military skill. It was certain that Alexander, on his return from Egypt,
must march northward along the Syrian coast before he attacked the
central provinces of the Persian empire. A direct eastward march from
the lower part of Palestine across the great Syrian Desert was then, as
ever, utterly impracticable. Marching eastward from Syria, Alexander
would, on crossing the Euphrates, arrive at the vast Mesopotamian
plains. The wealthy capitals of the empire, Babylon, Susa, and
Persepolis, would then lie to the south; and if he marched down through
Mesopotamia to attack them, Darius might reasonably hope to follow the
Macedonians with his immense force of cavalry, and, without even risking
a pitched battle, to harass and finally overwhelm them.
We may remember that three centuries afterward a Roman army under
Crassus was thus actually destroyed by the oriental archers and horsemen
in these very plains, and that the ancestors of the Parthians who thus
vanquished the Roman legions served by thousands under King Darius. If,
on the contrary, Alexander should defer his march against Babylon, and
first seek an encounter with the Persian army, the country on each side
of the Tigris in this latitude was highly advantageous for such an army
as Darius commanded, and he had close in his rear the mountainous
districts of Northern Media, where he himself had in early life been
satrap, where he had acquired reputation as a soldier and a general, and
where he justly expected to find loyalty to his person, and a safe
refuge in case of defeat.[49]
[Footnote 49: Mitford's remarks on the strategy of Darius in his last
campaign are very just. After having been unduly admired as a historian,
Mitford is now unduly neglected. His partiality and his deficiency in
scholarship have been exposed sufficiently to make him no longer a
dangerous guide as to Greek politics, while the clearness and brilliance
of his narrative, and the strong common sense of his remarks (where his
party prejudices do not interfere), must always make his volumes
valuable as well as entertaining.]
His great antagonist came on across the Euphrates against him, at the
head of an army which Arrian, copying from the journals of Macedonian
officers, states to have consisted of forty thousand foot and seven
thousand horse. In studying the campaigns of Alexander, we possess the
peculiar advantage of deriving our information from two of Alexander's
generals of division, who bore an important part in all his enterprises.
Aristobulus and Ptolemy--who afterward became king of Egypt--kept
regular journals of the military events which they witnessed, and these
journals were in the possession of Arrian when he drew up his history of
Alexander's expedition.
The high character of Arrian for integrity makes us confident that he
used them fairly, and his comments on the occasional discrepancies
between the two Macedonian narratives prove that he used them sensibly.
He frequently quotes the very words of his authorities; and his history
thus acquires a charm such as very few ancient or modern military
narratives possess. The anecdotes and expressions which he records we
fairly believe to be genuine, and not to be the coinage of a
rhetorician, like those in Curtius. In fact, in reading Arrian, we read
General Aristobulus and General Ptolemy on the campaigns of the
Macedonians, and it is like reading General Jomini or General Foy on the
campaigns of the French.
The estimate which we find in Arrian of the strength of Alexander's army
seems reasonable enough, when we take into account both the losses which
he had sustained and the reënforcements which he had received since he
left Europe. Indeed, to Englishmen, who know with what mere handfuls of
men our own generals have, at Plassy, at Assaye, at Meeanee, and other
Indian battles, routed large hosts of Asiatics, the disparity of numbers
that we read of in the victories won by the Macedonians over the
Persians presents nothing incredible. The army which Alexander now led
was wholly composed of veteran troops in the highest possible state of
equipment and discipline, enthusiastically devoted to their leader, and
full of confidence in his military genius and his victorious destiny.
The celebrated Macedonian phalanx formed the main strength of his
infantry. This force had been raised and organized by his father,
Philip, who, on his accession to the Macedonian throne, needed a
numerous and quickly formed army, and who, by lengthening the spear of
the ordinary Greek phalanx, and increasing the depth of the files,
brought the tactics of armed masses to the highest extent of which it
was capable with such materials as he possessed. He formed his men
sixteen deep, and placed in their grasp the _sarissa_, as the Macedonian
pike was called, which was four-and-twenty feet in length, and, when
couched for action, reached eighteen feet in front of the soldier; so
that, as a space of about two feet was allowed between the ranks, the
spears of the five files behind him projected in front of each
front-rank man.
