THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES
The first stir of a new movement in Nationalist Ireland outside the old
political lines came from Labour--from Irish Labour, as yet unorganized
and terribly in need of organization. On August 26, 1913, a strike in
Dublin began under the leadership of Mr. Larkin. It had all the violence
and disorder which is characteristic of economic struggles where Labour
has not yet learned to develop its strength; it opened new cleavages at
this moment when national union was most necessary: it was fought with
the passion of despair by workers whose scale of pay and living was a
disgrace to civilization; and after five months it was not settled but
scotched, leaving dark embers of revolutionary hate scattered through
the capital of Ireland.
One incident showed some of the consequences ready to spring, even in
England itself, from the action taken in Ulster. Mr. Larkin at the end
of October 1913 was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for sedition
and inciting to disturbance. A fierce outcry ran through the Labour
world in Great Britain; by-elections were in progress, and Government
was angrily challenged with having one law for the rich and another for
the poor, one law for Labour and another for the Unionist party. To this
pressure Government yielded, and Mr. Larkin was liberated after a few
days in jail.
But in Ireland more formidable symptoms soon made themselves manifest.
Captain J.R. White, son of Sir George White, the defender of Ladysmith,
was a soldier by hereditary instinct and had won the Distinguished
Service Order in South Africa. But some strain in his composition
answered to other calls, and upon Tolstoyan grounds he ceased to be a
soldier, without ceasing to be a natural leader of men. His first public
appearance was at a meeting in London in support of Home Rule addressed
by a number of prominent persons who were not Roman Catholics. But his
interests were plainly not so much Nationalist as broadly humanitarian;
freedom for the individual soul rather than for the nation was his
object: and he suddenly enrolled himself among Mr. Larkin's allies. His
proposal was outlined to a great assembly of the strikers gathered in
front of Liberty Hall: Mr. Larkin set it out. They must no longer be
"content to assemble in hopeless haphazard crowds" but must "agree to
bring themselves under the influences of an ordered and sympathetic
discipline." "Labour in its own defence must begin to train itself to
act with disciplined courage and with organized and concentrated force.
How could they accomplish this? By taking a leaf out of the book of
Carson. If Carson had permission to train his braves of the North to
fight against the aspirations of the Irish people, then it was
legitimate and fair for Labour to organize in the same militant way to
preserve their rights and to ensure that if they were attacked they
would be able to give a very satisfactory account of themselves."
Thus began in a small sectional manner a national movement which led far
indeed. Mr. O'Cathasaigh, from whose _Story of the Irish Citizen Army_ I
quote, attributes the failure of that purely Labour organization chiefly
to the establishment of the Irish Volunteers.
This was a development which Redmond on his part neither willed nor
approved, yet one which in the circumstances was inevitable. Who could
suppose that the formation of combatant forces would remain a monopoly
of any party? There was no mistaking the weight which a hundred thousand
Ulster Volunteers, drilled and regimented, threw into Sir Edward
Carson's advocacy. As early as September 1913, during the parliamentary
recess, Redmond received at least one letter--and possibly he received
many--urging him to raise the standard of a similar force, and pointing
out that if he did not take this course it might be taken by others less
fit to guide it. The letter of which I speak elicited no answer. It was
never his habit to reply to inconvenient communications--a policy which
he inherited from Parnell, who held that nearly every letter answered
itself within six months, if it were let alone. Certainly in this case
it so happened. Long before six months were up, facts had made argument
superfluous.
Wisdom is easy after the event, and few would dispute now that the
constitutional party ought either to have dissociated itself completely
from the appeal to force, or to have launched and controlled it from the
outset. Neither of these lines was followed, and the responsibility for
what was done and what was not done must lie with Redmond. Yet, as I
read it, the key to his policy lay in a dread, not of war, but of civil
war. To arm Irishmen against each other was of all possible courses to
him the most hateful. It opened a vision of fratricidal strife, of an
Ireland divided against itself by new and bloody memories.
Moreover, though he had, as the world came to know, soldiering in his
blood--though the call to war, when he counted the war righteous,
stirred what was deepest in him--by training and conviction he was
essentially a constitutionalist: he realized profoundly how strong were
the forces behind constitutionalism in Great Britain, how impregnable
was the position of British Ministers if they boldly asserted the law
with equality as between man and man. Where he was mistaken was in his
estimate of the Government with which he had to deal, and especially of
Mr. Asquith. Speaking to his constituents early in the New Year of 1914
he said, "The Prime Minister is as firm as a rock, and is, I believe,
the strongest and sanest man who has appeared in British politics in our
time." The verdict of history might have borne out this judgment had Mr.
Asquith never been forced to face extraordinary times. In the event, it
was Mr. Asquith's lack of firmness and failure in strength which drove
Redmond into belated acceptance of a policy modelled on Sir Edward
Carson's.
As early as July 1913 the demonstrations in Ulster led to discussion of
a countermove among young men in Dublin. But there was no public
proposal, until at the end of October Professor MacNeill, Vice-President
of the Gaelic League, published an article in the League's official
organ calling on Nationalist Ireland to drill and arm. The first meeting
of a provisional committee followed a few days later. Support was asked
from all sections of Nationalist opinion; but, as a whole, members of
the United Irish League and of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, who
constituted the bulk of Redmond's following, refused to act. Still,
about a third of the committee were supporters of the parliamentary
party; they included Professor Kettle, who was from 1906 to 1910 among
its most brilliant members. It was, however, significant that the Lord
Mayor, a prominent official Nationalist, refused the use of the Mansion
House for a meeting at which it was proposed to start the enrolment of
Irish Volunteers. As a result, the venue was changed to the Rotunda, and
so great enthusiasm was shown that the Rink was used for the assembly.
Even that did not suffice for half the gathering. Three overflow
meetings were held, and four thousand men are said to have been enrolled
that evening.
Yet the movement did not spread at once with rapidity. By the end of
December recruits only amounted to ten thousand. For this two causes
were answerable. The first was the honourable refusal of the committee
to allow companies to be enrolled except according to locality. They
would have no sectional companies of Sinn Fein volunteers, of United
Irish League Volunteers, of Hibernian Volunteers. All must mix equally
in the ranks. The second was the fear of most Nationalists that by
joining an organization with which the national leader was not
identified they might weaken his hand. This operated, although the
declared intention of the organization was to strengthen Redmond's
position. At Limerick in January Pearse said: "In the Volunteer movement
we are going to give Mr. Redmond a weapon which will enable him to
enforce the demand for Home Rule."
Briefly, for several months the numbers of the new force did not show
that the whole of Nationalist Ireland was in support of it. Ireland was
waiting for a sign from Redmond, and it did not come. The events which
literally drove Irish constitutional Nationalists into following
Ulster's example had still to occur.
There was, however, a wide extension of the cadres of the organization,
and it was being spread by men some of whom--like Professor
MacNeill--dissented from Redmond's attitude of quiescence, while some
were general opponents of the whole constitutional policy. They covered
the country with committees, recruited, it is true, from all sections of
Nationalist Ireland. But it was inevitable that the element who
distrusted Redmond, and whose distrust he reciprocated, should attain an
influence out of all proportion to its following in the country.
