THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES
I
At the ending of the long session of Parliament in 1914 there was a
curious scene in the House of Commons, where members were crowded to
assist at the formal passing of the Irish and Welsh Bills. On the
adjournment, Mr. Will Crooks, from his seat on the front bench below the
gangway, called out, "Mr. Speaker, would it be in order to sing 'God
save the King'?" and without more ado uplifted his voice and the House
chimed in. There must have been strange thoughts in the minds of
Redmond, of Mr. Dillon, and others of the Irish, standing in the places
where they had fought so long and bitter a battle, where they had been
so often the object of fierce reproaches, whence they had hurled back so
many taunts, now to find themselves the centre of congratulation, and
joined with English members in singing on the floor of the House that
national anthem which in Ireland had been for decades a symbol of
ascendancy, rigidly tabooed by every Nationalist.
When the singing ended, Mr. Crooks's genial voice rose again. "God save
Ireland!" he shouted.
"And God save England too!" Redmond answered.
That exchange of words outside the period of debate is, contrary to
usage but very properly, recorded in Hansard.
From this time forth Redmond was on his trial. He had given pledges; he
must make good to Ireland and make good to Great Britain. For the first,
since Home Rule could not be brought into operation, he must secure
recognition of the National Volunteers, must establish and regularize
their status; for the second, he must obtain recruits as Ireland's
contribution to the war. The two proposals were in his view--and indeed
were in reality--inseparably connected. For both, in order to succeed,
he needed to have the cordial support of his fellow-countrymen; for
both, he needed whole-hearted co-operation from the British Government.
It would be too much to say that Ireland backed him cordially; but for
the limitation of Ireland's response the fault lay chiefly and primarily
with the Government, which failed him completely. The War Office could
not actually and directly oppose his effort to raise troops; what they
could do was to hamper him by the adoption of wrong methods and the
refusal of right ones. Yet in that part of his task which involved
making good to England, laying England and the Empire under a debt of
living gratitude, his appeal was made to Ireland, and he succeeded so
far that only Ireland herself could have destroyed his work. But on the
other point, which involved gaining satisfaction for Ireland, the appeal
was made to Government and the refusal was complete. It was worse than
absolute, for it was tainted with bad faith. Mr. Asquith as Prime
Minister accepted the mutual covenant which Redmond had proposed, and
allowed Lord Kitchener to disallow fulfilment of it.
Redmond's view was not limited to Ireland's interest. No man living in
these islands felt more keenly for the great underlying principles at
issue in the war. His mission, as he conceived it, was to lead Ireland
to serve those principles. But it was futile to suppose that he could
secure for England all that England expected of Ireland if he could
obtain from England nothing of what Ireland asked. Redmond wanted
recognition for the Volunteers chiefly as a basis upon which Ireland
could feel that she was building an Irish army worthy of her record in
arms; and this army would be no mean assistance to the nations allied
against Germany's aggression. Considering all the facts which have to be
set out, the true cause for wonder is not the limitation but the extent
of his success.
There was neither delay nor uncertainty in his exposition of Ireland's
duty. Quite literally, he seized the first chance that came to his hand.
He left London on the evening when the Act was signed, motored to
Holyhead, as he liked to do, in the big car which his friends had
presented to him--it was the only material testimonial which he ever
received--and crossed by the night boat, driving on in the morning to
Aughavanagh. When he reached the Vale of Ovoca he found a muster of the
East Wicklow Volunteers. These were the nearest thing to him in all the
force--his own friends and neighbours from the Wicklow hills. Aughrim,
his post-town at the foot of his own particular valley, had its company,
commanded by a friend of his, the local schoolmaster--typical of what
was best in the Volunteers, a keen Gaelic Leaguer, tireless in, work for
the old language and old history. This man, well on in the forties, but
mountain-bred and hardy, had thrown himself into the new
movement--little guessing that a few months would see him a private in
the British Army, or that he would come with honour to command a company
of a famous Irish regiment on the battlefields of a European war.
If it had been only for the sake of Captain MacSweeny (he was then, of
course, only a captain of Volunteers), I think Redmond would have
stopped. But it was a gathering of many friends, who pressed him to
speak at a moment when his heart was full. Grave results followed from
what he said that day; but a week sooner or later he was bound to say
these things, and the results were bound to follow. Here is the pith of
his utterance:
"I know that you will make efficient soldiers. Efficient for what?
Wicklow Volunteers, in spite of the peaceful happiness and beauty
of the scene in which we stand, remember this country at this
moment is in a state of war, and the duty of the manhood of Ireland
is twofold. Its duty is at all cost to defend the shores of Ireland
from foreign invasion. It has a duty more than that, of taking care
that Irish valour proves itself on the field of war as it has
always proved itself in the past. The interests of Ireland, of the
whole of Ireland, are at stake in this war. This war is undertaken
in defence of the highest principles of religion and morality and
right, and it would be a disgrace for ever to our country, a
reproach to her manhood, and a denial of the lessons of her
history, if young Ireland confined their efforts to remaining at
home to defend the shores of Ireland from an unlikely invasion, or
should shrink from the duty of proving on the field of battle that
gallantry and courage which have distinguished their race all
through all its history. I say to you, therefore, your duty is
twofold. I am glad to see such magnificent material for soldiers
around me, and I say to you: go on drilling and make yourselves
efficient for the work, and then account for yourselves as men, not
only in Ireland itself, but wherever the firing-line extends, in
defence of right and freedom and religion in this war."
On the following Thursday Mr. Asquith, as Redmond had publicly urged him
to do, came to Dublin and spoke at the Mansion House with the Lord Mayor
in the chair. Mr. Dillon and Mr. Devlin, as well as Redmond, were on the
same platform and spoke also. The papers of September 25th, which
reported the speeches of this notable gathering, contained also a
manifesto from twenty members of the original Committee of the
Volunteers, definitely breaking with Redmond's policy and taking his
speech to the Wicklow Volunteers as their cause of action. Having
recited a version of the facts which led up to the inclusion of
Redmond's nominees on the Committee, it continued:
"Mr. Redmond, addressing a body of Irish Volunteers on last Sunday,
has now announced for the Irish Volunteers a policy and programme
fundamentally at variance with their own published and accepted
aims and objects, but with which his nominees are, of course,
identified. He has declared it to be the duty of the Irish
Volunteers to take foreign service under a Government which is not
Irish. He has made this announcement without consulting the
Provisional Committee, the Volunteers themselves, or the people of
Ireland, to whose service alone they are devoted."
