advancing toward Ariminum on the Adriatic, and driving before him the
Roman army under Porcius. Nor when the consul Livius had come up, and
united the second and third armies of the North, could he make head
against the invaders. The Romans still fell back before Hasdrubal beyond
Ariminum, beyond the Metaurus, and as far as the little town of Sena, to
the southeast of that river. Hasdrubal was not unmindful of the
necessity of acting in concert with his brother. He sent messengers to
Hannibal to announce his own line of march, and to propose that they
should unite their armies in South Umbria and then wheel round against
Rome. Those messengers traversed the greater part of Italy in safety,
but, when close to the object of their mission, were captured by a Roman
detachment; and Hasdrubal's letter, detailing his whole plan of the
campaign, was laid, not in his brother's hands, but in those of the
commander of the Roman armies of the South. Nero saw at once the full
importance of the crisis. The two sons of Hamilcar were now within two
hundred miles of each other, and if Rome were to be saved the brothers
must never meet alive. Nero instantly ordered seven thousand picked men,
a thousand being cavalry, to hold themselves in readiness for a secret
expedition against one of Hannibal's garrisons, and as soon as night had
set in he hurried forward on his bold enterprise; but he quickly left
the southern road toward Lucania, and, wheeling round, pressed northward
with the utmost rapidity toward Picenum. He had, during the preceding
afternoon, sent messengers to Rome, who were to lay Hasdrubal's letters
before the senate. There was a law forbidding a consul to make war or
march his army beyond the limits of the province assigned to him; but in
such an emergency, Nero did not wait for the permission of the senate to
execute his project, but informed them that he was already on his march
to join Livius against Hasdrubal. He advised them to send the two
legions which formed the home garrison on to Narnia, so as to defend
that pass of the Flaminian road against Hasdrubal, in case he should
march upon Rome before the consular armies could attack him. They were
to supply the place of these two legions at Rome by a levy _en masse_ in
the city, and by ordering up the reserve legion from Capua. These were
his communications to the senate. He also sent horsemen forward along
his line of march, with orders to the local authorities to bring stores
of provisions and refreshment of every kind to the roadside, and to have
relays of carriages ready for the conveyance of the wearied soldiers.
Such were the precautions which he took for accelerating his march; and
when he had advanced some little distance from his camp, he briefly
informed his soldiers of the real object of their expedition. He told
them that never was there a design more seemingly audacious and more
really safe. He said he was leading them to a certain victory, for his
colleague had an army large enough to balance the enemy already, so that
_their_ swords would decisively turn the scale. The very rumor that a
fresh consul and a fresh army had come up, when heard on the
battle-field--and he would take care that they should not be heard of
before they were seen and felt--would settle the business. They would
have all the credit of the victory and of having dealt the final
decisive blow. He appealed to the enthusiastic reception which they
already met with on their line of march as a proof and an omen of their
good fortune. And, indeed, their whole path was amid the vows and
prayers and praises of their countrymen. The entire population of the
districts through which they passed flocked to the roadside to see and
bless the deliverers of their country. Food, drink, and refreshments of
every kind were eagerly pressed on their acceptance. Each peasant
thought a favor was conferred on him if one of Nero's chosen band would
accept aught at his hands. The soldiers caught the full spirit of their
leader. Night and day they marched forward, taking their hurried meals
in the ranks, and resting by relay in the wagons which the zeal of the
country people provided, and which followed in the rear of the column.
Meanwhile, at Rome, the news of Nero's expedition had caused the
greatest excitement and alarm. All men felt the full audacity of the
enterprise, but hesitated what epithet to apply to it. It was evident
that Nero's conduct would be judged of by the event, that most unfair
criterion, as the Roman historian truly terms it. People reasoned on the
perilous state in which Nero had left the rest of his army, without a
general, and deprived of the core of its strength, in the vicinity of
the terrible Hannibal. They speculated on how long it would take
Hannibal to pursue and overtake Nero himself, and his expeditionary
force. They talked over the former disasters of the war, and the fall of
both the consuls of the last year. All these calamities had come on them
while they had only one Carthaginian general and army to deal with in
Italy. Now they had two Punic wars at a time. They had two Carthaginian
armies, they had almost two Hannibals, in Italy. Hasdrubal was sprung
from the same father; trained up in the same hostility to Rome; equally
practised in battle against their legions; and, if the comparative speed
and success with which he had crossed the Alps were a fair test, he was
even a better general than his brother. With fear for their interpreter
of every rumor, they exaggerated the strength of their enemy's forces in
every quarter, and criticised and distrusted their own.