Government's action--and this sentence will run like a refrain through
the rest of this book--contributed largely to strengthen the extremists
and to weaken Redmond's hold on the people. During eleven months the
Ulster Volunteers had been drilling, had been importing arms, and no
step was taken to interfere. Within ten days after the Irish Volunteer
Force began to be enrolled, a proclamation (issued on December 4, 1913)
prohibited the importation of military arms and ammunition into Ireland.
A system of search was instituted. But the Ulstermen were already well
supplied. Redmond was blamed for not forcing the withdrawal of the
proclamation. He controlled the House of Commons, it was said. This was
the line of argument constantly taken by dissentient Nationalists; and
it was true that he could at any moment put the Government out. Critics
did not stop to ask for whose advantage that would be. Government by
issuing this proclamation had effected no good: they had embarrassed
their chief ally, and they had laid the foundation for an imposing
structure of incidents which grew with pernicious rapidity into a
monumental proof that law, even under a Liberal administration, has one
aspect for Protestant Ulster and quite another for the rest of Ireland.
But in England at the beginning of the fateful year 1914 the Irish
Volunteers had not yet become recognized as a factor in the main
political situation. An attitude of mind had been studiously fostered
which found crude expression soon after the House met. One of the
Liberal party was arguing that Ulster had made Home Rule an absolute
necessity, because Nationalists would have "fourfold justification if
they resisted in the way you have taught them to resist the Government
of this country in maintaining the old system." "They have not the
pluck," interjected Captain Craig, the most prominent of the Ulster
members. The present Lord Chancellor, Mr. F.E. Smith, was voluble in
declarations that Nationalists would "neither fight for Home Rule nor
pay for Home Rule." These taunts did not ease Redmond's position,
especially as it became plain that Ulster's threat of violence had
succeeded.
Mr. Asquith, referring to the "conversations" between leaders which had
taken place during the winter, said that since no definite agreement had
been reached the Government had decided to reopen the matter in the
House. This meant, as Redmond pointed out with some asperity, that the
Prime Minister had accepted responsibility for taking the initiative in
making proposals to meet objections whose reasonableness he did not
admit. The Opposition, he thought, should have been left to put forward
some plan.
Yet Redmond's attitude, and the attitude of the House, was considerably
affected by an unusual speech which had been delivered by the Ulster
leader.
Sir Edward Carson, as everyone knows, is not an Ulsterman, and the chief
of many advantages which Ulster gained from his advocacy was that
Ulster's case was never stated to Great Britain as Ulstermen themselves
would have stated it. It is not true to say that Ulstermen by habit
think of Ireland as consisting of two nations, for all Ulstermen
traditionally regard themselves as Irish and so have always described
themselves without qualification. But it is true to say that Ulster
Protestants have regarded Irish Catholics as a separate and inferior
caste of Irishmen. The belief has been ingrained into them that as
Protestants they are morally and intellectually superior to those of the
other religion. Their whole political attitude is determined by this
conviction. They refuse to come under a Dublin Parliament because in it
they would be governed by a majority whom they regard as their
inferiors. It is in their deliberate view natural that Roman Catholics
should submit to be controlled by Protestants, unnatural that
Protestants should submit to be controlled by Roman Catholics.
It does not express the truth to say that Sir Edward Carson was adroit
enough to avoid putting this view of the case to the electors of Great
Britain or to the House of Commons. Temperamentally and instinctively,
he did not share it. He was a Southern Irishman who at the opening of
his life held himself, as not one Ulsterman in a thousand does,
perfectly free to make up his mind for or against the maintenance of the
Union. He reached the conclusion not only that Home Rule would be
disastrous for Ireland, for the United Kingdom, and for the British
Empire, but that it would mean for Irishmen the acceptance of an
inferior status in the Empire. As citizens of the United Kingdom, he
held, they were more honourably situated than they could be as citizens
of an Irish State within the Empire. This was an attitude of mind which
Ulster could endorse, although it did not fully represent Ulster's
conviction: but this was the case which Sir Edward Carson always made on
behalf of Ulster, and he made it as an Irishman whose personal interests
and connections lay in the South of Ireland, not in the North. His
argument was the more persuasive because it was based on a view of
Ireland's true interest--not of Ulster's only; and it was the harder on
that account for Redmond to repel peremptorily. More than this, between
him and Redmond there was an old personal tie. The Irish Bar is a true
centre of intercourse between men of varying political and religious
beliefs, and as junior barristers Edward Carson and John Redmond went
the Munster circuit together.
All this lay behind the appeal which on February 11, 1914, was implied
rather than expressed in the novel phrase and still more unaccustomed
tone of a consummate orator.
"Believe me," Sir Edward Carson said, "whatever way you settle the Irish
question" (and that phrase threw over the cry of "No Home Rule"), "there
are only two ways to deal with Ulster. It is for statesmen to say which
is the best and right one. She is not a part of the community which can
be bought. She will not allow herself to be sold. You must therefore
either coerce her if you go on, or you must in the long run, by showing
that good government can come under the Home Rule Bill, try and win her
over to the case of the rest of Ireland. You probably can coerce
her--though I doubt it. If you do, what will be the disastrous
consequences not only to Ulster, but to this country and the Empire?
Will my fellow-countryman"--and at this emphatic word, which jettisoned
absolutely the theory of two nations, the speaker turned to his left,
where Redmond sat in his accustomed place below the gangway--"will my
fellow-countryman, the leader of the Nationalist Party, have gained
anything? I will agree with him--I do not believe he wants to triumph
any more than I do. But will he have gained anything if he takes over
these people and then applies for what he used to call--at all events
his party used to call--the enemies of the people to come in and coerce
them into obedience? No, sir; one false step taken in relation to Ulster
will, in my opinion, render for ever impossible a solution of the Irish
question. I say this to my Nationalist fellow-countrymen, and, indeed,
also to the Government: you have never tried to win over Ulster. You
have never tried to understand her position. You have never alleged, and
can never allege, that this Bill gives her one atom of advantage."
Then, carried away by the course of his argument, an angry note came
into his voice, and before a minute had passed we were back in the old
atmosphere. He accused us of wanting "not Ulster's affections but her
taxes."
Well might Redmond say when he rose that Sir Edward Carson had been
heard by all of us with very mixed feelings. "I care not about the
assent of Englishmen," he said; "I am fighting this matter out between a
fellow-countryman and myself, and I say that it was an unworthy thing
for him to say that I am animated by these base motives, especially
after he had lectured the House on the undesirability of imputing
motives."
On the personal note Redmond was to the full as effective as his
opponent, and his speech of that day was memorable. It was also very
much more to the taste of the Liberal rank and file than what came from
their own front bench. "We do not by any means take the tragic view of
the probabilities or even the possibilities of what is called civil war
in Ulster," he said; and added that the House of Commons ought, in his
opinion, "to resent as an affront these threats of civil war." Yet in
the end he promised, for the sake of peace, "consideration in the
friendliest spirit" (not very different from acceptance) of any
proposals that the Government might feel called upon to put forward.