The next paragraph announced the expulsion of Redmond's nominees and the
reconstitution of the Committee as it existed before their admission.
Six resolutions followed. It is noteworthy that the attitude taken up
with regard to autonomy was simply "to oppose any diminution of the
measure of Irish self-government which now exists as a Statute on
paper," and to repudiate any "consent to the legislative dismemberment
of Ireland." There was no word of an Irish Republic and no explicit
claim beyond immediate operation for the Home Rule Act.
Ireland's attitude towards the war was defined by a resolution:
"To declare that Ireland cannot, with honour or safety, take part
in foreign quarrels otherwise than through the free action of a
National Government of her own; and to repudiate the claim of any
man to offer up the blood and lives of the sons of Irishmen and
Irishwomen to the service of the British Empire while no National
Government which could speak and act for the people of Ireland is
allowed to exist."
Mr. Asquith, when he spoke on Thursday night, must have been informed
that this split was imminent, and he spoke with a view to that
situation. He said:
"Speaking here in Dublin, I address myself for a moment
particularly to the National Volunteers, and I am going to ask them
all over Ireland--not only them, but I make the appeal to them
particularly--to contribute with promptitude and enthusiasm a large
and worthy contingent of recruits to the second new army of half a
million which is now growing up, as it were, out of the ground. I
should like to see, and we all want to see, an Irish Brigade--or,
better still, an Irish Army Corps. Don't let them be afraid that by
joining the colours they will lose their identity and become
absorbed in some invertebrate mass, or what is perhaps equally
repugnant, be artificially redistributed into units which have no
national cohesion or character.
"We shall, to the utmost limit that military expediency will allow,
see that men who have been already associated in this or that
district in training and in common exercises shall be kept together
and continue to recognize the corporate bond which now unites them.
One thing further. We are in urgent need of competent officers, and
when the officers now engaged in training these men prove equal to
the test, there is no fear that their services will not be gladly
and gratefully retained. But, I repeat, gentlemen, the Empire needs
recruits and needs them at once. They may be fully trained and
equipped in time to take their part in what may prove to be the
decisive field in the greatest struggle of the history of the
world. That is our immediate necessity, and no Irishman in
responding to it need be afraid he is jeopardizing the future of
the Volunteers.
"I do not say, and I cannot say, under what precise form of
organization it will be, but I trust and I believe--indeed, I am
sure--that the Volunteers will become a permanent, an integral and
characteristic part of the defensive forces of the Crown.
"I have only one more word to say. Though our need is great, your
opportunity is also great. The call which I am making is backed by
the sympathy of your fellow-Irishmen in all parts of the Empire and
of the world.... There is no question of compulsion or bribery.
What we want, what we ask, what we believe you are ready and eager
to give, is the freewill offering of a free people."
This was a double pledge as to Redmond's two objects. It promised,
first, that every inducement should be given to join a corps
distinctively Irish and having national cohesion and character;
secondly, that the Volunteers should obtain recognition as part of
the defensive forces of the Crown. Over and above this was an
assurance of enormous importance. There was to be no question of
compulsion. Nothing was asked, nothing would be asked, but "the
freewill offering of a free people."
Lord Meath followed, a representative figure of Unionist Ireland and a
most zealous promoter of recruiting. Then Redmond spoke, and as usual
dwelt on Ireland's contribution to the forces of the Regular Army so far
actually engaged, which was fully adequate in numbers. "As to quality,
let Sir John French answer for that, and let my friend and
fellow-countryman Admiral Beatty from Wexford speak from
Heligoland."--Nothing gave him more pleasure at all times than to dwell
on the personal achievement of Irishmen; his voice kindled when he named
such names.--He went on to give confident assurance, having in it the
note of defiant answer to the revolt which had been raised:
"I tell the Prime Minister he will get here plenty of recruits and of
the best material. We will maintain here in Ireland intact and inviolate
our Irish National Volunteers, and in my judgment that body of
Volunteers will prove to be an inexhaustible source of strength to the
new army corps and the new army that is being created."
Then, with disdainful reference to the "little handful of pro-Germans"
who had "raised their voices in Ireland," he declared that it would be
no less absurd to consider them representative than to take General
Beyers and not General Botha as expressing the sentiments of South
Africa.
Yet, as we know, the danger in South Africa was serious, and South
Africa possessed freedom, not the promise of freedom. General Botha had
what Redmond was denied--power to act and act promptly. In Ireland the
menace was far less grave at this moment, but it was destined to become
overpowering because Redmond lacked the power to deal with the situation
in his own way. Already much had been lost. Between the declaration of
war and the passage of the Home Rule Bill more than six weeks had been
allowed to elapse in which nothing was done in response to Redmond's
proposal, except the purely negative decision that Territorials should
not be sent to garrison Ireland. This inevitably strengthened the hand
of those who never liked the offer he had made. From the first an accent
of dissent from the new policy was plainly distinguishable in what came
from the Committee of the Volunteers. Mr. Bulmer Hobson says of the
famous speech of August 4th:
"This statement amounted to an unconditional offer of the services
of the Irish Volunteers to the English Government, and was made
without any consultation with the Volunteers themselves. The first
that members of the Provisional Committee heard of their being
offered to the Government was when they read it in the newspapers,
and Mr. Redmond's nominees on the Committee were as much surprised
as the older members. At the next meeting of the Standing
Committee, held a couple of days later, the nominated members
strove hard to induce us to endorse Redmond's offer. The utmost
they could get, however, notwithstanding their clear party
majority, was a statement of 'the complete readiness of the Irish
Volunteers to take joint action with the Ulster Volunteer Force for
the defence of Ireland.' Further than that the older members of the
Committee declined to go. This statement in reality committed, and
was meant to commit, the Volunteers to nothing, though it was
interpreted by the Press as a complete endorsement of Mr. Redmond's
policy."
