THE CASE FOR THE EPHEMERAL

I cannot understand the people who take literature seriously; but I can

love them, and I do. Out of my love I warn them to keep clear of this

book. It is a collection of crude and shapeless papers upon current or

rather flying subjects; and they must be published pretty much as they

stand. They were written, as a rule, at the last moment; they were

handed in the moment before it was too late, and I do not think that

our commonwealth would have been shaken to its foundations if they had

been handed in the moment after. They must go out now, with all their

imperfections on their head, or rather on mine; for their vices are too

vital to be improved with a blue pencil, or with anything I can think

of, except dynamite.

Their chief vice is that so many of them are very serious; because I

had no time to make them flippant. It is so easy to be solemn; it is so

hard to be frivolous. Let any honest reader shut his eyes for a few

moments, and approaching the secret tribunal of his soul, ask himself

whether he would really rather be asked in the next two hours to write

the front page of the _Times_, which is full of long leading articles,

or the front page of _Tit-Bits,_ which is full of short jokes. If the

reader is the fine conscientious fellow I take him for, he will at once

reply that he would rather on the spur of the moment write ten _Times_

articles than one _Tit-Bits_ joke. Responsibility, a heavy and cautious

responsibility of speech, is the easiest thing in the world; anybody

can do it. That is why so many tired, elderly, and wealthy men go in

for politics. They are responsible, because they have not the strength

of mind left to be irresponsible. It is more dignified to sit still

than to dance the Barn Dance. It is also easier. So in these easy pages

I keep myself on the whole on the level of the _Times_: it is only

occasionally that I leap upwards almost to the level of _Tit-Bits._

I resume the defence of this indefensible book. These articles have

another disadvantage arising from the scurry in which they were

written; they are too long-winded and elaborate. One of the great

disadvantages of hurry is that it takes such a long time. If I have to

start for High-gate this day week, I may perhaps go the shortest way.

If I have to start this minute, I shall almost certainly go the

longest. In these essays (as I read them over) I feel frightfully

annoyed with myself for not getting to the point more quickly; but I

had not enough leisure to be quick. There are several maddening cases

in which I took two or three pages in attempting to describe an

attitude of which the essence could be expressed in an epigram; only

there was no time for epigrams. I do not repent of one shade of opinion

here expressed; but I feel that they might have been expressed so much

more briefly and precisely. For instance, these pages contain a sort of

recurring protest against the boast of certain writers that they are

merely recent. They brag that their philosophy of the universe is the

last philosophy or the new philosophy, or the advanced and progressive

philosophy. I have said much against a mere modernism. When I use the

word “modernism,” I am not alluding specially to the current quarrel in

the Roman Catholic Church, though I am certainly astonished at any

intellectual group accepting so weak and unphilosophical a name. It is

incomprehensible to me that any thinker can calmly call himself a

modernist; he might as well call himself a Thursdayite. But apart

altogether from that particular disturbance, I am conscious of a

general irritation expressed against the people who boast of their

advancement and modernity in the discussion of religion. But I never

succeeded in saying the quite clear and obvious thing that is really

the matter with modernism. The real objection to modernism is simply

that it is a form of snobbishness. It is an attempt to crush a rational

opponent not by reason, but by some mystery of superiority, by hinting

that one is specially up to date or particularly “in the know.” To

flaunt the fact that we have had all the last books from Germany is

simply vulgar; like flaunting the fact that we have had all the last

bonnets from Paris. To introduce into philosophical discussions a sneer

at a creed’s antiquity is like introducing a sneer at a lady’s age. It

is caddish because it is irrelevant. The pure modernist is merely a

snob; he cannot bear to be a month behind the fashion.