It is noteworthy that in this prolonged debate there was no reference to
the new fact of a second volunteer force. But on February 12th a
question was asked about it. On the 17th there was allusion to another
growing element of danger--the discussions among officers of the Army of
a combined refusal to serve against Ulster. All these factors must have
weighed with Redmond and with his chief colleagues in their discussions
with the Government during the next three weeks. "Friendly
consideration" passed into acceptance on March 9th, when Mr. Asquith,
introducing the Home Rule Bill for its passage in the third consecutive
session (as required by the Parliament Act), outlined the proposed
modifications in it. They involved partition. But the exclusion was to
be optional by areas and limited in time.
The proposal to take a vote by counties had, it will be remembered, been
originally suggested by Mr. Bonar Law, and in following the Prime
Minister he could not well repudiate it. The test, however, which he now
put forward was whether or not the proposals satisfied Ulster: and he
fixed upon the time-limit of six years as being wholly unacceptable.
Redmond, on the other hand, while declaring that the Government had gone
to "the extremest limits of concession," said that the proposals had one
merit: they would "elicit beyond doubt or question by a free ballot the
real opinion of the people of Ulster." This indicated his conviction
that if Home Rule really came the majority in Ulster would prefer to
take their chances under it; the proposal of exclusion being merely a
tactical manoeuvre to defeat Home Rule by splitting the Nationalists.
Its efficacy for that purpose was immediately demonstrated. Mr. O'Brien
followed Redmond with a virulent denunciation of "the one concession of
all others which must be hateful and unthinkable from the point of view
of any Nationalist in Ireland." Opposition from Mr. O'Brien and from Mr.
Healy was no new thing. But by acceptance of these proposals the
Nationalist leader made their opposition for the first time really
formidable. Telegrams rained in that March afternoon--above all on Mr.
Devlin, from his supporters in Belfast, who felt themselves betrayed and
shut out from a national triumph which they had been the most zealous to
promote. From this time onward the position of Redmond personally and of
his party as a whole was perceptibly weakened. Especially an alienation
began between him and the Catholic hierarchy. It was impossible that the
clergy should be well disposed towards proposals which, as Mr. Healy put
it, would make Cardinal Logue a foreigner in his own cathedral at
Armagh.
Yet upon the whole the shake to Redmond's power was less than might have
been expected--largely, no doubt, because the offer was repelled. Sir
Edward Carson described it as "sentence of death with stay of execution
for six years." With a great advocate's instinct, he fastened on the
point in the Government's proposal which was least defensible.
In my opinion these modifications of the Bill were never adequately
discussed in the meetings of the Irish party. All was done between the
Government and Redmond's inner cabinet, consisting of Redmond himself,
Mr. Dillon, Mr. Devlin and Mr. T.P. O'Connor. The negotiations were most
delicate and difficult, and above all secrecy is hard to maintain when a
body of over seventy men, each keenly concerned for the view of his
constituents, comes to be consulted. Yet I think it a pity that the
party never thrashed this question out. Once the principle of option was
admitted, a great deal had to be considered. Voting must be a referendum
either to the province as a whole, to the constituencies separately, or
to local units of administration. A referendum by constituencies was as
impossible as one by parishes: for instance, Mr. Devlin's West Belfast,
out of the city's four divisions, would certainly have voted to remain
under the Irish Parliament, and an absurd situation would have resulted.
The choice lay between a vote by counties or by the province as a whole.
In the province, three counties out of nine were as predominantly
Nationalist as any part of Leinster. In two others, Tyrone and
Fermanagh, Nationalists were about 55 per cent of the electorate. But
the bulk of the population of Ulster resided in four counties of the
north-east, so that Protestants over the whole province had a majority
of some two hundred thousand. An appeal to the province, therefore,
might involve the exclusion from Home Rule of a very large area which
was thoroughly Nationalist. On the other hand, every scheme of exclusion
had in view the possibility of the excluded area changing its mind on
the question after a short trial. To separate the four overwhelmingly
Protestant counties was to set up a body in which a change of vote would
be much harder to bring about than in the province. As a matter of
statesmanship there was much to be said for closing with the Ulstermen's
original demand that the province should come in or stay out as a whole.
It satisfied Ulster's sentiment and lessened the chances of
crystallizing a Protestant block of excluded territory, which would tend
to become less and less Irish.
The answer to this was that Nationalists would never consent and did
never consent to the possibility of permanent exclusion for any part.
Insistence on the time-limit was from this point of view a matter of
absolute principle. Yet many believed then, and believe now, that if
any part of Ulster were excluded by legislation it would certainly come
in voluntarily after a short period. On the other hand, if any part were
excluded even for a year, it was difficult to believe that it could ever
be brought in except by its own consent. The view, however, to which we
were committed (with the party's general approval), was expressed by
Redmond at the customary St. Patrick's Day Nationalist banquet in
London.
"To agree to the permanent partition of Ireland would be," he said, "an
outrage upon nature and upon history." He quoted a phrase used by Mr.
Austen Chamberlain, who had described it as "the statutory negation of
Ireland's national claim." But, he argued, no such sacrifice of
principle had been made. The demand of Nationalists was for a Parliament
for the whole of Ireland, having power to deal with "every purely Irish
matter." Temporary limitations of this demand had already been accepted.
"We have agreed, as Parnell agreed in the Bill of 1886, and as we all
agreed in the Bill of 1893, that the power of dealing with some of the
most vital of Irish questions should not come within the purview of the
new Parliament for a definite number of years." The control of police,
for instance, was reserved to the Imperial Parliament in all those Bills
for a term of years. But this did not mean that Parnell or we abandoned
Ireland's right to manage her own police. Reservation of the police in
perpetuity would have been impossible to accept. In the same way, said
Redmond, "the automatic ending of any period of exclusion is for us a
fixed and immutable principle."
To maintain this conformity with national sentiment great advantages
were sacrificed. The whole debates of this period turned on the question
of the time-limit. If it had never been raised, opposition would still
have existed, but the fact would have been plain from the outset that
Protestant Ulster claimed to dictate not only where it had the majority,
but where the majority was against it. Redmond probably believed that
the opinion of Nationalists in the North could not be brought to consent
to abandonment of the time-limit. If so, he probably underrated, then as
always, the influence he possessed. It is always easy to persuade
Irishmen that if you are going to do a thing you should do it
"decently." What is more, a real effect could have been produced on much
moderate opinion in Ulster by saying to Ulster: "Stay out if you like,
and come in when you like. When you come in, you will be more than
welcome." But the decision for this course would have needed to be taken
before the proposals were made, since any attempt to enlarge them was
bound to renew and intensify the inevitable storm of Nationalist
dissent. Whatever the proposal, it should have been absolutely the last
word of concession.
