redistribution question. Redmond and the other Irish members were
obliged to go to London and assist for two days at a debate in the worst
traditions of the House of Commons. The change of atmosphere was
extraordinary--and the accusations of bad faith were not limited to what
passed at Westminster. One virulent speech declared that the Convention
had no prospects, never had any, and was never intended to have any.
This was accompanied by an attack on the action of the Ulster
group--based, of course, on hearsay. Those of us who felt that at any
rate the Convention offered a better hope for Ireland than any which now
could be based on action at Westminster pleaded for the acceptance of a
proposal which Redmond put forward as a compromise--that the proposed
Irish clauses should be dropped from the main Bill and the Irish matter
dealt with in a separate statute. It was so agreed at last, and a
conference between Irish members, with the Speaker presiding, was set
up, and quickly did its work. But if all this had been agreed to in
October or earlier, much friction would have been saved and a cause of
quarrel with the Ulster that was not in the Convention might have been
avoided. Still, peace was achieved, and the proposal to cut down Irish
representation was once more defeated.
Grand Committee met for another session, but was chiefly concerned with
getting ready for the reassembling of Convention--fixed for Tuesday,
December 18th. It was decided that a group meeting of Nationalists for
informal discussion should be held on the Monday night--the first
occasion on which this had been done.
Ill-luck, however, seemed to dog us. Dr. Kelly, the Bishop of Ross, who
was much closer in his point of view to Redmond than any of the other
Bishops, was gravely ill. This was foreseen. But on the Monday a heavy
snowstorm fell; Redmond, shut up in his hills at Aughavanagh, could not
reach Dublin. The roads were not open till the Thursday, and then he
thought it too late to come. He was in truth already too ill to face any
unusual exertion.
The Convention had been summoned, not to receive a final report from the
Grand Committee, but to face a new situation. An offer had been put
forward by one group which altered the whole complexion of the
controversy. Grand Committee had abstained from deciding whether to
counsel acceptance or rejection. But for the first time an influential
body of Irish Unionists had agreed, not as individuals but as
representatives, to accept Home Rule, in a wider measure than had been
proffered by the Bills of 1886 and 1893 or by the Act of 1914.
Limitations which were imposed in all these had been struck out by Lord
Midleton's proposals.
On the other hand, it was certain that the Ulster group would reject the
scheme. Conversation among Nationalists made it plain that if Ulster
would agree with Lord Midleton we should all join them. For the sake of
an agreement reached between all sections of Irishmen, but for nothing
less conclusive, Dr. O'Donnell and Mr. Russell were content to waive the
claim to full fiscal independence. Such an agreement, they held, would
be accepted by Parliament in its integrity. But if Ulster stood out,
there would be no "substantial agreement," and the terms which
Nationalists and Southern Unionists might combine to propose would be
treated as a bargaining offer, certain to be chipped down by Government
towards conformity with the Ulster demand. In the result there would be
an uprising of opinion in Ireland against a measure so framed; the
fiasco of July, 1916, would repeat itself.
Against this, and prompting us to acceptance, was the view very strongly
held by Redmond, that Government urgently needed a settlement for the
sake of the war, and would use to the utmost any leverage which helped
them to this end. An agreement with Lord Midleton would mean a Home Rule
proposal proceeding from a leading Unionist statesman who spoke for the
interest in Ireland, which, if any, had reason to fear Nationalist
government. This would mean necessarily a profound change in the
attitude of the House of Lords and of all those social influences whose
power we had felt so painfully. Government could undoubtedly, if it
chose, carry a measure giving effect to this compact.
Further, weighing greatly with the instincts of the rank and file was
the motive which prompted Irish Nationalists to welcome the advance made
by those whom Lord Midleton represented. The Southern Unionists were the
old landowning and professional class, friendly in all ways of
intercourse, but politically severed and sundered from the mass of the
population. Now, they came forward with an offer to help in attaining
our desire--quite frankly, against their own declared conviction that
the Union was the best plan, but with an equally frank recognition that
the majority was the majority and was honest in its intent. The
personality of the men reinforced the effect of this: Lord Oranmore, for
instance, whom most of them had only known by anti-Home Rule speeches in
the House of Lords, revealed himself as the friendliest of Irishmen,
with the Irish love for a witty phrase.
This temperamental attitude was of help to Lord Midleton when on
December 18th he expounded the position of himself and his friends in a
very powerful argument, the more persuasive because the good will in his
audience softened his habitual touch of contentiousness. It had seemed
to them, he said, that both in the Nationalist and Northern Unionist
camp there was a tendency to consider dispositions out of doors and to
conciliate certain antagonisms without considering whether they excited
others. He and his friends had determined to fix their minds solely on
the Convention itself, and to pursue the purpose for which they were
summoned of endeavouring after agreement within that body. They were
Unionists; but they had asked themselves what could be removed from the
present system without disturbing the essence of Union; and in that
effort they would go to the extremest limit in their power, without
thought of conciliating opinions outside, and without any attempt to
bargain.
On one point only he indicated that their scheme was tentative. Defence
was by consent of all left to the Imperial Parliament. This implied, he
held, an adequate contribution, and the yield of customs to be collected
by the Imperial Parliament seemed roughly to meet the case, for the
period of the war. But this was not absolutely a hard-and-fast proposal.
In any case, after the war, the amount should be the subject of inquiry
by a joint commission.
Apart from this, the offer was their last word. It conceded to Ireland
the control of all purely Irish services. This included the fixation of
excise, because excise on commodities produced in Ireland did not touch
the treaty-making power. Customs touched that power, and therefore
customs, like defence, must be left to the Imperial Parliament. But, he
argued, Irish Nationalists were not asked to give up anything which had
been conceded to them by any previous Home Rule proposal.
To all Unionists he said: These proposals keep the power of the Crown
over all Imperial services undiminished; they keep representation at
Westminster--a corollary from leaving the Imperial Parliament powers
over Irish taxation; and by accepting the suggestions already agreed
to, they give a generous representation to Unionists in an Irish
Parliament. This special representation of minorities was, he thought,
sufficient to give a guarantee of "sane legislation" while it lasted;
and he suggested that the period should be fifteen years. These
concessions, in his opinion, sufficiently protected Southern Unionists.
To Ulster he said, "We share every danger threatening you--we have many
dangers you need not fear. Yet, we have no sinister anticipations. Are
you still determined to stand out?"
On the other hand, when so much of the full demand was conceded, were
Nationalists insistent, he asked, on demanding what they had never asked
in the discussions upon any Home Rule Bill? Nationalist leaders had now
the chance of leading a combination of all sane elements in the
landowning and land-cultivating classes. No Irish leader had ever before
been able to present such an appeal to Unionist opinion as would come
from the man who represented a Convention Party.
It was a speech which Redmond, if present, must have replied to, and
could not have replied to without indicating profound sympathy--for he
was in agreement with its main lines; and his expression of opinion upon
it must have influenced strongly the views of the rank and file at the
moment when they were most open to suggestion.
In his absence, men's minds were greatly affected by the fear that if we
adopted these proposals, our decision would be exposed to attack from a
combination of three forces--Sinn Féin, which would at least officially
condemn anything less than complete separation, and would furiously
assail a proposal that denied full taxing powers; the Roman Catholic
Church, which would take its lead from Bishop O'Donnell, who set out in
an able memorandum the reasons why Ireland must have full control of
taxation; and finally, the powerful newspaper whose proprietor, Mr.
Murphy, at once gave signs of his hostility by putting on the paper an
amendment to Lord Midleton's resolution which amounted to a direct
negative.
The reassembly of the Convention was fixed for Wednesday, January 2nd.
Redmond came to Dublin on the Monday. He told me that he was inclined to
move that while we thanked Lord Midleton for his substantial
contribution towards our purpose, we could not accept his proposal,
unless it opened the way to a settlement. What he meant by this was not
merely that if Ulster agreed, we should accept; for that would certainly
open the way. But he had also in his mind the possibility of a guarantee
from Government that an arrangement come to, as this might be, by
four-fifths of the Convention, and repudiated only by the pledge-bound
Ulster block, would be regarded as substantial agreement, and taken as a
basis for legislation. In that case, also, the way would be open; but he
had no written assurance of such an understanding, though I gathered
that he was urging the Government to give it. We were, however, told on
good authority in these days that if the Southern Unionists' proposal
was accepted by the Nationalists and other elements outside of Ulster,
the Prime Minister would use his whole influence with his colleagues to
secure acceptance of the compact and immediate legislation upon it. This
would mean, we were also assured, that the whole thing would be done
before Easter.
On January 2nd the resumed debate for the first time brought the
Convention face to face with concrete proposals for a settlement. In
tone and in substance it would have done credit to any Parliament that
ever sat. I shall not try to summarize the arguments, but simply to note
certain outstanding facts.
