayed. This gave time for the Canadian Division
to be sent south and add their strength to the support. The German
trenches, at this point where the attack was to be made, were occupied
by the Seventh Westphalian Army Corps. This corps had lost many of
its men at Neuve Chapelle; and their places had been taken by youths
who had not reached the development of manhood and whose immaturity
and lack of military training greatly lessened the efficiency of
this famous body of troops.
Finally, on Saturday night, May 15, 1915, all conditions for the
attack seemed favorable to the British. There was no moon and the sky
was dark, though there was not that inky blackness that occasionally
occurs under similar weather conditions. The Indian Corps stole from
their trenches and began to go forward from Richebourg l'Avoué.
But the Germans were alert, and they illumined the movement with
innumerable flares which made the Indians easy targets for the
machine guns and rifles of the Teutons in that part of the line.
So quick was the work to repel the attack that many of the Indians
were slain as they were climbing out of their own trenches. As
a surprise attack at night, the British were not making much of
a success of their plan, but as a method of gaining ground and
keeping their enemy busy on that particular part of the line the
men of their Second Division were effective. They dashed into the
first line of German trenches and cleared them out with the bayonet
and hand grenade. The furor of the attack took them on into the
second line. By dawn the soldiers of the Second Division had driven
a wedge into the German line.
This wedge was widened and driven in harder by Sir Douglas Haig's
old command--the First Corps. This corps had suffered heavy losses
at the first battle of Ypres; but the men who filled the gaps in
the line were hardy young men who made excellent soldiers from
the start. Added to their enthusiasm was a desire to show their
ability as fighters, with the result that the British right wing was
so effective that it, in a great measure, made up for the failure of
the Indian troops. The center and the right, with bomb and bayonet,
drove the Germans from the trenches; and then together they forced
their way into the Teutons' position 600 yards along a front 800
yards in length. Early the next morning, before daylight on May
16, 1915, the British Seventh Division forced its way into the
German salient at Festubert. In the meantime the Germans were making
hasty preparations for a counterattack. Sir John French's plan,
however, had proved effective. It would have required a large supply
of high-explosive shells to have made much of an impression on the
excellent defenses which the German soldiers had constructed on
this part of the front. The British had no such supply of ammunition,
and, even if they had had it, it is doubtful if they would have been
able to demolish the formidable wire entanglements. Yet in this
night attack with the bayonet the British troops had accomplished
all they could have done if supplied with proper ammunition. In
the desperate charge which they made no wire entanglement could
stop the British soldiers. They threw their overcoats or blankets
over the barbed wire and then climbed across the obstruction. The
Seventh Division took three lines of trenches in this manner, until
it was 12,000 yards back of the original line of its enemy.
[Illustration: ATTACKS BY THE ALLIES IN THE ARTOIS
FRENCH, BRITISH, BELGIAN, CANADIAN AND MOROCCAN SOLDIERS AND THEIR
GERMAN ENEMIES
Liquid fire--a chemical which bursts into flame on contact with
the air--is discharged from an apparatus that resembles a fire
extinguisher. It is effective in fighting at close quarters]
[Illustration: Moroccan troops in camp at Arcy. France, like Great
Britain, has been able to draw upon her colonies for soldiers]
[Illustration: These Belgian soldiers are weary and covered with
mud from the trenches, but they are rallying for a fresh resistance
to German attacks]
[Illustration: Canadian volunteers at bayonet practice. From the
beginning of the war, the drilling of young Canadians for service
in Europe has gone on incessantly]
[Illustration: This large cave in the chalk hills of France furnishes
homes for three companies of German soldiers. It is divided by
partitions into many living rooms]
[Illustration: These soldiers have completed their underground
shelter by constructing a fireplace and are now adding the finishing
touches to the chimney]
[Illustration: A remarkable picture of French soldiers leaving
their trenches at the beginning of a spirited bayonet charge on
the German positions]
[Illustration: An armored automobile intercepting a troop of cavalry.
In the opening of the war in particular, automobile raiders played
a dashing part]
There were now two wedges driven into the German front, and the
British desired to join them and make what might be termed a
countersalient, or a salient running into the original salient of
the Germans. But the space between the two horns of the British
force was a network of trenches. The horns might prod and irritate
the Teutons, but they needed artillery again to rid the German
breastworks of machine guns and demolish the obstructions which
would cost too many lives to take in the same manner in which the
British success had been won in its night attack. Nevertheless
the British started in to bomb their way toward Festubert, and
they even gained forty yards in this hazardous undertaking before
they were forced to stop. If they had seemed to be an irresistible
force, they had met what had every appearance of being an immovable
body--and there was a limit to human endurance.
By May 17, 1915, the British concluded that their most advisable
offensive was to clear the space between their two wedges by cutting
off the Germans who held that part of their line. To do this the
British attempted to cut off the German communication to the north
from La Quinque Rue; but, by that time, the Teutons had received
reenforcements; and they rained such a shower of lead on the attacking
force that the attempt had to be abandoned, but not until many
heroic efforts had been made by the British to succeed in their
purpose.
Many Germans were made prisoners at all stages of the fighting.
