Grant, whence under flags of truce he sent two communications to
Jefferson Davis requesting, among other things, permission for an
interview. This, after some delay, was granted, and on the 12th of
January, 1865, he found himself in Richmond face to face with the
Confederate President. What transpired is accurately known from accounts
of the meeting by both Blair and Davis. The former admitted frankly that
Mr. Lincoln afforded him no opportunity to explain the object of his
mission, and, indeed, appeared anxious to avoid an interview on that
subject. When he had been assured that the Confederate authorities were
under no engagements to European powers that would prevent their
entering into arrangements with the Government of the United States Mr.
Blair unfolded his plan by reading to Mr. Davis a carefully prepared
paper embodying the following suggestions:
Slavery, he said, was doomed, for even the South itself had proposed to
employ the slave in winning its independence. That institution,
therefore, no longer remained as an obstacle to peace. Louis Napoleon,
he continued, had declared publicly that his object was to make the
Latin race supreme in the southern part of North America. This, indeed,
had been an idea of the Emperor’s uncle, who desired at one time to make
conquests of territory in the States bordering the Gulf, and the
foothold already effected in Mexico was one step in the accomplishment
of this grand design. After developing these points Mr. Blair added,
“Jefferson Davis is the fortunate man who now holds the commanding
position to encounter this formidable scheme of conquest, and whose fiat
can at the same time deliver his country from the bloody agony now
covering it in mourning. He can drive Maximilian from his American
throne, and baffle the designs of Napoleon to subject our Southern
people to the ‘Latin race.’”
How this was to be accomplished Mr. Blair’s paper outlined. President
Lincoln’s amnesty proclamation looked to an armistice, which could be
enlarged to embrace all engaged in the war; then by secret preliminaries
to a cessation of hostilities Mr. Davis could transfer to Texas such a
portion of the Confederate army as was deemed adequate to his purpose.
With a Southern force on the Rio Grande and Juarez conciliated it could
enter Mexico and expel her invaders. If these combined forces were
insufficient, multitudes from the Federal army, officers and men, would
be found ready to engage in the enterprise. Both Republicans and
Democrats of the North had declared their adherence to the Monroe
Doctrine.
After thus indicating for Mr. Davis a means of escape from his dilemma
the adroit politician next appealed powerfully to his desire of fame.
“He who expels the Bonaparte-Hapsburg dynasty from our Southern flank,”
proceeded Mr. Blair, “which General Jackson in one of his letters warned
me was the vulnerable point through which foreign invasion would come,
will ally his name with those of Washington and Jackson as a defender of
the liberty of the country. If in delivering Mexico he should model its
States in form and principle to adapt them to our Union and add a new
Southern constellation to its benignant sky while rounding off our
possessions on the continent at the Isthmus, and opening the way to
blending the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific, thus embracing our
Republic in the arms of the ocean, he would complete the work of
Jefferson, who first set one foot of our colossal Government on the
Pacific by a stride from the Gulf of Mexico.”[428]
Blair remarked in conclusion, “There is my problem, Mr. Davis; do you
think it possible to be solved?” After a little consideration came the
reply, “I think so.” Touching the question of bringing the sections
together again Mr. Davis observed that though a spirit of vindictiveness
had been engendered by the war, time and events would do something
toward its removal. The circumstance of Northern and Southern armies
united in a common cause would, he believed, assist greatly in restoring
the old feeling. He also acknowledged to his visitor that European
powers were pleased to see the sections exhausting their resources in
mutual war.
Thus was the Confederate leader persuaded to entertain the bold project
of conquering Mexico under pretence of relieving the Monroe Doctrine
from its peril. The explanation of this easy conversion, however, lies
mainly in the fact that Mr. Davis, however he might endeavor to conceal
his convictions, was convinced that the resources of the South were
scarcely equal to another campaign. Like other leaders of the
Confederacy he was anxious to seize any means of escape from an
embarrassing situation. He proposed to Mr. Blair, therefore, the
appointment of commissioners, and mentioned Judge Campbell, formerly of
the United States Supreme Court, as one qualified by his talents and
integrity to undertake such a mission.
During his short sojourn in Richmond Mr. Blair learned from other
prominent secessionists the hopelessness of the rebellion, and this,
perhaps, was the only tangible result of his celebrated intrigue. To
initiate the project Mr. Davis handed him a letter to be shown President
Lincoln. That interesting communication was as follows:
=Richmond, Virginia=, _12 Jany., ’65_.
=F. P. Blair=, Esq.:
=Sir=: I have deemed it proper, and probably desirable to you, to
give you, in this form, the substance of remarks made by me, to be
repeated by you to President Lincoln, etc., etc. I have no
disposition to find obstacles in forms, and am willing now, as
heretofore, to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace;
and am ready to send a commission whenever I have reason to suppose
it will be received, or to receive a commission, if the United
States Government shall choose to send one. That, notwithstanding
the rejection of our former offers, I would, if you could promise
that a commissioner, minister, or other agent, would be received,
appoint one immediately, and renew the effort to enter into
conference, with a view to secure peace to the two countries.
Yours, etc.,
=Jefferson Davis=.[429]
Mr. Lincoln’s only response to the communication thus brought to his
attention was to open a little wider the door for negotiation by sending
to Mr. Blair the following letter:
=Washington=, _January 18, 1865_.
=F. P. Blair=, Esq.:
=Sir=: You having shown me Mr. Davis’s letter to you of the 12th
instant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now, and
shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he, or any other
influential person now resisting the National authority, may
informally send to me, with the view of securing peace to the people
of our one common country.
Yours, etc.,
=A. Lincoln=.
With this note Mr. Blair returned to Richmond framing as best he could
excuses why President Lincoln rejected the overtures of Jefferson Davis
for a joint invasion of Mexico. With the nature of these explanations
this essay is not concerned. To cover his retreat from an unsuccessful
intrigue the disappointed commissioner then suggested that, perhaps,
Grant and Lee could enter into negotiations for peace with more
assurance of success than politicians could hope to do. Though Mr. Davis
offered no objection to this proposal, Blair was forced soon after to
report that military negotiations were out of the question.
The Confederate leader was then compelled to choose between obstinate
perseverance in his policy of a war for Southern independence or to
accept frankly Mr. Lincoln’s offer of reunion. Blair’s first visit to
Richmond did not escape observation, and, when his second conference was
known, interest in the purpose of his mission became intense. Without
some effort at negotiation Mr. Davis could not afterward satisfy the
peace party in the South without subjecting himself to the injurious
imputation of preferring war. In these circumstances, and after
consultation with his cabinet, he authorized Alexander H. Stephens, John
A. Campbell and R. M. T. Hunter to proceed to Washington as a commission
for the purpose of informally conferring with Mr. Lincoln “upon the
issues involved in the existing war, and for the purpose of securing
peace to the two countries.” They were burdened with no instructions,
and only one condition was insisted upon, that is, an acknowledgment of
Southern independence.
Toward the end of January they presented themselves at the Federal
military lines near Richmond, and, after an exchange of telegrams with
the authorities in Washington, were permitted to pass on to Fortress
Monroe. It was the original intention of President Lincoln to intrust
the work of the conference wholly to Secretary Seward, and for this
purpose he gave him the following written instructions:
=Executive Mansion,
Washington=, _January 31, 1865_.
Hon. =William H. Seward=, _Secretary of State_:
You will proceed to Fortress Monroe, Virginia, there to meet and
informally confer with Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, on
the basis of my letter to F. P. Blair, Esq., of January 18, 1865, a
copy of which you have. You will make known to them that three
things are indispensable, to wit: _First_. The restoration of the
national authority throughout all the States. _Second._ No receding
by the executive of the United States on the slavery question from
the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress,
and in preceding documents. _Third._ No cessation of hostilities
short of an end of the war and the disbanding of all forces hostile
to the Government. You will inform them that all propositions of
theirs, not inconsistent with the above, will be considered and
passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality. You will hear all
they may choose to say and report it to me. You will not assume to
definitely consummate anything.
Yours, etc.,
=Abraham Lincoln=.[430]
The different if not conflicting statements as to the object of their
mission nearly led to a return of the Confederate representatives
without any interview whatever. General Grant, fearing the unfavorable
influence on the Union cause of such a result, sent to Secretary Stanton
a confidential dispatch in which he referred to the evident sincerity of
Stephens and Hunter. He also expressed his regret that they were about
to return without an expression on the subject of their mission from any
person in authority. President Lincoln, who was about to recall Mr.
Seward by telegraph, decided, on reading Grant’s message, to join his
Secretary at Fortress Monroe, for which place he set out at once.
The famous conference, which took place February 3, 1865, on board a
steamer at Hampton Roads, has been treated in detail by nearly every
historian of the Rebellion, and, therefore, need only be briefly noticed
in these pages. An informal discussion of four hours occurred on the
_River Queen_. By a previous agreement no writings or memoranda were
made; hence our principal knowledge of what transpired at that
celebrated interview is derived from accounts subsequently written out
from memory by the Confederate commissioners, and from Secretary
Seward’s letter to Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister to
England.
Mr. Stephens, who began the discussion, asked whether there was no way
of restoring former relations; to this Mr. Lincoln replied, “There was
but one way that he knew of, and that was, for those who were resisting
the laws of the Union to cease that resistance.” Stephens observed that
they had been led to believe that both sections might for a time cease
their present strife and unite on some continental question until
passion had somewhat subsided and accommodation become possible.
To this suggestion Mr. Lincoln replied promptly: “I suppose you refer to
something that Mr. Blair has said. Now it is proper to state at the
beginning that whatever he said was of his own accord, and without the
least authority from me.” The President then stated that before the
visit to Richmond he had flatly refused to hear Mr. Blair’s
propositions; he was willing, however, to hear proposals for peace on
the conditions expressed in his reply to the letter of Mr. Davis. The
restoration of the Union was a _sine qua non_ with him, therefore his
instructions that no conference be held except on that basis.
Though the Confederate statesmen had resolved not to enter into any
agreement that would require their forces to unite in an invasion of
Mexico, Mr. Stephens continued to press the subject, and this after Mr.
Lincoln had refused even to discuss the question. The President then
brought the conversation back to the original object of the meeting, and
declared that he could not entertain a proposition looking to an
armistice until the paramount question of reunion was first determined.
The terms of reunion were then discussed. On this subject Mr. Lincoln is
reported by the commissioners to have said that the shortest way to
effect this was to disband the insurgent armies and permit “the National
authorities to resume their functions.” As to the admission of members
to Congress from the seceding States the President believed they ought
to be received, and also that they would be; however, he could enter
into no stipulations on that subject. By the cessation of resistance, he
is alleged to have declared, the States would be immediately restored to
their practical relations to the Union. This sentiment was probably
ascribed to him for party purposes.
As the enforcement of the confiscation and other penal laws was left
entirely with him he assured them that the Executive power would be
exercised with the utmost liberality. The courts could determine all
questions involving rights of property, and Congress, after passion had
been somewhat composed, would, no doubt, be liberal in making
restitution of forfeited property, or would indemnify those who had
suffered.
The President refused to promise any modification whatever of the terms
of his Emancipation Proclamation. He regarded it as a judicial question.
How the courts would decide it he did not know. His own opinion was that
as the proclamation was only a war measure, as soon as the war ceased it
would be inoperative for the future. It would be held to apply only to
such slaves as had come under its operation while it was in active
exercise. The courts, however, might hold that it effectually
emancipated all the slaves in the States to which it applied at the
time. He is reported further to have said that he interfered with
slavery to maintain the Union, and then only with hesitation and under
pressure of a public necessity. He had always favored emancipation, but
not immediate emancipation.
On the same occasion he is said to have stated as his belief that the
people of the North were not less responsible for slavery than those of
the South; if the war should then cease, with the voluntary abolition of
slavery by the States, he would favor, individually, payment by the
Government of a fair indemnity for the loss to owners. That feeling, he
believed, had an extensive existence in the loyal States. He knew some
who were in favor of an appropriation as high as $400,000,000 for that
purpose. However, he could enter into no stipulation. He merely
expressed his own views and what he believed to be the views of others
upon the subject.
Relative to the division of Virginia Mr. Lincoln said he could give only
“an individual opinion, which was, that Western Virginia would continue
to be recognized as a separate State in the Union.”
Seward brought to the notice of the commissioners one topic which to
them was new, that is, the passage by Congress three days earlier of the
proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution. He is reported to have
said that it was passed in deference to the war spirit, and that if the
South would agree to immediate restoration its ratification might be
defeated. This, however, is doubtful, for the Cabinet as well as the
President approved the action of Congress in submitting the Thirteenth
Amendment to the consideration of the States; besides, it is not in
harmony with Mr. Seward’s anti-slavery record.