If a clear proposal of local option by counties without time-limit had
been put before Parliament and the electorate, I do not think our
position in Ireland would have been worse than it was made by the
proposal of temporary exclusion, and it would have been greatly
strengthened in Parliament and in the United Kingdom. All moderate men,
and many pronounced Unionists, were becoming uneasy under the perpetual
menace of trouble. Events which now followed rapidly turned the
uneasiness into grave anxiety, but did not turn it to the profit of the
Government.
The policy which was adopted in Mr. Asquith's proposal of March 9th was
the policy which Mr. Churchill had pushed from the first introduction of
the Home Rule Bill, even when it was formally disavowed by the Prime
Minister. Contemptuous rejection of it by the Ulstermen when it was
proposed was not calculated to strengthen Mr. Churchill's personal
position, or to soothe his temper, and on March 14th he made a speech at
Bradford which very greatly stirred public feeling. If Ulster really
rejects the offer, said Mr. Churchill, "it can only be because they
prefer shooting to voting and the bullet to the ballot." Should civil
war break out in Ulster, the issue would not be confined to Ireland: the
issue would be whether civil and parliamentary government in these
realms was to be beaten down by the menace of armed force. Bloodshed was
lamentable, but there were worse things. If the law could not prevail,
if the veto of violence was to replace the veto of privilege, then, said
the orator, "let us go forward and put these grave matters to a proof."
When Mr. Churchill next appeared in the House of Commons, a great
outburst of cheering showed what a volume of feeling had found
expression in his speech. Redmond came to the St. Patrick's Day banquet
under the impression of that scene, and he spoke with a confidence which
gives to his words a tragic irony to-day. He cited "the superb speech of
Mr. Churchill" as evidence that "what is our last word is also the last
word of the Government."
"If the Opposition have spoken their last word," he said, "the Bill will
now proceed upon its natural course. It will proceed rapidly and
irresistibly, and in a few short weeks become the law of the land."
The weeks have lengthened into years, and so much has happened in them
that I keep no clear memory of that evening, though I was present. But
it represented the temper of the time, among Home Rulers, and more
particularly among Irish Nationalists, who generally held the opinion
that the military preparations in Ulster were, as Mr. Devlin called
them, "a hollow masquerade."
We saw the other side of the picture on Thursday, March 19th, when a
Vote of Censure was moved. Mr. Bonar Law launched on the House of
Commons a new and sinister suggestion.
"What about the Army? If it is only a question of disorder, the Army I
am sure will obey you, and I am sure that it ought to obey you; but if
it really is a question of civil war, soldiers are citizens like the
rest of us."
Sir Edward rose immediately the Prime Minister had replied to Mr. Bonar
Law, and his speech was furious. "In consequence of the trifling with
this subject by the Prime Minister and the provocation, which he has
endorsed, by the First Lord of the Admiralty last Saturday, I feel I
ought not to be here but in Belfast," he said; and he indicated his
intention of proceeding there as soon as he had spoken. What he had to
say chiefly concerned the Army, and the preparations which were being
made at the War Office for the despatch of troops to Ulster. He
suggested that there was the intention to provoke an attack so that
there might be "pretext for putting them down."
"You will be all right. You will be no longer cowards. The cowardice
will have been given up. You will have become men in entrenching
yourselves behind the Army. But under your direction they will have
become assassins."
With these words--memorable in connection with what happened later, but
not in Ulster--the Ulster leader left the House, followed by Captain
Craig. Friday's papers were of course full of the debate. At noon on
that day, March 20, 1914, General Sir Arthur Paget, Commander-in-Chief
in Ireland, held a meeting with the officers at the Curragh and received
the intimation that the majority of them would resign their commissions
rather than go on duty which was likely to involve a collision with
Ulster.
It seems only fair in dealing with this whole incident to print here an
account of what happened, written from the soldier's point of view, by
the man who was the spokesman and leader of the resigning
officers--Brigadier (now Lieutenant) General Sir Hubert Gough.[2]
'"I never refused to obey orders. On the contrary, I obeyed them. I
was ordered to make a decision--namely, to leave the Army or 'to
undertake active operations against Ulster.' These were the very
words of the terms offered. As I was given a choice, I accepted it,
and chose the first alternative, and as a matter of fact I have a
letter in existence written the night before the offer was made by
Sir A. Paget to my brother, saying: 'Something is up' (we had been
suddenly ordered to a conference). 'What is it? If I receive orders
to march North, of course I will go.'"
'All the officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade took the same line'
(continues the correspondent of the _Manchester Guardian_) 'and
resigned. This decision seems not to have been expected by the
authorities, and caused great perturbation. General Gough was urged
by Sir Arthur Paget to withdraw the resignation. Sir Arthur Paget
told them that the operations against Ulster were to be of a purely
defensive nature. Unfortunately, Sir Arthur Paget based his appeal
on expediency and private interest, and not sufficiently on the
call of public duty. This failed to influence the officers. They
persisted in their resignations, and only finally withdrew them on
receiving a written undertaking from the War Office that they would
not be again presented with the alternative of resigning or
attacking Ulster.'
The Irish Party had no guess at the inner aspect of the occurrence.
Naturally, but regrettably, we were the section of the House which had
least touch with what was thought and felt in barrack-rooms and
regimental messes. Naturally, but most regrettably, the opinion of the
Army regarded us traditionally as a hostile body; and at this time every
effort to accentuate that belief was made by the political party with
which the Army had most intercourse and connection.
Writing now, as I hope I may write without offence, of a state of things
not far off in time, but divided from us of to-day by the marks of a
vast upheaval, it can be said that the old professional Army was a
society governed in an extraordinary degree by tradition. Part of that
tradition was that the Army had no politics; and as everyone knows, the
man who says he has no politics is in practice almost invariably a
Conservative. In the Army, usage was at its strongest--stronger even
than at a public school; it was almost bad manners, "bad form," to hold
political opinions differing from those of your mess. Political
discussion was sharply discouraged; but this never meant that a man
might not express vehemently the prevailing opinion. On the broad facts
it was inevitable that the prevailing opinion should be unfriendly to
Irish Nationalists. Irish Nationalists had taken passionately the line
of opposition to the South African War; they had been sharply critical
of all the minor campaigns in which the Army had been engaged for
repression or for conquest during the whole period since Parnell began
his leadership. In Ireland itself, every man who reflected for a moment
saw at the Curragh the very embodiment of that force which had
maintained for over a hundred years a Government which had not the
consent of the governed; and unless he was one of those who regarded
themselves as "England's faithful garrison in Ireland," protestations of
enthusiasm for the armed forces of the Crown could not be the natural
expression of his feelings.