The phalangite soldier was fully equipped in the defensive armor of the
regular Greek infantry. And thus the phalanx presented a ponderous and
bristling mass, which, as long as its order was kept compact, was sure
to bear down all opposition. The defects of such an organization are
obvious, and were proved in after-years, when the Macedonians were
opposed to the Roman legions. But it is clear that under Alexander the
phalanx was not the cumbrous, unwieldy body which it was at Cynoscephate
and Pydna. His men were veterans; and he could obtain from them an
accuracy of movement and steadiness of evolution such as probably the
recruits of his father would only have floundered in attempting, and
such as certainly were impracticable in the phalanx when handled by his
successors, especially as under them it ceased to be a standing force,
and became only a militia.
Under Alexander the phalanx consisted of an aggregate of eighteen
thousand men, who were divided into six brigades of three thousand each.
These were again subdivided into regiments and companies; and the men
were carefully trained to wheel, to face about, to take more ground, or
to close up, as the emergencies of the battle required. Alexander also
arrayed troops armed in a different manner in the intervals of the
regiments of his phalangites, who could prevent their line from being
pierced and their companies taken in flank, when the nature of the
ground prevented a close formation, and who could be withdrawn when a
favorable opportunity arrived for closing up the phalanx or any of its
brigades for a charge, or when it was necessary to prepare to receive
cavalry.
Besides the phalanx, Alexander had a considerable force of infantry who
were called shield-bearers: they were not so heavily armed as the
phalangites, or as was the case with the Greek regular infantry in
general, but they were equipped for close fight as well as for
skirmishing, and were far superior to the ordinary irregular troops of
Greek warfare. They were about six thousand strong. Besides these, he
had several bodies of Greek regular infantry; and he had archers,
slingers, and javelin-men, who fought also with broadsword and target,
and who were principally supplied him by the highlanders of Illyria and
Thracia.
The main strength of his cavalry consisted in two chosen regiments of
cuirassiers, one Macedonian and one Thessalian, each of which was about
fifteen hundred strong. They were provided with long lances and heavy
swords, and horse as well as man was fully equipped with defensive
armor. Other regiments of regular cavalry were less heavily armed, and
there were several bodies of light-horsemen, whom Alexander's conquests
in Egypt and Syria had enabled him to mount superbly.
A little before the end of August, Alexander crossed the Euphrates at
Thapsacus, a small corps of Persian cavalry under Mazaeus retiring
before him. Alexander was too prudent to march down through the
Mesopotamian deserts, and continued to advance eastward with the
intention of passing the Tigris, and then, if he was unable to find
Darius and bring him to action, of marching southward on the left side
of that river along the skirts of a mountainous district where his men
would suffer less from heat and thirst, and where provisions would be
more abundant.
Darius, finding that his adversary was not to be enticed into the march
through Mesopotamia against his capital, determined to remain on the
battle-ground, which he had chosen on the left of the Tigris; where, if
his enemy met a defeat or a check, the destruction of the invaders would
be certain with two such rivers as the Euphrates and the Tigris in their
rear.
The Persian King availed himself to the utmost of every advantage in his
power. He caused a large space of ground to be carefully levelled for
the operation of his scythe-armed chariots; and he deposited his
military stores in the strong town of Arbela, about twenty miles in his
rear. The rhetoricians of after-ages have loved to describe Darius
Codomanus as a second Xerxes in ostentation and imbecility; but a fair
examination of his generalship in this his last campaign shows that he
was worthy of bearing the same name as his great predecessor, the royal
son of Hystaspes.
On learning that Darius was with a large army on the left of the Tigris,
Alexander hurried forward and crossed that river without opposition. He
was at first unable to procure any certain intelligence of the precise
position of the enemy, and after giving his army a short interval of
rest he marched for four days down the left bank of the river.
