I esteem it a high honor to have received a note from Mr. Bancroft

inclosing the report of proceedings of a New York meeting taking

measures for the relief of Union people of North Carolina. I thank

you and all others participating for this benevolent and patriotic

movement.

The main thought in the closing paragraph of your letter is one

which does not escape my attention, and with which I must deal in

all due caution, and with the best judgment I can bring to it.[234]

We have here the key to President Lincoln’s treatment of the slavery

question down to the hour of his lamented death. As the hostile

employment of negroes constituted by act of August 6 a full answer to

any claim for service General McClellan was informed by Secretary

Seward, December 4, 1861, that the arrest of such persons as fugitives

from labor “should be immediately followed by the military arrest of the

parties making the seizure.” These instructions were called forth by

intelligence that Virginia slaves engaged in hostility to the United

States frequently escaped from the enemy and took refuge within the

lines of the Army of the Potomac. Coming afterward into the District of

Columbia, such persons upon the presumption arising from color, were

liable to be arrested by the Washington police.[235]

On December 3, 1861, in his first annual message to Congress, Mr.

Lincoln discussed without especial emphasis the question of aiding those

slaves who had been freed under the act of August 6; he observed that

this class was dependent upon the United States; it was believed that,

for their own benefit, many of the States would enact similar laws; he

therefore recommended Congress to provide for accepting such persons

from the States,

according to some mode of valuation, in lieu, _pro tanto_, of direct

taxes, or upon some other plan to be agreed on with such States

respectively; that such persons, on such acceptance by the General

Government, be at once deemed free; and that, in any event, steps be

taken for colonizing both classes (or the one first mentioned, if

the other shall not be brought into existence) at some place or

places in a climate congenial to them. It might be well to consider,

too, whether the free colored people already in the United States

could not, so far as individuals may desire, be included in such

colonization.

To carry out the plan of colonization may involve the acquiring of

territory, and also the appropriation of money beyond that to be

expended in the territorial acquisition. Having practiced the

acquisition of territory for nearly sixty years, the question of

constitutional power to do so is no longer an open one with us. The

power was questioned at first by Mr. Jefferson, who, however, in the

purchase of Louisiana, yielded his scruples on the plea of great

expediency. If it be said that the only legitimate object of

acquiring territory is to furnish homes for white men, this measure

effects that object; for the emigration of colored men leaves

additional room for white men remaining or coming here. Mr.

Jefferson, however, placed the importance of procuring Louisiana

more on political and commercial grounds than on providing room for

population.

On this whole proposition, including the appropriation of money with

the acquisition of territory, does not the expediency amount to

absolute necessity—that without which the Government itself cannot

be perpetuated?

The war continues. In considering the policy to be adopted for

suppressing the insurrection, I have been anxious and careful that

the inevitable conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a

violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle. I have, therefore,

in every case thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Union

prominent as the primary object of the contest on our part, leaving

all questions which are not of vital military importance to the more

deliberate action of the Legislature.

In the exercise of my best discretion I have adhered to the blockade

of the ports held by the insurgents, instead of putting in force, by

proclamation, the law of Congress enacted at the last session for

closing those ports.

So, also, obeying the dictates of prudence as well as the

obligations of law, instead of transcending I have adhered to the

act of Congress to confiscate property used for insurrectionary

purposes. If a new law upon the same subject shall be proposed, its

propriety will be duly considered. The Union must be preserved; and

hence all indispensable means must be employed. We should not be in

haste to determine that radical and extreme measures, which may

reach the loyal as well as the disloyal, are indispensable.[236]

The President’s mastery of national affairs is seen in the ability and

thoroughness with which he treated a great variety of important public

questions; though his message touches with the utmost delicacy the

paramount issue of slavery it really marked an advance in his position.

However, he was not yet abreast of the aggressive anti-slavery party in

the 37th Congress, which had just commenced its first regular session.

The “increase of free States,” which Mr. Bancroft hoped would result

from the war, and which President Lincoln’s reply shows had not escaped

his attention, was not to be effected by military emancipation in the

field but by the voluntary action of the States themselves. The caution

and judgment which he brought to bear on this subject are apparent from

even a casual examination of the message, which refers to the number of

slaves that had been freed by the incidents of war, and to the extreme

probability that still others would be liberated in its progress. It

contained also a recommendation of colonization, a topic which had long

been familiar to Americans both North and South. To any new law

emancipating slaves for the participation of their masters in rebellion,

he promised to give due consideration. This part of the message had the

additional merit of being easily expanded into a more definite policy.

It was this characteristic prudence that led the President to suppress

the following remarks in a report which the Secretary of War had

prepared for the opening of Congress in December, 1861:

If it shall be found that the men who have been held by the rebels

as slaves are capable of bearing arms and performing efficient

military service, it is the right, and may become the duty, of this

government to arm and equip them, and employ their services against

the rebels, under proper military regulation, discipline, and

command.[237]

Any legislation, or even any extended debate, on these recommendations

was prevented by questions deemed more urgent by Congress. Indeed, the

President does not appear to have seriously expected favorable action at

this time upon his suggestions, for he resumed certain efforts which he

had been carefully considering. He believed that by the pressure of war

necessities the border States might be induced to take up the idea of

voluntary emancipation if the General Government would pay their

citizens the full property value of the slaves they were asked to

liberate; and this experiment seemed most feasible in the small State of

Delaware, which retained only the merest fragment of a property interest

in the institution.

Even before the appearance of his message a plan of compensated

abolishment had taken definite form in the mind of the President, for

about November 26 he had prepared a draft of a bill for gradual

emancipation in Delaware.[238] Through Congressman George P. Fisher the

proposition was laid before the General Assembly of that State and

received favorable consideration in the lower House. By the Senate,

which convened November 25, 1861, it was taken up for discussion on

February 7 succeeding. Upon the question, 4 voted in favor and 4 against

concurring in the action of the more popular branch of the Legislature.

The remaining Senator, McFerran, was absent or silent and is not

accounted for in the journal of this special session. Therefore the

measure was returned non-concurred in to the other chamber. The

following preamble and joint resolution relative to the proposed

emancipation bill are self-explanatory. The Federal suggestion was

repelled as an unwarranted interference in the domestic concerns of that

State:

_Whereas_, There has been circulating among the members of this

General Assembly a printed draft for a law to be entitled “An act

for the gradual emancipation of slaves in the State of Delaware with

just compensation to their owners”; _and whereas_ many of the

members of this General Assembly have been requested to support it,

the said draft being in the following words: [Then follows the

title, together with the twenty-one sections composing the bill. To

which is added:] _And whereas_ it is uncertain that said proposition

will be submitted to this General Assembly for its action,

nevertheless, viewing it to be unworthy of their support, they

desire to place upon record the grounds of their condemnation;

therefore

_Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of

Delaware in General Assembly met_, That the members of this

Legislature were not elected with a view to the passage of any act

for the emancipation of slaves, but with the understanding, either

expressed or implied, that legislation upon the distracting subject

of slavery was hostile to the public peace, and therefore to be

avoided; that the passage of the act drafted as aforesaid, inasmuch

as it renders Congressional action necessary, would, upon the

apparent application of the State of Delaware, introduce the slavery

question into Congress, would encourage the abolition element

therein, and fortify it in its purpose to destroy entirely all

property in slaves, and furthermore, would be injurious to the quiet

and harmony that prevail in this State.

_Be it further resolved by the authority aforesaid_, That it is the

opinion of this General Assembly, that Congress has no right to

appropriate a dollar for the purchase of slaves, and that such a

proposal, coming from the source to which it is traceable, evinces a

design on the part of those having control of our national affairs

to abolish slavery in the States.

_Resolved further_, That this General Assembly having in mind the

interests of the people of Delaware, are not willing, especially at

a time of financial embarrassment, to make the State of Delaware a

guarantor of any debt the payment of which depends upon the mere

pledge of public faith; that the confidence of the people of this

State that nothing would ever be done to promote a disunion of our

National system, but that it would remain, as expressed by Webster

“one and inseparable, now and forever,” having been impaired by the

events of the last two years, we are and should be very cautious in

resting our obligations on the mere faith of others; that by

accepting the terms to be offered by the United States, we should,

upon grounds of the plainest equity, be held to have pledged the

faith of Delaware for the payment of nine hundred thousand dollars

as mentioned in the draft aforesaid; that, keeping in mind the fact

that the power of the nation is now put forth to suppress a

rebellion prevailing throughout a very large portion of its

territory, and that in consequence of such rebellion and the

uncertainty of its being speedily quelled, the stocks of the United

States, which heretofore brought in the market a sum far beyond the

par value thereof, are now selling at a continually increasing rate

of discount, we are unwilling to pledge the faith of Delaware (a

faith which has never been violated) that the proposed mode of

payment is safe and proper.

_Resolved further_, That when the people of Delaware desire to

abolish slavery within her borders, they will do so in their own

way, having due regard to strict equity; that any interference from

without, and all suggestions of saving expense to the people, or

others of like character, are improper to be made to an honorable

people, such as we represent, and are hereby repelled—that though

the State of Delaware is small, and her people not of the richest,

they are beyond the reach of any who would promote an end by

improper interference and solicitations.

_Resolved further_, That a copy of the foregoing resolutions, duly

attested, be transmitted to each of our Senators, and to our

Representative in Congress, to be laid before their respective

houses.[239]

Thus ended, so far as Delaware was concerned, the question of

compensated emancipation. Precisely why the offer of Federal assistance

was rejected nowhere clearly appears except in the records of the

General Assembly. The high ground assumed in the resolutions was, of

course, the only one in harmony with public opinion in the State. There

are, however, some facts in the history of that Commonwealth which

afford a partial explanation of the action of its Legislature. When the

Federalist party as a political force had disappeared everywhere outside

of New England its principles and traditions still lingered on in

Delaware. The same conservative tendency, the same distrust of

innovation is seen again in the prudent manner in which the authorities

of the State invested and improved her portion of the surplus revenue

distributed among the States in 1837. With a half dozen exceptions the

shares allotted to other members of the Union have disappeared, in some

instances expended patriotically, in others squandered on projects more

or less visionary. It has frequently been observed, too, that a

community whose population is chiefly agricultural is apt to view with

suspicion any financial proposition of great magnitude. Whatever the

true explanation of her opposition to the policy of the President, the

question at once sank to rest in Delaware; it was soon to be revived

elsewhere, however, as will presently be seen.

Meanwhile army officers continued to determine, on their own authority,

very important questions relative to the surrender of fugitive slaves.