Yet mingled with the Nationalists' attitude of estrangement from the
forces which upheld a detested system of government there was a
deep-seated pride in the exploits of Irish troops; and no man ever felt
this more strongly than Redmond. He seldom spoke of the distinguished
men he met, but again and again I remember hearing him mention with
pleasure some talk over a dinner-table with this or that famous
soldier--Sir John French (as he then was), for instance. It was
happiness for him to find himself on friendly terms with the service to
which so many sentiments bound him. The Curragh incident was to him more
than a grave political event; it pained him beyond measure that this
opposition should be headed by a representative of one of the Irish
families most famous for their military record. In the debates which
dealt with all this matter he said no word, and he kept our party
silent--a wise course, and one to which every instinct prompted him.
In its political aspect, this action of General Gough and the fifty
officers allied with him revealed a new and formidable impediment on the
path to Home Rule; yet it was one of those barriers which rally forces
rather than weaken them, and in surmounting which, or sweeping them
aside, a new impetus may be gained. The incident was first discussed in
the House on Monday, March 23rd, and continued to dominate all other
questions for several days. From the Labour benches Mr. John Ward (now
Colonel), who had been a private soldier, gave the first indication of
the volume of resentment. His speech, remarkable in its power both of
phrasing and of thought, was delivered quite unexpectedly in a thin
House; but its effect was electrical. Later, Mr. J.H. Thomas spoke in
the same strain. When a railway strike was threatened, the soldiers had
been called out and had come without a murmur. Was the Army to be used
against all movements except those under the patronage of the Tory
party? If so, he would tell his four hundred thousand railway men to
equip themselves to defend their own interests.
These speeches set people thinking very gravely, but their effect was to
increase the confidence of Home Rulers--the more so as Sir Edward Grey,
in one of his rare moments of emphasis, declared his determination to go
as far as either speaker if the case which they foreshadowed should
arise. But new occurrences disquieted the public; the bungling which had
characterized dealings with the officers at the Curragh was not ended
there. General Gough received a document from Colonel Seely, Secretary
of State for War, countersigned by Sir John French and Sir Spencer
Ewart, the military heads of the War Office; and this document was in
part disavowed by the Cabinet. The two Generals resigned and Colonel
Seely followed their example. I have never seen the House of Commons so
completely surprised as on the afternoon when the Prime Minister
announced that he himself would succeed to the vacant office. The
surprise passed at once into a feeling of immense relief, very widely
shared by all parties. The right thing had been done in the right way,
and it was clear that Mr. Asquith possessed enormous authority, if he
chose to assert it.
The effect of all these happenings was immediately perceptible in the
resumed discussion on the Home Rule Bill. Mr. Dillon, speaking on the
second day, said: "Yesterday for the first time I heard this question
debated in a spirit of reasonableness and conciliation and with an
evident desire on both sides to reach an agreement." A proposal
frequently put forward from the Tory side suggested exclusion until a
federal arrangement for the United Kingdom could be completed. The
official Tory demand was for either a referendum or a general election.
But, as Redmond pointed out when he spoke on the fourth and last day of
the debate, any proposal for a settlement must be a settlement which
Ulster would accept, and Ulster declared that it would not be influenced
by any vote of the British people or by any Act of Parliament. In a
passage of very genuine feeling he indicated what Ulster might do to
assist him in securing for Ulster the extremest limit of concession:
"Anything which would mean burying the hatchet, anything which would
mean the consent of these Ulstermen to shake hands frankly with their
fellow-countrymen across the hateful memories of the past, would be
welcomed with universal joy in Ireland, and would be gladly purchased by
very large sacrifices indeed. If the right honourable and learned
gentleman (Sir Edward Carson) would say to me, 'We are both Irishmen; we
both love our country; we both hate--and I am sure this is absolutely
true of both of us--we both hate all the old sectarian animosities, all
the old wrongs, all the old memories which have kept Irishmen apart; let
us come together and see what we can do for the welfare of our common
country, so that we can hand down to those who come after us an Ireland
more free, more peaceful, more tolerant, an Ireland less cursed by
racial and religious differences'; if an appeal like that were made to
me, I say without the smallest hesitation that there are no lengths that
Nationalist Ireland would not be willing to go to assuage the fears,
allay the anxieties, and remove the prejudices of their Ulster
fellow-countrymen.
"But, alas! that is not the position. Even the permanent exclusion of
Ulster is not put forward as the price of reconciliation; it is simply
put forward as the one and sole condition upon which they will give up
their avowed intention of levying war upon their fellow-countrymen."
He dealt with the federal proposal, and once more avowed his desire for
that solution. "I have been all my political life preaching in favour of
federalism." But he could not consent that the exclusion of Ulster
should be prolonged indefinitely pending a settlement on federal lines,
nor consent to any "watering down of the powers in the present Home Rule
Bill."
What remained then, if Ulster would not accept the offer? Nothing but
"to proceed calmly with the Bill." Threats of civil war he discounted.
Disturbances there would probably be; but when the first Home Rule Bill
was defeated, there were weeks of the most terrible riots in Belfast.
The House could not afford to be deterred from any course by threats of
violence; and he was confident that the Bill would pass into law and
profoundly confident it would never be revoked.
He gave his reasons for that confidence in a passage almost
autobiographical in character--if only because it made the House realize
how completely this man's whole adult life had been devoted to this one
long service, and how far the labours of our party had achieved their
purpose.
"In a sense I may say I have lived my whole life within these walls. I
came in here little more than a boy, and I have grown old in the House
of Commons, and in the long space of years which have passed since then
I have witnessed the most extraordinary transformation of the whole
public life of this country, and I have witnessed an almost miraculous
change in the position and the prospects of the Irish National Cause.
When I came to this House, Irish Nationalist members, in a sense, were
almost outcasts. Both the great British parties--there was no Labour
party then--divided on everything else, were united in hostility to the
national movement and the national ideal. Home Rule seemed hopelessly
out of the range of practical politics. There were only a handful of men
in this whole House of Commons besides us who were in favour of any
measure of Home Rule for Ireland. Outside, the public opinion of this
country was ignorant, and it was actively hostile, and we found it
impossible to gain the ear of the democracy of England for the voice of
Ireland. All that has vanished into thin air. All that has radically
changed. The change has been slow and gradual, but it has been
continuous and sure. Such a change as that can never be reversed. You
might as well talk of the world going back to the days before
electricity or petrol as hope to bring back the prejudices and the
ignorance of the masses of the people in this country about Ireland, as
they existed in the past."
His confidence was strong and it communicated itself to Ireland. But
whatever could be said to shake confidence was said by Mr. O'Brien and
Mr. Healy, who denounced the Bill as worthless when linked to the plan
of even temporary partition, and declared that, whatever the Government
might say at present, we had not yet reached the end of their
concessions. On the division they and their party abstained, so that the
majority dropped to 77.
Up to this point it is still true to say that the Nationalist party were
constant to their faith in strictly constitutional action. But a new
development was imminent. On the night of Friday to Saturday, April
24th-25th, Ulstermen brought off their first overt act of rebellion.
They seized the ports of Larne and Donaghadee, cut off telephone and
telegraph, landed a very large quantity of rifles and ammunition, and
despatched them to every quarter of the province by means of a great
fleet of motor-cars which had been mobilized for the occasion. It was a
clean and excellent piece of staff work, planned by a capable soldier
and carried out under military direction: and the Tory Press hailed it
with no less enthusiasm than was elicited by the most important
victories in the recent war.