Lord Midleton modified his original proposal that collection of customs
should be an Imperial service throughout. He agreed that collection
might be done by the Irish Civil Service. Moreover, he admitted that
Ireland must have full means of checking the account for these taxes,
great part of which must necessarily be collected at English ports,
since tea, tobacco and the other dutiable articles were seldom shipped
direct to Ireland.
But he made it plain that the essential of his proposal was the
maintenance of a common customs system, leaving the fixation of customs
to the Imperial Parliament for Great Britain and Ireland. If this was
denied, as it would be by the acceptance of Mr. Murphy's amendment, all
Unionists would be driven once more into the same lobby; all chance of
uniting elements heretofore divided would disappear.
This was the fact against which we were brought up. Insistence on the
full Nationalist demand as it had been outlined in the Convention meant
the refusal of a new and powerful alliance which now offered itself, and
the destruction of anything which could be called an agreement.
In the close, Lord Midleton reinforced his appeal by a solid material
argument. The sub-committee presided over by Lord MacDonnell had reached
unanimous conclusions embodying proposals for the completion of land
purchase within a very brief period. Landlords, agents, tenants,
representatives for Ulster as well as from the South and West, were
parties to this plan. Lord Midleton now looked back on the past as one
who had been in the fight since Mr. Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill.
Every fresh settlement had been wrecked, he said, by standing for the
last shred of the demand. In 1885, if Gladstone had abandoned the
identity of democratic franchise for both countries and had made to the
Irish minority such concessions as this Convention was willing to make,
he would have carried the Liberal Unionist element with him. Then, as
now, a great land purchase scheme depended on the solution of the main
problem. To-day land purchase stood or fell with the Convention.
He was backed by Lord Dunraven--who waived his preference for his own
original proposal--and by Lord Desart, in most able argument: the latter
declaring that the proposal to give Ireland a separate customs system
could never be carried in England. But the speech of the day came from
Mr. Kavanagh, who, speaking as a Nationalist who had been a Unionist,
ended a most moving appeal for agreement with a declaration that he at
all events would vote for the compromise. There was no mistaking the
effect produced by the earnestness of this speaker, who knew as much of
Ireland and was as well fitted to judge of its true interests as any man
in the room. That effect was felt, I think, in the tone of a private
meeting of Nationalists held the same night. Redmond, with the art of
which he was a master, indicated support for the proposal without
forcing a conclusion. He dwelt on the fact that if we did not agree we
not only lost our chance of immediate and complete land purchase but
left ourselves subjected to the entire burden of war taxation. Other
speakers pointed out that we ought not to let ourselves be lured into
driving the Southern Unionists and the Ulstermen together against us.
Mr. Clancy said in his downright manner that he would not as yet express
his view publicly: but that he was not going to reject this offer for
the sake of fixing taxes on tea and tobacco, and that when the right
time came, he would say so. The strongest arguments used against this
view were that in surrendering control of customs we lost our management
of the taxes which pressed upon the poor; and further, that even if we
agreed, no one knew what would result. We had no guarantee that the
compact would be expressed in legislation. But on the whole the tone
showed a disposition to accept, and especially to support Redmond--who
had spoken of his political career as a thing ended. Next day the debate
in Convention continued. Archbishop Bernard, speaking as a Unionist,
said that the proposal was a venture beset with risks, but the greatest
danger of all was to do nothing. It would be a grave responsibility for
Ulster to wreck the chance of a settlement. Lord Oranmore dwelt on the
composition of the proposed Legislature Power was to be entrusted to a
very different Parliament from that which they had feared. He and his
like were to get what they desired--an opportunity of taking part in
the government of the country. It looked to him as if the only possible
Irish Government under this scheme must be Unionist in its complexion.
Perhaps there was an echo of this in Redmond's speech, by far the
greatest he made in the Convention, when at last he intervened on
January 4th--the Friday which ended that session.
He dealt at once with Mr. Barrie's often repeated view that the proper
object of our endeavours was to find a compromise between the Act of
1914 and the proposal for partition put forward by Ulster. On that basis
the Convention could never have been brought together. The Prime
Minister's letter of May 16th which proposed the Convention suggested
that Irishmen should meet "for the purpose of drafting a Constitution
for their own country." On May 22nd Mr. Lloyd George had said, "We
propose that Ireland should try her own hand at hammering out an
instrument of government for her people." The only limitation was that
it should be a Constitution "for the future government of Ireland within
the Empire."
Then he turned to the argument that all the sacrifices were asked from
Unionists. Let us weigh them, he said. What sacrifices had been made by
the Irish Nationalists, since this chain of events began?--Then followed
a passage which I recapitulate, not necessarily in full, but in phrases
which he actually used, and I noted down:
"Personal loss I set aside. My position--our position--before the war
was that we possessed the confidence of nearly the entire country. I
took a risk--we took it--with eyes open. I have--we have--not merely
taken the risk but made the sacrifice. If the choice were to be made
to-morrow, I would do it all over again.
"I have had my surfeit of public life. My modest ambition would be to
serve in some quite humble capacity under the first Unionist Prime
Minister of Ireland."
As to other sacrifices, in the way of concessions, he recited the list
of what had been agreed to--proposals so strangely undemocratic--the
nomination of members of Parliament, the disproportionate powers given
to a minority. "Shall we not be denounced for making them?" he asked.
On the other hand, what sacrifices had been made by the Southern
Unionists? These were the men who had had the hardest battle to fight in
the struggle over Home Rule. They were not, like Ulster Unionists,
"entrenched in a ring-fence," but the scattered few, who had suffered
most and who might naturally have entertained most bitterness. Yet Lord
Midleton's speech had been instinct with an admirable spirit. The speech
of the Archbishop of Dublin had touched him deeply.
"Between these men and us there never again can be the differences of
the past. They have put behind them all bitter memories. They have
agreed to the framework of a Bill better than any offered to us in 1886,
1893 or 1914."
As for us Nationalists--he emphasized that each man came here free,
untrammelled.
"I speak only for myself. But even if I stand alone, I will not allow
myself, because I cannot get the full measure of my demand, to be drawn
to reject the proffered hand of friendship held out to us. In my opinion
we should be political fools if we did not endeavour to cement an
alliance with these men."
As concerned the Labour men, Mr. Whitley, who had always been a
Unionist, had declared willingness to agree. But the Ulster
Unionists--what sacrifice had they made?
"The last thing I desire is to attack Mr. Barrie and his friends. But
they are not free agents. I was shocked when I heard that a section here
openly avowed the need to refer back to some outside body. If we had
been told we were going into a body which would consist of two orders of
members, it would have been difficult to get us here."
On the essential point Ulster had made no concession. What did Mr.
Barrie say in his formal document? 'We are satisfied that for Ireland
and for Great Britain a common system of finances with one Exchequer is
a fundamental necessity.' If they denied the taxing power to Ireland,
any proposal on these lines must give Ireland less than any proposal for
Home Rule ever put forward. This was Ulster's original position and they
had not budged an inch.
"This is their response to the Empire's S.O.S. Is it worthy of Ulster's
Imperial loyalty? I don't believe it is their last word."
Lord Londonderry, however, in replying, did not add any ground of hope.
The last speech of the day announced that of six trade unionists five
would support the compromise.
Redmond that evening put on the notice paper a motion adopting Lord
Midleton's proposals provided that they "be adopted by His Majesty's
Government as a settlement of the Irish question and legislative effect
be given to them forthwith."
On the day before this motion was tabled, a party was given at Lord
Granard's house which everybody attended, and which marked the most
festive moment of our comradeship. When we separated on the Friday most
men were absolutely confident of an agreement covering four-fifths of
the Convention.
Unhappily, the motion could not come under consideration for a period of
ten days. In the following week Lord Midleton thought it necessary to
attend the House of Lords. It was settled that we should spend the
interval discussing the land purchase report, for which his presence was
not essential. Redmond, whose health was still bad, did not come up to
Dublin. All this gave time for agitation, and agitation was at work.
Still, during that week there was no sign of any change in tone. Members
of the local bodies who had gone to their homes at the week's end came
back just as much inclined to settle as before.
I met Redmond on the night of Monday, January 14th. He had seen no one
in these ten days. He told me that he was still uncertain what would
happen, but asked me to get one of the leading County Councillors to
second his motion. Next morning I came in half an hour before the
meeting to find the man I wanted. When I met him he was full of
excitement, and said, "Something has gone wrong; the men are all saying
they must vote against Redmond." Then it was evident that propaganda had
been busy to some purpose.