Major-General Halleck declared in a proclamation of February 23, 1862,

that “it does not belong to the military to decide upon the relation of

master and slave. Such questions must be settled by the civil courts. No

fugitive slave will therefore be admitted within our lines or camps,

except when specially ordered by the General commanding.”[240] General

Halleck’s order No. 3 of November 20 preceding, as it cut off an

opportunity for the escape of thousands, occasioned much bitter

discussion both in and out of Congress. By Halleck it was explained in

these words: “Unauthorized persons, black or white, free or slaves, must

be kept out of our camps, unless we are willing to publish to the enemy

everything we do or intend to do.” This statement, however, does not

altogether harmonize with the spirit of his order.[241]

General Buell up to March 6 appears to have uniformly returned this

class of persons, and on the 26th of that month General Hooker permitted

nine citizens of Maryland to search for negroes supposed to have taken

refuge with some of the regiments in his division. Notwithstanding the

commander desired that no obstacles be thrown in their way, trouble

occurred when the claimants showed their authority and demanded the

surrender of their slaves. They were driven from camp because fears for

their safety were entertained by some of the officers. The anger of the

soldiers appears to have been especially aroused by the fact that when

within a few yards of camp the slaveholders fired two pistol shots at a

negro who was running past them.[242]

General Doubleday’s opinion, as stated April 6, 1862, by the Assistant

Adjutant-General, was, “that all negroes coming into the lines of any of

the camps or forts under his command, are to be treated as persons and

not as chattels.

“Under no circumstances,” continues this regulation, “has the commander

of a fort or camp the power of surrendering persons claimed as fugitive

slaves, as it cannot be done without determining their character.

“The additional article of war recently passed by Congress positively

prohibits this.”[243]

Notwithstanding the unmistakable tone of the above, General Williams

announced two months later from his headquarters at Baton Rouge that

commanders of the camps and garrisons in that part of Louisiana were

required to turn all fugitives beyond the limits of their guards and

sentinels because of “the demoralizing and disorganizing tendencies to

the troops of harboring runaway negroes.”[244]

Enough has been said to show the divergence of sentiment among Federal

commanders on the rendition of fugitive slaves. The party preferences of

officers served as a rather reliable index to the treatment of the

fugitive in any particular case. This confusion, it is scarcely

necessary to add, arose from the failure of Congress to pass a law on

the subject, and to a considerable degree from the absence of any

clearly expressed policy by the Administration. Of the changing opinions

of the President, however, we catch an occasional glimpse. Though the

contrabands at Fortress Monroe had, no doubt, brought before him the

entire question of slavery, the sagacity of General Butler had postponed

the necessity of any announcement in May, 1861; but the subject could

not always be avoided, and the imprudence of Fremont forced a

declaration in September following. The events of another year were

destined to produce changes which even the wisest could not then

foresee.

A new phase of this troublesome question resulted from the capture,

November 7, of Hilton Head, South Carolina, and the Federal occupation

of the Sea Islands, where the labor of slaves abandoned by their masters

was organized under authority of the Treasury Department by Mr. E. L.

Pierce. This was, probably, intended as nothing more than an experiment,

to be extended if successful. To interest Government officials at

Washington in the work among these freedmen, Mr. Pierce, at the

suggestion of Secretary Chase, called, February 15, 1862, upon the

President, who seemed rather annoyed at the visit, and, after listening

a few moments, said somewhat impatiently that he did not think he ought

to be troubled with such details; that “there seemed to be an itching to

get negroes into our lines.” To this Mr. Pierce replied that the negroes

were domiciled there when the Union forces took possession. The

President then handed his visitor a card by which Mr. Chase was

authorized to give what instructions he thought judicious relative to

Port Royal contrabands.[245] This impatience Mr. Pierce explains by

saying that the President was in expectation of a personal bereavement.

This certainly accounts for the anxiety and apparent annoyance of Mr.

Lincoln, but his remark that there seemed to be an “itching” to get

negroes inside Federal lines shows that he had not yet deliberately

considered the novel case of abandoned slaves; abandoned masters had

hitherto claimed his attention. Though slowly, as it may have appeared

to radical members of his own party, the President was surely

approaching the great question, and on March 6, 1862, sent to Congress a

message which recommended the adoption, and even proposed the form, of a

joint resolution declaring:

That the United States ought to coöperate with any State which may

adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary

aid, to be used by such State, in its discretion, to compensate for

the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of

system.[246]

As one of the most efficient means of self-preservation it was

recommended by the Executive to the coördinate branch of Government; for

to deprive the cotton States of the hope of being joined by the border

States would, he said, “substantially end the rebellion; and the

initiation of emancipation completely deprives them of it as to all the

States initiating it. The point is not that all the States tolerating

slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate emancipation; but that

while the offer is equally made to all, the more Northern shall, by such

initiation, make it certain to the more Southern that in no event will

the former ever join the latter in their proposed confederacy.” Gradual

emancipation he believed better for all concerned. The current

expenditures of the war would soon purchase, at a fair valuation, all

the slaves in any named State. However, it was proposed as a matter of

perfectly free choice. “In the annual message, last December,” continued

the President, “I thought fit to say, ‘the Union must be preserved, and

hence all indispensable means must be employed.’ I said this not

hastily, but deliberately. War has been made and continues to be an

indispensable means to this end. A practical re-acknowledgment of the

national authority would render the war unnecessary, and it would at

once cease. If, however, resistance continues, the war must also

continue; and it is impossible to foresee all the incidents which may

attend and all the ruin which may follow it. Such as may seem

indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency, toward ending

the struggle, must and will come.”

The message inquired “whether the pecuniary consideration tendered would

not be of more value to the States and private persons concerned than

are the institution and property in it, in the present aspect of

affairs?”[247]

This was really a great step in advance; by many it was regarded as a

direct and positive interference with the domestic institutions of the

States; it was certainly a preliminary movement to get rid of slavery.

The deliberate opinion of the Delaware Legislature has already been

noticed.

Easily distinguished in principle from the opposition in Delaware were

the sentiments expressed in Virginia when the equitable and generous

proposal of the President came up for consideration in the Richmond

Legislature. Mr. Collier submitted to that body a preamble and

resolution relative to the proposition. In the former it was said that

negro slaves having been the property of their masters for two hundred

and forty years, by use and custom at first, and subsequently by

recognition of the public law, ought not to be, and could not justly be,

interfered with in such property relation by the State, by “the people

in convention assembled to alter an existing constitution, or to form

one for admission into the confederacy, nor by the representatives of

the people of the State in the Confederate Legislature, nor by any means

or mode which the popular majority might adopt; and that the State,

whilst remaining republican in the structure of its government, can

lawfully get rid of that species of property, if ever, only by the free

consent of the individual owners.” For the State to deprive an

individual of this species of property would contravene the

indispensable principles of free government. This view, as further

explained by its author, denied the power of even a majority, in making

a new State constitution, to disturb a preëxisting and resident

property.[248]

Three days after sending his recommendation to Congress, the President

wrote privately to Henry J. Raymond, editor of the _New York Times_:

I am grateful to the New York journals and not less so to the

“Times” than to others, for their kind notices of the late special

message to Congress.

Your paper, however, intimates that the proposition, though well

intentioned, must fail on the score of expense. I do hope you will

reconsider this. Have you noticed the facts that less than one-half

day’s cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware at

$400 per head—that eighty-seven days’ cost of this war would pay for

all in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentucky, and

Missouri at the same price? Were those States to take the step, do

you doubt that it would shorten the war more than eighty-seven days,

and thus be an actual saving of expense?

Please look at these things and consider whether there should not be

another article in the “Times.”[249]

By his request those Congressmen from the border States then in

Washington called, March 10, on Mr. Lincoln, who explained that his

recent message was not inimical to the interests they represented. In

the progress of the war, slaves would come into camps and continual

irritation be thus maintained. In the border States that condition kept

alive a feeling of hostility to the Government. He told them further

“that emancipation was a subject exclusively under the control of the

States, and must be adopted or rejected by each for itself.”[250]

Relative to this interview a memorandum of the Hon. John W. Crisfield,

one of the Maryland Representatives present, contains the following

entry: “He [the President] was constantly annoyed by conflicting and

antagonistic complaints; on the one side a certain class complained if

the slave was not protected by the army; persons were frequently found

who, participating in these views, acted in a way unfriendly to the

slave-holder; on the other hand, slaveholders complained that their

rights were interfered with, their slaves induced to abscond and

protected within the lines; these complaints were numerous, loud and

deep; were a serious annoyance to him and embarrassing to the progress

of the war ... [they] strengthened the hopes of the Confederates that at

some day the border States would unite with them, and thus tend to

prolong the war; and he was of opinion, if this resolution should be

adopted by Congress and accepted by our [the border slaveholding]

States, these causes of irritation and these hopes would be removed, and

more would be accomplished toward shortening the war than could be hoped

from the greatest victory achieved by Union armies; ... that he did not

claim nor had this Government any right to coerce them” to accept the

proposition.

To Mr. Noell’s remark that the _New York Tribune_ favored the measure

and understood it to mean that gradual emancipation must be accepted or

the border States would get something worse, the President replied that

he must not be expected to quarrel with that journal before the right

time; he hoped never to have to do it. The message having said that “all

indispensable means must be employed” to preserve the Union, Mr.

Crisfield inquired pointedly, what would be the effect of the refusal of

a State to accept this proposal. Did the President, he asked, look “to

any policy beyond the acceptance or rejection of this scheme.” Mr.

Lincoln candidly replied that he had “no designs beyond the action of

the States on this particular subject,” though he should lament their

refusal to accept it. Mr. Crisfield said “he did not think the people of

Maryland looked upon slavery as a permanent institution; and he did not

know that they would be very reluctant to give it up if provision was

made to meet the loss and they could be rid of the race; but they did

not like to be coerced into emancipation, either by the direct action of

the Government or by indirection, as through the emancipation of slaves

in this District, or the confiscation of Southern property as now

threatened; and he thought before they would consent to consider this

proposition they would require to be informed on these points.” The

President answered that “unless he was expelled by the act of God or the

Confederate armies, he should occupy that house for three years; and as

long as he remained there Maryland had nothing to fear either for her

institutions or her interests on the points referred to.” Representative

Crisfield immediately added: “Mr. President, if what you now say could

be heard by the people of Maryland, they would consider your proposition

with a much better feeling than I fear without it they will be inclined

to do.” To this Mr. Lincoln said that a publication of his sentiments

would not do; it would force him before the proper time into a quarrel

which was impending with the Greeley faction. This he desired to

postpone, or, if possible, altogether to avoid.

