able to fight had assembled on one spot, and that they had been joined
by the Ambiani, the Aulerci, the Caletes, the Veliocasses, and the
Atrebates. Their camp was in a forest on a height surrounded by
marshes--Mont Saint Marc, in the forest of Compiègne; their baggage had
been transported to more distant woods. The command was divided among
several chiefs, but the greater part obeyed Correus on account of his
well-known hatred of the Romans. Commius had a few days before gone to
seek succor from the numerous Germans who lived in great numbers in the
neighboring counties--probably those on the banks of the Meuse.
The Bellovaci resolved with one accord to give Caesar battle, if, as
report said, he was advancing with only three legions; for they would
not run the risk of having afterward to encounter his entire army. If,
on the contrary, the Romans were advancing with more considerable forces
they proposed to keep their positions and confine themselves to
intercepting, by means of ambuscades, the provisions and forage, which
were very scarce at that season.
This plan, confirmed by many reports, seemed to Caesar full of prudence
and altogether contrary to the usual rashness of the barbarians. He took
therefore every possible care to dissimulate as to the number of his
troops. He had with him the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth legions, composed
of old soldiers of tried valor, and the Eleventh, which, formed of
picked young men who had gone through eight campaigns, deserved his
confidence, although it could not be compared with the others with
regard to bravery and experience in war. In order to deceive the enemy
by showing them only three legions--the only number they were willing to
fight--he placed the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth in one line; while the
baggage, which was not very considerable, was placed behind under the
protection of the Eleventh legion, which closed the march. In this
order, which formed almost a square, he came unawares in sight of the
Bellovaci. At the unexpected view of the legions, which advanced in
order of battle and with a firm step, they lost their courage and,
instead of attacking, as they had engaged to do, they confined
themselves to drawing themselves up before their camp without leaving
the height. A valley deeper than it was wide separated the two armies.
On account of this obstacle and the numerical superiority of the
barbarians, Caesar, though he had wished for battle, abandoned the idea
of attacking them and placed his camp opposite that of the Gauls in a
strong position. He caused it to be surrounded with a parapet twelve
feet high, surmounted by accessory works proportioned to the importance
of the retrenchment and preceded by a double fosse fifteen feet wide,
with a square bottom. Towers of three stories were constructed from
distance to distance and united together by covered bridges, the
exterior parts of which were protected by hurdle-work. In this manner
the camp was protected not only by a double fosse, but also by a double
row of defenders, some of whom, placed on the bridges, could from this
elevated and sheltered position throw their missiles farther and with a
better aim; while the others, placed on the _vallum_, nearer to the
enemy, were protected by the bridges from the missiles which showered
down upon them. The entrances were defended by means of higher towers
and were closed with gates.
These formidable retrenchments had a double aim--to increase the
confidence of the barbarians by making them believe that they were
feared, and next to allow the number of the garrison to be reduced with
safety when they had to go far for provisions. For some days there were
no serious engagements, but slight skirmishes in the marshy plain which
extended between the two camps. The capture, however, of a few foragers
did not fail to swell the presumption of the barbarians, which was still
more increased by the arrival of Commius, although he had brought only
five hundred German cavalry.
The enemy remained for several days shut up in its impregnable position.
Caesar judged that an assault would cost too many lives; an investment
alone seemed to him opportune, but it would require a greater number of
troops.
He wrote thereupon to Trebonius to send him as soon as possible the
Thirteenth legion, which, under the command of T. Sextius, was in winter
quarters among the Bituriges, to join it with the Sixth and the
Fourteenth (which the first of these lieutenants commanded at Genabum),
and to come himself with these three legions by forced marches.
During this time he employed the numerous cavalry of the Remi, the
Lingones and the other allies, to protect the foragers and to prevent
surprises, but this daily service, as is often the case, ended by being
negligently performed. And one day the Remi, pursuing the Bellovaci with
too much ardor, fell into an ambuscade. In withdrawing they were
surrounded by foot-soldiers in the midst of whom Vertiscus, their chief,
met with his death. True to his Gaulish nature, he would not allow his
age to exempt him from commanding and mounting on horseback, although he
was hardly able to keep his seat. His death and this feeble advantage
raised the self-confidence of the barbarians still more, but it rendered
the Romans more circumspect.