A moralist may pause upon the fact that Alexander must in this march
have passed within a few miles of the ruins of Nineveh, the great city
of the primæval conquerors of the human race. Neither the Macedonian
King nor any of his followers knew what those vast mounds had once been.
They had already sunk into utter destruction; and it is only within the
last few years that the intellectual energy of one of our own countrymen
has rescued Nineveh from its long centuries of oblivion.
On the fourth day of Alexander's southward march, his advance guard
reported that a body of the enemy's cavalry was in sight. He instantly
formed his army in order for battle, and directing them to advance
steadily he rode forward at the head of some squadrons of cavalry and
charged the Persian horse, whom he found before him. This was a mere
reconnoitring party, and they broke and fled immediately; but the
Macedonians made some prisoners, and from them Alexander found that
Darius was posted only a few miles off, and learned the strength of the
army that he had with him. On receiving this news Alexander halted, and
gave his men repose for four days, so that they should go into action
fresh and vigorous. He also fortified his camp and deposited in it all
his military stores and all his sick and disabled soldiers, intending to
advance upon the enemy with the serviceable part of his army perfectly
unencumbered.
After this halt, he moved forward, while it was yet dark, with the
intention of reaching the enemy, and attacking them at break of day.
About half way between the camps there were some undulations of the
ground, which concealed the two armies from each other's view; but, on
Alexander arriving at their summit, he saw, by the early light, the
Persian host arrayed before him, and he probably also observed traces of
some engineering operation having been carried on along part of the
ground in front of them.
Not knowing that these marks had been caused by the Persians having
levelled the ground for the free use of their war chariots, Alexander
suspected that hidden pitfalls had been prepared with a view of
disordering the approach of his cavalry. He summoned a council of war
forthwith. Some of the officers were for attacking instantly, at all
hazards; but the more prudent opinion of Parmenio prevailed, and it was
determined not to advance farther till the battle-ground had been
carefully surveyed.
Alexander halted his army on the heights, and, taking with him some
light-armed infantry and some cavalry, he passed part of the day in
reconnoitring the enemy and observing the nature of the ground which he
had to fight on. Darius wisely refrained from moving from his position
to attack the Macedonians on the eminences which they occupied, and the
two armies remained until night without molesting each other.
On Alexander's return to his headquarters, he summoned his generals and
superior officers together, and telling them that he knew well that
_their_ zeal wanted no exhortation, he besought them to do their utmost
in encouraging and instructing those whom each commanded, to do their
best in the next day's battle. They were to remind them that they were
now not going to fight for a province as they had hitherto fought, but
they were about to decide by their swords the dominion of all Asia. Each
officer ought to impress this upon his subalterns, and they should urge
it on their men. Their natural courage required no long words to excite
its ardor; but they should be reminded of the paramount importance of
steadiness in action. The silence in the ranks must be unbroken as long
as silence was proper; but when the time came for the charge, the shout
and the cheer must be full of terror for the foe. The officers were to
be alert in receiving and communicating orders; and everyone was to act
as if he felt that the whole result of the battle depended on his own
single good conduct.
Having thus briefly instructed his generals, Alexander ordered that the
army should sup and take their rest for the night.
Darkness had closed over the tents of the Macedonians when Alexander's
veteran general, Parmenio, came to him and proposed that they should
make a night attack on the Persians. The King is said to have answered
that he scorned to filch a victory, and that Alexander must conquer
openly and fairly. Arrian justly remarks that Alexander's resolution was
as wise as it was spirited. Besides the confusion and uncertainty which
are inseparable from night engagements, the value of Alexander's victory
would have been impaired if gained under circumstances which might
supply the enemy with any excuse for his defeat, and encourage him to
renew the contest. It was necessary for Alexander not only to beat
Darius, but to gain such a victory as should leave his rival without
apology and without hope of recovery.
The Persians, in fact, expected and were prepared to meet a night
attack. Such was the apprehension that Darius entertained of it that he
formed his troops at evening in order of battle, and kept them under
arms all night. The effect of this was that the morning found them jaded
and dispirited, while it brought their adversaries all fresh and
vigorous against them.