To an objection of Governor Wickliffe, of Kentucky, he said that the

resolution proposed would be considered rather as the expression of a

sentiment than as involving any constitutional question. He did not know

how the project was received by the members from the free States; some

of them had spoken to him and received it kindly; but for the most part

they were as reserved and chary as the border State delegations; he

could not tell how they would vote.[251]

To James A. McDougall, of California, who was making some opposition in

the Senate, he sent, March 14, this private communication while the

resolution was still pending:

As to the expensiveness of gradual emancipation with the plan of

compensation, proposed in the late message, please allow me one or

two brief suggestions.

Less than one half day’s cost of this war would pay for all the

slaves in Delaware at four hundred dollars per head.

Thus, all the slaves in Delaware by the census of 1860, 1,798

are....

400

—————————

Cost of slaves $719,200

One day’s cost of the war 2,000,000

=========

Again, less than eighty-seven days’ cost of this war would, at the

same price, pay for all in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia,

Kentucky, and Missouri.

Thus, slaves in Delaware 1,798

Maryland 87,188

District of Columbia 3,181

Kentucky 225,490

Missouri 114,965

————————————

432,622

400

————————————

Cost of slaves $173,048,800

Eighty-seven days’ cost of war 174,000,000

============

Do you doubt that taking the initiatory steps on the part of those

States and this District would shorten the war more than

eighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense?

A word as to the time and manner of incurring the expense. Suppose,

for instance, a State devises and adopts a system by which the

institution absolutely ceases therein by a named day—say January 1,

1882. Then let the sum to be paid to such a State by the United

States be ascertained by taking from the census of 1860 the number

of slaves within the State, and multiplying the number by four

hundred—the United States to pay such sums to the State in twenty

equal annual installments, in six per cent. bonds of the United

States.

The sum thus given, as to time and manner, I think, would not be

half as onerous as would be an equal sum raised now for the

indefinite prosecution of the war; but of this you can judge as well

as I. I enclose a census table for your convenience.[252]

On the same day of the conference with the border State delegations,

March 10, the resolution, in precisely the language suggested by the

President, was introduced by Roscoe Conkling, and on the following day

by a vote of 89 to 31 passed the House.[253] The Senate by 32 yeas to 10

nays took favorable action upon it on the 2d of April succeeding.[254]

It is important to notice that at this time, March, 1862, the Government

set up no claim of a right by Federal authority to interfere with

slavery within the limits of a State; also that public opinion in the

North had advanced to the position occupied by Representative McKean

more than a year before, when he introduced into Congress his resolution

for compensated emancipation.[255]

At a session, May 28, 1862, of the Union Convention of Baltimore its

Business Committee reported a series of resolutions which were adopted

unanimously, among them one approving the wise and conservative policy

proposed by the President in his message of March 6; that it was not

only the duty but the interest of the loyal people of Maryland to accept

the offer of pecuniary aid tendered by the Government to inaugurate an

equitable plan of emancipation and colonization.[256] This was the dawn

of emancipation in Maryland.

The President approved, April 16, six days after the passage of his

cherished measure, an act prohibiting slavery and liberating slaves in

the District of Columbia. It included both compensation to owners and

the principle of colonization.[257]

Shortly before its passage, April 17, a resolution was favorably

considered by the House to appoint a committee of nine empowered to

report whether any plan could be proposed and recommended for the

gradual emancipation of all African slaves and the extinction of slavery

in Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri by the

people or local authorities thereof, and how far and in what way the

United States could and ought equitably to aid in facilitating either of

the above objects. This measure was adopted by a vote of 67 to 52, and

one week later a committee was appointed by the Speaker.

General Hunter by an order of April 25 had extended martial law over

South Carolina, Georgia and Florida. Two weeks later he proclaimed

persons in those States heretofore held as slaves forever free. “Slavery

and martial law in a free country” he declared “altogether

incompatible.” The President in his proclamation of May 19, 1862,

rescinding this order once more reveals his sentiments on the slavery

question. The act of the Department commander, he said, was wholly

unauthorized. The document continues: “I further make known that,

whether it be competent for me, as Commander-in-Chief of the army and

navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free, and whether, at

any time, in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable to

the maintenance of the Government to exercise such supposed power, are

questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which

I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the

field.”[258]

Mr. Lincoln took this opportunity to point out to those most nearly

concerned the unmistakable signs of the times, and earnestly appealed to

them to embrace the offer of compensated abolishment, quoting upon that

subject the joint resolution of Congress. The order of General Hunter,

so far as it concerned the President, could have been dismissed by its

disavowal; but he went farther: he not only took advantage of this

occasion earnestly to urge upon the border States very serious

consideration of the principle of compensated emancipation, but he

raised, without pausing to discuss it, the question of his right as

Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy to declare the freedom of slaves

within the limits of a State should such a measure become indispensable

to the maintenance of the Union.

For refusing to employ his regiment in returning fugitive slaves of

disloyal masters, Colonel Paine, of the Fourth Wisconsin Volunteers, was

placed under arrest in the summer of 1862; about the same time

Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony was similarly disciplined both for refusing

permission to search his camp and for ordering the arrest of those

hunting for slaves.[259]

Instructions from the War Department, dated July 22, and applying to all

the States in rebellion except South Carolina and Tennessee, authorized

the employment as laborers of so many persons of African descent as the

military and naval commanders could use to advantage, and the payment of

reasonable wages for their labor.[260]

On May 12, 1862, Representative Lovejoy proposed a bill, a substitute

for one previously reported by him and introduced by Mr. Isaac N.

Arnold:

To the end that freedom may be and remain forever the fundamental

law of the land in all places whatsoever, so far as it lies within

the powers or depends upon the action of the Government of the

United States to make it so: Therefore,

_Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled_, That slavery or

involuntary servitude, in all cases whatsoever (other than in the

punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly

convicted) shall henceforth cease, and be prohibited forever in all

the Territories of the United States, now existing, or hereafter to

be formed or acquired in any way.[261]

This measure passed by 85 yeas to 50 nays. In the Senate, June 9, it was

reported amended by inserting this substitute: “That from and after the

passage of this act there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary

servitude in any of the Territories of the United States now existing,

or which may at any time hereafter be formed or acquired by the United

States, otherwise than in punishment of crimes whereof the party shall

have been duly convicted.” In this form it passed by a vote of 28 to 10

and the House concurred by 72 yeas to 38 nays.[262]

Charles Sumner, writing June 5, 1862, to a correspondent who was

impatient at what seemed the short-comings of the President, says:

Your criticism of the President is hasty. I am confident that, if

you knew him as I do, you would not make it.

Of course, the President cannot be held responsible for all the

misfeasances of subordinates, unless adopted or at least tolerated

by him. And I am sure that nothing unjust or ungenerous will be

tolerated, much less adopted, by him.

I am happy to let you know that he has no sympathy with Stanly in

his absurd wickedness, closing the schools, nor again in his other

act of turning our camp into a hunting ground for slaves. He

repudiates both—positively. The latter point has occupied much of

his thought; and the newspapers have not gone too far in recording

his repeated declarations, which I have often heard from his own

lips, that slaves finding their way into the national lines are

never to be re-enslaved. This is his conviction, expressed without

reserve.

Could you have seen the President—as it was my privilege often—while

he was considering the great questions on which he has already

acted—the invitation to emancipation in the States, emancipation in

the District of Columbia, and the acknowledgment of the independence

of Hayti and Liberia—even your zeal would have been satisfied, for

you would have felt the sincerity of his purpose to do what he could

to carry forward the principles of the Declaration of Independence.

His whole soul was occupied, especially by the first proposition,

which was peculiarly his own. In familiar intercourse with him, I

remember nothing more touching than the earnestness and completeness

with which he embraced this idea. To his mind, it was just and

beneficent while it promised the sure end of slavery. Of course, to

me who had already proposed a bridge of gold for the retreating

fiend, it was most welcome. Proceeding from the President, it must

take its place among the great events of history.

* * * * *

I wish that you really knew the President, and had heard the artless

expression of his convictions on these questions which concern you

so deeply. You might, perhaps, wish that he were less cautious, but

you would be grateful that he is so true to all that you have at

heart. Believe me, therefore, you are wrong, and I regret it the

more because of my desire to see all our friends stand firmly

together.[263]

The President requested and obtained, July 12, 1862, an interview with

the border State delegations. The near adjournment of Congress would

deprive him of an opportunity of seeing them for several months. He

believed they held more power for good than any other equal number of

members, and felt that the duty of making an appeal to them could not be

waived. This he did by reading a carefully prepared paper.

The Confederate States, he said, would cling to the hope of an ultimate

union with the border States as long as they perpetuated the institution

of slavery. If the members had supported his plan of gradual

emancipation in the preceding March the rebellion would now, 1862, be

substantially ended.

Looking to the stern facts in the case he inquired whether they could do

better for their States than to follow the course which he urged. If the

war continued long, the institution “will be extinguished by mere

friction and abrasion,”—by the incidents of war much of its value was

already gone. He did not speak of immediate emancipation, “but of a

decision at once to emancipate gradually.” Room for colonization could

be procured in South America ample and cheap enough. When their numbers

increased sufficiently to be company for one another the freed people

would not be so reluctant to go. His repudiation of General Hunter’s

proclamation had given offence to some whose support the Government

could not afford to lose. The pressure from such persons was still upon

him and the Congressmen from the border slave States could relieve him

and the country. He begged them to reexamine his message of March 6, and

commend it to the consideration of their constituents. The peril of

their common country demanded the loftiest views and the boldest action

if they desired to perpetuate popular government.[264]

It was represented to him, in a conversation which followed this appeal,

that the resolution of Congress, being no more than an expression of

sentiment, could not be regarded by them as a basis for substantial

action. Mr. Lincoln admitted that, as a condition of taking into

consideration a proposition so nearly affecting their social system, the

border slave States were entitled to expect a substantial pledge of

pecuniary aid.

It was further represented at this conference that the people of the

border States were interested in knowing the great importance which Mr.

Lincoln attached to the policy in question, while it was equally due to

the country, to the President and to themselves that they should

publicly announce the motives under which they were called to act, and

the considerations of public policy urged upon them and their

constituents. With a view to such a statement of their position the

members met in council to deliberate on the reply they should make, and

two days later the majority sent the following paper to the President:

“The undersigned ... have listened to your address with the profound

sensibility naturally inspired by the high source from which it

emanates, the earnestness which marked its delivery, and the

overwhelming importance of the subject of which it treats. We have given

it our most respectful consideration, and now lay before you our

response....

“... Repudiating the dangerous heresies of the secessionists, we

believed, with you, that the war on their part is aggressive and wicked,

and the objects for which it was to be prosecuted on ours, defined by

your message at the opening of the present Congress, to be such as all

good men should approve. We have not hesitated to vote all supplies

necessary to carry it on vigorously....”