Nevertheless, in one of the skirmishes which were continually taking
place within sight of the two camps about the fordable places of the
marsh, the German infantry--which Caesar had sent for from beyond the
Rhine in order to mix them with the cavalry--joined in a body, boldly
crossed the marsh, and, meeting with little resistance, continued the
pursuit with such impetuosity that fear seized not only the enemy who
fought, but even those who were in reserve. Instead of availing
themselves of the advantages of the ground, all fled in a cowardly
manner. They did not stop until they were within their camp, and some
even were not ashamed to fly beyond it. This defeat caused a general
discouragement, for the Gauls were as easily daunted by the least
reverse as they were made arrogant by the smallest success.
Day after day was passing in this manner when Caesar was informed of the
arrival of C. Trebonius and his troops, which raised the number of his
legions to seven. The chiefs of the Bellovaci then feared an investment
like that of Alesia, and resolved to quit their position. They sent away
by night the old men, the infirm, the unarmed men, and the part of the
baggage which they had kept with them. Scarcely was this confused
multitude in motion--embarrassed by its own mass and its numerous
chariots--when daylight surprised it, and the troops had to be drawn up
in line before the camp to give the column time to move away. Caesar saw
no advantage either in giving battle to those who were in position, nor,
on account of the steepness of the hill, in pursuing those who were
making their retreat; he resolved, nevertheless, to make two legions
advance in order to disturb the enemy in its retreat. Having observed
that the mountain on which the Gauls were established was connected with
another height (Mont Collet), from which it was only separated by a
narrow valley, he ordered bridges to be thrown across the marsh. The
legions crossed over them and soon attained the summit of the height,
which was defended on both sides by abrupt declivities.
There he collected his troops and advanced in order of battle up to the
extremity of the plateau, whence the engines placed in battery could
reach the masses of the enemy with their missiles.
The barbarians, rendered confident by the advantage of their position,
were ready to accept battle if the Romans dared to attack the mountain;
besides, they were afraid to withdraw their troops successively, as, if
divided, they might have been thrown into disorder. This attitude led
Cæsar to resolve upon leaving twenty cohorts under arms, and on tracing
a camp on this spot and retrenching it. When the works were completed
the legions were placed before the retrenchments and the cavalry
distributed with their horses bridled at the outposts. The Bellovaci had
recourse to a stratagem in order to effect their retreat. They passed
from hand to hand the fascines and the straw on which, according to the
Gaulish custom, they were in the habit of sitting, preserving at the
same time their order of battle; placed them in front of the camp, and
toward the close of the day, on a preconcerted signal, set fire to them.
Immediately a vast flame concealed from the Romans the Gaulish troops,
who fled in haste.
Although the fire prevented Cæsar from seeing the retreat of the enemy
he suspected it. He ordered his legions to advance, and sent the cavalry
in pursuit, but he marched slowly in fear of some stratagem, suspecting
the barbarians to have formed the design of drawing the Romans to
disadvantageous ground. Besides, the cavalry did not dare to ride
through the smoke and flames; and thus the Bellovaci were able to pass
over a distance of ten miles and halt in a place strongly fortified by
nature (Mont Ganelon), where they pitched their camp. In this position
they confined themselves to placing cavalry and infantry in frequent
ambuscades, thus inflicting great damage on the Romans when they went to
forage. After several encounters of this kind Cæsar learned by a
prisoner that Correus, chief of the Bellovaci, with six thousand picked
infantry and one thousand horsemen, was preparing an ambuscade in places
where the abundance of corn and forage was likely to attract the Romans.
In consequence of this information he sent forward the cavalry, which
was always employed to protect the foragers, and joined with them some
light-armed auxiliaries, while he himself, with a greater number of
legions, followed them as closely as possible.
