There were of course also a certain number of city republics, or

leagues of republics, but these were too small to have developed

national feeling in the modern sense; and the Roman system left most

of them a certain measure of self-government which modified their

regret for an independence the delight in which had been (in many

cases) reduced by domestic disorders.

-----

Is it possible, then, to arrive at any conclusion regarding the

respective strength which these two sets of forces are likely to display

in the coming centuries? Will the tendency to aggregation continue, and

does the future belong to great States? Or may new forces appear which

will reverse the process, as it was reversed, though through causes most

unlikely to reappear, at the fall of the Roman Empire?

At first sight the probabilities seem to point to further aggregation.

Although none of the five great national States—Russia, Germany, France,

Italy, Britain—is in the least likely to be absorbed by any of the

others, there is reason to think that within the next century some of

the smaller states will have disappeared from the map of Europe. In one

or two other parts of the world—as for instance in South and in Central

America—the process by which the great States are expanding is not yet

complete. The influences of swifter and cheaper communications by land

and sea, of increasing commerce, and of the closer intercourse which

commerce brings, of the power exerted by the printing press in

extinguishing the languages which prevail over a small area and

diffusing those spoken by vast masses of men—all these things make for

unity within each of the great States and add to the attractive power

which the greater have for the smaller. These influences, moreover, all

promise to be permanent.

Against them we must set the fact that Conquest, so far as civilized

peoples are concerned, seems likely to play a smaller rôle in the future

than in the past, because it begins to be perceived how tenacious is the

sentiment of nationality in a vanquished people, and how much the

maintenance of that sentiment may endanger the victor State. As was

observed in an earlier page, the progress of a community in civilization

often tends to intensify both its capacity for political discontent and

its peculiar national sentiment, thus counterworking the influences of

trade and wealth. A people, or a nationality included in a large State,

while feeling the centripetal forces of material interest, may

nevertheless feel the repellent instinct of an unquenched attachment to

its national traditions and cling to the hope of reviving its old

national life.

The problem is, however, a far more complex one than any comparison of

the influences of material interest on the one side and national

sentiment on the other would suggest. Many phenomena may be imagined

which would affect it as the world moves on. One is a change in the

conditions under which war is waged. Another is a removal of some of the

causes which induce war, or a means, better than now exists, of averting

its outbreak. Another is the growth of what is called Collectivism and a

disposition to apply its principles in small rather than in large areas,

seeing that there are obviously some things which can be better managed

in the former. We are far from having exhausted the possibilities of the

influence of scientific discovery upon economic life, and through it

upon social and political life. Both the relations of Nations and States

to one another and the relations of the groups or communities within

each State to each other may be affected in ways as yet scarcely dreamt

of. Neither can we foresee the modes in which the scientific way of

looking at all questions may come ultimately to tinge and modify men’s

habits of thought even in social and political matters. No institution

was at one time more generally prevalent over the world, or seemed more

deeply rooted, than Slavery; and slavery, which has now vanished from

civilized communities, will soon have vanished from all countries. There

is indeed hardly any institution for which permanence can be predicted

except—and some will not admit even this exception—the Family.

Imagine a world in which all the hitherto unappropriated territories had

been allotted to one or other of the few strongest States. Imagine

tariffs abolished and the principle of equality of trade-facilities

among States established. Imagine a system of international arbitration

created under which the risks of war were so greatly reduced that the

prospect of war did not occupy men’s minds and give a military and

aggressive tinge to their patriotism. The present relations of

centripetal and centrifugal forces would under such conditions be

greatly altered, as respects both the wide theatre of the world and the

internal conditions of each particular State.

Imagine also a great advance in the desire to use governmental agencies

for the benefit of the citizens, and a general conviction that such

agencies could best be used by comparatively small communities rather

than by the State as a whole. A new centrifugal force, centrifugal at

least in respect of each State, would thereby have been called into

action. No one will venture to foretell any of these things. But none of

them is impossible; and it is plain that they might produce a set of

conditions, and a play of forces, unlike the present, and unlike any

period in the past. We must not therefore assume that the large States

and the present structure and organization of States will be permanent.