This support, continues the response, was yielded “in the face of

measures most distasteful to us and injurious to the interests we

represent, and in the hearing of doctrines, avowed by those who claim to

be your friends, [which] must be abhorrent to us and our constituents.”

The greater number of them did not, however, vote for the measure

recommended in his message of March 6, and they proceeded to state the

principal reasons which influenced their action. First, it proposed a

radical change in their social system; it was hurried through both

Houses with undue haste; and was passed without any opportunity whatever

for consultation with their constituents, whose interests it deeply

involved. “It seemed,” said the majority, “like an interference by this

Government with a question which peculiarly and exclusively belonged to

our respective States, on which they had not sought advice or solicited

aid. Many of us doubted the constitutional power of this Government to

make appropriations of money for the object designated, and all of us

thought our finances were in no condition to bear the immense outlay

which its adoption and faithful execution would impose upon the national

Treasury. If we pause but a moment to think of the debt its acceptance

would have entailed, we are appalled by its magnitude. The proposition

was addressed to all the States and embraced the whole number of

slaves.”

The census of 1860 showed a slave population of nearly 4,000,000; from

natural increase the number in 1862 exceeded that. “At even the low

average of $300, the price fixed by the emancipation act for the slaves

of this District, and greatly below their real worth, their value runs

up to the enormous sum of $1,200,000,000; and if to that we add the cost

of deportation and colonization, at $100 each, which is but a fraction

more than is actually paid by the Maryland Colonization Society, we have

$400,000,000 more. They were not willing nor could the country bear a

tax sufficient to pay the interest on that sum in addition to the vast

and daily increasing debt already fixed upon them by the exigencies of

the war. The proposition is nothing less than the deportation from the

country of $1,600,000,000 worth of producing labor and the substitution

of an interest-bearing debt of the same amount. Even if it were expected

that only the border States would accept the proposition, that involved

a sum too great for the financial ability of the Government at this

time. The total number of slaves in those States according to the late

census was 1,196,112. The same rate of valuation with expenses of

deportation and colonization gives the enormous sum of $478,038,133.

“We did not feel that we should be justified in voting for a measure

which, if carried out, would add this vast amount to our public debt at

a moment when the Treasury was reeling under the enormous expenditure of

the war.”

To them the resolution seemed no more than the enunciation of a

sentiment. “No movement was then made to provide and appropriate the

funds required to carry it into effect; and we were not encouraged to

believe that funds would be provided. And our belief has been fully

justified by subsequent events. Not to mention other circumstances, it

is quite sufficient for our purpose to bring to your notice the fact

that, while this resolution was under consideration in the Senate our

colleague, the Senator from Kentucky, moved an amendment appropriating

$500,000 to the object therein designated, and it was voted down with

great unanimity. What confidence, then, could we reasonably feel that if

we committed ourselves to the policy it proposed, our constituents would

reap the fruits of the promise held out; and on what ground could we, as

fair men, approach them and challenge their support?”

They denied that if, as the President alleged, they had supported the

resolution of March 6, the war would be substantially ended, and they

added, “The resolution has passed and if there be virtue in it, it will

be quite as efficacious as if we had voted for it.”

The war, they asserted, was prolonged not by reason of their conduct,

but because of the union of all classes in the South. Those who wished

to break down national independence and set up State domination, the

State-rights party, could not be reconciled; but the large class who

believed their domestic interests had been assailed by the Government

might be if only they were convinced “that no harm is intended to them

and their institutions,” but that the Government was simply defending

its legitimate authority.

“Twelve months ago,” adds this response, “both Houses of Congress,

adopting the spirit of your message, then but recently sent in, declared

with singular unanimity the objects of the war, and the country

instantly bounded to your side to assist you in carrying it on. If the

spirit of that resolution had been adhered to, we are confident that we

should before now have seen the end of this deplorable conflict. But

what have we seen?

“In both Houses of Congress we have heard doctrines subversive of the

principles of the Constitution, and seen measure after measure founded

in substance on those doctrines proposed and carried through which can

have no other effect than to distract and divide loyal men, and

exasperate and drive still further from us and their duty the people of

the rebellious States. Military officers, following these bad examples,

have stepped beyond the just limits of their authority in the same

direction, until in several instances you have felt the necessity of

interfering to arrest them.... The effect of these measures was

foretold, and may now be seen in the indurated state of Southern

feeling.”

To these causes, and not to the failure of the border delegations to

support the measure, they attributed the terrible earnestness of those

in arms against the Government. Nor was the institution of slavery the

source of insurgent strength, but rather the apprehension that the

powers of a common Government would be wielded against the institutions

of the Southern States.

The reply concludes: “If Congress, by proper and necessary legislation,

shall provide sufficient funds and place them at your disposal, to be

applied by you to the payment of any of our States or the citizens

thereof who shall adopt the abolishment of slavery, either gradual or

immediate, as they may determine, and the expense of deportation and

colonization of the liberated slaves, then will our State[s] and people

take this proposition into careful consideration, for such decision as

in their judgment is demanded by their interest, their honor, and their

duty to the whole country.”[265]

The minority, seven in number, in their reply of the 15th declared

themselves ready to make any sacrifice to save the Government and the

institutions of their fathers, and promised to ask the people of their

States calmly, deliberately and fairly to consider the recommendations

of the President; they were encouraged to assume this position because

the leaders of the rebellion had offered to abolish slavery among them

as a condition of foreign intervention in favor of their independence as

a nation.[266]

Horace Maynard, though not representing a border State proper, expressed

his approval of the President’s policy and stated the physical

impossibility of submitting to the consideration of his people that or

any other proposition until Tennessee had first been freed from hostile

arms.[267]

A fourth paper submitted to the President was that of Senator J. B.

Henderson, of Missouri, who had cheerfully supported the measure at the

time of its introduction; he believed the proposition would have

received the approbation of a large majority of the border State

delegations if they could have foreseen that the war would have been

protracted a twelvemonth and had felt assured that the dominant party in

Congress would, like the President, be as prompt in practical action as

they had been in the expression of a sentiment. “In this period of the

nation’s distress,” says Senator Henderson, “I know of no human

institution too sacred for discussion; no material interest belonging to

the citizen that he should not willingly place upon the altar of his

country, if demanded by the public good.”[268]

Mr. Henderson did not agree with the opinion of the President that “the

war would now be substantially ended” had the members from the border

States supported the measure in the preceding March. Personally he was

favorable to the proposition, but remembered that he was the servant not

the master of the people of Missouri.

To the sudden and unexpected collapse of McClellan’s Richmond campaign

has been ascribed the determination of President Lincoln to adopt

general military emancipation so much sooner than he otherwise would

have done. The great and decisive element of military strength in the

slave population which he saw so clearly a little later could not even

then, June and July, 1862, have been altogether concealed from his keen

insight into affairs. His personal appeal to the border Congressmen was

made July 12; the result of that conference he easily anticipated. Nor

was the receipt of their written replies necessary to inform him that

his offer would be rejected. So much he could readily collect from their

oral objections and verbal criticisms. The decision to give notice of

his intention to issue a proclamation concerning slavery was probably

made within a few hours after he had assured Mr. Crisfield that the

emancipation policy extended no farther than to a refusal of the border

States to accept his tender of pecuniary aid to any commonwealth

voluntarily adopting the plan of gradual abolishment. However this may

be, he confided on the following day, July 13, 1862, to Secretaries

Seward and Welles his intention to emancipate slaves by proclamation if

their masters did not cease to make war on the Government. From the

diary of the latter, we learn under what circumstances this important

communication was made.

President Lincoln [writes Mr. Welles] invited me to accompany him in

his carriage to the funeral of an infant child of Mr. Stanton.

Secretary Seward and Mrs. Frederick Seward were also in the

carriage. Mr. Stanton occupied at that time, for a summer residence,

the house of a naval officer, some two or three miles west or

northwesterly of Georgetown. It was on this occasion and on this

ride that he first mentioned to Mr. Seward and myself the subject of

emancipating the slaves by proclamation in case the rebels did not

cease to persist in their war on the Government and the Union, of

which he saw no evidence. He dwelt earnestly on the gravity,

importance, and delicacy of the movement; said he had given it much

thought, and had about come to the conclusion that it was a military

necessity, absolutely essential for the salvation of the nation,

that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued, etc., etc.

This was, he said, the first occasion where he had mentioned the

subject to any one, and wished us to frankly state how the

proposition struck us. Mr. Seward said the subject involved

consequences so vast and momentous that he should wish to bestow on

it mature reflection before giving a decisive answer; but his

present opinion inclined to the measure as justifiable, and perhaps

he might say expedient and necessary. These were also my views. Two

or three times on that ride the subject, which was of course an

absorbing one for each and all, was adverted to, and before

separating, the President desired us to give the subject special and

deliberate attention, for he was earnest in the conviction that

something must be done. It was a new departure for the President,

for until this time, in all our previous interviews, whenever the

question of emancipation or the mitigation of slavery had been in

any way alluded to, he had been prompt and emphatic in denouncing

any interference by the General Government with the subject. This

was, I think, the sentiment of every member of the Cabinet, all of

whom, including the President, considered it a local domestic

question appertaining to the States respectively, who had never

parted with their authority over it. But the reverses before

Richmond, and the formidable power and dimensions of the

insurrection, which extended through all the slave States and had

combined most of them in a confederacy to destroy the Union,

impelled the Administration to adopt extraordinary measures to

preserve the national existence. The slaves, if not armed and

disciplined, were in the service of those who were, not only as

field laborers and producers, but thousands of them were in

attendance upon the armies in the field, employed as waiters and

teamsters, and the fortifications and intrenchments were constructed

by them.[269]

The session of Congress was drawing to a close, but before adjournment

the Confiscation Act, passed July 17, 1862, was approved by the

President. This with kindred laws increased the number of forfeitures of

title to slaves for the crimes of treason and rebellion. These penalties

were by him considered just and their imposition constitutional.

Within five days after the adjournment of Congress the President, July

21, 1862, reached his final conclusions on the subject of emancipation.

The diary of Secretary Chase contains the following record:

[Having received notice of a Cabinet meeting, Mr. Chase says:] I

went to the President’s at the appointed hour and found that he was

profoundly concerned at the present aspect of affairs, and had

determined to take some definite steps in respect to military action

and slavery. He had prepared several orders, the first of which

contemplated authority to commanders to subsist their troops in the

hostile territory; the second, authority to employ negroes as

laborers; the third, requiring that both in case of property taken

and negroes employed, accounts should be kept with such degree of

certainty as would enable compensation to be made in proper cases.

Another provided for the colonization of negroes in some tropical

country.