In urging on Mr. Stephens separate State action to effect a cessation of
hostilities, the President said: “If I resided in Georgia, with my
present sentiments, I’ll tell you what I would do if I were in your
place. I would go home and get the Governor of the State to call the
Legislature together, and get them to recall all the State troops from
the war; elect Senators and Members to Congress, and ratify this
constitutional amendment prospectively, so as to take effect—say in five
years. Such a ratification would be valid, in my opinion. I have looked
into the subject, and think such a prospective ratification would be
valid. Whatever may have been the views of your people before the war,
they must be convinced now that slavery is doomed. It cannot last long
in any event, and the best course, it seems to me, for your public men
to pursue would be to adopt such a policy as will avoid, as far as
possible, the evils of immediate emancipation. This would be my course,
if I were in your place.”[431]
The advice was wasted. When the party was on the point of separating,
Mr. Stephens again asked the President to reconsider the plan of an
armistice on the basis of a Mexican expedition. “Well, Stephens,”
replied Mr. Lincoln, “I will reconsider it; but I do not think my mind
will change.” Thus ended the famous Hampton Roads conference.
On their return to Richmond the commissioners made a formal report to
Mr. Davis of the failure of negotiations; this he transmitted to the
Confederate Congress with an artful letter designed to strengthen the
war party in the South, and to silence effectually the adversaries of
his administration. To improve this advantage a day was appointed for
the purpose of getting a popular expression on the result of the
conference. Business was generally suspended, and the people crowded
every building in the city suitable for holding large assemblies.
Churches, theatres and halls of legislation were engaged for the
occasion. Twenty orators, among the ablest in the South, told their
hearers of the Northern “ultimatum,” not omitting to describe eloquently
all the consequences of subjugation. The old war spirit appeared to have
been kindled once more; “But,” says Mr. Pollard, “it was only the sickly
glare of an expiring flame; there was no steadiness in the excitement;
there was no virtue in huzzas; the inspiration ended with the voices and
ceremonies that invoked it; and it was found that the spirit of the
people of the Confederacy was too weak, too much broken to act with
effect, or assume the position of erect and desperate defiance.”[432] In
March General Lee revealed the weakness of his army at Fort Steadman;
Grant’s movements around Petersburg followed in April; the rest is a
familiar story.
From this brief discussion of topics only allied to the Presidential
method of reunion it is time to resume our examination of the main
theme.
It is almost a trite observation to remark that President Lincoln’s
opinions on public questions were formed only after mature deliberation,
and that to the conclusions thus reached he adhered with inflexible
tenacity. Notwithstanding the sentiments of Congress on the question of
reconstruction he evinced a decided preference for his own. This is
proved by a number of letters and speeches from which two may be
selected both because of the time of their appearance and the station of
the persons to whom they were addressed. To General Hurlbut, who had
temporarily succeeded Banks in command at New Orleans, the President
wrote, November 14, 1864, the following admonitory letter:
Few things, since I have been here, have impressed me more painfully
than what, for four or five months past, has appeared a bitter
military opposition to the new State government of Louisiana. I
still indulged some hope that I was mistaken in the fact; but copies
of a correspondence on the subject between General Canby and
yourself, and shown me to-day, dispel that hope. A very fair
proportion of the people of Louisiana have inaugurated a new State
government, making an excellent new constitution—better for the poor
black man than we have in Illinois. This was done under military
protection, directed by me, in the belief, still sincerely
entertained, that with such a nucleus around which to build we could
get the State into position again sooner than otherwise. In this
belief a general promise of protection and support, applicable alike
to Louisiana and other States, was given in the last annual message.
During the formation of the new government and constitution they
were supported by nearly every loyal person, and opposed by every
secessionist. And this support and this opposition, from the
respective standpoints of the parties, was perfectly consistent and
logical. Every Unionist ought to wish the new government to succeed;
and every disunionist must desire it to fail. Its failure would
gladden the heart of Slidell in Europe, and of every enemy of the
old flag in the world. Every advocate of slavery naturally desires
to see blasted and crushed the liberty promised the black man by the
new constitution. But why General Canby and General Hurlbut should
join on the same side is to me incomprehensible.
Of course, in the condition of things at New Orleans, the military
must not be thwarted by the civil authority; but when the
constitutional Convention, for what it deems a breach of privilege,
arrests an editor in no way connected with the military, the
military necessity for insulting the Convention and forcibly
discharging the editor is difficult to perceive. Neither is the
military necessity for protecting the people against paying large
salaries fixed by a legislature of their own choosing very apparent.
Equally difficult to perceive is the military necessity for forcibly
interposing to prevent a bank from loaning its own money to the
State. These things, if they have occurred, are, at the best, no
better than gratuitous hostility. I wish I could hope that they may
be shown to not have occurred. To make assurance against
misunderstanding, I repeat that in the existing condition of things
in Louisiana, the military must not be thwarted by the civil
authority; and I add that on points of difference the commanding
general must be judge and master. But I also add that in the
exercise of this judgment and control, a purpose, obvious and
scarcely unavowed, to transcend all military necessity, in order to
crush out the civil government, will not be overlooked.[433]
A similar communication, though less peremptory in tone, he felt
constrained to send to General E. R. S. Canby, who had been assigned to
command in the military division of West Mississippi. Under date of
December 12, 1864, he wrote that officer:
I think it is probable that you are laboring under some
misapprehension as to the purpose, or rather the motive, of the
Government on two points—cotton and the new Louisiana State
government.
It is conceded that military operations are the first in importance;
and as to what is indispensable to these operations, the department
commander must be judge and master.
But the other matters mentioned I suppose to be of public importance
also; and what I have attempted in regard to them is not merely a
concession to private interest and pecuniary greed.
* * * * *
As to the new State government of Louisiana. Most certainly there is
no worthy object in getting up a piece of machinery merely to pay
salaries and give political consideration to certain men. But it is
a worthy object to again get Louisiana into proper practical
relations with the nation, and we can never finish this if we never
begin it. Much good work is already done, and surely nothing can be
gained by throwing it away.
I do not wish either cotton or the new State government to take
precedence of the military while the necessity for the military
remains; but there is a strong public reason for treating each with
so much favor as may not be substantially detrimental to the
military.[434]
That Mr. Lincoln never modified these opinions is conclusively proved by
the last public utterance of his life. In addressing the citizens of
Washington, who were holding a demonstration in consequence of Lee’s
surrender, the President on the evening of April 11 said:
By these recent successes the reinauguration of the national
authority—reconstruction—which has had a large share of thought from
the first, is pressed much more closely upon our attention. It is
fraught with great difficulty. Unlike a case of war between
independent nations, there is no authorized organ for us to treat
with—no one man has authority to give up the rebellion for any other
man. We simply must begin with and mold from disorganized and
discordant elements. Nor is it a small additional embarrassment that
we, the loyal people, differ among ourselves as to the mode, manner,
and measure of reconstruction. As a general rule, I abstain from
reading the reports of attacks upon myself, wishing not to be
provoked by that to which I cannot properly offer an answer. In
spite of this precaution, however, it comes to my knowledge that I
am much censured for some supposed agency in setting up and seeking
to sustain the new State government of Louisiana.
In this I have done just so much as, and no more than, the public
knows. In the annual message of December, 1863, and in the
accompanying proclamation, I presented a plan of reconstruction, as
the phrase goes, which I promised, if adopted by any State, should
be acceptable to and sustained by the executive Government of the
nation. I distinctly stated that this was not the only plan which
might possibly be acceptable, and I also distinctly protested that
the executive claimed no right to say when or whether members should
be admitted to seats in Congress from such States. This plan was in
advance submitted to the then Cabinet, and distinctly approved by
every member of it. One of them suggested that I should then and in
that connection apply the Emancipation Proclamation to the
theretofore excepted parts of Virginia and Louisiana; that I should
drop the suggestion about apprenticeship for freed people, and that
I should omit the protest against my own power in regard to the
admission of members of Congress. But even he approved every part
and parcel of the plan which has since been employed or touched by
the action of Louisiana.
The new constitution of Louisiana, declaring emancipation for the
whole State, practically applies the proclamation to the part
previously excepted. It does not adopt apprenticeship for freed
people, and it is silent, as it could not well be otherwise, about
the admission of members to Congress. So that, as it applies to
Louisiana, every member of the Cabinet fully approved the plan. The
message went to Congress, and I received many commendations of the
plan, written and verbal, and not a single objection to it from any
professed emancipationist came to my knowledge until after the news
reached Washington that the people of Louisiana had begun to move in
accordance with it. From about July 1862, I had corresponded with
different persons supposed to be interested [in] seeking a
reconstruction of a State government for Louisiana. When the message
of 1863, with the plan before mentioned, reached New Orleans,
General Banks wrote me that he was confident that the people, with
his military coöperation, would reconstruct substantially on that
plan. I wrote to him and some of them to try it. They tried it, and
the result is known. Such has been my only agency in getting up the
Louisiana government.
As to sustaining it, my promise is out, as before stated. But as bad
promises are better broken than kept, I shall treat this as a bad
promise, and break it whenever I shall be convinced that keeping it
is adverse to the public interest; but I have not yet been so
convinced. I have been shown a letter on this subject, supposed to
be an able one, in which the writer expresses regret that my mind
has not seemed to be definitely fixed on the question whether the
seceded States, so called, are in the Union or out of it. It would
perhaps add astonishment to his regret were he to learn that since I
have found professed Union men endeavoring to make that question, I
have purposely forborne any public expression upon it. As appears to
me, that question has not been, nor yet is, a practically material
one, and that any discussion of it, while it thus remains
practically immaterial, could have no effect other than the
mischievous one of dividing our friends. As yet, whatever it may
hereafter become, that question is bad as the basis of a
controversy, and good for nothing at all—a merely pernicious
abstraction.
We all agree that the seceded States, so called, are out of their
proper practical relation with the Union, and that the sole object
of the Government, civil and military, in regard to those States is
to again get them into that proper practical relation. I believe
that it is not only possible, but in fact easier, to do this without
deciding or even considering whether these States have ever been out
of the Union, than with it. Finding themselves safely at home, it
would be utterly immaterial whether they had ever been abroad. Let
us all join in doing the acts necessary to restoring the proper
practical relations between these States and the Union, and each
forever after innocently indulge his own opinion whether in doing
the acts he brought the States from without into the Union, or only
gave them proper assistance, they never having been out of it. The
amount of constituency, so to speak, on which the new Louisiana
government rests, would be more satisfactory to all if it contained
50,000, or 30,000, or even 20,000, instead of only about 12,000, as
it does. It is also unsatisfactory to some that the elective
franchise is not given to the colored man. I would myself prefer
that it were now conferred on the very intelligent, and on those who
serve our cause as soldiers.
Still, the question is not whether the Louisiana government, as it
stands, is quite all that is desirable. The question is, will it be
wiser to take it as it is and help to improve it, or to reject and
disperse it? Can Louisiana be brought into proper practical relation
with the Union sooner by sustaining or by discarding her new State
government? Some twelve thousand voters in the heretofore slave
State of Louisiana have sworn allegiance to the Union, assumed to be
the rightful political power of the State, held elections, organized
a State government, adopted a free State constitution, giving the
benefit of public schools equally to black and white, and empowering
the legislature to confer the elective franchise upon the colored
man. Their legislature has already voted to ratify the
constitutional amendment recently passed by Congress, abolishing
slavery throughout the nation. These twelve thousand persons are
thus fully committed to the Union and to perpetual freedom in the
State—committed to the very things, and nearly all the things, the
nation wants—and they ask the nation’s recognition and its
assistance to make good their committal.
Now, if we reject and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganize
and disperse them. We, in effect, say to the white man: You are
worthless or worse; we will neither help you, nor be helped by you.
To the blacks we say: This cup of liberty which these, your old
masters, hold to your lips we will dash from you, and leave you to
the chances of gathering the spilled and scattered contents in some
vague and undefined when, where, and how. If this course,
discouraging and paralyzing both white and black, has any tendency
to bring Louisiana into proper practical relations with the Union, I
have so far been unable to perceive it. If, on the contrary, we
recognize and sustain the new government of Louisiana, the converse
of all this is made true. We encourage the hearts and nerve the arms
of the twelve thousand to adhere to their work, and argue for it,
and proselyte for it, and fight for it, and feed it, and grow it,
and ripen it to a complete success. The colored man, too, in seeing
all united for him, is inspired with vigilance, and energy, and
daring, to the same end. Grant that he desires the elective
franchise, will he not attain it sooner by saving the already
advanced steps toward it than by running backward over them? Concede
that the new government of Louisiana is only to what it should be as
the egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching
the egg than by smashing it.