Of the more remote future, History can venture to say little more than

this—that it will never bring back the past. She recognizes that, as

Heraclitus says, one cannot step twice into the same river. Even when

she is able to declare that certain forces will assuredly be present,

she cannot forecast their relative strength at any given moment, nor say

what hitherto unobserved forces they may not, in their action upon one

another, call into activity. All she can do for the lawyer, the

statesman and the legislator, when they have to study and use the forces

operative in their own time, is to indicate to them the nature and the

character, the significant elements of strength and weakness, that

belong to each and every force that has been heretofore conspicuous, so

as to direct and guide them in observing and reflecting on the present.

This is much less than has sometimes been claimed for history.

Nevertheless it is a real service, for nothing is more difficult than to

observe exactly, and the ripest fruit of historical study is that

detachment of mind, created by the habit of scientific thinking, which

prevents observation from being coloured by prejudice or passion.

V

PRIMITIVE ICELAND

Iceland is known to most men as a land of volcanoes, geysers and

glaciers. But it ought to be no less interesting to the student of

history as the birthplace of a brilliant literature in poetry and prose,

and as the home of a people who have maintained for many centuries a

high level of intellectual cultivation. It is an almost unique instance

of a community whose culture and creative power flourished independently

of any favouring material conditions, and indeed under conditions in the

highest degree unfavourable. Nor ought it to be less interesting to the

student of politics and laws as having produced a Constitution unlike

any other whereof records remain, and a body of law so elaborate and

complex that it is hard to believe that it existed among men whose chief

occupation was to kill one another.

With the exception of Madeira and the Azores, Iceland is the only part

of what we call the Old World[116] which was never occupied by a

prehistoric race, and in which, therefore, the racial origin of the

population is historically known to us.

-----

Footnote 116:

Though geographically Iceland belongs rather to North America than to

Europe, geologically its affinities are with the Cape Verde Islands,

the Canaries, Madeira, and possibly the Azores to the South, with Jan

Mayen to the North, as it seems to owe its origin to a line of

volcanic action stretching from the Cape Verde Islands to far beyond

the Arctic Circle.

-----

None of those rude tribes who dwell scattered over the north of Asia,

Europe and America—Lapps, Samoyedes or Esquimaux—ever set foot in it.

Adamnan, Abbot of Iona from A.D. 679 to 704, reports in his famous _Life

of St. Columba_[117], a prophecy of the saint regarding a holy man named

Kormak, who, in Columba’s days (A.D. 521-597), made three long voyages

from Ireland in search of the ‘Desert in the Ocean’ (_eremum in

Oceano_), a term so happily descriptive of Iceland that one is tempted

to believe it to be the region referred to. A little later the Venerable

Bede (A.D. 673-735) speaks of contemporaries of his own who, coming from

the isle of Thule, declared that in it the sun could be seen at midnight

for a few days[118]. Still later the Irish monk Dicuil (writing about

A.D. 825) tells[119] of an isle lying far to the North-West where monks

known to him had spent the summer some thirty years before. And our

earliest Icelandic authority, the famous _Landnámabók_ (Book of the

Land-takings), mentions that when the first Norwegian settlers arrived

they found a few hermits of Irish race already established there, who

soon vanished from the presence of the stronger heathen, leaving behind

books, bells and staves (probably croziers). The Norse settlers called

them Papas (_i.e._ priests), or Westmen, a term used to describe the

Scots of Ireland. No doubt, then, the earliest discoverers of the isle

were these Celtic hermits, who had crossed the wide and stormy sea in

their light coracles of wood and leather, consecrating themselves to

prayer and fasting in this inclement wilderness. But they contributed no

element to the population of the island, and can hardly be said to have

a place in its history, which begins with the great Norwegian

immigration.