A good deal of discussion took place upon these points. The first

order was unanimously approved. The second was also unanimously

approved; and the third by all except myself. I doubted the

expediency of attempting to keep accounts for the benefit of

inhabitants of rebel States. The colonization project was not much

discussed.

The Secretary of War presented some letters from General Hunter, in

which General Hunter advised the Department that the withdrawal of a

large proportion of his troops to reënforce General McClellan

rendered it highly important that he should be immediately

authorized to enlist all loyal persons without reference to

complexion. Mr. Stanton, Mr. Seward, and myself expressed ourselves

in favor of this plan, and no one expressed himself against it. Mr.

Blair was not present. The President was not prepared to decide the

question, but expressed himself as averse to arming negroes.[270]

This Cabinet meeting came to no final conclusion, and, as we learn from

the same source, the discussion was resumed on the following day, July

22, when the question of arming the slaves was brought up.

I advocated it warmly [writes Secretary Chase].[271] The President

was unwilling to adopt this measure, but proposed to issue a

proclamation on the basis of the Confiscation Bill, calling upon the

States to return to their allegiance—warning rebels that the

provisions of the act would have full force at the expiration of

sixty days—adding, on his own part, a declaration of his intention

to renew, at the next session of Congress, his recommendation of

compensation to States adopting gradual abolishment of slavery—and

proclaiming the emancipation of all slaves within States remaining

in insurrection on the first day of January, 1863.[272]

Mr. Chase promised the measure his cordial support, but preferred that

no new expression on the subject of compensation be made at that time.

Secretary Chase, in the diary mentioned, says: “The impression left upon

my mind by the whole discussion was, that, while the President thought

that the organization, equipment, and arming of negroes, like other

soldiers, would be productive of more evil than good, he was not

unwilling that commanders should, at their discretion, arm for purely

defensive purposes, slaves coming within their lines.”[273] On the

kindred policy of emancipation, however, the President had reached a

definite conclusion which was in advance of the opinions entertained by

even the most radical members of his Cabinet. When, therefore, he read

to them, on July 22, his draft of an emancipation proclamation they were

for the most part taken completely by surprise. This momentous document

deserves to be reproduced entire.

In pursuance of the sixth section of the act of Congress entitled

“An act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and

rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other

purposes,” approved July 17, 1862, and which act and the joint

resolution explanatory thereof are herewith published, I, Abraham

Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim to and

warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth section to

cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the

existing rebellion, or any rebellion, against the Government of the

United States, and to return to their proper allegiance to the

United States, on pain of the forfeitures and seizures as within and

by said sixth section provided.

And I hereby make known that it is my purpose, upon the next meeting

of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure

for tendering pecuniary aid to the free choice or rejection of any

and all States which may then be recognizing and practically

sustaining the authority of the United States, and which may then

have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt,

gradual abolishment of slavery within such State or States; that the

object is to practically restore, thenceforward to be maintained,

the constitutional relation between the General Government and each

and all the States wherein that relation is now suspended or

disturbed; and that for this object the war, as it has been, will be

prosecuted. And as a fit and necessary military measure for

effecting this object, I as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy

of the United States, do order and declare that on the first day of

January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and

sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or States

wherein the constitutional authority of the United States shall not

then be practically recognized, submitted to, and maintained, shall

then, thenceforward, and forever be free.[274]

The diary of Secretary Chase, as well as the President’s endorsement on

his draft, shows the emancipation proclamation to have been read to the

Cabinet July 22, 1862. Various suggestions were offered; but except an

objection of Secretary Seward they had all been fully anticipated by Mr.

Lincoln and settled in his own mind. Secretary Seward said: “Mr.

President, I approve of the proclamation, but I question the expediency

of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the public mind,

consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the

effect of so important a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of

an exhausted Government, a cry for help; the Government stretching forth

its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to

the Government.”

Speaking afterwards of this incident, Mr. Lincoln said: “Seward’s idea

was ‘that it would be considered our last _shriek_ on the retreat. Now,’

added Mr. Seward, ‘while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, that you

postpone its issue, until you can give it to the country supported by

military success, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, upon

the greatest disasters of the war!’ The wisdom of this view,” said Mr.

Lincoln in recalling the occasion, “struck me with very great force. It

was an aspect of the case that, in all my thought upon the subject, I

had entirely overlooked. The result was that I put the draft of the

proclamation aside, as you do your sketch for a picture, waiting for a

victory.”[275]

Instead of the proclamation so carefully discussed, a short one was

published three days later, of which the most important part is as

follows:

In pursuance of the sixth section of the act of Congress entitled

“An act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and

rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for

other purposes,” approved July 17, 1862, and which act, and the

joint resolution explanatory thereof, are herewith published, I,

Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim

to and warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth

section to cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or

abetting the existing rebellion, or any rebellion, against the

Government of the United States, and to return to their proper

allegiance to the United States, on pain of the forfeitures and

seizures as within and by said sixth section provided.[276]

This warning was required by the sixth section of the act mentioned.

During the following month President Lincoln waited patiently for

tidings of some unquestioned success that would justify the publication

of his proclamation, but when instead he received in the closing days of

August intelligence of the second disaster at Manassas his anxiety must

have become intense. This victory, together with the succession of

others recently attending Confederate arms, encouraged General Lee’s

invasion of Maryland. An army, notwithstanding its late reverses, still

formidable in numbers and once more thoroughly reorganized marched

leisurely from the vicinity of Washington to locate and destroy him.

When, where or how the battle-cloud would break was uncertain. All eyes

were turned on McClellan, again in command of the Union forces and

strengthened by every soldier that could be spared from the defences of

the Federal capital. It was in this state of suspense, and on the very

day, September 13, that Lee’s victorious legions entered Frederick City

that the President gave audience to a deputation from the religious

denominations of Chicago, presenting a memorial for the immediate issue

of an emancipation proclamation, which was enforced by some remarks from

the chairman. The President replied that he had for weeks past, even for

months, thought much upon the subject of their memorial.

“I am approached,” said he, “with the most opposite opinions and advice,

and that by religious men, who are equally certain that they represent

the Divine will. I am sure that either the one or the other class is

mistaken in that belief, and perhaps, in some respect, both. I hope it

will not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God

would reveal His will to others, on a point so connected with my duty,

it might be supposed He would reveal it directly to me; for, unless I am

more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know

the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is I

will do it! These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose

it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must

study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible,

and learn what appears to be wise and right.”

The difficulties of the subject and the impossibility of even

anti-slavery men, in or out of Congress, agreeing upon any measure of

emancipation were then referred to. However, he would discuss the merits

of the case and asked pointedly:

“What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do, especially

as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole

world will see must necessarily be inoperative.... Would my word free

the slaves, when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the rebel

States? Is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual that would

be influenced by it there?”

He admitted to his visitors, however, that he raised no objections to

such a proclamation as they desired on legal or on constitutional

grounds; for, continued he, “as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy,

in time of war I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may

best subdue the enemy, nor do I urge objections of a moral nature, in

view of possible consequences of insurrection and massacre at the South.

I view this matter as a practical war measure, to be decided on

according to the advantages or disadvantages it may offer to the

suppression of the rebellion.”

The committee replied, and the President added, “I admit that slavery is

at the root of the rebellion.... I will also concede that emancipation

would help us in Europe, and convince them that we are incited by

something more than ambition. I grant, further, that it would help

somewhat at the North, though not so much, I fear, as you and those you

represent imagine.... Unquestionably, it would weaken the rebels by

drawing off their laborers, which is of great importance; but I am not

so sure we could do much with the blacks.”[277] The President, too,

called attention to the fact that the border slave States had 50,000

bayonets in the Union army. It would be a serious matter if in

consequence of such a proclamation they should go over to the South. In

conclusion he said that he had not decided against a proclamation of

liberty to the slaves, but held the matter under advisement and assured

them that the subject was on his mind by day and by night more than any

other.

It was currently reported among anti-slavery men in Illinois that the

emancipation proclamation was extorted from the President by the

pressure of such delegations as this from the Christian Convention.[278]

To determine how little foundation there is for this opinion it is only

necessary to recall what had occurred in the Cabinet on July 22

preceding.

The repulse of Lee’s veterans at Antietam, September 17, 1862, raised

somewhat the hopes of the President. On the 19th General McClellan

telegraphed an account of his victory, and Mr. Lincoln three days later

announced his intention to issue the postponed proclamation.

All the Cabinet members, having been summoned by messenger from the

State Department, were in attendance at the White House on September 22,

1862. After some talk of a general nature, and the reading by Mr.

Lincoln of a humorous chapter from a book by Artemus Ward, the

conversation assumed a more serious tone. What subsequently transpired

on that eventful occasion we learn from the following record in the

diary of Secretary Chase:

“Gentlemen, [said the President] I have, as you are aware, thought a

great deal about the relation of this war to slavery, and you all

remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had

prepared upon the subject, which, on account of objections made by

some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind has been much

occupied with this subject, and I have thought all along that the

time for acting on it might probably come. I think the time has come

now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we were in a better

condition. The action of the army against the rebels has not been

quite what I should have best liked. But they have been driven out

of Maryland, and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion.

When the rebel army was at Frederick I determined, as soon as it

should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a proclamation of

emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said

nothing to any one, but I made a promise to myself and [hesitating a

little] to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am

going to fulfill that promise. I have got you together to hear what

I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main

matter, for that I have determined for myself. This I say without

intending anything but respect for any one of you. But I already

know the views of each on this question. They have been heretofore

expressed, and I have considered them as thoroughly and as carefully

as I can. What I have written is that which my reflections have

determined me to say. If there is anything in the expressions I use

or in any minor matter which any one of you thinks had best be

changed, I shall be glad to receive your suggestions. One other

observation I will make. I know very well that many others might, in

this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if I was

satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any

one of them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which

he could be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield

it to him. But though I believe that I have not so much of the

confidence of the people as I had some time since, I do not know

that, all things considered, any other person has more; and, however

this may be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put

where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can, and bear the

responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take.”

The President then proceeded to read his Emancipation Proclamation,

making remarks on the several parts as he went on, and showing that

he had fully considered the subject in all the lights under which it

had been presented to him.

After he had closed, Governor Seward said: “The general question

having been decided, nothing can be said further about that. Would

it not, however, make the proclamation more clear and decided to

leave out all reference to the act being sustained during the

incumbency of the present President; and not merely say that the

Government _recognises_, but that it will maintain the freedom it

proclaims?”

I followed, saying: “What you have said, Mr. President, fully

satisfies me that you have given to every proposition which has been

made a kind and candid consideration. And you have now expressed the

conclusion to which you have arrived clearly and distinctly. This it

was your right, and, under your oath of office, your duty to do. The

proclamation does not, indeed, mark out the course I would myself

prefer; but I am ready to take it just as it is written and to stand

by it with all my heart. I think, however, the suggestions of

Governor Seward very judicious, and shall be glad to have them

adopted.”