When Redmond came in to his place, I said, "It's all right. Martin
McDonogh will second your motion." He answered with a characteristic
brusqueness, "He needn't trouble. I'm not going to move it; Devlin and
the Bishops are voting against me."
He rose immediately the Chairman was in his place.
"The amendment which I have on the paper," he said, "embodies the
deliberate advice I give to the Convention.
"I consulted no one--and could not do so, being ill. It stands on record
on my sole responsibility.
"Since entering the building I have heard that some very important
Nationalist representatives are against this course--the Catholic
bishops, Mr. Devlin--and others. I must face the situation--at which I
am surprised; and I regret it.
"If I proceeded I should probably carry my point on a division, but the
Nationalists would be divided. Such a division could not carry out the
objects I have in view.
"Therefore, I must avoid pressing my motion. But I leave it standing on
the paper. The others will give their advice. I feel that I can be of no
further service to the Convention and will therefore not move."[13]
There was a pause of consternation. The Chairman intervened and the
debate proceeded, and was carried on through the week. During its course
a letter to the Chairman from the Bishop of Ross was circulated to us,
most dexterous in exposition, most affecting in the tone of its
conclusion. It can be read in the Report of the Convention and it cannot
with justice be quoted except at full length--so admirable is the
linking of argument. It need only be said here that it was an appeal "to
my fellow-Nationalists who have already made great concessions" to
yield, for the sake of a settlement, this further point, and that the
appeal was signed "from my sick-bed, not far removed from my death-bed."
That eloquent voice and subtle brain could ill be spared from our
assembly: but the letter came too late. It is plain that the writer had
no inkling of what would happen till it was actually taking place.
No one can overstate the effect of this episode. Redmond's personal
ascendancy in the Convention had become very great. I am certain there
was not a man there but would have said, "If there is to be an Irish
Parliament, Redmond must be Prime Minister, and his personality will
give that Parliament its best possible chance." The Ulstermen had more
than once expressed their view that if Home Rule were sure to mean
Redmond's rule, their objections to it would be materially lessened.
Now, they saw Redmond thrown over, and by a combination in which the
clerical influence, so much distrusted by them, was paramount.
IV
A new stage in the history of the Convention now opens. In the interval
between the meeting which began by Redmond's withdrawal of his amendment
and that of the following week, Sir Horace Plunkett went to London and
laid the situation before the Prime Minister. Redmond had also written
to Mr. Lloyd George stating that no progress could be made unless
Government would declare its intentions as to legislation. The Chairman
came back with the following letter in his pocket:
10 DOWNING STREET,
WHITEHALL, S.W. 1,
_January_ 21, 1918.
DEAR SIR HORACE PLUNKETT,
In our conversation on Saturday you told me that the situation in
the Convention has now reached a very critical stage. The issues
are so grave that I feel the Convention should not come to a
definite break without the Government having an opportunity of full
consultation with the leaders of the different sections. If, and
when, therefore, a point is reached at which the Convention finds
that it can make no further progress towards an agreed settlement,
I would ask that representatives should be sent to confer with the
Cabinet. The Government are agreed and determined that a solution
must be found. But they are firmly convinced that the best hope of
a settlement lies within the Convention, and they are prepared to
do anything in their power to assist the Convention finally to
reach a basis of agreement which would enable a new Irish
Constitution to come into operation with the consent of all
parties.
Yours sincerely,
D. LLOYD GEORGE.
Before acting on this, Sir Horace Plunkett allowed the debate to
continue during two days. Since no movement towards agreement manifested
itself, but only evidence of widespread and various divergence, he laid
the Prime Minister's invitation before the Convention. There was
considerable difference of opinion before a decision was reached for
acceptance. Groups separated to select their representatives on the
delegation.
It was agreed in private conference that only one view should be
presented from the Nationalist side, and that the view of what was at
this point clearly the majority. Redmond, in agreeing to act as a
delegate, agreed to set aside his own judgment and to press the claim
for full fiscal responsibility--which, like other Nationalists, he
regarded as in the abstract Ireland's right. But illness prevented him
from attending when at last the delegates were received by the Prime
Minister on February 13th.
On the 5th he had asked a question in Parliament--the last he was to ask
there. It concerned the starting of a factory for the manufacture of
aircraft in Dublin--one of the things for which he was pressing in his
ceaseless effort to bring Ireland some industrial advantage from the
war. I saw him towards the end of that month in his room at the House,
and he commented bitterly upon a raid carried out by Sinn Féiners, in
which some newly erected buildings were destroyed at one of the
aerodromes near Dublin which he had helped to establish. But the main
thing he had to say concerned the course of the Convention. Everything,
in his judgment, was wrecked; he saw nothing ahead for his country but
ruin and chaos.
He spoke of his health. A bout of sickness which had prostrated him at
Christmas in Dublin had left him uneasy. He was at the time, I thought,
unduly alarmed about himself, and I believed that the continuance of
this frame of mind was simply characteristic of a man who had very
little experience of ill-health. I left him with profound compassion for
his trouble of spirit, but without any serious apprehension for his
state of body.
The Convention reassembled on February 26th to consider the result of
the delegation, which was summed up in a letter from Mr. Lloyd George.
This well-known document begins with a definite pledge of action. On
receiving the report of the Convention the Government would give it
immediate attention and would "proceed with the least possible delay to
submit legislative proposals to Parliament."--The date of this pledge
was February 25, 1918.--Mr. Lloyd George pressed, however, for a
settlement "in and through the Convention"; and he declared his
conviction that "In view of previous attempts at settlement and of the
deliberations of the Convention itself, the only hope of agreement lies
in a solution which on the one side provides for the unity of Ireland by
a single Legislature, with adequate safeguards for the interests of
Ulster and of the Southern Unionists, and, on the other, secures the
well-being of the Empire and the fundamental unity of the United
Kingdom."
Ireland's strong claim to some control of indirect taxation was
admitted; but it was laid down that till two years after the war the
fixation and collection of customs and excise should be left to the
Imperial Parliament: and that at the end of the war a Royal Commission
should report on Ireland's contribution to Imperial expenditure and
should submit proposals as to the fiscal relations of the two countries.
For the war period, Ireland was to contribute "an agreed proportion of
the Imperial expenditure," but was to receive the full proceeds of Irish
revenue from customs and excise, less the agreed contribution. The
police and postal services were to be reserved also as war services.
These provisions were laid down as essentials. A suggestion was made of
an Ulster Committee within the Irish Parliament, having power to modify
or veto measures, whether of legislation or administration, in their
application to Ulster.
Lastly, Government expressed their willingness to accept and finance
the Convention's scheme for land purchase and to give a large grant for
urban housing.
The question now before the Convention was whether it should or should
not accept this offer, which differed from the Midleton proposals in
that it withheld the control of excise as well as of customs, and that
it retained control of police and Post Office for the war period. It
also adumbrated an Ulster Committee, which had been an unpopular
suggestion when put forward in the presentation stages. On the other
hand, it offered great material inducements in the proposed expenditure
for land purchase and for housing. Some of the County Councillors who
had been most vehement in their opposition to the Midleton compromise
were now disposed to think this too good an offer to let go, but
believed it could be obtained without their taking the responsibility of
voting for it. It was necessary to point out that the Irish party could
not lower a standard of national demand set up by the Nationalists in
the Convention, and that if they did so they would be hooted out of
existence.
The main argument of those who advised against acceptance was that
Ministers had pledged themselves to act in any case. Let them. We could
best help by enunciating our own programme. Then they would know the
real facts of the Irish situation. If a majority of the Convention
accepted the proposals of the Prime Minister's letter, there was no
pledge that the Bill would be on those lines. We needed to keep a
bargaining margin in what we put forward. It was even suggested that the
Government proposals would be more likely to attract support in Ireland
if put forward as a generous offer from a largely Unionist Government
than if published as a compromise to which Nationalists had
condescended.
Our reply was that the essential thing was to make a beginning with
self-government, and that by refusing to accept the Government's offer,
on which alone we could combine with an influential Unionist section, we
gravely increased the difficulties in the way of carrying Home Rule. If,
as we held, the main need was to unite Ireland, the last thing on which
we should insist was the concession of complete financial powers. When
the lack of those powers began to prove itself injurious to Ireland's
material interests, Ireland would certainly become united in a demand
for the concession of them; and the history of the British Empire since
the loss of America showed that every such demand had been granted to a
self-governing State.
At this moment interest centred on the discussion in private councils of
Nationalists. The debates in full Convention were animated, but somewhat
unreal by comparison. Lord Midleton's motion had been dropped, by
consent, for a series of resolutions tabled by Lord MacDonnell which
were in substance an acceptance of Government's proposal.