Similarly I find that I have tried in these pages to express the real

objection to philanthropists and have not succeeded. I have not seen

the quite simple objection to the causes advocated by certain wealthy

idealists; causes of which the cause called teetotalism is the

strongest case. I have used many abusive terms about the thing, calling

it Puritanism, or superciliousness, or aristocracy; but I have not seen

and stated the quite simple objection to philanthropy; which is that it

is religious persecution. Religious persecution does not consist in

thumbscrews or fires of Smithfield; the essence of religious

persecution is this: that the man who happens to have material power in

the State, either by wealth or by official position, should govern his

fellow-citizens not according to their religion or philosophy, but

according to his own. If, for instance, there is such a thing as a

vegetarian nation; if there is a great united mass of men who wish to

live by the vegetarian morality, then I say in the emphatic words of

the arrogant French marquis before the French Revolution, “Let them eat

grass.” Perhaps that French oligarch was a humanitarian; most oligarchs

are. Perhaps when he told the peasants to eat grass he was recommending

to them the hygienic simplicity of a vegetarian restaurant. But that is

an irrelevant, though most fascinating, speculation. The point here is

that if a nation is really vegetarian let its government force upon it

the whole horrible weight of vegetarianism. Let its government give the

national guests a State vegetarian banquet. Let its government, in the

most literal and awful sense of the words, give them beans. That sort

of tyranny is all very well; for it is the people tyrannising over all

the persons. But “temperance reformers” are like a small group of

vegetarians who should silently and systematically act on an ethical

assumption entirely unfamiliar to the mass of the people. They would

always be giving peerages to greengrocers. They would always be

appointing Parliamentary Commissions to enquire into the private life

of butchers. Whenever they found a man quite at their mercy, as a

pauper or a convict or a lunatic, they would force him to add the final

touch to his inhuman isolation by becoming a vegetarian. All the meals

for school children will be vegetarian meals. All the State public

houses will be vegetarian public houses. There is a very strong case

for vegetarianism as compared with teetotalism. Drinking one glass of

beer cannot by any philosophy be drunkenness; but killing one animal

can, by this philosophy, be murder. The objection to both processes is

not that the two creeds, teetotal and vegetarian, are not admissible;

it is simply that they are not admitted. The thing is religious

persecution because it is not based on the existing religion of the

democracy. These people ask the poor to accept in practice what they

know perfectly well that the poor would not accept in theory. That is

the very definition of religious persecution. I was against the Tory

attempt to force upon ordinary Englishmen a Catholic theology in which

they do not believe. I am even more against the attempt to force upon

them a Mohamedan morality which they actively deny.

Again, in the case of anonymous journalism I seem to have said a great

deal without getting out the point very clearly. Anonymous journalism

is dangerous, and is poisonous in our existing life simply because it

is so rapidly becoming an anonymous life. That is the horrible thing

about our contemporary atmosphere. Society is becoming a secret

society. The modern tyrant is evil because of his elusiveness. He is

more nameless than his slave. He is not more of a bully than the

tyrants of the past; but he is more of a coward. The rich publisher may

treat the poor poet better or worse than the old master workman treated

the old apprentice. But the apprentice ran away and the master ran

after him. Nowadays it is the poet who pursues and tries in vain to fix

the fact of responsibility. It is the publisher who runs away. The

clerk of Mr. Solomon gets the sack: the beautiful Greek slave of the

Sultan Suliman also gets the sack; or the sack gets her. But though she

is concealed under the black waves of the Bosphorus, at least her

destroyer is not concealed. He goes behind golden trumpets riding on a

white elephant. But in the case of the clerk it is almost as difficult

to know where the dismissal comes from as to know where the clerk goes

to. It may be Mr. Solomon or Mr. Solomon’s manager, or Mr. Solomon’s

rich aunt in Cheltenham, or Mr. Soloman’s rich creditor in Berlin. The

elaborate machinery which was once used to make men responsible is now

used solely in order to shift the responsibility. People talk about the

pride of tyrants; but we in this age are not suffering from the pride

of tyrants. We are suffering from the shyness of tyrants; from the

shrinking modesty of tyrants. Therefore we must not encourage

leader-writers to be shy; we must not inflame their already exaggerated

modesty. Rather we must attempt to lure them to be vain and

ostentatious; so that through ostentation they may at last find their

way to honesty.

The last indictment against this book is the worst of all. It is simply

this: that if all goes well this book will be unintelligible gibberish.

For it is mostly concerned with attacking attitudes which are in their

nature accidental and incapable of enduring. Brief as is the career of

such a book as this, it may last just twenty minutes longer than most

of the philosophies that it attacks. In the end it will not matter to

us whether we wrote well or ill; whether we fought with flails or

reeds. It will matter to us greatly on what side we fought.

All Things Considered · 第 3 / 37 题