Fortunately for Rome, while she was thus a prey to terror and anxiety,
her consul's nerves were stout and strong, and he resolutely urged on
his march toward Sena, where his colleague Livius and the praetor
Porcius were encamped, Hasdrubal's army being in position about half a
mile to their north. Nero had sent couriers forward to apprise his
colleague of his project and of his approach; and by the advice of
Livius, Nero so timed his final march as to reach the camp at Sena by
night. According to a previous arrangement, Nero's men were received
silently into the tents of their comrades, each according to his rank.
By these means there was no enlargement of the camp that could betray to
Hasdrubal the accession of force which the Romans had received. This was
considerable, as Nero's numbers had been increased on the march by the
volunteers, who offered themselves in crowds, and from whom he selected
the most promising men, and especially the veterans of former campaigns.
A council of war was held on the morning after his arrival, in which
some advised that time should be given for Nero's men to refresh
themselves after the fatigue of such a march. But Nero vehemently
opposed all delay. "The officer," said he, "who is for giving time to my
men here to rest themselves is for giving time to Hannibal to attack my
men, whom I have left in the camp in Apulia. He is for giving time to
Hannibal and Hasdrubal to discover my march, and to manoeuvre for a
junction with each other in Cisalpine Gaul at their leisure. We must
fight instantly, while both the foe here and the foe in the South are
ignorant of our movements. We must destroy this Hasdrubal, and I must be
back in Apulia before Hannibal awakes from his torpor." Nero's advice
prevailed. It was resolved to fight directly; and before the consuls and
praetor left the tent of Livius, the red ensign, which was the signal to
prepare for immediate action, was hoisted, and the Romans forthwith drew
up in battle array outside the camp.
Hasdrubal had been anxious to bring Livius and Porcius to battle, though
he had not judged it expedient to attack them in their lines. And now,
on hearing that the Romans offered battle, he also drew up his men and
advanced toward them. No spy or deserter had informed him of Nero's
arrival, nor had he received any direct information that he had more
than his old enemies to deal with. But as he rode forward to reconnoitre
the Roman line, he thought that their numbers seemed to have increased,
and that the armor of some of them was unusually dull and stained. He
noticed, also, that the horses of some of the cavalry appeared to be
rough and out of condition, as if they had just come from a succession
of forced marches. So also, though, owing to the precaution of Livius,
the Roman camp showed no change of size, it had not escaped the quick
ear of the Carthaginian general that the trumpet which gave the signal
to the Roman legions sounded that morning once oftener than usual, as if
directing the troops of some additional superior officer. Hasdrubal,
from his Spanish campaigns, was well acquainted with all the sounds and
signals of Roman war, and from all that he heard and saw he felt
convinced that both the Roman consuls were before him. In doubt and
difficulty as to what might have taken place between the armies of the
South, and probably hoping that Hannibal also was approaching, Hasdrubal
determined to avoid an encounter with the combined Roman forces, and to
endeavor to retreat upon Insubrian Gaul, where he would be in a friendly
country, and could endeavor to reopen his communication with his
brother. He therefore led his troops back into their camp; and as the
Romans did not venture on an assault upon his intrenchments, and
Hasdrubal did not choose to commence his retreat in their sight, the day
passed away in inaction. At the first watch of the night Hasdrubal led
his men silently out of their camp, and moved northward toward the
Metaurus, in the hope of placing that river between himself and the
Romans before his retreat was discovered. His guides betrayed him; and
having purposely led him away from the part of the river that was
fordable, they made their escape in the dark, and left Hasdrubal and his
army wandering in confusion along the steep bank, and seeking in vain
for a spot where the stream could be safely crossed. At last they
halted; and when day dawned on them, Hasdrubal found that great numbers
of his men, in their fatigue and impatience, had lost all discipline and
subordination, and that many of his Gallic auxiliaries had got drunk,
and were lying helpless in their quarters. The Roman cavalry was soon
seen coming up in pursuit, followed at no great distance by the legions,
which marched in readiness for an instant engagement. It was hopeless
for Hasdrubal to think of continuing his retreat before them. The
prospect of immediate battle might recall the disordered part of his
troops to a sense of duty, and revive the instinct of discipline. He
therefore ordered his men to prepare for action instantly, and made the
best arrangement of them that the nature of the ground would permit.
Heeren has well described the general appearance of a Carthaginian army.
He says: "It was an assemblage of the most opposite races of the human
species from the farthest parts of the globe. Hordes of half-naked Gauls
were ranged next to companies of white-clothed Iberians, and savage
Ligurians next to the far-travelled Nasamones and Lotophagi.