The President then asked us severally our opinions as to the

modifications proposed, saying that he did not care much about the

phrases he had used. Every one favored the modification, and it was

adopted. Governor Seward then proposed that in the passage relating

to colonization some language should be introduced to show that the

colonization proposed was to be only with the consent of the

colonists, and the consent of the states in which the colonies might

be attempted. This, too, was agreed to, and no other modification

was proposed. Mr. Blair then said that the question having been

decided, he would make no objection to issuing the proclamation; but

he would ask to have his paper, presented some days since, against

the policy, filed with the proclamation. The President consented to

this readily. And then Mr. Blair went on to say that he was afraid

of the influence of the proclamation on the border States and on the

army, and stated, at some length, the grounds of his apprehensions.

He disclaimed most expressly, however, all objections to

emancipation _per se_, saying he had always been personally in favor

of it—always ready for immediate emancipation in the midst of slave

States, rather than submit to the perpetuation of the system.[279]

The foregoing account from the diary of Secretary Chase is fully

corroborated by a narrative of Mr. Welles describing the same

event.[280] Mr. Blair, as already observed, believed the time

inopportune for issuing the proclamation and feared as a result that the

border States would go over to secession. The President, however,

thought the difficulty not to act as great as to act. There were two

sides, he said, to that question. For months he had labored to get those

States to move in this matter, convinced in his own mind that it was

their true interest to do so, but his labors were vain. “We must take

the forward movement,” he declared. “They would acquiesce, if not

immediately, soon; for they must be satisfied that slavery had received

its death-blow from slave-owners—it could not survive the

rebellion.”[281]

When the Cabinet had concluded its deliberations the document was duly

attested, the seal affixed and the President’s signature added. On the

following morning, September 23, 1862, the proclamation was published in

full by all the leading newspapers of the loyal States, where it excited

the most profound surprise. Indicating, as it does, the progress of

opinion, it was the first great landmark of the war; behind it lay the

old, before it the new order of things. The successive steps by which

Mr. Lincoln reached this position have been sketched in the present

chapter with fullness and, it is believed, with accuracy. It has been

shown how fugitive slaves escaping to the Federal lines were at first

surrendered to their masters; how soon afterward, as in the case of

General Butler’s command, they were protected by the army and employed

as laborers; how in a later stage, certain Union commanders who proposed

to confiscate slave property or to arm negroes as soldiers were gently

rebuked and their acts disavowed by the President. This forbearance,

however, was without effect on the Southern people, whose hatred was

quite as likely to ascribe it to Yankee cowardice as to Yankee

magnanimity.

With this account of the introduction into the problem of reconstruction

of a novel and very perplexing element we are prepared to examine the

various theories of State status held by those whose position and

ability made them leaders of public opinion. That subject will be more

properly discussed in a separate chapter.

-----

Footnote 213:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 209.

Footnote 214:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 1.

Footnote 215:

Addresses and Papers of Edward L. Pierce, pp. 20–25.

Footnote 216:

Addresses and Papers of E. L. Pierce, p. 26.

Footnote 217:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist. p. 244.

Footnote 218:

Ibid.

Footnote 219:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 244.

Footnote 220:

Ibid., p. 245.

Footnote 221:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 235n.

Footnote 222:

Addresses and Papers of E. L. Pierce, p. 29.

Footnote 223:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 245.

Footnote 224:

Appendix, Globe, 1 Sess. 37th Cong., p. 42.

Footnote 225:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 245.

Footnote 226:

Ibid., pp. 245–246.

Footnote 227:

General Anderson had telegraphed President Lincoln that an entire

company of Kentucky soldiers had laid down their arms upon hearing of

Fremont’s action.

Footnote 228:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 77.

Footnote 229:

Ibid., pp. 78–79.

Footnote 230:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., pp. 247–248.

Footnote 231:

Ibid., p. 248.

Footnote 232:

N. Y. Tribune, November 8, 1861.

Footnote 233:

Letters and State Papers of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 90.

Footnote 234:

Ibid.

Footnote 235:

Ann. Cycl., 1861, p. 646.

Footnote 236:

First Annual Message, December 3, 1861. McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p.

134; Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 102–103.

Footnote 237:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 249.

Footnote 238:

Letters and State Papers of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 91.

Footnote 239:

See “Journal of the Senate of the State of Delaware, At a Special

Session of the General Assembly, Commenced and held at Dover, on

Monday, the 25th day of November, 1861.”

Footnote 240:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 250.

Footnote 241:

Ibid., p. 248.

Footnote 242:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 250.

Footnote 243:

Ibid.

Footnote 244:

Ibid., p. 251.

Footnote 245:

Addresses and Papers of E. L. Pierce, p. 87; also Letters and State

Papers of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 126.

Footnote 246:

Letters and State Papers of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 129.

Footnote 247:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 129–130.

Footnote 248:

Ann. Cycl., 1862, pp. 799–800.

Footnote 249:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 132.

Footnote 250:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 210.

Footnote 251:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 133–135; also

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., pp. 210–211.

Footnote 252:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 137–138.

Footnote 253:

Ann. Cycl., 1862, pp. 346–347.

Footnote 254:

Globe, Part II., 2 Sess. 37th Cong., p. 1496.

Footnote 255:

See p. 143, _ante_.

Footnote 256:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., pp. 226–227.

Footnote 257:

The question of colonizing free blacks out of the United States

engaged the attention of Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe, who had

some correspondence on the subject at the beginning of the nineteenth

century. Late in the year 1816 there was organized in the city of

Washington the “National Colonization Society,” of which the expressed

purpose was to encourage emancipation by procuring a place outside the

United States, preferably in Africa, to which free negroes could be

aided in emigrating. This, it was believed, would rid the South of its

free colored population which had already become a nuisance. Until

1830 it was warmly supported everywhere, and branches of the society

were established in nearly every State. In the South its purposes were

furthered by James Madison, by Charles Carroll and by Henry Clay.

Bushrod Washington became president of the association. Rufus King and

President Harrison were among its friends in the North.

Though Texas and Mexico were looked upon as favorable places for

locating a colony of free blacks, they were sent to the British

possession of Sierra Leone. In 1821 a permanent location was purchased

in Liberia. This settlement, with Monrovia as its capital, became

independent in 1847. The American Colonization Society attracted

little notice after the rise, about 1829–30, of those known as

immediate abolitionists.

Footnote 258:

Letters and State Papers of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 155.

Footnote 259:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 251.

Footnote 260:

Ibid., p. 252.

Footnote 261:

Globe, Part III., 2 Sess. 37th Cong., p. 2068.

Footnote 262:

Ibid., p. 2618. Ibid., p. 2769.

Footnote 263:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 233.

Footnote 264:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. pp. 204–205.

Footnote 265:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., pp. 214–217.

Footnote 266:

Ibid., pp. 217–218.

Footnote 267:

Ibid., p. 218.

Footnote 268:

Ibid., pp. 218–220.

Footnote 269:

Quoted in Nicolay and Hay’s Abraham Lincoln, A History. Vol. VI. p.

121 _et seq._

Footnote 270:

Schuckers’ Life of Salmon Portland Chase, pp. 439–440.

Footnote 271:

Ibid., p. 440.

Footnote 272:

Shuckers’ Life of Chase, pp. 440–441.

Footnote 273:

Ibid., p. 441.

Footnote 274:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 213.

Footnote 275:

Carpenter’s Six Months at the White House, pp. 21–22.

Footnote 276:

Letters and State Papers of Lincoln, Vol. II. p. 214.

Footnote 277:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., pp. 231–232.

Footnote 278:

McPherson’s Pol. Hist., p. 233.

Footnote 279:

Quoted in Schuckers’ Life of Chase, pp. 453–455.

Footnote 280:

The Galaxy, December, 1872, pp. 846–847.

Footnote 281:

Ibid., p. 847.

VI

THEORIES AND PLANS OF RECONSTRUCTION

In considering the different plans of reconstruction it is not deemed

necessary to discuss further than has been done in the preceding pages

the President’s theory of State status. There, in his effort to

establish loyal governments in three of the rebellious States, as well

as in the protection and encouragement extended to reorganized Virginia,

we have seen practical applications of that theory. In his first

inaugural Mr. Lincoln said: “It is safe to assert that no government

proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination,”

and on the same occasion he added, “No State, upon its own mere motion,

can lawfully get out of the Union; that _resolves_ and _ordinances_ to

that effect are legally void.”[282] From the principles of March 4,

1861, was logically deduced the central idea of the plan announced in

December, 1863, and maintained by the President till the last hour of

his life. In his first message to Congress, submitted at the special

session beginning July 4, 1861, he again attempted to remove the fears

of those whose prejudice ascribed to the dominant political party a

purpose to interfere in the domestic concerns of the slaveholding

States. As will be seen by the following quotation he little more than

reiterated on that occasion what he had solemnly declared four months

earlier:

Lest there be some uneasiness in the minds of candid men as to what

is to be the course of the Government towards the Southern States

_after_ the rebellion shall have been suppressed, the Executive

deems it proper to say, it will be his purpose then, as ever, to be

guided by the Constitution and the laws; and that he probably will

have no different understanding of the powers and duties of the

Federal Government relatively to the rights of the States and the

people, under the Constitution, than that expressed in the inaugural

address.

He desires to preserve the Government, that it may be administered

for all, as it was administered by the men who made it. Loyal

citizens everywhere have the right to claim this of their

Government, and the Government has no right to withhold or neglect

it. It is not perceived that, in giving it, there is any coercion,

any conquest, or any subjugation, in any just sense of those

terms.[283]

The first paragraph quoted expresses his perfect confidence in a

successful conclusion of the war, and in this respect suggests the faith

of Charles Sumner, in whose private correspondence the same thought

constantly occurs. In his message the President observed also that

Virginia had allowed “this giant insurrection to make its nest within

her borders; and this Government has no choice left but to deal with it

_where_ it finds it. And it has the less regret, as the loyal citizens

have, in due form, claimed its protection. Those loyal citizens this

Government is bound to recognize, and protect, as being Virginia.”[284]

As early as June, 1861, Mr. Lincoln, on application of Governor

Pierpont, recognized the restored State of Virginia by promising

assistance to repel invasion and to suppress domestic violence; his

example was followed by both Houses of Congress: first, in the prompt

admission of Senators and Representatives from that Commonwealth, and

long afterward, when there was ample time for reflection, by consenting

to admit the new State of West Virginia, to whose separate and

independent existence the reorganized Legislature had formally assented.