At the beginning of the war, there were two strong currents of desire in
the Volunteer body and its backers. One sought that the Volunteers
should retain complete freedom of action and in no way be brought under
the War Office. The other craved to see them trained and armed with the
least possible delay. Colonel Moore,[5] who was the chief of their
military staff at this time, says Mr. Hobson, saw no way of
accomplishing the latter object without the assistance of the military
authorities. Other men, who had come in since Redmond's speech,
impressed on the public that without legal recognition from the Crown no
Volunteer could act against the Germans in case of a landing without
exposing himself and others to the penalties which Germany was
inflicting in Belgium wherever the civilian population fired a shot. As
a result, negotiations were opened in August 1914 with the Irish
Command, and Colonel Moore, in concert with General Paget's staff, drew
up a scheme for training the Irish and Ulster Volunteers and for using
them when trained for a short term of garrison duty in Ireland. The
scheme was submitted to the Provisional Committee, who added conditions
designed to lead to rejection by the War Office; and in the upshot
Colonel Moore's proposals were refused by Lord Kitchener on one side and
by the Standing Committee of Volunteers on the other.
Redmond was of course aware of the failure of this scheme, and took up
the matter personally. He wrote to the Chief Secretary:
HOUSE OF COMMONS,
_September 9, 1914. Private_.
MY DEAR MR. BIRRELL,
I am very anxious to put shortly before you on paper my views with
reference to the Volunteer question, which we discussed with the
Prime Minister to-day. I take so strong a view on the subject that
I think I must ask you to show him this letter and to urge upon him
the importance of getting the War Office to move. I know the
influences that are at work in the War Office throwing cold water
on the Volunteers and causing intense dissatisfaction in Ireland by
unnecessary delays.
What I suggest should be done is this: There are two separate
questions: (1) Recruits; and (2) Volunteers for Home Defence.
The first absolutely depends upon the way in which the second is
treated. If the existing Volunteer organization is ignored and
sneered at and made little of, recruiting in the country will not
go ahead.
On the other hand, if the Volunteers are properly treated, I
believe that recruiting will go ahead.
Now, my suggestion is this: that an announcement should be made
immediately that the War Office are taking steps to assist in the
equipment and arming and instructing of a certain number of the
Irish Volunteers for Home Defence, and that this will be done
without interfering in any way with the character or organization
of the existing Volunteer Force.
Carrying out this programme will really not stand in the way of the
preparing of the new Army. All that is required is a few thousand
rifles, and there are plenty of them in the military stores in
Ireland at this moment which are not being used and will not be
used, because they are too old, in the training of the recruits,
but which would be quite suitable for making a beginning at any
rate in the drilling of the Volunteers. It might be stated that
they would be replaced by better weapons gradually, as soon as the
rush was over.
A few instructors should be placed at the disposal of the
Volunteers.[6]
If this is done, intense satisfaction will be given all through the
country, and the pride and sentiment of the Volunteers will be
touched, and the appeal for recruits generally through the country,
and even in the ranks of the Volunteers themselves, will, I am
confident, be responded to.
But, as I have said, if this course is not taken, inevitably
recruiting will flag.
I would earnestly beg of you to take this matter vigorously in
hand, so that some satisfactory announcement may be made before I
return to Ireland next week.
Very truly yours,
RIGHT HON. A. BIRRELL, M.P. J.E. REDMOND.
Mr. Asquith's speech on September 24th was at least an indication that
the Prime Minister desired to act in the spirit of Redmond's
suggestions. The Chief Secretary was of the same disposition. But
neither of them was able to control the imperious colleague who now had
taken charge of the Army, and who in the most critical moment thwarted
effectually the designs of Liberal statesmanship in Ireland.
After Redmond's death an "Appreciation" published in _The Times_ (with
the signature "A.B.,") by Mr. Birrell, contained this passage:
"He felt to the very end, bitterly and intensely, the stupidity of
the War Office. Had he been allowed to deflect the routine
indifference and suspicion of the War Office from its old ruts into
the deep-cut channels of Irish feelings and sentiments, he might
have carried his countrymen with him, but he jumped first and tried
to make his bargain afterwards and failed accordingly. English
people, as their wont is, gushed over him as an Irish patriot and
flouted him as an Irish statesman. Had he and his brother been put
in charge of the Irish Nationalist contingents, and an Ulster man,
or men, been put in a corresponding position over the Irish
Protestant contingents, all might have gone well. Lord Kitchener,
who was under the delusion that he was an Irishman no less than
Redmond, was the main, though not the only obstacle in the path of
good sense and good feeling."
Yet it is, to say the least, not clear why Lord Kitchener should have
been allowed to be an obstacle. Redmond was not fortunate in his allies.
He had set an example of generous courage; it was not followed by
British statesmen.
From the very outset of his campaign in Ireland he had two hostilities
to meet. The first was that of the section which had always been opposed
to him--the Unionist party. Into this block he had already driven a
wedge. The _Irish Times_, its principal organ in the South and West, was
now backing him heartily, and, as has been seen, not a few leading
Unionists were doing their utmost to assist. But the real opposition,
that of Ulster, was in no way conciliated. On September 28th, "Covenant
Day," a great meeting was held at which the Ulstermen denounced what
they called the Government's treachery, and declared their implacable
determination never to submit to Home Rule. Mr. Bonar Law for the
British Unionists proclaimed that whereas heretofore his party were
willing to be bound by the verdict of a general election, they now
withdrew that condition, and without any reservation would support
Ulster in whatever course it chose to adopt.
In a purely partisan sense these speeches, and this attitude, did
Redmond no harm in his campaign with Nationalists. When a certain
section of Home Rulers were clamouring that he had been tricked and
betrayed by the Government, had given all and got nothing, it was a good
rejoinder to point to the fact that in Ulster's opinion the opportunity
had been used to gain an unfair victory for Home Rule. But Redmond from
the outbreak of the war had no concern with party or partisan arguments.
He wanted a real truce, an end of bitterness, in Ireland.
There was, moreover, a feature of the Ulster propaganda in these days
which disturbed him. General Richardson, a retired Indian officer, who
had chief command of the Ulster Volunteer Force, in appealing for
recruits, urged the Volunteers "to recollect the events of March last
and what the Navy and Army did for Ulster. They came to the help of
Ulster in the day of trouble, and would come again." He added his
assurance to the Volunteers that "when the war was over, and their ranks
were reinforced by some 12,000 men, thoroughly well trained and with
vast field experience, they would return to the attack and relegate Home
Rule to the devil."
It did not assist Redmond in gaining recruits for the Army that a
general officer should represent the services as trusty and proven
allies of gentlemen whose leading idea in life was to relegate Home Rule
to such a destination The average Nationalist civilian did not easily
discriminate between what was said by a retired officer out of
commission and what was said by officers in uniform. There was a
tendency to regard General Richardson as speaking of right for the
Army--for which Nationalist recruits were desired.