The British bayonet seemed to strike them with terror, and the
bombs were more potent in scattering them than were the orders of
their commanders to repel the attacking force. Between Richebourg
l'Avoué and Le Quinque Rue is the farm Cour de l'Avoué. In front
of this farm the remains of a battalion of Saxons attempted to
surrender. They had arrived on the line as reenforcements to the
Westphalians, and had been fighting valiantly until their numbers
were so decreased that they were unable to hold out against their foes
longer. Whether their commanding officer ordered them to surrender
or a common impulse dictated their action, they left their position
and advanced toward the British. Not understanding their action,
the attacking force fired upon the Saxons who were sufficiently
numerous to give the impression that they might be leading a
counterattack. Thereupon the Saxons dropped their guns and the
firing from the British side ceased, only to be taken up on the
German side by the Westphalians. This was followed by an attack on
the would-be prisoners by the German artillery until every soldier
in the surrendering party was slain. This action horrified the
British, but the Germans considered it a means of discipline which
would have a salutary effect on any who might prefer the comforts
of a prison camp to dying for the Fatherland.
The British Seventh Division at Festubert continued to work south
along the German trenches. Its bayonets and bombs cleared the way
before it. The plan was for them to continue toward Rue d'Ouvert,
Chapelle St. Roch, and Canteleux. In the meantime the Second Division,
on the left of the Seventh Division, was to fight its way to Rue du
Marais and Violaines. The Indian contingent had received orders
to keep in touch with the Third Division. The Fifty-first Division
was sent to Estaires to act as a support to the First Army. By the
night of May 17, 1915, the British held all of the first line of
German trenches from the south of Festubert to Richebourg l'Avoué.
For a part of that distance the second and third lines of trenches
had been taken and held; and still farther forward the British
possessed many important points. Moreover the British soldiers
were so inspired with their success that they desired to press
on in spite of the fact that the nature of the country was such
that they were wet through and covered with mud. It was not all
enthusiasm, however. Mingled with the desire for victory was a desire
for revenge. The British on this part of the line were enraged by
the use of gas at Ypres and the sinking of the _Lusitania_.
On the night of May 17, 1915, the Fourth Cameron Highlanders, a
Territorial battalion, met with disaster. The men composing this
unit were from Inverness-shire, Skye, and the Outer Islands. Many
of them had been gamekeepers and hence were accustomed to outdoor
life and the handling of guns, all of which aided them in saving
the remnant of their command. They had been ordered to take some
cottages, occupied by German soldiers as a makeshift fortification.
The Cameronians on the way to the attack fell into a ditch which
was both deep and wide. It was necessary for them to swim to get
across the ditch in some places. In the meantime Highlanders were
being slain by German shells and the rifle fire that the men in
the cottages rained upon the Scots. One company was annihilated.
Another company lost its way. The rear end of a German communicating
trench was reached by a third company. Long before midnight this
company was almost without ammunition. Two platoons reenforced it
at midnight; but the reenforcements had no machine guns, which
would have given at least temporary relief. Under the circumstances
the only thing for the Territorials to do was to retreat. The Germans
made that quite as perilous a venture as the advance had been.
Only half of those who started for the cottages returned. Among
the slain was the commander, and twelve other officers were also
killed.
The British, in spite of a cold rain, pushed on 1,200 yards north
of the Festubert-La Quinque Rue road; and took a defense 300 yards
to the southeast of the hamlet. Two farms west of the road and
south of Richebourg l'Avoué, the farm du Bois and the farm of the
Cour de l'Avoué, in front of which latter the surrendering Saxons
were slain, had been held by the Germans with numerous machine guns.
The British took both farms by nightfall and found, on counting
their prisoners, that they then had a total of 608 as well as several
machine guns.
The Second and Seventh Divisions were withdrawn by Sir Douglas
Haig on the following day, Wednesday, May 19, 1915. The Fifty-first
Division and the Canadians took the places of the men who were sadly
in need of relief from active duty. Lieutenant General Alderson
received the command of both divisions together with the artillery
of both the Second and Seventh Divisions. The cold, wet weather
hampered operations and there was comparatively little activity,
though hostilities by no means altogether ceased. Each side needed
a little rest and time to fill in gaps in their respective lines.
Hence it was not until Sunday, May 23, that any fighting on a large
scale took place. On that day the Seventh Prussian Army Corps made
a desperate effort to break through that part of the British line
held by the Canadians near Festubert. The Prussians used their
old tactics with the result that the British shrapnel, rifle, and
machine-gun fire plowed great holes in their ranks. The Teutons in
this instance were without adequate artillery support, for many
of their batteries had been made useless by the British. From then
on to May 25, 1915, there were several small engagements in which
the British made gains. Then Sir John French concluded to end the
activity of his men on this part of the front. In that connection
he made the following statement: "I had now reasons to consider
that the battle which was commenced by the First Army on May 9 and
renewed on the 16th, having attained for the moment the immediate
object I had in view, should not be further actively proceeded
with.
"In the battle of Festubert the enemy was driven from a position
which was strongly intrenched and fortified, and ground was won
on a front of four miles to an average depth of 600 yards."
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