The recognition of Pierpont’s government, however, involved on the

constitutional question little difference of opinion between the

President and Congress. Thus far the political departments, if not in

complete harmony, were at any rate not in conflict. This act, though it

marked no distinct Executive policy, was the occasion of some discordant

notes which will be referred to in their proper relation.

It may not be unnecessary to observe that underlying the early policy of

the President was a conviction that the rebellion was effected by a

small but treasonable faction; indeed, in the message of July 4 he

expressed his belief that, with the probable exception of South

Carolina, the disloyal were in a minority in all the seceding States.

The great mass of Southern people, it was assumed, opposed disunion, and

with Federal assistance would soon right themselves. Peaceful citizens

of that section, being regarded as still under protection of the

Constitution, were, therefore, not to be molested. The conflict waged by

the General Government was a personal war against insurgents. Leaders

who encouraged sedition and committed acts of hostility against the

United States could be tried precisely as in a consolidated state like

Great Britain, and upon conviction punished for their treason. This

attitude was not only wise, but had the additional merit of greatly

simplifying the method of restoration. It asserted further that the

rebellious States were still in the Union, and under the existing

compact could not lawfully withdraw from it; being in the Union, they

were entitled to all the rights accorded to other members of the

confederation. In brief, its essential idea was the indestructibility of

a State, and it denied that the integrity of the national domain had

been impaired or the number of States diminished by the ordinances of

secession. The General Government could properly aid the people of a

State to express their will, but, beyond what was demanded by the

exigencies of the war, could not legally exercise those powers

constitutionally reserved to the States. By the treasonable act of

levying war against the Republic the rights and franchises incident to

United States citizenship were forfeited. The power of Congress extended

no further than to a guaranty of preëxisting republican forms of

government.

To the correctness of these principles Democrats and Republicans alike

gave almost universal assent. But the war was increasing in magnitude,

and the measures adequate to the suppression of a gigantic rebellion

proved to be very different from those adapted to a local insurrection.

The President’s original intention was to overcome armed resistance to

Federal power and as speedily as possible restore the States to their

former relations. This task, however, was more easily conceived than

accomplished, and in the terrible conflict that ensued political parties

as well as individual statesmen were swept onward from point to point to

very different resting-places. From this condition resulted the great

number of theories of reconstruction presented before the end of the

rebellion.

The President early in the war adopted principles that found little

favor with conservative Democrats. His readiness to recognize the

restored State of Virginia was equivalent to a declaration that if a

majority of the people in one of the seceded States voluntarily

transferred their obedience and support to a hostile power the loyal

minority constituted the State and should govern it. In this connection

will be remembered the objections of Bayard and Saulsbury to receiving

Senators Willey and Carlile from the reorganized government of Virginia.

A further advance is indicated by Mr. Lincoln’s appointment, early in

1862, of military governors for those States that had been brought

partly within Federal military lines. After the proclamation of

September 22, 1862, and that of January 1 succeeding, the question of

restoration was left permanently out of view. If the erring States were

ever to resume their places they must first recognize the anti-slavery

legislation summarized in the preceding chapter. Hitherto the paramount

consideration with the President was a speedy restoration of former

relations; thenceforth “the Union as it was” became impossible, because

slaves liberated in the progress of the war could never be returned to a

condition of servitude. The introduction of this element greatly

increased the difficulties of a problem already sufficiently intricate.

But neither this nor any other consequence of his proclamation appears

to have been overlooked by the Executive.

The message of December 8, 1863, together with the accompanying

proclamation sketched in outline the only plan which Mr. Lincoln ever

published on the subject of reconstruction, and even to this mode of

reinstatement he did not require exact conformity, recognizing that its

modification might be demanded by inherent differences in situation

among the returning States. By its terms all persons participated in the

rebellion, except certain described classes, were promised amnesty with

restoration of property (excluding slaves and those cases of property in

which rights of third parties intervened) upon taking an oath which

pledged support of the Constitution and the Union; of the slavery

legislation enacted during the war (unless such acts were repealed by

Congress, or were modified or annulled by the Supreme Court), and

adherence to all Executive proclamations on that subject so long and so

far as not modified or declared void by the Judiciary. Whenever in any

of the rebellious States a number of persons equal to one tenth of the

voters participating in the Presidential election of 1860, who were

qualified electors under the laws existing immediately before the

ordinance of secession, should reëstablish a State government republican

in form, and not contravening this oath, it would be recognized as the

true government of that State and should receive the benefits of the

constitutional guaranty. To the emancipated race renewed assurance of

permanent freedom was given. It was also suggested that in

reorganization the political framework of the States be maintained. The

admission of members elected to Congress was a matter for the

determination of its respective Houses.

It is proper to notice in this method of reorganization, known afterward

as “the Louisiana Plan,” the absence of any provision for conferring on

the freedmen the elective franchise. In a private letter to Governor

Hahn the President had, it is true, expressed his personal preference

for including among the electors such of the colored race as had fought

gallantly in the Union ranks and also the very intelligent among

them[285]. This, however, was only an unofficial suggestion. Nor were

securities of any sort required for the future as a condition of

reinstatement.

Under this plan, which was presented as only a rallying point, Union

governments had been inaugurated in Tennessee, Louisiana and Arkansas;

the first two participated in the Presidential election of 1864, and

before the close of the war they had all elected members to Congress.

The legality of these governments Mr. Lincoln always maintained. How

Congress regarded them will be related in succeeding chapters.

Long before the announcement of any mode of reorganization by the

Executive, members of the Legislative branch of Government had made some

efforts in this field; these, however, were for the most part tentative

and hesitant. The question had not yet been brought fairly before

Congress; indeed, it was in discussing the results and tendencies of

Presidential reconstruction that the Congressional plan, destined

ultimately to prevail, slowly assumed definitive form.

As early as December, 1861, Mr. Harlan, of Iowa, introduced into the

Senate a bill for the establishment of provisional governments for the

territory embraced by the States of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi,

Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas and Tennessee. It was referred to the

Committee on Territories, but was never reported.

More important, however, than this proposed enactment, both because of

the acknowledged position of their author and the influence which they

exerted upon the mode of reconstruction finally adopted, were the nine

resolutions offered, February 11, 1862, by Charles Sumner. These were

“declaratory of the relations between the United States and the

territory once occupied by certain States, and now usurped by pretended

governments, without constitutional or legal right.” A preamble in the

characteristic style of this celebrated statesman introduced his famous

propositions, which were as follows:

Whereas certain States, rightfully belonging to the Union of the

United States, have through their respective governments wickedly

undertaken to abjure all those duties by which their connection with

the Union was maintained; to renounce all allegiance to the

Constitution; to levy war upon the national Government; and, for the

consummation of this treason, have unconstitutionally and unlawfully

confederated together, with the declared purpose of putting an end

by force to the supremacy of the Constitution within their

respective limits; and whereas this condition of insurrection,

organized by pretended governments, openly exists in South Carolina,

Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas,

Tennessee, and Virginia, except in Eastern Tennessee and Western

Virginia, and has been declared by the President of the United

States, in a proclamation duly made in conformity with an act of

Congress, to exist throughout this territory, with the exceptions

already named; and whereas the extensive territory thus usurped by

these pretended governments and organized into a hostile

confederation, belongs to the United States, as an inseparable part

thereof, under the sanctions of the Constitution, to be held in

trust for the inhabitants in the present and future generations, and

is so completely interlinked with the Union that it is forever

dependent thereupon; and whereas the Constitution, which is the

supreme law of the land, cannot be displaced in its rightful

operation within this territory, but must ever continue the supreme

law thereof, notwithstanding the doings of any pretended governments

acting singly or in confederation, in order to put an end to its

supremacy: Therefore:

1. _Resolved_, That any vote of secession or other act by which any

State may undertake to put an end to the supremacy of the

Constitution within its territory is inoperative and void against

the Constitution, and when sustained by force it becomes a practical

_abdication_ by the State of all rights under the Constitution,

while the treason which it involves still further works an instant

_forfeiture_ of all those functions and powers essential to the

continued existence of the State as a body politic, so that from

that time forward the territory falls under the exclusive

jurisdiction of Congress as other territory, and the State being,

according to the language of the law, _felo-de-se_, ceases to exist.

2. That any combination of men assuming to act in the place of such

State, attempting to insnare or coerce the inhabitants thereof into

a confederation hostile to the Union, is rebellious, treasonable,

and destitute of all moral authority; and that such combination is a

usurpation incapable of any constitutional existence and utterly

lawless, so that everything dependent upon it is without

constitutional or legal support.

3. That the termination of a State under the Constitution

necessarily causes the termination of those peculiar local

institutions which, having no origin in the Constitution or in those

natural rights which exist independent of the Constitution, are

upheld by the sole and exclusive authority of the State.

4. That slavery, being a peculiar local institution, derived from

local laws, without any origin in the Constitution or in natural

rights, is upheld by the sole and exclusive authority of the State,

and must therefore cease to exist legally or constitutionally when

the State on which it depends no longer exists; for the incident

cannot survive the principal.

5. That in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction over the

territory once occupied by the States, it is the duty of Congress to

see that the supremacy of the Constitution is maintained in its

essential principles, so that everywhere in this extensive territory

slavery shall cease to exist practically, as it has already ceased

to exist constitutionally or legally.

6. That any recognition of slavery in such territory, or any

surrender of slaves under the pretended laws of the extinct States

by any officer of the United States, civil or military, is a

recognition of the pretended governments, to the exclusion of the

jurisdiction of Congress under the Constitution, and is in the

nature of aid and comfort to the rebellion that has been organized.

7. That any such recognition of slavery or surrender of pretended

slaves, besides being a recognition of the pretended governments,

giving them aid and comfort, is a denial of the rights of persons

who, by the extinction of the States, have become free, so that,

under the Constitution, they cannot again be enslaved.

8. That allegiance from the inhabitant and protection from the

Government are corresponding obligations, dependent upon each other,

so that while the allegiance of every inhabitant of this territory,

without distinction of color or class, is due to the United States,

and cannot in any way be defeated by the action of any pretended

Government, or by any pretence of property or claim to service, the

corresponding obligation of protection is at the same time due by

the United States to every such inhabitant, without distinction of

color or class; and it follows that inhabitants held as slaves,

whose paramount allegiance is due to the United States, may justly

look to the national Government for protection.