Again, if we reject Louisiana we also reject one vote in favor of
the proposed amendment to the national Constitution. To meet this
proposition it has been argued that no more than three fourths of
those States which have not attempted secession are necessary to
validly ratify the amendment. I do not commit myself against this
further than to say that such a ratification would be questionable,
and sure to be persistently questioned, while a ratification by
three fourths of all the States would be unquestioned and
unquestionable. I repeat the question: Can Louisiana be brought into
proper practical relation with the Union sooner by sustaining or by
discarding her new State government? What has been said of Louisiana
will apply generally to other States. And yet so great peculiarities
pertain to each State, and such important and sudden changes occur
in the same State, and withal so new and unprecedented is the whole
case that no exclusive and inflexible plan can safely be prescribed
as to details and collaterals. Such exclusive and inflexible plan
would surely become a new entanglement. Important principles may and
must be inflexible. In the present situation, as the phrase goes, it
may be my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the
South. I am considering, and shall not fail to act when satisfied
that action will be proper.
The promised announcement was never made; for within three days the
great career of Abraham Lincoln was brought to a close. The inherent
difficulties of reconstruction, as well as the mischievous consequences
of faction among Union men, he perceived and acknowledged at the outset.
Precisely how he would have removed the one and, without breaking with
his party, have avoided the other we can never know. His uniform success
in dealing with other embarrassing questions appears to justify the
opinion that he would not have failed altogether in solving the greater
problem presented by the return of peace. This subject will be further
discussed in the succeeding chapter.
-----
Footnote 425:
Globe, 2 Sess. 38th Cong., p. 141 (appendix).
Footnote 426:
Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln, by James R. Gilmore.
Footnote 427:
Gorham’s Life and Public Services of Edwin M. Stanton, Vol. II. pp.
148–153.
Footnote 428:
N. and H., Vol. X. pp. 101–102.
Footnote 429:
N. and H., Vol. X. p. 107.
Footnote 430:
Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 644–645.
Footnote 431:
An interesting account of this entire subject will be found in Nicolay
and Hay’s Lincoln, Vol. X. ch. VI.; see also Raymond’s Life of
Lincoln, pp. 647–662.
Footnote 432:
The Lost Cause, pp. 684–685.
Footnote 433:
Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 597–598.
Footnote 434:
Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 616–617.
XII
CULMINATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PLAN
Able and candid exponents of public opinion in the South, even those who
were a part of the “Lost Cause,” are almost unanimous in regarding the
assassination of President Lincoln as one of the greatest calamities
that befell their section of the Union.[435] Indeed, the writer has
heard a distinguished editor ascribe to Jefferson Davis himself the
opinion that next to the failure of the Confederacy the untimely death
of Mr. Lincoln was the severest blow inflicted on Southern
interests.[436] Many of the evils experienced by their States during the
early years of Congressional reconstruction would have been avoided,
they believe, under a continuance of the wise and considerate policy of
the martyr President. While it is true that the confidence which he
enjoyed among the masses in the loyal States, his unquestionable
integrity and his splendid intellectual powers would have made him a
formidable adversary even in a controversy with Congress, yet we have no
assurance that these undoubted elements of strength would have enabled
him, in the confused times following the Rebellion, to do more than
postpone a contest with the Legislative branch in which a desire to
discipline the South was even then winning adherents. The passions of
the hour would have discovered a weakness in his clemency to the
vanquished, while his very breadth of soul and sense would have been
regarded by radical members of his party as only an evidence of his
desire to facilitate the restoration to power of red-handed rebels. But
it is idle to speculate on what might have been the result of his
endeavors to heal the wounds of war, for, by the assassin’s bullet, the
execution of his policy passed into other hands.
While the terrible tragedy of April 14 was still unknown to a great
majority of American citizens, Andrew Johnson was quietly installed in
the office of President. As every detail of the simple ceremony in the
Kirkwood Hotel is familiar to this generation of readers, that event
requires only a passing allusion. In the presence of the constitutional
advisers of his predecessor, except Secretary Seward, who had been
dangerously wounded by one of Booth’s accomplices, the oath of office
was administered by Chief Justice Chase, who, with the Attorney-General,
had examined the precedents and the law. Besides these officials a few
members of Congress, who still lingered at the capital, were in
attendance as witnesses.
Something of Andrew Johnson’s political career has been related in the
chapter on Tennessee. As military governor of that State his high
courage, his acknowledged patriotism, his honesty of purpose and
principle were evident to all. Traits of character suspected, but not
then fully disclosed, were developed by more complex conditions. The
problem that confronted him may be briefly stated.
When Mr. Johnson succeeded to the Presidential office Confederate armies
somewhat broken, indeed, but still capable of mischief were retarding
the victorious march of Sherman’s legions. Measures for disbanding the
former became necessary when Southern leaders, recognizing the
hopelessness of further resistance, made overtures looking to an
armistice which took place and to the surrender that subsequently
followed. It became necessary to discontinue at once the enlistment of
men in the loyal States, and, to economize expense, to muster out of
service as expeditiously as possible the grand army of Union volunteers.
The energy and promptness with which this task was accomplished were not
the least of Secretary Stanton’s services to the nation. The perfection
to which years of experience had brought the machinery of the War
Department enabled the bulk of the Union armies to return without delay
to their homes, where, discarding the character of soldiers, they melted
insensibly into the civil population and speedily resumed the pursuits
of peace. Relations with France were somewhat strained, and, owing to a
succession of unfriendly acts, a war with Great Britain was not
improbable. The public finances, too, required attention. To provide a
revenue adequate to the extraordinary demands of the time was beginning
to tax the resources of Government. A satisfactory settlement of even
the least of these might well have appeared a serious question. The
cessation of hostilities, however, presented a problem far transcending
the greatest of them in importance.
Many of the late Confederate States were threatened with anarchy, for in
those commonwealths the recent authority had been extinguished and no
organizations existed which the Administration could recognize as State
governments. The political reconstruction of four of them, it is true,
had been commenced under encouragement and direction of the national
Executive, but even in those much remained to be done. Before examining
the condition of the insurgent States as a whole it may be well,
therefore, to summarize the most important events that occurred in
Arkansas, Tennessee, Louisiana and Virginia between the institution of
loyal governments in those commonwealths and the meeting of the
Thirty-ninth Congress in December, 1865.
The General Assembly of Arkansas, though lacking its full membership,
convened in March, 1865, and unanimously adopted on April 14 succeeding
the proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution. The action of
Congress, however, in submitting that proposition to the States had been
anticipated by the Union men of that commonwealth, for their organic law
had already abolished involuntary servitude; by the same instrument they
had repudiated all debts created in the conduct of the war, thereby
complying with three of the principal conditions required for restoring
their State to the Union.
During the same session an act passed the Legislature disfranchising all
citizens who had aided the Confederate cause after the organization,
April 18, 1864, of a loyal government. By the adversaries of this
measure it was claimed that the lawmaking body exceeded its powers,
because the act in effect prescribed qualifications for the suffrage
different from those required by the State constitution, and, so far as
it attempted to deprive citizens of their privileges without judicial
conviction of crime, was contrary to the law of the land. This statute
awakened the indifferent, and, as the time approached for holding
Congressional elections, excited considerable discussion.
In the mean time the new government silently extended its authority over
those parts of the State occupied by Southern soldiers until the
cessation of hostilities. Governor Flanigan on retiring suggested that
Confederate county officers be continued under his successor. This
proposal, however, was promptly rejected and the secession establishment
in all its parts completely ignored. Governor Murphy then published a
proclamation urging the people in those regions hitherto dominated by
the enemy, which comprised nearly half the counties in the State, to
assemble and renew their local organizations. His address was favorably
received, and his administration soon acquiesced in throughout the
commonwealth. Outrages ceased with the disappearance of Confederate
soldiers, and by the beginning of July judicial tribunals had been
revived in nearly every county. Some of the courts had been in session,
and most of them were prepared to meet regularly for the transaction of
business. Taxes were collected as quietly as before the war, and civil
process could be executed in every part of the State. Hundreds had
returned from the South to their former homes and resumed the pursuits
of peace. Discontent, so far as any existed in the State, was confined
to some ex-Confederate officers and to a few non-combatants who had
sympathized with the rebellion. Both classes advised disregard of the
disfranchising law, but as a rule the returned soldiers on both sides
were quiet and orderly. All accounts concur in representing the
pacification of Arkansas as complete toward the end of summer, and by
October 13, 1865, the Secretary of State was able to report officially
that the new government was in successful operation, the civil
organization of every county having been effected. Governor Murphy in
approving a circular published near the close of the same month by
Brigadier General Sprague, an assistant commissioner of the Freedmen’s
Bureau, enjoined both civil officers and citizens to give all possible
encouragement to the officers and appointees of the bureau.[437]
The President on receiving intelligence of this satisfactory condition
of affairs sent to Governor Murphy the following dispatch:
There will be no interference with your present organization of
State government. I have learned from E. W. Gantt, Esq., and other
sources, that all is working well, and you will proceed and resume
the former relations with the Federal Government, and all the aid in
the power of the Government will be given in restoring the State to
its former relations.[438]
As the time approached for an election of national Representatives, the
Governor issued another address in which he advised the choice of
persons who could take the oath required by Congress. Three members were
elected, namely: William Ryers, G. H. Kyle and James M. Johnson, who
subsequently appeared at Washington and presented their
credentials.[439]
The foregoing account of the situation in Arkansas is confirmed by the
testimony of General Reynolds, military commander of the department, who
had sent officers into all the counties. These reported civil government
as everywhere reëstablished. The State, they asserted, had never enjoyed
greater tranquillity. There was not a shadow of conflict between the
civil and the military authority, for the latter in sustaining the
former was careful not to encroach on any of its functions. In short,
the restoration of civil law in that State was universally admitted.
In two thirds of the counties, however, great destitution prevailed.
Early in the summer the General Government felt compelled to distribute
among indigent freedmen and refugees vast quantities of food, and
Northern generosity alone, the Governor declared, could prevent great
distress during the ensuing winter. Nor was his expectation
disappointed. It is a splendid tribute to the character of Americans
that one of the most destructive conflicts in history, with all the
animosities which protracted civil wars engender, did not perceptibly
impair in them the feelings of humanity.
The organization of a Union government in Tennessee has elsewhere been
described. The Assembly chosen under its authority met at Nashville on
the 2d of April, 1865, and three days later ratified the Thirteenth
Amendment. On the 21st the President was requested to proclaim the
insurrection at an end in that commonwealth, though a few weeks later he
was called upon for troops to guarantee a republican form of government
and to protect the State against invasion and domestic violence. Besides
appointing executive officers the Legislature elected to the United
States Senate David T. Patterson and Joseph S. Fowler.
The most important measure of the session, however, was the enactment on
June 5 of a severe law affecting the elective franchise. By it the right
to vote was restricted, as formerly, to white males who had attained
their twenty-first year. To the classes excepted by the Proclamation of
December 8, 1863, were added all those who had left seats in the General
Assembly, all who were absentees from the United States for the purpose
of aiding the rebellion and all who had fled within the Confederate
lines with the same intention. These were disfranchised for the period
of fifteen years from the passage of the act.[440]
During this session there was presented by the freedmen of the State a
petition for the elective franchise. The “colored citizens of
Tennessee,” as they styled themselves, received no response to their
prayer beyond the approval of an order for printing 500 copies of their
memorial. The motion for this trifling concession was carried by a vote
of 41 to 10.
On June 12 the Legislature adjourned until the first Monday in October.
On the same day Governor Brownlow ordered an election to be held on
August 2 for Representatives to Congress in each of the eight districts
into which the State had just been divided. Vacancies in the General
Assembly were directed to be filled at the same time.
The disfranchising act, with the oath required thereunder, had the
effect of excluding a large number, probably three fourths, of the
citizens from voting. Its adversaries declared the law unconstitutional,
and it encountered much opposition, especially in Middle and West
Tennessee. Its constitutionality, however, was sustained by one of the
State courts in a decision rendered June 29, and the Governor, in a
proclamation of July 10 succeeding, argued in favor of the statute.
Those who should unite to defeat its execution would be “declared in
rebellion against the State of Tennessee, and dealt with as rebels.” It
was further signified that votes cast in violation of the law would not
be taken into account by the Secretary of State.
Nor were these idle threats, for the civil officers were instructed “to
arrest and bring to justice all persons who, under pretence of being
candidates for Congress or other office, are traveling over the State
denouncing and nullifying the Constitution and laws of the land, and
spreading sedition and a spirit of rebellion.”[441]
It was relative to these measures that President Johnson on July 20,
1865, sent the following despatch to Governor Brownlow:
I hope and have no doubt you will see that the recent amendments to
the constitution of the State as adopted by the people, and all the
laws passed by the last Legislature in pursuance thereof, are fairly
executed, and that all illegal votes in the approaching election be
excluded from the polls, and the election for members of Congress be
legally and fairly conducted. When and wherever it becomes necessary
to employ force for the execution of the laws and the protection of
the ballot-box from violence and fraud, you are authorized to call
upon Maj.-Gen. Thomas for sufficient military force to sustain the
civil authorities of the State. I have received your recent address
to the people, and think it well timed, and hope it will do much
good in reconciling the opposition to the amendment to the
constitution and the laws passed by the last Legislature. The law
must be executed and the civil authority sustained. In your efforts
to do this, if necessary, Gen. Thomas will afford a sufficient
military force. You are at liberty to make what use you think proper
of this despatch.[442]
Though no violence marked the election, considerable irregularities,
notwithstanding the Governor’s precautions, appear to have crept into
modes of registration, and he felt compelled in consequence to reject
the ballots of twenty-nine counties. In this contest 61,783 citizens
participated, but when those illegally enrolled were disregarded the
number was reduced to 39,509. The defective vote, which applied to all
the candidates, was thrown out in every county, though it changed the
result in only one district. Of the eight Representatives chosen all
were Union men; four, however, were conservatives, opposed both to test
oaths and measures of disfranchisement.[443] Governor Brownlow because
of his action was severely censured, but was supported by a majority of
the General Assembly.