The enemy had posted themselves in a plain--that of Choisy-au-Bac--of
about one thousand paces in length and the same in breadth, surrounded
on one side by forests, on the other by a river which was difficult to
pass (the Aisne). The cavalry becoming acquainted with the designs of
the Gauls and feeling themselves supported, advanced resolutely in
squadrons toward this plain, which was surrounded with ambushes on all
sides.
Correus, seeing them arrive in this manner, believed the opportunity
favorable for the execution of his plan and began by attacking the first
squadrons with a few men. The Romans sustained the shock without
concentrating themselves in a mass on the same point, "which," says
Hirtius, "usually happens in cavalry engagements, and leads always to a
dangerous confusion." There, on the contrary, the squadrons, remaining
separated, fought in detached bodies, and when one of them advanced, its
flanks were protected by the others. Correus then ordered the rest of
his cavalry to issue from the woods. An obstinate combat began on all
sides without any decisive result until the enemy's infantry, debouching
from the forest in close ranks, forced the Roman cavalry to fall back.
The lightly armed soldiers who preceded the legions placed themselves
between the squadrons and restored the fortune of the combat. After a
certain time the troops, animated by the approach of the legions and the
arrival of Caesar, and ambitious of obtaining alone the honor of the
victory, redoubled their efforts and gained the advantage. The enemy, on
the other hand, were discouraged and took to flight, but were stopped by
the very obstacles which they intended to throw in the way of the
Romans. A small number, nevertheless, escaped through the forest and
crossed the river. Correus, who remained unshaken under this
catastrophe, obstinately refused to surrender, and fell pierced with
wounds. After this success Caesar hoped that if he continued his march
the enemy in dismay would abandon his camp, which was only eight miles
from the field of battle. He therefore crossed the Aisne, though not
without great difficulties.
The Bellovaci and their allies, informed by the fugitives of the death
of Correus, of the loss of their cavalry and the flower of their
infantry, and fearing every moment to see the Romans appear, convoked by
sound of trumpet a general assembly and decided by acclamation to send
deputies and hostages to the proconsul. The barbarians implored
forgiveness, alleging that this last defeat had ruined their power, and
that the death of Correus, the instigator of the war, delivered them
from oppression, for, during his life, it was not the senate which
governed, but an ignorant multitude. To their prayers Caesar replied
that last year the Bellovaci had revolted in concert with the other
Gaulish peoples, but that _they_ alone had persisted in the revolt. It
was very convenient to throw their faults upon those who were dead, but
how could it be believed that with nothing but the help of a weak
populace a man should have had sufficient influence to raise and sustain
a war contrary to the will of the chiefs, the decision of the senate,
and the desire of honest people? However, the evil which they had drawn
upon themselves was for him a sufficient reparation.
The following night the Bellovaci and their allies submitted, with the
exception of Commius, who fled to the country from which he had but
recently drawn support. He had not dared to trust the Romans for the
following reason: "The year before, in the absence of Caesar, T.
Labienus, informed that Commius was conspiring and preparing an
insurrection, thought that without accusing him of bad faith," says
Hirtius, "he could repress his treason." ("Under pretext of an interview
he sent C. Volusenus Quadratus, with some centurions, to kill him; but
when they were in the presence of the Gaulish chief the centurion who
was to strike him missed his blow and only wounded him; swords were
drawn on both sides and Commius had time to escape.")
The most warlike tribes had been vanquished and none of them dreamed of
further revolt. Nevertheless, many inhabitants of the newly conquered
countries abandoned the towns and the fields in order to withdraw
themselves from the Roman dominion. Caesar, in order to put a stop to
this emigration, distributed his army in different countries. He ordered
the quaestor, Mark Antony, to come to him with the Twelfth legion, and
sent the lieutenant Fabius with twenty-five cohorts into an opposite
part of Gaul--to the country situated between the Creuse and the
Vienne--where it was said that several tribes were in arms, and where
the lieutenant, Caninius Rebilus, who commanded with two legions, did
not appear to be sufficiently strong. Lastly, he ordered T. Labienus to
join him in person and to send the Fifteenth legion, which he had under
his command, into Cisalpine Gaul to protect the colonies of Roman
citizens there against the sudden inroads of the barbarians, who the
summer before had attacked the Tergestini (the inhabitants of Trieste).