The Liberal Government could not help Redmond to allay Ulster or
Unionist hostility. One thing they could do; they could ensure that
whatever concession or privilege was extended to those who followed Sir
Edward Carson should be equally accorded to those who followed Redmond.
This one thing which they could have done they did not do. They allowed
the War Office to increase the arrogance of the Ulstermen and to weaken
Redmond's hand, giving Ulster special privileges, which inevitably
created jealousy and suspicion in Nationalist Ireland--as shall be shown
in detail.
But first it is necessary to indicate the other element of
hostility--far more serious than that of Ulster, because it challenged
Redmond's leadership. It was that of the extremist group, which rapidly
began to welcome German successes, not for any love to Germany but
because it could not conceive of any hope for Ireland except in the
weakening or Destruction of British power. These men, as been already
seen, had acquired an influence in the Volunteer Force out of all
proportion to their numbers, owing to the fact that the Irish party had
stood aloof from the movement in its early stages. Professor MacNeill
said later that but for the Gaelic League and the Gaelic Athletic
Association there would have been no Irish Volunteers. The bulk of both
these bodies was always antagonistic to the parliamentary movement. When
their opposition openly declared itself, in consequence of the East
Wicklow speech, Redmond was not sorry to have a clear issue raised,
involving a formal breach. In a public letter to Colonel Moore he wrote
that he read "this extraordinary manifesto with feelings of great
relief," because communications from all parts of the country had forced
him to the conclusion that so long as the signatories to this document
remained members of the governing body, "no practical work could be done
to put the Volunteer organization on a real business basis."
By a real "business basis" he meant that the Volunteers should be made a
defensive force to act in concert with the troops engaged in the war.
That was the clear issue. You must be for the troops or against them. In
these days the official attitude of those who signed the dissenting
manifesto was that Ireland should be neutral. But at such a crisis, as
Mr. Dillon said in a telling phrase, a man who calls himself a neutral
"is either an enemy or a coward."
It became only too clear later that we had to do with a body of men who
were enemies and were certainly not cowards. Their number at this moment
was difficult to determine. What immediately revealed itself was that
the vast majority of the Volunteers, when choice was forced on them,
adhered to Redmond.
The case of my own constituency, Galway City, may be given as typical,
though rather of the towns than of the country. The country-side was
apathetic; the towns were both for and against Redmond's policy. In
Galway, Sinn Fein had a strong hold on the college of the National
University, but, on the other hand, the depot of the Connaught Rangers
was just outside the city at Renmore, and that famous corps had many
partisans; while in the fishing village of the Claddagh nearly every man
was a naval reservist.
I came to Galway on the day the Home Rule Bill was signed and attended a
couple of Volunteer drills, where I noted the activity of some young men
going round with a password: "For whom will you serve?" "For Ireland
only." After the publication of the dissenting manifesto a Committee was
called, and I obtained leave to be present. There was a sharp
discussion, and at the finish the vote was a tie, whether to support
Redmond or the dissentients. This did not at all please me or my
friends, so we determined to have a big general meeting to see on which
side public support really lay. Everybody was invited, and a great many
people could not get into the hall; this mattered the less because the
Sinn Feiners cut the electric wires leading to the building and plunged
us in darkness; luckily, it was a fine night, and we took the meeting
outside with great success. A couple of interruptions were drastically
dealt with, and complete peace then prevailed. Two of the four county
members were among the many speakers, and the last man to address the
meeting was a wounded Connaught Ranger back from the line. We cheered
for the Rangers, and then we cheered for the King; the local band was
present, but unable, though quite willing, to assist at this point.
"Isn't it a pity," the chief bandsman said to me, "there was three of us
knew the tune well, but they've all gone to the front, and not a one of
us ever heard it."
But as a net result the original Volunteer organization was killed. The
pick of the young and keen who were with us went off to the war; the
young and keen who stayed kept up an organization with very different
purposes. There was plenty of material in Galway and everywhere else to
build up a volunteer corps such as Redmond desired to see; but the
organizing spirits were in the opposite camp, and our friends did not
interest themselves in what seemed to be a kind of play-acting when such
serious business was afoot in the world. Had they been set to duties of
coast patrol, under officers who were available on the spot, and given
clear recognition as part of the defensive forces, their body would have
been alive and active; as it was, it atrophied and grew inert. Broadly
speaking, the same was true all over the country. Redmond was willing to
make bricks for the War Office to build with; they insisted that he
should make them without straw.
Facts directly connected with recruiting ultimately convinced the
British public that the War Office had spoilt a great opportunity in
Ireland. But the fundamental blunder, the deep-seated cause which
undermined the force of Redmond's appeal, was the refusal of recognition
to the National Volunteers and the failure to fulfil the promise held
out in Mr. Asquith's Dublin speech.
II
The other respects in which the War Office crippled the Nationalist
efforts after recruiting were matters of detail, not of principle. The
first and best help which Redmond might expect would have come from his
colleagues in the party; and all the recruiting authorities in Ireland
should have been directed to secure that help locally. No such step was
taken. No attempt was made to enlist Nationalists of position as patrons
of the recruiting campaign. In Catholic Nationalist districts it was the
rule rather than the exception to select gentlemen of the Protestant
Church, and of strong Unionist opinions, as recruiting officers. If
Catholic Nationalists had been selected as the official agents to assist
in raising the Ulster Division, there would have been an outcry, and
very rightly; it would have been contrary to common sense. But the War
Office, always even obsequiously ready to consider the Ulstermen's point
of view, completely lacked sympathy for that of the majority in Ireland.
In some cases the choice of a man locally unpopular on public grounds
afforded--to speak plainly--an excuse for those leading Nationalists
who were loath to depart from all the tradition of their lifetime. Some
of Redmond's colleagues held that they had been "extreme men" all their
lives, and they thought it too hard that they should be expected to ask
Irishmen to join the English Army. Yet these same men would have worked
enthusiastically for the Volunteers, and by sympathy for their comrades
who went out could have been led into a very different attitude.