In October, when the Legislature reassembled, a bill to render persons
of African and of Indian descent competent witnesses in the State courts
passed the Senate by the close vote of 10 to 9, but failed altogether to
receive the approval of the House. The Representatives of his State
declined at that time, by a vote of 35 to 25, to pass a simple
resolution endorsing the Administration of President Johnson, but almost
unanimously adopted in place of that proposition the following:
_Resolved_, That we endorse the administration of his Excellency the
President of the United States, and especially his declaration that
treason shall be made odious, and traitors punished.[444]
A colored convention representing the freedmen of the State was held at
the capital during the week succeeding the election. If the Legislature
did not grant before December 1, 1865, their petition for the elective
franchise, this body resolved to protest against the admission of the
Tennessee delegation to Congress. On the question of negro suffrage the
Governor in his October message said:
I think it would be bad policy, as well as wrong in principle, to
open the ballot-box to the uninformed and exceedingly stupid slaves
of the Southern cotton, rice, and sugar fields. If allowed to vote,
the great majority of them would be influenced by leading
secessionists to vote against the Government, as they would be
largely under the influence o£ this class of men for years to come,
having to reside on and cultivate their lands. When the people of
Tennessee become satisfied that the negro is worthy of suffrage,
they will extend it, and not before; and I repeat that this question
must be regulated by the State authorities and by the loyal voters
of the State, not by the General Government.[445]
Apprehending trouble from the antagonism of races Mr. Brownlow advocated
the old idea of colonization for the black man. He believed, however,
that negroes should be admitted to testify in the courts and argued in
favor of conferring such a privilege. Repugnance to their testimony, he
declared, was due principally to education and habit.
If the following account from _The Knoxville Whig_ of September 27 is
trustworthy the freedmen of Tennessee had but a slender claim to the
right to vote. That journal said:
Thousands of free colored persons are congregating in and around the
large towns in Tennessee, and thousands are coming in from other
States, one third of whom cannot get employment. Indeed, less than
one third of them want employment, or feel willing to stoop to work.
They entertain the erroneous idea that the Government is bound to
supply all their wants, and even to furnish them with houses, if, in
order to do that, the white occupants must be turned out. There is a
large demand for labor in every section of the State, but the
colored people, with here and there a noble exception, scorn the
idea of work. They fiddle and dance at night, and lie around the
stores and street corners in the day time.[446]
The Governor’s message, sent in at this session, was hopeful in tone. He
favored some amendment but not a repeal of the franchise law. He advised
also a “full pardon to the masses—the young and the deluded, who
followed blindly the standard of revolt, provided they act as becomes
their circumstances.” The unrepentant, however, should suffer the period
of disfranchisement; while the active leaders, he believed, were
entitled “neither to mercy nor forbearance.” To some negroes he would
give the right of suffrage, but, believing it unsafe, he was opposed to
conferring it on them all.
Tennessee, over which advancing and retreating armies had repeatedly
passed, suffered even more severely than Arkansas, for besides having
been the principal theatre of operations for the contending hosts in the
West, her territory had also been in the early rule of Governor Johnson
the scene of local strife. Old family feuds that for various reasons had
been allowed to slumber were in many instances revived, and the most
lawless outrages perpetrated in the face of day. These disorders,
however, had practically ceased toward the conclusion of his
governorship, and peace reigned once more within the borders of that
community. The existence there of a considerable demand for labor
assisted greatly in diminishing the burden of the authorities.
The closing months of the war found the loyal government of Louisiana
endeavoring with the influence of the Union army to extend its
jurisdiction over all the territory that had been brought under Federal
control. Notwithstanding its contracted area this commonwealth for
certain purposes was treated as a restored member of the Union. Like the
Northern States it was affected by the draft which, on February 15, took
place in some districts included in the Department of the Gulf. But the
great struggle that for four years had employed the attention and tested
the resources of the Government soon reached its close, thus rendering
unnecessary any field service from the recruits then obtained.
Though the attitude of Congress toward the Banks government has been
described in the preceding pages, that was not believed the proper place
to examine the nature of the election which was held on September 5, or
the _personnel_ of the Legislature chosen on that occasion. In
connection with the appointment by that assembly of Messrs. Smith and
Cutler as United States Senators the subject was noticed incidentally.
The action of Congress on the question of admitting members from
Louisiana was, however, fully entered into in that relation.
Some additional information affecting the validity of that election is
afforded by a proclamation published May 13, 1865, by the acting
Governor, J. Madison Wells.[447] This document asserts that the Register
of Voters for the city of New Orleans declared officially that there had
been enrolled 5,000 persons who did not possess the legal qualifications
for electors. To ascertain the political people, therefore, a new
registration was thought desirable. Mr. Wells accordingly declared the
old records closed from the date of his proclamation. The certificates
granted thereon, as well as the enrollment, were pronounced null and
void. He then authorized the opening on June 1, 1865, of a new set of
books, the enrollment to be made in accordance with the qualifications
prescribed by the constitution and laws of Louisiana. The old
registration having been made under an order of General Banks this
announcement led at once to a difference between the Department
Commander and the acting Governor. Many names recorded on the old books
were alleged to have been those of colored men, and a circumstance
presently to be related tends to support the assertion.
About that time the Confederate Governor, Allen, transferred to Federal
officials all the important military records in his possession, and from
his capital at Shreveport published a communication in which he
announced his administration closed on that day. He said in part: “The
war is over, the contest is ended, the soldiers are disbanded and gone
home, and now there is in Louisiana no opposition whatever to the
Constitution and laws of the United States.”[448]
On June 10 an address to the people of thirty-five parishes was issued
by the new Governor, who congratulated them on their return to the
protection of the national flag. It was not with the past, he reminded
them, but with the present and the future that their welfare was bound
up. They were exhorted to go manfully to work and reëstablish civil
government. The submission to law and the prompt acquiescence of those
recently hostile to the United States he regarded as a hopeful sign.
Even the soldiers, he said, returned to their homes better and wiser
men, promising by a cheerful obedience to law to atone for past errors.
All citizens were urged to imitate their example. Provisional
appointments to county offices would be made until they could be filled
by election. In naming persons for such places the Governor promised to
be guided by the recommendation of the people if they selected men of
good reputation who had taken the amnesty oath, which would be a
prerequisite in every case. If the people did not act promptly he would
feel compelled to make appointments upon the best information
obtainable. If errors were made, then citizens would be themselves to
blame for neglecting promptly to suggest the proper persons. A
provisional judiciary would also be constituted.
Important elections, he announced, would take place in the autumn, when
Representatives to Congress and members of a Legislature would be
chosen. If each parish was provided with the proper officers to open the
polls an election for governor and other State officers would take place
at the same time. The people addressed were informed that in making the
new constitution its framers did not intend to deprive them of their
rights. The response to this appeal was a local reorganization in nearly
all the parishes affected.
Governor Wells, on September 21, in a second order appointed the 6th of
November succeeding as the day for holding the election, and also
defined the qualifications of voters. White male citizens of the United
States who had attained the age of twenty-one years and had resided
twelve months in the commonwealth were declared entitled to exercise the
suffrage. Evidence was also required of every elector that he had taken
the oath of amnesty contained in the proclamation of December 8, 1863,
or that prescribed, May 29, 1865, by Mr. Johnson. The excepted classes
could vote only upon receiving a special pardon from the President. In
other respects the election would be conducted in accordance with the
constitution of 1852.
By a Democratic convention, held October 2 in New Orleans, at which
twenty-one parishes were unrepresented, Mr. Wells was unanimously
nominated for Governor. The preamble to a body of resolutions adopted on
that occasion asserts that the issue which for four years had tried the
strength of the Government had been made openly and manfully; that the
decision having been adverse they now came forward in the same spirit of
frankness and honor to support the Federal Government under the
Constitution.
The “National Democratic” party they believed to be the only agency by
which radicalism, to which they imputed a tendency toward consolidation,
could be successfully encountered, and through which the General
Government could be restored to its pristine purity. On the subject of
reorganization they endorsed President Johnson’s policy, which, it was
alleged, preserved unimpaired the rights of the States and maintained
their equality in the Union.
Noticing a question already assuming importance, they declared that, in
accordance with the constant adjudication of the Federal Supreme Court,
persons of African descent could not be regarded as citizens of the
United States; that under no circumstances could there exist any
equality between the white and other races; that as the national
Government was instituted by, so it was designed to be perpetuated for
the exclusive benefit of, white men. For the time they were content with
this oblique reference to the subject of negro suffrage. Another
resolution advised the calling of a convention to frame a constitution
for the State, that of 1864 being characterized as the creation of
fraud, violence and corruption.
This convention, which admitted the effectual abolition of slavery in
the South, assumed that those who had sustained loss by the policy of
emancipation could rightfully petition Congress for compensation. The
repeal was also advocated of those statutes and ordinances not in
harmony with the Federal Constitution. Believing it consonant with “the
chivalrous magnanimity” of President Johnson the convention earnestly
appealed for an early general amnesty and a prompt restitution of
property.
Almost a month preceding the meeting of this convention an address was
circulated by the “National Conservative Union” party, whose
representatives assembled one week later than the Democratic delegates.
Its members opposed both an extension of suffrage to negroes and the
calling of a new constitutional convention. Like the Democratic
delegates they endorsed the reconstruction policy of the President. They
approved the attitude of their conservative Northern friends who opposed
radicalism and an elevation of the freedmen to political equality with
whites. The doctrine of secession was repudiated, and to the payment of
all obligations created in carrying on the war they declared themselves
inflexibly opposed. They, too, favored the speedy passage of an act of
general amnesty as well as a repeal of the confiscation law.
Governor Wells was also the choice of this convention. He accepted both
nominations and perceived no inconsistency in doing so, never, he
asserted, having been a strict party man. Mr. Wells, who had formerly
been a Red River planter, proved his loyalty to the Federal Government
by coming within the Union lines as soon as they were established, and
bringing with him his slaves, thereby endangering somewhat his
ownership.
Though he had not yet returned to his home, the friends of Henry Watkins
Allen, the late Confederate executive, named him as their candidate for
governor.
In the election, which was held at the appointed time, the entire vote
polled was 27,808, of which Governor Wells received 23,312, and
ex-Governor Allen, 5,497. In every county except one the Democratic
ticket for members of the Legislature was successful.
Perhaps the most instructive incident of this contest was the part
played by those known as “Radical” Republicans. These held a
mass-meeting in the city of New Orleans on November 13 at which were
adopted resolutions claiming the election to Congress of Henry C.
Warmoth as territorial Delegate. When he subsequently appeared in
Washington his case was brought to the attention of the House by
Thaddeus Stevens, who offered, December 20, 1865, what purported to be a
certificate of Warmoth’s election as Delegate from the “Territory of
Louisiana.” On request of the Pennsylvania leader this document was
referred to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.[449]
This extreme element, which assumed to regard Louisiana as a Territory,
polled 19,000 votes, most of which were alleged to have been cast by
colored men. It declared the State organization repugnant to the Federal
Constitution both in law and effect. The President, it was asserted,
could not restore Louisiana by proclamation, for reinstatement could be
accomplished in a constitutional manner only by petitioning Congress for
admission whenever a majority of the people deemed such a course
expedient, and the temper of the whites, nine tenths of whom were
disloyal, rendered it inadvisable at that time to take such a step. The
meeting rejoiced that the Republican party in the North had triumphed in
the recent elections, for these victories pointed to ultimate success.
The premature admission of Louisiana Congressmen, by placing the Union
people under rebel rule, would be disastrous. However, as loyal citizens
they would confine themselves to peaceable means of redress.
Warmoth appears shortly before the end of the war to have gone into
Louisiana with the Union army, in which he is said by one authority to
have acquired the reputation of a brave soldier and by another to have
merited dismissal from its ranks.[450] By organizing the freedmen and
insisting upon their political rights he won their confidence; his
shrewdness and engaging address retained their gratitude. In this
election his adherents not only sought to determine the Federal
relations of Louisiana, but also conferred upon negroes the privilege of
voting, for there was then no law of either the General or State
government investing them with any such right.