-----

Footnote 117:

_Vita S. Columbae_, cap. vi.

Footnote 118:

Comment. on 2 Kings xx. 9. The extreme northernmost point of Iceland

just touches the Arctic Circle.

Footnote 119:

In his book _De Mensura Orbis Terrae_, cap. 7, he identifies the isle

with Thule; and the reports of the monks point rather to Iceland than

to the Faeroe Isles, a group which Dicuil mentions elsewhere, and

which therefore he cannot mean by his Thule. The name Thule has of

course been applied by different writers to different lands. When

Tacitus says that it was seen in the distance by the fleet of

Agricola, he probably means either Shetland or the Fair Isle between

the Shetlands and the Orkneys.

-----

The first Teuton to reach Iceland was a Norse Viking named Naddođ, who

was driven to the isle by a storm in the latter half of the ninth

century. He called it Snæland, or Snowland. A second visitor, a Swede

named Gardar, sailed round it; a third (Flóki, a Norseman) landed, and

gave it the name it still bears. But though the news of the discovery

soon spread far and wide through the whole Northland, the isle might

possibly have lain unoccupied but for the events that were passing in

Norway. King Harald the Fairhaired was then in the full career of his

conquests. The great battle of Hafrsfjord had established his power in

Central and Southern Norway, and he was traversing the fjords with his

fleet, compelling the petty chieftains who stood at the head of the

numerous small independent communities that filled the country to

acknowledge his supremacy, and imposing a tax upon the land-holding

freemen.

The proud spirit of the warriors who for more than a century had been

ravaging the coasts of all Western Europe could not brook subjection,

and, being unable to offer a united opposition, the boldest and bravest

among them resolved to find freedom in exile. Some sought the Orkneys,

Shetlands and Faeroe isles, already settled by Northmen. Some joined the

Norwegian settlers in Ireland, and drove the Celtic population out of

some districts on its eastern coast. Others, again, followed Hrolf

Ganger (Göngu Hrolfr) (‘the Walker’), or Rollo as our books call him, a

Viking who, having incurred the wrath of Harald, sailed forth from his

home on the fjords near Bergen to found in Northern Gaul a dynasty of

Norsemen whence came the long line of Norman dukes and English kings,

_Albanique patres atque altae moenia Romae_. And yet others, hearing the

praises of the lately-discovered isle far off in the ocean, turned their

prows to the west and landed on the solitary shores of Iceland. They

embarked without any concert or common plan; each chieftain, or head of

a household, taking his own family, and perhaps a group of friends or

dependents; and they settled in the new land where they pleased,

sometimes throwing overboard as they neared the shore the wooden

columns, adorned with figures of Thor and Oðin, of the high-seat in

their old Norwegian hall, and disembarking at the point to which these

were driven by the winds and currents. At first each took for himself as

much land as he desired, but those who came later, when the better

pastures had been already occupied, were obliged to buy land or to fight

for it; and a curious custom grew up by which the extent of territory to

which a settler was entitled was fixed. A man could claim no more than

what he could carry fire round in a single day; a woman, than that round

which she could lead a two-year-old heifer. So rapid was the

immigration, many colonists from Norwegian Ireland and the Scottish

isles, Orkneys, Shetlands and Hebrides (the two former groups being then

Scandinavian) joining those who came direct from Norway, that in sixty

years the population had risen (so far as our data enable it to be

estimated) to about 50,000, a number which seems not to have been

exceeded down to the census of A.D. 1823. With those who came from

Ireland and the Hebrides there came some small infusion of Celtic blood,

which we note in such names as Njál, Kjartan, and Kormak, given to men

descended from the daughters of Irish chieftains.