Carthaginians and Phoenici-Africans formed the centre, while innumerable
troops of Numidian horsemen, taken from all the tribes of the Desert,
swarmed about on unsaddled horses, and formed the wings; the van was
composed of Balearic slingers; and a line of colossal elephants, with
their Ethiopian guides, formed, as it were, a chain of moving fortresses
before the whole army."
Such were the usual materials and arrangements of the hosts that fought
for Carthage; but the troops under Hasdrubal were not in all respects
thus constituted or thus stationed. He seems to have been especially
deficient in cavalry, and he had few African troops, though some
Carthaginians of high rank were with him. His veteran Spanish infantry,
armed with helmets and shields, and short cut-and-thrust swords, were
the best part of his army. These and his few Africans he drew up on his
right wing, under his own personal command. In the centre he placed his
Ligurian infantry, and on the left wing he placed or retained the Gauls,
who were armed with long javelins and with huge broadswords and targets.
The rugged nature of the ground in front and on the flank of this part
of his line made him hope that the Roman right wing would be unable to
come to close quarters with these unserviceable barbarians before he
could make some impression with his Spanish veterans on the Roman left.
This was the only chance that he had of victory or safety, and he seems
to have done everything that good generalship could do to secure it. He
placed his elephants in advance of his centre and right wing. He had
caused the driver of each of them to be provided with a sharp iron spike
and a mallet, and had given orders that every beast that became
unmanageable, and ran back upon his own ranks, should be instantly
killed by driving the spike into the vertebra at the junction of the
head and the spine. Hasdrubal's elephants were ten in number. We have no
trustworthy information as to the amount of his infantry, but it is
quite clear that he was greatly outnumbered by the combined Roman
forces.
The tactics of the Roman legions had not yet acquired that perfection
which they received from the military genius of Marius,[64] and which we
read of in the first chapter of Gibbon. We possess, in that great work,
an account of the Roman legions at the end of the commonwealth, and
during the early ages of the empire, which those alone can adequately
admire who have attempted a similar description. We have also, in the
sixth and seventeenth books of Polybius, an elaborate discussion on the
military system of the Romans in his time, which was not far distant
from the time of the battle of the Metaurus. But the subject is beset
with difficulties; and instead of entering into minute but inconclusive
details, I would refer to Gibbon's first chapter as serving for a
general description of the Roman army in its period of perfection, and
remark that the training and armor which the whole legion received in
the time of Augustus were, two centuries earlier, only partially
introduced. Two divisions of troops, called _hastati_ and _principes_,
formed the bulk of each Roman legion in the Second Punic War. Each of
these divisions was twelve hundred strong. The hastatus and the princeps
legionary bore a breastplate or coat of mail, brazen greaves, and a
brazen helmet with a lofty upright crest of scarlet or black feathers.
He had a large oblong shield; and, as weapons of offence, two javelins,
one of which was light and slender, but the other was a strong and
massive weapon, with a shaft about four feet long and an iron head of
equal length. The sword was carried on the right thigh, and was a short
cut-and-thrust weapon, like that which was used by the Spaniards. Thus
armed, the hastati formed the front division of the legion, and the
principes the second. Each division was drawn up about ten deep, a space
of three feet being allowed between the files as well as the ranks, so
as to give each legionary ample room for the use of his javelins and of
his sword and shield. The men in the second rank did not stand
immediately behind those in the first rank, but the files were
alternate, like the position of the men on a draught-board. This was
termed the _quincunx_ order.
[Footnote 64: Most probably during the period of his prolonged
consulship, from B.C. 104 to B.C. 101, while he was training his army
against the Cimbri and the Teutons.]
Niebuhr considers that this arrangement enabled the legion to keep up a
shower of javelins on the enemy for some considerable time. He says:
"When the first line had hurled its _pila_, it probably stepped back
between those who stood behind it, and two steps forward restored the
front nearly to its first position; a movement which, on account of the
arrangement of the quincunx, could be executed without losing a moment.
Thus one line succeeded the other in the front till it was time to draw
the swords; nay, when it was found expedient, the lines which had
already been in the front might repeat this change, since the stores of
pila were surely not confined to the two which each soldier took with
him into battle.
"The same charge must have taken place in fighting with the sword,
which, when the same tactics were adopted on both sides, was anything
but a confused _mêlée_; on the contrary, it was a series of single
combats." He adds that a military man of experience had been consulted
by him on the subject and had given it as his opinion "that the change
of the lines as described above was by no means impracticable; but, in
the absence of the deafening noise of gunpowder, it cannot have had even
any difficulty with well-trained troops."