The Legislature, which was convoked in special session, assembled at New
Orleans on the 23d of November. The Governor’s message on that occasion
related chiefly to such local objects as required the attention of the
lawmaking body. By recommending an election of United States Senators
Mr. Wells repudiated the action of the General Assembly, which, at the
preceding session, had appointed Messrs. Smith and Cutler to represent
the State. Acting upon the Governor’s suggestion, the latter was again
chosen, with Hahn for his colleague. These appointments were intended to
fill vacancies caused by the withdrawal, February 5, 1861, of John
Slidell and Judah P. Benjamin.
One of the first acts of the lower House was the selection of a
committee to consider a resolution which provided for assembling a
convention to draft a State constitution. For reasons already assigned
the majority report of this committee recommended the calling of a
convention and counselled the Governor to order an election in which the
question could be voted on by the people. The minority recognized the
constitution of 1864 as binding, and on the ground of public economy
preferred its amendment, especially as it had already acted favorably on
the abolition of slavery. The adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment and
the repeal of the ordinance of secession were mentioned by them as
conditions essential to the recognition of Louisiana as a State and as
indispensable to a restoration of all the privileges which that
condition implied.
As early as February 17 preceding the Legislature established under the
constitution of 1864 had ratified the Thirteenth Article amending the
Constitution. By a vote of two to one the Assembly again approved that
action. The session came to an end on the 22d of December.
This commonwealth, a veritable Eden when the strife began, had been
sadly changed in its progress. A generous Government, indeed, by
repairing the levees protected her fairest parishes from inundation. The
same beneficent authority maintained many public institutions of charity
that must else have ceased their noble work. Distress and want had
already invaded that once prosperous community, and in the city of New
Orleans alone 16,000 persons were dependent upon and maintained by
Federal bounty. Silence reigned in the great cotton market of the world.
The wreck of her public finances has elsewhere been described. Her
opulent commerce had been destroyed, agriculture everywhere languished.
Plantations that but lately teemed with rich harvests showed the effects
of interrupted cultivation, and the mighty river that had annually
poured into her metropolis the productions of a dozen States now flowed
untroubled to the Gulf.
To show the attitude of Congress toward the Alexandria government events
in Virginia have in part been anticipated. The Legislature of the loyal
portion of that Commonwealth was composed of members from only ten
counties and parts of other counties. It was by delegates from this
restricted area that the constitution of 1864 was framed and adopted.
By this instrument the elective franchise was confined to male whites
that had attained the age of twenty-one years, who had resided twelve
months in the State and were willing to swear support of the Federal
Constitution and the restored government; but officials and voters were
required in addition to make oath, or affirmation, that they had not,
since January 1, 1864, voluntarily given aid or assistance to those in
rebellion against the General Government. The Assembly, however, was
empowered, when it was deemed safe to do so, to restore to citizenship
all who would be disfranchised by this provision of the organic law.
Involuntary servitude was also abolished. While great numbers of negroes
were thus set at liberty, nothing was then done to elevate them to the
dignity of citizens. The question of making them voters was, of course,
still more remote.
The General Assembly was prohibited from making provision for the
payment of any debt or obligation created in the name of the
Commonwealth by the pretended State authorities at Richmond; and it was
also forbidden to permit any county, city or corporation to levy or
collect taxes for the discharge of any debt incurred for the purpose of
aiding any rebellion against the State or the United States, or to
provide for the payment of any bonds held by rebels in arms.[451]
The Confederate capital, long deemed impregnable, fell on the 2d of
April. Within a week came tidings of the surrender of Lee’s entire army,
greatly reduced in numbers, it is true, but hitherto the main reliance
of the Confederacy. Mr. Lincoln, apparently, was not altogether without
expectation of some such fortunate outcome of the extensive preparations
that had been made for ensuring the success of the final campaign, and
on the following day, April 10, 1865, he sent from Washington to the
executive head of the restored State this telegram:
=Governor Pierpont=, _Alexandria, Virginia_:
Please come up and see me at once.[452]
=A. Lincoln.=
Mr. Pierpont, as the writer has been credibly informed, called by
request on President Lincoln during the week of his assassination,
evidently in response to this telegram, when they spent three hours
together in conversation. No third party appears to have been present at
their consultation. The topic discussed it is not difficult to imagine.
Shortly before his death, which occurred in March, 1899, Governor
Pierpont informed his daughter that he never believed Andrew Johnson
carried out Mr. Lincoln’s idea in the reconstruction of Virginia.[453]
That policy, however, had not then, April 10, assumed definitive form in
the mind of the President himself, for he expressly stated to Mr.
Pierpont that he had no plan for reorganization, but must be guided by
events. His last public utterance establishes the correctness of this
statement.
Four weeks later President Johnson by executive order recognized the
Alexandria establishment, and toward the close of the same month, May
26, 1865, Mr. Pierpont, with other members of his government, arrived in
Richmond. The sneer of Thaddeus Stevens that the archives and property
of loyal Virginia were conveyed to the new capital in an ambulance
affords at least an adequate idea of the feeble condition of the
restored State. But notwithstanding the absence of all pomp and his lack
of the usual emblems of authority the Governor, we are told, was
received in a very flattering manner.
Virginia, which emerged from the struggle crippled by the loss of an
important part of her domain, suffered more in the destruction of the
elements of wealth than any of her errant sisters, and though entering
somewhat reluctantly on a career of rebellion, she was the only member
of the Confederacy that was permanently weakened. Industry could never
repair the alienation of her territory. While it may appear that the
General Government acted harshly toward a State to which the Union owed
so much, the preceding pages show clearly that the loss of her
trans-Alleghany counties was due chiefly to an unwise administration of
her internal affairs. Notwithstanding the statement of Mr. Blaine, the
writer does not think that Virginia was singled out for punishment. But
even apart from her dismemberment the ravages of war fell most heavily
on the Old Dominion. There it was that the Army of the Potomac and the
Army of Northern Virginia contended longest for supremacy. Troops in
their marches and countermarches foraged liberally on her people,
sometimes without distinction of friend or foe. Concrete illustrations
will occur to every reader acquainted with the military history of the
great conflict. The devastation of the Shenandoah valley was only a
striking example of what was constantly occurring within more restricted
areas of the State. Barns and dwelling houses, fences and crops perished
in the universal destruction. Cattle were either killed or carried off,
and even the implements of husbandry were frequently devoted to the
flames. The injury thus sustained by agricultural interests was followed
in many districts by an alarming scarcity of food during the ensuing
years, and to escape starvation numbers of her citizens fled from once
happy homes. Newspaper correspondents in their progress through the
State describe scenes of wretchedness and distress. In exploring for
their journals wide regions that had recently been the theatre of war
they witnessed spectacles of want, hunger and despair. Uncultivated
tracts in the wake of the armies contributed to heighten the picture of
desolation. Richmond, the centre of so many interesting historical
associations, though long exempt from pillage, perished ultimately in a
conflagration. In short, nearly every landmark of prosperity was effaced
by the calamities of war.
To repair these ravages, to repeople these solitudes, to revive commerce
and agriculture, to restore tranquillity and maintain order was the
stupendous task before Governor Pierpont, in whose public career it may
be regarded as the second stage. After the formation of West Virginia,
in which he had acted a conspicuous and honorable part, and one that can
scarcely be overrated, his exertions barely sufficed to preserve the
continuity of a loyal government in his native State. In the former
undertaking he had the coöperation of nearly every person of
consideration beyond the Alleghanies. His efforts in Richmond, however,
received but indifferent support. Whites of little influence and negroes
who were still but prospective citizens made up the greater number of
his adherents. A handful of secessionists, it is true, set the example
of obedience to the laws, though they found among their late associates
but few imitators. It was from such material and in such circumstances
that Mr. Pierpont was to reconstruct the grand old Commonwealth. The
Governor, however, applied himself at once to the duties imposed by his
office. He appointed persons to reorganize the various counties by
holding elections for local officers, though in numerous instances he
merely authorized to act for the preservation of peace those citizens
whom the military officers might select. The difficulties of the
situation were such that he summoned the Legislature to meet in special
session at Richmond on the 20th of June.
In response to this request the lawmaking body assembled at the
appointed time. The Executive message on that occasion related concisely
what had been done by the restored government subsequent to June, 1861.
It also stated that since his arrival at the capital the Governor had
conversed with intelligent men of every shade of political opinion and
representing every part of Virginia. He was convinced, he said, that if
the test of loyalty prescribed by their constitution was enforced in the
election and qualification of officers, it would render organization
impracticable in most of the counties. It was folly to suppose that a
State could be administered “under a republican form of government where
in a large portion of the State, nineteen twentieths of the people are
disfranchised and cannot hold office. But, fortunately, by the terms of
the constitution, the General Assembly has control of this subject. The
restricting clauses of the constitution were devised in time of war....
Men accept the facts developed by the logic of the past four years,
declare that they have taken the oath of allegiance to the Government of
the United States without mental reservation, and intend to be, and
remain, loyal to the Government of their fathers. It would not be in
accordance with the spirit of that noble Anglo-Saxon race, from which we
boast our common origin, to strike a fallen brother, or impose upon him
humiliating terms after a fair surrender.”[454]
For the oath required by the State constitution he suggested the
substitution of that prescribed by the President, or one of similar
character; he also recommended the passage of an act to legalize
marriage between persons of color, and the appointment of a day for
holding elections of Representatives to Congress and for members of the
Legislature in those counties where none had been chosen.
The subject of disfranchisement was immediately taken up in both Houses,
and the result of their action was to allow the suffrage to those who,
upon taking the amnesty oath, had not held office under the Confederacy
or its State governments. Those who had done so could neither vote nor
hold office. The Legislature submitted to the people, to be determined
at the election in October succeeding, the question of removing this
restriction upon officeholders.
This action of the Assembly was followed by the appearance of a large
number of competitors for office, and considerable interest was
awakened. Finding, however, that they would be unable to take the oath
required by Congress many of the candidates for the national Legislature
withdrew. The President was asked by some citizens of Albemarle County
whether, in his opinion, Congress would probably insist upon the oath.
The following reply to their inquiry was made by Attorney-General Speed:
The President has referred to me your letter, dated Charlottesville,
Virginia, September, 1865, and I am instructed by him to say that he
has no more means of knowing what Congress may do in regard to the
oath about which you inquire than any other citizen. It is his
earnest wish that loyal and true men, to whom no objections can be
made, should be elected to Congress.
This is not an official letter, but a simple expression of
individual opinion and wish.[455]
The election was held on October 12, the vote polled being the smallest
ever given in the history of the State. In the first eight Congressional
districts, however, it exceeded 40,000. The constitutional amendment met
with very little opposition, many counties voting unanimously to remove
the restriction upon the suffrage.[456] The Assembly then chosen
convened at Richmond on December 4, 1865, the time fixed for the meeting
of Congress.
While it is true that there were grounds for apprehension regarding the
stability of the new governments instituted in these four States, the
principal cause of anxiety to the Administration was the disorganized
political and social condition of the remaining members of the late
Confederacy. It was universally agreed that with the destruction of its
military power the authority of that government was completely
extinguished. From that moment until the revival within them of Federal
laws these commonwealths were destitute of all legislation of a general
character. Under our dual principle of government, however, this could
be endured temporarily. But the absence of a central organism would soon
be evident in the reappearance of those alarming symptoms which marked
American political and industrial life in the critical period between
the Treaty of Paris, in 1783, and the inauguration, nearly six years
later, of the present national system. In that unhappy interval,
however, the authority of the various States was ample for the
regulation of domestic affairs, while in the deranged and confused times
succeeding the Rebellion seven entire commonwealths were left without
any general or any particular government. Their territory, indeed, had
passed under control of the Union forces, for when the Administration of
Jefferson Davis was overthrown the disloyal State establishments, of
which it was only an emanation, fell likewise. Though internal progress
was not seriously to be expected in this situation, tolerable order was
preserved by Federal soldiers, who occupied the entire region between
the Potomac and the Rio Grande, for even in those States reorganized
under Executive auspices civil authority was not yet established on a
foundation sufficiently secure to maintain itself without assistance
from the military power of the nation.
Besides the absence of all civil government there were other elements of
discord that tended to increase the confusion in these States. Their
population, it need scarcely be observed, was not homogeneous. The
decree of emancipation together with the incidents of war had brought
freedom to almost the entire slave population of the South. This was
soon to be confirmed by the proposed constitutional amendment, which was
designed both to place beyond question the status of freedmen and to
strike the shackles from the limbs of the last bondman in the loyal as
well as in the disloyal States. About the middle of December nearly
4,000,000 negroes bereft of the hand that bestowed their daily
sustenance found themselves suddenly dependent for support upon their
own exertions. The General Government, it is true, by creating the
Bureau of Freedmen and Refugees, diminished considerably the danger from
this source, though this relief by no means solved the problem of
transforming the recent slave into a useful member of society; besides,
the bureau itself subsequently degenerated into a fruitful source of
abuse.