The written order of battle which Darius himself caused to be drawn up
fell into the hands of the Macedonians after the engagement, and
Aristobulus copied it into his journal. We thus possess, through Arrian,
unusually authentic information as to the composition and arrangement of
the Persian army. On the extreme left were the Bactrian, Daan, and
Arachosian cavalry. Next to these Darius placed the troops from Persia
proper, both horse and foot. Then came the Susians, and next to these
the Cadusians. These forces made up the left wing.
Darius' own station was in the centre. This was composed of the Indians,
the Carians, the Mardian archers, and the division of Persians who were
distinguished by the golden apples that formed the knobs of their
spears. Here also were stationed the bodyguard of the Persian nobility.
Besides these, there were, in the centre, formed in deep order, the
Uxian and Babylonian troops and the soldiers from the Red Sea. The
brigade of Greek mercenaries whom Darius had in his service, and who
alone were considered fit to stand the charge of the Macedonian phalanx,
was drawn up on either side of the royal chariot.
The right wing was composed of the Coelosyrians and Mesopotamians, the
Medes, the Parthians, the Sacians, the Tapurians, Hyrcanians, Albanians,
and Sacesinae. In advance of the line on the left wing were placed the
Scythian cavalry, with a thousand of the Bactrian horse and a hundred
scythe-armed chariots. The elephants and fifty scythe-armed chariots
were ranged in front of the centre; and fifty more chariots, with the
Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry, were drawn up in advance of the right
wing.
Thus arrayed, the great host of King Darius passed the night that to
many thousands of them was the last of their existence. The morning of
the first of October[50] dawned slowly to their wearied watching, and
they could hear the note of the Macedonian trumpet sounding to arms, and
could see King Alexander's forces descend from their tents on the
heights and form in order of battle on the plain.
[Footnote 50: The battle was fought eleven days after an eclipse of the
moon, which gives the means of fixing the precise date.]
There was deep need of skill, as well as of valor, on Alexander's side;
and few battle-fields have witnessed more consummate generalship than
was now displayed by the Macedonian King. There were no natural barriers
by which he could protect his flanks; and not only was he certain to be
overlapped on either wing by the vast lines of the Persian army, but
there was imminent risk of their circling round him, and charging him in
the rear, while he advanced against their centre. He formed, therefore,
a second, or reserve line, which was to wheel round, if required, or to
detach troops to either flank, as the enemy's movements might
necessitate; and thus, with their whole army ready at any moment to be
thrown into one vast hollow square, the Macedonians advanced in two
lines against the enemy, Alexander himself leading on the right wing,
and the renowned phalanx forming the centre, while Parmenio commanded on
the left.
Such was the general nature of the disposition which Alexander made of
his army. But we have in Arrian the details of the position of each
brigade and regiment; and as we know that these details were taken from
the journals of Macedonian generals, it is interesting to examine them,
and to read the names and stations of King Alexander's generals and
colonels in this the greatest of his battles.
The eight regiments of the royal horse-guards formed the right of
Alexander's line. Their colonels were Clitus--whose regiment was on the
extreme right, the post of peculiar danger--Glaucias, Ariston, Sopolis,
Heraclides, Demetrias, Meleager, and Hegelochus. Philotas was general of
the whole division. Then came the shield-bearing infantry: Nicanor was
their general. Then came the phalanx in six brigades. Coenus' brigade
was on the right, and nearest to the shield-bearers; next to this stood
the brigade of Perdiccas, then Meleager's, then Polysperchon's; and then
the brigade of Amynias, but which was now commanded by Simmias, as
Amynias had been sent to Macedonia to levy recruits. Then came the
infantry of the left wing, under the command of Craterus.
Next to Craterus' infantry were placed the cavalry regiments of the
allies, with Eriguius for their general. The Thessalian cavalry,
commanded by Philippus, were next, and held the extreme left of the
whole army. The whole left wing was intrusted to the command of
Parmenio, who had round his person the Pharsalian regiment of cavalry,
which was the strongest and best of all the Thessalian horse regiments.