But neither in the private councils nor in the public debates had we
Redmond's presence. His illness had grown serious; an operation was
necessary; it passed over hopefully, and on Tuesday, March 5th, when the
debate resumed, Mr. Clancy had a telegram saying that he was practically
out of danger.
It was plain in these days that we were nearing a most critical
decision, and Nationalist opinion was profoundly uneasy. Many men were
drifting back to Redmond's view, and recoiled from the prospect of
dividing the Convention once more into its original component
parts--Nationalists on the one side, Unionists on the other. It was
proposed that on the Wednesday Nationalists should meet and, if
possible, concert joint action; if not, determine definitely each to go
our own ways; for a painful part of the situation was that all of us had
been used to act together, and none now felt himself free of some
obligation. This had to be cleared up When we came down to Trinity
College that morning, the news met us that Redmond was dead.
The Convention adjourned its work, although time pressed most seriously,
till after the interment. Ireland is a country where a public man can
always count on a good funeral. The body was brought to Kingstown, and
thence by special train to Wexford, where he had expressed the wish to
be laid, in the burying-place of his own people and in the town with
which he had been most closely associated. Hundreds of men came from
distant parts to mark their sorrow and respect: what remained of him was
carried in long and imposing procession through the streets. Over the
grave Mr. Dillon, who had been chosen to succeed him in the chair of the
Irish party, spoke eloquent and fitting words. Some day, no doubt, a
monument to his memory will be set up in the streets of Wexford, where
his great uncle's statue stands, and where will be placed the memorial
to his gallant brother, subscribed for from all parts of the kingdom and
from all Irish regiments in the Army.
But I say without hesitation that the first and most striking endeavour
to put in lasting shape a tribute to John Redmond was made in the
Convention, not by great men, but by the ordinary rank and file of Irish
Nationalists, who went back from the graveside to the work which his
death had interrupted.
Those who had been inclined before to accept his advice--still standing
on our minutes--were now more than ever determined to follow it. That
advice was not to refuse the hand of friendship which offered itself
from men who by alliance with us could take away from the Home Rule
demand all sectarian character: who could bring for the first time a
great and representative body of Irish landlord opinion and Irish
Protestant opinion into line with the opinion of Irish tenants and Irish
Catholics. In order to act upon this advice men needed to face a
powerful combination of forces and much threatened unpopularity: they
had to encounter the hostility of an able and vindictively conducted
newspaper; they had to separate themselves politically from the united
voice of their own hierarchy; they had to break away from the politician
who for many years now had equalled Redmond in his influence in Ireland
and surpassed him in popularity. All of them were representative of
constituents, all were living among those whom they represented; not a
man of them but knew he would worsen his personal and political position
by what he did. Yet, for that is the true way to state it, they stood to
their dead leader's policy.
It needs not to follow out in any detail the steps by which we reached
the end of our labours. In the upshot, the Ulster group of nineteen
dissented from everything and joined in a report which renewed the
demand for partition. The Primate and the Provost signed a separate note
declaring that a Federal Scheme based on the Swiss or Canadian system
offered the only solution which could avoid the alternative choice
between the coercion of Ulster and the partition of Ireland. The
remaining members, sixty-six in all, accepted one common scheme.[14]
Their number included ten Southern Unionists, five Labour
representatives (three of whom were Protestant artisans from Belfast),
with Lords Granard, MacDonnell and Dunraven, Sir Bertram Windle and the
representatives of the Dublin and Cork Chambers of Commerce.
The scheme on which we concurred recommended the immediate establishment
of self-government by an Irish Ministry responsible to a Parliament
consisting of two Houses, composed on highly artificial lines. For a
period of fifteen years Southern Unionists were to be represented by
nominated members, while Ulster was to have extra members elected by
special constituencies representing commercial and agricultural
interests. The Parliament was to have full control of internal
legislation, administration and direct taxation. The fixation of customs
and excise was to be from Westminster, but the proceeds of these taxes
to be paid into the Irish Exchequer. There was to be a contribution to
the cost of Imperial defences, and representation at Westminster, but a
representation of the Irish Parliament rather than of the
constituencies. All of this was agreed to at our last meeting, and
nothing could have been more pleasant than the atmosphere of good will
which prevailed. But this was after a critical division--the most
critical in which I have ever voted--in which those of us Nationalists
who were for accepting the Government proposals voted with the Southern
Unionists and those who were against with the Ulster group. The
combination of Ulstermen and extreme Nationalists was thirty-four
strong; those who adopted Redmond's policy and Lord Midleton's were
thirty-eight. We had in our lobby sixteen of the Nationalist County and
Urban Councillors; they had eleven.
If that vote had gone otherwise, we were told plainly that the Southern
Unionists would be no parties to the rest of the compromise. They were
willing to recommend self-government only if the Convention recommended
the reservation of customs to the Imperial Parliament. This point had
become in their minds important even more as a symbol of the close union
between the two kingdoms than by reason of the economic advantages which
they attributed to it.
Once the sticking-point was passed, the divided Nationalists recombined,
and we were all at one in our mutual felicitations on the harmony which
prevailed at the close. But as one of our rank and file said in my ear,
"If we had not given the vote we did, where would be all this talk of
harmony? And mind you now, it was not easy to give it."
He was right, and within six months it cost him the chairmanship of his
County Council. Others paid the same penalty, I am sure, without
grudging it, for most of us were prouder of that action than of any
other in our political lives. It may be well to set down the names of
the local representatives and Labour men who voted as Redmond would have
advised on that first crucial division.
They were: W. Broderick, Youghal Urban Council; J.J. Coen, Westmeath
County Council; D. Condren, Wicklow County Council; J. Dooly, Kings
County County Council; Captain Doran, Louth County Council; T. Fallon,
Leitrim County Council; J. Fitzgibbon, Roscommon County Council; Captain
Gwynn, Irish Party; T. Halligan, Meath County Council; W. Kavanagh,
Carlow County Council; J. McCarron, Labour; M. McDonogh, Galway Urban
Council; J. McDonnell, Galway County Council; C. McKay, Labour; J.
Murphy, Labour; J. O'Dowd, Sligo County Council; C.P. O'Neill, Pembroke
Urban Council; Dr. O'Sullivan, Mayor of Waterford; T. Power, Waterford
County Council; Sir S.B. Quin, Mayor of Limerick; D. Reilly, Cavan
County Council; M. Slattery, Tipperary (S. Riding); H.T. Whitley,
Labour.[15]
In so far as we were led by anyone, Mr. Clancy, fulfilling in public
what he had privately spoken, was our leader and spokesman.
We were along with the Southern Unionists and our natural allies, Lords
Granard and MacDonnell and Sir Bertram Windle. Archbishop Bernard and
Dr. Mahaffy voted with us in that pinch, so that both the late Provost
of Trinity and the present one did their part to secure an agreement.
In the other list, the Archbishop of Armagh and the Moderator were
grouped with the Archbishop of Cashel and the Bishops of Raphoe and Down
and Connor; the Lord Mayor of Cork and Lord Mayor of Belfast were
together; Mr. Devlin was with Mr. Barrie. This list represented no unity
except a common refusal to agree to any compromise. Those who voted in
it followed one or other of two trains of cogent reasoning; but the
reasonings led to opposite conclusions. These men were beyond doubt as
honest in their convictions as those who went the other way; but they
took the easier course, whether they were Nationalist or Unionist: they
swam with the tide.
The troubles which Nationalists brought on themselves by supporting Lord
Midleton were answered by the troubles which his group met for
supporting Nationalist demands. The men who refused to make the
compromise possible have the laugh of us. Neither section of us who
voted for agreement achieved anything by facing the risk of
unpopularity. We had followed Redmond's policy and we shared Redmond's
fate. We had done our best to help the British Government and that
Government itself defeated us.
By the Prime Minister's letter Government was pledged to legislate for
the better government of Ireland, not upon condition of our reaching
substantial agreement, but in any event. Yet the letter emphasized the
"urgent importance of getting a settlement in and through the
Convention." We had secured a report for a scheme in which sixty-six out
of eighty-seven concurred in the broad lines; and of the twenty-one
dissentients, nineteen were a group sent to the assembly with a pledge
which they construed as giving them a special position, in that no
legislation affecting them was to be passed without their concurrence.
The agreement which we had reached enabled the Government, when it
undertook legislation, to quote Unionist authority on the one hand and
Nationalist authority on the other for many wise provisions which
otherwise a Coalition Ministry might have found it most difficult to
propose.
But no legislation followed. Once more an Irish issue became involved in
the wheels of the English political machine.