Nor were Southern whites by any means unanimous as to the best policy to
adopt in the circumstances in which an unsuccessful rebellion had placed
them. Between Union men and secessionists there existed a feeling of
extreme bitterness. Even among members of the latter class there was
considerable difference of opinion, as in North Carolina, where the
former Whigs, by the moderation of their views as much as by constantly
agitating the question of reconstruction, had somewhat embarrassed the
Richmond authorities while war was still flagrant. Add to these causes
of disorder the discontent of thousands of disbanded soldiers who
returned in the gloom of defeat not infrequently to ruined homes and
wasted fields. Then, too, there was the disappointment and humiliation
naturally felt by a brave and impulsive people who had fought gallantly
in support of a cause condemned, indeed, by the civilized world, but
believed by them to be not only just but indispensable to their
prosperity and happiness.
Though a volume could be profitably employed in describing, town by town
and county by county, the extent of destruction inflicted on the South,
a few brief paragraphs must suffice to suggest an imperfect idea of the
enormous loss of wealth sustained by that section. The wreck of four
members of the Confederacy has been noticed in the preceding pages. That
rapid sketch, however, took no account of the damage to individuals by
the liberation of their slaves, for, except in those instances where
negroes left the commonwealth, that was not in any sense a loss to the
State. If it were, a community, by reducing to servitude a part of its
inhabitants, could at any time increase the amount of its capital. It is
only from the slaveholder’s point of view, therefore, that emancipation
can be regarded as a pecuniary loss. Immense damage was sustained by
both North and South in the withdrawal of millions of men from the
various fields of production. The energy of these multitudes, which was
rapidly making the United States the most opulent and powerful nation on
the globe, had exerted itself for four years in the destruction of
former accumulations.
Almost at the moment that the star of the Confederacy had begun to
decline the imperial State of Georgia, hitherto exempt from punishment,
was wasted by fire and sword. Sometimes the Southern, sometimes the
Northern army stripped the country of everything capable of supporting
life. Crops had been harvested, indeed, but this served only to
facilitate their destruction. In the retreat of Johnston and the advance
of Sherman toward Atlanta highways had been injured, bridges burned and
many lines of railroad completely destroyed. Dwellings, when they
interfered with military operations, were levelled by even the
Confederate army, and the Union forces could not be expected to show
greater consideration for the property of public enemies. General Hood
not only wasted the vast stores accumulated in Atlanta but burned
habitations when they stood in the way of his fortifications. Though
winter was rapidly approaching, the Federal commander deemed it
necessary after the capture of that stronghold to expel from their
abodes a considerable part of its population. A brief truce, it is true,
enabled the miserable inhabitants to remove a part of their effects
farther south; thousands, outcasts from their ruined homes, were thus
driven to wander among strangers whose bounty had already been taxed by
earlier fugitives; both classes were dependent for their maintenance on
the precarious charity of an impoverished people. Crowded dwellings
forced great numbers in the inclement weather to seek shelter in the
neighboring forests, where they found a safe refuge, indeed, but a
scanty subsistence. Over the region traversed by Sherman and Johnston
the forces of Hood soon after traced a devastating march northward to
Dalton. The mischiefs of the great march to Savannah have frequently
been described. Its beginning was announced by the blaze of burning
buildings, and when the last of the Federal soldiers had set their faces
toward the sea the city of Atlanta was little more than a mass of
smoking ruins. Though the region traversed was probably the richest in
the State, extensive misery accompanied the progress of the army. The
meat and the vegetables needed for his command were taken by the Union
General. Horses, mules and wagons were freely appropriated; slaves also
were assisted to escape from their masters. Mills and cotton-gins were
frequently devoted to the flames. In Milledgeville factories,
storehouses and public buildings were destroyed. The principal edifices
of Macon perished about the same time. Indeed, Augusta was the only
considerable place in the State that escaped serious harm. The people in
northwestern Georgia were in the utmost destitution, large families
being frequently for whole days without food; venerable persons of both
sexes, sinking under the weight of years and infirmities, often walked
fifteen and even twenty miles to procure food enough to prevent
starvation. The injury to all the usual means of transportation greatly
increased the difficulty of bringing relief. When the conflict had
ended, however, Federal officers did what they could to alleviate the
almost universal distress, and their magnanimity was not without
influence on the future conduct of many an ex-Confederate veteran.
South Carolina, the fatal State that woke the sword of war, did not
suffer greatly in the earlier stages of the conflict, though even then
her foreign commerce was extinguished and her agriculture interrupted
along the coast. Before its close, however, she was destined to
experience most of its horrors. A restless generation of agitators had
assiduously inculcated the notion that the South was ruthlessly
oppressed by Yankee avarice. This teaching bore fruit, and the people of
South Carolina, coming to regard themselves as little better than
tributary slaves, were easily persuaded to resort to the wager of
battle. With the progress of the contest this proud State was growing
weaker within, hostile pressure was constantly increasing from without.
Time at length and the fortunes of war had brought round their revenge,
and when the veterans of Sherman turned northward from Savannah the
Palmetto State was powerless to prevent, or seriously to retard, their
advance. Transportation was greatly embarrassed by the destruction of
the bridges as well as the tracks of almost every important railway
within the State. Immense quantities of cotton and numbers of cotton
warehouses, uncounted dwellings and depots, machine shops and foundries,
as well as several sailing vessels and steamboats were consumed by
flames. Besides these blackened memorial’s of disaster and defeat, the
stately cities of Charleston and Columbia were almost simultaneously
laid in ruins by great conflagrations. The inability of the civil
authorities to furnish food for his army constrained General Sherman to
forage for supplies. In this manner all the cattle, hogs, sheep and
poultry, even the little stores of meal, treasured as the last barrier
against want, were consumed, and the people left entirely without
subsistence. To prevent general starvation the Confederate commander was
compelled to distribute the rations of his soldiers among the wretched
inhabitants. From various causes many ancient and wealthy families found
themselves suddenly reduced to a condition of beggary, and so low was
the condition of the public treasury that the Legislature as early as
the mid-summer of 1865 had already begun seriously to discuss the
question of repudiation.
With some slight alterations this picture of South Carolina’s ills will
serve for that of her northern and more deserving sister, so far at
least as concerns those parts overrun by the contending hosts. The
cessation of hostilities stopped the carnival of death and silenced the
engines of destruction before half of North Carolina’s territory had
been crossed. From the first years of the war there were numerous
instances of privation among the loyalists of that State. Toward its
close the more favored classes also began to feel the pressure of want.
The negroes required and received assistance from the Freedmen’s Bureau.
The whites, refugees as well as secessionists, were aided by the
commanders of the rival forces.
Florida, fortunately for her people, was so remote from the principal
scenes of war that she felt few of its evils. Battles, it is true,
occurred within the State, but they were as skirmishes compared to the
bloody engagements which took place elsewhere. The same observations are
substantially true of Texas. A fringe of Mississippi’s territory, too,
had been swept by the furnace-blast of war. The extensive movements
around Corinth, Iuka, Vicksburg, Jackson and Port Hudson will suggest
the extent of destruction that visited the northern half of that State.
There existed considerable privation in that section, though no general
distress as in other members of the Confederacy.
All the Gulf States, however, were not equally fortunate. Though long
impending, the fate of Alabama came swiftly. Almost in the same hour she
was invaded from the north and menaced from the south. A large portion
of her material resources was already exhausted when the cavalry raids
of General Wilson spread terror and devastation through the interior
counties. The city of Selma was laid in ashes; smaller towns and
villages were likewise consumed by flames; schools and colleges, private
buildings and public edifices perished in the universal wreck. Monuments
of ruin were everywhere conspicuous throughout a region the most
productive, probably, in all the South. Silence and desolation reigned
where but lately stood proud and hospitable mansions. Nor was the
destruction of wealth or its elements the only injury sustained, for
industry would soon repair the losses of capital. Labor itself had been
severely crippled. Of the army of 122,000 soldiers which Alabama
furnished to the cause of secession 35,000, it was estimated, had been
left on the field of battle, and at least an equal number had been
disabled for life. Mobile, enriched by the cotton trade, was silent as
some ancient necropolis. Her splendid commerce was ruined; her stately
ships were gone, and the wave broke unheeded on the shores of her
deserted harbor.
This hurried summary conveys only a very inadequate notion of the
complex problem which Mr. Johnson was forced to consider. His arduous
duty was to repair the ravages of military violence, to evoke order from
the discord of civil strife, to heal the wounds which the imperious
power of slavery had inflicted upon industries and institutions; in a
word, to restore the harmony of that Republic founded by the wisdom of
Washington and preserved by the policy of Lincoln. The sentiments of the
Chief Magistrate who was about to attempt this difficult but
indispensable task it is now time to consider. His deliberate
conclusions and his spontaneous utterances are best examined, it is
believed, in something like chronological order.
On June 9, 1864, almost a year before his accession to the Presidency,
he had said in addressing the people of Nashville:
But in calling a convention to restore the State, who shall restore
and reëstablish it?... Shall he who brought this misery upon the
State be permitted to control its destinies? If this be so, then all
this precious blood of our brave soldiers and officers so freely
poured out will have been wantonly spilled....
Why all this carnage and devastation? It was that treason might be
put down and traitors punished. Therefore I say that traitors should
take a back seat in the work of restoration. If there be but five
thousand men in Tennessee loyal to the Constitution, loyal to
freedom, loyal to justice, these true and faithful men should
control the work of reorganization and reformation absolutely. I say
that the traitor has ceased to be a citizen, and in joining the
rebellion has become a public enemy. He forfeited his right to vote
with loyal men when he renounced his citizenship and sought to
destroy our Government.... If we are so cautious about foreigners
who voluntarily renounce their homes to live with us what should we
say to the traitor, who, although born and reared among us, has
raised a parricidal hand against the Government which always
protected him? My judgment is that he should be subjected to a
severe ordeal before he is restored to citizenship.... Before these
repenting rebels can be trusted, let them bring forth the fruits of
repentance.... Treason must be made odious, and traitors must be
punished and impoverished. Their great plantations must be seized,
and divided into small farms, and sold to honest, industrious men.
The day for protecting the lands and negroes of these authors of the
rebellion is past. It is high time it was.[457]
Though he had never been accustomed to conceal his opinions on questions
of public interest, and though there was no reason for supposing that
his views on reorganization had changed in the months intervening
between the Nashville speech and his inauguration, there was
considerable curiosity, if not indeed impatience, to learn his
sentiments on the paramount issue before the nation. Even the
unparalleled excitement and profound regret occasioned by the
assassination of Mr. Lincoln could not make men forget the grave
questions which the changed conditions of the Union presented for the
consideration of statesmen. Therefore the brief remarks addressed by the
new Executive to those who were present at his inauguration were eagerly
scrutinized for some indication of the principles which he was likely to
adopt in the conduct of his Administration. The absence, however, of
even a hint on that interesting subject gave universal disappointment,
and anxious patriots were not reassured by his failure to announce any
expression of a purpose to continue the policy of his predecessor. By
his intimate friends this omission was construed as an intention to
pursue in dealing with the South a less generous course than, it was
believed, Mr. Lincoln had marked out.
Among the more extreme “Radicals” this surmise occasioned little regret,
for they did not object to the accession of an Executive made, as they
believed, of sterner stuff than the late incumbent. From his fierce
denunciation of secessionists both while military governor of Tennessee
and subsequently, it was generally understood that more stringent
methods would be adopted by Mr. Johnson than had hitherto been employed.
Among other things he said in his inaugural: “As to an indication of any
policy which may be pursued by me in the administration of the
Government, I have to say that that must be left for development, as the
administration progresses. The message or declaration must be made by
the acts as they transpire. The only assurance that I can now give of
the future, is by reference to the past.”[458]
Delegations of citizens who waited upon him to tender their cordial
support were assured in the most explicit terms that his past course
was an indication of what his future policy would be. Three days after
entering upon the duties of his office a deputation of distinguished
persons called on Mr. Johnson under circumstances at once unusual and
touching. The remains of the late President still lay in the White
House. Before the sad procession of the dead left the national Capital
for Springfield, Governor Oglesby, with other gentlemen from Illinois,
called to assure the new Executive of their respect and confidence.
His record, they declared, gave assurance to their State that in his
hands they could safely trust the destinies of the Republic. The
President responded in a speech discussing a far wider range of topics
than he had treated in his inaugural. Appropriate reference to his
predecessor, the tragical close of whose career was scarcely alluded
to in his first address, was made in this more extended discourse. He
spoke with unaffected and profound emotion. “The beloved of all hearts
has been assassinated,” said he, “and when we trace this crime to its
cause, when we remember the source whence the assassin drew his
inspiration, and then look at the result, we stand yet more astounded
at this most barbarous, most diabolical act.... We can trace its cause
through successive steps back to that source which is the spring of
all our woes. No one can say that if the perpetrator of this fiendish
deed be arrested, he should not undergo the extremest penalty of the
law known for crime: none will say that mercy should interpose. But is
he alone guilty? Here, gentlemen, you perhaps expect me to present
some indication of my future policy. One thing I will say: every era
teaches its lesson. The times we live in are not without instruction.