The third division of the legion was six hundred strong and acted as a
reserve. It was always composed of veteran soldiers, who were called the
_triarii_. Their arms were the same as these of the principes and
hastati, except that each _triarian_ carried a spear instead of
javelins. The rest of the legion consisted of light-armed troops, who
acted as skirmishers. The cavalry of each legion was at this period
about three hundred strong. The Italian allies who were attached to the
legion seem to have been similarly armed and equipped, but their
numerical proportion of cavalry was much larger.
Such was the nature of the forces that advanced on the Roman side to the
battle of the Metaurus. Nero commanded the right wing, Livius the left,
and the praetor Porcius had the command of the centre. "Both Romans and
Carthaginians well understood how much depended upon the fortune of this
day, and how little hope of safety there was for the vanquished. Only
the Romans herein seemed to have had the better in conceit and opinion
that they were to fight with men desirous to have fled from them; and
according to this presumption came Livius the consul, with a proud
bravery, to give charge on the Spaniards and Africans, by whom he was so
sharply entertained that the victory seemed very doubtful. The Africans
and Spaniards were stout soldiers, and well acquainted with the manner
of the Roman fight. The Ligurians also were a hardy nation, and not
accustomed to give ground, which they needed the less, or were able now
to do, being placed in the midst. Livius, therefore, and Porcius found
great opposition; and with great slaughter on both sides prevailed
little or nothing. Besides other difficulties, they were exceedingly
troubled by the elephants, that brake their first ranks and put them in
such disorder as the Roman ensigns were driven to fall back; all this
while Claudius Nero, laboring in vain against a steep hill, was unable
to come to blows with the Gauls that stood opposite him, but out of
danger. This made Hasdrubal the more confident, who, seeing his own left
wing safe, did the more boldly and fiercely make impression on the other
side upon the left wing of the Romans."[65]
[Footnote 65: Sir Walter Raleigh: _Historie of the World_.]
But at last Nero, who found that Hasdrubal refused his left wing, and
who could not overcome the difficulties of the ground in the quarter
assigned to him, decided the battle by another stroke of that military
genius which had inspired his march. Wheeling a brigade of his best men
round the rear of the rest of the Roman army, Nero fiercely charged the
flank of the Spaniards and Africans. The charge was as successful as it
was sudden. Rolled back in disorder upon each other, and overwhelmed by
numbers, the Spaniards and Ligurians died, fighting gallantly to the
last. The Gauls, who had taken little or no part in the strife of the
day, were then surrounded, and butchered almost without resistance.
Hasdrubal, after having, by the confession of his enemies, done all that
a general could do, when he saw that the victory was irreparably lost,
scorning to survive the gallant host which he had led, and to gratify,
as a captive, Roman cruelty and pride, spurred his horse into the midst
of a Roman cohort, and sword in hand, met the death that was worthy of
the son of Hamilcar and the brother of Hannibal.
Success the most complete had crowned Nero's enterprise. Returning as
rapidly as he had advanced, he was again facing the inactive enemies in
the South before they even knew of his march. But he brought with him a
ghastly trophy of what he had done. In the true spirit of that savage
brutality which deformed the Roman national character, Nero ordered
Hasdrubal's head to be flung into his brother's camp. Ten years had
passed since Hannibal had last gazed on those features. The sons of
Hamilcar had then planned their system of warfare against Rome which
they had so nearly brought to successful accomplishment. Year after year
had Hannibal been struggling in Italy, in the hope of one day hailing
the arrival of him whom he had left in Spain, and of seeing his
brother's eye flash with affection and pride at the junction of their
irresistible hosts. He now saw that eye glazed in death, and in the
agony of his heart the great Carthaginian groaned aloud that he
recognized his country's destiny.
Meanwhile, at the tidings of the great battle, Rome at once rose from
the thrill of anxiety and terror to the full confidence of triumph.
Hannibal might retain his hold on Southern Italy for a few years longer,
but the imperial city and her allies were no longer in danger from his
arms; and, after Hannibal's downfall, the great military republic of the
ancient world met in her career of conquest no other worthy competitor.
Byron has termed Nero's march "unequalled," and, in the magnitude of its
consequences, it is so. Viewed only as a military exploit, it remains
unparalleled save by Marlborough's bold march from Flanders to the
Danube in the campaign of Blenheim, and perhaps also by the Archduke
Charles' lateral march in 1796, by which he overwhelmed the French under
Jourdan, and then, driving Moreau through the Black Forest and across
the Rhine, for a while freed Germany from her invaders.