We have ourselves in part to thank for it. We might in January have
taken Redmond's advice, and Lord Midleton's declared view that
legislation would follow might have proved correct. Yet, what use are
might-have-beens? History is concerned with what happened, and our work
in the Convention dragged itself on till the great German offensive had
been launched and the Allied line pushed back to the very gates of
Paris, and Government was at its wits' end for men. It is hard to blame
a Ministry for what harm was done in the frantic rush to cope with
perhaps the most critical instant in all history; but what was done
produced infinite mischief and no good result. Immediately after the
Convention's report (signed upon April 8th) had been received,
Government proposed to apply conscription to Ireland.
It is said, and it is not difficult to believe, that without making this
proposal they dare not have come upon the British people with so extreme
demands for compulsory service as were made. But by making it Ministers
tore up and scattered in fragments whatever results the Convention had
to show for its labours, and by legislating for conscription in Ireland
they gained not one man. The proposal, as Redmond had always told them,
proved impossible to carry out.
I do not believe that if Redmond had lived this would ever have
happened. His record in the war gave him an authority in Parliament
which no other Irishman could possibly claim. It would have been
impossible for Mr. Lloyd George to take such a step without giving him
notice; and once that notice came, Redmond could have insisted upon the
significance of the report of the Convention's sub-committee on
questions of defence. This committee consisted of two civilians and
three soldiers. Lord Desart, a Unionist, was in the chair; Mr. Powell,
K.C., a Unionist (afterwards Irish Solicitor-General and now a judge),
was the other civilian; the soldiers were the Duke of Abercorn, an
Ulster Covenanter, with Captain Doran and myself, Nationalists from the
Sixteenth Division. We found unanimously that if an Irish Parliament
existed, whatever might be the claims of the Imperial authority, it
would be impracticable to impose conscription without the Irish
Parliament's consent. This unanimous finding was bound to influence the
view of any Ministry, no matter how hard pressed. But, as debate
revealed, Mr. Lloyd George had never heard of it.
I believe that Redmond could have persuaded Mr. Lloyd George to adopt in
April the course on which--but after the harm was done--he fell back in
June, when Lord French asked for a large, but limited, number of
recruits to refill the Irish Divisions within a specified time--at the
end of which time, failing the production of the volunteers, other
measures must be taken. Here, however, we are back in the region of
speculation. Conscription was proposed and anarchy let loose in Ireland.
Redmond's words, "Better for us never to have met than to have met and
failed," stand as the final sentence on this notable episode in Irish
history.
That is the Convention's epitaph as, I think, he would have written it.
How shall we write his own?
No attempt has been made in this book, and none shall be made, to
represent him as a hero. But there are certain attributes which malice
itself can scarcely deny him. All his ideals were generous. His love of
country, the master-motive in his life, had nothing in it exclusive or
tribal or partisan. His was a policy forward-looking and constructive;
without narrowness or jealousy, it aimed to bring the destinies of
Ireland into the hands of Irishmen, not greatly caring what Irishmen
they were--indeed, if they were in a real measure responsible to
Ireland, not caring at all. In this spirit he grasped masterfully at the
chance which the war offered; in this spirit, he went out to meet his
fellow-countrymen in the Irish Convention.
And not only towards his countrymen was he magnanimous. His love of
Ireland was free from all attendant hates. His resentment was never on
private grounds, and it was without rancour. He spent his whole life in
opposition, and was not embittered; his mind remained constructive after
thirty years spent in criticism. His experience of political life and of
English Ministers had rid him of any credulous faith in mankind; yet his
instinct was always to perceive the best in men. The friend who knew him
best in Convention, and who had seen him in his darkest hours then and
long ago, said this of him: "He was always an optimist." The speaker did
not mean--he could not have meant--that in those last months Redmond was
sanguine. He meant, I think, that he had faith; that in a country where
suspicion is the prevailing disease, he credited men with honest motives
and with his own love of Ireland.
If he went wrong at any time, he went wrong by too generous a judgment
of other men, too open-handed a policy. Perhaps, too, he may have
erred--it was his characteristic defect--in not pressing his policy upon
others with more vehemence. He had not the temperament which, when once
possessed with an idea, rests neither night nor day in pursuit of it and
spares neither others' labour nor its own to carry the conception into
effect. There was an element of inertia in his nature, and of the
ordinary self-seeking motives which impel men not a trace. Ambition he
had none--none, at all events, in the last ten or fifteen years, during
which I have known him. As for vanity, I never saw a man so entirely
devoid of it. His modesty amounted to a defect, in that he always
underestimated his personal influence. A man less single-minded, vainer,
more ambitious of success, might with the same gifts have achieved more
for Ireland in thrusting towards a personal triumph. A man with more
love for the homage of crowds might have kept himself in closer touch
with the mass of his following.
The way of life to which he was committed was in its essence distasteful
to him. I do not believe that history shows an example of a statesman
who served his country more absolutely from a sense of duty.
All this might be admitted without conceding greatness to him. But he
was a great man, unlike others, cast in a mould of his own. Without the
least affectation of unconventionality, and indeed under a formal
appearance, he was profoundly unconventional. His tastes, whether in
literature, in art, in the choice of society, in the choice of his way
of life, were utterly his own, unaffected by any standard but that which
he himself established. Without subtlety of interpretation, his
judgments cut deep into the heart of things. You could not hear him
speak, could not be in his presence, without feeling the weight of his
personality.
A statesman, if ever there was one, he was never given the opportunity
of proving himself in administration; he can be judged only by his gifts
in counsel and by his power of guiding action. As a counsellor, he was
supreme. He had that faculty for anticipating the future, that broad,
far-reaching vision of the chain of events which can proceed only from
long, deep and constant thought, and which is truly admirable when
united, as it was in him, to a sovereign contempt for this or that
momentary outcry. In these qualities of insight and foresight I have
only seen one man approach him, the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman,
to whose credit stands the greatest work of Imperial reconciliation
accomplished in our day. But Redmond had supremely what the wise old
Scotsman lacked--the gift of persuasive speech, to win acceptance for
his wisdom and his vision.
He could persuade, but he could not compel. His was not the magnetism
which constrains allegiance almost in despite of reason--the power which
was possessed by his first and only leader, Parnell. Redmond's appeal
was to men's judgment and convictions, not to those instincts which lie
deepest and most potent in the heart of man. That was the limitation to
his greatness. He could lead only by convincing men that he was right.
If in the end it is true he failed to convince his countrymen and failed
to carry them with him, this book has told what difficulties were set in
his way, not so much by those who desired a different end than his, but
by those who desired the same end. Yet admit that he failed and that he
fell from power. No man holds power for ever, and during seventeen
continuous years he held the leadership among his own people with far
more than all the personal ascendancy of a Prime Minister in one of the
oversea Dominions; and he held it without any of the binding force which
control of administration and patronage bestows. He left his people
improved in their material circumstances to an almost incredible degree,
as compared with their state when he began his work.
Yet Ireland counts his life a failure, and he most assuredly accepted
that view; for he died heartbroken, not for his own sake but for
Ireland's, because he had not won through to the goal. His action upon
the war was his life's supreme action; he felt this, and knew that it
had failed to achieve its end. By that action let us judge him, for all
else is trivial in comparison beside it.
It is said by his critics that he bargained badly. If reply were made
that he believed the Allied cause to be right and desired to lead his
country according to his conception of justice, we should be answered
that he was in charge of his country's interests, not of her morals; and
he would have admitted an element of truth in this. Yet, as in the Boer
War he had led his countrymen to support what he conceived to be the
right cause, even with certain injury to their own, so now assuredly he
would not have acted as he did, had he not been convinced that Ireland's
honour was to be served as well as her advantage.
But when there is talk of bargaining, it is well to consider what he had
to bargain with. No one in August 1914 anticipated the course of the
war. No one foresaw the need for the last man available. It was more
than a year before Great Britain could even equip the men who pressed
themselves forward for service. All that he really had in his hand to
give or to withhold was the value of Ireland's moral support. Could he
by waiting his time have made a better bargain?
When that critical hour came, Redmond knew in his, bones the weight of
Ireland's history; he knew all the propensities which would instantly
tend to assert themselves, unless their play was checked by a strong
counter-emotion. He knew that if Ireland said nothing and did nothing at
the crisis, things would be said of Ireland which would rapidly engender
rising passion; and with the growth of that passion all possibility, not
of bargaining but of controlling the situation between the two countries
would be gone. In plain language, if he had not acted at once, his only
chance for action would have been in heading an Ireland hostile to
England. In this war, with the issue defined as it was from the outset,
he could only have done this by denying all that he believed. But apart
from his judgment of the merits, there was his purpose of unity to be
served. Ulster was the difficulty; all other obstacles were disposed of.
How could he hope for an Ulster united to Ireland, if Ulster were
divided from Ireland on the war?