Planting themselves in this irregular way, and in a country where the

good land lay in scattered patches, and where deserts, glaciers and

morasses, as well as torrents, passable only with difficulty or even

danger, cut off one settlement from another, the first settlers did not

create, and indeed felt little need of, any political or social

organization. But after a time a sort of polity began to shape itself,

and the process of its growth is one of the most interesting phenomena

of mediaeval history. The elements out of which it sprang were of course

those two which the settlers had brought with them from Norway, and both

of which were part of the common heritage of the Teutonic race—the habit

of joint worship at a temple, and the habit of holding an assembly of

all freemen to discuss and dispatch matters of common interest, and more

especially lawsuits[120]. This assembly resembled the Old English Folk

Mot, and was called the Thing, a name which survives in our English word

Hustings (Husting or House Thing), the platform from whence candidates

spoke at parliamentary elections, which disappeared in A.D. 1872 when

written nominations were prescribed by the statute which introduced vote

by ballot. The Þing[121] was held at the temple, usually dedicated to

Thor, the favourite deity of the Norsemen as Oðin was of the Swedes;

since the place of worship was the natural centre of the neighbourhood,

and the Þing was presided over by the local magnate or chief, who was

usually also the owner or guardian of the local temple, there being

among the Scandinavian peoples no special sacerdotal caste.

-----

Footnote 120:

Not but what the habit of holding such an assembly has existed among

peoples of very diverse race in many parts of the world. It existed

among the Greeks. It exists among the Kafirs of South Africa.

Footnote 121:

I use the Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon letter þ in this word to

distinguish it from the common English word.

-----

Now when a Norse chief settled himself in Iceland, one of his first acts

was to erect a temple, often with the sacred pillars which he had

brought from the ancestral temple in the old country. The temple soon

became a place of resort, not only for his own immediate dependents, but

also for those other settlers of the district who might not be rich

enough to build and maintain a shrine of their own. Of this temple the

chieftain and his descendants were the priests; and as the meetings of

the local Þing were held at it, he was the natural person to preside

over such meetings, both because he was usually (though not invariably)

eminent by his wealth and power, and also because he offered the

sacrifices and kept the sacred temple-ring on which judicial oaths were

taken, as at Rome men swore at the Ara Maxima of Hercules. Thus the

priest acquired, if he had not already enjoyed it, the position of a

sort of local chieftain or magnate, not unlike those kings of heroic

Greece whom we read of in Homer, or those German tribe-princes whom

Tacitus describes. Although his title was that of Goði[122] (originally

Guði) or priest, a word derived from the name of the Deity, he lost in

becoming the depositary of a certain measure of political power most of

such religious character as his office had possessed. Nor did any

sanctity attach to his person. In that age at least religion had come to

sit rather lightly upon the Norsemen. Either from inner decay, or from

the influence of the Christian peoples with whom they came in contact

beyond the seas, the old faith was beginning to disintegrate. Worship

was often cold or careless, and we read of men who regarded neither Þor

nor Oðin, but trusted in their own might and main.

-----

Footnote 122:

The term goði does not seem to have been used in Norway, but Ulfila,

in his translation of the Bible into Gothic (in the fourth century

A.D.), renders ἱερεύς by _gudja_. The ð is pronounced like th in

‘then.’

-----

The Goði was therefore much more of a secular than of an ecclesiastical

person, a chieftain rather than a priest in our sense of the word[123].

His powers as a chieftain were very indefinite, as indeed had been those

of the local chieftains of Norway. He was only the first among a number

of free and warlike landowners, some of them equal or superior to him in

lineage, with an official dignity which was little more than formal in

the hands of a weak man, but might be turned to great account by a

person of vigour and ability. As he presided in the Þing, so he was the

appropriate person to see to the regularity of its judicial proceedings,

to preserve order, and to provide for the carrying out of any measures

of common concern on which it might determine. When any unforeseen

danger or difficulty arose, he was looked to to advise or take the lead

in action; the members of his Þing expected aid and protection from him,

while he, like a thegn among the Teutons of contemporary England,

expected support and deference from them. But he had no legal powers of

coercion. Any one might oppose him in the Þing or out of it. Any

Þing-man might withdraw at pleasure, join himself to some other Goði,

and become a member of some other Þing[124]. There was, it must be

noted, no territorial circumscription corresponding to the Þing. Land

had nothing to do with the position held by the Goði to the Þingmen, and

herein, as well as in the absence of the relation of commendation and

homage, we see a capital difference between this system and feudality.