Many of them, too, felt an honourable scruple about asking others to do
what they could not do themselves. As a parliamentary group we were
under a singular disability. In its early days the Irish party had been,
what Sinn Fein is now, a party of the young. But so strong was the tie
of gratitude that service in its ranks became an inheritance, and in
most cases a man once elected stayed on till he died or resigned. By
1914, of all parties in the House we had by far the largest proportion
of men over military age. I question whether three out of the seventy
could have passed the standard then exacted--for two or three of the
younger men were medically unfit. In these circumstances the War Office
would have been well advised to waive a regulation or two to facilitate
matters; but the rigour of the rules was maintained. One of my
colleagues, a man in the early forties, offered to join as a private; he
was refused. In my own case a similar refusal was based on Lord
Kitchener's personal opinion against that of the Under-secretary for
War, to whom, as a personal friend, I had written; it took nearly six
months to get the decision altered; and by that time the value of
example was much depreciated. The beginning was the chance to give a
lead.
Far graver was the intolerable delay in forming a corps which should
appeal definitely to Irish national and Nationalist sentiment. The First
Army included one Irish Division--the Tenth, destined to a splendid
history, under a popular commander, Sir Bryan Mahon; but it had no
specially Nationalist colour, so to say, and no connection with the
Irish Volunteers. Redmond wanted the counterpart of what had been
readily granted to Sir Edward Carson; and this was what Mr. Asquith had
outlined in his speech at Dublin. The Sixteenth Division already
existed; its commander was appointed on September 17th. But the first
step to give it the desired character was not taken without long delay,
and much heart-burning and confusion resulted.
Part of the confusion is attributable to the fact that Redmond, in his
desire to touch the historic memories connected with the famous corps
which attained its crowning glory at Fontenoy, always spoke of "a new
Irish Brigade." But at the Mansion House meeting Mr. Asquith spoke of
something more than a brigade--an army corps; and Redmond, following
him, instantly accepted the idea. "I used the word 'brigade' in my
ignorance--I meant an Irish army corps." There was always present to his
mind the hope that in some larger formation the Ulster Division might
find itself shoulder to shoulder with other Irish troops.
Yet intending recruits were puzzled, and Lord Meath, writing to Redmond
on October 10th that he had formed a Recruiting Committee in Dublin "for
the purpose of endeavouring to raise the Irish Army Corps for which you
spoke," reported that men came in asking to know where was the Irish
Brigade, and refused to join anything else. Lord Meath suggested that
Redmond should obtain from Lord Kitchener "an official declaration
sanctioning the enlistment of Irishmen in an Irish Brigade, or Irish
Army Corps, consisting exclusively of Irish officers and men." He wrote
again on the 14th, asking that the Prime Minister himself should be
approached, and on the 17th, in reply to some communication from
Redmond: "I hope you will insist on some official and unmistakable
statement that your request has been granted."
The tone of these letters, coming from no fire-eating Nationalist but
the staunchest of Unionist peers, is sufficient proof that Lord
Kitchener's action or inaction was resented by those who knew Ireland
and had the best interests of Ireland at heart. The _Irish Times_ wrote
in the same sense; and on October 19th a formal attack was launched in
the _Daily Chronicle_, which drew a sharp contrast with the treatment
accorded to Ulster. "Up to this hour," the writer said, "the Irish
Division asked for by Mr. Redmond has been refused sanction by the War
Office." This was an overstatement, but it was true that up to this time
such a belief naturally prevailed, because the War Office could not be
induced to make the desired announcement that sanction had been given.
Moreover, although the concession had been made, it was made in a very
different way from that used in dealing with Sir Edward Carson. Redmond
had no voice whatever in the organization. The choice of a divisional
commander was of infinite importance; and it fell upon
Lieutenant-General Sir Lawrence Parsons, K.C.B., an artillery officer of
great distinction, a man of wide general knowledge and culture and of
strongly marked individuality. Yet his individuality did not make him
easy for Redmond to work with. He was not simply a typical professional
soldier of the old Army; he was an idealist in his profession; and part
of the professional soldier's idealism is to resent and despise
political considerations. He recognized that Redmond had spoken and
acted with a statesman's vision; he failed to recognize that in many
matters political tactics are necessary to carry out a statesman's plan.
Also, it was very difficult for him or for any other professional
soldier to realize that recruiting, under such conditions as then
prevailed, was a politician's task, not a soldier's, even in Great
Britain; and that this was tenfold more true of Ireland.
The point requires to be emphasized, because it applies to a greater
personage--Lord Kitchener himself. I believe that Lord Kitchener
honestly desired the success of Redmond's mission. To my personal
knowledge he sent for one officer long known to him and took him from a
command in which he was comfortably placed and sent him, against his
will, to raise one of our battalions in a difficult area. The choice was
absolutely sound, and success was achieved by methods which did not
always follow strictly the letter of King's Regulations. But these
departures from rule were quite in accordance with the spirit of the old
Army, and Lord Kitchener was ready to stand over any of them. He would
do the best he could for our division on the old lines. He would, I am
certain, have said that he had done the best thing possible for it in
appointing to the command an Irishman who was a first-rate soldier and a
first-rate man to supervise the training of troops. So far as my
judgment is able to go, the credit for making the Sixteenth Division
what it was when we went to France belongs chiefly to the divisional
general under whom we trained.
General Parsons had the gift, which appears to be rare in soldiers, of
imparting ideas not merely about discipline but about the art of war;
and he had an enthusiasm which communicated itself. But these were the
qualities of the soldier in his own sphere, with which Redmond had no
contact. What Redmond knew was the writer of letters which now lie
before me. Running through them all is the tone of a soldier in
authority who accepts assistance from a friendly, influential,
well-meaning but imperfectly instructed civilian. There is no
recognition of the fact that Redmond was the accepted leader of a
Volunteer Force numbering over a hundred thousand men; no glimpse of any
perception that morally, and almost officially, Redmond was the
accredited head of the nation in whose name the division was being
raised--a nation to which the statutory right of self-government had
just been accorded.
The whole position was extraordinary. Legally and theoretically, Redmond
was a simple member of Parliament. Practically and morally, he was the
head of Ireland, exactly as Botha was of South Africa; and he was trying
to do without legal powers what Botha was doing by means of them. He was
far more than the Leader of the Opposition in Great Britain; for in
Ireland there really was no Government. Moral authority, which must
proceed from consent of the governed, the Irish Government had not
possessed for many a long day; but its legal status had been
unimpeachable. Now even that was gone; it was merely a stop-gap
contrivance, carrying on till the Act of Parliament should receive
fulfilment; and, as a bare matter of fact, it was powerless. No
operative decision of any moment was taken or could be taken at this
moment in Ireland. Everything was referred to the Cabinet, and that body
had no power to carry out a popular policy in Ireland.