Everything depended on an instant and almost desperate move. He might
have left the sole offer of service from Ireland to lie with Sir Edward
Carson. What he did actually was to offer instantly all that the
Ulstermen had offered, and more, for he proposed active union in Ireland
itself. It was a bold stroke, but it was guided by an ideal perpetually
present with him--the essential unity of Ireland. To set Irishmen
working together at such a crisis in the common name of Ireland was an
object for which he was willing to jeopardize the whole organization
which stood behind him, at a moment when he could speak of full right
for three-fourths of his countrymen. And, when he is called a failure,
let it be remembered that in this he did not fail.
This fight is not yet ended, the long battle is not lost. Had Ireland
from the first stood aloof, had she been drawn at the war's opening into
the temper which she displayed in its closing stages, then indeed we
might despair of any hopeful issue, any genuine peace between these two
neighbouring islands, and, what matters infinitely more, between the
strong yet divergent strains that make up Ireland itself.
But as the mists of passion clear and deeds rather than words come into
sharp light, it will be seen and realized that for a thousand Irishmen
who risked their lives to defeat Redmond's effort there were fifty
thousand who at his summons took on themselves far greater hardships and
faced dangers far more terrible. By them we take our stand--we who
followed Redmond, who believed and still believe in his wisdom. We wish
no word of his last years unspoken, no act undone by that great and
generous-hearted Irishman in the supreme period of his life. In his
defeat and ours, we accept no defeat; we shall endeavour to keep our
will set, as his was, for a final triumph which can mean humiliation for
no Irish heart. Tangled as are the threads of all his policy, he leaves
the task far nearer to accomplishment than he found it; and if in the
end freedom and prosperity come to a united Ireland, they will be found
to proceed--however deeply overlaid by years and by events may be the
chain of causation--from the action which John Redmond took in August
1914, and upon which his brother, with a legion like him, set the seal
of his blood.
To have served long and faithfully without reward--to have given all of
life to one high purpose--to have faced a great crisis greatly--these
are claims enough for Redmond that the allegiance of his comrades and
followers may be justified when it is judged. The grave has closed over
him, and the rest is for us to do, that a coping-stone may be set on his
life's labours, and that reparation final and conclusive, for what he
suffered undeservedly, may yet be offered to the dead.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 10: When ultimately we did meet, these were the elements which
assembled.]
[Footnote 11: His notes here are only references to quotations. I
supplement on this page by my own notes.--S.G.]
[Footnote 12: He was knighted for his work in connection with the war.]
[Footnote 13: These are my notes, jotted as he spoke.--S.G.]
[Footnote 14: Subject to the publication of a Report signed by Bishop
O'Donnell, and these in agreement with him reaffirmed their view.]
[Footnote 15: The following, though unavoidably absent at the critical
moment, joined with us: M.K. Barry, Cork County Council; J. Butler,
Kilkenny County Council; Patrick Dempsey, Belfast; M. Governey, Carlow
Urban Council; M.J. Minch, Kildare County Council.]
INDEX
Agar-Robartes, Mr., 68-69
Ancient Order of Hibernians, 259
Army--
Irish Brigades raised for the War--
Sixteenth Division,
staffing of, 174, 187-188;
development of opinions in, 188;
10th Division made up from, 194-195;
proceeds to France, 200-201;
in action, 230, 241;
Messines, 264-265;
Ypres, 306
Tenth Division, 195
Tyneside Battalions, 190
Ulster Division, 201;
on the Somme, 240;
Messines, 264-265;
Ypres, 306
Irish Nationalist attitude to, 140-141
Irish recruiting--
Redmond's efforts, 154-155, 158, 176-179, 185, 191-192, 199, 202,
207, 211;
efforts handicapped by Government, 163, 175-6, 177, 190-191, 206;
letter to Birrell, 160;
Sinn Féin propaganda against, 219
Irish Regulars' achievements, 150;
in Gallipoli, 195 ff.
Ulster sympathies of, 83, 99, 104 ff.;
the Curragh incident, 105-109
Ashe, Thomas, 300-2
Asquith, H.H.,
struggle of, with House of Lords, 43-46, 50;
on indivisibility of Ireland, 69, 72;
Ladybank speech, (Oct., 1913), 85
War Minister, 109
response to Redmond's National Defence offer, 138, 143
on Ulster preparations for resisting Home Rule, 148
fails Redmond, 153, 167
recruiting speech in Dublin, 155-157
the Coalition, 192
Redmond's letter to, against conscription, 208-209
the Rebellion, 226
reports on his visit to Ireland, 232
breaks faith with Redmond, 239-240
displaced, 244
estimate of, 87, 93
mentioned, 30, 34, 41, 73, 138, 139
Aughavanagh, 37-39, 267
Balfour, A.J., 55-56
Balfour, G., 23
Barrie, Mr., 271, 304, 308, 321
Beatty, Admiral, 158
Bernard, Dr., Abp. of Dublin, 272, 310, 318
three points of, 291 ff.
Biggar, Joseph, 6
Birrell, A., Redmond's letter to, on the Volunteers, 160
on Kitchener's attitude to Irish National Volunteers, 162
_Appreciation_ of Redmond quoted, 162, 184
the Rebellion, 219-220
mentioned, 31, 69, 139, 198
Blake, E., 24
Brade, Sir R., 203
Budget of 1909-10, 42, 47
Butler, Sir W., 5
Butt, Isaac, 6
Campbell, Sir James, 219
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H., 34, 337
Carson, Sir E.,
the Covenant demonstrations, 72;
moves exclusion of Ulster, 75;
on Ulster and the Army, 105;
on possibility of persuading Ulster, 114;
the Speaker's Conference, 121;
attitude to Home Rule enactment, 148-149;
joins the Coalition, 192-193;
interpretation of exclusion proposals, 234;
refuses joint platform at Newry, 200;
kills Volunteer Bill, 208;
on conscription for Ireland, 210, 211;
final victory against Redmond, 240;
temperamental attitude to Home Rule, 96-97;
quoted, 67, 71, 80-81, 83, 100;
appeal on Ulster's claim, 97-98;
mentioned, 89, 229, 260, 263
Casement, Sir Roger, 116, 221, 223;
quoted, 115, 118
Castletown, Lord, 24
Cecil, Lord Hugh, 50
Cecil, Lord Robert, 115
Chamberlain, Austen, 102
Churchill, Winston,
Belfast speech of (1912), 62, 67;
devolution proposal, 71;
Bradford speech (1914), 103-104;
the Larne gun-running, 113;
mentioned, 77, 84
Citizen Army, the, 180, 183;
the Rebellion, 218
Clark, Sir George, 271-272
Clarke, ----, execution of, 224
Clancy, J.J., 269, 318, 332
Coalition formed, 192-193
Coercion, 8-9, 16, 82
Colthurst, Capt., 228, 231
Commons, House of,
Parnell's obstruction in, 6 ff.;
payment of members, 52;
scene after passing Home Rule Bill, 152;
disgust of, at Redmond's defeat, 240;
Redmond's estimate of, 12;
his familiarity with, 111
Congested Districts Board, 28
Connolly, James, 183;
the Rebellion, 218, 224
Conscription,
Redmond's opposition to, 208 ff., 242, 247-248;
application of, to Ireland, 334
Convention, _see_ Irish Convention
Craig, Capt., 51, 70, 105;
quoted, 95
Crooks, Will, 152
Crozier, Dr., Abp. of Armagh, 198, 272, 279, 300, 302, 310, 330
Curragh incident, 105-109
Curzon, Col., 187
Dalton, Miss (Mrs. John Redmond), 14, 20
Davitt, Michael, 8, 19
Davitt (young), 116
de Robeck, Admiral, despatch of, 195-196
de Valera, E., 268, 269
Desart, Lord, 273, 318
Devlin, J.,
in Redmond's "inner cabinet," 25, 36;
his supporters' disappointment on compromise, 109;
recruiting successes of, 177, 179;
indispensable in Ireland, 183;
carries Belfast Convention for exclusion proposals, 235;
on the Irish Convention, 269, 304, 310, 322;
estimate of, 21;
Redmond's estimate of, 235;
mentioned, 48, 84, 155, 263
Devolution, 28, 71
Dillon, John,
relations with Redmond, 25, 36;
on coercion, 82;
an Irish Volunteer movement, 115;
speech on suppression of the Rebellion, 231;
declines to serve on the Irish Convention, 269;
mentioned, 16, 100, 109, 121, 129, 155
Doran, Capt., 274-275
Doyle, Sir A. Conan, cited, 131-132
Dublin strike (1913), 90, 273
Duke, Sir. H.E., 240, 275
Dunraven, Lord, 27, 28, 77;
on the Convention, 273, 282, 317-318, 330
Ewart, Sir S., 108
Field, William, 24
Financial Relations Commission, 24, 75
Fingall, Lord, 174
Forster, W.E., 79
Franchise Bill (1917), 302, 304-305, 311
French, Sir John, 107, 108
Friend, General, 198
Gallipoli, Irish troops in, 195 ff.