The American people must be taught—if they do not already feel—that
treason is a crime and must be punished.... When we turn to the
criminal code we find arson laid down as a crime with its appropriate
penalty. We find theft and murder denounced as crimes, and their
appropriate penalty prescribed; and there, too, we find the last and
highest of crimes,—treason.... Let it be engraven on every mind that
treason is a crime, and traitors shall suffer its penalty.... I do not
harbor bitter or resentful feelings towards any.... When the question
of exercising mercy comes before me it will be considered calmly,
judicially—remembering that I am the Executive of the Nation. I know
men love to have their names spoken of in connection with acts of
mercy, and how easy it is to yield to that impulse. But we must never
forget that what may be mercy to the individual is cruelty to the
State.”
Commenting on this speech Mr. Blaine, from whom it is quoted, says that
it “was reported by an accomplished stenographer, and was submitted to
Mr. Johnson’s inspection before publication. It contained a declaration
intimating to its hearers, if not explicitly assuring them, that ‘the
policy of Mr. Lincoln in the past shall be my policy in the future.’
When in reading the report he came to this passage, Mr. Johnson queried
whether his words had not been in some degree misapprehended; and while
he was engaged with the stenographer in modifying the form of
expression, Mr. Preston King, of New York, who was constantly by his
side as adviser, interposed the suggestion that all reference to the
subject be stricken out. To this Mr. Johnson promptly assented. He had
undoubtedly gone farther than he intended in speaking to Mr. Lincoln’s
immediate friends, and the correction—inspired by one holding the
radical views of Mr. King—was equivalent to a declaration that the
policy of Mr. Lincoln had been more conservative than that which he
intended to pursue.”[459]
To a deputation of New Hampshire citizens he said in part: “This
Government is now passing through a fiery, and, let us hope, its last
ordeal—one that will test its powers of endurance, and will determine
whether it can do what its enemies have denied—suppress and punish
treason.” Though he had been urged, he asserted, by friends whose good
opinion he valued, he refrained from foreshadowing in a public manifesto
the policy which would guide him. He further observed on this occasion:
“I know it is easy, gentlemen, for any one who is so disposed, to
acquire a reputation for clemency and mercy. But the public good
imperatively requires a just discrimination in the exercise of these
qualities.... To relieve one from the penalty of crime may be productive
of national disaster. The American people must be taught to know and
understand that treason is a crime.... Treason is a crime, and must be
punished as a crime. It must not be regarded as a mere difference of
political opinion. It must not be excused as an unsuccessful rebellion,
to be overlooked and forgiven. It is a crime before which all others
sink into insignificance; and in saying this it must not be considered
that I am influenced by angry or revengeful feelings.” He added, that to
those who had been deluded and deceived by designing men, to those who
had been only technically guilty of treason, he would accord amnesty,
leniency and mercy. On the instigators of rebellion, however, should be
visited “the full penalty of their crimes.”[460]
Replying, April 21, to an address of Governor Morton, who introduced a
delegation from Indiana, he said: “Mine has been but one straightforward
and unswerving course, and I see no reason why I should depart from
it....
“I hold it as a solemn obligation in any one of these States where the
rebel armies have been driven back or expelled—I care not how small the
number of Union men, if enough to man the ship of State—I hold it, I
say, a high duty to protect and secure to them a republican form of
government. This is no new opinion.... In adjusting and putting the
government upon its legs again, I think the progress of this work must
pass into the hands of its friends. If a State is to be nursed until it
again gets strength, it must be nursed by its friends, and not smothered
by its enemies.”[461] To this delegation he declared himself not less
opposed to consolidation than to dissolution and disintegration. In a
brief reply on the same day to a deputation from Ohio he added nothing
of value to these observations, and on the 24th of April he addressed in
a similar strain a body of exiles from the South.
“The colored American asks but two things,” said the spokesman of a
negro delegation about the same time, “that he have, first, complete
emancipation, and secondly, full equality before American law.” To this
the President replied, among other things, that he feared leading
colored men did not “understand and appreciate the fact that they have
friends on the south side of the line. They have, and they are as
faithful and staunch as any north of the line. It may be a very easy
thing, indeed popular, to be an emancipationist north of the line, but a
very different thing to be such south of it. South of it, it costs a man
effort, property, and perhaps life.”[462]
Two months later, June 24, in replying to an address of a South Carolina
committee, he said in part: “The friction of the rebellion has rubbed
out the nature and character of slavery. The loyal men who were
compelled to bow and submit to the rebellion should, now that the
rebellion is ended, stand equal to loyal men everywhere. Hence the wish
of reconstruction, and the trying to get back the States to the point at
which they formerly moved in perfect harmony.” He reminded them that as
an institution slavery was gone, and said there was no hope that the
people of South Carolina would be admitted into either the Senate or the
House of Representatives until by their conduct they had afforded
evidence of this truth. In their circumstances the true policy was to
restore the State government, not through military rule, but by the
action of the people.[463]
Desiring to relieve all loyal citizens and well-disposed persons from
unnecessary trade restrictions, and to encourage a return to peaceful
pursuits, the President removed, April 29, 1865, the interdict on all
domestic and coastwise intercourse in that portion of the late
Confederate States east of the Mississippi and within the lines of
national military occupation. From this order, however, certain named
articles contraband of war were excepted. Military and naval regulations
in conflict with his proclamation were revoked. On May 22 following he
announced that ports in the same district would be reopened to foreign
commerce after July 1, 1865, though certain places in Texas were still
denied this privilege.
The insurrection hitherto existing in Tennessee was declared at an end
on June 13, 1865. The authority of the United States, this Proclamation
asserted, was unquestioned within the limits of that commonwealth, and
duly commissioned Federal officials were in undisturbed exercise of
their functions. All disabilities attaching to the State and its
inhabitants were therefore removed; but nothing contained in the order
was to be construed as affecting any of the penalties and forfeitures
for treason which had previously been incurred.
Ten days later, June 23, the blockade of Galveston and other ports
beyond the Mississippi was rescinded. These were to be opened to foreign
trade on the 1st of July succeeding. It was ordered, August 29, 1865,
that after September 1 all restrictions upon internal, domestic and
coastwise commerce be removed, so that even articles contraband of war
might be imported into and sold in the late insurgent States, the
necessity for prohibiting intercourse in those articles having in great
measure ceased.
In an order dated May 9, 1865, the President declared null and void all
acts and proceedings of the military and civil organizations of Virginia
which had been in rebellion against the General Government; also that
all persons who should exercise or attempt to exercise any authority,
jurisdiction or right under Jefferson Davis, and his confederates, or
under John Letcher or William Smith,[464] and their confederates, or any
pretended commission or authority issued by them, or any of them, since
April 17, 1861, would be deemed and taken as in rebellion against the
United States, and dealt with accordingly. By the same order the
authority of the United States was revived within the geographical
limits known as Virginia, and the heads of the several Executive
Departments were instructed to enforce therein all Federal laws the
administration of which belonged to their respective offices.
To carry into effect the constitutional guaranty of a republican form of
government and “afford the advantage and security of domestic laws, as
well as to complete the reëstablishment of the authority of the laws of
the United States, and the full and complete restoration of peace within
the limits aforesaid, Francis H. Pierpont, Governor of the State of
Virginia,” was assured of such assistance from the Federal authorities
as was believed necessary in any lawful measures that he might adopt for
extending the State government throughout that Commonwealth.[465]
The Secretary of the Treasury was directed to nominate without delay
assessors of taxes and collectors of customs and internal revenue, and
such other officers of his Department as were authorized by law, to
execute the revenue laws of the United States. Preference in making
appointments was to be given to qualified loyal residents of the
districts in which their respective duties were to be performed; but if
suitable persons could not be found residing there, then citizens of
other States or districts should be named.
In the matter of appointments similar instructions were given to the
Postmaster-General, who was empowered to establish post offices and post
routes, and to enforce the postal laws of the United States in the State
of Virginia.
The heads of the remaining Executive Departments, State, War, Navy and
Interior, were likewise ordered to enforce the acts of Congress
pertaining to their respective offices. The judge of the United States
District Court for Virginia was directed to hold courts in that
Commonwealth, while it was made the duty of the Attorney-General to
instruct the proper officers to libel and bring to judgment,
confiscation and sale, property subject to confiscation, and to provide
for the administration of justice within the said State in all matters
of which the Federal courts had cognizance.
It was this recognition of his government, and this assurance of
support, that induced Mr. Pierpont less than three weeks afterward to
remove his capital from Alexandria. An account of this event as well as
of the nature of the Governor’s duties in his enlarged jurisdiction, has
been anticipated.
In recognizing Mr. Pierpont as Governor of Virginia, President Johnson
merely concluded to retain for reconstruction what had already been
accomplished by the loyal minority of that Commonwealth. Nor is it easy
to perceive why, by rejecting what had been done, he should have
increased the difficulties of a situation even then sufficiently
complicated. While military governor of Tennessee he had executed, and,
so far as appears, without remonstrance, all the measures recommended by
Mr. Lincoln, so that when he succeeded to the Presidency he was to some
extent committed to the policy of his predecessor. He preserved his
consistency by endeavoring to maintain that system in which he had
formerly acquiesced, and in sustaining the reconstructed governments of
Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee and Virginia it is somewhat hazardous to
affirm that he acted unwisely. More than this the adherents of President
Lincoln could not reasonably have expected. Mr. Johnson was not,
however, required by any consideration of moment to apply that mode of
restoration to the seven remaining States; nor is it by any means
certain that he had a legal right to do so. With President Lincoln the
problem was to preserve the Union. To effect that object he believed it
necessary to institute loyal governments, and his action in so doing
appears to have been clearly within his powers as Commander-in-Chief.
Had his course been unwise or even prejudicial to national interests,
the reorganization of those States was still a legitimate war measure to
which his discretion undoubtedly extended. When Andrew Johnson became
President, however, the nature of the problem had greatly changed, for
even though no proclamation had yet announced the termination of the
Rebellion, hostilities had entirely ceased before he issued the first of
his orders on reconstruction. It was only by something like a legal
fiction, therefore, that the war powers could longer be exercised. It is
believed that his failure to recognize the different circumstances was
an error of judgment. The danger of a renewal of the conflict was not
sufficiently real to justify a continuance of the unlimited authority
that might be deemed necessary in time of war. He was aware that
Congress had refused to admit representatives or to count electoral
votes from those States reorganized during the Rebellion, when the
action of the Executive rested on the firm, if somewhat undefined,
foundation of the war powers. After a majority, even in these
circumstances, had pronounced against that system, on what ground could
the new President base his expectation of success? Without first
assuring himself of the coöperation of the Legislative branch he should
not have undertaken the arduous task of reviving Union governments in
those commonwealths where even the very image of civil authority had
been effaced. Perhaps he had been convinced that the method of
restoration was analogous to the process of terminating war with a
foreign power in which the initiative is to be taken by the Executive
Department of Government. On this subject Mr. Blaine acutely remarks,
that, “There is nothing of which a public officer can be so easily
persuaded as of the enlarged jurisdiction that pertains to his
station.”[466] It was while executing his measures of reconstruction
that Mr. Lincoln discovered the real sentiments and, to his surprise, no
doubt, encountered the determined opposition of Congress. In the case of
his successor the same excuse cannot be urged, for he was aware of the
temper of the Republican majority, and appears to have consulted only
his courage in espousing a cause already condemned by many of the most
influential leaders of the party to which he principally owed his
election.
As the order recognizing the Alexandria government marked no distinct
Executive policy, speculation could still amuse or employ itself on the
expected announcement by the new President. The first step in that
momentous undertaking was the appointment, May 29, 1865, of William W.