As for Cæsar, he proceeded with four legions to the territory of the
Eburones to lay it waste. As he could not secure Ambiorix, who was still
wandering at large, he thought it advisable to destroy everything by
fire and sword, persuaded that this chief would never dare to return to
a country upon which he had brought such a terrible calamity. The
legions and the auxiliaries were charged with the execution of this
plan. Then he sent Labienus, with two legions, to the country of the
Treviri, who, always at war with the Germans, were only kept in
obedience by the presence of a Roman army.
During this time Caninius Rebilus, who had first been appointed to go
into the country of the Ruteni, but who had been detained by petty
insurrections in the region situated between the Creuse and the Vienne,
learned that numerous hostile bands were assembling in the country of
the Pictones. He was informed of this by letters from Duratius, their
king, who, amid the defection of a part of his people, had remained
invariably faithful to the Romans. He started immediately for Lemonum
(Poitiers). On the road he learned from prisoners that Duratius was shut
up there and besieged by several thousand men under the orders of
Dumnacus, chief of the Andes.
Rebilus, at the head of two weak legions, did not dare to measure his
strength with the enemy; he contented himself with establishing his camp
in a strong position. At the news of his approach, Dumnacus raised the
siege, and marched to meet the legions, but after several days of
fruitless attempts to force their camp he returned to attack Lemonum.
Meanwhile, the lieutenant, Caius Fabius, occupied in pacifying several
other tribes, learned from Caninius Rebilus what was going on in the
country of the Pictones and marched without delay to the assistance of
Duratius. The news of the march of Fabius deprived Dumnacus of all hope
of opposing, at the same time, the troops shut up in Lemonum and the
relieving army. He abandoned the siege again in great haste, not
thinking himself safe until he had placed the Loire between himself and
the Romans; but he could only pass that river where there was a bridge
(at Saumur). Before he had joined Rebilus, before he had even obtained a
sight of the enemy, Fabius, who came from the North, and had lost no
time, doubted not, from what he heard from the people of the country,
that Dumnacus, in his fear, had taken the road which led to that bridge.
He therefore marched thither with his legions, preceded at a short
distance by his cavalry. The latter surprised the column of Dumnacus on
its march, dispersed it, and returned to the camp laden with booty.
During the night of the following day Fabius again sent his cavalry
forward with orders to delay the march of the enemy so as to give time
for the arrival of the infantry. The two bodies of cavalry were soon
engaged, but the enemy, thinking he had to contend with only the same
troops as the day before, drew up his infantry in line so as to support
the squadrons, when suddenly the Roman legions appeared in order of
battle. At this sight the barbarians were struck with terror, the long
train of baggage thrown into confusion, and the infantry dispersed. More
than twelve thousand men were killed and all the baggage fell into the
hands of the Romans.
Only five thousand fugitives escaped from this rout; they were received
by the Senonan, Drappes, the same who in the first revolt of the Gauls
had collected a crowd of vagabonds, slaves, exiles, and robbers to
intercept the convoys of the Romans.
They took the direction of the Narbonnese with the Cadurcan Lucterius
who had before attempted a similar invasion.
Rebilus pursued them with two legions in order to avoid the shame of
seeing the province suffering any injury from such a contemptible
rabble. As for Fabius, he led the twenty-five cohorts against the
Carnutes and the other tribes whose forces had already been reduced by
the defeat they had suffered from Dumnacus. The Carnutes, though often
beaten, had never been completely subdued. They gave hostages, and the
Armoricans followed their example. Dumnacus, driven out of his own
territory, went to seek a refuge in the remotest part of Gaul.