General Elections--
1906, 43
1910 (Jan.), 43-44
1910 (Dec.), 49
1918, 231
George V, King, 121
George, D. Lloyd,
non-Irish preoccupations of, 41-42;
Conciliation mission after the Rebellion, 232;
agreement with the Irish, 234;
agreement thrown over, 239;
Redmond's hopes from, as Premier, 244-245;
on Irish distrust, 246;
supports the "two nations" theory, 255;
the Convention, 260;
letter to Plunkett, 324;
conference with Convention representatives, 325;
proposals to the Convention, 326 ff.;
quoted on Ulster, 73
Gladstone, W.E., 11, 17, 42, 130, 317;
breach with Parnell, 18-19;
retirement, 23
Gladstone, W.G.C., 66
Gough, Gen., quoted, 105 ff.
Government, delays of, 185, 236-237, 244, 247;
general attitude to Redmond, _see under_ Redmond
Granard, Lord, 273, 282
Grey, Earl, 78
Grey, Lord (Sir Edward), Ulster proposals of, 85, 86;
speech on outbreak of War, 128-130;
quoted, 66;
mentioned, 30, 108
Harbison, Mr., 270
Harty, Abp. of Cashel, 270
Hayden, Mr., 38, 130-131
Hazleton, Mr., 14
Healy, T.M., returned for Wexford, 7-8;
attacks on Redmond and Nationalist Party, 34, 273;
opposition to county option, 100, 111-112;
declines to serve on Convention, 269;
quoted, 256;
mentioned, 15, 16, 47, 49
Hickie, Maj.-Gen, W.B., 201, 265
Hulk, Maj.-Gen., 268
Hobson, Bulmer, quoted, 115,159
Home Rule Bill (1912), demonstrations for and against, 62;
National Convention, 65, 66;
Ulster's attitude, 65, 67 ff.;
exclusion proposals, 68, 78, 84, 99;
devolution proposals, 71;
Unionist converts, 73;
in Committee, 68, 74;
financial arrangements under, 74-75;
Report stage, 75;
Third Reading, 77;
in the Lords, 77 ff.;
third Introduction (1914), 99;
inadequate private discussion of, by Irish Party, 100-101;
the Amending Bill, 121, 126;
the Speaker's Conference, 121 ff.;
amending Bill postponed, 126;
operation of, to be deferred, 148-149;
Royal assent, 151;
Asquith's move towards securing immediate operation of,
after the Rebellion, 232;
O'Connor's demand for, 249
Hopwood, Sir Francis, 275
Industrial depression in Ireland under the War, 184
_Irish at the Front, The_, quoted, 201
Irish Brigades, _see under_ Army
Irish Convention--
Committee of Nine, 304, 307, 310
Financial considerations, 285, 286, 293-295, 307, 309;
Lord Midleton's proposals, 312-323;
Lloyd George's proposals, 326-332
First meeting of, 271
Fraternization between representatives, 286-287
Grand Committee of Twenty, 301, 303, 307, 311
Inception of, 258, 260
Intermediate Authority proposal, 285-286
Land Purchase Sub-Committee, 304, 317
Personnel of, 271 ff.
Preliminaries, 269
Procedure adopted, 280
Reports presented by, 330
Sinn Féin attitude to, 263-264, 267-268
Spirit of, 279-280
Ulster representatives, attitude of, 321;
attitude to Redmond, 323;
Report presented by, 330
Irish Council Bill (1907), 31 ff., 78
_Irish Independent_, 273, 330
Irish Party, discipline of, 12-13;
personnel of, 59;
Redmond's relations with, 59-61
Irish relations with England most cordial (1916), 213
Irish suspicion, 189-90
Irish Volunteers, Redmond's policy repudiated by, 155-156;
collisions with National Volunteers, 180;
Rebellion of 1916, 218 ff.
(_See also_ National Volunteers)
Jameson, Andrew, 271, 298
Judge, M.J., cited, 132
Kavanagh, W.M., 274, 318
Kelley, Dr., Bp. of Ross, 270, 293, 310, 323
Kenny, Dr., 38
Ker, S.P., quoted, 202
Kettle, Prof., T.M., 14, 93;
recruiting work of, 186;
killed in action, 241;
estimate of, 185
Kitchener, Earl,
attitude of, to Irish Volunteers, 138-140, 153, 160, 162, 175, 181;
Redmond's interview with, on recruiting, 198-199, 205;
letter on Irish recruiting, 199;
estimate of, 138
Knight, Mr., 294-295
Labour Party, 44, 87, 108
Land Act (1909), 41
Land League, 8
Land Purchase, 17, 27-28
Lang, Dr., Abp. of York, on Ulster, 78-80
Lansdowne, Marquis of, 29, 236, 238
Larkin, James, 90, 183, 273
Larne Gun-running, 112-114
Law, A. Bonar,
speeches of, on Ulster, 65, 70;
Ulster policy, 77, 83, 87, 99, 163;
protest against enactment of Home Rule, 149;
quoted on Major Willie Redmond, 245;
estimate of, 56;
mentioned, 132, 178
Liberal Party, 13, 29
Lincolnshire, Marquis of,
Volunteer Bill of, 205, 208
Liquor trade in Ireland, 42
Local Government Act (1897), 24
Long, W., quoted, 216
Longford Election, 257, 259
Lonsdale, Sir John, 263
Lords, House of,
Veto controversy, 42 ff., 50, 52, 57;
Conference, 48
Loreburn, Lord, 84
Lynch, Arthur, 129
Lysaght, Edward, 273, 282, 296, 301-302
McCarthy, Justin, 13;
quoted, 26
McCullagh, Sir C., 284
MacDermott, Dr., 272
MacDonagh, 201;
the Rebellion, 218, 224
MacDonnell, Sir Anthony,
devolution scheme of, 28-29;
supports Home Rule Bill, 78;
in the Convention, 273, 282, 310, 317
McDowell, Sir Alexander, 272, 303-304, 307-308
MacNeill, Prof.,
promotes Nationalist arming, 93;
volunteer following of, 180;
the Rebellion, 219;
cited, 164, 180-181;
mentioned, 64, 116
MacRory, Dr., Bp. of Down and Connor, 270
MacSweeney, Capt., 153
Mahaffy, Dr., Provost of Trinity, 272, 330
Maxwell, Sir John, 225-226
Meath, Lord, 158, 169
Midleton, Lord, 271, 273, 285, 296, 304, 308;
Customs proposals, 310 ff.
Mooney, J.J., 21, 38
Moore, Lt.-Col. M., 159-160, 203
Murphy, W.M., 273, 282, 295, 304, 315, 317
Nathan, Sir M., 220
National Volunteers,
establishment of, 91-92, 94-95, 99;
Redmond's adhesion to, 114;
formidable character of, 114-115;
committee difficulties, 117 ff.;
Bachelor's Walk affair, 123-125;
Redmond's offer of, for National Defence, 134 ff., 203 ff.;
general response, 136-138;
demand for recognition, 153, 159-161, 202-203;
refused, 153, 162, 167, 181, 203, 207-208, 222;
secession of Irish Volunteers from, 155;
Asquith's pledge regarding, 157;
Review of, in Phoenix Park, 204;
Bulmer Hobson's _History_ of, quoted, 115, 159
O'Brien, Patrick, 38, 267
O'Brien, William, attacks by,
on Redmond and National Party, 34;
opposition to Budget (1909), 42, 47;
to Home Rule Bill (1912), 74;
to county option, 100, 111-112;
to the Convention, 263;
declines to serve, 269
O'Cathasaigh, Mr., cited, 91
O'Connor, "Long John," 38
O'Connor, T.P.,
Canadian tour 1910, 48;
recruiting successes of, 190;
motion for immediate Horns Rule, 249;
cited, 203;
mentioned, 25, 100, 130-131
O'Donnell, Dr., Bp. of Raphoe, 270, 284, 294, 303, 304,
308, 310, 312, 330;
speech on Papal Decrees, 299-300
Oranmore, Lord, 313, 319
Paget, Gen. Sir Arthur, 105ff.