One coastguard, running to give the alarm, died of heart failure:
otherwise there was no casualty. The police and customs officers were
confronted with _force majeure_ and submitted without show of
resistance. The Prime Minister, in answering a question as to the action
which he proposed to take, used these words:
"In view of this grave and unprecedented outrage the House may be
assured that His Majesty's Government will take without delay
appropriate steps to vindicate the authority of the law and protect
officers and servants of the King and His Majesty's subjects in the
exercise of their legal rights."
The Opposition was noticeably silent, and next day some embarrassment
was apparent when they proceeded with a previously arranged Vote of
Censure on the Government for the military and naval movements in
connection with which the Curragh incident had occurred. The sum of
these movements amounted to despatching four companies to points in
Ulster at which very large stores of arms and ammunition were lying
under very small guard--and at one of which there was a battery of field
guns with no protecting infantry. It was regarded as at least possible
that the stores might be rushed by "evil-disposed persons, not fully
under the control of their leaders." It was also regarded as possible
that the movement of these companies might be resisted and that much
larger operations might be thereby involved. The stationing of the Fleet
opposite the Belfast coast was part of the measures taken against this
latter contingency.
All this preparation was denounced as a conspiracy organized by Mr.
Churchill with intent to provoke rebellion and put it down by a
massacre. In view of the important military operation which Ulster had
just carried out against the Crown, Mr. Churchill was not without
justification in comparing the motion to a vote of censure by the
criminal classes on the police. Yet, after much hard hitting in speech,
he once more led the way in retreat from the Government's position. Sir
Edward Grey had declared, speaking for the Government, that beyond the
six years' limit they could not go. Mr. Churchill himself had declared
the Government's offer would be and should be their last word. Yet now,
avowedly on his own account, and not speaking for the Cabinet, he
proposed that a new negotiation should be opened with Sir Edward Carson.
This proposal elicited no response, and the debate continued that day in
a line of violent recrimination. But next day Sir Edward Carson rose and
affirmed that he had previously declared his willingness to advise
Ulster to close with a proposal giving exclusion until a Federal scheme
had been considered, when the whole matter should be reviewed "in the
light of the action of the Irish Parliament and how they got on." Now he
said:
"I shall try to make an advance on what I said before. I will say
this--and I hope the House will believe me, because, though I do not
want to be introducing my own personality into it, I am myself a
southerner in Ireland--I would say this: That if Home Rule is to pass,
much as I detest it, and little as I will take any responsibility for
the passing of it, my earnest hope, and indeed I would say my most
earnest prayer, would be that the Government of Ireland for the South
and West would prove, and might prove, such a success in the future,
notwithstanding all our anticipations, that it might be even for the
interest of Ulster itself to move towards that Government, and come in
under it and form one unit in relation to Ireland. May I say something
more than that? I would be glad to see such a state of things arising in
Ireland, in which you would find that mutual confidence and goodwill
between all classes in Ireland as would lead to a stronger Ireland as an
integral unit in the federal scheme. While I say all that, that depends
upon goodwill, and never can be brought about by force."
Redmond remained silent; but months later it became known that he had
taken action to foster this new spirit. He advised the Prime Minister
not to proceed with the prosecution which had been threatened against
the Larne gun-runners. But at the same time he urged upon Government
that they should withdraw the proclamation against importing arms: and
for this he had good reason. The Larne affair had rendered the movement
in support of the Irish Volunteers irresistible, and Redmond had decided
to throw himself in with it.
The result was an amazing upward leap in the numbers of the Volunteers.
On June 15th a question brought out that they were estimated at 80,000
against 84,000 of the Ulster force; but the Nationalist body was
increasing at the rate of 15,000 a week. By July 9th they were reckoned
(on police information) at 132,000, of whom nearly forty thousand were
Army reservists.
These facts now dominated the situation. It was now abundantly clear
that if passing Home Rule meant civil war, so also would the abandonment
of Home Rule. On June 16th Lord Robert Cecil raised a debate on the new
danger. In that debate words were quoted from Sir Roger Casement, one of
the most active promoters of the movement: "When you are challenged on
the field of force, it is upon that field you must reply." Mr. Dillon,
who exulted in the "splendid demonstration of national sentiment shown
in the uprising of the National Volunteers," urged strongly that the
growth of a rival body was not a menace to public order but an added
security. The armed Ulstermen would be "much slower to break the peace"
when they realized the certainty of formidable resistance--and this, be
it said, was no ungrounded observation. Yet at the same time the very
success of the Volunteer movement was disquieting Redmond. He was not in
the same position as Sir Edward Carson, who from the first had directed,
presided over, and controlled the raising and equipment of his force;
and unless the force were to be a menace to his leadership, he must
secure control. As Mr. Bulmer Hobson puts it in his _History of the
Irish Volunteers_:
"The Volunteers had men in their ranks who were political followers of
Mr. Redmond's, and men who were not, and who never had been. The latter
were willing to help him if he had been ready to help them; they would
have made terms with him, but were not prepared to be merely absorbed
into his movement."
The strength of Redmond's position lay in the fact that the vast
majority of the enrolled men looked to him as their leader: his
weakness, in that the committees under which enrolment had taken place
were largely composed of the extremist section. He now determined to
unite the Volunteers with the parliamentary party as the Ulster
Volunteers were linked with Sir Edward Carson and his civilian
organization.
The men with whom he had to deal were principally Professor MacNeill and
Sir Roger Casement. His first proposal was to replace the existing
Provisional Committee by another, consisting of nine members, with
Professor MacNeill, who was regarded as a general supporter of
Redmond's, in the chair. Oddly enough, the negotiations broke down
because Redmond nominated Michael Davitt's son along with Mr. Devlin and
his own brother to be representatives. The young Davitt had at an early
stage expressed dissent from the movement, and this, coming from his
father's son, left bitter resentment. The existing Committee now
proposed to call a National Convention of the Volunteers. Such a body
would clearly have become a rival, and a powerful rival, to the National
Convention of a purely citizen type, and Redmond felt himself forced to
take drastic action. In a public letter dated June 9th he wrote:
"I regret to observe the controversy which is now taking place in the
Press on the Irish National Volunteer movement. Many of the writers
convey the impression that the Volunteer movement is, to some extent at
all events, hostile to the objects and policy of the Irish party. I
desire to say emphatically that there is no foundation for this idea,
and any attempts to create discord between the Volunteer movement and
the Irish party are calculated in my opinion to ruin the Volunteer
movement, which, properly directed, may be of incalculable service to
the National Cause.
"Up to two months ago I felt that the Volunteer movement was somewhat
premature, but the effect of Sir Edward Carson's threats upon public
opinion in England, the House of Commons, and the Government; the
occurrences at the Curragh Camp, and the successful gun-running in
Ulster, have vitally altered the position, and the Irish party took
steps about six weeks ago to inform their friends and supporters in the
country that in their opinion it was desirable to support the Volunteer
movement, with the result that within the last six weeks the movement
has spread like a prairie fire, and all the Nationalists of Ireland will
shortly be enrolled.