Nor was the post of Goði a place whence much emolument could be drawn.

The Þingmen were indeed required to pay a sort of tax called the temple

toll (_hoftollr_), but this did no more than meet the expenses to which

the Goði was put in keeping up the temple, and feasting those who came

to the sacrifices; it gave him no revenue which he could use to extend

his authority. Accordingly, the Goðorð was regarded as implying power

rather than property, and was not (after the introduction of

Christianity) liable to the payment of tithe. A curious feature of the

office was its alienability. Probably because it had arisen out of the

ownership of the temple, it was regarded as a piece of private property

which could be transferred by way of sale or gift, and could be vested

in several persons jointly. And similarly a number of Goðorðs might by

inheritance or purchase become vested in the same person.

-----

Footnote 123:

It is true that as the Sagas whence we draw our knowledge of the Goði

were all written down at a time when heathenism had vanished, it is

possible that they may not fully represent the original character of

the office.

Footnote 124:

The illustrious Konrad Maurer, to whose learned researches and sound

judgement every one who writes about the constitutional antiquities of

Iceland must feel infinitely indebted, thinks that the name of Goði

was used in Norway before the emigration to Iceland, though probably

the priest was there a less important person than he became in

Iceland, where his custody of the temple put him to some extent in the

position held in the Norwegian motherland by the hereditary chieftain,

who was in Norway the natural president of the local Thing.

Those who desire to study the early history of Iceland may be referred

to the writings of Dr. Maurer, and especially to his _Island bis zum

Untergange des Freistaats_ (Munich, 1874), and his _Beiträge zur

Rechtsgeschichte des Germanischen Nordens_ (Munich, 1852).

-----

Thus in the years immediately following the immigration there sprang up

round the coasts of Iceland a great number of petty, unconnected and

loosely aggregated groups of settlers. We must not venture to call them

states, scarcely even communities, not principalities, such as those

which were beginning to spring up in Western Europe, not in a strict

sense republics, yet nearer to republics than to principalities,

organized, so far as they were organized at all, chiefly for the

purposes of justice, and particularly for the exaction of fines for

homicide, but with no settled plan of government, no written laws—if

indeed writing was yet in use at all—no defined territory, and a

comparatively weak cohesion among their own members, the Thingmen. The

really effective tie was, in those ages, the tie of kindred; and the

Þingmen of the same Goði were not kinsfolk, were not a clan or sept,

like the Celtic communities of Scotland and Ireland. That tie was strong

enough to involve a whole district in the blood-feud of a single man.

For when any member of a family was killed, it was the duty of his

nearest relatives to avenge his death, either by obtaining a full

compensation in money, for which, if the offender refused to pay it, a

lawsuit was brought in the Þing, or else by slaying the murderer or some

member of his family. Thus a feud, like a _Vendetta_ in Corsica or in

Eastern Kentucky, might go on from generation to generation, each act of

revenge drawing others in its train, and tending to draw more and more

families into the feud, because when fights took place, the friends of

each party often joined, and if some were killed, their relatives had a

new blood-claim to prosecute.

Between the different communities that had thus sprung up there was no

political tie whatever. There did not as yet exist any Icelandic nation,

much less any common Icelandic State of which all the communities felt

themselves members. Each was an independent body; and if a dispute arose

between the members of two different Þings, there was no means of

adjusting it except by voluntary submission to the award of some other

Þing or else by open war. Seeing that slayings and plunderings and

burnings were everyday occurrences in this fierce race, where Vikingry

(_i.e._ piracy) was the most honoured pursuit, such cases were very

frequent, especially as to take revenge for a kinsman’s death was deemed

a sacred duty.

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