The centre of the second line was occupied by a body of phalangite
infantry, formed of companies which were drafted for this purpose from
each of the brigades of their phalanx. The officers in command of this
corps were ordered to be ready to face about if the enemy should succeed
in gaining the rear of the army. On the right of this reserve of
infantry, in the second line, and behind the royal horse-guards,
Alexander placed half the Agrian light-armed infantry under Attalus, and
with them Brison's body of Macedonian archers and Cleander's regiment of
foot. He also placed in this part of his army Menidas' squadron of
cavalry and Aretes' and Ariston's light horse. Menidas was ordered to
watch if the enemy's cavalry tried to turn their flank, and, if they did
so, to charge them before they wheeled completely round, and so take
them in flank themselves.
A similar force was arranged on the left of the second line for the same
purpose. The Thracian infantry of Sitalces were placed there, and
Coeranus' regiment of the cavalry of the Greek allies, and Agathon's
troops of the Odrysian irregular horse. The extreme left of the second
line in this quarter was held by Andromachus' cavalry. A division of
Thracian infantry was left in guard of the camp. In advance of the right
wing and centre was scattered a number of light-armed troops, of
javelin-men and bowmen, with the intention of warding off the charge of
the armed chariots.[51]
[Footnote 51: Kleber's arrangement of his troops at the battle of
Heliopolis, where, with ten thousand Europeans, he had to encounter
eighty thousand Asiatics in an open plain, is worth comparing with
Alexander's tactics at Arbela. See Thiers' _Histoire du Consulat_.]
Conspicuous by the brilliancy of his armor, and by the chosen band of
officers who were round his person, Alexander took his own station, as
his custom was, in the right wing, at the head of his cavalry; and when
all the arrangements for the battle were complete, and his generals were
fully instructed how to act in each probable emergency, he began to lead
his men toward the enemy.
It was ever his custom to expose his life freely in battle, and to
emulate the personal prowess of his great ancestor, Achilles. Perhaps,
in the bold enterprise of conquering Persia, it was politic for
Alexander to raise his army's daring to the utmost by the example of his
own heroic valor; and, in his subsequent campaigns, the love of the
excitement, of "the raptures of the strife," may have made him, like
Murat, continue from choice a custom which he commenced from duty. But
he never suffered the ardor of the soldier to make him lose the coolness
of the general.
Great reliance had been placed by the Persian King on the effects of the
scythe-bearing chariots. It was designed to launch these against the
Macedonian phalanx, and to follow them up by a heavy charge of cavalry,
which, it was hoped, would find the ranks of the spearmen disordered by
the rush of the chariots, and easily destroy this most formidable part
of Alexander's force. In front, therefore, of the Persian centre, where
Darius took his station, and which it was supposed that the phalanx
would attack, the ground had been carefully levelled and smoothed, so as
to allow the chariots to charge over it with their full sweep and speed.
As the Macedonian army approached the Persian, Alexander found that the
front of his whole line barely equalled the front of the Persian centre,
so that he was outflanked on his right by the entire left wing of the
enemy, and by their entire right wing on his left. His tactics were to
assail some one point of the hostile army, and gain a decisive
advantage, while he refused, as far as possible, the encounter along the
rest of the line. He therefore inclined his order of march to the right,
so as to enable his right wing and centre to come into collision with
the enemy on as favorable terms as possible, although the manoeuvre
might in some respect compromise his left.
The effect of this oblique movement was to bring the phalanx and his own
wing nearly beyond the limits of the ground which the Persians had
prepared for the operations of the chariots; and Darius, fearing to lose
the benefit of this arm against the most important parts of the
Macedonian force, ordered the Scythian and Bactrian cavalry, who were
drawn up in advance on his extreme left, to charge round upon
Alexander's right wing, and check its farther lateral progress. Against
these assailants Alexander sent from his second line Menidas' cavalry.
As these proved too few to make head against the enemy, he ordered
Ariston also from the second line with his right horse, and Cleander
with his foot, in support of Menidas.