"Within the last fortnight I have had communications from men in all
parts of the country, inquiring as to the organization and control of
the Volunteer movement, and it has been strongly represented to me that
the Governing Body should be reconstructed and placed on a thoroughly
representative basis, so as to give confidence to all shades of National
opinion."
Redmond's proposal was that to the existing Committee there should be
added twenty-five representative men from different parts of the
country, nominated at the instance of the Irish party and in sympathy
with its policy and aims. Failing this, he intimated that it would be
"necessary to fall back on county control and government until the
organization was sufficiently complete to make possible the election of
a fully representative Executive by the Volunteers themselves."
The intimation was not at once accepted. An order was issued calling on
the Volunteers to elect additional representatives by counties to be
added to the Committee. Redmond at once publicly declared that this
amounted to refusal of his offer, and he put the issue very plainly. The
Provisional Committee was originally self-constituted and had been
increased only by co-option. The majority of its members, he was
informed, were not supporters of the Irish party: of the rank and file
at least 95 per cent., he said, were supporters of the Irish party and
its policy.
"This is a condition of things which plainly cannot continue. The rank
and file of the Volunteers and the responsible leaders of the Irish
people are entitled, and indeed are bound, to demand some security that
an attempt shall not be made in the name of the Volunteers to dictate
policy to the National party who, as the elected representatives of the
people, are charged with the responsibility of deciding upon the policy
best calculated to bring the National movement to success.
"Moreover, a military organization is of its very nature so grave and
serious an undertaking that every responsible Nationalist in the country
who supports it is entitled to the most substantial guarantees against
any possible imprudence. The best guarantee to be found is clearly the
presence on the Governing Body of men of proved judgment and
steadiness."
As a last word he renewed his threat of calling on his supporters to
organize separate county committees independent of the Dublin centre.
This was carrying matters with a high hand, and the fact that he
succeeded proves the greatness of his prestige at the moment. The
Committee in a published manifesto accepted his terms, but accepted them
with declared regret, and eight of the original members seceded. Among
them was Patrick Pearse, with whom went three others who suffered death
in Easter week two years later.
All this was a disastrous business, and the worst part of it lay in the
public avowal of divided councils. Moreover, a committee so constituted
could not, and did not, operate efficiently. The original members were
primarily interested in the Volunteer Force; the added ones primarily in
the parliamentary movement. Nearly all of the latter--selected for their
"proved judgment and steadiness"--were men past middle age; and of the
whole twenty-five Willie Redmond alone subsequently bore arms.
There was indeed an underlying difference of principle. Redmond knew
well, and all parliamentarians with him, that under the terms of the
Home Rule Bill no army could be raised or maintained in Ireland without
the consent of the Imperial Parliament. The original Volunteer Committee
laid it down as an axiom that the Volunteer Force should be permanent;
they were, as Casement put it, "the beginning of an Irish army." Sir
Edward Carson's policy had produced a new mentality among Irish
Nationalists, and it made many take Redmond's constitutionalism for
timidity.
But in the eyes of the world and of Ireland generally, Redmond was just
as much as Sir Edward Carson the accredited and accepted leader of his
Volunteer organization, and to him the Volunteers looked for provision
of arms and equipment. One of his chief preoccupations in those months
was with this matter, and it explains his desire to have the
proclamation against the import of arms withdrawn. The Larne exploit had
proved the futility of it; articles by Colonel Repington in _The Times_
testified to the completeness of the provision which had been made for
Ulster. But smuggling is always a costly business, and Nationalists were
hampered by the cost. More than that, there was ground for suspicion
that the scales were not equally weighted as between Ulster and the rest
of the country. On June 30th Redmond wrote a letter to the Chief
Secretary repeating his case for withdrawal of the proclamation. It is
all memorable, but especially the warning which concludes the following
passages from it:
"In the South and West of Ireland, not only are the most active measures
being taken against the importation of arms, but many owners of vessels
are harassed unnecessarily.
"The effect of this unequal working of the proclamation has been grave
amongst our people, and has tended to increase both their exasperation
and their apprehensions.
"The apprehensions of our people are justified to the fullest. They find
themselves, especially in the North, faced by a large, drilled,
organized and armed body. Furthermore, the incident at the Curragh has
given them the fixed idea that they cannot rely on the Army for
protection. The possession of arms by Nationalists would, under these
circumstances, be no provocation for disorder, but a means of preserving
the peace by confronting one armed force with another, not helpless
but, by being armed, fully able to defend themselves.
"Finally, we want to call your most serious attention to the grave and
imminent danger of a collision between Nationalists and the police in
the effort to import arms. The police in the South and West might not be
so passive as they were in the recent affair at Larne, and there might
be serious conflicts, and even loss of life, and from this day forward
every day which the proclamation is enforced as strictly as it is now
against the Nationalists brings increased danger of disastrous collision
between the police and the people."
Within a fortnight a minor incident illustrated the "unequal working"
referred to in the first of these points. General Richardson, who
commanded the Ulster Force, had issued on July 1st an order authorizing
all Ulster Volunteers to carry arms openly and to resist any attempt at
interference. In Ulster accordingly no search was ever attempted. But on
July 15th Mr. Lawrence Kettle, brother to Professor Kettle, who had from
the first been a prominent official of the Volunteers, was returning in
his motor from the electric works at the Pigeon House; he was stopped by
the police and his car searched for arms. Such an occurrence in Ulster
would have been held to justify immediate rebellion, and would have been
carefully avoided. In Dublin there was no such avoidance of provocation.
Yet the avoidance of anything which might precipitate strife was indeed
in these days most desirable. June 28th saw the murder of the Archduke
at Sarajevo. The European sky grew rapidly overcast. Days passed, and
the possibility of civil war was exchanged for the near probability of
European war which might find the British Empire divided against itself.
It was necessary in the highest interests of State for the Government to
make an effort to compose the cause of so much violent faction, which
might at any moment assume acute form. The Amending Bill, introduced in
the House of Lords with the Government's offer embodied in it, had been
altered by the Peers in a manner which Lord Morley described as
tantamount to rejection. In this shape it was to come before the House
of Commons on July 20th. But on that Monday, when the House reassembled
after the weekly holiday, the Prime Minister rose at once and announced
in tones of no ordinary solemnity that the King had thought it right to
summon representatives of parties both British and Irish to a Conference
next day at Buckingham Palace, over which Mr. Speaker would preside.
Redmond in two brief sentences guarded his attitude. He disclaimed all
responsibility for the policy of calling the Conference and expressed no
opinion as to its chances of success. The invitation had reached him and
Mr. Dillon in the form of a command from the King, and as such they had
accepted it.
Some may remember how radiantly fine were those far-off days in July
which led us up to the brink of such undreamt-of happenings. On the
Tuesday night I was sitting alone on the Terrace, when Redmond came out.