Redmond had put forward a policy which they had accepted in principle.
It could only be carried out through him, and for success he must be
consulted in detail. Neither Lord Kitchener nor General Parsons in fact
recognized the status which this implied. They were prepared to listen
to suggestions from him; they were not prepared to accept guidance, as
they must have done had he been Prime Minister of the country.
It was impossible that Redmond's attitude in dealing with General
Parsons should not imply some sense of the position which he held;
equally impossible, from the temper and mentality of the man, that there
should not be in General Parsons's letters an underlying assertion that
in military matters the military must decide.
The correspondence between the two men opened by a letter from Sir
Lawrence Parsons, who had just established his headquarters at Mallow;
and its chief purpose was to direct Redmond's attention to the fact that
an Irish Division was a much finer and nobler unit than an Irish
Brigade. Two points in it, however, are of interest. "I have been
appointed by Lord Kitchener," said General Parsons, "because I am an
Irishman and understand my countrymen." Also, "I have had a considerable
share in selecting the officers of the Division, almost all Irishmen of
every political and religious creed."
What lay behind the first of these sentences was a profound conviction
that the writer thoroughly understood the necessities of the situation.
That was a disastrous mistake. To understand Ireland at such a moment
was difficult for anyone, impossible for a man who had not been in close
touch with the mental condition produced by all these extraordinary
happenings. The effect of the preparations for rebellion in Ulster, of
the Curragh incident, and of the collision between troops and people in
Dublin--the effect of the existence of a permitted Nationalist Volunteer
Force--the effect of Redmond's appeal: these were three completely novel
and conflicting currents in the stream of Irish life. Nobody could hope
to estimate these developments from a general view, however intelligent,
of Irish history and character, nor even from the most intimate and
sympathetic acquaintance with Irish troops of the old Army.
A proof of the unhappy lack of comprehension is furnished by the second
sentence I have quoted. General Parsons had been most rightly allowed by
the War Office to assist in selecting officers for the Division. But it
had never occurred to either party to consult Redmond on this critical
matter. Does anyone suppose that Sir Edward Carson had no voice in the
staffing of the Ulster Division? He had at all events received from the
first a clear promise that all professional soldiers who had been
officers in the Ulster Volunteers would be officers in the Division, and
that any who had been mobilized should be restored to their associates
in the Division.
General Parsons brought to this whole matter the fine principle that no
man's religious or political beliefs should stand in his way. He omitted
to consider the effect produced on the situation by the fact that the
Ulster Division had been actually allowed to exclude all Catholics, as
such, and to accept no officer who was not politically in sympathy with
Unionist Ulster. Redmond had not the least wish to exclude either
Protestants or Unionists; he wanted all Irishmen on an equality. But he
was bound by common sense and by a perception of realities to desire
that Protestants and Unionists should not appear to monopolize the
command.
Not one of the three brigadiers appointed was generally known in
Ireland, personally or by his connections. One was an Englishman. Of the
officers originally appointed not one in five was a Catholic. No
Catholic commanded a battalion, scarcely half a dozen were field
officers. The only Catholic field officer appointed to the Division who
had been prominently connected with the Volunteers was Lord Fingall, and
he had severed his connection with that body.
All this was a terrible blunder. Whether it was wise or unwise to allow
the formation of a division having the peculiar character of the Ulster
Division may be argued--but certainly Redmond never took exception to
it, and no man who ever saw these Ulstermen in the field can regret its
inception. But once it was formed, its existence created a situation
which had to be recognized. An equivalent ought to have been given; but
no genuine attempt to do this was made.
In replying to Sir Lawrence Parsons, Redmond raised no controversy as to
what had been done; he was, indeed, not cognizant of the facts. But he
addressed himself from the first to making friendly suggestions.
Amongst other things he referred to an appeal which Sir Lawrence Parsons
had addressed to the women of Ireland, that they should provide
regimental colours for the battalions of the Division. This appeal was
promptly met, to Redmond's great delight--delight which was soon
changed into vexation, for the War Office stepped in, declared the
proceeding irregular, and prohibited the holding of colours by any
temporary battalion. General Parsons was obliged to publish an
explanation which must have been galling to himself, and which went far
to confirm the impression that the War Office, with all its
preoccupations, had time to keep an unfriendly eye on the Nationalist
recruiting effort.
Another trivial matter led to prolonged and irritating controversy.
Towards the end of October the Belfast and Dublin papers announced that
the Army Council had approved of "an Ulster badge similar to that worn
by Ulster Volunteers" as a cap badge for all troops in the Ulster
Division. It was pointed out that this would have the effect of
preserving the identity of the Ulster Division. Immediately, and not
unnaturally, the demand for a similar concession was put forward on
behalf of the Sixteenth Division. General Parsons was opposed, as any
old soldier would be, to a variation in the distinguishing marks of old
and famous regiments. He did not allow for the fact that we needed to
attract new soldiers in masses--men who as yet knew nothing of
regimental tradition. Still, he co-operated in forwarding Redmond's
desire, which was to meet a widely spread sentimental demand. Now that
the war is over, many soldiers argue that there is no reason in the
nature of things why Irish regiments should not have a clearly
distinguishing uniform, as the Scots or the Colonials do. In the last
months, when recruiting was a matter of urgency, Colonel Lynch induced
the War Office to consent to equipping an Irish Brigade with a
completely distinctive dress; unhappily the pattern was (after several
months) still under discussion when the war ended. I have little doubt
that from the point of view of recruiting even the badge, to say nothing
of a distinctive uniform, would have been an asset; I have no doubt at
all that the refusal of it was a set-back, because it was a refusal
given after a discussion and correspondence which lasted from November
till February. The most interesting point, however, is that Lord
Kitchener found time to occupy himself repeatedly with this question in
the period between the first and second battles of Ypres. If his
intervention had been judicious, it would have been as impressive as the
spectacle of a battery elephant stopping in action to pick up a pin with
his trunk.
On one point Redmond's representations, heartily backed by General
Parsons, were successful. Catholic chaplains, of whom no adequate number
were at first provided for Irish troops, were secured. It is pleasant to
note that Lord Roberts, who before the war had been vehement on the
Ulster side, used his personal influence to support this application. A
month or two later, when death came to the veteran, dramatically, among
the troops in France, Redmond told the House of Commons how on that
question Lord Roberts had met him in the friendliest way and endeavoured
to arrange for attending the great meeting at the Dublin Mansion House.