Parliament, _see_ Commons _and_ Lords
Parnell, C.S., 6-13, 17-19, 92;
property of, 7, 37;
power of, 58;
anecdote of Willie Redmond and House of Commons, 249
Parnellites, 19-21, 23-25;
fusion of, with anti-Parnellites, 25
Parsons, Lt.-Gen. Sir L., 170ff., 200-201, 204-205
Pearse, Patrick, speech of, in Dublin, 63-64;
Limerick speech, quoted, 94;
secedes from National Volunteers, 118;
the Rebellion, 218, 222-223;
execution, 224
_Phoenix_ Park murders, 14
Pigott, 18
Pirrie, Lord, 293
Plunket, Count, 248
Plunkett, Lord (Sir Horace),
Conference scheme of (1895), 23;
the Convention, 274, 302, 309;
as Chairman, 279;
Lloyd George's letter to, 324
Poe, Col. Sir Hutcheson, 145
Pollock, Mr., 272, 299, 308
Primate, the, _see_ Crozier
Primrose, Neil, 68-69
Primrose Committee, 270, 293-294
Protestant Ascendency, 86, 96, 101
Raymond Le Gros, 2-3
Rebellion, Redmond's attitude to, 3
Rebellion of 1916, 218-219, 221, 227;
denounced by Redmond, 223-224;
suppression of, 224-229;
Government's fomentation of _disaffection_, 227-229;
comparison with South African Rebellion (1914), 225
Recruiting, _see under_ Army
Redmond, John Edward, 4
Redmond, John--
Ancestry and family of, 2-4
Career--
education, 5;
clerkship in the House, 6;
returned for New Ross, 8;
Parliamentary _debut_, 9-11;
Australian and American mission, 14;
marriage, 14;
second American mission, 17;
imprisoned (1888), 17;
chosen leader of Parnellites, 19;
returned for Waterford, 19;
attitude to Roman Catholic Church, 20:
widowed, 20;
second marriage, 21-22;
work with Plunkett, 23-24;
on Commission on Financial Relations, 24;
Chairman of United Irish Party, 25, 58;
his inner cabinet, 25, 58, 100;
attitude to Irish Council Bill, 31-33;
campaign for Home Rule (1907), 34-35;
House of Lords controversy, 45-46, 57;
"Dollar Dictator," 48;
the Nottingham Meeting (1912), 73;
Home Rule campaign (1912) following Carson, 84;
on proposed exclusion of Ulster, 85-86;
attitude to National Volunteers, 92;
speeches on the Ulster position, 98, 99, 102, 109-111;
the Ulster gun-running, 114;
relations with National Volunteers thereafter, 114 ff.;
the Speaker's Conference, 121-122;
speech on outbreak of War, 132 ff.;
offers the Volunteers for national defence, 134ff;
Recruiting manifesto, 151;
refuses office in Coalition Government, 192;
interview with Kitchener on recruiting, 198, 205;
Conference at Viceregal Lodge, 198-199;
visits Irish troops at the Front, 201-202;
opposes Conscription for Ireland, 208 ff.
letter to Asquith, 208
Rebellion of 1916, 219 ff.
Government breach of faith, 238-240;
moves vote of censure, 243;
criticizes Lloyd George, 245;
renewed opposition to conscription, 248;
the Smuts dinner, 257;
the Convention, 258, 261-263;
death of his brother, 256;
death of Pat O'Brien, 267;
in the Convention, 278-279;
relations with Nationalist representatives, 283-284;
speech in Belfast, 289 ff.;
at Westminster, 304;
speech on vote of thanks to the Forces, 305-306;
Meetings of Committee of Nine, 307 ff.;
ill-health, 257, 282, 312, 322;
attitude to Lord Midleton's proposals, 316, 318-321;
tables motion conditionally accepting, 321;
withdraws owing to Nationalist opposition, 322-323;
illness, 325;
operation, 328;
death, 329
Characteristics--
Ambition, lack of, 40, 336
Caution, 282
Courtesy, 26, 35
Eloquence, 41, 88
Lucidity, 41, 53, 59
Moderation, 3, 11
Modesty, 36, 336
Optimism, 74
Peaceable temperament and tolerance, 21, 25, 26, 35, 88
Rest, love of, 38
Reticence, 37
Romantic strain, 37
Self-abnegation, 278, 280
Sensitiveness, 243, 282
Tact, 88
Trustworthiness, 194
Comparison of,
with Campbell-Bannerman, 337;
with Parnell, 338;
position compared, with that of Botha, 158, 172, 184, 212, 224
Estimate of, 335;
Birrell's estimate, 194;
Healy's tribute, 256;
estimate as leader, 59-61, 283, 310, 338;
estimate of his work, 338-341
Government slighting of, and disregard of his advice, 153, 163, 167,
175-176, 190-191, 220, 226, 229, 238-239;
instances of bad faith, 153, 239-240, 246;
recruiting efforts handicapped, 163, 175-176, 177, 190-191, 206
House of Commons life of, 111
Imperialism of, 15
Irishmen, attitude towards, 27, 63
Military sympathies of, 107-108
Oratorical style of, 5
Recruiting efforts of, _see under_ Army
Status of, in Ireland, 171-172
Social isolation of, 13
Stephens' attack on, 276-277
War policy of, 132, 216
Redmond, Major "Willie,"
Australian mission and marriage, 14;
imprisoned (1888), 17;
returned for East Clare, 20;
War service, 182-3, 185, 213-214, 230;
position in his regiment, 188-189;
speeches in the House quoted, 215-216, 245;
advises resignation of Parliamentary party, 259;
last speech in the House, 249-254;
killed in action, 51, 265;
estimate of, 249;
mentioned, 4, 13, 19, 38, 118, 128
Redmond, Major William Archer, 4, 185;
on the Somme, 240;
wins D.S.O., 306;
returned as Nationalist in 1918 election, 231
Redmond, William Archer, 4, 5, 7
Richardson, Gen., 163
Roberts, Lord, 176
Roman Catholic Church, 49, 187
Russell, George ("A.E."),
in the Convention, 274, 282, 304, 310, 312
Sclater, Sir Henry, 204-205
Selborne, Lord, 236
Seely, Col., 108-109
Sexton, Th., 16, 24
Shaw, Mr., 6
Sheehy-Skeffington, Mr., 228, 231
Sinn Féin--
Convention ignored by, 263-264, 267-268
Demonstration by, at funeral of Thomas Ashe, 300
Electoral successes of, 231, 257, 268, 278
Growth of, from May 1916, 232
Propaganda, suspicion fostered by, 189
Rebellion of 1916, _see that heading_
Smith, F.E., quoted, 95
South African War, 24
Stephens, James, quoted, 276-277
Taylor, Capt., J.S., 27
Tennant, H.J., 198, 206
Thomas, J.H., 108
_Times_ forgeries, 18
Ulster--
Administrative autonomy proposal, 85, 86
Arms importation by, 81, 94;
Larne gun-running, 112-114
Asquith's moratorium concession to, 149
Belfast Convention (1916), 235
Churchill's speech (1912), 62
Convention, the (1917), representatives at, 271-272, 285;
their attitude and procedure, 281, 299
County option proposals, 77, 85, 99 ff.;
difficulties of the scheme, 101
Covenant, the, 72;
military covenanters, 83
Exclusion proposals, 68, 78, 84, 233-234;
embodied in the Bill, 99;
time limit discussions, 101-103;
Council of 1916 accepts exclusion proposals, 235
Favouritism applied to, 95, 120, 123, 125, 164, 169, 170, 174
Friendly relations with Nationalists, 51
Home Rule, resistance to, 65, 67 ff.;
Parliamentary majority for, 77;
distribution of Home Rulers, 101
Inseparability of, 69, 76-77, 84
Lloyd George's scheme, 234
Protestant ascendency, 86, 96, 101
Provisional Government formed, 80, 83
Rebellion preparations of, 148
Redmond's efforts to conciliate, 76-77, 109-110, 114
War, attitude on outbreak of, 130
mistrustful of Irish Volunteers, 142
United Irish League, 58, 259, 261
University Act (1908), 41
Vatican Decrees, 49
Wallace, Col., 299
Walsh, Abp., 257
War--
Outbreak, 126 ff.
Redmond's policy regarding, 132, 216;
Nationalist criticism of, 276-277 (_see also_ Army, recruiting)
Ulster's attitude, 130, 142
Ward, Col. John, 108
Waterford, 19
Wexford, 3
_What the Irish Regiments have done_ quoted, 202
White, Capt., J.R., 90-91
Whitley, H.T., 320
Wicklow surroundings, 37-39
Wimborne, Lord, 198, 199, 205
Windle, Sir B., 282, 330
Wyndham, G., 27-29
Shall a man understand,
He shall know bitterness because his kind,
Being perplexed of mind,
Hold issues even that are nothing mated.
And he shall give
Counsel out of his wisdom that none shall hear
And steadfast in vain persuasion must he live,
And unabated
Shall his temptation be.
JOHN DRINKWATER, in _Abraham Lincoln_.
End of Project Gutenberg's John Redmond's Last Years, by Stephen Gwynn