SCIPIO AFRICANUS CRUSHES HANNIBAL AT ZAMA AND SUBJUGATES CARTHAGE
B.C. 202
LIVY
(Sprung from a colony of Tyre, Carthage, founded about B.C. 800, rapidly
developed, through a wonderful system of colonization, into a dominating
power, her rule extending through Northwestern Africa and Western
Europe. In B.C. 509 Carthage made her first treaty with Rome. But the
rivalry which grew up between the two Powers developed into a stubborn
contest for the empire of the world, culminating in the three Punic
wars. The first of these lasted from B.C. 264 to 241; the second, from
B.C. 218 to 201. In the interval between these two wars Rome acquired
the northern part of Italy, whence she sent victorious armies against
the barbarians in Gaul. Meanwhile, under Hamilcar Barcar, the
Carthaginians had effected the conquest of Southern Spain, which they
reduced to the condition of a dependency.
Hamilcar's greater son, Hannibal, was compelled by his father to swear
eternal enmity to Rome. Having established the Carthaginian empire in
Spain, at the age of twenty-six he took the Spanish city of Saguntum, an
ally of Rome, and this was the immediate cause of the Second Punic War,
which the Romans declared. The passage of the Alps by Hannibal is
regarded as one of the greatest military performances in history. He was
welcomed by the Gauls as a deliverer, and was soon operating in Northern
Italy, his appearance there being a complete surprise to the Romans. He
won victories over them at the rivers Ticinus and Trebia, B.C. 218;
another in 217 at Lake Trasimenus; a great triumph at Cannae in 216;
took Capua in the same year, and wintered there; in 212 captured
Tarentum; marched against Rome in 211; and in 203 was recalled to
Africa.
In the mean time the Romans had decided to carry the war into Africa,
although in 215 they had beaten Hannibal, and in 211 had retaken Capua.
Publius Cornelius Scipio [Scipio Africanus Major] in B.C. 210-206 drove
the Carthaginians out of Spain. In 205 he was made consul, and the next
year invaded Africa. Landing on the coast, he was met by the forces of
the Numidian King, who became his allies against Carthage. In 203 he
defeated Syphax and Hasdrubal. Hannibal now having returned to Carthage,
he took command of the forces which she opposed to the Roman invaders,
but in B.C. 202 suffered final overthrow at Zama, in the battle that
ended the Second Punic War. Livy's account of the closing scenes of that
war, which here follows, gives the reader a clear understanding of the
sequence and conclusion of the events related.)
Marcus Servilius and Tiberius Claudius, having assembled the senate,
consulted them respecting the provinces. As both were desirous of having
Africa, they wished Italy and Africa to be disposed of by lots; but,
principally in consequence of the exertions of Quintus Metellus, Africa
was neither assigned to anyone nor withheld. The consuls were ordered to
make application to the tribunes of the people, to the effect that, if
they thought proper, they should put it to the people to decide whom
they wished to conduct the war in Africa. All the tribes nominated
Publius Scipio. Nevertheless, the consuls put the province of Africa to
the lot, for so the senate had decreed. Africa fell to the lot of
Tiberius Claudius, who was to cross over into Africa with a fleet of
fifty ships, all quinqueremes, and have an equal command with Scipio.
Marcus Servilius obtained Etruria. Caius Servilius was continued in
command in the same province, in case the senate resolved that the
consul should remain at the city. Of the praetors, Marcus Sextus
obtained Gaul, which province, together with two legions, Publius
Quinctilius Varus was to deliver to him; Caius Livius obtained Bruttium,
with the two legions which Publius Sempronius, the proconsul, had
commanded the former year; Cneius Tremellius had Sicily, and was to
receive the province and two legions from Publius Villius Tappulus, a
praetor of the former year; Villius, as propraetor, was to protect the
coast of Sicily with twenty men-of-war and a thousand soldiers; and
Marcus Pomponius was to convey thence to Rome one thousand five hundred
soldiers, with the remaining twenty ships. The city jurisdiction fell to
Caius Aurelius Cotta; and the rest of the praetors were continued in
command of the respective provinces and armies which they then had. Not
more than sixteen legions were employed this year in the defence of the
empire. And, that they might have the gods favorably disposed toward
them in all their undertakings and proceedings, it was ordered that the
consuls, before they set out to the war, should celebrate those games
and sacrifice those victims of the larger sort which, in the consulate
of Marcus Claudius Marcellus and Titus Quinctius, Titus Manlius the
dictator had vowed, provided the commonwealth should continue in the
same state for the next five years. The games were exhibited in the
circus during four days, and the victims sacrificed to those deities to
whom they had been vowed.