For once, he was in a mood to talk. His mind was full of the strangeness
and interest of that first day's Conference--a council, or parley, so
momentous, so unprecedented. It touched what was very strong in him--the
historic imagination. He told me how the King had received them all,
stayed with them for some intercourse of welcome, and had been specially
marked in his courtesy to Redmond himself, who had of course never
before been presented to him. Then, he had accompanied them to the room
set apart for their deliberations and had left them with their chairman,
the Speaker. When I think over Redmond's description of the Sovereign's
personality, it seems to me that he was describing one so paralysed, as
it were, by anxiety as to have lost the power of easy, genial and
natural speech. But the dominant thought in his mind did not concern
King George. One figure stood out--Sir Edward Carson. "As an Irishman,"
Redmond said, "you could not help being proud to see how he towered
above the others. They simply did not count. He took charge absolutely."
As I gathered, the eight members sat four on each side of a long table,
with the Speaker at the head. The Irish leaders were on his right and
left, and the discussion was chiefly between them.
It turned mainly on the question of the area to be excluded. Enormous
trouble had been taken, and Redmond told me later that a great map in
relief had been constructed, showing the distribution of Protestant and
Catholic population. This brought out with astonishing vividness the
contrast: the Catholics were on the mountains and hill-tops, the
Protestants down along the valley lands.
Nothing could be more cordial, Redmond said, than Sir Edward Carson's
manner to him. They met as old friends, and I believe that when they
parted, one asked the other that they should have "one good shake-hands
for the sake of old times on the Munster circuit." But it was clearly
recognized that there was a point beyond which neither of them could
take his followers, and these points could not be brought to meet. Even
if adjustment had been possible on the question of time-limit, neither
would give up the debatable counties, Tyrone and Fermanagh, in which the
Nationalists had a clear though small majority of the population, but in
which the Ulster Volunteer organization was very strong. On Friday, July
24th, Mr. Asquith announced the failure of the attempt. "The possibility
of defining an area for exclusion from the operation of the Government
of Ireland Bill was considered, and the Conference being unable to agree
either in principle or in detail on such an area, it concluded."
An incident which did not lack significance was that on the second day
of these meetings Redmond, returning with Mr. Dillon along Birdcage Walk
to the House, was recognized by some Irish Guards in the barracks, who
raised a cheer for the Nationalist leaders which ran all along the
barrack square. The Army was not all disposed to take sides with Ulster
and against the Nationalists.
But parts of it were. The collision between forces of the Crown and
Irish Volunteers trying to land arms, which Redmond had foretold and
deprecated in his letter of June 30th, was fated to occur.
On Saturday, July 25th, five thousand Ulster Volunteers, fully armed,
with four machine guns--in short, an infantry brigade equipped for
active service--marched through the streets of Belfast, no one
interfering. On Sunday, the 26th, a private yacht sailed into Howth
harbour with eleven hundred rifles on board and some boxes of
ammunition. By preconcerted arrangement a body of some seven hundred
Irish Volunteers had marched down to meet the yacht. These men took the
rifles, and with them set out to march back in column of route to
Dublin. Two thousand rounds of ammunition were with them in a
truck-cart, but none was distributed.
Meanwhile the telephones had been busy. The Assistant-Commissioner of
Dublin Police, Mr. Harrel, an energetic officer, was informed, and he
acted instantly. The Under-Secretary, permanent official head of Dublin
Castle, was at his Lodge in the Phoenix Park some two miles distant: Mr.
Harrel informed him of what was happening and was ordered to meet him at
the Castle. But Mr. Harrel was not content to delay. He called out what
police he could muster, some hundred and eighty men, and judging that
they would be insufficient, decided on his own authority to requisition
the military. At the Kildare Street Club he found the Brigadier-General
in command of the troops in Dublin, and this officer immediately ordered
out a company of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. With this force of
soldiers and police Mr. Harrel proceeded to a point on the road from
Howth to Dublin and blocked the way. When the body of Volunteers
reached him, he demanded the surrender of their rifles. This was
refused. He then ordered the police to disarm the men. A scuffle
followed, in which nineteen rifles were seized. Some of the Volunteers
without orders fired revolvers, and by this firing two soldiers were
slightly wounded. One Volunteer received a slight bayonet wound.
Then there was a stop and a parley, and the Volunteer leaders threatened
to distribute ammunition. While the parley lasted the Volunteers in rear
of the column dispersed, carrying their rifles, leaving only a couple of
ranks drawn across the road in front, who blocked the view. When Mr.
Harrel perceived what was happening, he ordered the soldiers to march
back to Dublin and took the police with him.
By this time wild rumours had spread through the city, and on the way
back the troops were mobbed. They were pelted with every kind of missile
and many were hurt, though none seriously; and it understates the truth
to say that they were in no danger. They had their bayonets, and from
time to time made thrusts at their assailants. At last, on the quays, at
a place called Bachelor's Walk, the company was halted, and the officer
in command intended, if necessary, to give an order for a few individual
men to fire over the heads of the crowd. But the troops had lost their
temper, and without order given a considerable number fired into the
crowd. Three persons were killed and some thirty injured.
The first that I knew of these events was on the Monday, when I got the
paper at a station in Gloucestershire, on my way to the House. The
railway-carriage was full of casual English people, and I have never
heard so much indignant comment on any piece of news. "Why should they
shoot the people in Dublin when they let the Ulstermen do what they
like?" That was the burden of it. It is easy to guess what was felt and
thought and said in Dublin and throughout Ireland.
What Redmond said in the House of Commons is characteristic of his
attitude. He demanded that full judicial and military inquiry into the
action of the troops should be held, and that proper punishment should
be inflicted on those found guilty.
"But," he said, "really the responsibility rests upon those who
requisitioned the troops under these circumstances. So far as the troops
are concerned, I deplore more than I can say that this has
occurred--this incident calculated to breed bad blood between the Irish
people and the troops. I deplore that. I hope that our people will not
be so unjust as to hold the troops generally responsible for what, no
doubt, taking it at its worst, was the offence of a limited number of
men."
I do not think any soldier could have wished for a fairer or more
friendly statement; and a chance assisted to realize his hope that the
troops generally would not be held responsible. One of the killed was a
woman whose son was a Dublin Fusilier. This man published a letter in
the Press calling on all Dublin Fusiliers and all soldiers who
sympathized with him to attend the funeral. It was well that the
populace should feel on such a matter as this that all the troops were
not against them; and well that they should be counselled by the leader
of their nation to be reasonable in the direction of their resentment.
This whole incident should never be forgotten by those who are disposed
to judge the Irish harshly for what they did, and did not do, in the
succeeding years. Above all, it should be remembered that the news of
it, terribly provocative in itself to any people, but tenfold
provocative by reason of the contrast which it revealed as compared with
the treatment of Ulster, was published to the world less than ten days
before Redmond had to face the question, What should Ireland do in the
war?
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 2: _Manchester Guardian_, February 4, 1919]