On another matter Redmond was able to assist the equipment of the
Division. He suggested, and General Parsons fully admitted the value of,
regimental bands; but the War Office made no grants for them. Redmond
drew upon a large sum which had been placed at his disposal by a private
individual to further his campaign, and all our battalions were indebted
to him for their fife and drum equipment. There was, in short, no detail
in which he was not willing and anxious to assist the Division and its
commander. But the friction between the two men was unmistakable.
The most serious cause of it was the line taken by General Parsons about
the appointment of officers. He laid down a rule, which I think would
have had excellent results if enforced throughout the whole of the new
armies, that no man should be recommended for a commission without
previous military experience, and that candidates lacking that
experience must put in a period of service in the ranks. He set apart a
special company in one battalion, the 7th Leinsters, to which such men
should be sent, so that while drilling and exercising with the rest of
the battalion, and enjoying no special privilege, they ate and slept and
lived together in their own barrack rooms.
Yet the obstacle thus set up deterred a good many of the less zealous,
who could not understand why that should be made a condition in the
Irish Division which was not so in the Ulster Division--nor, indeed, so
far as I know, anywhere else at that time. Men who had been officers of
Ulster Volunteers got their commissions as a matter of course; the
officer of National Volunteers had to prove his competence in the cadet
company. General Parsons fully admitted this difference of treatment,
and justified it by saying to Redmond that in consequence of it he would
be very sorry to change officers with the Ulster Division. One cannot
refuse to admire such a spirit; but he ought to have asked himself
whether it was fair to impose a handicap on Redmond's efforts.
Everything turned on getting representative young men from the
Volunteers, and from the correspondence it appears that few were coming
from the South and West. From the North they poured in. In our 47th
Brigade, the 6th Royal Irish Regiment was mainly composed of Derry
Nationalists; the 7th Leinsters and the 6th Connaught Rangers were
almost to a man followers of Mr. Devlin from Belfast.
Next after Redmond, Mr. Devlin was the man to whom our Division owed
most. But the first and the main impetus came from Redmond himself. He
spoke on October 4th at Wexford, the capital of his native county; on
the 11th at Waterford, his own constituency; on the 18th at Kilkenny,
the constituency of his close friend Pat O'Brien. A week later he was at
Belfast and in the glens of Antrim, among the Nationalists of Ulster.
Then Parliament kept him for a few weeks; in December he was back, and
spoke at Tuam and in Limerick. Everywhere the Volunteers turned out in
great numbers to receive him; and to them his appeal was primarily
addressed.
At Wexford he laid stress on Mr. Asquith's pledge that the Volunteers
should remain as a recognized permanent force for the defence of the
country, and this led him to raise frankly the question of control. Who
should have authority over Volunteers in a State? Surely the elected and
responsible government. But pending Home Rule, "the policy and control
of the Volunteers must rest with the elected representatives of the
country."
More generally, he reminded them that he had always spoken of the
possibility of some great political convulsion that might destroy their
plans. "Nothing but an earthquake can now prevent Home Rule," he had
said. "The outbreak of this overwhelming war might easily have
overwhelmed Home Rule. But we have survived it."
And he went on to argue that the delay might be a blessing in disguise.
Civil war between Irishmen had always seemed to him an impossibility.
That impossibility was now universally admitted. In a passage of unusual
heat he denounced the "so-called statesmen" who came over unasked to our
country to inflame feelings--as Mr. Bonar Law had done; and he appealed
to all sections "to enable us to utilize the interval before a Home Rule
Parliament assembles to unite all Irishmen under a Home Rule
Government."
At Waterford he was largely occupied with repelling the charge that he
and his colleagues had made a bargain with the Government to ship Irish
Volunteers overseas to fight whether they would or no. This was the line
on which opposition was developing, and it was assisted by articles in
the English Press, which laid it down that unless the Irish furnished a
sufficiency of recruits, Home Rule should be repealed.
An extension of this argument, that Redmond was buying Home Rule with
the blood of young Irishmen, raised the question whether Home Rule was
worth the price. While the Bill was not yet law, it was a flag, a
symbol. Once it became an Act, men's attitude changed; they turned to
criticizing what they had got; and one powerful newspaper, bitterly
hostile to the Parliamentary party, expended much ingenuity in
exaggerating the limitations of what had been gained. While one set of
critics endeavoured to show how miserable was the price obtained,
another dwelt on the unrighteousness of making such a bargain without
Ireland's consent. In Redmond's speech at Kilkenny there was a note of
resentment. He refused at any great crisis to consider "what might
please the gallery or the crowd, or might spare him the insults of a
handful of cornerboys."
But the kernel of all his thought was put into one sentence by him at
Belfast. "The proper place to guard Ireland is on the battlefields of
France." It was from Belfast after this meeting that the first striking
demonstration of response came--organized and inspired by Mr. Devlin. On
November 20th nearly a full battalion of recruits, many National
Volunteers, entrained for Fermoy; a week later they were followed by
another great detachment. The example spread; and when Redmond spoke at
Limerick on December 20th, the _Irish Times_ in a friendly leading
article admitted that "the National Volunteers were now coming forward
in large numbers and the Irish Brigade was going to be a credit to the
country." This was a very different note from that which had come from
Unionist quarters at earlier stages.
III
So far as recruiting went, Redmond had won. He was sure of making good
to England. But in what concerned making good to Ireland, he had no
progress to report. He stated that already nearly 16,500 men from the
Volunteers had joined the Army, and he could not understand why
Government was so chary of giving assistance to train and equip this
force. There was no doubt as to the mass of men available. Figures
supplied by the police to the Chief Secretary estimated that between
September 24th, when the split took place, and October 31st, out of
170,000 Volunteers, only a trifle over 12,000 adhered to Professor
MacNeill.
But in Dublin the opponents were nearly 2,000 out of 6,700; and two
strong battalions went almost solid against Redmond. These battalions,
along with the Citizens' Army, were destined to alter the course of
Irish history. It was specially true of them, but true generally of all
the minority who left Redmond, that they were kept together by a
resolute and determined group who had a clear purpose.