9. That the duty directly cast upon Congress by the extinction of

the States is reinforced by the positive prohibition of the

Constitution that “no State shall enter into any Confederation,” or

“without the consent of Congress keep troops or ships-of-war in time

of peace, or enter into any agreement or compact with another

State,” or “grant letters of marque and reprisal,” or “coin money,”

or “emit bills of credit,” or “without the consent of Congress lay

any duties on imports or exports,” all of which have been done by

these pretended Governments, and also by the positive injunction of

the Constitution, addressed to the nation, that “the United States

shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of

government,” and that in pursuance of this duty cast upon Congress,

and further enjoined by the Constitution, Congress will assume

complete jurisdiction of such vacated territory where such

unconstitutional and illegal things have been attempted, and will

proceed to establish therein republican forms of government under

the Constitution; and in the execution of this trust will provide

carefully for the protection of all the inhabitants thereof; for the

security of families, the organization of labor, the encouragement

of industry, and the welfare of society, and will in every way

discharge the duties of a just, merciful and paternal

Government.[286]

Sumner, as already noticed, having confidence in the ultimate triumph of

the national cause, began early in the war to reflect on the subject of

reorganization. As might have been expected from his previous career,

his opinion of the changes that would result from rebellion inclined him

at the outset to adopt the views of the less extreme anti-slavery men.

Notwithstanding this fact, however, his scheme of reconstruction,

because of its radical and comprehensive character, caused something of

a sensation when introduced in the Senate, and disturbed the repose of

many conservative patriots outside. By leading Republicans it was

promptly disavowed as the policy of their party. These resolutions,

though never adopted or even formally discussed by Congress, colored

somewhat the final work of reconstruction. An account of the extent and

the manner in which they influenced the legislative plan belongs

properly to a consideration of the acts of March, 1867. What appeared to

be a public necessity had by that time brought many members of his party

fully abreast of Mr. Sumner.

The interval had been employed in various ways to keep his peculiar

theory before the public. A private letter to Francis Lieber, dated

March 29, 1862, shows that Sumner’s view of the measures essential to

restoration had not been modified by the discussions of a month.

“Assuming,” he says, “that our military success is complete, and that

the rebel armies are scattered, what next? Unless I am mistaken, the

most difficult thing of all,—namely, the reorganization. How shall it be

done,—by what process? What power shall set a-going the old governments?

Will the people coöperate enough to constitute self-government? I have

positive opinions here. If successful in war, we shall have then before

us the alternative: (1) Separation; or (2) subjugation of these States

with emancipation. I do not see any escape. Diplomatists here and abroad

think it will be separation. I think the latter, under my resolutions or

something like.”[287]

By a distinguished Confederate officer Sumner has been described as a

statesman who seemed over-educated, and who had retained without having

digested his learning;[288] by an admirer of his own party as wanting in

tact and practical wisdom as a legislator.[289] Though it must be

admitted that a grain of truth forms the basis of these criticisms, yet

the letter to his friend Dr. Lieber shows no lack of insight into the

events and tendencies of the times. Without anticipating a subsequent

portion of this narrative it may be observed here that if his vision did

not pierce the remote future, his knowledge and experience enabled him

to see as much of coming events as the most gifted of his

contemporaries. Writing a year later, July 21, 1863, to Hon. John

Bright, one of our few friends in England, he remarked that “so great a

revolution cannot come to a close at once.”[290] The defeat of General

Lee at Gettysburg a few weeks earlier suggested the thought that the

destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia would have precipitated on

Congress the entire question of reconstruction, and time was an

essential element in the development of Sumner’s most cherished plans.

Not only in his private correspondence and in the discussion of every

conceivable measure before Congress did he endeavor to enforce his

theory of State status, but he also published in a leading periodical an

elaboration and defence of his opinions. For many reasons the

undelivered speech forming the basis of his article in the _Atlantic

Monthly_ for October, 1863, is of remarkable interest. It reveals the

mental habits of one of the most useful and influential characters then

in public life; the statesman is really thinking aloud. He appears, for

instance, to have been much impressed by the fact that, under the

Commonwealth, Cromwell partitioned his country into military districts

of which Sumner remarked that there were precisely _eleven_, just the

number of States in rebellion. One view is enforced by an appropriate

passage from Cicero, while of Edmund Burke it is asserted that had he

lived during the Civil War his eloquence would have blasted Southern

leaders for their folly and madness in entering upon a career of

rebellion. All who are familiar with the debates of that period must

have observed that Sumner was considerably influenced by the authority

of great names, and in consequence sometimes exposed himself to rebuke

from men who, though in many respects inferior, had studied the

questions of the day in the light of their own times.

It is not intended, however, to trace the origin of the doctrine of

State suicide or even to suggest all the arguments upon which he relied

for its support, the purpose of these remarks being rather to show on

what principles its essential propositions were based. This, it is

believed, cannot be better done than by explaining the resolutions in

his own language.

In the _Atlantic Monthly_ he wrote: “It is sometimes said that the

States themselves committed _suicide_, so that as States they ceased to

exist, leaving their whole jurisdiction open to the occupation of the

United States under the Constitution. This assumption is founded on the

fact that, whatever may be the existing governments in these States,

they are in no respect constitutional, and since the State itself is

known by the government, with which its life is intertwined, it must

cease to exist constitutionally when its government no longer exists

constitutionally.”

He acknowledges the difficulty of defining the entity which we call a

State. “Among us,” says Mr. Sumner, “the term is most known as the

technical name for one of the political societies which compose our

Union.... Nobody has suggested, I presume, that any ‘State’ of our Union

has, through rebellion, ceased to exist as a _civil society_, or even as

a _political community_. It is only as a _State of the Union_, armed

with State rights, or at least as a _local government_, which annually

renews itself, as the snake its skin, that it can be called in question.

But it is vain to challenge for the technical ‘State,’ or for the annual

government, that immortality which belongs to civil society. The one is

an artificial body, the other is a natural body; and while the first,

overwhelmed by insurrection or war, may change or die, the latter can

change or die only with the extinction of the community itself, whatever

may be its name or its form.”

Phillimore is quoted in support of the proposition that a “State,” even

in a broader signification, may lose its life. That author says: “A

state, like an individual, may die,” and, among the various ways in

which this may occur, adds, “by its submission and the donation of

itself to another country.” “But in the case of our Rebel States,”

resumes Mr. Sumner, “there has been a plain submission and donation of

themselves,—_effective, at least, to break the continuity of

government_, if not to destroy that immortality which has been claimed.

Nor can it make any difference, in breaking this continuity, that the

submission and donation, constituting a species of attornment, were to

enemies at home rather than to enemies abroad,—to Jefferson Davis rather

than to Louis Napoleon. The thread is snapped in one case as much as in

the other.

“But a _change of form_ in the actual government may be equally

effective. Cicero speaks of a change so complete as ‘to leave no image

of a state behind.’ But this is precisely what has been done throughout

the whole Rebel region: there is no image of a _constitutional_ State

left behind.”

The first resolution of the series quoted declares “That any vote of

secession or other act by which any State may undertake to put an end to

the supremacy of the Constitution within its territory is inoperative

and void against the Constitution, and when sustained by force it

becomes a practical _abdication_ by the State of all its rights under

the Constitution.” Perhaps Mr. Sumner in the essay failed to strengthen

his original statement of this proposition, which he believed was

“upheld by the historic example of England, at the Revolution of 1688,

when, on the flight of James II. and the abandonment of his kingly

duties, the two Houses of Parliament voted that the monarch, ‘having

violated the fundamental laws, and having withdrawn himself out of the

kingdom, _had abdicated the government_, and that the throne had thereby

become vacant.’” This precedent, which Senator Sumner thought

applicable, was by no means so formidable an argument against the

rebellious States as he chose to regard it. If the term _abdicate_ is

equivalent to a species of informal resignation it did not apply

strictly to the case of James II., for that unfortunate ruler presented

to Englishmen the unusual spectacle of withdrawing from his kingdom

under an escort of Dutch troops. Doubtless he remembered the saying of

his father, who proved the truth of the adage in his own person, that

the distance is short between the prison and the grave of a king. The

expectation of recovering his throne was a motive with James scarcely

less powerful than that of taking precaution for his personal safety.

This intention appears from the unsuccessful campaign in Ireland, which

he had selected as a rallying point. That monarch’s real offence was his

violation of the laws of England. Many of his predecessors, as well as

some of his successors, were as unreasonable and as obstinate as he. The

charge of abdication was scarcely a decent pretext for declaring the

throne vacant, and Mr. Sumner appears to have forgotten for the moment

that the Federal Government is one of limited while Parliament is

clothed with absolute powers. In reality James was coerced by the Prince

of Orange into “withdrawing” from the Kingdom. It is not intended here

to call in question the accepted vindication of the Revolution of 1688,

but merely to show that the Massachusetts statesman was at times not

above supporting an argument by a legal or an historical fiction.

The same resolution continues: “The treason which it [the attempt by

force to terminate the supremacy of the Constitution] involves still

further works an instant _forfeiture_ of all those functions and powers

essential to the continued existence of the State as a body politic.”

On the idea of State forfeiture his reasoning is entitled to more

respect. He argues: “But again it is sometimes said that the States, by

their flagrant treason, have _forfeited_ their rights as States, so as

to be civilly dead. It is a patent and indisputable fact, that this

gigantic treason was inaugurated with all the forms of law known to the

State; that it was carried forward not only by individuals, but also by

States, so far as States can perpetrate treason; that the States

pretended to withdraw bodily in their corporate capacities;—that the

Rebellion, as it showed itself, was _by_ States as well as _in_ States;

that it was by the governments of States as well as by the people of

States; and that, to the common observer, the crime was consummated by

the several corporations as well as by the individuals of whom they were

composed. From this fact, obvious to all, it is argued that, since,

according to Blackstone, ‘a traitor hath abandoned his connection with

society, and hath no longer any right to the advantages which before

belonged to him purely as a member of the community,’ by the same

principle the traitor State is no longer to be regarded as a member of

the Union. But it is not necessary, on the present occasion, to insist

on the application of any such principle to States.”

Discarding as not essential to his defence the theories of State

forfeiture, State abdication, or even State suicide, the article adds:

“It is enough, that, for the time being, and _in the absence of a loyal

government_, they can take no part and perform no function in the Union,

_so that they cannot be recognized by the National Government_. The

reason is plain. There are in these States no local functionaries bound

by constitutional oaths, so that, in fact, there are no constitutional

functionaries; and since the State government is necessarily composed of

such functionaries, there can be no State government. Thus, for

instance, in South Carolina, Pickens and his associates may call

themselves the governor and legislature; and in Virginia, Letcher and

his associates may call themselves governor and legislature; but we

cannot recognize them as such. Therefore to all pretensions in behalf of

State governments in the Rebel States I oppose the simple FACT, that for

the time being no such governments exist. The broad spaces once occupied

by those governments are now abandoned and vacated.”