Drappes and Lucterius, when they learned that they were pursued by
Rebilus and his two legions, gave up the design of penetrating into the
province; they halted in the country of the Cadurci and threw themselves
into the _oppidum_ of Uxellodunum (Puy-d'Issolu, near Varac), an
exceedingly strong place formerly under the dependence of Lucterius, who
soon incited the inhabitants to revolt.
Rebilus appeared immediately before the town, which, surrounded on all
sides by steep rocks, was, even without being defended, difficult of
access to armed men. Knowing that there was in the oppidum so great a
quantity of baggage that the besieged could not send it away secretly
without being detected and overtaken by the cavalry, and even by the
infantry, he divided his cohorts into three bodies and established three
camps on the highest points. Next he ordered a countervallation to be
made. On seeing these preparations the besieged remembered the
ill-fortune of Alesia, and feared a similar fate. Lucterius, who had
witnessed the horrors of famine during the investment of that town, now
took especial care of the provisions.
During this time the garrison of the oppidum attacked the redoubts of
Rebilus several times, which obliged him to interrupt the work of the
countervallation, which, indeed, he had not sufficient forces to defend.
Drappes and Lucterius established themselves at a distance of ten miles
from the oppidum, with the intention of introducing the provisions
gradually. They shared the duties between them. Drappes remained with
part of the troops to protect the camp. Lucterius, during the
night-time, endeavored to introduce beasts of burden into the town by a
narrow and wooded path. The noise of their march gave warning to the
sentries. Rebilus, informed of what was going on, ordered the cohorts to
sally from the neighboring redoubts, and at daybreak fell upon the
convoy, the escort of which was slaughtered. Lucterius, having escaped
with a small number of his followers, was unable to rejoin Drappes.
Rebilus soon learned from prisoners that the rest of the troops which
had left the oppidum were with Drappes at a distance of twelve miles,
and that by a fortunate chance not one fugitive had taken that direction
to carry him news of the last combat. The Roman general sent in advance
all the cavalry and the light German infantry; he followed them with one
legion, without baggage, leaving the other as a guard to the three
camps. When he came near the enemy he learned, by his scouts, that the
barbarians--according to their custom of neglecting the heights--had
placed their camp on the banks of a river (probably the Dordogne); that
the Germans and the cavalry had surprised them, and that they were
already fighting. Rebilus then advanced rapidly at the head of the
legion drawn up in order of battle and took possession of the heights.
As soon as the ensigns appeared, the cavalry redoubled its ardor; the
cohorts rushed forward from all sides and the Gauls were taken or
killed. The booty was immense and Drappes fell into the hands of the
Romans.
Rebilus, after this successful exploit, which cost him but a few
wounded, returned under the walls of Uxellodunum. Fearing no longer any
attack from without, he set resolutely to work to continue his
circumvallation. The day after, C. Fabius arrived, followed by his
troops, and shared with him the labors of the siege. While the south of
Gaul was the scene of serious trouble, Cæsar left the quaestor, Mark
Antony, with fifteen cohorts in the country of the Bellovaci. To deprive
the Belgæ of all idea of revolt he had proceeded to the neighboring
countries with two legions; had exacted hostages, and restored
confidence by his conciliating speeches. When he arrived among the
Carnutes--who the year before had been the first to revolt--he saw that
the remembrance of their conduct kept them in great alarm, and he
resolved to put an end to it by causing his vengeance to fall only upon
Gutruatus, the instigator of the war.
This man was brought in and delivered up. Although Cæsar was naturally
inclined to be indulgent, he could not resist the tumultuous entreaties
of his soldiers, who made that chief responsible for all the dangers
they had run and for all the misery they had suffered. Gutruatus died
under the stripes and was afterward beheaded.
It was in the land of the Carnutes that Cæsar received news, by the
letters of Rebilus, of the events which had taken place at Uxellodunum
and of the resistance of the besieged. Although a handful of men shut up
in a fortress was not very formidable, he judged it necessary to punish
their obstinacy, for fear that the Gauls should entertain the conviction
that it was not strength, but constancy, which had failed them in
resisting the Romans; and lest this example might encourage the other
states which possessed fortresses advantageously situated, to recover
their independence.