The "Irish Volunteers," as the dissentients called themselves, were made
to feel that they were a minority, and an unpopular minority in more
than one instance. In Galway, when they turned out to parade the
streets, they were driven off with casualties--retaliation for their
interference with our meeting in September. In Dundalk there was a
somewhat similar occurrence. But they got more than their own back one
day in November by a bold _coup_--forerunner of many. Ninety rifles
belonging to the National Volunteers were being moved in a cart from one
place to another. Half a dozen men armed with revolvers held up the cart
and its driver and carried off the rifles. At their Convention, held in
the end of October, Professor MacNeill said: "They would go on with the
work of organizing, training and equipping a Volunteer force for the
service of Ireland in Ireland, and such a force might yet be the means
of saving Home Rule from disaster, and of compelling the Home Rule
Government to keep faith with Ireland without the exaction of a price in
blood."
That forecast has not as yet realized itself; and many of us think that
the chief achievement of this section has been to turn to waste a heavy
price that was paid in blood by other men for the sake of Ireland. But
unquestionably they were, though the minority, far more of a living
reality than the mass of the original force--and for a simple reason.
Their purpose, whether good or bad, was within their own control. The
purpose of the majority was to carry out Redmond's policy--which was to
make the Volunteers part of an Irish army of which the striking force
was designed to defend Ireland on the battlefields of Flanders. But to
carry out that policy the National Volunteers must be accepted as a
purely local Irish military organization for home defence--controlled,
in the absence of a popularly elected Irish Government, by the elected
Irish representatives. The War Office thwarted that policy. Lord
Kitchener would not accept it. He continued to be of the opinion that by
equipping Redmond's followers he would be arming enemies.
It is worth noting that one of the ablest and most detached students of
Irish affairs was wholly on Redmond's side. Lord Dunraven, appealing on
behalf of "the new Irish Brigade," pointed out that both sides of
Redmond's policy must be accepted. "No scheme which fails to take some
account of the National Volunteer Force can do justice to what Ireland
can give," he wrote. But was there everywhere a desire to do justice to
what Ireland could give--and was willing to give? Redmond was warned in
those days by an influential correspondent in England that a deliberate
policy was being pursued by the opponents of Home Rule, who undoubtedly
had strong backing in the War Office. The National Volunteers were to
become the objects of derision and contempt, which would extend to
himself. By keeping the Volunteers out of active participation in war
service, it could be proved that Redmond did not speak for Ireland or
represent Ireland; that the Irish were raising unreal objections so as
to keep an excuse for avoiding danger. It was urged on him that he
should press for the extension of the Territorial Act to Ireland and
endeavour to bring his men in on this footing.
There were two difficulties in the way of this scheme which nevertheless
attracted him strongly. The first was that enlistment in the
Territorials for home service had been stopped--so that the proposal had
little advantage, if any, over enlistment in the Irish brigades. The
second was due to the Volunteers themselves, many of whom, though
willing to serve in the war, were unwilling to take the oath of
allegiance.
There were limits to the length to which Redmond felt himself able to
go, and he never dealt with this objection by argument. The example
which he set was plain to all. He joined in singing "God save the King,"
in drinking the King's health, and at Aughavanagh now he flew the Union
Jack beside the Green flag. He was willing to take part in any
demonstration which implied that Nationalist Ireland under its new legal
status accepted its lot in the British Empire fully and without reserve.
It was superfluous for him to argue that Nationalists might consistently
take the oath of allegiance when Nationalists were pledging their lives
in the King's service beside every other kind of citizen in the British
Empire. Over and above his own example was the example of his brother
and his son. On November 23rd Willie Redmond addressed a great meeting
in Cork and told them, "I won't say to you go, but come with me." He was
then fifty-three--and for most men it would have been "too late a
week." But no man was ever more instinctively a soldier, and to
soldiering he had gone by instinct as a boy. He was an officer in the
Wexford Militia for a year or two, till politics drove him out of that
service and drew him into another. Now he went to the war gravely but
joyfully. I think those days did not bring into relief any more
picturesque or sympathetic figure.
One thing ought to be said. Mr. Devlin wished to join also, but Redmond
held that he could not be spared from Ireland, where his influence was
enormous; and he was placed in a somewhat unfair position, even though
everyone who knew him knew that his chief attribute was personal
courage. But he was indispensable for the work which had to be done, of
helping at this strange crisis to keep Ireland peaceful and united at a
time when Government was at its lowest ebb of authority.
Trouble threatened. On October 11th, the anniversary of Parnell's death,
three bodies of Volunteers turned out in Dublin--the National
Volunteers, the Irish Volunteers, and the Citizen Army. A collision
occurred which might easily have become serious. This passed off, but
early in December the Government suppressed three or four of the openly
anti-British papers, which were, of course, still more virulent against
Redmond. They reappeared under other names. But a meeting of protest
against the suppression was held outside Liberty Hall. Mr. Larkin had,
by this time, gone to America. His chief colleague, Mr. James Connolly,
who was the brain of the Irish Labour Movement, presided, and at the
close declared that the meeting had been held under the protection of an
armed company of the Citizen Army posted in the windows and on the roof
of Liberty Hall. Had the police or military attempted to disperse the
meeting, he said, "those rifles would not have been silent."
Ulster was not the only place where armed men thought themselves
entitled to resist coercion.
Dublin was the more dangerous because the war, which created so much
employment in Great Britain, brought no new trade to Ireland, outside of
Belfast. Agriculture prospered, but the towns knew only a rise of
prices. Redmond began with high hopes, which Mr. Lloyd George fostered,
of rapidly-developing munition works, which would at the close of
hostilities leave the foundation for industrial communities. Here again,
however, Redmond's representations were in vain. When the heavy extra
tax on beer and spirits was levied by the first supplementary Budget, he
opposed it angrily:
"You are doing some shipbuilding at Belfast, you are making a few
explosives at Arklow, you are buying some woollen goods from some
of the smaller manufacturers, but apart from that, the bulk of the
hundreds of millions of borrowed money which you are spending on
the war is being spent in England and in increasing the income of
your country."
This tax on alcohol would curtail the most important urban industry of
the South and West of Ireland, and he feared that it was the old story
of crushing Ireland's trade under the wheel of British interests.
Here again Redmond could only plead with the Irish Government that they,
in their turn, should plead with the Imperial authorities. He should
have been able to act in his own right as the head of an Irish Ministry,
knowing the importance of providing employment at such a time. He saw
the need and how to meet it; but he had none of the resources of power.
As compared with the other men who occupied, in the public eye, a rank
equivalent to his--with General Botha, for instance--he was like a
commander of those Russian armies which had to take the field against
Germans with sticks and pikes.