Holden as Provisional Governor of North Carolina. The order promulgating
that measure was as follows:
Whereas the fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution
of the United States declares that the United States shall guarantee
to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and
shall protect each of them against invasion and domestic violence;
and whereas the President of the United States is, by the
Constitution, made commander-in-chief of the army and navy, as well
as chief civil executive officer of the United States, and is bound
by solemn oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the
United States, and to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed; and whereas the rebellion, which has been waged by a
portion of the people of the United States against the properly
constituted authorities of the Government thereof, in the most
violent and revolting form, but whose organized and armed forces
have now been almost entirely overcome, has, in its revolutionary
progress, deprived the people of the State of North Carolina of all
civil government; and whereas it becomes necessary and proper to
carry out and enforce the obligations of the United States to the
people of North Carolina, in securing them in the enjoyment of a
republican form of government:
Now, therefore, in obedience to the high and solemn duties imposed
upon me by the Constitution of the United States, and for the
purpose of enabling the loyal people of said State to organize a
State government, whereby justice may be established, domestic
tranquillity insured, and loyal citizens protected in all their
rights of life, liberty, and property, I, Andrew Johnson, President
of the United States, and Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of
the United States, do hereby appoint William W. Holden, Provisional
Governor of the State of North Carolina, whose duty it shall be, at
the earliest practicable period, to prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary and proper for convening a
convention, composed of delegates to be chosen by that portion of
the people of said State who are loyal to the United States, and no
others, for the purpose of altering or amending the constitution
thereof; and with authority to exercise, within the limits of said
State, all the powers necessary and proper to enable such loyal
people of the State of North Carolina to restore said State to its
constitutional relations to the Federal Government, and to present
such a republican form of State government as will entitle the State
to the guarantee of the United States therefor, and its people to
protection by the United States against invasion, insurrection, and
domestic violence; _Provided_, that in any election that may be
hereafter held for choosing delegates to any State convention, as
aforesaid, no person shall be qualified as an elector, or shall be
eligible as a member of such convention, unless he shall have
previously taken the oath of amnesty, as set forth in the
President’s proclamation of May 29, A. D. 1865, and is a voter
qualified as prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the State of
North Carolina, in force immediately before the 20th day of May,
1861, the date of the so-called ordinance of secession; and the said
convention when convened, or the Legislature that may be thereafter
assembled, will prescribe the qualifications of electors, and the
eligibility of persons to hold office under the Constitution and
laws of the State, a power the people of the several States
composing the Federal Union have rightfully exercised from the
origin of the Government to the present time.
And I do hereby direct:
_First._ That the military commander of the Department, and all
officers and persons in the military and naval service aid and
assist the said Provisional Governor in carrying into effect this
proclamation, and they are enjoined to abstain from, in any way,
hindering, impeding or discouraging the loyal people from the
organization of a State Government, as herein authorized.
Then followed instructions, similar to those contained in the order of
May 9, relative to Virginia, directing the heads of the several
Executive Departments to enforce those Federal laws in North Carolina of
which the administration belonged to their respective offices.
Somewhat earlier on the same day was published an Amnesty Proclamation,
renewing in effect the provisions of that issued by Mr. Lincoln on the
8th of December, 1863. It increased, however, the number of classes
excepted from the benefits of the original offer by adding the
following:
All persons who have been or are absentees from the United States
for the purpose of aiding the rebellion.
All military and naval officers in the rebel service, who were
educated by the Government in the Military Academy at West Point or
the United States Naval Academy.
All persons who held the pretended offices of governors of States in
insurrection against the United States.
All persons who left their homes within the jurisdiction and
protection of the United States, and passed beyond the Federal
military lines into the pretended confederate States for the purpose
of aiding the rebellion.
All persons who have been engaged in the destruction of the commerce
of the United States upon the high seas, and all persons who have
made raids into the United States from Canada, or been engaged in
destroying the commerce of the United States upon the lakes and
rivers that separate the British Provinces from the United States.
All persons who, at the time when they seek to obtain the benefits
hereof by taking the oath herein prescribed, are in military, naval,
or civil confinement, or custody, or under bonds of the civil,
military, or naval authorities, or agents of the United States, as
prisoners of war, or persons detained for offences of any kind,
either before or after conviction.
All persons who have voluntarily participated in said rebellion, and
the estimated value of whose taxable property is over twenty
thousand dollars.
All persons who have taken the oath of amnesty as prescribed in the
President’s proclamation of December 8, A. D. 1863, or an oath of
allegiance to the Government of the United States since the date of
said proclamation, and who have not thenceforward kept and
maintained the same inviolate.[467]
The proclamation provided, however, that persons belonging to the
excluded classes could make special application for pardon, when such
liberal clemency would be exercised by the President as was deemed
consistent with the facts in each case, and with the peace and dignity
of the United States.
Secretary Seward, who attested the proclamation, approved its general
tenor as well as its details. At first he appears to have opposed the
“Twenty-thousand-dollar exclusion,” but finally yielded to the arguments
of the President, who by this description had hoped to include a
numerous class that did not come under any of those specified. In this
respect it possessed the comprehensive as well as the convenient
character of a general warrant. All attempts to fix responsibility for
secession have proved futile, and it is difficult to explain the
President’s attitude toward Southern men of property unless, indeed, he
meant to humiliate a class that he personally disliked, or, perhaps, he
intended to act upon the principle that to be mild it is necessary first
to appear cruel. Precisely why the other classes were excepted from the
offer of indemnity the reader of Rebellion literature need not be
informed. The amnesty proclamation applied to all the insurgent States.
Like the “Louisiana plan,” the order appointing Mr. Holden was based on
that clause of the Federal Constitution which guarantees “to every State
in this Union a republican form of government.” It was in his character
of Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, as well as Executive, that
he assumed to appoint a provisional governor. The Rebellion, which in
its progress had “deprived the people of the State of North Carolina of
all civil government,” he described as having been “almost entirely
overcome.” This condition rendered it necessary to fulfill the Federal
obligation to secure to the people of that State a republican form of
government. The order being self-explanatory, it only remains to observe
that none but “loyal people” were to participate in electing delegates
to the convention, which it was made the duty of the Governor to
convoke. The term “loyal people” included all who would take the oath
and receive the pardon provided for in the proclamation. These were
required to be qualified voters under the laws in force immediately
before the act of secession. By this provision the negroes of the State
were excluded from the electoral people, and the work of reconstruction
left entirely in the hands of the whites. The convention chosen by these
citizens, or the Legislature that might be thereafter assembled, was
authorized to “prescribe the qualifications of electors, and the
eligibility of persons to hold office under the constitution and laws of
the State, a power,” added the order, which “the people of the several
States composing the Federal Union have rightfully exercised from the
origin of the Government to the present time.”
Governor Holden in a proclamation of June 12, 1865, announced his
appointment and declared his purpose to order an election of delegates
to a State convention, the object of calling which was briefly noticed.
He also made known his intention to commission justices of the peace for
the purpose of administering the oath of allegiance and opening the
polls. He urged the people to resume their accustomed pursuits; refugees
were encouraged by an offer of protection to return to the State, and
freedmen were instructed in the duties peculiar to their altered
circumstances.
By a second proclamation, dated August 8, the choice of delegates to the
proposed convention was fixed for September 21 succeeding. Some delay in
appointing a date for holding the election was occasioned by a desire to
afford the people an opportunity of enrolling their names and obtaining
the required certificates.
By such voters as were not included in any of the excepted classes,
together with the few who had been able to procure the Presidential
pardon, full delegations were chosen in all but three counties. The
details of this election accessible to the writer are exceedingly
meagre. Owing much to the timely publication and the admirable character
of the orders of General Schofield, who had exercised the functions of
military governor until superseded by Mr. Holden, the contest appears to
have been free from unusual violence, though newspaper correspondents,
it is true, reported disturbances at several polling places and mention
rumors of rioting.
The convention, which assembled at Raleigh on October 2, was composed
for the most part of members who had either openly opposed or
reluctantly joined the secession movement. There were few, however, who
had not given aid and comfort to the enemy. In other words, they were
Whigs and conservative Democrats. Every representative readily took the
oath to support the Constitution of the United States. The convention
organized by electing Edwin G. Reade, an ex-member of the Thirty-fifth
Congress, as president. On taking his seat Mr. Reade made an appropriate
and conciliatory address.
The Provisional Governor also submitted to the members of the convention
a brief message in which he observed that their duties were too plain to
require any suggestions from him. North Carolina, he said, attempted in
May, 1861, to separate herself from the Union. That attempt involved her
in protracted and disastrous war. She entered the rebellion a
slaveholding and emerged from it a non-slaveholding State. “In other
respects,” he declared, “so far as her existence as a State and her
rights as a State are concerned, she has undergone no change.”[468] He
assumed that the convention would insert in the organic law a provision
forever prohibiting involuntary servitude in North Carolina. The
language abolishing that institution, the form of the resolution
abrogating the ordinance of secession and the nature of the action to be
taken on the war debt were the most important questions before the
convention.
On October 7 the repealing ordinance was passed unanimously in the
following terms:
The ordinance of the convention of the State of North Carolina,
ratified on the 21st day of November, 1789, which adopted and
ratified the Constitution of the United States, and also all acts
and parts of acts of the General Assembly ratifying and adopting
amendments to the said Constitution, are now, and at all times since
the adoption and ratification thereof, have been, in full force and
effect, notwithstanding the supposed ordinance of the 20th of May,
1861, declaring the same to be repealed, rescinded, and abrogated;
and the said supposed ordinance is now, and at all times hath been,
null and void.[469]
The resolution abolishing slavery, reported on the following day, was
adopted on the 9th of October, and is as follows:
_Be it declared and ordained by the delegates of the people of the
State of North Carolina in convention assembled, and it is hereby
declared and ordained_, That slavery and involuntary servitude,
otherwise than for crimes, whereof the parties shall have been duly
convicted, shall be, and is hereby, forever prohibited within the
State.[470]
Not without some reluctance there was also adopted a resolution
prohibiting any future Legislature from assuming or paying any State
debt created directly or indirectly for the purpose of aiding the
Rebellion. There seems to have been in the convention a strong element
opposed to the passage of such a measure, or at all events who preferred
to refer it to a popular vote. The decision of the convention on this
subject appears to have been influenced by a telegram from the President
to Governor Holden, in which the former says:
Every dollar of the debt created to aid the rebellion against the
United States should be repudiated finally and forever. The great
mass of the people should not be taxed to pay a debt to aid in
carrying on a rebellion which they in fact, if left to themselves,
were opposed to. Let those who have given their means for the
obligations of the State look to that power they tried to establish
in violation of law, Constitution, and will of the people. They must
meet their fate. It is their misfortune, and cannot be recognized by
the people of any State professing themselves loyal to the
Government of the United States and in the Union....[471]
The convention adjourned October 19 to reassemble on the fourth Thursday
of May, 1866. Judge Reade, its president, previously delivered a
farewell address, in which he said: “Our work is finished. The breach in
the Government, as far as the same was by force, has been overcome by
force; and so far as the same has had the sanction of legislation, the
legislation has been declared to be null and void. So that there remains
nothing to be done except the withdrawal of military power when all our
governmental relations will be restored, without further asking, on the
part of the United States. The element of slavery, which so long
distracted and divided the sections, has by an unanimous vote been
abolished. Every man in the State is free. The reluctance which for a
while was felt to the sudden and radical change in our domestic
relations—a reluctance which was made oppressive to us by our kind
feelings for the slave, and by our apprehensions of the evils which were
to follow him—has yielded to the determination to be to him, as we
always have been, his best friends; to advise, protect, educate and
elevate him; to seek his confidence, and to give him ours, each
occupying appropriate positions to the other.... It remains for us to
return to our constituents and engage with them in the great work of
restoring our beloved State to order and prosperity.”[472]
An election, fixed for November 9, was ordered by Mr. Holden for the
choice of Governor, members of a General Assembly, county officers and
Representatives in Congress. On the same occasion the people were to
vote on the ordinance abolishing and prohibiting slavery. The action of
the convention on the Confederate debt being final, that subject was not
referred to the popular judgment.
On behalf of the convention the president and other delegates soon after
adjournment proceeded to Washington to acquaint Mr. Johnson with the
result of their deliberations. They related to him what has already been
placed before the reader. As the convention had yielded what was
involved in the war, President Johnson was requested to declare on the
part of the Federal authorities that the governmental relations of North
Carolina had been reconciled. Notwithstanding what had been done they
feared that their State delegation would be excluded from Congress by
the imposition of a test oath which few men in that commonwealth could
take. The convention, therefore, petitioned Congress, through Mr.
Johnson, to repeal the requirement. The President, after expressing his
satisfaction with what North Carolina had done, reminded the delegates
that to make restoration practicable one thing still remained to be
accomplished, namely, their acceptance of the amendment abolishing
slavery throughout the United States.
The ordinances submitted to the people were ratified at the November
election, when Jonathan Worth was chosen Governor over Mr. Holden by a
majority of 6,730, in a total of 58,554 votes. The repeal of the
secession ordinance was ratified by a vote of 20,506 to 2,002, and that
prohibiting slavery by 19,039 against 3,970.
In a dispatch of November 27, President Johnson, thanking the
Provisional Governor for the efficient manner in which he had executed
his duties, said that the result of the election was greatly to damage
the prospects of the State in the restoration of its government, that if
the action and spirit of the Legislature were in the same direction it
would greatly increase the harm already done, and might prove fatal. He
hoped the mischief would be repaired.[473]
Meanwhile the Legislature during a brief session ratified, with only six
dissenting votes, the Thirteenth Amendment, and elected John Pool and
William A. Graham United States Senators. Seven Representatives in
Congress had been previously chosen.